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2023 CNDI Negative
Federal Jobs Guarantee NEG › AT: Competitiveness Advantage › AT: China – China Can’t Compete

China will never beat the US – Xi prioritizes politics and ideology over economics which denies innovation.

Conerly 22

Bill Conerly; Sep 1, 2022; China Economy Is Weakening; ]

The Chinese economy is faltering. The risk of a real recession looms large, and the most optimistic scenario under current leadership would be slow growth, far slower than in recent decades. China is important to the United States economy. It accounts for about nine percent of all U.S. exports and a much higher share for some western states such as Oregon and Washington. China is also an important trade partner for other countries to which we are closely tied, such as Canada and Japan. More importantly, China supplies American consumers and businesses with many goods at low prices. Sam Walton said that Walmart “helps save people money so they can live better;” China could make the same claim for its U.S. consumers. Supply chains for U.S. manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers use many Chinese products. Signs of Chinese economic weakness dominate recent news reports. Youth unemployment was nearly 20% in July 2022. The purchasing managers index fell in the latest report, Home sales declined 40% from a year ago. GDP rose by just 0.4% over the past four quarters, compared to the national target of 5.5% growth. Is America at risk of the same problems that are weakening China? And if not, how much will we be hurt by their weakness? America has some risk of China’s problems, and a higher probability of mild damage to our economy due simply to their economic decline. China’s greatest problem is their leadership’s heavy handed efforts to control the people, and thus the economy. China’s economic gains began in the late 1970s when Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, liberalized economic regulations. Farmers were allowed to leave collectives, small businesses were tolerated and foreign investment welcomed. In the following decades, China enjoyed the greatest alleviation of poverty in world history. Now Xi Jinping has reasserted government control of many aspects of people’s live, with widespread impacts on the economy. The Zero-Covid policy has locked down major cities and closed ports. Combine this with the jingoist vaccine stance—only Chinese vaccines have been approved—and the country’s low performance in full vaccination of its elderly. Fear of losing face, such as by approving a foreign vaccine that performs better, and hubris about the leaders’ ability to manage complex systems pull down performance across other areas as well. China’s tech sector, led by Jack Ma’s Ant Group, showed the world that online payments can be cheap, easy and widespread. Before the world caught up with China, though, Xi imposed controls that limit its tech sector and will likely prevent further innovation. Increased control of the economy comes as excesses in the housing industry wallop the population. Many people bought apartments before they were built, paying mortgages on properties still under construction. When construction slowed or stopped, the buyers lost pride of ownership. China’s bankruptcy law captures the key features of modern Western practices, but one legal expert reported, “The Chinese bankruptcy law in action often changes from case to case and from time to time without sufficient certainty.” Two political scientists summed up the situation: “Xi’s refusal to allow economic logic to drive policy is a considered strategy in service of political and ideological control. Xi never saw economic growth as an imperative the way his predecessors did, but the challenges posed by Covid-19 and the recent growth slowdown accelerated his abandonment of an economics-first governance strategy. Foreign observers and policymakers should not expect Xi to moderate his autocratic demands on the Chinese economy or society in his third term.” With economic growth secondary to political control, China’s consumers and businesses will suffer, at least relative to where they might have been. China’s problems are not entirely foreign to America. Our leaders sometimes save face to the detriment of the public, and at other times claim greater ability to formulate good policy than is warranted. However, our checks and balances make massive blunders far less likely to continue than in a party dictatorship as China has. Business leaders in the United States worry that weakness in China will harm the U.S. economy, a valid concern given our close ties. The magnitude of trade between the two economies is small enough to calm macroeconomic fears. Last year our exports to China of $151 billion amounted to just two-thirds of one percent of our $23 trillion GDP. Lack of growth in China, or even a severe recession, would have too small an impact to notice in the aggregate, though certain companies would be hurt significantly. Businesses that do a large volume of transactions with China, either as buyers or sellers, should consider how the shift to political control of the economy will impact them separately from the size of the Chinese economy. Already American companies that rely on Chinese suppliers are worrying about supply chain snarls from the Zero Covid policy. The potential for war over Taiwan has increased as Xi made clear that politics and control is more important than the economy. Although most businesses that have been buying Chinese products cannot make a sudden change in all of their suppliers, gradual adjustments are already beginning. These purchase reductions will accentuate China’s economic problems.

2023 CNDI Negative
Federal Jobs Guarantee NEG › AT: Competitiveness Advantage › AT: China – Transition Peaceful

Chinese transition is peaceful

Harris 14 (Peter, contributor to the National Interest and newsletter editor for the International History and Politics section of the American Political Science Association, 2014, “Problems with Power-Transition Theory: Beyond the Vanishing Disparities Thesis”, Asian Security, p. 253-254)//EAW

It should be noted that power-transition theorists tend to argue that rising states will be the ones to initiate hegemonic war with a declining state rather than the other way around. There are actually several assumptions embedded in this claim that a vanishing disparity in power will cause a rising state to initiate war with a declining state. First, Organski assumes that there are distributional consequences to how the international order is organized, which create material incentives for states to compete over its form. Second, because dominant states are presumed to have had a hand in constructing the extant international order, such states always benefit disproportionately from their dealings with others in the international system, receiving “the greatest share of the benefits that flow from the existence of the international order,” and thus have a rational self-interest in maintaining the status quo. Third, Organski assumes that rising states invariably stand to gain from changing the status quo because a new international order would serve them better than the extant one. Fourth, Organski implies that international order can be remade by rising states—that is, world order is sufficiently malleable such that a newly dominant state could have significant influence over its shape if that rising state is able to displace or unseat the established hegemon. Fifth, war against the preexisting hegemon is cost-effective for the rising state or group of states—that is, the benefits of usurping a dominant state via force outweigh the costs of waging hegemonic war. Viewed through the lens that Organski has bequeathed, then, Thucydides’s trap is a lethal contraption indeed. Consider, for example, its application to the contemporary and anticipated rise of China. China is the third largest country in the world by area and the first biggest by population. Its economy has grown rapidly for decades and is forecast to overtake that of the United States at some point during this century. China is already the world’s largest trading nation, its biggest producer of steel, and the second biggest consumer of oil. Its voracious appetite for raw materials spurs economic growth in countries on its periphery and farther afield. Beijing’s economic policy is geared towards the urbanization and industrialization of what has historically been a primarily agrarian society. While its GDP per capita is still quite low relative to other industrialized economies, this only portends the distance that China still has to go and foretells the enormous latent potential that the country still has at its future disposal. In short, China already surpasses the United States on some of Organski’s key measures of national power and is almost certain to eclipse its rival along his other dimensions in due course. What is more, neither the United States nor any other world power seems capable of doing much to halt China’s rise. At some point—namely, the point at which Chinese power comes close to eclipsing that of the United States—Organski’s formulation of power-transition theory would clearly predict that conflict between the United States, China, and their respective allies will ensue. China is destined to want to change the extant world order, which unambiguously is the product of the United States and its liberal, maritime-capitalist, Anglo-Saxon predecessor as world hegemon, the British Empire. The scene is set for a Great Power showdown of epic proportions.

2023 CNDI Negative
Federal Jobs Guarantee NEG › AT: Competitiveness Advantage › Hege Bad- War

Only hegemonic restraint can prevent conflict – its key to alliances

Mallet 21 – is a PhD Candidate at the University of Surrey’s politics department, 2/15/21 (Ellis, “Not Your Grandparents’ Grand Strategy: Rethinking Liberal Hegemony”, U.S. Studies Online, , accessed 6/26/22)//jd 

Liberal internationalism as a grand strategic paradigm has created a resistance to— or perhaps more bluntly, a rejection of—a realist balance of power thinking. As such, the advancement of a liberal international order has led to discrepancies between American power and the resources available to it. The ‘shining city upon a hill’ finds itself increasingly overstretched through its involvement in endless Middle Eastern wars, its self-proclaimed duty to promote democracy abroad, the reality of a resurgent Russia and China, and global democratic relapsing, all in the face of domestic turmoil at home. A strategy of liberal internationalism has resulted in a costly foreign policy approach in which freedom and liberty have become the linchpin of American creed. Rallying against this conventional wisdom, Trump’s ‘America First’ strategy aimed to repudiate some of the core tenets of liberal internationalism and implicitly rejected the United States’ role as ‘world policeman’. His administration confronted American allies as ‘free-riders’, entered negotiations with adversaries without preconditions and showed hostility towards free trade and international cooperation. This is not to say Trump had a coherent or effective foreign policy, or that he completely abandoned the use of military force and steered away from a goal of regime change—quite the opposite—but his condemnation of the narrow Washington consensus provided a unique opportunity for American policy elites to question the underlying logic of its traditional trajectory. Nevertheless, President Joe Biden has committed not only to rebuilding America, but also to “building back better”. While the new administration is likely to pursue a rigorous restoration of American exceptionalism and liberal internationalism, a return to the pre-Trump status quo ante is not likely to improve US foreign policy in a way that is able to effectively address the contemporary challenges it faces today. The prevailing path-dependencies that exist around the forward leaning military posture in which the United States must attempt to tackle tyranny all over the world is one of the biggest problems in American foreign policy. The alliance structures and force postures of the bygone Cold War era are incompatible with emerging shifts in the global balance of power. The Biden administration must steer away from the inclination to conflate global leadership with military force and it must refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of others to its own detriment. America no longer enjoys unfettered unipolar primacy and can therefore no longer rely on business-as-usual policies that are ill-suited to the complexities of the 21st century. It is precisely the preponderant power of the United States that has accelerated the process of its own relative decline whereby excessive military adventurism has resulted in an inability to distinguish between vital national security interests and those things that America can live without. By seeking to restore American primacy, President Biden is likely to miss the opportunity to build a more constructive, less militarised foreign policy that is better suited to the world America finds itself in today. Where America must go from here After four years of Trumpism, if the Biden administration wants to successfully begin the task of self-restoration at home, it should practice restraint abroad. The United States is not in danger of conquest; thus, US territorial integrity is secure. As such, a grand strategy of restraint would force policy elites to rethink its assessment of the national interest based on the reality that presents itself as opposed to being founded upon idealistic ambition. Broadly, restraint seeks to revise existing alliance structures and to encourage responsibility among them in order to shift regional defence burdens away from the United States. It emphasizes the danger of threat inflation, reduces existing US defence commitments and minimizes the forward-deployment of troops along with the frequent use of force. In particular, it would see a reduction of investment in the Middle East and a careful withdrawal of troops; a shifting of defence burdens to allies in Europe as a result of reduced US commitments in the region and an end to NATO expansion; and the maintenance of a stable balance of power in Asia, namely achieved through alliance commitments. Restraint drives home the point that the United States is not here to come to the rescue as has often been assumed—it must rely on regional actors to maintain regional balances of power and intervene only when American national interest is at stake, using military force as a very last resort. The results of such a grand strategy would see global tensions eased, direct threats to American personnel reduced, the burden on US forces in regions of peripheral interest lessened, progress on areas of mutual concern come to fruition, and, perhaps most importantly, it will allow the new administration to more effectively combat the coronavirus pandemic and allow for a degree of economic recovery. Supporters of liberal hegemony wrongly conflate a grand strategy of restraint with isolationist tendencies which is, in part, why it has existed on the margins of an acceptable elite opinion. But restraint in no way advocates that the United States should retrench entirely from the global stage—military power still remains central to US national security—it merely suggests that America has the ability and opportunity to preserve its security at a lesser cost than that of liberal internationalism. Restoring the foreign policy toolkit to focus on creative diplomacy, international institutions and cooperative engagement to deal with collective threats should be coupled with a demilitarisation of US foreign policy. Such a strategy requires a self-control that recognises not everything and anything is in the interest of the United States. Overall, a grand strategy of restraint would reject the need for global hegemony and refute the idea that a safe world is only one that is remade in America’s image 

2023 CNDI Negative
Federal Jobs Guarantee NEG › AT: Competitiveness Advantage › Hege Bad- War

U.S. heg fuels unnecessary conflict by creating tensions with and intimidating other nations

Kelly 19 [6 Aug 2019, Kelly, Robert E., Robert E Kelly is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University., “US foreign policy: restraint without retrenchment”, The Interpreter, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/us-foreign-policy-restraint-without-retrenchment]//AA

US foreign policy since the end of the Cold War has come under growing criticism for its expansive, even aggressive, character. Despite its name, “liberal hegemony” often seems illiberal, belligerent, even militaristic. The US has used force regularly over the last 30 years, often with dubious results. Iraq 2003 is the most obvious example, but Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, and (through its Saudi proxy) Yemen also spring to mind. The current US President Donald Trump has also threatened force against North Korea, Venezuela, and Iran. In response to these excesses, a clutch of realist critics have argued variously for restraint or retrenchment – Barry Posen, Daniel Larison, and Stephen Walt immediately spring to mind. I found this H-Diplo review of Walt’s recent book nicely summarises the issues at hand. The primary argument is that the United States does far too much overseas, especially when it does not need to. The US faces no existential threats. Its geography – its distance from the contentious theatres of Eurasia – is generous. It is the wealthiest country in the world, with an unmatched military. Before the First World War, it restricted itself mostly to the Western hemisphere. Its expansion in the 20th century was driven by threats emanating from Eurasia, first fascism, then communism. Yet since the “end of history” and the dissipation of those threats in 1989, there has been no pull-back. Instead, the US has been ever more sucked into places around the world. This expansion produces unnecessary tension with China, Russia, and the Islamic world. Worse, the US now fights more often than it did during the Cold War. These interventions often take far longer than the public is led to expect. They kill far more people and cost far more money than admitted. At home, a massive national security state has emerged, confirming President Dwight Eisenhower’s famous warning of the “military-industrial complex”. US military interventions have often taken far longer than the public is led to expect (Photo: US Central Command/Flickr) The policy response to this sprawl is some mix of retrenchment and restraint. A US grand strategy of “offshore balancing” would husband American resources at home. Intervention would only occur when facing a genuine hegemonic challenger – most obviously China. But the “small wars” which have characterised US intervention in recent decades would stop, for we now know that they do not stay small. Diplomacy would be properly funded; US foreign policy would be de-militarised. Multilateralism and international organisations would be given a chance where the US today disdains them. From an American point of view, it is hard to argue with a lot of this. The country is pretty clearly exhausted with “forever wars” such as Afghanistan or Iraq. Trump openly ran against “dumb wars” in America’s traditionally hawkish party and still won easily. That is a powerful signal for change from the public. It is also hard to see wars with Iran, Venezeula, or North Korea staying “regional contingencies”, because as with other US ground conflicts, they would almost certainly explode in size and duration. Similarly, it is hard to argue against US allies doing more. US presidents have complained for decades about allied free-, or more accurately cheap-, riding. Trump has unfortunately tarnished this concern with his otherwise reprehensible conduct, but the notion of a more balanced, less hegemonic American alliance network is rather appealing. So restraint – fewer wars, less “omni-directional belligerence”, more diplomacy – is not too controversial. I imagine most US allies would actually like this, too. Many US partners were dismayed at getting chain-ganged into the Iraq war, for example, agreeing to it only to retain US friendship. Similarly, Trump was nearly alone in pushing for war with North Korea in 2017. Donald Trump openly ran against “dumb wars” (Photo: US Central Command/Flickr) It is important to distinguish this restraint from retrenchment though, which I do not think this literature does well. Restraint ultimately means better US judgment – less paranoia, less worst-case-scenario thinking, less willingness to describe every unfriendly government or far-off region as “strategic” to the US, less activism and jumpiness. No one disagrees with greater US perspicacity, except perhaps America’s most irresponsible partners such as the Saudi royals or Israel’s Likud party. Give a child a hammer, and everything is an upraised nail – give a superpower a massive military and global basing, and threats become an easy recourse. Retrenchment is more than this though. It is actual withdrawal of US forces back to the Western hemisphere from forward bases in Eurasia, specifically from Europe, the Persian Gulf, and East Asia. Given China’s rise however, retrenchment would like fall on Europe and the Middle East first. Europe, most observers would agree, has the wealth and state strength to do far more for its own security, while US policing of the Middle East is simply beyond even its superpower reach. Restrainers’ argument for retrenchment is temptation. It is formally possible, as I am arguing, that US forces could stay forward – that is, in Eurasia – without fighting more unnecessary wars. But as long as they are there, as long as there are US forces near countries such as Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela, it will be hugely tempting for US policy-makers to militarily threaten those states. This is akin to the “law of the hammer” – give a child a hammer, and everything is an upraised nail. Give a superpower a massive military and global basing, and threats become an easy recourse. A full-blooded restraint argument would claim greater US foreign policy discipline is possible only when the US is physically out of the way. Ideally though, the US could stay where it was wanted – eastern Europe, Australia, South Korea, Japan – without actually leaping therefrom into wars. The advantages of staying forward are clear. US presence bolsters alliances. It helps solidify liberal democracy in places which might otherwise backslide. It builds democratic solidarity around the world among otherwise disparate states to push back concertedly on authoritarians such as Russia or China. It builds interoperability with local partners should future military needs arise and gives the US a location from which to operate should local geopolitics worsen. Even a small US presence can reinforce positive trends, such as democratisation or the deterrence of Sino-Russian meddling, without, hopefully, being large enough to invoke the law of the hammer. And the financial assistance from allies could offset the cost of US forward stationing. In South Korea and Japan, the US, Japanese, and South Korean governments frequently repeat that is actually cheaper to keep US forces there than bring them home. Allied support, plus the costs to the US to build new facilities back in the US, offsets the expense – although hard data to substantiate these claims is not forthcoming. Eastern Europe is an obvious example. US retrenchment from Europe would almost certainly encourage more Russian meddling from Vladimir Putin and worsen democratic backsliding in those new democracies. Those would be moral and strategic costs to the United States. In response, could the US keep a small local presence that both provides the “reinforcement effects” described above without so much combat power as to encourage unnecessary war-making? Can we have restraint without full-blown retrenchment? Or would even small US presences encourage so much allied free-riding or intervention temptation that they are not worth it? “Places not bases”, in which the US retains “lily pads” for possible operations in the future without large contingents of men and material, are one possibility to square this circle.

2023 CNDI Negative
Federal Jobs Guarantee NEG › AT: Competitiveness Advantage › AT: Hege Solves War

Decline is peaceful and necessary to avoid war

MacDonald 2018 - Associate Professor of Political Science @ Wellesley College Paul K and Joseph M. Parent, Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment, Cornell U Press, p. 179-180

Pessimism is a staple in political discourse, but seldom has there been so much of it surrounding America’s role in the world. We have argued that the prevailing wisdom about the dangers of decline is misleading. Relative decline is common; war and death spirals are not. These facts alone should discourage panic or overreaction. Even beyond war, decline has the opposite effect to that which scholars have posited over an array of measures. Instead of pushing states to belligerence in disputes short of war, decline is one of the most powerful forces pulling states to peace. The case studies have shown that there is a great deal of ruin in nations, but serious reforms have regularly surmounted setbacks and dysfunction. In fact, recovery is a real possibility. States have healthy competitive instincts and decline opens space for institutional overhauls. Rather than being puppets of structural forces, declining powers have room to shape their policies in ways that make them more viable, but less violent. In short, there are good grounds for optimism in decline. Declining powers are not inclined to unleash violence, nor are they tied up by competing bureaucracies, interest groups, or parties. The most frequent response to decline is not belligerence but retrenchment. Great powers align their ends and means to better defend core interests, refi t and refuel institutions, and reallocate resources for more productive investment. Retrenchment does not always lead to recovery, but under a wide variety of conditions it is preferable to the alternatives: expanding out, lashing out, or holding on. If this argument is correct, then the deep and abiding pessimism about the capacity of the United States to manage the rise of new great power rivals is misplaced. Pundits have it backwards: if power politics is returning, those forces are more likely to preserve peace than preclude it.

2023 CNDI Negative
Federal Jobs Guarantee NEG › AT: Competitiveness Advantage › AT: Hegemony- Unsustainable

US hegemony is unsustainable – tensions lead to war in the long-term

Ward 14 [August 22, 2014, Ward, Alex, Alex is a reporter covering the White House, with a focus on foreign policy and national security, as well as a co-host of Vox's "Worldly" podcast. Before joining Vox, Alex was an associate director in the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security where he worked on military issues and US foreign policy. He also wrote the #NatSec2016 newsletter for War on the Rocks where he covered the 2016 presidential election and the candidates' views on national security., “Only US Can Prevent Great Power War”, The Diplomat, ]//AA

As the World War I centennial is celebrated, repressed thoughts of great power war once again begin to surface. With today’s highly “interconnected global economy” underwritten by a liberal order leading to the “rise of the rest,” it appears unlikely that any state would want to disrupt the current system. And yet, the constant stream of somber news reignites fears of a calamitous global catastrophe. In times of international flux, where the worst seems possible, it is important to turn to those who can best interpret these eras. In the case of great power or “hegemonic” wars, there is hardly a greater authority than Robert Gilpin. In his seminal work on the subject, War and Change in World Politics, Gilpin argues that three preconditions must be met for a hegemonic war to occur. First, Gilpin believes that the soon-to-be warring parties must feel there is a “‘closing in’ of space and opportunities.” Second, there must be a general “perception that a fundamental historical change is taking place.” Finally, events around the world start to “escape human control.” Notably, all three of these conditions currently exist in the world. Closing In Europe, where great power conflict took place for centuries, was heavily congested and contested. As powers like Britain, France, Germany and others rose, they fought for influence and geography at the expense of the others’ territory. Due to the close quarters, any desire for expansion on one country’s part would cause concern in the others. Today, some say, the world is different. The two powers that would compete in a war — the United States and China — are separated by a vast ocean, supposedly making it hard for each to antagonize the other. This, however, is not true. The map may show an expansive world, but new technologies — leading to hyperconnectivity and shorter travel times, especially for military equipment — have made the world “claustrophobic.” To wit, when China announced an “Air Defense Identification Zone” the United States quickly deployed two B-52 bombers to challenge its claim. And that was using old equipment. Both China and the United States are developing hypersonic missiles and vehicles. Humanity has already conquered physical space with commercial flight and fast ships. Now, it continues to shrink space even further for potentially decisive advantage. It is also hard to claim that China and the United States are far apart when they regularly bump up against each other as they have in the South China Sea. Perception Since the dawn of “Pax Americana” after World War II, belief in the United States as the undisputed global hegemon remained fairly stable. Until now. According to a recent Pew poll, Americans’ views of the United States as a global power have reached a 40-year low. Indeed, only 17 percent believe that America plays a “more important and powerful role than ten years ago.” Rightly or wrongly, this perception exists. Even though most people still find the United States preferable to China, regional powers can use the widespread belief that America is declining to make their cases for running the system. In fact they are already doing so to a degree. For example, China’s Global Times reports that 47 percent of people believe China has achieved “major power” status. Should both perceptions keep trending in the same direction — the United States is declining while China rises — then the feeling of an historic shift is almost inevitable. Human Control As current events prove, even the great powers cannot stop horrendous things from happening in the world. From Latin America and Africa to Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, chaos and turmoil run rampant. While this is a particularly bad period for international affairs, it is naïve to think this may be an isolated epoch. In fact, there is reason to think the world might grow more unstable in the years ahead. Over the next 11 years, the world can expect another one billion people, reaching a total of around 8 billion by 2030. As technology becomes more powerful, it will do two things. First, it will empower the individual, or a group of individuals, to do great good or great harm. Second, it will allow individuals to be more aware of how the middle class lives. People around the world will demand similar things, causing stress on governments and brewing civil unrest and instability. Thus, as people are further empowered and further angered, the probability that these non-state actors — indeed, normal, everyday people — disrupt international affairs or geopolitics is high. Governments will continue to have less and less control of the citizenry, allowing the regular citizen to do with her newfound power what she wills. In essence, we will see, in a big way, the diffusion of power.

2023 CNDI Negative
Federal Jobs Guarantee NEG › AT: Competitiveness Advantage › AT: Hegemony- Unsustainable

This time is different — executive oscillation, dollar flight, and polarization all make American hegemony unsustainable — it’s due to structural factors that supersede Trump.

Drezner, 19 — Daniel W. Drezner, Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University, is Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. (4-16-2019; "This Time Is Different: Why U.S. Foreign Policy Will Never Recover" Foreign Affairs; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/tgrime-different; //GrRv)

But this time really is different. Just when many of the sources of American power are ebbing, many of the guardrails that have kept U.S. foreign policy on track have been worn down. It is tempting to pin this degradation on Trump and his retrograde foreign policy views, but the erosion predated him by a good long while. Shifts in the way Americans debate and conduct foreign policy will make it much more difficult to right the ship in the near future. Foreign policy discourse was the last preserve of bipartisanship, but political polarization has irradiated that marketplace of ideas. Although future presidents will try to restore the classical version of U.S. foreign policy, in all likelihood, it cannot be revived. This time really is different. The American foundations undergirding the liberal international order are in grave danger, and it is no longer possible to take the pillars of that order for granted. Think of the current moment as a game of Jenga in which multiple pieces have been removed but the tower still stands. As a result, some observers have concluded that the structure remains sturdy. But in fact, it is lacking many important parts and, on closer inspection, is teetering ever so slightly. Like a Jenga tower, the order will continue to stand upright—right until the moment it collapses. Every effort should be made to preserve the liberal international order, but it is also time to start thinking about what might come after its end. The gravity of the problem is dawning on some members of the foreign policy community. Progressives are debating among themselves whether and how they should promote liberal values abroad if they should return to power. Conservatives are agonizing over whether the populist moment represents a permanent shift in the way they should think about U.S. foreign policy. Neither camp is really grappling with the end of equilibrium, however. The question is not what U.S. foreign policy can do after Trump. The question is whether there is any viable grand strategy that can endure past an election cycle. THE GOOD OLD DAYS In foreign policy, failures garner more attention than successes. During the Cold War, the “loss of China,” the rise of the Berlin Wall, the Vietnam War, the energy crisis, and the Iran hostage crisis all overshadowed the persistently effective grand strategy of containment. Only once the Soviet Union broke up peacefully was the United States’ Cold War foreign policy viewed as an overarching success. Since then, the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, along with the 2008 financial crisis and the rise of populism, have dominated the discussion. It is all too easy to conclude that the United States’ recent foreign policy has been an unmitigated disaster. At the same time that all these negative developments were taking place, however, underlying trends were moving in a more U.S.-friendly direction. The number of interstate wars and civil wars was falling dramatically, as was every other metric of international violence. Democracy was spreading, liberating masses of people from tyranny. Globalization was accelerating, slashing extreme poverty. The United States could take a great deal of credit for these gains, because the liberal order it nurtured and expanded had laid the foundations for decades of relative peace and prosperity. Washington made mistakes, of course, such as invading Iraq and forcing countries to remove restrictions on the flow of capital across their borders. As misguided as these errors were, and as much as they alienated allies in the moment, they did not permanently weaken the United States’ position in the world. U.S. soft power suffered in the short term but recovered quickly under the Obama administration. The United States still managed to attract allies, and in the case of the 2011 intervention in Libya, it was NATO allies begging Washington to use force, not vice versa. Today, the United States has more treaty allies than any other country in the world—more, in fact, than any country ever. The United States was able to weather the occasional misstep in large part because its dominance rested on such sturdy foundations. Its geographic blessings are ample: bountiful natural resources, two large oceans to the east and the west, and two valued partners to the north and the south. The country has been so powerful for so long that many of its capabilities seem to be fundamental constants of the universe rather than happenstance. The United States has had the most powerful military in the world since 1945, and its economy, as measured by purchasing power parity, became the biggest around 1870. Few people writing today about international affairs can remember a time when the United States was not the richest and most powerful country. Long-term hegemony only further embedded the United States’ advantage. In constructing the liberal international order, Washington created an array of multilateral institutions, from the UN Security Council to the World Bank, that privileged it and key allies. Having global rules of the game benefits everyone, but the content of those rules benefited the United States in particular. The Internet began as an outgrowth of a U.S. Department of Defense initiative, providing to the United States an outsize role in its governance. American higher education attracts the best of the best from across the world, as do Silicon Valley and Hollywood, adding billions of dollars to the U.S. economy. An immigrant culture has constantly replenished the country’s demographic strength, helping the United States avoid the aging problems that plague parts of Europe and the Pacific Rim. The United States has also benefited greatly from its financial dominance. The U.S. dollar replaced the British pound sterling as the world’s reserve currency 75 years ago, giving the United States the deepest and most liquid capital markets on the globe and enhancing the reach and efficacy of its economic statecraft. In recent decades, Washington’s financial might has only grown. Even though the 2008 financial crisis began in the American housing market, the end result was that the United States became more, rather than less, central to global capital markets. U.S. capital markets proved to be deeper, more liquid, and better regulated than anyone else’s. And even though many economists once lost sleep over the country’s growing budget deficits, that has turned out to be a non-crisis. Many now argue that the U.S. economy has a higher tolerance for public debt than previously thought. Diplomatically, all these endowments ensured that regardless of the issue at hand, the United States was always viewed as a reliable leader. Its dense and enduring network of alliances and partnerships signaled that the commitments Washington made were seen as credible. American hegemony bred resentment in some parts of the globe, but even great-power rivals trusted what the United States said in international negotiations. At the same time as the international system cemented the United States’ structural power, the country’s domestic politics helped preserve a stable foreign policy. A key dynamic was the push and pull between different schools of thought. An equilibrium was maintained—between those who wanted the country to adopt a more interventionist posture and those who wanted to husband national power, between those who preferred multilateral approaches and those who preferred unilateral ones. When one camp overreached, others would seize on the mistake to call for a course correction. Advocates of restraint invoked the excesses of Iraq to push for retrenchment. Supporters of intervention pointed to the implosion of Syria to argue for a more robust posture. Thanks to the separation of powers within the U.S. government, no one foreign policy camp could accrue too much influence. When the Nixon White House pursued a strictly realpolitik approach toward the Soviet Union, Congress forced human rights concerns onto the agenda. When the Obama administration was leery of sanctioning Iran’s central bank, congressional hawks forced it to take more aggressive action. Time and time again, U.S. foreign policy reverted to the mean. Overreaching was eventually followed by restraint. Buck-passing led to leading. The results of these crosscutting pressures were far from perfect, but they ensured that U.S. foreign policy did not deviate too far from the status quo. Past commitments remained credible into the future. For decades, these dynamics, global and domestic, kept crises from becoming cataclysmic. U.S. foreign policy kept swinging back into equilibrium. So what has changed? Today, there is no more equilibrium, and the structural pillars of American power are starting to buckle. THE NEW NORMAL Despite the remarkable consistency of U.S. foreign policy, behind the scenes, some elements of American power were starting to decline. As measured by purchasing power parity, the United States stopped being the largest economy in the world a few years ago. Its command of the global commons has weakened as China’s and Russia’s asymmetric capabilities have improved. The accumulation of “forever wars” and low-intensity conflicts has taxed the United States’ armed forces. Outward consistency also masked the dysfunction that was afflicting the domestic checks on U.S. foreign policy. For starters, public opinion has ceased to act as a real constraint on decision-makers. Paradoxically, the very things that have ensured U.S. national security—geographic isolation and overwhelming power—have also led most Americans to not think about foreign policy, and rationally so. The trend began with the switch to an all-volunteer military, in 1973, which allowed most of the public to stop caring about vital questions of war and peace. The apathy has only grown since the end of the Cold War, and today, poll after poll reveals that Americans rarely, if ever, base their vote on foreign policy considerations. The marketplace of ideas has broken down, too. The barriers to entry for harebrained foreign policy schemes have fallen away as Americans’ trust in experts has eroded. Today, the United States is in the midst of a debate about whether a wall along its southern border should be made of concrete, have see-through slats, or be solar-powered. The ability of experts to kill bad ideas isn’t what it used to be. The cognoscenti might believe that their informed opinions can steady the hands of successive administrations, but they are operating in hostile territory. To be fair, the hostility to foreign policy experts is not without cause. The interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya were massive screwups. Despite what the experts predicted, globalization has not transformed China into a Jeffersonian democracy. The supposedly infallible advice enshrined in the Washington consensus ended up triggering multiple financial crises. Economists and foreign affairs advisers advocated austerity, despite the pain it caused the poor and the middle class, and consistently cried wolf about an increase in interest rates that has yet to come. No wonder both Barack Obama and Trump have taken such pleasure in bashing the Washington establishment. Institutional checks on the president’s foreign policy prerogatives have also deteriorated—primarily because the other branches of government have voluntarily surrendered them. The passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which exacerbated the Great Depression, showed that Congress could not responsibly execute its constitutional responsibilities on trade. With the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, it delegated many of those powers to the president, marking the beginning of a sustained decline in congressional oversight. More recently, political polarization has rendered Congress a dysfunctional, petulant mess, encouraging successive administrations to enhance the powers of the executive branch. Nor has the judicial branch acted as much of an impediment. The Supreme Court has persistently deferred to the president on matters of national security, as it did in 2018 when it ruled in favor of the Trump administration’s travel ban. Foreign policy analysts largely celebrated this concentration of power in the executive branch, and prior to Trump, their logic seemed solid. They pointed to the public’s ignorance of and Congress’ lack of interest in international relations. As political gridlock and polarization took hold, elected Democrats and Republicans viewed foreign policy as merely a plaything for the next election. And so most foreign policy elites viewed the president as the last adult in the room. What they failed to plan for was the election of a president who displays the emotional and intellectual maturity of a toddler. As a candidate, Trump gloried in beating up on foreign policy experts, asserting that he could get better results by relying on his gut. As president, he has governed mostly by tantrum. He has insulted and bullied U.S. allies. He has launched trade wars that have accomplished little beyond hurting the U.S. economy. He has said that he trusts Russian President Vladimir Putin more than his own intelligence briefers. His administration has withdrawn from an array of multilateral agreements and badmouthed the institutions that remain. The repeated attacks on the EU and NATO represent a bigger strategic mistake than the invasion of Iraq. In multiple instances, his handpicked foreign policy advisers have attempted to lock in decisions before the president can sabotage them with an impulsive tweet. Even when his administration has had the germ of a valid idea, Trump has executed the resulting policy shifts in the most ham-handed manner imaginable. Most of these foreign policy moves have been controversial, counterproductive, and perfectly legal. The same steps that empowered the president to create foreign policy have permitted Trump to destroy what his predecessors spent decades preserving. The other branches of government endowed the White House with the foreign policy equivalent of a Ferrari; the current occupant has acted like a child playing with a toy car, convinced that he is operating in a land of make-believe. After Trump, a new president will no doubt try to restore [reasonability] sanity to U.S. foreign policy. Surely, he or she will reverse the travel ban, halt the hostile rhetoric toward long-standing allies, and end the attacks on the world trading system. These patches will miss the deeper problem, however. Political polarization has eroded the notion that presidents need to govern from the center. Trump has eviscerated that idea. The odds are decent that a left-wing populist will replace the current president, and then an archconservative will replace that president. The weak constraints on the executive branch will only make things worse. Congress has evinced little interest in playing a constructive role when it comes to foreign policy. The public is still checked out on world politics. The combination of worn-down guardrails and presidents emerging from the ends of the political spectrum may well whipsaw U.S. foreign policy between “America first” and a new Second International. The very concept of a consistent, durable grand strategy will not be sustainable. The combination of worn-down guardrails and presidents emerging from the ends of the political spectrum may well whipsaw U.S. foreign policy between “America first” and a new Second International. In that event, only the credulous will consider U.S. commitments credible. Alliances will fray, and other countries will find it easier to flout global norms. All the while, the scars of the Trump administration will linger. The vagaries of the current administration have already forced a mass exodus of senior diplomats from the State Department. That human capital will be difficult to replace. For the past two years, the number of international students who have enrolled in U.S. university degree programs has fallen as nativism has grown louder. It will take a while to convince foreigners that this was a temporary spasm. After the Trump administration withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, it forced SWIFT, the private-sector network that facilitates international financial transactions, to comply with unilateral U.S. sanctions against Iran, spurring China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom to create an alternative payment system. That means little right now, but in the long run, both U.S. allies and U.S. rivals will learn to avoid relying on the dollar. Perhaps most important, the Trump administration has unilaterally surrendered the set of ideals that guided U.S. policymakers for decades. It is entirely proper to debate how much the United States should prioritize the promotion of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law across the world. What should be beyond debate, however, is that it is worthwhile to promote those values overseas and enshrine them at home. Trump’s ugly rhetoric makes a mockery of those values. Although a future president might sound better on these issues, both allies and rivals will remember the current moment. The seeds of doubt have been planted, and they will one day sprout. The factors that give the United States an advantage in the international system—deep capital markets, liberal ideas, world-class higher education—have winner-take-all dynamics. Other actors will be reluctant to switch away from the dollar, Wall Street, democracy, and the Ivy League. These sectors can withstand a few hits. Excessive use of financial statecraft, alliances with overseas populists, or prolonged bouts of anti-immigrant hysteria, however, will force even close allies to start thinking about alternatives. The American advantage in these areas will go bankrupt much like Mike Campbell in The Sun Also Rises did: “gradually and then suddenly.” Right now, the United States’ Jenga tower is still standing. Remove a few more blocks, however, and the wobbling will become noticeable to the unaided eye

2023 CNDI Negative
Federal Jobs Guarantee NEG › AT: Competitiveness Advantage › AT: Hegemony- Unsustainable

Hegemony is unsustainable – fiscal and military pressure undermine stability

Suri and Valentino 16 (Jeremi, Mack Brown Distinguished Chair for Leadership in Global Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin, Benjamin, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, 2016, “Sustainable Security: Rethinking American National Security Strategy”, pg. 5-9, )//EAW

Strategic crises are common and they rarely result in enduring shifts of power. The systemic elements of the international system—geography, the allocation of wealth, the mobilization of military capabilities, perceptions of political legitimacy, and routines of behavior—are generally more resilient than the pressures of a particular moment, even a major war. For this reason, American international predominance has continued with remarkable consistency across the last six decades, despite repeated policy miscalculations and misallocations of resources. American strategic leadership has been mediocre, at best, but American strategic predominance has remained largely invulnerable. Many observers expect this trend to continue with the new energy resources emerging from North America, expansion of global markets for commerce, increased demands for political participation across the globe, and rising political-economic turmoil around East Asia and Europe—the only two regions capable of producing a strategic peer to the United States in the foreseeable future. According to this analysis, American predominance will continue even if America fails to adapt its national security strategy to a changing world. This is a comforting and humbling prediction, echoing German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s contemptuous nineteenth century comment that “God has a special providence for fools, drunks, and the United States of America.” Perhaps America’s luck is finally running out. There is reason to believe that the mediocrity of American strategic leadership is now imperiling the country’s inherited strategic advantages. The crises facing the United States today are not new, but they appear to be reaching a historical tipping point because of the accumulated costs of past decisions, the density of current challenges, and, above all, the stagnation of American policy-making. Simply stated, the United States is operating in an incredibly difficult international environment with extensive commitments but limited reserves, and even more limited readiness at home to adjust to these circumstances. These pressures are not transitory, but the consequence of long-term trends that are unlikely to reverse themselves in the near future. The accumulated and current pressures on the United States do not make a strategic tip inevitable, but they make a serious consideration of new policy options and assumptions imperative. That is the motivation for this book. The United States remains a wealthy and dynamic society that can spend more on its security than any of its peers. The United States also continues to support a more powerful military than most of its competitors combined. American military and communications technologies are, in many cases, at least one and often two generations ahead of others. The United States consistently deploys more advanced weapons in larger numbers and with the better-trained operators than our adversaries. That will not change in coming years. American military expenditures are high in absolute terms, but remain at a historically sustainable level of about five percent of gross national product. The trouble is not that the United States spends too little on the military, but that it may have too many commitments both at home and abroad. There are a dizzying number of latent demands on American force across the globe; and while political realities make it unlikely that American military spending will rise dramatically in the foreseeable future, no conceivably sustainable military budget could ensure that all American commitments are simultaneously protected. American ships patrol all the major waterways of the world, American bases constitute what one scholar calls a global “archipelago” of facilities, and American aircraft fly daily missions (manned and unmanned) above virtually all terrain. Basic American military operations are ubiquitous, they are labor intensive, and they are expensive. Within a political climate that demands an “all-volunteer” force, there is little available capacity in the incredibly large American military for multiplying regional conflicts that demand additional personnel and capacities. For all its extraordinary size and skill, the American military can easily become overstretched. It might have reached that point already. In conflicts like those in Iraq and Afghanistan—and now a new war against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, as well as other terrorist groups—US armed forces quickly find themselves spread too thin to accomplish strategic aims. The civilians who direct American policy—including the president, the secretaries of state and defense, and the national security advisor—find themselves in perpetual crisis mode, reacting to new demands rather than thinking systematically about strategic priorities. Another inherited burden on resources is demographic. As Cindy Williams argues, although the United States does not confront population decline (as in Europe and East Asia), the country faces ballooning health and retirement obligations that are crowding out other investments. After a half-century when the United States has fielded the largest peacetime military force in its history, it is now obligated to finance higher economic transfer payments to veterans than ever before. An all-volunteer military compounds these problems because volunteers demand more long-term benefits for retention. These expenses are threatening to break the Pentagon’s budget, just as they are producing exorbitant national debt obligations. The American military, like other major civilian institutions, is asked to address a growing number of current commitments and crises while it must devote a higher proportion of its resources than ever before to personnel who are no longer active. We may be at a tipping point where inherited costs undermine current investments. Defense Secretaries Robert Gates and Leon Panetta both articulated these urgent points, as they called for more restraint in American military commitments and serious reform in health and retirement entitlements. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen made the clearest public statement about these resource challenges. In September 2011, on the eve of another recurring budget battle in Congress, he told a group of business executives that the “biggest threat to our national security is our debt.” Mullen focused on the higher costs for capital equipment and “increases in pay, and especially increases in the cost of health care.” Mullen closed his candid statement with a clear call for greater restraint in American military commitments and more attention to the prudent reallocation of resources: “We must consider the world as it is -- the threats as we see them -- not wishing away the danger nor blowing it out of proportion,” Mullen said. “Pragmatism and practicality must be our watchwords moving forward,” he added, “[and] strategy must become our acumen.” Despite the enormous influence of Gates, Panetta, and Mullen, these figures failed to make serious headway on reform. American policy-makers in the Bush and Obama administrations were more cautious about intervening in foreign conflicts after long frustrating months of combat in Afghanistan and Iraq, but they have not shown any serious willingness to reduce costly inherited commitments around the world. If anything, the “Asian pivot” has created a new obligation to increase the American land, sea, and air presence in Asia, while maintaining military hegemony in the Persian Gulf, Western Europe, and all major waterways around the globe. Civil wars and territorial disputes throughout East and South Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East threaten to suck in further American military forces, based on security guarantees that the United States has inherited, in some cases, from the early years of the Cold War. Resource pressures demand some degree of American retrenchment, but political calculations push policy-makers to avoid all the difficult trade-offs. Without attention to tradeoffs, there can be no coherent strategy. Perversely, the across-the-board sequester budget cuts of 2013 reinforced the resource problem because they exclude reductions to entitlements, they leave inherited obligations in place, and they are accompanied by the increasing demands on American security forces around Syria, North Korea, Libya, Somalia, and other international trouble-spots. The sequester simply asks the American military, and all other government agencies, to do more with less. This is a recipe for even greater overstretch and under-achievement in American foreign policy. This is also a recipe for more strategic blunders like the Iraq War of 2003, where ambitious policy aims were accompanied by clearly insufficient resource commitments. Observing the widening mismatch between ambitions and resources, numerous commentators have focused on the dysfunctional elements of American domestic politics. Neither partisanship nor politicization of foreign policy are new, but the heightened elements of both phenomena press dangerously on current resource vulnerabilities. It looks, at times (especially during the government shutdown and threatened default of October 2013), like a perfect storm. The political posturing of American international dominance is blowing hard against the weakened walls of available American capabilities and domestic support. American military personnel, diplomats, and other officials are now spread so thin that one must question whether they can continue to perform basic functions with the competence citizens expect. High standards of quality usually decline when personnel are asked to do more with less. The natural tendency is to cover-up seemingly small holes in capabilities until they are exposed in disastrous fashion. There is an accompanying urge to silence warnings about potential shortfalls in fulfilling required missions. This has been the experience for other government agencies under similar conditions in the past.

2023 CNDI Negative
Federal Jobs Guarantee NEG › AT: Competitiveness Advantage › A/C Econ Competitiveness

Infrastructure won’t solve - it's an education problem

Alan et al 21 (Alan E. - Department of Homeland Security. David R. - Department of Defense. Matthew Flug - DUAL Commercial. Tino Dinh - Principal, Data Science & Analytics, Ardent Management Consulting. “IMPROVING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS IN THE GLOBAL MARKET.” 2021 Public-Private Analytic Exchange Program.)

Overall decline in quality in America’s public education system may lead to long term economic disadvantage for the US when competing with other countries particularly if the creation, and the protection, of new IP suffers. A decrease in the creation of IP as well as the violation thereof will likely have a deleterious effect in the realm of Green Technology, Advanced Manufacturing, and Information Technology. IP accounts for 38 percent of the US GDP and without the skills and education that lead to the creation of IP, the US will be at an increasing disadvantage globally. In short, lack of education leads to less IP creation meaning less jobs etc.; economies are built on IP. Demand for IP rights has historically tracked with global economic performance. America’s IP- intensive sectors account for nearly 45 million US jobs, is worth an estimated $6.6 trillion dollars and accounts for 38 percent of the total US GDP.96 Furthermore, IP accounts for 52 percent of all US merchandise exports amounting to roughly $842 billion and accounts for more than 40 percent of US economic growth and employment.97 In 2020, China led world in international patent applications followed by the US, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Germany, and seeing a 16 percent increase over 2019 vice the US which saw a 3% increase over the same time period.98 According to an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) study released in March 2019, global trade in counterfeit and pirated goods reached $509 billion in 2016, accounting for 3 percent of the global trade in goods for that year.99 According to the same study, China (combined with Hong Kong) accounted for 63 percent of the world exports of counterfeit goods in 2016 valued at $322 billion.100 Every major new industry to include automobiles, semiconductors, and biotech, among others, was launched based on IP-protected innovation. The recent implementation of mRNA technology that enabled a COVID vaccine to be produced within months of the virus’ discovery is probably one of the most poignant examples. While there has been a recent recognition that small businesses need to better understand IP and the laws that protect it, there has not been a clear approach to bridging the gap in schools; enabling creative design or understanding what IP is or how it is created is critical.101 In the US, kindergarten through 12th grade (K-12) public educational system faces a myriad of internal and external challenges to revamp school curriculums and cultures to help US public schools prepare students to enter a dynamic and globally competitive technological workforce. K-12 school staff and administration (e.g., teachers, principals, and district leaders) are currently faced with real-world decision-making in preparation for the workforce of the future on careers that have not been clearly defined (or in some cases even imagined), let alone identified and created. For example, 10 years ago space tourism was not a realistic sector, but is now a very real likelihood. With burgeoning sectors such as these, identifying the jobs that such an industry requires are both hard to imagine and more importantly begin training students at a young age to be prepared to enter. There is simply no way to know what will be required. Compounding the issue, opinions differ on how important preparing students for the future workforce really is. More than half of the 586 school and district leaders who responded to a December 2019 survey conducted by a leading, independent educational research center noted updating curriculum to get students ready for the jobs of the future is a top priority, yet 39 percent said their districts were paying at least some attention to this issue, while only 10 percent of respondents said that workforce preparation was getting only a “little” focus, and only two of the educators surveyed said their districts weren’t considering the issue at all.102 Despite the varying degree of opinion, the consensus underlying concern for school administrators appears to be that students will not be prepared for gainful employment if changes are not made to the curriculum right now. While preparing students for the future of work is a top priority, according to research conducted by an independent educational research center, there are at least five big challenges that need to be addressed regarding decision-making preparing for the future of work: 1. Differing perspectives on what public schools should focus on: College preparation vs. Workforce preparation 2. Limited Success Models and Limited Resources 3. Standardized Testing Pressure 4. Rapid Pace of Technological Change 5. Creating Meaningful Internships

Many alt causes to economic competitiveness

2023 CNDI Negative
Federal Jobs Guarantee NEG › AT: Competitiveness Advantage › A/C Econ Competitiveness

Infrastructure is just one of many issues at the center of economic competitiveness – aff isn’t enough

Alden and Strauss 16 (Edward Alden is Bernard L. Schwartz senior fellow at the Council on Fore­­­ign Relations (CFR), specializing in U.S. economic competitiveness, trade, and immigration policy. Rebecca Strauss – author. Excerpt from How America Stacks Up. Council on Foreign Relations. Feb 2016. https://www.cfr.org/excerpt-how-america-stacks)

Any discussion of whether the U.S. economy is competitive raises obvious questions. Competitive with whom? And in what? In its first report to President Barack Obama in 2011, the President’s Jobs and Competitiveness Council, which was chaired by General Electric Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Jeffrey Immelt, wrote, “Top global business leaders continually benchmark their operations against the best in the world in order to improve. On competitiveness, the United States should benchmark its performance aswell.” Some high-profile efforts have been made to do just this. The World Economic Forum (WEF), which hosts the annual Davos summit, has developed its Global Competitiveness Index, which ranks countries using an elaborate formula that assesses 123 variables over twelve “pillars” such as a country’s government institutions and its macroeconomic environment, as well as infrastructure, education, and technological sophistication. The good news for the United States is that, after falling as low as seventh behind such countries as Germany, Switzerland, Finland, and Singapore, it rose back to third in the most recent report, behind Switzerland and Singapore. But though the WEF report is valuable in highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of different economies, it has limited utility for policymakers. What was missing was a deeper comparative look at some of the capacities that go into making economies more or less competitive and an assessment of where the United States stands in these areas. To help in developing such benchmarks, the Council on Foreign Relations started a new series of comparative publications called the Renewing America Progress Report and Scorecard series. Each installment took a deep dive into how the United States is measuring up against similar economies across a host of challenges pertinent to a high-functioning economy. The reports sometimes compared the United States with developing economies like China or Brazil, or with smaller economies like Denmark or Finland, but the most relevant comparisons are with other large advanced economies. Where, in other words, does U.S. performance stand alongside similar industrialized economies such as Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Canada? What can the United States learn from these countries, and they from the United States? Many things, of course, go into making a competitive economy, from the quality of its corporate management to the smooth functioning of capital markets. The goal in this initiative was to focus on the role of government in creating the conditions for a more competitive economy. CFR therefore decided to look in detail at eight issues that are at the center of the debate over U.S. economic competitiveness. Education. Human capital is perhaps the most important long-term driver of an economy. Smart workers are more productive and innovative. Yet the United States has fallen behind many other countries in moving its students successfully through school and college, and in particular has seen a huge achievement gap open between children from wealthier families and children from poorer families. Alone among those of other developed nations, the generation entering the U.S. labor force today is no more educated than the one that is retiring. Transportation infrastructure. Roads, bridges, and rail lines are the arteries of an economy, allowing goods to move domestically and to international markets, and allowing people to get to and from work in an efficient manner. The current U.S. road and transportation system is only of average quality compared to those in other advanced economies. And while the United States should be spending more to improve and expand its transportation infrastructure, it barely spends enough to maintain the existing network, even as the population continues to grow. Traffic congestion is now twice as bad as it was in the early 1980s. International trade and investment. The United States depends far more on the global economy than it did two decades ago, and international trade and foreign investment are increasingly vital to U.S. prosperity. Yet on most measures of trade and investment performance—including the growth of exports and its ability to attract foreign investment— the United States remains in the middle of the pack among advanced economies. The good news is that the U.S. trade agenda, including the recent Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement with Japan and ten other Pacific Rim countries, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations with Europe, is the most far-reaching in two decades and could reinforce U.S. competitive advantages. Corporate tax. Corporate tax rates play a big role in encouraging or discouraging companies from investing in the U.S. economy. The U.S. government, however, has not significantly revised its corporate tax rules since the mid-1980s. The result is that, though the United States once had among the lowest corporate tax rates in the industrialized world, it now has the highest. Most advanced countries have been lowering corporate tax rates and changing how they tax foreign profits. Worse, even with the rich world’s highest corporate tax rate, the United States does not raise as much corporate tax revenue as most other rich countries. This is because U.S. tax rules perversely encourage companies to invest offshore and to move profits offshore whenever possible so that taxes payable to the U.S. government can be deferred indefinitely. Worker retraining. The United States has long had one of the world’s most dynamic and flexible job markets, with new jobs being both destroyed and created at a pace few other economies can match. But in the aftermath of the Great Recession, many more workers have faced crippling long-term unemployment. Although unemployment has fallen, the labor force participation is still the lowest in more than three decades. Ineffective worker-assistance policies slow economic recovery, leading to skills shortages for employers and hurting U.S. competitiveness. Many other advanced economies invest more in worker retraining and use more innovative programs to help workers return to the job market. Regulation. Government regulations are increasingly costly for U.S. businesses, and especially for small businesses, even though they do not appear to pose a competitive disadvantage for U.S. companies relative to those based in other advanced economies. The American public is deeply divided over whether businesses face too many regulations, and Republicans and small-business leaders have grown more concerned over the course of the Obama presidency. Yet when asked about specific regulations, such as standards on air quality, fuel efficiency, or workplace safety, most Americans favor the status quo. Compared with some other advanced economies, however, the U.S. government does a poor job of reviewing the stock of existing regulations and altering or eliminating those that no longer make sense. Government debt and deficits. The U.S. government faces unsustainable long-term debt, which has already crowded out investments in education, infrastructure, and scientific research that are needed to maintain U.S. economic competitiveness. And the problem will get worse. In 2000, the United States had less debt in relation to its economic output than most other advanced economies, but by 2015 it had nearly caught up to the average. The good news is that U.S. annual budget deficits have fallen from highs of nearly 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009–2012 as a result of the Great Recession to about 3 percent of GDP currently. But the debt burden will grow rapidly again in about a decade as entitlement spending rises with the aging population. By 2040, the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to reach unprecedented peacetime levels, and the U.S. government has yet to take the steps needed to change that trajectory.

2023 CNDI Negative
Federal Jobs Guarantee NEG › AT: Competitiveness Advantage › A/C Econ Competitiveness

Too many alt causes to economic competitiveness – debt, education, healthcare, political polarization

Porter 12 (Michael E. Porter is the Bishop William Lawrence University Professor at Harvard Business School. “The Looming Challenge to U.S. Competitiveness.” Harvard Business Review. March 2012. https://hbr.org/2012/03/the-looming-challenge-to-us-competitiveness)

This erosion reflects troubling trends in many of the factors that underpin U.S. competitiveness. This set of factors, as identified in the work of Michael Porter, Mercedes Delgado, Christian Ketels, and Scott Stern, includes macro and micro components. From a macro perspective, a competitive nation requires sound monetary and fiscal policies (such as manageable government debt levels), strong human development (good health care and K–12 education systems), and effective political institutions (rule of law and effective law-making bodies). Macro foundations create the potential for long-term productivity, but actual productivity depends on the microeconomic conditions that affect business itself. A competitive nation exhibits a sound business environment (including modern transport and communications infrastructure, high-quality research institutions, streamlined regulation, sophisticated local consumers, and effective capital markets) as well as strong clusters of firms and supporting institutions in particular fields, such as information technology in Silicon Valley and energy in Houston. Competitive nations develop companies that adopt advanced operating and management practices. In a large country like the U.S., many of the most important drivers of competitiveness rest at the regional and local levels, not the national level. Though federal policies surely matter, microeconomic drivers tied to regions—such as roads, universities, pools of talent, and cluster specialization—are crucial. Assessing the U.S. through this lens, we see significant cracks in its economic foundations, with particularly troubling deterioration in macro competitiveness. Problems include levels of government debt not seen since World War II; health care and primary education systems whose results are neither world-class nor reflective of the large sums spent on them; and a polarized and often paralyzed political system (especially at the federal level) that makes decisions only when facing a crisis. In micro competitiveness, eroding skills in the workplace, inadequate physical infrastructure, and rising regulatory complexity increasingly offset traditional strengths such as innovation and entrepreneurship. Our HBS alumni survey provided an original and timely assessment of overall competitiveness and the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. The findings were sobering. (See the chart “Evaluating the U.S. Business Environment,” in the article “Choosing the United States,” HBR March 2012.) Respondents perceived the United States as already weak and in decline with respect to a range of important factors: the complexity of the national tax code, the effectiveness of its political system, basic education, macroeconomic policies, and regulation. Some current American strengths, such as logistics and communications infrastructure and workforce skill levels, were seen as declining. America’s unique strengths in entrepreneurship, higher education, and management quality were intact, but these strengths must overcome growing weaknesses in many other areas. Nearly two-thirds of survey respondents said that the U.S. business environment is falling behind that of emerging economies, while just 8% said that the U.S. is pulling ahead. Overall, the picture that emerges is an American economy that has some crucial strengths but is weakening, with problems especially visible in macro factors.

2023 CNDI Negative
Federal Jobs Guarantee NEG › AT: Competitiveness Advantage › A/C Econ Competitiveness

Infrastructure isn’t key – investments in education, research, and innovation come first

Hughes 21 (Kent Hughes - Public Policy Fellow and Chief Economic and International Trade Advisor in the Office of the Director, CEO and President of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. “The New Economy and U.S. Global Competitiveness.” KAD. March 2021. https://www.kas.de/documents/283221/283270/The+New+Economy+and+US+Global+Competitiveness.pdf/89a84838-1ab7-1310-6977-095ccce95521?version=1.0&t=1615905263752)

Investing in R&D is not new, and it will be an important element in new economy competitiveness. But supporting federal and university laboratories is not enough. The United States needs to look at the path from the laboratory to production for domestic and global markets. In addition to funding research at universities, national laboratories, and research centers, the United States must also support the education of scientists, engineers, and skilled workers. During the early 1980s, the U.S. often led the world in scientific break throughs, but often lagged in terms of turning ideas into competitive products. Students of innovation point to two hurdles that face every innovator. The challenge of moving from idea to product is often referred to as the Valley of Death. Taking the next step and taking production to a competitive scale is referred to as surmounting the Darwinian Sea. A combination of federal, state, and private support will help labs and single inventors to overcome both hurdles. The U.S. has taken some creative steps to foster innovation. Started by the Obama administration, the Manufacturing USA program now has some 16 public private partnerships focused on aspects of advanced manufacturing that range from 3-D printing to regenerative medicine. The Departments of Defense and Energy provide much of the public funding and choose topics that fit their mission. The Department of Commerce also supports manufacturing institutes but chooses candidates from an open competition. In a recent competition focused on pharmaceuticals, the Department of Commerce identified five qualified candidates but could only fund one (ISA, 2020). By way of contrast, when China saw the U.S. developing the manufacturing institutes, it quickly created its own version. China now has 40 or more similar institutes. The Chinese example suggests the U.S. should pay close attention to the innovation initiatives around the world. In the Department of Commerce, the Foreign Commercial Services promotes exports and economic opportunity for American companies and workers overseas. U.S. could match that effort with a Foreign Technology Service that identifies innovations in products, processes, and institutions around the world. After rejoining the Paris Accord, President Biden is expected to set goals for reducing harmful emissions. Meeting any ambitious goals will require research and development coupled with the ability to put green innovations to work. Facing an ever more competitive world, many students of innovation suggest that the U.S. must pick priority areas for research. Basic research can lead to unexpected but promising directions. At the same time, targeted research focusing on what next steps are needed in artificial intelligence or new materials for electronics will yield near-term dividends that help the U.S. maintain a competitive edge. In an era of global companies and competing nations, the United States is likely to create incentives to translate innovations into domestic production and jobs. Like foreign policy, competitiveness policy starts at home. The Biden team can be expected to build on the reality and the sense that gains in productivity are widely shared.

2023 CNDI Negative
Federal Jobs Guarantee NEG › AT: Competitiveness Advantage › US Infra High Now

Non-Unique – Congress passed billions in funds to accelerate infrastructure projects

Inside Infrastructure 23, “US infrastructure spending starts 2023 with a bang”, We Build Value, 2.15, 2023, Isim

The U.S. construction sector has started 2023 on the right foot, sustained by the sudden acceleration of the non-residential segment and particularly by large infrastructure projects. According to many analysts, 2023 should bring sizable increases in investments and the development of long term projects that state administrations had been considering for some time. A Dodge Construction report shows a 27% increase in new starts in December 2022, the first rise since 2017. Much of this leap was due to the start of construction of large projects such as the Golden Triangle Ethylene Cracker plant, worth $8.5 billion in Orange, Texas; AltAir/World Energy’s new $2 billion renewable energy facility in Paramount, California; the Champlain Hudson Power Express power line in New York, a $2.2 billion project; a New Fortress Energy Louisiana LNG terminal in Grand Isle, worth $1.2 billion; and the $535 million solar power plant by Black Diamond in Illinois. The main engine propelling sports infrastructure this year are college stadiums, with $1.7 billion worth of investment, matching 2022’s record. This includes large restructuring projects for Oregon State, Nebraska and Texas A&M. Another boost comes from the $28,5 billion in projects in various stages of development to build stadiums such as the ones for the Tennessee Titans in Nashville, Buffalo Bills in Orchard Park, New York, and the soccer stadium for Miami FC. The restyling of large sports arenas goes hand in hand with the construction of new roads all over the country, and especially in Florida where the sustainable mobility infrastructure sector is particularly active given the huge increase in residents over the last decade. The Sunshine state has surpassed New York to third place with 21 million people, after Texas (28 million) and California (38 million). 2023 began in Florida with new bids for tender, such as the one worth $218 million won by Lane Construction, part of the Webuild group, to increase the capacity and improve the mobility and safety of the intersection between Interstate 4 (I-4) and Sand Lake Road (State Road 482) in Orange County. The route is part of the well known Orlando tourist corridor linking some of the main attractions such as Universal Studios, Sea World and, of course, Disney World. Lane plays an important role in the renewed attention to infrastructure in Florida. It’s projects include the expansion of the I-275 to improve the flow of goods and people in the Tampa area. In Orlando it is working on the ring road of the intersection between the I-4, the SR 417 and the new Wekiva Parkway, while in Osceola it is completing the Poinciana Parkway. Another boost in 2023 for the infrastructure industry came at the end of January from the White House’s Mega Grant (National Infrastructure Project Assistance) assigning $1.2 billion in federal funds to nine projects. “From the Hoover Dam to the Golden Gate Bridge, some infrastructure projects are so large and complex that they defy traditional funding systems—and so significant that they become iconic parts of the American landscape,” said U.S. Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg. “After receiving over one hundred applications, we are proud to fund these nine infrastructure megaprojects across the country to create jobs, strengthen our supply chains, expand our economy, and renew America’s built landscape.” Among the major projects included in the Mega Grant are improvements to the Brent Spence bridge linking Cincinnati, Ohio and Covington, Kentucky, next to which a new bridge will be built, costing $250 million. This corridor over the Ohio river registers a flow of goods worth $400 billion a year and is today one of the worst bottle necks for trucks in the nation. Some $292 million are destined for the Hudson Yards Concrete Casing, Section 3, in New York, which will build the concrete casing of the new Hudson River Tunnel, the much anticipated Gateway rail project that will speed Amtrak trains on the North East corridor, which serves 17% of the U.S. population. The Mega Grant will also pay for the substitution of the I-10 Calcasieu River Bridge, in Parish, Louisiana, costing $150 million, and the Alligator River Bridge between Dare and Tyrell counties in North Carolina, at $110 million. The latter is a movable bridge and a critical getaway during hurricane evacuations. It will be substituted with a modern fixed bridge for cars, bicycles and pedestrians.

2023 CNDI Negative
Federal Jobs Guarantee NEG › AT: Competitiveness Advantage › US Infra High Now

Infrastructure’s revamping – bridge investments spillover.

Sengupta 23 – Rituparna is a career geographer with a strong knowledge domain in the growing global trend of digital smart cities emerging with resilience to face challenges from any front – natural, social, economic or political.; January 5, 2023; FHWA Announces USD 2.1 Billion to Improve US Bridge Infrastructure; ; //[TMS—GK]

The US Department of Transportation’s Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) announced USD 2.1 billion investments to improve US bridge infrastructure on January 4, 2023. “Safe, modern bridges ensure that first responders can get to calls more quickly, shipments reach businesses on time, and drivers can get to where they need to go,” said US Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg at the official announcement of these key infrastructure investments. USD 2.1 billion to improve four nationally significant bridges in US The first round of Large Bridge Project Grants from President Biden’s Bipartisan Infrastructure Law’s competitive Bridge Investment Program has just been announced by FHWA. This is part of the large dedicated investment in highway bridges since the construction of the Interstate highway system in the US. These grants are going to provide significant investments for four projects spread over, five US states. US Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg added in at the official announcement that “the Biden-Harris Administration is proud to award this historic funding to modernize large bridges that are not only pillars of our economy, but also iconic symbols of their states’ past and future.” The strategic value of the bridge infrastructure improvement projects in the country was further highlighted in the official statement by the Deputy Transportation Secretary Polly Trottenberg as she said that these “first Large Bridge grants will improve bridges that serve as vital connections for millions of Americans to jobs, education, health care and medical care and help move goods from our farms and factories.” USD 144 million announced to improve bridges south of Chicago FHWA announced a huge investment of USD 144 million to rejuvenate four important bridges on the southern part of Chicago which cross the Calumet River. This important Illinois’ project is to receive funding from the first round of Large Bridge Grants from President Biden’s Bipartisan Infrastructure Law’s competitive Bridge Investment Program. These bridges are critical part of the area’s economy as they provide a steady route for marine traffic to and from the Illinois International Port and surrounding industry and also provide a reliable connection between the communities on either side of the river. “This grant to improve four bridges over the Calumet River in Illinois demonstrates the transformational investments we are making to support President Biden’s commitment to rebuilding our nation’s infrastructure,” said FHWA Administrator Shailen Bhatt at the official announcement of this bridge infrastructure improvement program. USD 400 million to improve the Golden Gate Bridge in California California’s project to reinvigorate essential structural elements on the Golden Gate Bridge to enhance its resiliency against the region’s vulnerability to earthquakes is now going to receive USD 400 million in the first round of Large Bridge Grants from President Biden’s Bipartisan Infrastructure Law’s competitive Bridge Investment Program. This investment is very important as the Golden Gate Bridge is vital to the region’s economy. An estimated 37 million vehicles cross the bridge per year, including 555,000 freight trucks, as well as waterborne commerce through the Golden Gate Strait connected to the Port of Oakland. It is indeed a vital transportation link allowing for the movement of people and freight along the California Coast. “We are pleased to partner with the Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transportation District and see work get underway to modernize the Golden Gate Bridge, which will have a real impact on the quality of life for thousands of residents and motorists traveling between San Francisco and Marin County who will benefit from these improvements for decades to come” said FHWA Administrator Shailen Bhatt at the announcement of this key investment for this important California infrastructure project. Investments for Kentucky and Connecticut Departments of Transport The Kentucky Transportation Cabinet will receive USD 1.385 billion to restructure the existing Brent Spence Bridge to improve interstate and local traffic flow between the interconnected Kentucky and Ohio communities on either side of the Ohio River. This bridge is known to be the second worst truck bottleneck in the nation and carries more than USD 400 billion in freight per year. Hence its rejuvenation would provide a great boost to the region’s economy. The Connecticut Department of Transportation will receive USD 158 million for improvement measures directed towards the Gold Star Memorial Bridge, which is part of the Interstate 95 corridor over the Thames River between New London and Groton, Connecticut. The bridge reportedly carries 42,600 vehicles per day and is a vital connection on the I-95 corridor for people and goods traveling between New York and New England. Advancing key priorities under the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), also known as the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL), holds the central discussion theme in the US infrastructure community ever since it was signed into law by President Biden in 2021. The law promises a historical sum of USD 1.2 trillion in investments to improve America’s ageing infrastructure. Such a huge amount of investment brings in with it questions, regarding how the trillion plus dollars will be utilized. For instance how to identify the most in need of the investments within the infrastructure sector or which area of spend would be most beneficial— upgrades, maintenance, or repairs? The latest round of Bridge infrastructure innovations announced would further strengthen the key priorities under the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. Overall nearly USD 40 billion investments have been planned over five years that will help repair or rebuild ten of the most economically significant bridges in the country along with thousands of bridges across the nation. Geospatial support for a reliable bridge infrastructure As a nation’s infrastructure ages, comprehensive asset management of roads and bridges grows in importance. Geospatial solutions are important to the review of critical infrastructure that supports safe travel on roads and bridges. Applications of geospatial technology to strengthen infrastructure are continuously advancing. Its value is today felt at all stages of infrastructure management projects from monitoring to actual project implementation and evaluation phases. One of its most important contribution is the provision of accurate real time geospatial data which is essential for the overall health management of such key infrastructure initiatives. This information is liberally used by the US Department of Transport in strengthening its decision support system. Well integrated geospatial technology enables the government authorities to make quicker decisions. In fact geospatial data is a critical component across all levels of the US government, including Federal, State, and local agencies. Over the past few decades, several advanced geospatial tools have emerged that provide comprehensive mapping of infrastructure and topography across different landscapes. Data that is captured by these tools is vital for many aspects of highway and bridge construction. A strong bridge infrastructure is a recognition of a nation’s overall healthy transport infrastructure system. Bridges play a strategic role in connecting people, good and transports. It’s not an exaggeration to say that a bridge’s close down can be a major obstacle for the economic progress of any nation. Hence all efforts to enhance the bridges of a country are very important initiatives indeed. “The Bridge Investment Program reflects President Biden’s commitment to rebuilding our nation’s infrastructure and represents a historic reinvestment in our economy,” said FHWA Administrator Shailen Bhatt at the official announcement made for the bridge infrastructure rebuilding project investments. “These Large Bridge Project Grants are going to projects that are construction ready and will have a real impact for vehicles, transit, pedestrians and bicyclists traveling on America’s roadways who will benefit from these improvements for decades to come” he summarized. The multi-million dollar investments just announced for improving and rebuilding important bridges of the country will certainly wield a great role in providing a catalyst for boosting the economy of the nation interlinked to these infrastructure components.

2023 CNDI Negative
Federal Jobs Guarantee NEG › AT: Competitiveness Advantage › US Infra High Now

Biden’s improving infrastructure now – smart grids are becoming widespread.

USDA 23; United States Department of Agriculture; Biden-Harris Administration Invests $2.7 Billion to Improve and Expand Rural Electric Infrastructure; ; //[TMS—GK]

WASHINGTON, Jan. 30, 2023 – U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Secretary Tom Vilsack today announced the Department is investing $2.7 billion to help 64 electric cooperatives and utilities (PDF, 175 KB) expand and modernize the nation’s rural electric grid and increase grid security. “These critical investments will benefit rural people and businesses in many ways for decades to come,” Vilsack said. “This funding will help rural cooperatives and utilities invest in changes that make our energy more efficient, more reliable, and more affordable. Investing in infrastructure – roads, bridges, broadband and energy – supports good-paying jobs and keeps the United States poised to lead the global economy.” Background: USDA is investing in 64 projects through the Electric Loan Program. This funding will benefit nearly 2 million rural people and businesses in Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin. The loans include $613 million to help rural utilities and cooperatives install and upgrade smart grid technologies. Smart grid can be a catalyst for broadband and other telecommunications services in unserved and underserved rural areas in addition to improving grid security and reliability. Nearly half of the awards will help finance infrastructure improvements in underserved communities. Below are some examples of how the funding will be used: The Northern Virginia Electric Cooperative is receiving a $111 million loan to connect 1,264 consumers and build and improve 404 miles of line. The loan includes $13.4 million for smart grid technologies. Northern Virginia Electric, headquartered in Manassas, serves 176,604 consumers over 7,614 miles of line in six counties. The Carteret-Craven Electric Membership Cooperative in Newport, North Carolina, is receiving a $28 million loan to connect 3,115 consumers and build and improve 132 miles of line. The loan includes $169,437 for smart grid technologies. Carteret-Craven Electric serves 41,655 consumers through 2,493 miles of line in four counties in southeastern North Carolina. Minnesota’s Beltrami Electric Cooperative is receiving a $22.7 million loan to connect 1,480 consumers and build and improve 225 miles of line. The loan includes $1.3 million for smart grid technologies. Beltrami Electric is headquartered in Bemidji, Minnesota. It serves 21,772 consumers in portions of Beltrami, Cass, Clearwater, Hubbard, Itasca and Koochiching counties with 3,500 miles of distribution line covering approximately 3,000 square miles. In the coming months, USDA will announce additional energy infrastructure financing. The Biden-Harris Administration’s Inflation Reduction Act provided more than $12 billion to USDA for loans and grants to expand clean energy, transform rural power production, create jobs and spur economic growth. This funding will help make energy cleaner, more reliable and more affordable. USDA’s Electric Loan Program can help finance wind, solar and natural gas plants, as well as improvements to produce cleaner energy from coal-fired plants. Local utilities also use the loans to invest in infrastructure to deliver affordable power to millions of residential, commercial and agricultural consumers. Under the Biden-Harris Administration, Rural Development provides loans and grants to help expand economic opportunities, create jobs and improve the quality of life for millions of Americans in rural areas. This assistance supports infrastructure improvements; business development; housing; community facilities such as schools, public safety and health care; and high-speed internet access in rural, Tribal and high-poverty areas. For more information, visit .

2023 CNDI Negative
Federal Jobs Guarantee NEG › AT: Competitiveness Advantage › US Infra High Now

Infrastructure investments now – implementation is ongoing

Lucas 23 (Alec Lucas. “Infrastructure Spending Update: Progress Continues as Companies Look to 2023.” Global X. 1/12/23. https://www.globalxetfs.com/infrastructure-spending-update-progress-continues-as-companies-look-to-2023/)

The $550 billion in new spending that the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) directs toward traditional and next-generation infrastructure represents one of the most prodigious infrastructure investments in U.S. history.1 In the first year since passage in November 2021, dispersal of federal grants to the state level was on schedule, with investments translating into progress on projects and even contract wins for engineering and construction firms. Although IIJA funding is already having an impact, many firms contend that the projects announced in 2022 are only a fraction of what is to come. In looking to 2023, we believe that the IIJA’s continued rollout, combined with other recent legislation, may provide more substantial tailwinds across the U.S. infrastructure value chain. Key Takeaways Over $185 billion in IIJA funding is now available at the state level and more than 10,000 projects can be connected to these investments.2 Many IIJA-related projects are in the planning stage, but some preexisting or time-sensitive projects moved forward thanks to federal spending. Management teams for companies throughout the U.S. infrastructure value chain offer guidance that more material benefits from the IIJA, the CHIPs Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) could begin to materialize in 2023. States Welcome Billions of Dollars and Thousands of Planned Projects According to White House data, the three states receiving the greatest share of the $185 billion of announced IIJA funding thus far, California, Texas, and Florida, account for as many as 1,400 projects.3 It is important to note that the project tally provided by the White House does not represent projects that are prepared to begin construction, often referred to as “shovel ready” projects. Most identified projects remain in their planning stages, with several logistical steps remaining before building or renovation can begin. Regardless, these projects are likely to indicate where IIJA-funded construction could eventually occur. IIJA funds flowed quickly to established programs or those dictated by formula. Formula grants are automatically distributed to the state level by statute, making them easier to implement than discretionary funding, which is awarded through a competitive process. An example is the $2.89 billion made available for airport improvement projects for fiscal years 2022 and 2023.4 Funding made its way to these projects because it was delivered through the preexisting Airport Improvement Grant program, which the Federal Aviation Administration oversees. The formula grant is one of the reasons why over 30% of the projects identified by the White House thus far are airport development initiatives.5 Similarly, an outsized portion of the resources available are for road and bridge projects because 97% of the funds announced so far for these initiatives are distributed via formula grants.6 Ultimately, we expect the currently announced funding and projects to represent a small subset of the benefits that the IIJA could unlock. Over the next several years of IIJA implementation, a larger share of funding could target areas such as passenger and freight rail, grid improvement, digital infrastructure, resiliency, and clean water. IIJA-Funded Projects Are Moving Forward Propelled by the IIJA, several high-profile projects advanced to their next stages on schedule, many of which were planned or already under construction before the bill’s passage. The graphic below highlights several of these projects. Overall construction starts on new major projects are expected to accelerate later in the decade. In some cases, the infrastructure bill is directly responsible for the replacement of critical transportation infrastructure. A notable example is the Fern Hollow Bridge in Pittsburgh, which made headlines when it collapsed in January 2022. Officials from the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation were able to secure $23.3 million in IIJA funding to expedite restoration efforts, allowing the bridge to reopen to traffic in December 2022.7 The Biden Administration estimated that without the IIJA, the project could have taken 2–5 years to secure funding and complete construction.8 The Fern Hollow Bridge is far from the only major transportation asset that is receiving IIJA-funded upgrades. To date, IIJA funding has been involved in launching over 2,800 bridge repair and replacement projects across the country, according to the White House.9 In the first year of the IIJA rollout, there were fewer project updates for next generation spending areas such as grid improvements and digital infrastructure. This is partially because funding for these initiatives will be delivered primarily through competitive grants or by programs that originated with the bill.

2023 CNDI Negative
Federal Jobs Guarantee NEG › AT: Inequality Adv › AT: Slow Growth Impact

‘Slow growth’ is inevitable AND is proof of a strong economy.

Dietrich Vollrath 20, Professor of economics at the University of Houston, "Slow economic growth is a sign of success," USAPP, 02/22/2020, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2020/02/22/slow-economic-growth-is-a-sign-of-success/.

We’re accustomed to looking at the growth rate of GDP to evaluate the health of our economy. Which is why the recent slowdown in growth appears so troubling. In the US, GDP growth for 2019 was 2.3%, meaning it has been nineteen years since growth hit 4%, and nearly as long since it touched 3%. For the UK the story is similar, as it has been fifteen years since growth hit 3%. In the Eurozone as a whole, growth last came close to 4% in 2000. These slowdowns across developed economies predates the financial crisis, and leads to natural questions: what went wrong with the economy, and how do we fix it? But the slowdown we’re observing isn’t something we can fix – or that we would want to fix – because the slowdown was never a consequence of things that went wrong. Instead, as I show my new book, the slowdown is a consequence of things that went right. From a simple accounting perspective, there are two main factors behind slower growth: the fall in fertility during the 20th century, and the shift of our expenditures away from goods and towards services. And both of those explanations can be traced back to economic success. The fall in fertility had a significant impact on economic growth for decades, particularly in the US. The baby boom generated a one-time wave of human capital that hit the economy during the middle of the 20th century. As those new workers hit the workforce, the proportion of workers to population rose substantially, as evidenced by the fall in the youth dependency ratio between 1960 and 1980 (see Figure 1). Combined with the relatively high educational attainment of the baby boomers compared to prior generations, this provided a substantial boost to the growth rate, increasing it around 1.25 percentage points in 1990 compared to immediately after World War II. As that wave of human capital receded, so did the growth rate. Starting in the early 2000s, the old age dependency ratio started to rise (see Figure 1) the inevitable consequence of the drop in youth dependency back in the 1960s and 1970s. As workers aged out of the workforce – and continue to do so – this dragged down the growth rate of the aggregate economy. That 1.25 percentage point boost during the 20th century disappeared in the 21st, explaining most of the slowdown in the US. But why should we see these demographic shifts as a success? The drop in fertility after the baby boom which explains the shifts was driven by several successes. Expanded access to college education pushed back the age at which people were willing to marry. The opening up of many professions to women, along with growth in overall wages, meant that it made sense for many women to delay marriage. Finally, advances in contraceptive technology meant it was possible for women to take advantage of the new educational and professional opportunities that arose. The growth slowdown today is a consequence of family decisions made decades ago in response to rising living standards and the expansion of women’s rights. The second source of the slowdown, the shift from goods towards services, was also driven by success. In the past one hundred years we became incredibly efficient at producing goods like clothes, food, furniture, and computers. The consequence was a steady reduction in the price of those goods relative to services. We could have used that reduction to buy even more goods than we did, but instead we took advantage of the savings to purchase more services like education, healthcare, and travel. Therefore the composition of our expenditures shifted away from goods and towards services (see Figure 2). We still consume more goods than before; it is just that they got so cheap that their share of our total expenditure fell relative to services. This had a consequence for overall economic growth, however. Productivity growth in services is lower than for goods. That wasn’t a failure of services in the last few years. It appears to be an inherent quality noted by economist William Baumol in the 1960s. If a restaurant — a service — tried to operate with half their normal staff, you’d complain about the slow service and lack of attention. In comparison, if a manufacturer produced a laptop – a good – with half as much labour, you’d never know. This makes productivity growth harder for services than for goods. As we shifted expenditures towards services, aggregate productivity growth was thus bound to fall. Between the middle of the 20th century and today, that probably shaved another 0.2 to 0.25 percentage points off of the growth rate. But note that this only happened because of the productivity growth we experienced in the first place, a success. Relative to the successes in the demographic shifts and spending shifts, the usual suspects are not capable of explaining the growth slowdown. Tax rates fell right as the slowdown started, and evidence from across states and industries shows that, if anything, more regulation was associated with faster growth, not slower. Trade with China exploded in the last twenty years, but evidence suggests that this had little effect on growth for the economy as a whole, even though individual regions and industries saw booms or busts. Economy-wide measures of the mark-up of price over cost rose, but it turns out that this didn’t lower growth. The shift of activity to high mark-up industries kept economic growth rates from falling even further than they did, as it meant we produced more valuable products. If you’re still uncertain that the growth slowdown is a consequence of success, ask yourself what you’d give up to bring growth back to 4%. We could destroy half of all our goods: cars, couches, TVs, laptops, houses, trampolines, and so on. That would lead to a massive shift of spending towards goods as we scrambled to replace everything, and we’d see a jump in productivity growth. Alternatively, we could roll back contraceptive rights and women’s participation in the workforce in the hopes of starting a new baby boom. Wait twenty years and we’d have another surge of human capital into the economy. Would either of those be worth it just to see growth hit 4% again, perhaps not until 2040? Assuming the answer is “no”, that tells us the growth slowdown happened because of things that went right, things we would not sacrifice.

2023 CNDI Negative
Federal Jobs Guarantee NEG › AT: Inequality Adv › AT: Slow Growth Impact

No impact to slow growth.

Fettweis 17 – Dr. Christopher J. Fettweis, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, PhD in Government and Politics from the University of Maryland, “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace”, Security Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3, p. 434-442 [language modified]

Others are more skeptical of institutions’ potential to shape behavior, and believe instead that stability is dependent upon the active application of the hegemon’s military power.51 The second version of the hegemonic-stability explanation is based upon a different view of human nature than is the liberal, one less sanguine about the potential for voluntary cooperation. Actors respond to concrete incentives, according to this outlook, and will ignore rules or law if transgressions are not punished. The would-be hegemon must enforce stability, therefore, not merely establish it. Policing metaphors are common in this literature, with the United States playing the role of sheriff or globocop charged with keeping the peace.52 [FOOTNOTE] 52 Richard N. Haass, The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after the Cold War (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1997); Colin S. Gray, The Sheriff: America's Defense of the New World Order (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004). View all notes [END FOOTNOTE] Take away the police, or damage their credibility, and instability would soon return. “The present world order,” according to Robert Kagan, “is as fragile as it is unique,” and would collapse without sustained US efforts.53 “In many instances,” add Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol, “all that stands between civility and genocide, order and mayhem, is American power.”54 Though this argument is commonly associated with neoconservatism55—and will be referred to as the neoconservative explanation from here on in—it is also accepted by a number of scholars and observers generally considered outside of that ideological approach.56 The two versions are united on this point: it is not unipolarity in general that accounts for the New Peace, but American unipolarity in particular. US hegemony is essentially benevolent, according to both liberals and neoconservatives. The United States has constructed an order that takes the interests of other states into account, which decreases revisionist impulses. At the very least, it is nonthreatening, and does not generate the kind of balancing behavior that might be expected to bring it to an end.57 In the liberal version, the order constructed by the United States is beneficial to all its members, who have a stake in its maintenance. Adherents of the more muscular version, whether neoconservative or not, assume that the default position of smaller states in a unipolar system is to bandwagon with the center.58 No one seems to suggest that there is an irenic structural logic of unipolarity independent of US behavior. The question is therefore not so much about the connection between unipolarity and the New Peace as much as it is whether US behavior, in one form or another, has brought it about. Hegemonic stability is in some ways more theoretically elegant than the other possible explanations for the New Peace. For one thing, it does not suffer from questions regarding its causal direction. While it may be reasonable to suggest that peace produced the expansion of democracy and/or economic development rather than the other way around, peace did not produce unipolarity. In fact, if the United States is indeed supplying the global public good of security, it might be able to take credit for a number of these positive trends. Not just peace but democracy, economic stability, and development all might be beneficial side effects of unipolarity. 59 “A world without U.S. primacy,” argued Samuel P. Huntington, “would be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth.”60 There is a great deal at stake here, for both scholarship and practice. If hegemony is responsible for the New Peace, then its peaceful trends are unlikely to last much beyond the unipolar moment. The other proposed explanations described above are essentially irreversible: nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented, and no defense against their use is ever going to be completely foolproof; the pace of globalization and economic interdependence shows no sign of slowing; democracy seems to be firmly embedded in the cultural fabric of many of the places it currently exists, and may well be in the process of spreading to the few places where it does not. The UN, while oft criticized, shows no signs of disappearing. And finally, history contains precious few examples of the return of institutions deemed by society to be outmoded, barbaric, and/or futile.61 In other words, liberal normative evolution is typically unidirectional. Few would argue, for instance, that either slavery or dueling is likely to reappear in this century; illiberal normative recidivism is exceptionally rare.62 If the neoconservatives are correct and US hard power is primarily responsible for the New Peace, however, then it cannot be expected to last long after US hegemonic decline, or adjustment in its grand strategy toward retrenchment. If liberal internationalists are right and the New Peace is largely a product of the world order that the United States has forged, then it may have a bit more staying power beyond unipolarity, but not necessarily much. Determining the relationship between hegemony and the New Peace has importance that goes beyond the academy. Whether or not decline is on the immediate horizon, unipolarity is unlikely to last forever. If the New Peace is essentially an American creation, that post-unipolar future is likely to be quite a bit more violent than the present. Evidence for and against Pax Americana Since the world had never experienced system-wide unipolarity prior to the end of the Cold War, judgments about its relative stability and likely duration are necessarily speculative.63 Extrapolations can be made from regional unipolar systems, like the Roman Mediterranean, but definitive system-wide statements cannot be made from one case. Still, if US power were primarily responsible for the New Peace, one would expect that it would leave some clues about its effects. This section reviews three kinds of evidence regarding Pax Americana in order to determine whether an empirical relationship can be said to exist between various kinds of US activity and global stability. Conflict and Hegemony by Region Even the most ardent supporters of the hegemonic-stability explanation do not contend that US influence extends equally to all corners of the globe. The United States has concentrated its policing in what George Kennan used to call “strong points,” or the most important parts of the world: Western Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Persian Gulf.64 By doing so, Washington may well have contributed more to great power peace than the overall global decline in warfare. If the former phenomenon contributed to the latter, by essentially providing a behavioral model for weaker states to emulate, then perhaps this lends some support to the hegemonic- stability case.65 During the Cold War, the United States played referee to a few intra-West squabbles, especially between Greece and Turkey, and provided Hobbesian reassurance to Germany’s nervous neighbors. Other, equally plausible explanations exist for stability in the first world, including the presence of a common enemy, democracy, economic interdependence, general war aversion, etc. The looming presence of the leviathan is certainly among these plausible explanations, but only inside the US sphere of influence. Bipolarity was bad for the nonaligned world, where Soviet and Western intervention routinely exacerbated local conflicts. Unipolarity has generally been much better, but whether or not this was due to US action is again unclear. Overall US interest in the affairs of the Global South has dropped markedly since the end of the Cold War, as has the level of violence in almost all regions. There is less US intervention in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in the twentieth century, for instance, and also less conflict. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as is relative US interest outside of counterterrorism and security assistance.66 Regional peace and stability exist where there is US active intervention, as well as where there is not. No direct relationship seems to exist across regions. If intervention can be considered a function of direct and indirect activity, of both political and military action, a regional picture might look like what is outlined in Table 1. These assessments of conflict are by necessity relative, because there has not been a “high” level of conflict in any region outside the Middle East during the period of the New Peace. Putting aside for the moment that important caveat, some points become clear. The great powers of the world are clustered in the upper right quadrant, where US intervention has been high, but conflict levels low. US intervention is imperfectly correlated with stability, however. Indeed, it is conceivable that the relatively high level of US interest and activity has made the security situation in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East worse. In recent years, substantial hard power investments (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), moderate intervention (Libya), and reliance on diplomacy (Syria) have been equally ineffective in stabilizing states torn by conflict. While it is possible that the region is essentially unpacifiable and no amount of police work would bring peace to its people, it remains hard to make the case that the US presence has improved matters. In this “strong point,” at least, US hegemony has failed to bring peace. In much of the rest of the world, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Washington’s intervention choices have at best been erratic; Libya and Kosovo brought about action, but much more blood flowed uninterrupted in Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, Sri Lanka, and Syria. The US record of peacemaking is not exactly a long uninterrupted string of successes. During the turn-of-the-century conventional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a highlevel US delegation containing former and future National Security Advisors (Anthony Lake and Susan Rice) made a half-dozen trips to the region, but was unable to prevent either the outbreak or recurrence of the conflict. Lake and his team shuttled back and forth between the capitals with some frequency, and President Clinton made repeated phone calls to the leaders of the respective countries, offering to hold peace talks in the United States, all to no avail.67 The war ended in late 2000 when Ethiopia essentially won, and it controls the disputed territory to this day. The Horn of Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious US involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably affecting their calculations. Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is minimal. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. It seems hard to make the case that the relative peace that has descended on so many regions is primarily due to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconservative leviathan, or its lighter, more liberal cousin. Something else appears to be at work. Conflict and US Military Spending How does one measure polarity? Power is traditionally considered to be some combination of military and economic strength, but despite scores of efforts, no widely accepted formula exists. Perhaps overall military spending might be thought of as a proxy for hard power capabilities; perhaps too the amount of money the United States devotes to hard power is a reflection of the strength of the unipole. When compared to conflict levels, however, there is no obvious correlation, and certainly not the kind of negative relationship between US spending and conflict that many hegemonic stability theorists would expect to see. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on defense by about 25 percent, spending $100 billion less in real terms in 1998 that it did in 1990.68 To those believers in the neoconservative version of hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace,” argued Kristol and Kagan at the time.69 The world grew dramatically more peaceful while the United States cut its forces, however, and stayed just as peaceful while spending rebounded after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the military budget was cut under President Clinton, in other words, and kept declining (though more slowly, since levels were already low) as the Bush administration ramped it back up. Overall US military spending has varied during the period of the New Peace from a low in constant dollars of less than $400 billion to a high of more than $700 billion, but war does not seem to have noticed. The same nonrelationship exists between other potential proxy measurements for hegemony and conflict: there does not seem to be much connection between warfare and fluctuations in US GDP, alliance commitments, and forward military presence. There was very little fighting in Europe when there were 300,000 US troops stationed there, for example, and that has not changed as the number of Americans dwindled by 90 percent. Overall, there does not seem to be much correlation between US actions and systemic stability. Nothing the United States actually does seems to matter to the New Peace. It is possible that absolute military spending might not be as important to explain the phenomenon as relative. Although Washington cut back on spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. The United States has accounted for between 35 and 41 percent of global military spending every year since the collapse of the Soviet Union.70 The perception of relative US power might be the decisive factor in decisions made in other capitals. One cannot rule out the possibility that it is the perception of US power—and its willingness to use it—that keeps the peace. In other words, perhaps it is the grand strategy of the United States, rather than its absolute capability, that is decisive in maintaining stability. It is that to which we now turn. Conflict and US Grand Strategy The perception of US power, and the strength of its hegemony, is to some degree a function of grand strategy. If indeed US strategic choices are responsible for the New Peace, then variation in those choices ought to have consequences for the level of international conflict. A restrained United States is much less likely to play the role of sheriff than one following a more activist approach. Were the unipole to follow such a path, hegemonic-stability theorists warn, disaster would follow. Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski spoke for many when he warned that “outright chaos” could be expected to follow a loss of hegemony, including a string of quite specific issues, including new or renewed attempts to build regional empires (by China, Turkey, Russia, and Brazil) and the collapse of the US relationship with Mexico, as emboldened nationalists south of the border reassert 150-year-old territorial claims. Overall, without US dominance, today’s relatively peaceful world would turn “violent and bloodthirsty.”71 Niall Ferguson foresees a post-hegemonic “Dark Age” in which “plunderers and pirates” target the big coastal cities like New York and Rotterdam, terrorists attack cruise liners and aircraft carriers alike, and the “wretchedly poor citizens” of Latin America are unable to resist the Protestantism brought to them by US evangelicals. Following the multiple (regional, fortunately) nuclear wars and plagues, the few remaining airlines would be forced to suspend service to all but the very richest cities.72 These are somewhat extreme versions of a central assumption of all hegemonic-stability theorists: a restrained United States would be accompanied by utter disaster. The “present danger” of which Kristol, Kagan, and their fellow travelers warn is that the United States “will shrink its responsibilities and—in a fit of absentmindedness, or parsimony, or indifference— allow the international order that it created and sustains to collapse.”73 Liberals fear restraint as well, and also warn that a militarized version of primacy would be counterproductive in the long run. Although they believe that the rule-based order established by United States is more durable than the relatively fragile order discussed by the neoconservatives, liberals argue that Washington can undermine its creation over time through thoughtless unilateral actions that violate those rules. Many predicted that the invasion of Iraq and its general contempt for international institutions and law would call the legitimacy of the order into question. G. John Ikenberry worried that Bush’s “geostrategic wrecking ball” would lead to a more hostile, divided, and dangerous world.74 Thus while all hegemonicstability theorists expect a rise of chaos during a restrained presidency, liberals also have grave concerns regarding primacy. Overall, if either version is correct and global stability is provided by US hegemony, then maintaining that stability through a grand strategy based on either primacy (to neoconservatives) or “deep engagement” (to liberals) is clearly a wise choice.75 If, however, US actions are only tangentially related to the outbreak of the New Peace, or if any of the other proposed explanations are decisive, then the United States can retrench without fear of negative consequences. The grand strategy of the United States is therefore crucial to beliefs in hegemonic stability. Although few observers would agree on the details, most would probably acknowledge that post-Cold War grand strategies of American presidents have differed in some important ways. The four administrations are reasonable representations of the four ideal types outlined by Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross in 1996.76 Under George H. W. Bush, the United States followed the path of “selective engagement,” which is sometimes referred to as “balance-of-power realism”; Bill Clinton’s grand strategy looks a great deal like what Posen and Ross call “cooperative security,” and others call “liberal internationalism”; George W. Bush, especially in his first term, forged a strategy that was as close to “primacy” as any president is likely to get; and Barack Obama, despite some early flirtation with liberalism, has followed a restrained realist path, which Posen and Ross label “neo-isolationism” but its proponents refer to as “strategic restraint.”77 In no case did the various anticipated disorders materialize. As Table 2 demonstrates, armed conflict levels fell steadily, irrespective of the grand strategic path Washington chose. Neither the primacy of George W. Bush nor the restraint of Barack Obama had much effect on the level of global violence. Despite continued warnings (and the high-profile mess in Syria), the world has not experienced an increase in violence while the United States chose uninvolvement. If the grand strategy of the United States is responsible for the New Peace, it is leaving no trace in the evidence. Perhaps we should not expect a correlation to show up in this kind of analysis. While US behavior might have varied in the margins during this period, nether its relative advantage over its nearest rivals nor its commitments waivered in any important way. However, it is surely worth noting that if trends opposite to those discussed in the previous two sections had unfolded, if other states had reacted differently to fluctuations in either US military spending or grand strategy, then surely hegemonic stability theorists would argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. Many liberals were on the lookout for chaos while George W. Bush was in the White House, just as neoconservatives have been quick to identify apparent worldwide catastrophe under President Obama.78 If increases in violence would have been evidence for the wisdom of hegemonic strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the relationship between US power and international stability suggests that the two are unrelated. The rest of the world appears quite capable and willing to operate effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise have precious little empirical support upon which to build their case. Hegemonic stability is a belief, in other words, rather than an established fact, and as such deserves a different kind of examination.

2023 CNDI Negative
Federal Jobs Guarantee NEG › AT: Inequality Adv › AT: Slow Growth Impact

US growth and innovation decline is inevitable—immigration decline, university budget cuts, and housing crisis.

Watney 20—(resident fellow of technology and innovation at the R Street Institute). Caleb Watney. July 19, 2020. “America’s Innovation Engine Is Slowing”. The Atlantic. . Accessed 8/17/21.

The visa debacle was only the latest of many ominous signs for the United States, long the world’s primary incubator of new technologies, new drugs, new therapies, and new business models. The coronavirus pandemic and the administration’s botched response to it are damaging the engine of American innovation in three major ways: The flow of talented people from overseas is slowing; the university hubs that produce basic research and development are in financial turmoil; and the circulation of people and ideas in high-productivity industrial clusters, such as Silicon Valley, has been impeded. All three trends started before the coronavirus arrived, but the pandemic has accelerated them in ways that, if left unaddressed, could cripple [destroy] the U.S. economy for decades. During the difficult economic recovery from COVID-19, closed businesses will be able to reopen and rehire their furloughed workers, and delayed investments will resume. But if the nation’s capacity for economic and technological innovation is diminished, Americans will feel the loss for decades to come—not just in lower GDP but in slower progress toward a vaccine for COVID-19, solutions to climate change, a cure for cancer, and more. Over the past century, the U.S. has consistently attracted the world’s most inquiring minds and skilled workers, despite an immigration system that is in no way optimized for that purpose. More than half of American startups that became companies valued at $1 billion or more—a category that includes Google, Tesla, Stripe, and Uber—count immigrants among their founders and top executives. By some estimates, immigrants account for a quarter of U.S. invention and entrepreneurship. A large number of immigrants with technical expertise come to the United States through the university system. According to research by the National Foundation for American Policy, citizens of other countries make up huge majorities of the graduate students at U.S. universities in such fields as electrical engineering (81 percent), computer science (79 percent), and industrial engineering (75 percent). These students go on to work for artificial-intelligence companies, logistics firms, biotech labs—or start their own. When given the opportunity, they prefer to stay in the United States. More than 80 percent of international doctoral students in artificial intelligence, for example, remain in the country after graduation, according to a December report from the Center for Security and Emerging Technology. The Harvard Business School economist William R. Kerr has argued that the U.S. has benefited enormously from the international flow of talent. From 2000 to 2010, more immigrant inventors migrated to the United States than to all other countries combined. But the number of international students is expected to plunge as the pandemic makes overseas travel difficult—and as rising case counts in the United States scare off visitors from other countries. Inside Higher Ed recently reported that the University of Arizona, for example, expects an 80 percent decline in the number of new international students. And this was before the Trump administration announced a moratorium on a number of work-visa categories that many of these students count on when they make plans to study in the U.S. The drop in international students may not be temporary. Students make plans years ahead of time, and once they decide to stay home or migrate to someplace more welcoming, the United States will likely lose out on their talents for good. This dynamic can compound over time; highly skilled people are most attracted to regions with many other highly skilled people. While the United States has raised barriers to skilled migration, countries such as Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom have been tearing theirs down. Until now, the U.S. maintained its reputation as the global epicenter for talented scientists and technical practitioners through sheer inertia. The pandemic, which the United States has managed far worse than other countries, could lead students and other immigrants to conclude that their best opportunity lies elsewhere. If they stop coming, that will mean fewer start-ups, fewer tech workers, fewer scientists, and ultimately fewer jobs. As the influx of talented people from overseas slows, university bottom lines will suffer. In the past decade, international students, who typically pay full tuition, have become a major revenue source. In 2015, a financial-services firm estimated that international students, who made up 12 percent of students enrolled at public universities, were providing about 28 percent of total tuition revenue. Public-university budgets were devastated after the Great Recession depleted state coffers. According to the State Higher Education Executive Officers Association, state support for public universities was still $1,000 less per student in real dollars in 2018 than in 2008. The looming state budget cuts from the coronavirus recession will only make matters worse, and the many colleges and universities, public and private, that stayed afloat over the past decade by vigorously recruiting international students no longer have that option. Without further support, American colleges and universities face significant faculty and research budget cuts. The potential for disinvestment is greatest in the science and engineering departments, which rely most heavily on international students. These developments jeopardize the role that universities play in promoting innovation. They not only attract and train talented students; they also produce fundamental research that becomes the basis for future technological progress. They serve as focal points for commercialization through their individual patenting offices, and as collaborators for experimental product development with industry; they also help codify knowledge through journal publications. As even the richest universities cut costs and less wealthy ones ponder whether they can survive, the net effect will be less scientific research in a shrinking academic ecosystem. Governments in other countries understand the urgency of heading off such outcomes. The United Kingdom plans to provide emergency loans to its universities to cover 80 percent of their losses from the drop-off in international students, but the United States has made no such move. Indeed, by threatening student visas, immigration officials were poised to deepen schools’ financial woes. Also essential to innovation in the U.S. are the high-productivity metropolitan regions, such as Silicon Valley, New York, Boston, Seattle, and Austin, Texas, where knowledge-based clusters have sprouted up, typically around universities. Engineers, academics, investors, designers, computer scientists, and supply-chain managers mingle across firms, share ideas, have serendipitous run-ins, and push one another in a way that makes the entire group more productive and creative than individuals would be in isolation. “The ten most innovative cities in the United States,” a recent research paper points out, “account for 23 percent of the national population, but for 48 percent of its patents and 33 percent of its gross domestic product.” The paper goes on to argue that complex industries such as semiconductors, biotechnology, and neurobiology are even more likely to benefit from clustering in big cities when compared with less complex activities such as paper or apparel manufacturing. Before the pandemic, housing shortages in the San Francisco Bay Area and other high-demand locations had become a major barrier to innovation and economic growth. Silicon Valley and similar clusters now face a rather different challenge: the sudden spike in remote work. The pandemic has reminded people of the value of large living spaces. Already, the least dense zip codes of metropolitan areas have seen home purchases increase twice as much as the densest, according to the American Enterprise Institute’s Housing Center. This trend holds for many of the major industrial clusters in San Francisco, New York, Los Angeles, and Seattle. Meanwhile, large tech companies forced to deal with remote work have discovered that, at least in the short run, it works tolerably well. Rather than deal with continued reopening uncertainty as the virus rages on, companies like Facebook, Twitter, Shopify, and Quora have allowed most or all of their employees to work from home permanently. An exodus of engineers from Silicon Valley could prove beneficial to smaller communities in cheaper parts of the country—but could slow the kind of innovation that happens when talented people work in close proximity. The physical isolation of employees will hamper the development of groundbreaking ideas within individual firms. It could also decrease the number of spillover opportunities that can arise in new firms. The proverbial process in which two engineers meet in the office, start tossing around product ideas in their downtime, consult with a local venture capitalist to get advice, and leave to found a start-up will be severely diminished if all of these connections are mediated via Zoom. Videoconferencing is useful in maintaining existing relationships but a poor substitute for chance meetings with new colleagues. Even if remote work is beneficial on balance for a given tech company, it could be a net negative for the company’s larger industrial cluster and for the country. In the past half century, America’s innovation engine—built on an influx of global brainpower, a vibrant university system, cities that encourage the spontaneous interaction of people and ideas—has worked so well that policy makers have taken it for granted. Yet the pandemic is now disassembling that engine in remarkably precise ways. among nations of diverse political make-up to uphold international stability. Sixth, embrace G-Plus global governance. The growing complexity of global governance is inevitable due to the proliferation of a variety of new actors (including the rising powers like China, but also civil society and private actors) and transnational issue areas. It is impossible for the state-centric bureaucratic institutions crafted in the 1940s to cope with these changes. These institutions should welcome the proliferation of "demanders" of global governance and learn to work with them, avoiding duplication of resources. The ongoing fragmentation in global governance creates new opportunities for closer partnership between inter-governmental institutions, private sector, and civil society. Finally, take regional powers and regionalism seriously. Regions are crucial sites for both conflict and cooperation. In considering ways to develop a new world order, one should not focus too much on the big emerging powers like China and India, or neglect the role of other regional powers in the developing world such as Indonesia in ASEAN. Not all forms of regionalism are harmful to global cooperation; indeed they may contribute to it. Many regional organizations share normative concerns about peace and justice, and deserve their space in any meaningful scheme for global order. The traditional liberal universalist tendency to associate regionalism with spheres of influence or power balancing is misplaced, since many examples of regionalism (notwithstanding exceptions such as the Russia-led Eurasian Union) today are open, interactive, and inclusive. The complexity of international politics today calls for questioning the existing theories and vocabulary of international relations, especially of liberalism and realism. Liberals often profess a monopoly over all "good things" in international life, such as rationality, respect for human dignity, and good governance, free trade, and rule-based order, and trace their origins exclusively from the Western civilization. Yet these ideas and practices could be found in other, non-Western civilizations, including but not limited to Islamic, Chinese, and Indian. But liberal theory has shown little acknowledgment of the multiple sources of and contributions to the development of those ideas and practices. As a result, liberalism is seen today as asking and expecting the Rest to follow ideas that it claims to have been solely developed in the West, even as the leading liberal Western nations grossly violate them. With liberalism now under challenge at home, it will be even harder to sell to the rest of the world. When facing the future, while many liberals remain in denial, realists return to the past. Instead of fresh ideas to understand and explain change in world politics, they keep rehashing notions like multipolarity or power transition. Another such concept is the "Thucydides Trap. " 48 But this is a misreading of history. As discussed in chapter 1, the world today is a far cry from the nineteenth-century multipolar era; it's even more misleading to view it from the prism of the self-styled and limited geopolitics of Greek city-states. The era of liberal hegemony is past. The remnants of the liberal international order would form one of the multiple, but cross-cutting systems, and coexist or enmesh with other ideas in a world of growing complexity and interconnectedness. International relations scholars should be wary of conventional wisdom and be open to new concepts and theories, and hence to new possibilities of world order that have no precedent in history. The multiplex world is Star Trek world, where the challenge is to "boldly go where no one has gone before."

2023 CNDI Negative
Federal Jobs Guarantee NEG › AT: Inequality Adv › No Econ !

‘Slow growth’ is inevitable AND is proof of a strong economy.

Dietrich Vollrath 20, Professor of economics at the University of Houston, "Slow economic growth is a sign of success," USAPP, 02/22/2020, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2020/02/22/slow-economic-growth-is-a-sign-of-success/.

We’re accustomed to looking at the growth rate of GDP to evaluate the health of our economy. Which is why the recent slowdown in growth appears so troubling. In the US, GDP growth for 2019 was 2.3%, meaning it has been nineteen years since growth hit 4%, and nearly as long since it touched 3%. For the UK the story is similar, as it has been fifteen years since growth hit 3%. In the Eurozone as a whole, growth last came close to 4% in 2000. These slowdowns across developed economies predates the financial crisis, and leads to natural questions: what went wrong with the economy, and how do we fix it?

But the slowdown we’re observing isn’t something we can fix – or that we would want to fix – because the slowdown was never a consequence of things that went wrong. Instead, as I show my new book, the slowdown is a consequence of things that went right.