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ENDI 2023 - States Counterplan Affirmative Answers › 2AC/1AR – Links to net benefit (politics) - Compacts
Cornell Law No Date. “INTERSTATE COMPACTS”
Except for the single limitation that the consent of Congress must be obtained, the original inherent sovereign rights of the states to make compacts with each other was not surrendered under the Constitution.2270 “The Compact,” as the Supreme Court has put it, “adapts to our Union of sovereign States the age-old treaty-making power of independent sovereign nations.”2271 In American history, the compact technique can be traced back to the numerous controversies that arose over the ill-defined boundaries of the original colonies. These disputes were usually resolved by negotiation, with the resulting agreement subject to approval by the Crown.2272 When the political ties with Britain were broken, the Articles of Confederation provided for appeal to Congress in all disputes between two or more states over boundaries or “any cause whatever”2273 and required the approval of Congress for any “treaty confederation or alliance” to which a state should be a party.2274
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ENDI 2023 - States Counterplan Affirmative Answers › 1AR - Links to net benefit (politics)
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, 16. Associate Professor, Columbia Law School, “Executive Federalism Comes to America,” 102 Virginia Law Review 953 (June 2016), Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3175
As I have suggested, executive federalism grows out of the political polarization of our times. Hyperpolarized parties gridlock Congress and further empower the executive branch, but they also create strong links across the state-federal divide. n172 These links may enable something like party government through state-federal cooperation among co-partisans, enhancing the ability of the federal executive and certain states to act. At the same time, the state-federal connection amplifies opportunities for partisan resistance and contestation. If state and federal executives seek each other out because of partisan affinity, their collaborations tend also to bring in other state actors with opposing positions.
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ENDI 2023 - States Counterplan Affirmative Answers › 1AR - Links to net benefit (politics)
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, 16. Associate Professor, Columbia Law School, “Executive Federalism Comes to America,” 102 Virginia Law Review 953 (June 2016), Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3175
In the United States today, national partisan conflict and cooperation occur in an integrated way across the states and the federal government. In previous work, I have focused on the contestatory aspects of this "partisan federalism" - the ways in which political actors use both the state and federal governments to stage partisan competition. n51 In one recent display of how partisan alliances trump institutional affiliations and national conflict gets played out in state as well as federal sites, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell sent a letter urging governors to resist the Clean Power Plan promulgated by President Obama's Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). n52 The most powerful member of Congress thus tried to enlist the states to fight another part of the federal government on partisan grounds. And he addressed his argument to governors in particular, recognizing that the key players in shaping national policy and the state-federal relationship had become the executives at both levels of government. Importantly, however, partisan federalism creates alliances as well as opposition. The same Clean Power Plan that Senator McConnell opposes also offers an example of state-federal cooperation fueled by shared ideological commitments. n53 The decline of dual federalism underlies this dynamic - the fact that the state and federal governments regulate in the same areas facilitates state-federal cooperation. Indeed, the significance of such partisan connections may be most apparent in traditional cooperative federalism schemes, when states and the federal government are jointly administering a federal program. But these connections also matter in the absence of such programs because state legislation or regulation may be a means of furthering a national agenda frustrated in Washington. Unable to get a minimum wage increase through Congress, for example, President Obama seized on already-underway state efforts and argued to the National Governors Association, among others, that states [*967] could be critical fora for national governance. n54 In 2014 and 2015, several blue states increased the minimum wage, advancing within particular jurisdictions a goal broadly shared among Democratic officials. n55 As the Clean Power Plan and minimum wage examples suggest, national, polarized parties do not generate only federal-state conflict or cooperation. They generate both at the same time. Party identification leads different groups of state and federal actors to ally with each other and against opposing groups of state and federal actors. Even this statement is much too simple. As Parts III and IV of this Article argue, partisan positions become more complicated as state and federal actors interact in a variety of ways. While the most basic and readily apparent dynamic of partisan federalism is that Democrats and Republicans recognize members of their own party as allies - and members of the other party as opponents - across the state-federal divide, diversity exists among officials of the same party, especially when they are able to negotiate on their own instead of aggregating their interests. National parties help to fuel deep federal-state integration, even as a variety of different and shifting relationships emerge from such integration.
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ENDI 2023 - States Counterplan Affirmative Answers › 2AC - Links to net benefit (politics)
Girard Miller, 21. Miller is the finance columnist for Governing. He is a retired investment and public finance professional and the author of Enlightened Public Finance (2019). “Can the Idea of a Universal Basic Income Really Fly?” August 31, 2021. https://www.governing.com/finance/can-the-idea-of-a-universal-basic-income-really-fly
For political liberals, one of the unwanted outcomes of their initiatives is that state and local efforts to rebalance the distribution of income solely within their boundaries are likely to further polarize our national politics: Red jurisdictions will become redder and blue states could ultimately lose seats in Congress because of self-interest migration. Refugees from collectivism tend to lean hard to the right.
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ENDI 2023 - States Counterplan Affirmative Answers › 2AC – No solvency – Strike down
Hayes R. Holderness, 17. Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law, “Taking Tax Due Process Seriously: The Give and Take of State Taxation,” Richmond School of Law, 2017, https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2434&context=law-faculty-publications
Given the above analysis, the states' current efforts to remove Quill's physical presence rule for sales and use taxes and to adopt economic nexus standards for other taxes will not grant the states enforcement jurisdiction over all remote vendors making sales to their residents. Under the something-forwhich-it-can-ask-return aspect of the due process nexus inquiry, there is a set of remote vendors over which the states do not have enforcement jurisdiction: those whose only connection to a state is selling to residents of that state that approach the vendors with orders. If history has any lesson here, it is that people will model their practices in order to avoid a state's jurisdiction to tax if possible and efficient for them.' Once the dominance of the Commerce Clause limitations on enforcement jurisdiction is undermined, people should be expected to change their behavior in response to the Due Process Clause limitations. As the states' current issues with remote vendors demonstrate, these limitations can have a serious economic impact. 154 The potential "jurisdictional misalignment"' arising from a state having substantive jurisdiction over its residents' use of goods sold by a remote vendor but not having enforcement jurisdiction as a practical matter over the residents or as a legal matter over the remote vendor demonstrates the need to redefine the relationship between the federal government and the states with respect to state jurisdiction to tax if the states wish to fully solve their remote vendor issues. As others have argued, limitations on state-level enforcement jurisdiction may indicate the need to impose state tax collection obligations at the federal level."' Understanding the something-for-which-itcan-ask-return aspect confirms the need to think beyond state-level enforcement jurisdiction (barring a judicial refining of the due process limitations on state jurisdiction to tax, which may itself be due 157).
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ENDI 2023 - States Counterplan Affirmative Answers › 2AC – No solvency - Inequality
Samuel D. Brunson, 22. Georgia Reithal Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, summer 2022. “Bargain Basement Progressivity? Constitutional Flat Taxes, Demogrants, and Progressive Income Taxation,” 53 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 683 (2022). https://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol53/iss4/3
State and local tax regimes, which rely largely on regressive forms of taxation, unsurprisingly tend to be regressive themselves. That regressiv- ity means that poorer and minoritized state residents tend to pay more as a percentage of their income for state services than higher-income resi- dents. And if they and high-income residents do not pay enough, they are left with reduced services, a burden that also falls harder on the poor than on the rich.
To the extent that states ameliorate this regressivity, they tend to do so through the imposition of a progressive income tax. But even among the majority of states that have a personal income tax, that tax does little to affect the overall mix of regressive taxes. Most states with progressive income taxes have limited progressivity in their income taxes, and that limited progressivity does little to deal with income inequality or the state’s other regressive taxes.234
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ENDI 2023 - States Counterplan Affirmative Answers › 1AR - No solvency - Laundry list
Nisma Gabobe, 20. Senior Research Associate at the Sightline Institute, "Three Big COVID-19 Stimulus Ideas to Help Renters and Workers," May 7, 2020. https://www.sightline.org/2020/05/07/three-big-covid-19-stimulus-ideas-to-help-renters-and-workers/.
What is known is that the federal government has far more resources to support people than do states. To illustrate, Washington State recently expanded its Low-Income Home Energy Assistance program to cover $1,000 in rent and $500 in energy assistance to people at 125 percent of the poverty line and below, serving approximately 5,000 families—in a state with 7.8 million residents.
CANCEL RENTS AND MORTGAGES
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ENDI 2023 - States Counterplan Affirmative Answers › 1AR - No solvency - Laundry list
Seth Giertz & Mehmet Tosun, 12. *Giertz is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Nebraska Lincoln. *Mehmet Tosun is a Professor at the University of Nevada, Reno. “Migration elasticities, fiscal federalism, and the ability of states to redistribute income.” National Tax Journal 65.4 (2012): 1069–92. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1084&context=econfacpub.
For several decades, the dominant view among economists was that the ability of state governments to redistribute income is limited, and thus redistribution should be left primarily to the federal government. This view was well articulated by Richard Musgrave (1971, p. 7): “Policies to adjust the distribution of income among individuals must be conducted on a nationwide basis … [R]egional measures are self-defeating, as the rich will leave and the poor will move to the more egalitarian-minded jurisdictions. Progressive income taxation at the upper as well as transfers at the lower end of the scale — if substantial in scope — must be uniform within the entire area over which there is a high degree of capital and labor mobility, which means they have to be a function of the national government” (Musgrave, 1971, p.7).
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ENDI 2023 - States Counterplan Affirmative Answers › 2AC - No solvency – Laundry List
Adam Crepeau, 19. Adam Crepeau is a former policy analyst at Maine Policy Institute. “Is it feasible to provide a universal basic income in Maine?” The Maine Wire, November 25, 2019. https://www.themainewire.com/2019/11/is-it-feasible-to-provide-a-universal-basic-income-in-maine/
In addition to the hefty cost estimates and potential new taxes, there are other problems with a UBI program in Maine. Between 1968 and 1980, the federal government experimented with a negative income tax, a program that guarantees a minimum income and phases out when earnings increase. Research found that for every $1,000 in additional benefits, earned income reduced by $660, decreasing the net benefit to individuals. The study also found that desired work hours decreased among both men and women. Proponents of UBI point to Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend as the exemplar of success when discussing the idea of direct cash payments. However, this program gives just $1,606 annually to Alaskans in 2019. According to the Fund’s Annual Report, it cost more than $1 billion to provide an annual payment of $1,600 to 639,247 eligible individuals in 2018. While lower than the national average, Alaska’s poverty rate has hovered between 9 and 11 percent for the last decade. In addition, Alaska funds the Permanent Fund Dividend with a portion of the royalties collected from oil and mineral development. According to the Alaska Department of Revenue, individuals are eligible in 2019 as long as they can answer “yes” to these requirements:
I was a resident of Alaska during all of calendar year 2018; On the date I apply for the 2019 Permanent Fund Dividend, I have the intent to remain an Alaska resident indefinitely; I have not claimed residency in any other state or country or obtained a benefit as a result of a claim of residency in another state or country at any time since December 31, 2017; I was not: Sentenced as a result of a felony conviction during 2018; Incarcerated at any time during 2018 as the result of a felony conviction; or Incarcerated at any time during 2018 as the result of a misdemeanor conviction in Alaska if convicted of a prior felony or two or more prior misdemeanors since January 1, 1997 If absent from Alaska for more than 180 days, I was absent on an allowable absence; and I was physically present in Alaska for at least 72 consecutive hours at some time during 2017 or 2018. Another major difference in Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend is that the benefit it provides is relatively small compared to the proposals being tossed around on the national stage. It becomes much more enticing to reduce working hours if an individual can receive $12,000 annually as opposed to $1,600. Nonetheless, adopting this criteria would reduce overall cost estimates. Yet Maine remains the oldest state in the nation with a median age of 44.9 years. Implementing a universal basic income would likely exacerbate Maine’s workforce shortage by reducing individuals’ reliance on work to receive income. The state is slated to lose six percent of its workforce by 2026 as baby boomers age over 65 years. If the state provides a minimum income to people on the verge of retirement, individuals may retire at a faster pace. Able-bodied adults may also reduce their work hours, depending on the size of the UBI subsidy. In other words, the effects of a UBI program could actually worsen Maine’s current and projected workforce shortage. Even if a UBI program supplanted other anti-poverty program spending, the political climate in Augusta does not appear conducive to facilitating this trade-off, and doing so would still pose serious risk to state taxpayers.
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ENDI 2023 - States Counterplan Affirmative Answers › 1AR - No solvency - States have no money
Anshu Siripurapu & Jonathan Masters, 21. *Anshu Siripurapu covers economics, energy, and geopolitics, and helps edit the Daily News Brief. He holds a BA in political economy from University of Southern California. *Jonathan Masters has a BA in political science from Emory, MA in social theory from the New School. “How COVID-19 Is Harming State and City Budgets.” March 19, 2021. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-covid-19-harming-state-and-city-budgets
States ended the 2020 fiscal year in better shape than was initially forecast because of hundreds of billions of dollars in federal aid and the unusual nature of the pandemic recession. Low-wage earners in the service industries, who pay less in taxes, were devastated by job losses, while the stock market boomed and high-wage workers were relatively unscathed. But states were still projected to see huge shortfalls in the years ahead, even before the surge of COVID-19 cases in late 2020. The situation varies significantly across states, depending on the structure of their economies and their prepandemic fiscal health: for example, California has seen record revenues, fueled by the stock market and income gains among its wealthiest residents. But the majority of states have seen tax revenues shrink, according to an analysis by the Washington Post; five states, including Alaska and Florida, suffered double-digit percentage declines. Tax revenues have fallen sharply as states faced record unemployment claims and rising public health costs. Though the economy is slowly adding jobs, nearly ten million of them have been lost since the pandemic began, with restaurants and hotels among the hardest-hit businesses. As people lose jobs, more qualify for Medicaid, the costs for which are shared by states and the federal government. Moreover, in the first quarter of 2020, state pension funding levels fell to their lowest point in three decades, as the pandemic caused the value of pension fund assets to plummet. Though the stock market later recovered, there are still concerns about its performance, as well as the effect of low interest rates from bonds on pension funds.
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ENDI 2023 - States Counterplan Affirmative Answers › 1AR - No solvency - States have no money
Anshu Siripurapu & Jonathan Masters, 21. *Anshu Siripurapu covers economics, energy, and geopolitics, and helps edit the Daily News Brief. He holds a BA in political economy from the University of Southern California. *Jonathan Masters leads writers and editors who produce wide-ranging content for CFR.org. Masters has a BA in political science from Emory University and an MA in social theory from the New School. “How COVID-19 Is Harming State and City Budgets.” March 19, 2021. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-covid-19-harming-state-and-city-budgets
Many U.S. state and local governments, on the front lines of the response to the coronavirus pandemic, are facing severe budget shortfalls. A distressing combination of dwindling tax revenues, record unemployment, and rising health costs have pushed them to cut back on spending for infrastructure and education—of which states and cities are by far the primary funders. Some still bear the scars of the 2008 financial crisis, which forced painful spending cuts to public services. Even before the pandemic, subnational governments were grappling with ballooning costs, including health care and pensions for public employees. Some had already sought bankruptcy protection. In response to COVID-19, states and municipalities have made cuts, frozen spending and hiring, laid off workers, and drawn down rainy day funds. Some states have seen revenues rise due to the uneven nature of this recession, but by and large the pandemic has drained state and local coffers. The federal government has stepped in to provide substantial aid.
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ENDI 2023 - States Counterplan Affirmative Answers › 1AR - No solvency - Federal government key
Stephanie Cutler et al, 19. *Stephanie Cutler graduated from Duke University with a bachelor's degree in Public Policy and Visual and Media Studies. *Brennan Zook graduated from Duke University with a degree in Public Policy, Political Science, and an Arts Innovation & Entrepreneurship Certificate. *Elijah Williams is a graduate of Duke University and current Enterprise Associate Account Executive at Amazon Web Services (AWS). “Universal Basic Income and Job Guarantees: Feasible or Unrealistic?” 2019. https://sites.duke.edu/policylab/files/2019/10/Brockman-UBI-Job-Guarantee-Memo.pdf
A job guarantee is more feasible to implement at a state-level than a universal basic income, given its lower cost in relation to raising the standard of living. The greatest barriers to feasibility lie in state funding and questionable policy sustainability. In order to address North Carolina’s issues of unemployment and poverty, a job guarantee should be implemented at a local level by offering on-the-job training through North Carolina’s Work First program.
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ENDI 2023 - States Counterplan Affirmative Answers › 2AC - No solvency – Federal government key
Stephanie Cutler et al, 19. *Stephanie Cutler graduated from Duke University in May 2021 with a bachelor's degree in Public Policy and Visual and Media Studies. *Brennan Zook graduated from Duke University in 2021 with a degree in Public Policy, Political Science, and an Arts Innovation & Entrepreneurship Certificate. *Elijah Williams is a graduate of Duke University and current Enterprise Associate Account Executive at Amazon Web Services (AWS). “Universal Basic Income and Job Guarantees: Feasible or Unrealistic?” 2019. https://sites.duke.edu/policylab/files/2019/10/Brockman-UBI-Job-Guarantee-Memo.pdf
Universal Basic Income: Universal Basic Income (UBI) offers potential on a national level, but currently is not sustainable at the state level to address unemployment and poverty. It is intended to be an individual, unconditional, and frequent payment, in order to counter job-loss from automation.11 Traditional UBI policy lacks means-based testing or work requirements typical in welfare policy.
Barrier: State-Level Funding
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ENDI 2023 - States Counterplan Affirmative Answers › 2AC – Perm - Do the Counterplan
Legal Dictionary 16 [Federal Government. August 7, 2016. https://legaldictionary.net/federal-government/]
A federal government is a system of government that divides the power between a larger central government, and the local and regional governments beneath it. In the United States, the federal government’s powers were established by the Constitution. Perfect examples of federal governments are those that function best in large countries with a broad diversity among its citizens, though where a common culture still exists, which ties everyone together. To explore this concept, consider the following federal government definition.
Definition of Federal Government
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Girard Miller, 21. Miller is the finance columnist for Governing. He is a retired investment and public finance professional and the author of Enlightened Public Finance (2019). “Can the Idea of a Universal Basic Income Really Fly?” August 31, 2021. https://www.governing.com/finance/can-the-idea-of-a-universal-basic-income-really-fly
Today's wider push for a universal basic income is a new twist on the public assistance that our states, counties and many municipalities have long provided to needy residents. For the most part this has taken the form of earmarked aid for shelter, food, health care and other in-kind services. Often the primary funding source has been federal dollars supplemented by state appropriations. Last year, a few dozen localities began reallocating money from public safety to community services, housing the homeless and getting at the root causes of criminal behavior. But these targeted social services programs are not to be confused with the concept of universal income, which begins with the idea that everybody should have a floor income level and would be free to spend it as desired.
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ENDI 2023 - States Counterplan Affirmative Answers › 1AR - Perm - Do Both (Federalism Net Benefit)
Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather Gerken 09. Bulman-Pozen has a Juris Doctorate degree from Yale University. Gerken is a Professor of Law at Yale Law School. “Essay: Uncooperative Federalism,” The Yale Law Journal 118.7 (2009): 1256-1583.
Federalism scholarship offers two distinct visions of federal-state relations. The dominant vision depicts states as rivals and challengers to the federal government - a role they play by virtue of being autonomous policymakers outside the federal system. A second vision is offered by scholars of cooperative federalism, who argue that the dominant vision ignores the substantial portions of "Our Federalism," n1 in which states are not autonomous policymakers but instead carry out federal programs. As the moniker suggests, scholars of cooperative federalism argue that states should serve not as autonomous outsiders, but supportive insiders - servants and allies to the federal government.
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Farm Bill DA Answers --- ENDI 23 › AT: Impact---2AC/1AR › AT: Forests---2AC/1AR
Hannah Voak 16, Assistant Ecologist, Nurture Ecology Ltd., 4/22/16, “A world without trees,”
There are approximately 3.04 trillion trees on planet Earth (Crowther et al 15), covering 31% of the world’s land surfacew1. Today, for Earth day, we’re taking a look at trees. Around 15 billion trees are cut down each year. So, hypothetically speaking, it would take just over 200 years for the world’s forests to completely disappear. While this scenario is unlikely, what would be the consequences of a tree-free planet? Let’s start with perhaps the most obvious difference – oxygen concentration. A lack of oxygen? Oxygen makes up roughly 21% of the Earth’s atmosphere, but you probably know that already. What you might be surprised to find out, however, is that only half of this oxygen is produced through photosynthesis in trees and other plants on land. The other half is produced in oceans, by microscopic marine organisms called phytoplankton. The environment would not be devoid of oxygen if all trees were lost but the oxygen level would be lower. Would it be sufficient for humans to survive? In one year, a mature leafy tree produces as much oxygen as ten people breathe. If phytoplankton provides us with half our required oxygen, at current population levels we could survive on Earth for at least 4000 years before the oxygen store ran empty. However, that’s not considering a number of other factors: increasing population size, for example, would reduce the amount of oxygen available, whilst phytoplankton blooms due to an abundance of carbon dioxide could increase oxygen levels. Suffocating smog Whilst there may be enough oxygen for humans to survive on Earth, at least to begin with, the air we breathe could still be responsible for our demise. Like giant filters, trees help to cut down on pollution levels. Leaves intercept airborne particles and ozone, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide and other greenhouse gases are absorbed through the leaves stomata. In 2012, outdoor air pollution was estimated to cause 3.7 million premature deaths worldwidew2. Imagine the impact removing these environmental sieves would have on humankind. Air-pollution masks would become a necessity and bottled ‘clean air’ could come at a premium. Full of hot air? Armed with pollution masks, would the climate and temperature still be suitable for us? One important consideration is carbon dioxide. In one year, an acre of mature trees soaks up the same amount of carbon dioxide that we produce by driving the average car 26 000 miles. Since human activities like this increase the normal level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, cutting down trees would tip the balance even further, not to mention the enormous amount of stored carbon that would be released from doing so. Deforestation is already responsible for up to 15% of global greenhouse gas emissions and you might think that an overwhelming increase in carbon dioxide would result in a much warmer planet. However, the relationship between trees and global temperature is much more complicated. Energy and water fluxes between trees and the atmosphere also play a role and a tree’s colour, for example, can affect the amount of the Sun’s energy that is absorbed or reflected. Studies have shown that Europe’s trees have actually caused a slight increase in regional temperatures since 1750w3, while transpiration from plants in tropical forests cools the surface temperature. Therefore, whether the temperature becomes too hot to handle could depend on many factors, although a recent study concluded that reducing forest size increases average air surface temperatures in all climate zones (Alkama & Cescatti 16).
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Farm Bill DA Answers --- ENDI 23 › AT: Impact---2AC/1AR › AT: Sustainability---2AC/1AR
Jayson Lusk 16. professor of agricultural economics at Oklahoma State University, The New York Times, “Why Industrial Farms Are Good for the Environment,” September 23, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/25/opinion/sunday/why-industrial-farms-are-good-for-the-environment.html?_r=0
Large farmers — who are responsible for 80 percent of the food sales in the United States, though they make up fewer than 8 percent of all farms, according to 2012 data from the Department of Agriculture — are among the most progressive, technologically savvy growers on the planet. Their technology has helped make them far gentler on the environment than at any time in history. And a new wave of innovation makes them more sustainable still. A vast majority of the farms are family-owned. Very few, about 3 percent, are run by nonfamily corporations. Large farm owners (about 159,000) number fewer than the residents of a medium-size city like Springfield, Mo. Their wares, from milk, lettuce and beef to soy, are unlikely to be highlighted on the menus of farm-to-table restaurants, but they fill the shelves at your local grocery store. There are legitimate fears about soil erosion, manure lagoons, animal welfare and nitrogen runoff at large farms — but it’s not just environmental groups that worry. Farmers are also concerned about fertilizer use and soil runoff. That’s one reason they’re turning to high-tech solutions like precision agriculture. Using location-specific information about soil nutrients, moisture and productivity of the previous year, new tools, known as “variable rate applicators,” can put fertilizer only on those areas of the field that need it (which may reduce nitrogen runoff into waterways). GPS signals drive many of today’s tractors, and new planters are allowing farmers to distribute seed varieties to diverse spots of a field to produce more food from each unit of land. They also modulate the amount and type of seed on each part of a field — in some places, leaving none at all. Many food shoppers have difficulty comprehending the scale and complexity facing modern farmers, especially those who compete in a global marketplace. For example, the median lettuce field is managed by a farmer who has 1,373 football fields of that plant to oversee. For tomatoes, the figure is 620 football fields; for wheat, 688 football fields; for corn, 453 football fields. How are farmers able to manage growing crops on this daunting scale? Decades ago, they dreamed about tools to make their jobs easier, more efficient and better for the land: soil sensors to measure water content, drones, satellite images, alternative management techniques like low- and no-till farming, efficient irrigation and mechanical harvesters. Today, that technology is a regular part of operations at large farms. Farmers watch the evolution of crop prices and track thunderstorms on their smartphones. They use livestock waste to create electricity using anaerobic digesters, which convert manure to methane. Drones monitor crop yields, insect infestations and the location and health of cattle. Innovators are moving high-value crops indoors to better control water use and pests. Plows Into Sensors Estimates of savings in animals and farmland by using modern techniques rather than the technologies and methods of the 1950s. Before “factory farming” became a pejorative, agricultural scholars of the mid-20th century were calling for farmers to do just that — become more factorylike and businesslike. From that time, farm sizes have risen significantly. It is precisely this large size that is often criticized today in the belief that large farms put profit ahead of soil and animal health. But increased size has advantages, especially better opportunities to invest in new technologies and to benefit from economies of scale. Buying a $400,000 combine that gives farmers detailed information on the variations in crop yield in different parts of the field would never pay on just five acres of land; at 5,000 acres, it is a different story. These technologies reduce the use of water and fertilizer and harm to the environment. Modern seed varieties, some of which were brought about by biotechnology, have allowed farmers to convert to low- and no-till cropping systems, and can encourage the adoption of nitrogen-fixing cover crops such as clover or alfalfa to promote soil health. Herbicide-resistant crops let farmers control weeds without plowing, and the same technology allows growers to kill off cover crops if they interfere with the planting of cash crops. The herbicide-resistant crops have some downsides: They can lead to farmers’ using more herbicide (though the type of herbicide is important, and the new crops have often led to the use of safer, less toxic ones). But in most cases, it’s a trade-off worth making, because they enable no-till farming methods, which help prevent soil erosion. These practices are one reason soil erosion has declined more than 40 percent since the 1980s. Improvements in agricultural technologies and production practices have significantly lowered the use of energy and water, and greenhouse-gas emissions of food production per unit of output over time. United States crop production now is twice what it was in 1970. That would not be a good change if more land, water, pesticides and labor were being used. But that is not what happened: Agriculture is using nearly half the labor and 16 percent less land than it did in 1970. Instead, farmers increased production through innovation. Wheat breeders, for example, using traditional techniques assisted by the latest genetic tools and information, have created varieties that resist disease without numerous applications of insecticides and fungicides. Nearly all corn and soybean farmers practice crop rotation, giving soil a chance to recover. Research is moving beyond simple measures of nitrogen and phosphorus content to look at the microbes in the soil. New industrywide initiatives are focused on quantifying and measuring soil health. The goal is to provide measurements of factors affecting the long-term value of the soil and to identify which practices — organic, conventional or otherwise — will ensure that farmers can responsibly produce plenty of food for our grandchildren.
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Farm Bill DA Answers --- ENDI 23 › AT: Impact---2AC/1AR › AT: Climate Impact---2AC/1AR
Lisa Held 23. "Is a Climate-Smart 2023 Farm Bill Even Possible?". Civil Eats. 4-26-2023. https://civileats.com/2023/04/26/climate-smart-farm-bill-heat-flooding-resilience-policy-conservation/
Although it seems like everyone in D.C. is buzzing about a “climate farm bill,” some of the most impactful changes, including crop diversification and shifting diets from meat toward plants, are barely on the negotiating table.
For the past decade, Emma Jagoz has been stewarding and expanding a thriving organic farm that now spans 25 acres near Frederick, Maryland. At Moon Valley Farm, she grows a wide variety of vegetables that end up in CSA boxes and restaurant kitchens in Maryland, Washington, D.C., and Virginia year-round.
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Disadvantage
Farm Bill DA Answers --- ENDI 23 › AT: Impact---2AC/1AR › AT: Food Wars---1AR
Halvard Buhaug et al 15. Peace Research Institute in Oslo an Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Tor Benjaminsen, Espen Sjaastad, Ole Magnus Theisen.] “Climate variability, food production shocks, and violent conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa” Environmental Research Letters, Volume 10, Number 12 (http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/10/12/125015
Across all models, we find relatively weak and insignificant effects for domestic food production and we also note that the sign of the coefficients shifts between outcome types. In this sense, table 1 implicitly contrasts both claims that political violence is more prevalent when basic needs are met (Salehyan and Hendrix 2014) and claims that agricultural income shocks increase civil conflict risk (von Uexkull 2014). The results are consistent with Koubi et al (2012) and van Weezel (2015), however, who conclude that rainfall—a significant determinant of yields in SSA—has little impact on conflict either directly or through economic performance. The covariate that best and most consistently explains temporal variation in political violence is the time-lagged conflict incidence indicator. Models 1–2 show that a new civil conflict is unlikely to break out if another one is already ongoing in the same country whereas Models 3–6, which capture the occurrence of less organized conflict, demonstrate that violence begets violence. Coups d'état (Models 7–8) exhibit a comparatively weak temporal correlation pattern in our data and are generally regarded as a highly unpredictable phenomenon (Luttwak 1979). Next, we estimate the same set of models on a subsample of 14 countries in SSA where rainfall has a large and significant positive effect on food production (figure 2(b); see supplementary information, section B for details). To better capture the influence of climate variability and reduce concerns with endogeneity, we further replace the standard OLS model with two-stage instrumental variable regression. The first stage in this model estimates the joint influence of annual rainfall (linear and squared terms) and temperature (linear) on contemporaneous food production. This effect then constitutes the exogenous instrument for food production in the second stage. The results are reported in table 2. Mirroring the results presented above, we fail to uncover a robust signal for agricultural performance, although the sign of the coefficient for food production now remains negative in seven of the eight specifications. Food production shocks may have different consequences depending on the socioeconomic context, so next we consider a series of interactive relationships. Specifically, we investigate the joint effect of food production and (i) low level of development, (ii) extent of discriminatory political system, and (iii) economic dependence on agriculture; three conditions whereby loss of income from agriculture might constitute a particular challenge to society. To model these interactions, we include time-varying regressors instead of country-fixed effects where (i) is represented by infant mortality rate (IMR; World Bank 2014), (ii) is captured using the Ethnic Power Relations v.1.1 data (Cederman et al 2010), while (iii) uses an index of agricultural contribution to GDP (World Bank 2014). Moreover, to preserve focus on temporal dynamics, food production is now operationalized as yearly deviation from the country mean, 1961–2009. We use additive inverse deviation values to ensure theoretical consistency among the components in the interaction terms. All models control for (ln) population size, conflict history, and a common time trend, and models without IMR and agricultural dependence additionally control for (ln) GDP per capita. The results are presented in table 3. Again, we are unsuccessful in establishing a consistent covariation pattern between agricultural performance and political violence. Interpreting the combined effect of interaction terms with continuous parameters is inherently difficult but figure 4 shows that food production is insignificantly related to all conflict outcomes across levels of socioeconomic development for all three interaction terms. The sole exception is the result in Model 24, where lower food production in highly discriminatory societies is negatively associated with non-state conflict. This result would seem to contradict the standard scarcity thesis (Homer-Dixon 1999) although it is consistent with observations that conflict is more prevalent during surplus years (Witsenburg and Adano 2009, Salehyan and Hendrix 2014). Mirroring earlier research, ethnopolitical exclusion is strongly related to higher civil conflict risk, but not necessarily to other forms of political violence. Infant mortality rate and economic dependence on agriculture appear largely irrelevant. While this may come as a surprise, recall that most countries in SSA are characterized by underdevelopment and a large agricultural sector, implying that the variation in values on these indicators is modest. Large parameter uncertainties and p-values above the conventional significance threshold (5%) may disguise substantively important effects (Ward et al 2010). Accordingly, as a final assessment, we conduct a set of out-of-sample simulations and compare predictions for models with and without food production. The models are estimated on a subset of the full sample, in this case all years before 2000, and the estimated effects are then used to predict conflict outcomes out of sample, i.e., the 2000–09 period. Figure 5 shows the predicted values from four pairs of models that are specified similarly to Models 17, 20, 23, and 26, except for the shorter time period and the fact that one model in each pair drops the food production deviation variable. For civil conflict and social unrest, the models generate very similar predictions, signaling that agricultural performance adds little to the models' predictive power. There is more spread in the predictions for the remaining two outcome categories. Puzzlingly, the model without food production performs better in both cases—i.e., the Receiver Operating Characteristics curves have higher 'Area Under the Curve' scores. We hesitate to put too much emphasis on the ROC tests, given the rareness of the outcomes (notably Models 17 and 26) and the relatively small training samples (Models 20 and 23), but nonetheless the patterns observed in the out-of-sample simulations substantiate the regression results reported above; fluctuations in agricultural output explain little of the observed variation in political violence in post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa. 5. Concluding remarks Emerging evidence suggests that food price shocks are associated with an increase in social unrest (Smith 2014, Bellemare 2015, Hendrix and Haggard 2015, Weinberg and Bakker 2015). Yet, the robust 'non-finding' presented here implies that so-called 'food riots' play out largely isolated from climate-sensitive production dynamics in the affected countries. Likewise, claims that adverse weather and harvest failure drive contemporary violence in Africa (e.g., Hsiang et al 2013, IFPRI 2015) are not supported by our analysis. Instead, social protest and rebellion during times of food price spikes may be better understood as reactions to poor and unjust government policies, corruption, repression, and market failure (e.g., Bush 2010, Buhaug and Urdal 2013, Sneyd et al 2013, Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015).