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2023 CNDI Counterplan
UBI CP – CNDI 23 › Solvency › S – Growth

UBI is an econ multiplier – models prove the economy will rise 12.5%, increase output and labor force participation

Cheng & Maass 20 --- Alex Cheng & Andreas Maass. Writers for Berkeley Economic Review 2/25/2020 (“Unboxing Universal Basic Income”. Berkeley Economic Review. https://econreview.berkeley.edu/unboxing-universal-basic-income/. Date Accessed: 6-22-2023.)

Another key argument for UBI is the effect it will have on the growth of the economy. Proponents of UBI claim that putting money in the hands of every American will create an economic multiplier, and permanently grow the economy. Evidence from past case studies and economic predictions seems to support this assertion. A 2017 report by the Roosevelt Foundation used the Levy Institute macroeconometric model to demonstrate that an unconditional cash assistance program of $1,000 for all adults annually would expand the economy by 12.56 percent over the baseline after eight years. The study shows that, in addition to a rise in aggregate demand, a $1,000 UBI would likely cause an increase in output, employment, labor force participation, prices, and wages. Various studies of cash transfer programs in other countries demonstrate that economic growth ultimately also trickles up? to other aspects of welfare programs. The “Mincome” Experiment in Manitoba, Canada, where an experimental basic income project was tested almost 40 years ago, showed that the population receiving a basic income had an 8.5 percent reduction in hospital visits, with fewer incidents of work-related injuries, and fewer emergency room visits from accidents and injuries. Additionally, the population experienced lower psychiatric hospitalization, which is an indicator of higher overall mental health. Another example, the GiveDirectly™ program, created cash transfer methods for poor households in Kenya, and showed positive effects in nutrition-based spending and overall assets for these households. This also correlated to overall healthier lifestyles and less hospital visitation. With this information, the benefits of UBI seems to be substantiated by strong empirical evidence and a number of logical macroeconomic predictions. That being said, the studies are smaller-scale than anything that would be implemented in the United States. They also are focused primarily in under-developed markets with lower wage floors. For that reason, many critics maintain that UBI in the US may not be a foolproof idea or work in a similar manner as the smaller scale sample in Kenya.

2023 CNDI Counterplan
UBI CP – CNDI 23 › Solvency › S – Growth

A UBI program would result in a $2.5 trillion into the US economy

Jones, 17 – Writer for Futurism

[Brad Jones, “Experts say universal basic income would boost US economy by staggering $2.5 trillion,” Futurism, 11-27-2017, https://futurism.com/experts-universal-basic-income-boost-us-economy-staggering-2-5-trillion, accessed 6-22-2023]

In recent months, everyone from  to  has come out in favor of universal basic income (UBI), a system in which every person receives a regular payment simply for being alive. Now, a study carried out by the  has concluded that implementing a UBI in the U.S. could have a positive effect on the nation's economy.

2023 CNDI Counterplan
UBI CP – CNDI 23 › 1NC Toolbox › 1nc – Paternalism Impact

Ethical obligation to reject paternalism – it relies on devaluation and manipulation of the individual.

Koepke 13 - Instructor at the Johns Hopkins University Center; MA in Philosophy from Georgia State University (Cami, Libertarian Paternalism and the Authority Of The Autonomous Person, ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University)

Groll emphasizes that the primary feature that makes paternalism impermissible with respect to competent adults is the practical reasoning of the paternalist actor (2012, p. 717). In particular, one of the reasons that the paternalist actor does not treat the will of a competent subject as structurally decisive in her considerations is that she thinks that the subject “fails to exercise [his] capacity for sound judgment” (p. 718). The reasoning that underlies the actions of Bob’s doctor and Ernest’s friend Sabina is that they think Bob and Ernest are failing to make a good self-regarding decision, or at least not as good a decision as Bob’s doctor and Ernest’s friend could make for them (2012, p. 718). Yet, whether Bob or Ernest make the optimal decision in self- regarding matters is their own business. Respecting the will of a competent adult means recognizing that the individual’s self-regarding decisions are hers, and hers alone, to make. Respecting the will involves making it the decisive consideration when deciding how to act toward that individual in matters regarding her well-being. While Groll (2012) does not explicitly discuss the S/T argument, his distinction between treating the will as structurally decisive and treating it as substantially decisive is useful for understanding why libertarian paternalism disrespects the will of individuals, even though it preserves choices and does not counter the preferences of individuals (2012, p. 692). If the government adopted the S/T argument for libertarian paternalism as a basis for policymaking, it would fail to accord the will of competent adults the respect it intuitively deserves. Sunstein and Thaler think that the will of competent adults should only be treated as substantially decisive in the government’s policy deliberations. In the government’s deliberation process, they make considerations of well-being to be of higher priority than considerations about the will; “The promotion of well-being should be a principal goal” of the government (2006, p. 253). This prioritization of considerations is especially apparent in Sunstein and Thaler’s reasons for preferring the default method of nudging over the mandated choice method. Recall that in the mandated choice method, an individual’s options are presented in a way that encourages her to deliberate about what choice is really the best for her, hopefully engaging her ability for careful judgment. In contrast, the default method is aimed at utilizing reasoning biases to increase the likelihood of an individual making a specific decision. Sunstein and Thaler favor the default method precisely because it is more likely to result in the individual selecting the optimal option. They write that if a certain option likely “promotes people’s welfare, perhaps [the default method] should be preferred over requiring active choices” (2006, p. 258). However, while mandated choices are intended to engage an individual’s abilities for deliberation and judgment, the default method attempts to skirt these abilities to achieve a specific outcome, i.e. the individual’s well-being. Rather than supporting a method intended to encourage individuals to deliberate about their options, Sunstein and Thaler prefer a method intended to manipulate reasoning biases in order to promote well-being.

2023 CNDI Counterplan
UBI CP – CNDI 23 › 1NC Toolbox › 1nc – Innovation NB (China)

Maintaining our innovative lead solves nuclear war

Kroenig and Gopalaswamy 18 – Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Deputy Director for Strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council; Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council

Matthew Kroenig and Bharath Gopalaswamy, "Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war?," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 11-12-2018, 

Rather, we should think more broadly about how new technology might affect global politics, and, for this, it is helpful to turn to scholarly international relations theory. The dominant theory of the causes of war in the academy is the “bargaining model of war.” This theory identifies rapid shifts in the balance of power as a primary cause of conflict.

2023 CNDI Counterplan
UBI CP – CNDI 23 › 1NC Toolbox › 1nc – Innovation NB (China)

UBI solves competitiveness with China – it fosters tech, inspires national interest, and increases innovation

Singer & Silvian 21 --- Scott Singer is a Ph.D. candidate in international relations at the University of Oxford. Ben Silvian is pursuing his Masters degree in technology management at Georgetown University. 11/09/2021 (“How Universal Basic Income Can Advance the United States’ China Strategy.” The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/how-universal-basic-income-can-advance-the-united-states-china-strategy/. Date Accessed: 6-23-2023.)

How can the United States overcome the democratic constraint problem that is inhibiting progress in developing an optimal foreign policy response toward China? The answer lies partly in modifying domestic incentives such that the American public supports strategically optimal foreign policies. If U.S. domestic policy can harness technological advancement to improve the lives of average Americans, it can unlock advantageous foreign policy approaches from their domestic constraints. The only way to turn Luddites into technophiles is to recalibrate the system so that the economic gains of advanced technology start flowing to them. Relevant human infrastructure investment could manifest in a range of forms, but here we consider one of the most prominent ideas from the 2020 U.S. presidential elections: Universal Basic Income (UBI).

At its core, UBI is a direct investment in American human capital, distributing the immense economic gains of technology advancements throughout the populace. The policy, popularized by Andrew Yang as a “Freedom Dividend,” would guarantee direct cash payments every month. Cash is highly flexible and fungible, meaning it can be used to overcome the recipient’s most pressing financial pain points.

2023 CNDI Counterplan
UBI CP – CNDI 23 › 1NC Toolbox › 1nc – Innovation NB (Generic)

Innovation prevents extinction – ensures resilence.

Dylan Matthews 18. Co-founder of Vox, citing Nick Beckstead @ Rutgers University. 10-26-2018. "How to help people millions of years from now." Vox. https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/26/18023366/far-future-effective-altruism-existential-risk-doing-good

If you care about improving human lives, you should overwhelmingly care about those quadrillions of lives rather than the comparatively small number of people alive today. The 7.6 billion people now living, after all, amount to less than 0.003 percent of the population that will live in the future. It’s reasonable to suggest that those quadrillions of future people have, accordingly, hundreds of thousands of times more moral weight than those of us living here today do. That’s the basic argument behind Nick Beckstead’s 2013 Rutgers philosophy dissertation, “On the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future.” It’s a glorious mindfuck of a thesis, not least because Beckstead shows very convincingly that this is a conclusion any plausible moral view would reach. It’s not just something that weird utilitarians have to deal with. And Beckstead, to his considerable credit, walks the walk on this. He works at the Open Philanthropy Project on grants relating to the far future and runs a charitable fund for donors who want to prioritize the far future. And arguments from him and others have turned “long-termism” into a very vibrant, important strand of the effective altruism community. But what does prioritizing the far future even mean? The most literal thing it could mean is preventing human extinction, to ensure that the species persists as long as possible. For the long-term-focused effective altruists I know, that typically means identifying concrete threats to humanity’s continued existence — like unfriendly artificial intelligence, or a pandemic, or global warming/out of control geoengineering — and engaging in activities to prevent that specific eventuality. But in a set of slides he made in 2013, Beckstead makes a compelling case that while that’s certainly part of what caring about the far future entails, approaches that address specific threats to humanity (which he calls “targeted” approaches to the far future) have to complement “broad” approaches, where instead of trying to predict what’s going to kill us all, you just generally try to keep civilization running as best it can, so that it is, as a whole, well-equipped to deal with potential extinction events in the future, not just in 2030 or 2040 but in 3500 or 95000 or even 37 million. In other words, caring about the far future doesn’t mean just paying attention to low-probability risks of total annihilation; it also means acting on pressing needs now. For example: We’re going to be better prepared to prevent extinction from AI or a supervirus or global warming if society as a whole makes a lot of scientific progress. And a significant bottleneck there is that the vast majority of humanity doesn’t get high-enough-quality education to engage in scientific research, if they want to, which reduces the odds that we have enough trained scientists to come up with the breakthroughs we need as a civilization to survive and thrive. So maybe one of the best things we can do for the far future is to improve school systems — here and now — to harness the group economist Raj Chetty calls “lost Einsteins” (potential innovators who are thwarted by poverty and inequality in rich countries) and, more importantly, the hundreds of millions of kids in developing countries dealing with even worse education systems than those in depressed communities in the rich world. What if living ethically for the far future means living ethically now? Beckstead mentions some other broad, or very broad, ideas (these are all his descriptions): Help make computers faster so that people everywhere can work more efficiently Change intellectual property law so that technological innovation can happen more quickly Advocate for open borders so that people from poorly governed countries can move to better-governed countries and be more productive Meta-research: improve incentives and norms in academic work to better advance human knowledge Improve education Advocate for political party X to make future people have values more like political party X ”If you look at these areas (economic growth and technological progress, access to information, individual capability, social coordination, motives) a lot of everyday good works contribute,” Beckstead writes. “An implication of this is that a lot of everyday good works are good from a broad perspective, even though hardly anyone thinks explicitly in terms of far future standards.” Look at those examples again: It’s just a list of what normal altruistically motivated people, not effective altruism folks, generally do. Charities in the US love talking about the lost opportunities for innovation that poverty creates. Lots of smart people who want to make a difference become scientists, or try to work as teachers or on improving education policy, and lord knows there are plenty of people who become political party operatives out of a conviction that the moral consequences of the party’s platform are good. All of which is to say: Maybe effective altruists aren’t that special, or at least maybe we don’t have access to that many specific and weird conclusions about how best to help the world. If the far future is what matters, and generally trying to make the world work better is among the best ways to help the far future, then effective altruism just becomes plain ol’ do-goodery.*

2023 CNDI Counterplan
UBI CP – CNDI 23 › 1NC Toolbox › 1nc – Innovation NB (Generic)

UBI unlocks innovation and small business entrepreneurship.

Light 21 --- Jennifer Light is a writer for the Jr Executive. 1/22/2021 (“Universal Basic Income’s Impact on Entrepreneurship.” https://www.thejrexecutive.com/post/universal-basic-income-s-impact-on-entrepreneurship. Date Accessed: 6-24-2023.)

Social entrepreneurship is the most crucial type of entrepreneurship, as it is startup companies that develop ideas and solutions to current social, cultural, and environmental issues, such as climate change. Unfortunately, entrepreneurship has been on the decline. According to the INC, “entrepreneurs have been in decline for 40 years due to fear of financial failure.” Furthermore, the Office of Advocacy explains that around one in twelve small businesses is doomed to close a year, most commonly due to low sales and restricted cash flow. To resolve the fear of failure and stimulate small businesses, a Universal Basic Income (UBI) of $1,000 a month should be implemented. Luckily, a UBI has the potential to stimulate entrepreneurship further and give businesses the push they need to start, and provide a safety net for companies.

The largest concern of most small business startups is the lack of funding and spending ability. According to an NSBA study, more than 25% of small business owners say they aren’t able to obtain the funds they need to operate their business. Not only are legal fees expensive, but branding and web hosting sites are as well. According to Sammi Carmella, a writer for Business News Daily, average costs for a micro-business average around $3,000. The Journal of Small Business and Entrepreneurship quantifies that many small businesses were forced to finance through personal savings and credit cards. They explain, “over 80% of US entrepreneurs utilized personal sources of funding, accounting for 57% of all startup financing acquired during this period.”

2023 CNDI Counterplan
UBI CP – CNDI 23 › 1NC Toolbox › 1nc – Top

A UBI is comparatively better – the CP alone avoids bureaucratic inefficiency, private sector crowd-out, and alienation.

Standing ’19 (Guy, Professorial Research Associate, PhD Prof at University of London, and a council member of the Progressive Economy Forum. “Basic Income as Common Dividends: Piloting a Transformative Policy,” 2019, )-mikee

The claim made in this report is that a basic income would promote social justice, freedom and basic security while combating the eight giants, in ways that other possible policies would not. But some other proposals have been made as alternatives. One deserves scrutiny, given the widespread advocacy of it. From time to time, there is a surge in advocacy of a job guarantee for everyone, or for everyone ‘able to work’. It is happening again, from a slew of politicians and social scientists positioning themselves on the centre left, as social democrats. In the USA, several prominent Democrat senators and possible candidates for the next presidential election have said they support the idea, including Bernie Sanders, Cory Booker, Elizabeth Warren, Kamala Harris and Kirsten Gillibrand. In Britain The Guardian has endorsed it unequivocally as ‘a welcome return to a politics of work’.130 The Guardian claimed a job guarantee policy ‘would secure a basic human right to engage in productive employment’. Throughout history, the vast majority of people would have found that a very strange ‘human right’.131 Having a job is to be in a position of subordination, reporting to and obeying a boss in return for payment. Indeed, historically the words ‘job’, ‘jobbing’ and ‘jobholder’ were terms of regret and even pity, referring to someone with a bits-and-pieces existence. Subordination and alienation have also been at the heart of labour law, which is based on the master-servant model. The newspaper added that the job guarantee ‘would only offer employment undersupplied by the private sector’, singling out ‘environmental clean-up’ and ‘social care’. These may sound appealing on paper but represent a narrow and unattractive range of jobs to be offered. They also bear more than a passing resemblance to the menial jobs convicted offenders are obliged to undertake under ‘community payback’ schemes. The practical objections become evident as soon as the details are considered: what jobs, who would be responsible for providing them, who would qualify to be offered them, what would the jobs pay and for how many hours, who would pay, how much would it cost to supervise participants and to police compliance with the job’s requirements, and what would be the effects on other workers and on the wider economy? To start with, identifying jobs to be provided and administering the process would be a bureaucratic nightmare (witness the shambles of many ‘community payback’ schemes, even though they are on a small scale and the labour they offer is ‘free’). And, when asked what type of job would be guaranteed, proponents never suggest the guaranteed jobs would match people’s skills and qualifications, instead falling back on low-skill, low-wage jobs they would not dream of for themselves or their children. Then other questions arise. If guaranteed jobs are providing desired services or goods, and are subsidised, there must be substitution effects – guaranteeing jobs now taken by others - and deadweight effects - putting people in jobs that would have been created anyhow. If somebody is given a guaranteed job at the minimum wage, what happens to others already doing such jobs? Would the job guarantee agency guarantee their jobs as well, with no decline in wages if they happened to be higher? If the unemployed were offered a job at a minimum wage subsidised by the state, this would increase the vulnerability of others, either displacing them or lowering their income. Ro Khanna, a California Democrat congressman, has said firms would not be allowed to hire subsidised workers if they were substitutes for previous employees.132 Clever employers could find ways round that. However, it would also be unfair. Why should a firm coming into a market be subsidised relative to one that has been in it for a while, giving the newcomer an unfair advantage? The Guardian further claimed, without citing evidence, that a job guarantee scheme would not be inflationary because ‘any restructuring of relative wages would be a oneoff event’. This contradicts generations of research. If all were guaranteed a job, what would stop wage-push inflation? The only restraining factors would be fear of automation and more offshoring. But it would hardly be fear, as a job would be guaranteed anyhow! The gross cost of a job guarantee might outweigh the net gain. If the government guaranteed the minimum wage in guaranteed jobs, those in jobs paying less (or working fewer than the guaranteed hours) might quit or find ways to be made redundant, so they could have a guaranteed job instead. Social democrats might like that, as it would mean better-paying jobs for more of the underemployed and precariat. But the fiscal cost would be daunting. For example, in the UK, over 60% of those regarded as poor are in jobs or have someone in their household who is.133 Would they all become eligible for a guaranteed good job? At its unlikely best, a job guarantee would be paternalistic. It presumes the government knows what is best for individuals, who would be offered a necessarily limited range of jobs at its disposal. Suppose someone was pressed to take a guaranteed job on a construction site (‘infrastructure’, a favoured area for guaranteed jobs) and that person proved incompetent and was injured. Would the job guarantee agency be held responsible and pay compensation? It should, since it put the person in that position. How would that be factored into the costing of a job guarantee scheme? Similarly, if a person put into a ‘social care’ job was negligent and caused harm or distress to the care recipient, would the latter be able to sue the job guarantee agency for compensation? In addition, a job-guarantee scheme would spring a familiar trap – the phoney distinction between those who ‘can work’ and would thus be eligible for a guaranteed job and those ‘who cannot work’.134 In Britain, this has led to demeaning and stigmatising ‘capacity-to-work’ and ‘availability-for-work’ tests, resulting in discriminatory action against disabled and vulnerable people, and those with care responsibilities. Another failing of the job guarantee route is the mapping of a path to ‘workfare’. What would happen to somebody who declined to accept the guaranteed job? They would be labelled ‘lazy’ or ‘choosy’ and thus ‘ungrateful’ and ‘socially irresponsible’. Yet there are many reasons for refusing a job. Studies show that accepting a job below a person’s qualifications can lower their income and social status for the long term. As what is happening in the current UK benefit system attests, those not taking jobs allocated to them would face benefit sanctions, and be directed into jobs, whether they liked them or not. Jobs done in resentment or under duress are unlikely to be done well. A job guarantee would be a recipe for perpetuating low productivity. What would happen if a person in a guaranteed job performed poorly, perhaps because of limited ability or simply because they knew it was ‘guaranteed’? If you are guaranteed a job, why bother to work hard? If you are an employer and are given a subsidy to pay employees guaranteed a job, why bother to try to use labour efficiently? If subsidised through tax credits or a wage subsidy, a worker would need to produce only a little more value than the cost to the employer to make it profitable to retain him or her. This would cheapen low-productivity jobs relative to others and inhibit the higher productivity arising from labour-displacing technological change. If a job of a certain type is guaranteed, what happens if an employer wishes to invest in technology that would remove the need for such jobs? Those calling for a job guarantee also ignore the fact that any market economy requires some unemployment, as people need time to search for jobs they are prepared to accept, and firms must sift applicants for jobs they want to have done. To adopt a job guarantee policy would risk putting the economy in gridlock. Job guarantee advocates, such as Larry Summers, President Clinton’s former Treasury Secretary, argue that people without jobs ‘are much more likely to be dissatisfied with their lives’ and are more likely to be drug addicts and abusive than those with even low-wage jobs.135 This is bogus. I suggest there would be no correlation between life satisfaction and having a job if the comparison was made between those in lousy jobs and those with no job but an adequate income on which to live. Somebody facing a choice between penury and a lousy job will prefer the job. But that does not mean they like or want it for itself. The polling company Gallup conducts regular State of the Global Workplace surveys in over 150 countries. In 2017, it found that globally only 15% of workers were engaged by their job, and in no country did the figure exceed 40%. One recent UK survey found that 37% of jobholders did not think their job made any significant contribution. Summers ends his article by equivocating – ‘the idea of a jobs guarantee should be taken seriously but not literally’. He seems to mean government should try to promote more employment, through ‘wage subsidies, targeted government spending, support for workers with dependants, and more training and job-matching programmes’. In other words, he reverts to the standard social democratic package that has not done very well in the past three decades. Besides being a recipe for labour inefficiency and labour market distortions, tending to displace workers employed in the ‘free’ labour market and to depress their wages, the job guarantee proposal fails to recognise that today’s crisis is structural and requires transformative policies. Tax credits, job guarantees and statutory minimum wages would barely touch the precariat’s existential insecurity that is at the heart of the social and economic crisis, let alone address the aspirations of the progressive and growing part of the precariat for an ecologically grounded Good Society.136 The emphasis on jobs is non-ecological, since it is tied to the constant pursuit of economic growth. There are many instances, support for fracking and for the third runway at Heathrow airport being recent examples, where the promise of more jobs has trumped costs to health and the environment. And a job guarantee policy could have a strong appeal to the political right as a way to dismantle the welfare state. Why pay unemployment benefits if everybody has a guaranteed job? In the USA, one conservative commentator chortled that ‘over 100 federal welfare programs would be replaced with a single job guarantee program.’137 Finally, there is what this writer regards as the policy’s worst feature. It would reinforce twentieth-century labourism, by failing to make the distinction between work and labour. Those who back guaranteed jobs typically ignore all forms of work that are not paid labour. A really progressive agenda would strengthen the values of work over the dictates of labour. It would seek to enable more people to develop their own sense of occupation.138 A job is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Economists tend to be inconsistent in this respect. In the textbooks, labour has ‘disutility’; it is negative for the worker. Yet many economists who use or write these textbooks then advocate putting everybody in jobs. Why make a fetish of ‘jobs’? A job is doing ‘labour’ for others. What about all the forms of work that we do for those we love or for our community or for ourselves? Many forms of work that are not labour are more rewarding psychologically and socially. A regime of putting everybody into jobs, in unchosen activities, would be orchestrated alienation. Surely a progressive should want to minimise the time we spend in stultifying and subordinated jobs, so that we can increase the time and energy for forms of work and leisure that are self-chosen and oriented to personal and community development. There is one last point, to do with the claim that a job guarantee would be politically popular. Much is made of a US poll which asked people whether they would support a scheme to guarantee a job for anybody ‘who can’t find employment in the private sector’, if paid from a 5% tax on those earning over $200,000. The result was 52% in favour. Supporters thought this was ‘stunning’.139 With such a loaded question, one should be stunned by the bare-majority support. After all, most respondents were being told they would not have to pay, and that there were no alternative jobs available, an unlikely scenario. Rather than jobs per se, the primary challenge is to build a new income distribution system, recognising that the old one has broken down irretrievably. The rentiers are running away with all the revenue thrown up by rentier capitalism, and real wages will continue to lag. Putting people into static low-wage jobs is no response.

2023 CNDI Counterplan
UBI CP – CNDI 23 › 1NC Toolbox › 1nc – Top

UBI solves the aff – it promotes growth and reduces inequality.

Straubhaar ‘17 --- Thomas Straubhaar is a Professor of Economics at the University of Hamburg with a research focus on international economic relations. 2017. (“On the Economics of a Universal Basic Income”. Intereconomics. https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2017/number/2/article/on-the-economics-of-a-universal-basic-income.html. Date Accessed: 6-22-2023. Edited for Ableist language.)

The UBI is an adequate and effective way to adjust the concept of the social market economy to the age of digitisation, globalisation and the long-term trends that go along with a demographically ageing society. It is an efficient reaction to the increasing polarisation between (human) capital owners and less qualified workers who must finance their lives with labour income stemming from low-paid jobs.18

The social market economy follows a simple principle: it wants to “dissolve a merely imaginary contradiction between liberal and social worldviews in the peaceful way of social irenics”, which means with harmonious reconciliation.19 Freedom and social justice, market efficiency and social equilibrium are not mutually exclusive – indeed, they are mutually dependent.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Answers to Neg › AT: Cap K

Perm – Feminist UBI consistent with broader movements of degrowth.

Hermann, 2021 - MA Candidate in International Affairs at Hertie School [Katrin, Sept 28, Path for Europe, “Reimagining Care: Feminist degrowth and UBI” Acc 1/16/23 TA]

A Feminist Degrowth Perspective Degrowth stresses the need to move away from economic growth as a sole political objective. Instead, the focus should be on “well-being, social justice and ecological sustainability”. Within the degrowth movement, the feminist perspective is slowly becoming more prominent, with the Feminisms and Degrowth Alliance (FaDA) network launching in 2017. Feminist scholars have criticized capitalist production and consumption patterns for not taking into account the invaluable nature of care work for individual and societal well-being. This approach specifically envisions a society with diverse gender roles, where paid and unpaid work is distributed fairly among all members of society. Degrowth carries potential to rethink the growth-centric economy and lends itself well to feminist economic thought, which seeks to undo patriarchal power structures, which in turn alleviates the undue double burden placed on women at home and in the labour market. Indeed, Kallis, Demaria and D’Alisa have stated that “the degrowth imaginary centres around the reproductive economy of care”[3], with other central proposals of the degrowth school (e.g. work-sharing) emphasizing care as well. Corinna Dengler and Birte Strunk have examined the impact of the current growth paradigm on gender and environmental injustices. Their analysis is based around the ICE model developed by Jochimsen and Knobloch (see Figure 1) which relegates caring activities and ecological processes into the ‘maintenance’ economy, which the formal ‘monetized’ economy largely ignores. Dengler and Strunk’s analysis acknowledges that an increase in women’s labour participation will not necessarily further gender equality. As examined, this creates a double burden of paid and unpaid work for most women, and even when this work is outsourced to care providers, there still exists a divide, but now between the more vulnerable and those who profit. Thus, Dengler and Strunk suggest work-sharing proposals that focus on the working day rather than working week. Since women are most often the ones that are in charge of daily household activities (e.g. caring for other family members), a shortening of the “first shift” for both women and men could allow for a reduction in women’s double burden and a more equal division of these daily activities amongst genders. Though by no means flawless, this proposal is meant to emphasize the potential for feminist economics and the degrowth movement to pave the way for a caring economy and potentially alleviate certain gender injustices. Figure 1: ICE Model The feminist degrowth movement is centred around regeneration – in this sense policies geared towards reforming the care economy are meant to encourage this sector to thrive. In order to do so, redistributive measures should be introduced to ensure that carers are adequately compensated. Consequently, both feminist scholars and degrowthers have been examining UBI (Universal Basic Income) as a potential alternative. Feminist degrowthers have more specifically supported a Care Income that builds on basic income proposals and emphasizes the recognition of unpaid care work performed by women. Universal Basic Income through a feminist lens A Universal Basic Income (UBI) has been supported by degrowthers, with the feminist branch specifically calling for a Care Income as proposed by the Global Women’s Strike and taken forward by the Green New Deal for Europe. This involves the payment of an unconditional regular income paid to adult members of societies, regardless of work status, level of income or living arrangements. Though convincing arguments in favour of a basic income scheme have been made, it has yet to be fully introduced into any modern welfare state due to the objections that it undermines the incentive to work and unsustainably increases public expenditure.[4]

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Answers to Neg › AT: Econ Impacts

Domestic violence against women worsens economy

Ouedraogo and Stenzel ‘21

“How Domestic Violence is a Threat to Economic Development”, IMF, November 24, 2021 . – Myra

It’s being called the “shadow pandemic”—an increase in physical, sexual and emotional abuse of women is taking place amid the lockdowns and societal turmoil caused by the global health crisis. The evidence is only growing. In Nigeria, the number of reported cases of gender-violence linked to lockdowns increased by more than 130 percent. In Croatia, reported rapes increased by 228 percent during the first five months of 2020 compared to 2019. The economic costs of domestic violence are higher during downturns and could make recovery more challenging. For many women around the world, no place is more unsafe than their own homes. As the world recognizes , it has become clear that the pandemic has made this violence worse. Abuse of any form is fundamentally wrong and a violation of basic human rights. shows how violence against women and girls is a major threat to economic development in a region where domestic violence is widespread—sub-Saharan Africa. The results of our study suggest that an increase in violence against women by 1 percentage point is associated with a 9 percent lower level of economic activity (proxied by nighttime lights). Violence against women and girls has a multi-dimensional effect on the overall health of an economy both in the short-term and long-term. In the short term, women from abusive homes are likely to work fewer hours and be less productive when they do work. In the long run, high levels of domestic violence can decrease the number of women in the workforce, minimize women’s acquisition of skills and education, and result in less public investment overall as more public resources are channeled to health and judicial services. Previous studies have found domestic violence costs a given economy between 1 and 2 percent of GDP. However, these studies use simple accounting mechanisms and often don’t account for potential reverse causality. Our research takes a new approach, matching deep survey data of women in the region with satellite imagery and employs appropriate technical methods to address endogeneity issues. We look at data from the US Agency for International Development’s collected from the 1980s to the present. The surveys ask women specific questions about mistreatment. The data come from 18 sub-Saharan African countries, covering more than 224 districts and more than 440,000 women representative of around 75 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s female population. The surveys found that more than 30 percent of women in the region had experienced some form of domestic abuse. To measure the impact on economic development at a district level, we compare the survey data with satellite data on nighttime lights provided by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Nightlight satellite data can be a powerful tool for measuring economic activity when the most used measure for economic activity—gross domestic product—is not available at the sub-national level. We found that higher levels of violence against women and girls are associated with lower economic activity, driven mainly by a significant drop in female employment. The physical, psychological, and emotional violence that women experience makes it more difficult for them to achieve or maintain a job. Based on this connection, if sub-Saharan African countries in the sample were to reduce the level of gender-based violence closer to the world average of 23 percent of women experiencing abuse, it could result in long-term GDP gains of around 30 percent.An economic downturn, such as the one caused by the pandemic, can contribute to an uptick in domestic violence. This exacerbates the economic costs of domestic violence compared to normal times. Our research also found other evidence for the negative impact of domestic violence on economic activity. Domestic violence is more detrimental to countries without protective laws against domestic violence and countries rich in natural resources where extractive industries are more likely to crowd out more women-centered jobs and lead to less economic power among females. We also found that the economic costs of violence against women is lower in countries like South Africa, where there is a lower gender gap in education between partners and where women have more decision-making power than in other sub-Saharan African countries. Stopping violence against women is an indisputable moral imperative, but our research shows that it’s economically important too. The economic costs of domestic violence are higher during downturns and could make recovery more challenging. Countries should take efforts now to strengthen laws and protections against domestic violence. Strong laws are critical to deter violence against women, protect victims of domestic violence, and promote women’s participation in the workforce. Improving education opportunities for girls is an important step in the longer term. Reducing the gender education gap gives women more economic freedom and less ability to be influenced and controlled by men. In efforts to build back better from the pandemic, policies to support women and combat gender-based violence are more important than ever.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Answers to Neg › AT: Budget Turn

Other social assistance programs won’t need as much funding in the aff world. Also, poverty costs more.

Kathryn Karcher 2019 – Former President of California Academy of Appellate Lawyers, Certified Specialist in Appellate Law “How Might a Universal Basic Income or Federal Jobs Guarantee Help Women?”, Political Science Honors Program, 03/04/2019, https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/43803/LRA2019_Karcher.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y – A.K.

Decreased costs in other programs and increased and new taxes could offset these totals. Progressives should be cautious about cutting social programs, particularly because this aspect of UBI can provide a trojan horse for those who wish to cut social programs that many Americans need. Still, both UBI and FJG would reduce the number of people who require additional assistance. Considering the fact that studies estimate $153 billion per year is spent on public assistance programs due to low wages, we can see that the benefits of UBI or FJG would reduce the costs of other programs. The Supplemental Assistance Nutrition Program (SNAP), the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), unemployment insurance, and TANF would require less funding once people had either a basic income or a well-paying job with benefits. Increased and new taxes on the financially well-off should precede any cuts to social programs. Carbon taxes, financial transaction taxes, and land-value taxes would distribute wealth more equitably without further burdening those in the lower and middle classes. An additional benefit of this approach is that increased taxes on corporations and eliminating subsidies to fossil fuel companies have the simultaneous effect of funding new social programs while helping the environment and redistributing wealth. Discussions of these costs must include the positive impact that UBI and FJG would likely have on Americans’ spending power and the labor market. A jobs guarantee, for instance, would employ approximately 10 million workers. When we consider the costs offset by UBI or FJG, along with new taxes that will make our tax system more fair, neither policy is so exceptionally expensive. Those who remain skeptical about whether these programs warrant these changes to our budget should consider the exorbitant cost of the status quo. Harry Holzer, a labor economist at Georgetown, “calculated that child poverty alone costs the United States about 4 percent of GDP a year, every year, by reducing productivity and work output, increasing the incidence of crime, and pushing up public health expenditures of children when they become adults. That adds up to roughly $700 billion a year, a little more than the United States spends on the military and a little less than it spends on Social Security.” Without even considering more pressing issues of justice, poverty is far more expensive than effective social programs.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Answers to Neg › AT: FJG CP

UBI solves better than an FJG, addressing the causes of women’s issues.

Kathryn Karcher 2019 – Former President of California Academy of Appellate Lawyers, Certified Specialist in Appellate Law

“How Might a Universal Basic Income or Federal Jobs Guarantee Help Women?”, Political Science Honors Program, 03/04/2019, https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/43803/LRA2019_Karcher.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y – A.K.

When it comes to more easily predictable and thus escapable violence, a full-time job may not be the most accessible exit option for some women. Women who face more burdens when it comes to entering a workplace, due to complications such as caregiving responsibilities or disabilities, may be less able to rely on a jobs program. However, this could be accounted for with full-time childcare or forms of employment which include people with different abilities. Still, neither UBI nor FJG address the causes of violence, so they both do a fair job of addressing this face of oppression.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Answers to Neg › AT: War Impacts

War inevitable and unending under patriarchy – the disad’s framing reifies masculine ways of conceptualizing international relations.

Peet and Sjoberg, 2020 (Laura Sjoberg, Professor of Political Science at U Florida; the Late Jessica Peet taught IR at the University of Florida and USC. Introduction to Gender and Civilian Victimization in War (Print Book), SPP)

As scholars, the "lenses" we use "foreground some things, and background others" in our research (V. Peterson and Runyan 1999). Our research questions start with the ideas, concepts, and variables we see as most important in global politics. For example, the scholars who have written on intentional civilian victimization have started with the ideas, concepts, and variables they see as most important in global politics, including regime type, international law, strategy, and culture. Like other scholars in IR, feminist work uses "lenses" to foreground variables of particular interest, specifically sex, gender, and sexuality; gender identity; and gender hierarchy, using "gender lenses" to view global politics (V. Peterson and Runyan 1999: 2). Looking through gender lenses is a way "to focus on gender as a particular kind of power relation, or to trace out the ways in which gender is central to understanding international processes" (Steans 1998: 5). While women's oppression is a primary concern for feminists, "the driving force of feminism is its attention to gender and not simply to women .... [T]he concept, nature and practice of gender are key" (Zalewski 1995). Feminists, then, "ask what assumptions about gender (and race, class, nationality, and sexuality) are necessary to make particular statements, policies, and actions meaningful" (Wilcox 2009). In our analysis of civilian victimization, we focus on how the concept, nature, and practice of gender influences states' and other war-fighting parties' decisions to target civilians and ask what assumptions about gender are necessary to make intentional civilian victimization appealing, despite the non-combatant immunity norm. With this focus, we also look at the intersections of gender, race, ethnicity, and nationalism in constituting both the idea of the civilian and her vulnerability. In order to fully grasp why those are important questions, we need to spend a little time understanding what feminists mean by 'sex' and by 'gender' in this context. Many people see sex as biology - male and fem ale sex organs make people men or women. 4 In the conventional wisdom, then, gender is directly related to, and maps onto, sex - men are masculine and women are feminine. However, feminist scholarship has "questioned the conventional assumption that gender differences (and subordination) are rooted in biological differences between women and men" (Scott 1987; Sjoberg 2006a: 32). Instead, feminist scholars suggest that the relation between sex and gender is presumed rather than natural, where masculinity and femininity are separable from maleness and femaleness. Masculine characteristics, like strength, protectiveness, rationality, aggressiveness, presence in public life, domination, and leadership, then, are perceived as related to maleness, while in reality they are not reserved for men. Conversely, traits associated with femininity, like weakness, vulnerability, emotion, passivity, privacy, submission, and care, are assumed to be the domain of women, while that is not always or even normally the case. Genderings can be read into and back onto sex, which is malleable rather than set, and co-constituted with gender (e.g., Butler 1990, 1993). Applying this understanding, gender cannot be operationalized as a 'yes' or 'no' (or 'male' or 'female' question), or as a matter of degree. It also cannot be accounted for by asking questions about 'what women do' differently than 'what men do' in global politics.5 Instead, it is more of a constellation of significations, where masculinities and femininities are mutually constituted (along with race, class, sexuality, etc.) in specific, hierarchical relation to one another - where ( often) masculinities are prized and powerful, while femininities are seen as undesirable and therefore subordinated. In this context, we can talk not just about men and women and masculinities and femininities but of masculinism and feminization. Masculinism is the prizing of masculinities and the exclusion and/ or devaluing of femininities in social and/ or political contexts. Masculinism leads to feminization - the devaluing of femininities by putting down or putting aside people, groups, or ideas associated with femininities and by associating devalued or marginalized people, groups, or ideas with femininities (V. Peterson 2010; see also V. Peterson and Runyan 2010). 6 V. Spike Peterson describes feminization as devalorization: Not only subjects (women and marginalized men), but also concepts, desires, tastes, styles, "ways of knowing" ... can be feminized - with the effect of reducing their legitimacy, status and value. Importantly, this devalorization is simultaneously ideological (discursive, cultural) and material (structural, economic) .... This devalorization normalizes - with the effect of "legitimating" - the marginalization, subordination, and exploitation of feminized practices and persons ... the "naturalness" of sex difference is generalized to the "naturalness" of masculine (not necessarily male) privilege, so that both aspects come to be taken-for -granted "givens" of social life (V. Peterson 2010). In this vein, a key tenet of feminist theorizing about the global political arena is that it is gender -hierarchical (Sjoberg 2009). Though masculinities and femininities are detectable across known human history, they are not static, temporally, geographically, or culturally. Quite the opposite, the dominant 'masculinity' or 'femininity' is different at different times, and in different places and cultures. While "the exact content of genders varies with various and shifting socio-political contexts, ... gender subordination (defined as the subordination of femininities to masculinities) remains a constant feature of social and political life across time and space" (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 9). Feminist research in IR, then, asks how these complex notions of gender constitute and influence the realities of everyday life in global politics . In this book, we are particularly interested in how gender influences belligerents' (especially states') decisions to attack civilians in war in conjunction with other parts of the 'puzzle' of intentional civilian victimization. Thinking about gender and intentional civilian victimization Revisiting the narratives that began this introduction, it is possible to see gender influencing intentional civilian victimization in what happened to Hassan and Benedicte and their contemporaries. Referencing experiences like Benedicte's, Judith Gardam has explained that rape is never truly aimed at or affecting just one person (1993: 363). Instead, "rape functions as a strategy to deliver a blow against a collective energy by striking at a group of high symbolic value" (Pettman 1996: 190). By raping Benedicte, government forces were attacking non -lvoirians by attacking "their" women, as "xenophobic speech [was] aimed specifically at women from the 'enemy' community," encouraging rape and sexual violence (Amnesty International 2007). As a result, sexual violence became "an intentional strategy to terrorise, demean, and defeat an entire population, as well as a way of engendering hate and destruction" between the rebels and the government in Cote d'Ivoire (Amnesty International 2004). In the 1990s war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, women suffered the brunt of civilian victimization, as a result both of apparently gender -neutral tactics and of a systematic campaign of genocidal rape. Reports of mass rape began appearing in newspaper headlines in August of 1992 (Hansen 2001: 55). Women were raped, both individually and as proxy for the nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina also being 'raped.' The rape of civilian women was also the rape of ('their') nation, an idea that was reiterated by Bosnian ambassador to the United Nations addressing the Security Council in 1993: Excellencies, Bosnia and Herzegovina is being gang-raped ... I do not lightly apply the analogy of a gang rape to the plight of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As we know, systematic rape has been one of the weapons of this aggression against the Bosnian women in particular. (Metrovic 1994: xii) In this statement the rape of Bosnian women is metaphor for the destruction and 'rape' of a nation, literally and figuratively. This sort of "rape happens, not as a consequence of thoughtless, provocative, or unfortunate behavior, but as a question of national warfare" (Hansen 2001: 59). Lene Hansen explains that, in Bosnia, [r ]aping "the nation's women" is not only an act of violence against individual women; it also works to install a disempowered masculinity as constitutive of the identities of the nation's men. The interconnection between individual/ collective and national/ gendered might also be illustrated by the way that a woman impregnated by rape can be represented as a passive "national" container of a child imagined to be the future bearer of the rapist's nationality. In this way, an individual rape can be read for its collective, national significance through the complex sign of the child's imagined future identity as an embodiment of the enemy state. (Hansen 2001: 60) Women were also targeted for violence that was not explicitly sexual. Some Serb policy statements emphasized depriving individual households of nutritional and medical resources necessary for reproduction as a way to target the opponent ethnicities. Even the targeting of men had gendered connotations and implications. Planning for the Srebrenica massacre (where an estimated 8,000 men were killed, selected as men for victimization), the killing was discussed as a strategy for reducing the availability of men, who were characterized as fertilizers and protectors for women. Planners referred to their strategies as "cleaning houses" such that women would pose "less resistance to repopulation" (referring to forced impregnation) without 'their' men. 7 Narratives like this could be and have been told of many wars, genocides, conflicts, and terrorist attacks around the world. In this book, we present evidence that when belligerents intentionally victimize civilians, they are actually attacking women because of women's actual and symbolic position in the life, livelihood, and nationalist narratives of the opponent's state and/ or nation. While most people who read Benedicte and Hasan's stories assume that Benedicte's experience was a gendered form of civilian victimization and Hasan's experience was tragic but a case of 'normal' or ungendered civilian victimization, we argue that it is not just in sexual violence against civilians that civilian victimization is gendered. Instead, when civilians are attacked in war, often 'civilian' is in important ways a proxy for women, not as female bodies but for how they are positioned in and symbolic of nation and state. Wartime sexual violence is {like other civilian victimization tactics) a way to get to the 'heart' of the opponent by destroying both crucial resources and the very parts of their society which legitimate the fighting of the war in the first place - pure, innocent women that good men fight just wars to protect (see, e.g., Elshtain 1987). Along these lines, we theorize intentional civilian victimization through gender lenses. Expanding on feminist work about nationalism and war generally, and the noncombatant immunity principle specifically, we contend that the very same logic that makes belligerents so eager to 'protect' their innocent women from wars also encourages them to attack the women who are seen as belonging to their enemies. In war stories, just warriors fight the good fight to protect their innocent women and children from those foreign or outside men who would attack them (Huston 1983). Just warriors, then, legitimate not only wars generally but also their masculinities specifically by protecting women back home (Sjoberg 2006b). Attacking the women that motivate the opponent to fight - the women that symbolize his state and/ or nation and whose protection legitimates his war - attacks both the will to fight a particular war and the logic of war-fighting. In these terms, as we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 3, intentional civilian victimization can be seen as a product of the gendered narratives that legitimate and sustain nationhood and the practices of the making and fighting of wars. We are, of course, not arguing that women and only women are killed in the victimization of civilians. Such an argument would be both inaccurate and oversimplified. We are instead arguing that 'civilian victimization' is, sometimes consciously and sometimes not, an attack on women, where 'civilian' is in important ways a proxy for women. But this proxy is not a simple, one-to-one mapping where belligerents think 'civilian' but mean 'women' (as women), even to the extent that belligerents are willing to admit attacking civilians. Rather the proxy is a complex indicator of state/nation, based on actual and perceived strength. Belligerents attack (women) civilians for the same reason they claim protection for their own - because the 'protection racket' is an underlying justification for states, governments, and their wars (see, e.g., S. Peterson 1977). Insomuch as women are indicators, signifiers, and reproducers of state and nation, belligerents attack women to attack the state and nation. We contend that such an explanation, when compared to the others that have been presented up to this point, provides both greater theoretical leverage towards understanding the problem of civilian targeting and greater empirical explanatory power for the particulars of cases of civilian victimization in war. In the remainder of this introduction, we outline how this book makes that argument and presents both quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence to support it.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Answers to Neg › AT: War Impacts

Their DA impact invisibilizes gender as a structuring logic of conflict and violence which makes their impacts inevitable

Applin et al ’23 (Samantha, Assistant Professor @ SUNY Cortland, John-Michael Simpson, Assistant Professor @ SUNY Cortland, and Anna Curtis, Associate Professor @ SUNY Cortland, “Men Have Gender and Women Are People: A Structural Approach to Gender and Violence”, Violence Against Women, 2023, Vol. 29(5) 1097–1118)

Research in the social sciences on violence that is not identified as “gendered” often falls into the bracket of “mainstream” violence research. Such research focuses chiefly on incidences involving boys/men, although this may not be acknowledged forthrightly in these analyses, and a systematic structural gender analysis is commonly missing from mainstream violence research. The de-emphasis on gender in such research occurs in the context of patriarchal gender systems in which researchers are invariably situated. Empirically, it is quite clear that violence is a highly gendered social occurrence, so feminist explanations provide context for the continued discounting of its centrality in core explanations. The gendered nature of violence is identifiable “through perpetrators’ characteristics, their decision-making, and its effects,” as Kaiser and Hagan (2015, p. 79) noted in a study on genocide in Darfur, wherein they concluded that all studies of such offenses should consider gender. Given that research focusing on the violence of boys/men is largely constitutive of “mainstream” social science inquiries into violence, the absence of a systematic structural gender analysis is both endemic and largely unacknowledged, a theoretical shortcoming that is aided by multiple conventions within the social sciences. Beyond the segregation of topics on women, gender, and “gendered” violence into specialized subareas, these conventions include the overrepresentation of men as research subjects in violence research without categorizing such research as specialized, the absence of identifiers for men in research that is presented as the study of people, and underpinnings of gender essentializing based on largely unspoken presumptions of biological determinism. These latter points collectively lend themselves to the discounting of men as gendered actors, and to the interpretation of social life, culture, and social structure through a shallow understanding of gendered processes when men, especially, are studied. Multiple studies have found that girls/women are underrepresented in samples used in criminological assessments in both sociology and criminology journals (Hannon & Dufour, 1998; Hughes, 2005; Sharp & Hefley, 2007). That men commit more violence than women traditionally justified the tendency to focus research and theoretical development on men (Britton, 2000; Hannon & Dufour, 1998), yet this reasoning is inconsistent with general principles of social science methodology where comparison is the foundation of social inquiry. “When researchers sample only men because men commit more crime,” Hannon and Dufour (1998) noted, “they are often sampling around the dependent variable by excluding a group known to be disproportionately located on one side of the mean” (p. 64). Significant differences in the perpetration of violence based on gender should justify more research focusing on women and gender, not less, given that social conditions and expectations for women provide a contradistinction to 1100 Violence Against Women 29(5) men worth exploring as scholars theorize on the cultur men worth exploring as scholars theorize on the cultural and structural (rather than individual or pathological) roots of violence. Additionally, the theoretical shortcomings associated with oversampling men are compounded by the tendency in scholarship to reference studies conducted on men as representing the proclivities, conditions, and opportunities of all people. Hannon and Dufour (1998) found that about 90% of articles with samples of boys/men overgeneralized in their title for both time periods. When the sample was comprised of women, the title reflected the sample composition in all cases except one, indicating the tendency to include identifiers for samples of women. Contemporary scholarship often builds upon a scaffold of overgeneralized research presented as research about human conditions and behaviors. In a similar manner, societal and historical harms largely perpetrated by men are often discussed in nongendered terms, allowing for the neglect of gendered perspectives in assessments of these social occurrences. For example, Chief Executive Officers of the transatlantic investment banking system who contributed to the 2008 global economic crisis played a role in “inflicting endemic and catastrophic levels of systemic violence upon the global population at large” (Ellis & Wykes, 2013, p. 85). Although a group largely consisting of men inflicted tremendous harm, these acts are not typically conceptualized as a form of men’s violence, demonstrating “the massive falsification of consciousness that patriarchy [and capital hegemony] continues to purvey” (Ellis & Wykes, 2013, p. 85). With respect to climate change, Cuomo (2011) observed that “the implication that humans as a species have caused climate change” is misleading and obscures the “people and particular cultures, nations, industries, and economic systems” (p. 697) overwhelmingly responsible for these environmental impacts. “Men, primarily wealthier heterosexual white men from the global North,” wrote Wonders and Danner (2015) “have disproportionate influence over decisions shaping the causes, consequences, and responses to climate change through their domination of economic and political decisionmaking” (p. 403). Universalizing responsibility for social issues such as climate change detracts from an acknowledgment of the systems and groups primarily responsible for these global harms that disproportionately impact women and other vulnerable populations (Wonders & Danner, 2015). With respect to mass atrocities such as genocide, Nyseth Brehm et al. (2016) observed that the de-emphasis of social characteristics such as gender is common in the literature, which often focuses on men but does not analyze gender. Talking about men in general terms not only treats the exclusion of women as nonsignificant, but also renders men as a social group invisible. When it comes to violence, women’s gender is more likely than the gender of men to be marked as a factor in their collective behaviors or experiences. Because men are treated as “generalized people,” their behaviors/social conditions are implicitly framed as nongendered. Women are identified and separated out, and thus become the group that “needs to be explained” through a gendered analysis. By failing to explicitly equate gender with boys/men and their behaviors, numerous researchers fail to incorporate a meaningful gender analysis in their work (for a detailed discussion, see Ellis & Wykes, 2013). When scholars include gender in their assessments, the treatment is often shallow, such that it does not capture the extent to which gender structures social life. In an analysis of over 300 pieces in three of the most highly ranked journals in criminology, Sharp and Hefley (2007) found that nearly 85% of the articles either ignored gender, focused solely on men, or simply controlled for gender in the analysis. Similarly, in Davies and True’s (2015) analysis of research on conflict-related sexual violence, they argued that such studies “unintentionally compartmentalize gender, often treating it as a single, isolable variable,” and in doing so, “neglect the volume of feminist research that reveals that gender cannot be disaggregated from instrumentality and political violence” (p. 496). Although research on conflict-related sexual violence has been consequential in reconceptualizing these acts as mass atrocity crimes and as political in nature, the research also ignores the centrality of gender in explaining this class of violence, rendering theoretical explanations, and thus policy responses incomplete (Davies & True, 2015).5

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Answers to Neg › AT: War Impacts

Sexual violence happens on a continuum – focus on systemic impacts is key since patriarchal warmaking causes endless violence.

Sheperd ‘9 [Laura J. Dept of Political Science and International Studies, U of Birmingham (UK), “Gender, Violence and Global Politics: Contemporary Debates in Feminist Security Studies,” Political Studies Review, V7 I2, Apr]

According to conventional accounts of international relations (IR), scholars focus on war (predominantly as a means to providing the sovereign state with security) and the existence of war's corollary is a foundational assumption that goes largely unquestioned. Peace must exist, for international relations are not characterised by perpetual conflict. However, peace is implicitly defined, in dichotomous terms, by the absence of violent conflict, as 'not-war'. Of more analytical interest is conflict, which is always a possibility and which, moreover, occurs between states. International relations as a discipline, narrowly conceived, is largely unconcerned with activities that occur within the state. Minimally, feminist and other critical approaches to IR seek to correct such disciplinary myopia. While classical realism theorises the political actor –Hans Morgenthau's 'political man' (1973, pp. 15–6) – in order to construct the state as actor, the now dominant neo-realism abstracts the human subject from its disciplinary musings, leading to the infamous 'black box' model of the state. Early feminist scholarship challenged this assumption as well, arguing that individuals, as human subjects in all their messy complexity, are an integral part of international relations (see Shepherd, 2007, pp. 240–1). Attention to the human subject in I/international R/relations – or, as Christine Sylvester phrases it, 'relations international', to emphasise the embedded nature of all kinds of relations in the international sphere, including power relations and gender relations (Sylvester, 1994, p. 6; see also Enloe, 1996) – allows critical scholars to look beyond the disciplinary obsession with war. Further, it allows us to investigate one of the simplest insights of feminist IR, which is also one of the most devastating: the war/peace dichotomy is gendered, misleading and potentially pathological. In this essay, I address each of these concerns in turn, developing a critique of the war/peace dichotomy that is foundational to conventional approaches to IR through a review of three recent publications in the field of feminist security studies. These texts are Cynthia Enloe's (2007) Globalization and Militarism, David Roberts' (2008) Human Insecurity, and Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women's Violence in Global Politics by Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry (2008). Drawing on the insights of these books, I ask first how violence is understood in global politics, with specific reference to the gendered disciplinary blindnesses that frequently characterise mainstream approaches. Second, I demonstrate how a focus on war and peace can neglect to take into account the politics of everyday violence: the violences of the in-between times that international politics recognises neither as 'war' nor 'peace' and the violences inherent to times of peace that are overlooked in the study of war. Finally, I argue that feminist security studies offers an important corrective to the foundational assumptions of IR, which themselves can perpetuate the very instances of violence that they seek to redress. If we accept the core insights of feminist security studies – the centrality of the human subject, the importance of particular configurations of masculinity and femininity, and the gendered conceptual framework that underpins the discipline of IR – we are encouraged to envisage a rather different politics of the global. From Boudica to Bhopal As Sjoberg and Gentry recount (2008, pp. 38–9), Boudica was an Iceni queen who led an uprising against the Roman forces occupying the British Isles circa 61 AD. Prior to launching the attack, Boudica's refusal to allow a Roman general to claim ownership of her land resulted in the rape of her two daughters as punishment. However, 'many inherited tales about Boudica do not emphasise her personal or political motivations, but the savage and unwomanly brutality of her actions' (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, p. 39). Almost two thousand years later and half a planet away, a toxic gas leak in 1984 at a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India caused the immediate deaths of approximately 3,000 people and left tens of thousands suffering the after-effects for decades (Roberts, 2008, p. 10). At first reading, little links these two accounts of quite different forms of violence. The first is an instance of violent resistance against imperial oppression, and Boudica has been vilified, her efforts delegitimised, in much the same way as many actors in 'small wars' tend to be in global politics today (see Barkawi, 2004). The second is perhaps more usefully seen as the result of structural violence, following Johan Galtung's explanation of the same, as 'violence where there is no such actor' (cited in Roberts, 2008, p. 18). However, by asking questions about Boudica and Bhopal that are born of a 'feminist curiosity' (Enloe, 2007, p. 1, p. 11), these texts demonstrate connections beyond the simplistic equation that is applicable to both: actor/structure plus violence equals death. In Human Insecurity, Roberts poses the question, 'What is violence?' (2008, p. 17). This is a question rarely asked in international relations. Violence is war: large-scale, state-dominated, much studied, war. However, the three texts under review here all offer more nuanced theories of violence that focus analytical attention on complex constructions of agency (institutional and international), structure, and the global context that is product and productive of such violence. Through an intricate and beautifully accessible analysis of modernity –'that pot of gold at the end of the global rainbow' (Enloe, 2007, p. 64) – Enloe encourages her readers to seek the connections between globalisation and militarisation, arguing that at the heart of this nexus lie important questions about violence and security. Roberts notes a broad dissatisfaction with the concept of 'human security' (2008, pp. 14–7), offering instead his investigative lens of 'human insecurity', defined as 'avoidable civilian deaths, occurring globally, caused by social, political and economic institutions and structures, built and operated by humans and which could feasibly be changed' (p. 28). Placing the human at the centre of concerns about security immediately challenges a conventional state-based approach to security, as Enloe explains. In a convincing account of the hard-fought expansion of the concept of security, mapped on to strategic and organisational gains made by various feminist organisations, Enloe reminds us that if we take seriously the lives of women – their understandings of security – as well as on-the-ground workings of masculinity and femininity, we will be able to produce more meaningful and more reliable analyses of 'security'– personal, national and global (Enloe, 2007, p. 47). This latter quote typifies an approach for which Enloe has become somewhat famous. In the early 1980s, Enloe began asking the questions for which she is rightly acknowledged as a key figure in feminist security studies, including Does Khaki Become You? (Enloe, 1983) and 'where are the women?' (Enloe, 2000; see also Enloe, 2004). Inspired by her own curiosity about the roles played by women and the functions performed by gender in the militarisation of civilian life, Enloe has explored prostitution, marriage, welfare and war making with an eye to the representation (both political and symbolic) of women. In Globalization and Militarism she offers detailed vignettes that illuminate just how interwoven violence is with the quest for (various types of) security, and demands that nothing is left unquestioned in a critical analysis of these concepts. Even baby socks (embossed with tiny fighter planes, a gift to the parent of a small boy) have something to tell us about gender, militarism and the casual representations of violence and war that society accepts (Enloe, 2007, pp. 143–4). Following a similar logic, although he initially defines human insecurity as avoidable civilian deaths, Roberts focuses on 'preventable female deaths ... and avoidable deaths in children under five' (2008, p. 31). While this conflation of 'civilian' with 'women and children' is rather problematic (see Carpenter, 2006), in asking not only, where are the women? but also, why are they dying in such disproportionate numbers? Roberts enhances his critique of 'most security studies ... [that] largely [miss] the scale of avoidable human misery and avoidable human death' (2008, p. 4). As mentioned above, Roberts uses Galtung's concept of structural violence to draw attention to the manifest ways in which an increasingly interconnected global system relies on gender and violence (and gendered violence) for its perpetuation: 'The process of globalization, to which few are ideologically or otherwise opposed, is an essential conveyor and articulator of the masculinity that underpins andrarchy' (Roberts, 2008, p. 157). Whereas Enloe offers a persuasive and accessible account of patriarchy, a concept familiar to feminist and non-feminist scholars alike (Enloe, 2007, pp. 66–8), Roberts suggests 'andrarchy' as an alternative, which he defines as 'the gender-partisan ideological domination and rule structure that determines and sustains the general relative power of males over females globally' (Roberts, 2008, p. 140). However, it is difficult to see how this reformulation either differs substantively from patriarchy as an analytical tool or assists in the construction of an alternative theory of global violence that centralises the individual, and therefore takes gender seriously, in that it seems to essentialise violent actors (males) and violated victims (females). In contrast, Enloe's explanation of patriarchy challenges such essentialism as its first point of critical intervention. That is, the assumption of essential differences between men and women is part of patriarchal ideology, feeding into stereotypical notions of how such men and women should behave, which in turn constitute recognisable discourses of gender: sets of narratives about masculinity and femininity and how these are, in general, respectively privileged and marginalised. The most theoretically coherent account of gender and violence offered in these three texts comes from Sjoberg and Gentry and employs the notion of discourse to great effect. Whereas Roberts seeks to map out a consciously structural account of global violence, where the structure in question is a hybrid of andrarchy and a 'rapacious, increasingly competitive and hyper-masculine' neoliberalism (Roberts, 2008, p. 118), Sjoberg and Gentry offer a more sophisticated analysis of structure and agency in their 'relational autonomy framework' that accounts for both individual agency and structural constraint (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, pp. 189–98). When people perform acts of political violence, they argue, this is a conscious choice, but crucially individuals 'choose within a specified spectrum of socially acceptable choices' (p. 190). 'In its simplest form, relational autonomy is the recognition that freedom of action is defined and limited by social relationships' (p. 194) and this has profound implications for the study of violence in global politics. Sjoberg and Gentry use this insight to demonstrate that women's violence in global politics is rendered unintelligible, through narrative representations of the perpetrators as mothers, monsters or whores (in media discourse and academic discussion), rather than as autonomous agents. From the abuses of prisoners held at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, via the 'black widows' of Chechnya, to female perpetrators of genocidal violence in Rwanda, the authors show how representations of women's violence conform to and further confirm the stereotypes of violent women as either mothers (supporting or vengeful), monsters or sexually deviant whores (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, pp. 30–49). The very different theories of violence outlined in these three texts all contribute to the development of a more comprehensive and holistic understanding of violence in global politics. By insisting that international relations are also gender relations – by demanding that we recognise that states are an analytical abstraction and politics is practised or performed by gendered bodies – all of the authors put forward theories of violence that are corrective of gender blindness, in that the violences in question are simultaneously gendered and gendering (see Shepherd, 2008, pp. 49–54). They are gendered because they have different impacts on male and female bodies (Enloe, 2007, p. 13), both materially as people experience violence differently depending on their gender (and race, class, sexuality and so on) and also discursively, as what we expect of men and women in terms of their behaviours, violent and otherwise, is limited by the meaning(s) ascribed to male and female bodies by society. Regarding the former, Roberts proposes that we term the global victimisation of women 'structural femicide' (Roberts, 2008, p. 65), but does not sufficiently engage with the question of whether defining gendered violence as violence against women (and children) functions to constitute the subject of 'woman' as a perpetual victim, in need of protection and lacking in agency (Shepherd, 2008, p. 41). In contrast, Sjoberg and Gentry neatly articulate the interplay between material and discursive violence as they write a theory that accounts 'for people's impact on global politics and for the impact of narratives others construct for and about them' (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, p. 216, emphasis in original). Thus, violence is gendering as our understanding of politics is in part reproduced through violent actions. Through discursive violence against individuals – for example, representing Chechen women suicide terrorists as 'black widows', which demands that they are attributed the characteristics of the venomous and deadly black widow spider and, further, that their violence is grounded in familial loss, 'born directly of a desire for vengeance for the deaths of their husbands and sons' (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, p. 100) rather than as the result of a process of political decision making – our understanding of that individual and of the act of violence itself is produced. Similarly, through material acts of violence, discourses of gender are given physical form; the detainees at Abu Ghraib who were forced to simulate oral sex with each other were forced to do so in part because of crude cultural understandings of homosexuality as deviant and homosexuals as lesser men – that is, as women. To force a man to perform oral sex on another man is to undermine his masculinity and simultaneously to reinforce the gendered power relations that claim privilege for masculinity over femininity, heterosexuality over homosexuality – power relations that render such an act intelligible in the first instance. Such understandings of violence are beyond the remit of conventional state-based approaches to international relations. However, 'it is by tracking the gendered assumptions about how to wield feminization to humiliate male[s]' (Enloe, 2007, p. 115) and how to represent gendered individuals in such a way as to render some acts of violence intelligible as political and others as monstrous that we can begin to piece together a useful feminist account of global violence, which is a necessary component of understanding security. Everyday Violence and In-Between Days In addition to questioning what violence is, how it is represented and with what effects, feminist security studies scholarship also asks which violences are considered worthy of study and when these violences occur. Expanding the concept of violence that underpins feminist analysis, as outlined above, allows us to take seriously what Arthur Kleinman (2000) refers to as 'the violences of everyday life'. Beyond a narrow focus on war and state-based violence lies a plethora of everyday violences that feminist security studies seeks to address. In the field of security studies the broadening and deepening of the concept of security, such that it is no longer assumed to apply only to the sovereign state, has demonstrated the multiple insecurities experienced by individuals and social collectives (Booth, 2005, pp. 14–5). The development of the concept of 'human security' largely took place within the parameters of a wider disciplinary debate over the appropriate referent object for security studies (the individual, society, the state) and the types of threat to the referent object that would be recognised. In a move similar to Ken Booth's (1991) reformulation of security as emancipation, Roberts' quest for individual empowerment seeks to overcome the 'élite-legitimized disequilibrium' that results in the manifest insecurity of the majority of the world's population (Roberts, 2008, p. 185). As might be expected, the violences Roberts identifies are innumerable. In addition to the physical violences of 'infanticide, maternal mortality, intimate ("domestic", "honour" and "dowry") killings and lethal female genital mutilation; and avoidable deaths in children under five' (Roberts, 2008, p. 31), his analysis attacks the institutional structures of the dominant international financial institutions (pp. 117–35) and the andrarchal and neoliberal discourses that sustain them (pp. 136–58). In short, Roberts' answer to the question of which violences matter in global politics is quite simple: all of them. However, while studies of human security, he argues, seek to provide the human with security, his reformulated analytic takes as its starting point human insecurity; that is, he starts with the threat(s) to the sovereign subject rather than the subject's ontological condition. Roberts suggests that this circumvents the disciplinary definitional problem with human security – identified by Roland Paris (2001), Edward Newman (2001; 2004) and others – but I cannot see how this is the case, given that the answer to the question 'what is it that humans do to make the world a more dangerous and dysfunctional place?' (Roberts, 2008, p. 28) is also quite simple: we live in it. Thus Roberts' analytic seems to suffer the same lack of definitional clarity – and therefore policy relevance – that he ascribes to more conventional approaches; it is no easier to identify, quantify and ultimately reduce the threats experienced by coexisting human subjects than it is to provide those human subjects with security, if security can first be defined as freedom from fear or want. I do not espouse some construction of human nature (if such a thing were to exist) that assumes essential selfishness and a propensity for violence, nor do I assume that security is a zero-sum game, in that one person's security must always be at the expense of another's, but I recognise that even the most well-intentioned security policy can have unforeseen and sometimes disastrous effects. Sometimes, moreover, as Sjoberg and Gentry demonstrate, the decision to perform acts of political violence that are a source of insecurity for the intended victims can be understood if not condoned. Enloe's analytical remit is similarly wide-ranging to Roberts', in that she focuses on processes – globalisation and militarism – that are inherently violent. However, although Enloe also insists that all violences should count in the study of global politics, she grounds this claim in an analysis of specific sites of violence and demonstrates with startling clarity just how everyday items – for example, sneakers – are both globalised and militarised: Threaded through virtually every sneaker you own is some relationship to masculinized militaries. Locating factories in South Korea [in the 1960s and 1970s] was a good strategic decision in the eyes of those Oregon-headquartered male Nike executives because of the close alliance between male policymakers in Washington and Seoul. It was a relationship – unequal but intimate – based on their shared anticommunism, their shared commitment to waging the Cold War, and their shared participation in an ambitious international military alliance (Enloe, 2007, p. 28). By drawing her readers' attention to the ways in which discourses of gender (ideas about how 'proper' men and women should behave) function, Enloe reminds us that adhering to ideals of masculinity and femininity is both productive of violence and is a violence in itself, a violence against the empowered human subject. 'Ideas matter', she concludes, ideas about modernity, security, violence, threat, trust. 'Each of these ideas is fraught with blatant and subtle presumptions about masculinity and femininity. Ideas about both masculinity and femininity matter. This makes a feminist curiosity a necessity' (Enloe, 2007, p. 161). While conventional studies of IR and security may be willing to concede that ideas matter (see Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001), paying close attention to the work that gender does allows for a fuller understanding of why it is that particular violences fall outside the traditional parameters of study. As to the question of when violence is worthy of study, all three texts implicitly or explicitly draw on the popular feminist phrase: 'the personal is political'. This slogan neatly encapsulates the feminist critique of a supposed foundational divide between the private and the public realms of social life. In arguing that the personal is political, feminist theory refuses to accept that there are instances of human behaviour or situations in social life that can or should be bracketed from study. At its simplest, this critique led to the recognition of 'domestic violence' as a political, rather than a personal issue (see, for example Moore, 2003; Youngs, 2003), forming the foundation for critical studies of gendered violence in times of war and in times of peace that would otherwise have been ignored. Crucially, Enloe extended the boundaries of critique to include the international, imbuing the phrase with new analytical vitality when she suggested, first, that the phrase itself is palindromic (that is, that the political is also personal, inextricably intertwined with the everyday) and, second, that the personal is international just as the international is personal. 'The international is personal' implies that governments depend upon certain kinds of allegedly private relationships in order to conduct their foreign affairs. ... To operate in the international arena, governments seek other governments' recognition of their sovereignty; but they also depend on ideas about masculinised dignity and feminised sacrifice to sustain that sense of autonomous nationhood (Enloe, 2000, pp. 196–7). These ideas about dignity and sacrifice are not neatly contained within the temporal boundaries of any given war, nor are they incidental to the practice of warfare. Further, there is of course also the question of who gets to define or declare war, or peace. While some of the violent women whose actions are analysed by Sjoberg and Gentry perform their violences in wartime (for example, Lynndie England, who received the most attention from global media of the women involved in prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib; see Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, pp. 67–70), others are fighting wars that are not sanctioned by the international community (such as the Chechen women [pp. 97–111] and female Palestinian suicide bombers [pp. 112–40]). As discussed above, ideas about masculinity and femininity, dignity and sacrifice may not only be violent in themselves, but are also the product/productive of physical violences. With this in mind, the feminist argument that 'peacetime' is analytically misleading is a valid one. Of interest are the 'in-between days' and the ways in which labelling periods of war or peace as such can divert attention away from the myriad violences that inform and reinforce social behaviour. [W]ar can surely never be said to start and end at a clearly defined moment. Rather, it seems part of a continuum of conflict, expressed now in armed force, now in economic sanctions or political pressure. A time of supposed peace may come later to be called 'the pre-war period'. During the fighting of a war, unseen by the foot soldiers under fire, peace processes are often already at work. A time of postwar reconstruction, later, may be re-designated as an inter bellum– a mere pause between wars (Cockburn and Zarkov, cited in El Jack, 2003, p. 9). Feminist security studies interrogates the pauses between wars, and the political processes – and practices of power – that demarcate times as such. In doing so, not only is the remit of recognisable violence (violence worthy of study) expanded, but so too are the parameters of what counts as IR. Everyday violences and acts of everyday resistance ('a fashion show, a tour, a small display of children's books' in Enloe, 2007, pp. 117–20) are the stuff of relations international and, thus, of a comprehensive understanding of security. In the following section I outline the ways in which taking these claims seriously allows us to engage critically with the representations of international relations that inform our research, with potentially profound implications. The Violent Reproduction of the International As well as conceiving of gender as a set of discourses, and violence as a means of reproducing and reinforcing the relevant discursive limits, it is possible to see security as a set of discourses, as I have argued more fully elsewhere (Shepherd, 2007; 2008; see also Shepherd and Weldes, 2007). Rather than pursuing the study of security as if it were something that can be achieved either in absolute, partial or relative terms, engaging with security as discourse enables the analysis of how these discourses function to reproduce, through various strategies, the domain of the international with which IR is self-consciously concerned. Just as violences that are gendering reproduce gendered subjects, on this view states, acting as authoritative entities, perform violences, but violences, in the name of security, also perform states. These processes occur simultaneously, and across the whole spectrum of social life: an instance of rape in war is at once gendering of the individuals involved and of the social collectivities – states, communities, regions – they feel they represent (see Bracewell, 2000); building a fence in the name of security that separates people from their land and extended families performs particular kinds of violence (at checkpoints, during patrols) and performs particular subject identities (of the state authority, of the individuals affected), all of which are gendered. All of the texts under discussion in this essay argue that it is imperative to explore and expose gendered power relations and, further, that doing so not only enables a rigorous critique of realism in IR but also reminds us as scholars of the need for such a critique. The critiques of IR offered by feminist scholars are grounded in a rejection of neo-realism/realism as a dominant intellectual framework for academics in the discipline and policy makers alike. As Enloe reminds us, 'the government-centred, militarized version of national security [derived from a realist framework] remains the dominant mode of policy thinking' (Enloe, 2007, p. 43). Situating gender as a central category of analysis encourages us to 'think outside the "state security box"' (p. 47) and to remember that 'the "individuals" of global politics do not work alone, live alone or politic alone – they do so in interdependent relationships with others' (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, p. 200) that are inherently gendered. One of the key analytical contributions of all three texts is the way in which they all challenge what it means to be 'doing' IR, by recognising various forms of violence, interrogating the public/private divide and demanding that attention is paid to the temporal and physical spaces in-between war and peace. Feminist security studies should not simply be seen as 'women doing security', or as 'adding women to IR/security studies', important as these contributions are. Through their theorising, the authors discussed here reconfigure what 'counts' as IR, challenging orthodox notions of who can 'do' IR and what 'doing' IR means. The practices of power needed to maintain dominant configurations of international relations are exposed, and critiquing the productive power of realism as a discourse is one way in which the authors do this. Sjoberg and Gentry pick up on a recent theoretical shift in Anglo-American IR, from system-level analysis to a recognition that individuals matter. However, as they rightly point out, the individuals who are seen to matter are not gendered relational beings, but rather reminiscent of Hobbes' construction of the autonomous rational actor. '[T]he narrowness of the group that [such an approach] includes limits its effectiveness as an interpretive framework and reproduces the gender, class and race biases in system-level international relationship scholarship' (Sjoberg and Gentry 2008, p. 200, emphasis added). Without paying adequate attention to the construction of individuals as gendered beings, or to the reproduction of widely held ideas about masculine and feminine behaviours, Sjoberg and Gentry remind us that we will ultimately fail 'to see and deconstruct the increasingly subtle, complex and disguised ways in which gender pervades international relations and global politics' (2008, p. 225). In a similar vein, Roberts notes that 'human security is marginalised or rejected as inauthentic [because] it is not a reflection of realism's (male) agendas and priorities' (2008, p. 169). The 'agendas and priorities' identified by Roberts and acknowledged by Sjoberg and Gentry as being productive of particular biases in scholarship are not simply 'academic' matters, in the pejorative sense of the term. As Roberts argues, 'Power relationships of inequality happen because they are built that way by human determinism of security and what is required to maintain security (p. 171). Realism, as academic discourse and as policy guideline, has material effects. Although his analysis employs an unconventional definition of the term 'social construction' (seemingly interchangeable with 'human agency') and rests on a novel interpretation of the three foundational assumptions of realism (Roberts, 2008, pp. 169–77), the central point that Roberts seeks to make in his conclusion is valid: 'it is a challenge to those who deny relationships between gender and security; between human agency (social construction) and lethal outcome' (p. 183). In sum, all three texts draw their readers to an inescapable, and – for the conventional study of IR – a devastating conclusion: the dominance of neo-realism/realism and the state-based study of security that derives from this is potentially pathological, in that it is in part productive of the violences it seeks to ameliorate. I suggest that critical engagement with orthodox IR theory is necessary for the intellectual growth of the discipline, and considerable insight can be gained by acknowledging the relevance of feminist understandings of gender, power and theory. The young woman buying a T-shirt from a multinational clothing corporation with her first pay cheque, the group of young men planning a stag weekend in Amsterdam, a group of students attending a demonstration against the bombing of Afghanistan – studying these significant actions currently falls outside the boundaries of doing security studies in mainstream IR and I believe these boundaries need contesting. As Marysia Zalewski argues: International politics is what we make it to be ... We need to rethink the discipline in ways that will disturb the existing boundaries of both that which we claim to be relevant in international politics and what we assume to be legitimate ways of constructing knowledge about the world (Zalewski 1996, p. 352, emphasis in original). Conclusion: 'Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend' (Mao Tse-Tung) In this essay, I have used the analysis of three contemporary publications in the field of feminist security studies to demonstrate three significant sets of analytical contributions that such scholarship makes to the discipline of IR. Beyond the war/peace dichotomy that is frequently assumed to be definitive of the discipline, we find many and various forms of violence, occurring in and between temporally distinct periods of conflict, which are the product/productive of socially acceptable modes of gendered behaviour, ways of being in the world as a woman or man. I have also argued that critical engagement with conventional, state-based approaches to (national) security must persist as the academic discourses we write are complicit in the construction of the global as we understand it. Further, 'if all experience is gendered, analysis of gendered identities is an imperative starting point in the study of political identities and practice' (Peterson, 1999, p. 37). To this end, I conclude by suggesting that we take seriously Enloe's final comment: 'Tracking militarization and fostering demilitarization will call for cooperative investigations, multiple skills and the appreciation of diverse perspectives' (2007, p. 164). While there has been intense intra-disciplinary debate within contemporary feminist security studies over the necessary 'feminist credentials' of some gendered analyses, it is important to recognise the continual renewal and analytical vigour brought to the field by such debates.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Answers to Neg › AT: Social Services Turn

A UBI would be in addition to other social programs, not replacement – that is what universal means

Tereshchenko, 2023 – Political Scientist at the Panteion - University of Athens [Sofia, Feb 23 “The Global Importance Of Universal Basic Income (UBI) Manifestation - Universal Basic Income And Why It’s A Solution Needed Right Now” Acc 3/23/23 TA]

A Universal Basic Income is one where every person in society is guaranteed a set amount of money to maintain their basic needs. The UBI does not take the place of other social welfare programs, but rather supplements them. This proposal is most often discussed as a solution for economic security, where people would no longer have to work for money to access their basic needs or steal…by raising the criminal rates high. The UBI could be implemented through various systems: a tax on capital, an increase in minimum wage or even an increase in the general price level. One of the most promising implementations would be an increase in the minimum wage, which increases as productivity increases (and therefore decreases unemployment). And is adjusted to keep the same percentage of income over time.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Answers to Neg › AT: Social Services Turn

The negative assumes that the government budget is fixed, but a UBI increases support for increasing the budget.

Hanna and Olken, 2018 - prof of South-East Asia Studies and prof of Economics at MIT [Rema and Benjamin, Harvard Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall “Universal Basic Incomes versus Targeted Transfers: Anti-Poverty Programs in Developing Countries” TA]

Other Challenges with Targeted Transfers In choosing between a broader approach like a universal basic income and a more narrowly targeted approach, several other important considerations arise in addition to inclusion and exclusion errors. We consider four issues: breadth of political support, horizontal equity, transparency, and labor market distortions. First, we have focused on the case where the government has a fixed budget available for the transfer program. However, political support for redistribution may be much higher if everyone gets a “piece of the pie” (Gelbach and Pritchett 2002). Thus, as inclusion error increases, the overall amount of funding available for transfers may increase. As the elasticity between the total budget and the number of beneficiaries increases, universal transfers become more attractive (Klasen and Lange 2016). Second, the principle of horizontal equity holds that each person who has the same relevant conditions should be treated the same. Transfer programs using proxy-means tests will have errors in the prediction algorithm—and so they do not treat all people with the same utility of receiving the benefits identically. For programs where the income cutoff for providing benefits is near-zero, horizontal equity violations are (mechanically) close to zero, because almost no households receive the program. Violations of horizontal equity are also mechanically zero for universal basic income: by definition, if all households receive the transfer, then all households are treated the same.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Answers to Neg › AT: Social Services Turn

Non-Unique – social programs are being cut now due to GOP opposition

Sammon, 2023 - Slate politics writer [Alexander March 07, Slate “The Incredible Shrinking Power of Joe Biden’s Welfare State” TA]

The worst may be yet to come. Every five years, Congress negotiates the Farm Bill, which is the country’s largest agricultural and food policy omnibus. It’s up for negotiation again this fall. In the last go-around in 2018, Republicans tried to gore SNAP benefits during its deliberation, at the behest of President Trump, but failed to do so. It’s no secret that slashing SNAP is yet again on the GOP’s wishlist. SNAP has also come up as a potential hostage in the debt limit fight. After the party’s vocal pledge during Biden’s State of the Union not to cut Social Security or Medicare—and the party’s quasi-religious respect for the largest possible military budget—SNAP remains one of the only major social services that might be cut in the name of a “balanced budget.” For President Biden, the quiet expiration of enhanced SNAP marks yet another disappearing act in his once vaunted welfare state. The Child Tax Credit, a signature Biden policy in the American Rescue Plan Act, halved child poverty. But it expired with relatively little pushback at the end of 2021. Enhanced unemployment benefits expired three months before that. Now, Medicaid is next. The continuous enrollment provision that was added to Medicaid during COVID, which has allowed Americans to remain enrolled in the program without constant eligibility reassessments, is set to expire on March 31. It is estimated that between 5 million and 14 million people will promptly lose Medicaid coverage once that change is effectuated. And despite the fact that these programs are effective and popular, there has been shockingly little vocal opposition from Democrats to the expiration of these benefits. In the first two years of the Biden administration, some very good progress was made in the so-called war on poverty. But those gains are being given back quickly. “This is a steep and precipitous drop in benefit amounts,” said Ellen Vollinger, SNAP director for the Food Research and Action Center. “There would’ve been a smoother offramp if people had had more months to plan. The decision was made at the end of December, and getting the word out was a challenge.”

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Answers to Neg › AT: Women will Exit the Workforce

A basic income will not cause women to leave the labor market – other factors are more important and existing welfare programs give much worse disincentives to women workers.

Cantillon and McLean, 2016 - Glasgow Caledonian University and UC Berkeley [Sara and Caitlin, Sept 3, The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, Basic Income Guarantee: The Gender Impact within Households," Available at: TA]

At the same time, predictions of a drop in women's labor force participation may also be overstated. Sociological and heterodox economic perspectives have emphasized broader motivations other than income regarding labor force participation, such as status, satisfaction, and other less tangible benefits. The incentive for unemployed persons to take up employment is most often measured using the "replacement rate" (RR)—the ratio between net income out of work and net income when in work, and research in this area reinforces the idea of work or employment being more than just income. Empirical data shows that there are many who choose to work, despite facing replacement ratios of close to or over 100 percent (Callan et al., 2011). That is, they choose to be working, even if they could be close to or even better off financially by remaining unemployed. BIG advocates (Fitzpatrick, 1999; Van Parijs, 1995) further point out that existing systems of social security have substantial disincentives to work embodied in unemployment and poverty traps where low-income households face severe reductions in benefits for every dollar they earn. Combined with logistical problems, financial costs of entering work, and uncertainty regarding stability of employment, there is a huge incentive to forgo work in favor of benefits, if choosing one reduces income from the other. BIG reduces such disincentives, thus potentially making the most vulnerable women better off, with greater rather than lesser incentive to engage in paid labor. This issue highlights the role of women's diversity in creating ambiguous effects of BIG, with some women likely to be gainers and some losers under any reform (see also Robeyns, 2001).