2023
CNDI
Negative
Feminist UBI NEG › Case Turns › Distraction Turn
Lorena Lombardozzi 2020 - Senior Lecturer in Economics at the School of Social Sciences & Global Studies, Co-Director of IKD
“Gender Inequality, Social Reproduction and the Universal Basic Income”, Political Quarterly, 04/03/2020, - A. K.
Weeks notes that the ‘demand for a UBI does not directly address either the unequal gendered division of household-based reproductive labour or its privatization’, even ‘serv[ing] simply to offer more support for the traditional hetero-patriarchal family’s gender division of productive and reproductive labour, with more men participating in waged work and more women working in the home’.
2023
CNDI
Topicality
T – Tax Exercise › Aff › Progressive
Caminada ’14 [Koen; April 14; Professor of Empirical Analysis of Social and Tax Policy; Leiden Law Blog, “Facts & Figures: Income inequality and fiscal redistribution in 29 countries,” cache, https://www.leidenlawblog.nl/articles/facts-figures-income-inequality-and-fiscal-redistribution-in-39-countries]
Different social policies bring different types of welfare systems, leading to various outcomes in the income distribution. Since one of the functions of many national social protection systems is to reduce income inequality, this blog may provide relevant information for policy makers. Chen Wang and I updated our Leiden Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Database, based on the the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) in which microdatasets from nearly forty countries have been harmonised. Consequently it is possible to study income inequality and fiscal redistribution across countries.
A standard analysis of fiscal redistribution is to compare pre-tax-transfer income inequality and post-tax-transfer income inequality. Primary income inequality is given by a summary statistic of pre-tax, pre-transfer incomes and disposable income inequality is given by the same summary statistic of disposable equivalent incomes. Inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient which ranges from 0 (all households have equal incomes) to 1.0 (the richest household receives all income). Table 1 presents the framework for accounting income inequality and redistribution through various income sources. From nearly 300 variables in the dataset, we chose those related to household income (all kinds of income sources), total number of persons in a household and household weight (in order to correct sample bias or non-sampling errors) to measure income inequality and fiscal redistribution across countries.
2023
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Topicality
T – Tax Exercise › Aff › Can be Transfers
IMF ’14 [International Monetary Fund; Jan 23; the IMF Is a major financial agency of the United Nations, and an international financial institution, headquartered in Washington, D.C., consisting of 190 countries; IMF Policy Paper, “Fiscal Policy and Income Inequality,” http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/012314.pdf]
20. Evaluating the redistributive impact of fiscal policies requires a comparison of incomes after taxes and transfers with those that would exist without them. In principle, assessments of the incidence of fiscal policies should incorporate information on consumers’ and producers’ behavioral responses to taxes and transfers and their impact on market incomes. In practice, most studies do not incorporate this aspect, since sufficient data on behavioral responses are often unavailable. In these studies, the incidence of commodity taxes is typically assumed to fall on consumers, factor taxes are assumed to fall on factor suppliers (labor and capital), and transfers to beneficiaries do not lead to changes in factor supplies. The evidence below is drawn from such studies. In econometric studies, on the other hand, behavioral responses are captured—Box 3 provides a summary of recent empirical literature evaluating the distributive impact of fiscal policy based on econometric analysis of cross-country panel data.
The use of regression-based models to study the redistributive impact of fiscal policy has grown in recent years. In principle, these models can provide estimates of the effects of fiscal policy without assumptions on compliance and take-up rates. They can also capture the general equilibrium effects of taxes and transfers. The models usually regress the disposable income Gini coefficient on variables capturing the composition of taxes and spending, while adding control variables to account for other factors that can affect income distribution. Several difficulties are encountered in these empirical studies. For example, data may not be fully comparable across countries or over time; estimation methods may not adequately address the endogeneity of fiscal variables and omitted variable bias; and the results and their interpretation are sensitive to model specification and data sources. These models can also obscure the fact that the design of taxes and transfers also matters for their distributive incidence, as they implicitly assume a similar design across countries.
2023
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Topicality
T – Tax Exercise › Aff › Can be Transfers
---includes in-kind transfers, like the job training/education component of a guaranteed jobs program
---excludes non-FR policies that effect income inequality, like labor law, antitrust, or sectoral regulation
---measures the effect of the plan on income inequality an annual basis, via direct effects on income distribution
2023
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Topicality
T – Tax Exercise › Aff › 2ac – T ‘Taxes’
Andrew Chamberlain 7, Staff Economist, Tax Foundation; Gerald Prante, Staff Economist, Tax Foundation; and Scott A. Hodge, President, Tax Foundation, March 2007, “Who Pays America’s Tax Burden, and Who Gets the Most Government Spending?,” https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/sr151.pdf
VII. Putting Tax Burdens and Government Spending Together: Net Tax Burdens
Now that we’ve looked at both the nation’s tax burden and government spending, let’s put them both together. When we do this, we end up with a measure of how much people pay into government, and how much government spends on to people in return. Economists sometimes refer to this as “fiscal redistribution” or the “fiscal incidence” of government policy.
2023
CNDI
Topicality
T – Tax Exercise › Neg › Taxes and Transfers
Bozio et al in 2020
Antoine Bozio, Bertrand Garbinti, Jonathan Goupille-Lebret, Malka Guillot, Thomas Piketty; Predistribution vs. Redistribution: Evidence from France and the U.S.; World Inequality Lab; https://wid.world/document/predistribution-vs-redistribution-evidence-from-france-and-the-u-s/
Public policies aiming to reduce inequalities can be classified into two categories. First, for a given level of pretax inequality, taxes, transfers and other public spending can reduce post-tax income inequality. This is what is usually called redistribution policies. The public economics literature has largely been influenced by an approach which treats pre-tax inequalities as given, and where the policy options for reducing inequalities largely rest on various combination of tax-and-transfers, with the constraints imposed by the behavioral responses to the tax and transfer system (e.g., this is the generic logic of optimal taxation literature).1 However, public policies can also affect the pretax distribution of income (what we will call “predistribution”). For instance, the legal and social system contributes to determine the bargaining power of workers vis-à-vis firm owners and managers, via wage-setting rules, corporate laws, trade regimes or labor market regulations. Similarly, educational and health care policies impact the access to skills and jobs, and therefore the overall inequality of labor earnings. Trade and technological changes can also influence the relative earnings of different skills or occupation, as well as a range of market regulations. Finally, taxation and transfers can also affect pre-tax income either via changes in bargaining incentives or through different dynamics of capital accumulation. Although these channels are known to impact inequalities, the lack of adequate data series with sufficient historical and comparative breadth has limited the ability to evaluate and compare the long-term impact of various public policy options on inequality.
2023
CNDI
Topicality
T – Tax Exercise › Neg › Taxes and Transfers
IMF in 2020
International Monetary Fund; IMF Working Paper Fiscal Affairs Department Designing Fiscal Redistribution: The Role of Universal and Targeted Transfers Prepared by David Coady and Nghia-Piotr Le; https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/WP/2020/English/wpiea2020105-print-pdf
Although increasing income inequality has been observed in many countries, the varying experiences across countries, with inequality even decreasing in a sizeable share of countries, suggests that public policy and institutions play and important role in determining such outcomes.2 In this respect, fiscal redistribution (i.e., the transfer of income from higher to lower income households via tax and transfer schemes) has a key role to play in addressing income inequality. For instance, evidence from studies of fiscal redistribution shows that over threequarters of the difference in average disposable income inequality between advanced and Latin American countries (with the lowest and highest average disposable income inequality, respectively) is accounted for by differences in the extent of fiscal redistribution rather than by differences in market incomes (Bastagli, Coady and Gupta, 2015). This paper focuses on the design of fiscal redistribution through income taxes and transfers in advanced and developing countries.3 In particular, it focuses on the growing debate on the relative merits of universal and targeted social assistance transfers in achieving income redistribution objectives (Atkinson, 2015; Brown, Ravallion, and van de Walle, 2017; Gentilini et al., 2020). It argues that the fixation of the policy debate on the narrow targeting of transfers to lower-income groups (i.e., avoiding leakage of transfers to higher-income groups) in large part reflects an unbalanced framing of the issue with an undesirably narrow focus on the transfer side of fiscal redistribution neglecting the potential redistributive role of taxes. It also reflects an overly narrow focus on incentive (or efficiency) costs with insufficient attention to the administrative, social and political costs of targeting that in practice affect the feasible set of redistributive taxes and transfers available to governments and which need to be balanced against efficiency costs.
2023
CNDI
Topicality
T – Tax Exercise › Neg › Taxes and Transfers
Malte Luebker, 2015, (Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut (WSI) Dr. rer. Pol, January 2015, Redistribution policies, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/298075483_Redistribution_policies)
In dictionaries, redistribution is defined as “to alter the distribution of” something. This is a useful starting point: what follows is that income redistribution policies encompass all government interventions that alter the distribution of incomes, including those that affect the primary distribution of incomes. As argued in Part II of this volume, granting collective bargaining rights (or denying them) has consequences for the functional distribution of incomes and for wage inequality, as do minimum wages. However, governments alter the primary distribution of incomes in other, often even less visible ways. For instance, the liberalization of financial markets since the 1980s is widely believed to have contributed to a concentration of incomes at the top, and to a shift away from wages and towards profits (see Stiglitz, 2012; ILO, 2012). Likewise, trade liberalization has differential impacts on the incomes of various groups in society (see Jansen and Lee, 2007). Such a broad definition of redistribution underlines the fact that most government action has redistributive consequences. To gain support for unpopular decisions such as the opening of trade, governments sometimes try to compensate the losers and impose a corresponding tax on the winners (ibid.). At this stage, redistribution becomes more apparent since it directly alters the primary distribution of incomes. This direct intervention in the form of taxes and transfers is commonly at the heart of public debates over redistribution, simply because it is more visible, even though the impact can be minuscule when compared the original policy decision. For example, trade compensation schemes are commonly thought to redistribute less than 5 per cent of the gains from trade (ibid.: 75). The concept of fiscal redistribution captures these direct interventions that governments make through taxes and transfers. A key policy concern is often their net effect on income inequality, usually expressed as the change in a summary measure such as the Gini coefficient between the primary and secondary distribution. The impact can be further disaggregated into the direct effect of taxes and mandatory social contributions and the contribution of transfers (see section 6). Tax policies play a crucial role for both aspects: They determine how much resources are at the disposal of governments for social policies, but the structure of the tax code by itself has an impact on inequality. At one extreme, income taxes can be regressive, i.e. the tax rates are lower for those with higher incomes. An example for a tax that widens inequality is the ‘poll tax’, an equal lump sum paid by every resident. However, although the top marginal tax rates have fallen substantially across the industrialized world since the 1970s, modern tax systems are still typically progressive and tax rates increase with incomes. The result is that the rich pay (or are expected to pay) a greater share of their income as taxes, and that inequality after taxes is lower than before taxes. Between these two models lie distribution-neutral regimes with flat tax rates, where everybody pays the same proportion of her or his income in tax. However, the structure of tax rates often given an incomplete picture of their redistributive impact since the rich, in particular, often take advantage of tax exemptions or find other ways to avoid paying taxes in full. This practice, euphemistically known as ‘tax optimization’ or ‘aggressive tax planning’, can undermine the intended redistributive effects of the tax code – and has re-ignited the public debate about the fairness of tax systems in many countries. Another facet of tax codes is that income from capital (be it in the form of interest, dividends or realized capital gains) is often taxed at a different, generally lower rate than income from labour (or is exempt from taxation altogether).5 To the extent that the capital incomes accrue to those at the top of the income pyramid, this further undermines the progressiveness of taxation (see also Atkinson et al., 2011). On the whole, the redistributive impact of direct taxes on income and wealth is relatively well understood, based on the analysis of household survey datasets or national accounts (see section 4 below). 6 However, countries have increasingly shifted towards indirect taxes such as a general sales tax (GST) or a value added tax (VAT).7 By taxing general consumption, these taxes have a bigger relative impact on those who consume a larger part of their incomes – generally the poor – and are hence often regressive (see Emran and Stiglitz, 2007). However, while households effectively pay these taxes, they affect prices (and not income) and their impact on income inequality is more difficult to assess than in the case of direct taxes. While the conventional analysis of fiscal redistribution has important insights to offer, it has some conceptual shortcomings. One important concern is that a snapshot taken at a single point in time (usually for a given year) focuses only on inter-personal redistribution, ignoring life-cycle redistribution. For instance, old-age pensions appear as if they were a transfer from the young (who pay contributions and/or taxes to fund them) to the old (who receive pensions). In reality, the young and the old are not two distinct groups, but young workers will grow old over time so that today’s contributors are tomorrow’s beneficiaries. There is of course no guarantee that an individual’s benefits will be equal to her or his contributions (those who die young will not receive anything in return, and those who are blessed with longevity will generally gain more). Pension systems therefore remain redistributive – albeit to different degrees, depending on their design (see Chapter 9 by C. Behrendt and J. Woodall).
2023
CNDI
Topicality
T – Tax Exercise › Neg › Redistribution = Tax
Paul 91, Professor of Law (Jeremy, “THE HIDDEN STRUCTURE OF TAKINGS LAW,” Southern California Law Review)//BB
But it is nonsense to find talismanic significance in the idea of taking money from the public as a whole. See Michelman, supra note 11, at 146-49 (arguing that within the liberal tradition Scalia's concession that general redistribution is permissible commits him to principles that justify affirmative welfare rights). Progressive taxes take money from some, high income earners, and transfer it through public assistance to others, low or no income earners. Indeed, the very definition of redistribution is to take from some to give to others. Taxes may be a good mechanism for redistribution because legislators may encounter difficulty in singling out one group for adverse, perhaps unfair, treatment. Justice Scalia is unconvincing, however, in his effort to demonstrate that the entire class of landlords is less likely to be unfairly singled out than, for example, the class of high income earners. See Note, Taking a Step Back: A Reconsideration of the Takings Test of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 102 HARV. L. REV. 448, 464 (1988) (challenging the claim that tax policy is more democratic than regulatory policy). In short, once redistribution becomes a permissible goal of government, the standard for unfair redistribution cannot be derived from mere allegations that the purpose of a statute is redistributional. See generally Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984) (characterizing the ambivalence of takings clause jurisprudence toward redistribution as the inevitable result of the tension within the American tradition between property as wealth and property as virtue).
2023
CNDI
Topicality
T – Tax Exercise › Neg › Redistribution = Tax
Dyreng and Hoopes 22, both professors of accounting (Scott Dyreng, Professor of Accounting at Duke, and Jeff Hoopes, Professor of Accounting at UNC, “Progressive Taxation: What is it? Why would we want it? Do we have it?,” transcribed by Youtube, edits by Brett Bricker, )
I like that explanation and I use that in my class as a justification for what sometimes we call income redistribution. And basically the idea is this, can take something away from, I’m going to keep picking on tim cook today, i can take 100 away from tim cook and he doesn't hardly even notice and i can give it to somebody who's a starving student and they are just thrilled to have that extra hundred dollars and so Tim cook's not any sadder and the other person is much happier and collectively in society then we are happier overall. So and i think it's a good i think it's a good i think it's reasonable it certainly has limits but it's a reasonable way to think about the world. So you said you use that to explain income redistribution what's the difference what's the connection between income redistribution and progressivity? Well one connection is this so what you were talking about was just one side of the equation which is the government taking the income. The other side of the equation is…you have to you have to make the evil voice taking the income yeah okay so the government's gonna take your income and by the way um it took my income uh well i filed my taxes jeff was saying he filed his on saturday night i'm doing them saturday filed them today like half an hour ago okay so i i'm almost worse than you i started on saturday night i could not bear to finish i finished on sunday night fearing that something would come up that i would have to resolve on monday it turned out it was fine so i did file on late sunday night electronically. So the the government took all my money but they're not going to just take that money and burn it they're going to take that money and do something with it including possibly directly giving it to someone who doesn't have very much money and so that's where the redistribution part of it comes in. The government doesn't literally take only take from rich people they give, sometimes, to poor people. I would say they're pretty i mean as long as when you said it literally you said as long as they don't burn it as long as they don't burn it and as long as they're not taking rich people to just like shuffle things around and give back to rich people then they're the same thing, progressive, yeah.
2023
CNDI
Topicality
T – Tax Exercise › Neg › Fiscal = Tax
Beezer 88, Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit (Robert R. Beezer, 1988, “United States v. Cuevas,” United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, No. 87-5007, University of Kansas Libraries, Lexis)
The term "fiscal aspects" is not defined anywhere in the Swiss order. Other passages, however, shed light [**30] on the Swiss court's intent. On page one of the (29-page) order, the Swiss court observed that Zurich authorities had opened two cases against Cuevas, one "because of financing illegal activities in narcotics trading," a second "for collection of wrongfully obtained capital gains."
The second prosecution, relating to taxes, provides the most obvious referent for the term "fiscal aspects." Such a construction of "fiscal aspects" (relating to taxes or financial penalties) is supported by the following central, but ambiguous passage of the extradition order:
2023
CNDI
Topicality
T – Tax Exercise › Neg › FR Requires Tax
Lustig and Higgins 18, *Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development, Brookings Institution, **Reporter Writer (*Lora Lustig, **Sean Higgins, 2018, “Commitment to Equity Handbook: Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty,” Brookings Institution, ISBN: 978-0-8157-3221-1, Chapter 1: THE CEQ ASSESSMENT Measuring the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty, University of Kansas Libraries, Springer)
1 The Theory of Fiscal Redistribution: Key Analytical Insights
In this Handbook, “fiscal redistribution” refers to the process by which the state collects revenues from individuals and households (primarily through taxes) and spends these revenues on benefits (for example, cash transfers, price subsidies, and in-kind benefits such as education and health) intended for specific individuals and households. In so doing, the state changes the postfiscal income distribution and poverty rates that would have prevailed in the absence of fiscal policy. Because of behavioral responses and general equilibrium effects, fiscal policy can also change the prefiscal income distribution and poverty rates. While at this point the CEQ Assessments do not estimate the counterfactual prefiscal income with these second-round effects in place, it is important to note that the analytical insights presented here and in chapters 2 (Enami, Lustig, and Aranda), 3 (Enami), 4 (Higgins and Lustig), and 5 (Enami) apply to fiscally included income redistribution regardless of the method used to estimate its extent. That is, regardless of whether fiscal redistribution is calculated using run-of-the-mill fiscal incidence analysis, microsimulation methods, or partial or general equilibrium modeling, the theoretical results discussed below and in the next four chapters apply.
2023
CNDI
Topicality
T – Tax Exercise › Neg › FR Requires Tax
Pelke 21, M.A., dissertation in fulfillment of Ph.D. in economics, University of Heidelberg (Lars Pelke, 2021, “Rethinking Inequality under Autocracy. Parties, Citizens, and Preferences,” Chapter 1: Introduction, )
The third central concept is (income) redistribution. As Tullock argues, ‘‘redistribution is probably the most important function of most modern governments’’ (Tullock, 2013, p. 1). However, the level of redistribution and its cross-sectional variation cannot be modeled using only purely economic explanations, such as the level of inequality in a given society (see McCarty & Pontusson, 2009). Therefore, I focus on the question of how political processes and institutions, such as autocratic ruling strategies and the degree of incumbent party institutionalization, determine the level of redistribution and inequality. In this dissertation, redistribution is broadly defined as the transfer of resources from one person or group to another person or group (see also Albertus, 2015; Boadway & Keen, 2000; Solt, 2020; Tullock, 2013). More precisely, income or fiscal redistribution is defined as the transfer of resources via taxes and fiscal transfer policies from one person or group to another. By contrast, land redistribution —a second influential type of redistribution (Albertus, 2015) —is defined as land reform measures that lead to a reallocation of land properties from landed elites to the landed poor.10 In addition, income redistribution is also often conceptualized as the transfer of resources to the poor.
2023
CNDI
Topicality
T – Tax Exercise › Neg › 1nc – T ‘Tax’
Brian P. Hanley 21, Ph.D., founder and chief scientist for Butterfly Sciences, 2021, “Is Modern Monetary Theory’s prescription to spend without reference to tax receipts an invitation to tyranny?,” Acta Oeconomica, 71(3), pp. 431-450
MMT does not currently advocate, nor demand taxation for redistribution of wealth for the purpose of addressing inequality. However, Wray would like to tax the wealthy until they are no longer rich, though this is not a formal part of MMT (Wray 2020). 3 The redistribution of wealth through taxation is a fundamental feature of the neoclassical theory (Samuelson 1956; Mas-Colell et al. 1995; Keen 2011), but such wealth redistribution is absent from MMT (Wray 2014a). Redistribution taxation is no longer practiced as much as it once was, particularly in the USA (FRED 2020d), and despite its foundational position in neoclassical theory, it is rarely mentioned in public discourse today. However, I think that adding redistribution taxation to the MMT system is probably a necessity to stabilize the economy (Weller 2010), and to accomplish political stability (Acemoglu – Robinson 2012). The former reason is that taxation for redistribution lowers Gini, and thus, stabilizes demand growth. While Weller and Rao’s argument is relative to the emerging economies, the same issues appear in the developed ones. Relative to politics, Acemoglu and Robinson’s work shows that the more unequal economic hierarchies produce political instability together with worse economic performance. Barring this kind of taxation, other careful work must be done to prevent rentier gaming of the economy, although Mosler’s concept of eliminating bond sales has a great deal of merit.
2023
CNDI
Topicality
T – Tax Exercise › Neg › 1nc – T ‘Tax’
Hicks 86, Researcher, Northwestern University (Alexander Hicks, 1986, “CLASS INFLUENCE ON REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICY: THE CASE OF U.S. STATE GOVERNMENTS, 1951-1961,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 14)//BB
The present redistributive policy focus is on a particular type of government redistribution that may be called direct fiscal redistribution to the poor (hereafter DFRP). Fiscal redistribution refers here to redistribution of money and in-kind income among strata of households by means of both government spending and taxing (i.e., fiscal) activities. For example, increased generosity in public assistance payment levels and reliance upon progressive income as opposed to regressive sales taxes can provide positive fiscal redistribution. Direct fiscal redistribution refers to that part of such redistribution that can be accounted for in terms of government's relatively direct and immediate give-and-take of expenditures and taxes to and from income strata of households. Current evidence suggests that such redistribution is considerable in advanced capitalist political democracies, especially vis-à-vis the poor (e.g., Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977; Hicks and Swank, 1984b). During the 1970s DFRP apparently augmented the "pre-fisc" income share of poor households in the U.S. by over 100 percent (see Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977: 74 on the U.S.; and Hicks and Swank, 1984b on advanced capitalism).
2023
CNDI
Counterplan
States CP › Aff Answers › AT: Weed Tax
Respaut, 2014, writer @ Reuters(Robin, “High taxes may slow marijuana revenue in Washington state -Moody's”, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/21/usa-washington-marijuana-idUSL2N0PW1U020140721)
(Reuters) - High state and local taxes and a paucity of storefront licenses mean revenue from legalized marijuana sales in Washington state could be minimal this year, according to Moody's Investor Service. Stores opened this month in Washington, where the second state in the nation to legalize recreational marijuana forecast it will collect $51.2 million in revenues during the upcoming 2015-17 biennial budget. But Moody's said on Monday that marketplace competition and supply challenges could mean lower than anticipated sales. Washington's excise tax of 25 percent and sales taxes of 9.6 percent might deter consumers, the ratings agency warned. Colorado, the country's first state to legalize recreational marijuana, charges a 15 percent excise tax and 12.9 percent consumer sales tax. "The state's recreational marijuana market has a burdensome tax structure for consumers," Moody's said, adding residents might prefer to purchase marijuana from a medical dispensary, which requires a recommendation from a licensed marijuana doctor. "Many patients have reported that obtaining this annually renewable recommendation is fairly easy." The availability of recreational marijuana might also be limited because Washington has issued only seven percent of the available licenses for retailers (24 of 334 licenses), largely due to a backlog of applications and the stringent requirements to pass a state inspection, Moody's reported. Most of the revenues from recreational marijuana sales in Washington are slated to go toward enforcement, treatment programs and marijuana education and health services. About 19 percent of the collected revenues will be directed to the state's general fund.
2023
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Counterplan
States CP › Aff Answers › AT: Weed Tax
Jake Mann 14, Motley Fool economics writer, “National Marijuana Legalization: How Much Tax Revenue Could It Bring In?”, 7-30,
Worth noting is that Colorado and Washington are projected to make about $47 million and $63 million a year, respectively. Both figures are lower than what each state is currently on track to make in the near future, but why? Most likely, this differential is due to medical marijuana. In many dispensaries, it's cheaper to buy with a doctor-prescribed card than without one. In Colorado, medical purchase limits are also higher than those imposed on recreational users. "We sort of expected that the adult-use (recreational) market would cannibalize the medical marijuana market," economist Larson Silbaugh said last month, the Colorado Fiscal Institute reports. He adds: "So far, there isn't any evidence that the medical marijuana market is sort of shrinking with people going to the adult-use market." Ultimately, this is an issue states need to solve. As The Denver Post points out, medical marijuana could shrink potential revenue because it's taxed at a lower rate. The outlet recently interviewed Larry Wolk from the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment. It writes: [Wolk] is "still very concerned" that too many medical marijuana cards go out without the existence of a bona fide physician-patient relationship, as the law requires ... so long as it remains relatively easy to get certified — thanks in part to constitutional language — Wolk believes there may not be much incentive for people to get off the medical program. And if so, the long-term tax revenues from retail pot may end up being much less than promised.
2023
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Counterplan
States CP › Aff Answers › AT: Weed Tax
Elaine Povich 13, Fiscal Times Washington correspondent, “Not So Fast: Tax Revenue Estimates From Legal Marijuana May Not Materialize”, 5-14,
When Colorado and Washington voted to legalize marijuana for recreational use, supporters sold the idea partially based on new tax revenue estimates that ranged as high as $2 billion over five years. But recent reports and analyses offer some advice: Don't spend that money yet. “Nobody has any idea (about revenue),” said Jeffrey Miron, a Harvard economist and analyst at the libertarian Cato Institute. “There's only one good way to find out what the revenue would be, and that would be for all levels of government to legalize it and then we see what happens.” While many states have legalized marijuana for medical use, nationwide recreational legalization is not likely anytime soon. Meantime, economic studies in both Colorado and Washington — the first two states to legalize marijuana for purely recreational use — have ventured predictions that played into the successful efforts to legalize the drug. In a widely cited study of the Colorado law, the Colorado Center on Law and Policy predicted that marijuana legalization would produce $60 million annually in new revenue and savings for the state each year until 2017. The taxes on marijuana sales include a 15 percent excise tax (dedicated to school construction) and a 10 percent sales tax, for a total of 25 percent. According to the study, those levies would bring in $32 million for the state budget, $14 million for local governments and would result in a savings of more than $12 million in state and local law enforcement spending. The first $40 million of the excise tax revenue is dedicated to school construction. Extrapolating from there, the study projected economic development based on anticipated tax revenue — counting on 372 new construction jobs to build schools. Last week, Colorado lawmakers approved the taxes and set other regulations. Gov. John Hickenlooper, a Democrat, is expected to sign the bill. The taxes then go before the voters in a November referendum. If approved, the regulations would take effect in January. Unrealistic Expectations? The $60 million estimate is still being discussed, but a more recent study tempered expectations. The Colorado Futures Center at Colorado State University concluded that while revenue will be raised, it may not meet the state's expectations, particularly the 15 percent tax targeted for school construction. The report concluded that for the tax to raise the $40 million anticipated for schools, given current consumption estimates, the cost to grow a pound of marijuana would be in the range of $1,100 a pound, almost twice earlier estimates. That level risks raising the price of retail marijuana so high that it could send users back to the black market. “Our overall conclusion was while there is some revenue here, this is not a panacea for fiscal imbalance going forward,” said Phyllis Resnick, lead analyst and author of the report. “Our conclusion at the end was there is at least a risk, even with a high revenue number, once you take all this into account, there is not going to be a significant amount left over relative to the size of the (state's budget) gap,” which is anticipated to be $3 billion to $3.5 billion by 2025. In Washington, a state government estimate predicted revenue could reach $1.9 billion over five years, “assuming a fully functioning marijuana market.” Brian Smith, spokesman for the Washington State Liquor Control board, which will regulate legal marijuana sales, said licenses to sell pot will be issued beginning in December. Taxes of 25 percent will be imposed at three levels — producer, processor, and retail. Smith said it will take time for money to make its way to state treasury. “Until you start those initial sales between producers to processor, you won't begin the flow of revenue,” he said. While noting the lucrative tax estimates, Smith said the state is being cautious and hasn't “banked” any of the revenue for the next two-year budget cycle, which begins in July. “It's too unknown,” he said. “We're operating as if we are going to implement this (tax) system, but the future is unknown.” Both states have made assumptions about consumption of marijuana in order to set their revenue estimates. For example, the Washington state study used the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services national drug survey from 2008-2009, which estimated that 17.2 percent of Washington residents aged 18 to 25 used marijuana, plus 5.6 percent of those over 26. From those figures, the study estimated 363,000 Washington marijuana users in 2013, plus a 3 percent increase in 2015 to account for population growth and inflation. (Colorado and Washington will restrict recreational use to those over 21.) “My intuition tells me there will be a cross border effect,” said Scott Drenkard, an economist with the Tax Foundation who has studied the issue. “It will be cheap and available. That's something to consider. There is going to be a tourism boom of some sort. It won't be illicit.” But he added, “It's hard to know because it's an entirely new product on the legal market.” Another wrinkle: Taxes may be harder to collect because pot sales are a cash-only business. It is cash at the medical marijuana stores open in many states and it will be cash at the new recreational marijuana stores. That's because no bank will knowingly approve credit card sales for the drug, nor knowingly take deposits from the transactions, since marijuana is still illegal under federal law. A financial institution could be fined or reprimanded if it handled marijuana money, even in states where it is legal. “The short answer is we don't (deal with marijuana business) said Don Childears, president of the Colorado Bankers Association. “I don't know how the state regulates or taxes an industry when it can't follow the money. No financial institution — bank or credit union or anything — may handle any kind of marijuana business, medicinal or recreational, because it is illegal under federal law so we can't touch that business.” There have been anecdotal reports out of both states that medical marijuana shops have underground relationships with banks that wink at the source of cash, or title their businesses as something innocuous, like “Suzie's Cookies,” so a bank won't guess the source of the deposits. But there is a bit of a problem in cash deposits, according to Childears, because marijuana has a distinct odor which can be picked up on currency. “An easy way to detect these businesses is literally by the smell of the currency,” he said. And if that's the case, banks are obligated to report it to authorities.
2023
CNDI
Counterplan
States CP › Aff Answers › AT: Weed Tax
Kevin Sabet 13, Director of the Drug Policy Institute and Assistant Professor in the Division of Addiction Medicine, University of Florida; Ph.D., Social Policy, Oxford University (Marshall Scholar); Senior Policy Advisor in the Obama Administration's Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2009-2011; co-founder, with Patrick J. Kennedy, of Project SAM (Smart Approaches to Marijuana). “Article: A New Direction? Yes. Legalization? No. Drawing on Evidence to Determine Where to Go in Drug Policy,” 91 Or. L. Rev. 1153
II Public Budgets Will Suffer, Not Gain, from Drug Legalization and Taxation Many legalization advocates urge the government to "tax the hell out of" drugs, 14 in order to pay for the assumed increased use and addiction costs. That way, new users will be deterred from starting because the price would be out of reach. The most vulnerable (i.e. the poor) would benefit from high costs, too, since one might think that those with less disposable income can afford expensive drugs. Ironically, however, this scenario actually exacerbates some of the worst qualities of prohibition. High-cost drugs would ensure that an already well-established black market would remain largely in tact. If a person can buy cocaine for ten dollars an ounce from a dealer or go to a government-sponsored "drug store" for ten times that much, he or she would opt for the former scenario. Especially if drugs were still illegal for minors (no one has seriously proposed legalizing marijuana or cocaine for minors), a black market would still have reasons to linger. This is precisely what occurred in Canada when it imposed steep taxes on cigarettes. 15 In fact, today there is a thriving black market for the highly taxed cigarettes in certain parts of the United States as criminals smuggle packs of cigarettes from lower-taxed states to those with higher taxes. For example, New York has the highest tax on cigarettes in the country ($ 4.35 per pack, with an additional $ 1.50 in New York City). 16 As a result, it has the highest [*1158] smuggling rates in the United States: 60.9% of cigarettes were smuggled into New York in 2011. 17 After Massachusetts, Florida, and Utah raised their cigarette taxes, smuggling significantly increased. 18 California Board of Equalization officials have recently estimated that cigarette excise tax revenue evasion was $ 182 million in fiscal year 2005-06. 19 Around fifteen percent of all cigarettes sold in that state have somehow avoided the excise taxes in place on each pack to raise revenues for the state budget. 20 This is lower than evasion rates in other countries, according to the Chief Economist for the California Board of Equalization. 21 For example, about twenty-two percent of the United Kingdom's domestic cigarette market now consists of smuggled cigarettes. 22 In Canada, smuggled cigarettes represented about thirty-three percent of all domestic cigarette consumption at their peak. 23 In the United States, illegal drugs cost $ 193 billion per year in lost social costs. 24 That number would no doubt increase under legalization and then have to be distributed to the new number of total drug users. Experience with taxing alcohol and tobacco shows that any attempt to pay for lost costs through taxes would be futile. Indeed the social costs of legalization (e.g., increased health costs, accidents, productivity losses) outweigh any possible tax that could be levied against the drug. Drugs that are already legal in the United States are a good example of what would happen if we thought we could reap the financial benefits of illegal drugs: For every one dollar of revenue they produce, they each cost the United States ten dollars in lost social costs. 25
2023
CNDI
Counterplan
States CP › Aff Answers › AT: Gambling
Adrienne Lu 14, reporter at Stateline, a nonpartisan, nonprofit news service of the Pew Charitable Trusts that provides daily reporting and analysis on trends in state policy, “Online gambling revenues fall short”, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/06/24/stateline-online-gambling-revenues-fall-short/11306661/
State lawmakers who dream of dollar signs from legalized online gambling might want to pause for a moment to consider Delaware, Nevada and New Jersey. Last year, the three states became the first in the country to legalize Internet gaming. But as New Jersey Treasurer Andrew Sidamon-Eristoff told state lawmakers earlier this year: "Clearly, the results so far have not met our expectations." New Jersey officials initially predicted legal online gambling would boost state tax revenues by $180 million in fiscal 2014. By the time Republican Gov. Chris Christie signed the budget last June, the figure had been revised downward to $160 million. We just didn’t feel that it would be wise to put out a number. It was just too much unknown. Michael Lawton, Nevada Gaming Control By the end of May, one month shy of the fiscal year's end, the state had taken in just $9.3 million in revenue from online gambling, according to the nonpartisan Office of Legislative Services. And with collections in April and May falling below those in March, online gambling isn't even trending upward. State officials have blamed the slow start on technology glitches and payment processing issues. Nevada and Delaware, which have much smaller populations than New Jersey, also have collected only modest revenue from online gambling. In Delaware, state officials had counted on $7.5 million in additional tax revenue in fiscal year 2014. But because of a delayed rollout and one-time startup costs, Internet gaming made no net contributions to the state budget in fiscal 2014, state officials said. The startup costs included software design and data servers to host the gambling. In Nevada, officials opted not to make revenue projections for the nascent industry – or to count on the money in its budget. The state, which legalized only interactive poker, generated about $700,000 in tax revenue from about $10.2 million in gaming wins from May 2013 through April of this year, according to Michael Lawton, a senior research analyst with the Nevada State Gaming Control Board. "We just didn't feel that it would be wise to put out a number," Lawton said. "It was just too much unknown." In March, Morgan Stanley chopped its market projection for the U.S. online gaming industry by 30 percent, from $5 billion to $3.5 billion by 2017, "to better reflect the insights we have gained following the first few months of operations" in Delaware, Nevada and New Jersey. From illegal to legal Experts said it's natural that legal Internet gaming would take some time to develop. "This is an industry that requires consumer education," said Chris Grove, editor of the Online Poker Report. "It exists in a weird gray area because it was perceived to be illegal for so long." In Nevada, where only casinos are permitted to operate online gambling web sites, the casinos take a cut from the winnings and then pay the state a percentage of their take. The three states have different approaches to taxing online gambling revenue: • In Delaware, after expenses are paid, revenues for online slots are divided three ways: the state receives 43.5 percent, the horse racing industry receives 10 percent and the casinos receive 46.5 percent. For table games, the distribution is the same as for land-based casinos: casinos receive 66.1 percent, the state, 29.4 percent and the horse breeders, 4.5 percent. • Nevada taxes Internet gaming up to 6.75 percent, the same tax rate it uses for other gross gaming revenue.New Jersey taxes Internet gambling at 15 percent, nearly double the 8 percent tax on gross gambling revenue at its casinos. • New Jersey's revenue estimates were unrealistic from the start, Grove said, because they relied on the most optimistic projections and counted on 12 months' worth of revenue even though online gambling did not go live until late November, nearly halfway into the fiscal year. Grove said the state's initial revenue estimates for online gambling were "driven far more by political need and budgetary magic math than by sober, rational analysis of the market." Still, Sidamon-Eristoff told lawmakers he remains "bullish over the medium and long term." Despite lingering challenges in online gaming, he said, "We have seen enormous and growing interest in this form of gaming." Other states The U.S. Justice Department opened the door for states to legalize online gambling when it ruled in 2011 that the federal Interstate Wire Act of 1961 applied only to sports betting, reversing course on its previous interpretation banning all internet gambling. This year, California, Mississippi and New York have introduced bills to allow online gambling, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures, while Pennsylvania introduced legislation to prohibit online gambling. The Mississippi bill to legalize internet gambling died in committee. Legislators in West Virginia introduced a resolution to study Internet gambling and lottery. In February, Democratic Gov. Jack Markell of Delaware and Republican Gov. Brian Sandoval of Nevada signed an agreement that will allow people in each state to play online poker with one another, the first agreement of its kind in the country. Also this year, Colorado enacted a law prohibiting the sale of lottery tickets online; in Florida, a bill to allow online lottery sales died in committee; Minnesota lawmakers introduced competing legislation to permit and prohibit lottery games on the Internet—all of which failed. Washington reintroduced a bill to reduce the penalties for online gambling. We have seen enormous and growing interest in this form of gaming. New Jersey Treasurer Andrew Sidamon-Eristoff But the future of legalized online gaming is far from certain. In March, U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., and Rep. Jason Chaffetz, R-Utah, introduced a bill that would ban most online gambling, which has gained bipartisan support. Supporters include Texas Gov. Rick Perry and South Carolina Gov. Nikki Haley, both Republicans, along with 15 state attorneys general. Pushing the bill is Sheldon Adelson, the chief executive officer of Las Vegas Sands Corp. and a major Republican donor, who has launched a campaign to stop the legalization of online gambling, arguing that it "takes gambling too far." Sandoval has spoken critically of the bill, saying it would infringe upon states' rights and undermine existing state law. "Gaming regulation is the responsibility of state government," Sandoval said in a statement. "Nevada has performed this function for decades and maintains an experienced, sophisticated and respected regulatory structure." Markell also opposes the bill, saying that Internet gaming has traditionally been regulated by the states and that there is no reason for the federal government to interfere with the state lotteries and other gaming that states now authorize and regulate. Some advocates warn that gambling of any kind comes with costs as well as revenues. "Internet gambling is not a panacea," said Keith Whyte, executive director of the National Council on Problem Gambling. "Like all legalized gambling, it has both benefits and costs. Those social costs are real and they directly impact the state's bottom line," in areas such as criminal justice and health care, he said. Whyte's organization calls for states that decide to legalize gambling to take steps to protect consumers, such as requiring gamblers to set loss limits in advance and require better information for consumers about how the games work. What happened A number of issues have stymied the legal online gambling market. New Jersey officials have cited problems with geolocation technology, which determines whether a prospective online gambler is indeed within state borders, in accordance with state laws. Payment processing has been another common issue. Some potential gamblers have run into roadblocks when banks that issue credit cards have blocked attempts to gamble online, in some cases because they did not yet know that gambling was legal. Some credit card companies have declined to participate altogether. A research report released by Morgan Stanley in March estimated that about 60 percent of online gaming transactions in New Jersey were rejected and that about half of those users did not make other attempts to fund their accounts. Israel Posner, executive director of the Levenson Institute of Gaming, Hospitality and Tourism at Stockton College of New Jersey, said there has been a learning curve for all involved. Gaming providers, for example, are still learning how to provide games that will be interesting to customers using mobile devices, which may be different from those that work well in live casinos. And online poker requires "a critical mass of people who are interested in playing the game you want to play at the stakes that you want to lay at the time that you want to play," Posner said.