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2023 ENDI Negative
NEG › Answers to Growth Advantage › ---XT---UBI Not Solve Innovation/Entrepreneurship---2NC/1NR

UBI doesn’t stimulate entrepreneurship or innovation---pilot projects prove

Jason Furman 19. Professor of the Practice of Economic Policy at Harvard Kennedy School (HKS), and Robert Seamans, "AI and the Economy: Innovation Policy and the Economy: Vol 19," Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 19. https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/699936.

A third issue is with the argument that UBI may stimulate entrepreneurship and innovation. There are strong arguments for policies that stimulate entrepreneurship, given that rates of new business entry have declined over the past three decades (Decker et al. 2014). But there is little evidence of heightened entrepreneurship and innovation in regions with UBI-like programs, such as oil-rich areas that provide income to most residents, including in Alaska, Norway, and some Gulf states. Moreover, the argument for increased entrepreneurship and innovation relies on the assumption that entrepreneurs and inventors will take more risk. But there may be a countervailing force in that lenders, wary of increased risk-taking by entrepreneurs, may cut back on lending. There is some evidence of this type of behavior from the economics of bankruptcy literature (e.g., Berkowitz and White 2004).

2023 ENDI Negative
NEG › Answers to Growth Advantage › 1NC AT: Growth Advantage

3---No impact to economic decline.

Walt 20 [Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?”, May 13th, ]

On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).”

Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself.

2023 ENDI Negative
NEG › Answers to Growth Advantage › 1NC AT: Growth Advantage

That collapses the economy

Rachel Minogue 18. Economic Fellow at Third Way, 2017-2018, 5-24-18. "Five Problems with Universal Basic Income," https://www.thirdway.org/memo/five-problems-with-universal-basic-income.

With either approach, UBI is based on assumptions about the future economy that run counter to many economic realities. As a result, it creates a series of problems for the modern US economy that need to be examined. Those problems fall into five categories:

Jobs aren’t disappearing; rather, the nature of work is changing.

2023 ENDI Negative
NEG › Answers to Growth Advantage › 1NC AT: Growth Advantage

2---TURN---UBI destroys incentives to work

Robert Doar 18. Morgridge Fellow in Poverty Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, spring 2018. "Universal Basic Income Would Undermine the Success of Our Safety Net," https://www.bushcenter.org/catalyst/are-we-ready/doar-universal-basic-income.

Universal Basic Income (UBI) would be an unaffordable way to undermine our social safety net’s successes. UBI would transfer money away from those who need it most, change the distinctly American relationship between citizen and government, and sharply raise taxes or the national debt (or both). And critically, it would fail to improve upon our current safety net’s biggest weakness: UBI would destroy – not improve – incentives to work.

The first problem is the money. A truly universal payment of $10,000 to every citizen every year adds up to a new expense of about $3 trillion, well more than we spend on our social safety net now, and close to the entirety of the tax revenue currently collected by the federal government.

2023 ENDI Negative
NEG › Answers to Growth Advantage › 1NC AT: Growth Advantage

1---UBI doesn’t increase innovation or entrepreneurship

Robert Seamans 17. Associate Professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business and Director of the Center for the Future of Management, 6-6-2017. "Universal Basic Income Is Not An Innovation Policy," https://www.forbes.com/sites/washingtonbytes/2017/06/06/universal-basic-income-is-not-an-innovation-policy/?sh=6edfcbde2e8f.

UBI Is Unlikely To Stimulate Entrepreneurship And Innovation

In my view, while there may be other benefits to UBI, the argument that UBI might stimulate entrepreneurship and innovation suffers from two key problems. First, the U.S. economy already has multiple safety nets in place for would-be entrepreneurs and innovators, including bankruptcy laws, unemployment insurance, the Affordable Care Act (which allows employees to leave their firms without fear of losing health care), and other programs described below. It is not clear that replacing one set of safety nets with another will stimulate entrepreneurship and innovation.

2023 ENDI Negative
NEG › Answers to Automation Advantage › ---XT---UBI Not Solve Trust/Democracy---2NC/1NR

UBI undermines social cohesion

Ian Goldin 18. Professor of Globalisation and Development at the University of Oxford, 2-12-18. “Five reasons why universal basic income is a red herring.” Financial Times.

Third, UBI will undermine social cohesion. Individuals gain not only income, but meaning, status, skills, networks and friendships through work. Delinking income and work, while rewarding people for staying at home, is what lies behind social decay. Crime, drugs, broken families and other socially destructive outcomes are more likely in places with high unemployment, as is evident in the drug pandemic in the US.

2023 ENDI Negative
NEG › Answers to Automation Advantage › ---XT---UBI Not Solve Trust/Democracy---2NC/1NR

Too many alt causes to trust in government

Jennifer Rubin 22. American political commentator who writes opinion columns for The Washington Post, 6-7-2022. "Opinion," https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/06/07/pew-poll-why-is-trust-government-so-low/.

Pew Research Center’s latest poll confirms what has been known for a long time: Trust in government is low. Really low.

“Just 20% say they trust the government in Washington to do the right thing just about always or most of the time,” the pollsters found, although when asked about specific government functions (e.g., responding to natural disasters, preventing terrorist attacks), approval soars to nearly 70 percent. Democrats’ trust level is low (29 percent), but not as low as Republicans’ (9 percent).

2023 ENDI Negative
NEG › Answers to Automation Advantage › ---XT---UBI Not Solve Trust/Democracy---2NC/1NR

UBI’s ineffective at generating trust in government---the impacts on workers are negative

Anna Coote 19. Principal Fellow at the New Economics Foundation, and Edanur Yazici, April 2019. “UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME A UNION PERSPECTIVE.” http://www.world-psi.org/sites/default/files/documents/research/en_ubi_full_report_2019.pdf

There are strong arguments against UBI. It is thought to have negative im- pacts on workers and to cost too much, absorbing funds that would be better spent in other ways. It diverts political energies from more important issues and shores up neoliberal ideology.

IMPACTS ON LABOUR

2023 ENDI Negative
NEG › Answers to Automation Advantage › ---XT---No Automation Crisis---2NC/1NR

Prefer our evidence

Georgios Petropoulos et al. 19. Post-doc at MIT, a research fellow at Bruegel, and a digital fellow at the Stanford Digital Economy Lab, with J. Scott Marcus, Nicolas Moës, and Enrico Bergamini, “Digitalisation and European Welfare States,” Blueprint Series, Bruegel, https://www.bruegel.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Bruegel_Blueprint_30_ONLINE.pdf

The idea of a ‘robot tax’ originated with the founder of Microsoft, Bill Gates. Gates argued that if human workers’ income is taxed today, and then a robot is deployed to do the same work, it seems logical to think that we should tax the robot at a similar level to the human. Some have gone on to suggest that a robot tax could be used to pay for the re-training of human workers who have lost their jobs to robots (Merler, 2017).

Most economists are sceptical of this proposal. A European robot tax would tend to hinder innovation, thus reducing European compet- itiveness, and possibly leading to distortions in relative investments in capital versus human labour (Merler, 2017).

2023 ENDI Negative
NEG › Answers to Automation Advantage › ---XT---No Automation Crisis---2NC/1NR

Balance of research votes neg

Robert Seamans 21. Nonresident Senior Fellow - Center on Regulation and Markets, Brookings, 8-25-2021. "Tax not the robots," https://www.brookings.edu/research/tax-not-the-robots/.

While the arguments in favor of a robot tax may be well-intentioned, robot taxes are a misguided idea that would have negative consequences for firms, their workers, and ultimately the economy. To begin with, the assertion that robots are taking jobs is not well founded. Recent research shows that firms that adopt robots experience more employment growth than those that do not. These firms also appear to be more productive, potentially benefiting consumers, although the gains experienced by the adopting firm may come at the expense of firms that do not adopt. Moreover, defining a “robot” turns out to be non-trivial; depending on this definition, a robot tax may affect some industries more than others, regardless of the impact on human labor. Ultimately, a robot tax would lead to slower adoption of robots, especially in industries such as manufacturing where it may be easier to define a “robot,” and this slower adoption will likely lead to less economic growth. Instead of robot taxes, policymakers who want to help workers displaced by automation should focus on other policies, such as addressing disparities in taxes on capital and labor and easing labor market frictions. Doing so would benefit workers, firms, and the economy more so than would a tax on robots.

FIRMS ADOPTING ROBOTS SEE MORE EMPLOYMENT AND BETTER PERFORMANCE

2023 ENDI Negative
NEG › Answers to Automation Advantage › ---XT---No Automation Crisis---2NC/1NR

Jobs will be displaced slowly---markets and government policy will have time to adapt.

Steven Pinker 18. Johnstone Professor of Psychology, Harvard University, “Chapter 19: Existential Threats,” Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress, Viking, an imprint of Penguin Random House LLC, 2018, pp. 359–395

Artificial intelligence, to be sure, poses the more mundane challenge of what to do about the people whose jobs are eliminated by automation. But the jobs won’t be eliminated that quickly. The observation of a 1965 report from NASA still holds: “Man is the lowest-cost, 150-pound, nonlinear, all-purpose computer system which can be mass-produced by unskilled labor.” 32 Driving a car is an easier engineering problem than unloading a dishwasher, running an errand, or changing a diaper, and at the time of this writing we’re still not ready to loose self-driving cars on city streets. 33 Until the day when battalions of robots are inoculating children and building schools in the developing world, or for that matter building infrastructure and caring for the aged in ours, there will be plenty of work to be done. The same kind of ingenuity that has been applied to the design of software and robots could be applied to the design of government and private sector policies that match idle hands with undone work. 34

2023 ENDI Negative
NEG › Answers to Automation Advantage › ---XT---No Automation Crisis---2NC/1NR

This advantage is fearmongering---new jobs make up for losses to automation

Ryan A. Hughes 23. Founder of Bull Oak Capital, an investment advisory firm, 1-27-2023. "Universal Basic Income is a Bad Idea," .

As stated earlier, Andrew Yang believes that robots and automation will purge America of countless jobs. Will automation replace some jobs? Yes. It is almost guaranteed that some jobs will be phased out. But other, more meaningful jobs will be created in its place. This has been the case since the rise of humanity.

Automation is not a new concept. Since the earliest times, tools and machines have been invented to make a task easier. In 1722, the lathe was invented, a tool designed to hold a section of material to be carved, cut, or shaped. The lathe is credited with being the first machine tool that led to the invention of all subsequent machine tools.

2023 ENDI Negative
NEG › Answers to Automation Advantage › 1NC AT: Automation Advantage

5---Democracy is resilient but doesn’t solve anything

Renske Doorenspleet 19. Politics Professor at the University of Warwick. Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 239-243.

The value of democracy has been taken for granted until recently, but this assumption seems to be under threat now more than ever before. As was explained in Chapter 1, democracy’s claim to be valuable does not rest on just one particular merit, and scholars tend to distinguish three different types of values (Sen 1999). This book focused on the instrumental value of democracy (and hence not on the intrinsic and constructive value), and investigated the value of democracy for peace (Chapters 3 and 4), control of corruption (Chapter 5) and economic development (Chapter 6). This study was based on a search of an enormous academic database for certain keywords,6 then pruned the thousands of articles down to a few hundred articles (see Appendix) which statistically analysed the connection between the democracy and the four expected outcomes. The frst fiding is that a reverse wave away from democracy has not happened (see Chapter 2). Not yet, at least. Democracy is not doing worse than before, at least not in comparative perspective. While it is true that there is a dramatic decline in democracy in some countries,7 a general trend downwards cannot yet be detected. It would be better to talk about ‘stagnation’, as not many dictatorships have democratized recently, while democracies have not yet collapsed. Another fnding is that the instrumental value of democracy is very questionable. The feld has been deeply polarized between researchers who endorse a link between democracy and positive outcomes, and those who reject this optimistic idea and instead emphasize the negative effects of democracy. There has been ‘no consensus’ in the quantitative literature on whether democracy has instrumental value which leads some beneficial general outcomes. Some scholars claim there is a consensus, but they only do so by ignoring a huge amount of literature which rejects their own point of view. After undertaking a large-scale analysis of carefully selected articles published on the topic (see Appendix), this book can conclude that the connections between democracy and expected benefts are not as strong as they seem. Hence, we should not overstate the links between the phenomena. The overall evidence is weak. Take the expected impact of democracy on peace for example. As Chapter 3 showed, the study of democracy and interstate war has been a fourishing theme in political science, particularly since the 1970s. However, there are four reasons why democracy does not cause peace between countries, and why the empirical support for the popular idea of democratic peace is quite weak. Most statistical studies have not found a strong correlation between democracy and interstate war at the dyadic level. They show that there are other—more powerful—explanations for war and peace, and even that the impact of democracy is a spurious one (caveat 1). Moreover, the theoretical foundation of the democratic peace hypothesis is weak, and the causal mechanisms are unclear (caveat 2). In addition, democracies are not necessarily more peaceful in general, and the evidence for the democratic peace hypothesis at the monadic level is inconclusive (caveat 3). Finally, the process of democratization is dangerous. Living in a democratizing country means living in a less peaceful country (caveat 4). With regard to peace between countries, we cannot defend the idea that democracy has instrumental value. Can the (instrumental) value of democracy be found in the prevention of civil war? Or is the evidence for the opposite idea more convincing, and does democracy have a ‘dark side’ which makes civil war more likely? The findings are confusing, which is exacerbated by the fact that different aspects of civil war (prevalence, onset, duration and severity) are mixed up in some civil war studies. Moreover, defining civil war is a delicate, politically sensitive issue. Determining whether there is a civil war in a particular country is incredibly diffcult, while measurements suffer from many weaknesses (caveat 1). Moreover, there is no linear link: civil wars are just as unlikely in democracies as in dictatorships (caveat 2). Civil war is most likely in times of political change. Democratization is a very unpredictable, dangerous process, increasing the chance of civil war significantly. Hybrid systems are at risk as well: the chance of civil war is much higher compared to other political systems (caveat 3). More specifcally, both the strength and type of political institutions matter when explaining civil war. However, the type of political system (e.g. democracy or dictatorship) is not the decisive factor at all (caveat 4). Finally, democracy has only limited explanatory power (caveat 5). Economic factors are far more significant than political factors (such as having a democratic system) when explaining the onset, duration and severity of civil war. To prevent civil war, it would make more sense to make poorer countries richer, instead of promoting democracy. Helping countries to democratize would even be a very dangerous idea, as countries with changing levels of democracy are most vulnerable, making civil wars most likely. It is true that there is evidence that the chance of civil war decreases when the extent of democracy increases considerably. The problem however is that most countries do not go through big political changes but through small changes instead; those small steps—away or towards more democracy—are dangerous. Not only is the onset of civil war likely under such circumstances, but civil wars also tend to be longer, and the confict is more cruel leading to more victims, destruction and killings (see Chapter 4). A more encouraging story can be told around the value for democracy to control corruption in a country (see Chapter 5). Fighting corruption has been high on the agenda of international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. Moreover, the theme of corruption has been studied thoroughly in many different academic disciplines—mainly in economics, but also in sociology, political science and law. Democracy has often been suggested as one of the remedies when fghting against high levels of continuous corruption. So far, the statistical evidence has strongly supported this idea. As Chapter 5 showed, dozens of studies with broad quantitative, cross-national and comparative research have found statistically signifcant associations between (less) democracy and (more) corruption. However, there are vast problems around conceptualization (caveat 1) and measurement (caveat 2) of ‘corruption’. Another caveat is that democratizing countries are the poorest performers with regard to controlling corruption (caveat 3). Moreover, it is not democracy in general, but particular political institutions which have an impact on the control of corruption; and a free press also helps a lot in order to limit corruptive practices in a country (caveat 4). In addition, democracies seem to be less affected by corruption than dictatorships, but at the same time, there is clear evidence that economic factors have more explanatory power (caveat 5). In conclusion, more democracy means less corruption, but we need to be modest (as other factors matter more) and cautious (as there are many caveats). The perceived impact of democracy on development has been highly contested as well (see Chapter 6). Some scholars argue that democratic systems have a positive impact, while others argue that high levels of democracy actually reduce the levels of economic growth and development. Particularly since the 1990s, statistical studies have focused on this debate, and the empirical evidence is clear: there is no direct impact of democracy on development. Hence, both approaches cannot be supported (see caveat 1). The indirect impact via other factors is also questionable (caveat 2). Moreover, there is too much variation in levels of economic growth and development among the dictatorial systems, and there are huge regional differences (caveat 3). Adopting a one-size-ftsall approach would not be wise at all. In addition, in order to increase development, it would be better to focus on alternative factors such as improving institutional quality and good governance (caveat 4). There is not suffcient evidence to state that democracy has instrumental value, at least not with regard to economic growth. However, future research needs to include broader concepts and measurements of development in their models, as so far studies have mainly focused on explaining cross-national differences in growth of GDP (caveat 5). Overall, the instrumental value of democracy is—at best—tentative, or—if being less mild—simply non-existent. Democracy is not necessarily better than any alternative form of government. With regard to many of the expected benefts—such as less war, less corruption and more economic development—democracy does deliver, but so do nondemocratic systems. High or low levels of democracy do not make a distinctive difference. Mid-range democracy levels do matter though. Hybrid systems can be associated with many negative outcomes, while this is also the case for democratizing countries. Moreover, other explanations—typically certain favourable economic factors in a country—are much more powerful to explain the expected benefts, at least compared to the single fact that a country is a democracy or not. The impact of democracy fades away in the powerful shadows of the economic factors.8

2023 ENDI Negative
NEG › Answers to Automation Advantage › 1NC AT: Automation Advantage

4---No impact to populism

Luís de Sousa et al., 21. Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa, with Daniel Fernandes and Florian Weiler, March 2021. “Is Populism Bad For Business? Assessing The Reputational Effect Of Populist Incumbents.” Swiss Political Science Review Volume 27, Issue 1. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/spsr.12411

We expect that populist incumbencies, for the various reasons invoked in the literature and discussed above, generate negative perceptions of the country’s political stability and business climate among economic stakeholders. To test these hypotheses, we organize the remainder of this article as follows. First, we discuss the reputational effect of populist incumbency. We argue that governments with populist party(ies) are more likely to generate political uncertainty and have a negative effect on the country’s business climate/reputation. We then employ statistical analysis to test these hypotheses by using maximum likelihood estimation and include two random effects. Our findings suggest that populist incumbencies have no clear impact on the stability of the political system (with a few known exceptions) and the attractiveness of the business climate, despite the discursive and ideological dimensions.

2023 ENDI Negative
NEG › Answers to Automation Advantage › 1NC AT: Automation Advantage

3---UBI doesn’t solve trust or democracy

Daron Acemoglu 19. Institute Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 6-19-2019. "Why Universal Basic Income is a bad idea," https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-universal-basic-income-is-a-bad-idea-2019-06-19.

Equally important, these solutions leverage democratic politics. The same cannot be said for a UBI, which is parachuted from above as a way of placating the discontented masses.

It neither empowers nor even consults the people it aims to help. (Do workers who have lost their middle-class jobs want government transfers or an opportunity to get another job?) As such, UBI proposals have all the hallmarks of the “bread and circuses” used by the Roman and Byzantine Empires — handouts to defuse discontent and mollify the masses, rather than providing them with economic opportunities and political agency.

2023 ENDI Negative
NEG › Answers to Automation Advantage › 1NC AT: Automation Advantage

2---UBI doesn’t solve automation challenges

Vivek Wadhwa 17. Distinguished fellow at Carnegie Mellon University’s College of Engineering. Duke Corporate Education, September 2017. "Why universal basic income can't solve the challenges of automation," https://www.dukece.com/insights/why-universal-basic-income-cant-solve-challenges-automation/.

Universal basic income (UBI) alone won’t solve the coming sea change in the labor market.

To many voters and policymakers in the United States, the concept of a universal basic income (UBI) once seemed completely unhinged. The idea of the government handing out cash to everyone ran counter to ideas of fairness on both sides of the ideological spectrum, and once only saw support among niche left-wing political parties and a few radical capitalist economists who viewed it as the only solution to the apocryphal benefits trap. This trap dictates that those struggling in the economy have a disincentive to work, because doing so threatens their state benefits. The idea was presented that if everyone got a UBI, any work done could be paid in addition to their basic income.

2023 ENDI Kritik
Answers to Capitalism Kritik › 2AC – Impact Defense

Using the state to reimagine and reform capitalism is both possible and necessary to solve at the macro level.

Mariana Mazzucato 21. Professor in the Economics of Innovation and Public Value at University College London where she is the founding director of the UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose, 1-28-2021. Mission Economy: A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism, p. 204-10.

This book has applied what I believe is the immensely powerful idea of a mission to solving the ‘wicked’ problems we face today. In it, I have argued that tackling grand challenges will only happen if we reimagine government as a prerequisite for restructuring capitalism in a way that is inclusive, sustainable and driven by innovation.

First and foremost, this means reinventing government for the twenty-first century – equipping it with the tools, organization and culture it needs to drive a mission-oriented approach. It also means bringing purpose to the core of corporate governance and taking a very broad stakeholder position across the economy. It means changing the relationship between public and private sectors, and between them and civil society, so they all work symbiotically for a common goal. The reason for the emphasis on rethinking government is simple: only government has the capacity to bring about transformation on the scale needed. The relationship between economic actors and civil society shows our problems at their most profound, and this is what we must unravel.

2023 ENDI Kritik
Answers to Capitalism Kritik › 2AC – Impact Defense

Modern capitalism is not a destructive monolith. Attributing all current issues to capitalism ignores real-world developments that can’t be explained by Marxist analysis.

David Lane 20. Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences (UK) and Emeritus Fellow of Emmanuel College, Cambridge University, 3-18-2020. “Building socialism: from ‘scientific’ to ‘active’ Marxism”, Third World Quarterly, vol. 41(8) p. 1306-1321.

All the countries of the world have been drawn into the capitalist order; capitalism has continued to grow and spread, and its developments have confounded Marx’s predictions. Its contradictions have been resolved, at least partially, through forms of coordination and control exercised by the state and increasingly by regional and global institutions. The polarisation of class struggle, anticipated by Marx, has been occluded by a much more differentiated occupational system promoting a pluralistic and socially diverse political process. Capitalism has moved from chaotic competition to a more organised form constituted by global financial and non-financial companies and transnational institutions. The cyclical development of capitalism continues. World capitalism has shown a capability for diffusion and adaptation. It is conditioned by variations which exist in different economic and political formations. ‘Scientific Marxism’, like ‘Darwinism’ in the physical world, is subject to revision in the light of new facts and theories. Marx’s materialist approach has been widely accepted, while many of his political predictions have been discarded. In this respect his work has been absorbed to various degrees by different subjects in the humanities and social sciences; it has influenced political parties and legitimated political leaders; and it remains a fertile but debatable approach to our understanding of world history. Marx made a significant contribution to the understanding of the nineteenth-century class structure of capitalism. His knowledge is limited to the society he knew at the time. To overcome the tendency to reductionism, Marx’s approach might be developed with insights from other theories and approaches. Bureaucracy, patriarchy, militarism and credentialism (the exercise of ‘expert’ knowledge) also constitute forms of political and economic power and have their own laws of development. Social discrimination and political domination should be distinguished from economic exploitation. Such forms of power sometimes overlap with the interests of economic classes, but they are primarily performed by social groups and elites sometimes operating on behalf of nation states or international organisations. It is mistaken to attribute all the malformations, inadequacies and injustices to inherent faults or contradictions in the class structures of capitalist or socialist regimes. Other problems, such as those concerned with environmental exploitation as well as the consequences of nuclear war, have assumed greater importance in the twenty-first century and were not anticipated by Marx’s historical materialism. To understand current international conflict, Thucydides provides a geo-strategic dimension unheeded by Marx. The oppression of marginalised groups has cultural and historical roots. Cultural values are deeply engrained and prove obstinate to change. These dimensions of power might be shaped by, but are not constituent parts of, economic exploitation and should be analysed separately. Moreover, they cannot be equated with economic exploitation – Marx has been vindicated in giving to the ownership of private property and economic surplus obtained through market relationships a qualitatively different level of power than other forms of domination and discrimination.

2023 ENDI Kritik
Answers to Capitalism Kritik › 2AC – Impact Turn – War

Capitalism is net better for peace—wealth and democracy is negatively correlated with aggression.

Mark Harrison 12. Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Warwick, Centre for Russian and East European Studies at University of Birmingham, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University, 12-20-2012. “Capitalism at War”, University of Warwick. https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mharrison/public/capitalism_at_war.pdf

Capitalism’s Wars America is the world’s preeminent capitalist power. According to a poll of more than 21,000 citizens of 21 countries in the second half of 2008, people tend on average to evaluate U.S. foreign policy as inferior to that of their own country in the moral dimension.4 While this survey does not disaggregate respondents by educational status, many apparently knowledgeable people also seem to believe that, in the modern world, most wars are caused by America; this impression is based on my experience of presenting work on the frequency of wars to academic seminars in several European countries. According to the evidence, however, these beliefs are mistaken. We are all aware of America’s wars, but they make only a small contribution to the total. Counting all bilateral conflicts involving at least the show of force from 1870 to 2001, it turns out that the countries that originated them come from all parts of the global income distribution (Harrison and Wolf 2011). Countries that are richer, measured by GDP per head, such as America do not tend to start more conflicts, although there is a tendency for countries with larger GDPs to do so. Ranking countries by the numbers of conflicts they initiated, the United States, with the largest economy, comes only in second place; third place belongs to China. In first place is Russia (the USSR between 1917 and 1991). What do capitalist institutions contribute to the empirical patterns in the data? Erik Gartzke (2007) has re-examined the hypothesis of the “democratic peace” based on the possibility that, since capitalism and democracy are highly correlated across countries and time, both democracy and peace might be products of the same underlying cause, the spread of capitalist institutions. It is a problem that our historical datasets have measured the spread of capitalist property rights and economic freedoms over shorter time spans or on fewer dimensions than political variables. For the period from 1950 to 1992, Gartzke uses a measure of external financial and trade liberalization as most likely to signal robust markets and a laissez faire policy. Countries that share this attribute of capitalism above a certain level, he finds, do not fight each other, so there is capitalist peace as well as democratic peace. Second, economic liberalization (of the less liberalized of the pair of countries) is a more powerful predictor of bilateral peace than democratization, controlling for the level of economic development and measures of political affinity.

2023 ENDI Kritik
Answers to Capitalism Kritik › 2AC – Impact Turn – Environment

Empirics prove regulating capitalism can solve environmental challenges, and capitalist innovation is the biggest driver of green technologies.

David Rosenberg 17. Economics editor and columnist for Haaretz, 11-21-2017. “Capitalism Is Our Only Hope of Rescue From Climate Change”, Haaretz. https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/2017-11-21/ty-article/.premium/capitalism-is-our-only-hope-of-rescue-from-climate-change/0000017f-f333-d487-abff-f3ffc4870000)

On paper, Fong and other critics of capitalism have some points. But the reality is very different. In a modern capitalist economy, far from being the jungle that Fong and Klein portray it, business is subject to regulations, societal values and forces beyond its control. It may fight back, and sometimes fight back nasty, but it accepts the outcome. Take the energy crisis of the early 1970s, which combined all of these factors, and in some respects echoes the dilemma facing business in the era of global warning. Suddenly OPEC raised oil prices. But rather than threaten war (as leftists who see no bounds to capitalist rapaciousness would assume), the capitalist economies adjusted. Corporations became more energy efficient and developed products that provided the same savings for consumers, because that’s what the market demanded. Government stepped in with regulations that filled in the gaps where the market couldn’t or wouldn’t. It worked. If energy use per unit of GDP in the United States were still at 1973 levels, the country’s energy use would be over 40% greater than its current level. The fact is, capitalism’s critics are so focused on the system’s fundamental wickedness, as they see it, that they ignore its assets, namely its dynamism – its willingness to dispense with anything that doesn’t work and try something else, not because it has the good of humanity in mind, but because it wants to beat the competition and make bigger profits. Given the right set of incentives, businesses in capitalist economies will conform to rules that limit environmental damage. More importantly, they will develop the technologies to help mitigate climate change further. Electric and self-driving cars, solar and wind power, smart transportation and a host of other energy-saving technologies are being developed by corporations, not by government, and certainly not in the world’s last surviving bastions of socialism. Fong doesn’t go into the particulars of the democratic socialism that he fantasizes will rescue the world from warming. If it’s a kind of centralized economy, he might do well to look back at the environmental record of the old Soviet Union, which was a disaster. If he imagines some kind of squishy network of socialist collectives, what is to prevent them from engaging in the same selfish behavior as corporations? Capitalism is messy and uncooperative, but against climate change, it’s the best chance we’ve got.