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Neal McCluskey, 17. Director of the Cato Institute’s Center for Educational Freedom. “For the Love of Choice, Don’t Federalize It,” March 14, 2017. https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/love-choice-dont-federalize-it
Federal money means federal regulation We should protect federalism both to ensure that differing methods of delivering choice can be tried without having to compete against a choice monopolist—an oxymoronic but all-too-real concept when discussing the feds—and to prevent national homogenization of private schools via the kinds of regulations that inevitably get attached to federal dough. On the first major concern—avoiding a monopoly choice system—I believe the most meaningful form of accountability is having to satisfy parents. But while I oppose most rules and regulations on schools participating in choice programs, I would never declare that my preferred amount of regulation is always and everywhere incontrovertibly right. Research does not make a slam-dunk case for any specific system. Research is limited, as are our minds. The way we learn what’s best now and continue to discover methods that may be better is to allow free action on a level playing field. Federalism helps us do just that. On the second point—federal “help” rendering once-autonomous private institutions increasingly homogenous—all major forms of choice are susceptible to government control to varying degrees. The danger is far greater when that control comes from Washington, because you can’t even move to another state to escape it.
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2NC/1NR - Links – Basic Income
David Green et al, 20. *David Green is a professor in the Vancouver School of Economics at University of British Columbia, he is an international fellow at the Institute for Fiscal Studies in London, England. His research interests are primarily related to the interaction of technological change and social policy in determining wage and employment outcomes. *Jonathan Rhys Kesselman is a Professor Emeritus in the School of Public Policy at Simon Fraser University. *Lindsay Tedds is the Scientific Director of the Fiscal and Economic Policy program at the School of Public Policy and an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Calgary. “Considerations for Basic Income as a Covid-19 response.” University of Calgary School of Public Policy Publications, SPP Briefing Paper, Volume 13:11, May 2020. https://doi.org/10.11575/sppp.v13i0.70353. ProQuest.
However, in the current vigorous debate, it is our view, based on nearly two years of work on the topic, that crucial considerations are being swept aside as some commentators — both advocates and critics of a basic income — depict it in simple terms. Advocates often argue that its advantages are in its simplicity and opponents argue that it is too simplistic. Neither turns out to be true. Implementing a basic income is not simple. There is a need to carefully consider the details of a basic income to avoid simply creating a cash transfer program that is neither consistent with the guiding principles of a basic income nor able to achieve the desired objectives, which themselves need to be determined. A basic income is also not a single, uniform policy, but rather a range of policy proposals with multiple design details that need to be selected and reconciled with the principles and objectives of a basic income. Unless one is advocating for the elimination of all existing systems, it is also essential to consider how the basic income interacts with the existing system, and even what parts of the system would remain, not the least of which pose complex fiscal federalism considerations.
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2NC/1NR - Links – Fiscal redistribution
Howard Chernick, 07. Howard Chernick is a Professor of Economics at Hunter College in New York. “A Reconsideration of the Optimal Assignment of Redistribution Under Fiscal Federalism.” Proceedings. Annual Conference on Taxation and Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the National Tax Association, Vol. 100, 100th Annual Conference on Taxation (November 15-17, 2007), pp. 216-224.
In contrast to the standard upward assignment argument, the argument in this paper is that not only too little, but also too much centralization can be suboptimal. While there is little argument that age-based redistribution—the provision of social and medical insurance to the elderly—should be primarily a federal function, in the case of means-tested programs, too much centralization can thwart the complementarity of support by subnational governments. The greater the dispersion in fiscal capacity, need, and preferences across subnational units in a federation, the greater the importance of a balance of federal and subnational fiscal responsibility.
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ACIR, 81. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. The Federal role in the federal system, the dynamics of growth. June 1981. https://library.unt.edu/gpo/ACIR/Reports/policy/A-86.pdf
One of the many consequences of these changes is that the historic autonomy and independent Constitutional status of the states and their localities are accorded far less weight in the nation's political processes than formerly. In the not-so-distant past, the strongly decentralized system of political parties led by state and local officials served as a principal informal bulwark of federalism.S9 Political reality demanded that the interests and concerns of state and local governments automatically be accorded deference at the national level-and such generally was the case through the early 1960s.
Now, various specialized constituencies and interest groups have become major sources of campaign funds, manpower, and votes. For this reason (among others), Congress, the executive branch and federal courts may rush into areas where they once feared to tread at all. Questions of federalism often are treated as minor matters of legal technicality, rather than high principle, while fields once regarded as purely subnational concerns are marked by proliferating aid programs. The conditions under which federal assistance is offered have become more numerous, more onerous, and sometimes even more openly coercive than could have been imagined possible two decades ago.
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ACIR, 81. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. The Federal role in the federal system, the dynamics of growth. June 1981. https://library.unt.edu/gpo/ACIR/Reports/policy/A-86.pdf
Over time, however, both the amount of federal payments and the scope of federal authority increased- initially in small, incremental steps, then in giant leaps. First Congress moved from a posture of denying federal authorities any enforcement powers to requiring the enactment of national water quality standards in the event that a state chose not to specify its own clean water criteria. In order to rationalize this shift, the federal government moved from timid reliance upon its power to tax and spend to increasingly broad interpretations of the interstate commerce clause. It institutionalized its role as a protector of the nation's waters by raising a small administrative section buried within an agency within a department to the status of an independent agency. Finally, the stated purpose of the legislation underwent a significant metamorphosis from protecting the rights and responsibilities of the states to establishing a national policy. One step behind, a similar scenario was occurring in the field of air pollution. One result of the increasing intrusiveness of federal policy was a drastic deterioration in the quality of national-state relationships. Antagonism replaced cooperation. By the mid-1970s, it could be said that: . . . whereas past policy reflected a sort of "cooperative federalism" consisting in some national but also considerable state authority, that of the present underscores "federal" and, as one might expect, is distinctly uncooperative. Pollution policy is national policy, and the states are little more than reluctant minions mandated to do the dirty work-to implement federal directives often distasteful at the local level.l16
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ACIR, 81. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. The Federal role in the federal system, the dynamics of growth. June 1981. https://library.unt.edu/gpo/ACIR/Reports/policy/A-86.pdf
Though not a grant-in-aid, the federal-state unemployment insurance (UI) system also exhibits similar deficiencies when judged from an equity standpoint, and for similar reasons. Also created by the Social Security Act of 1935, UI leaves most of the crucial policy decisions on eligibility and benefit levels to the 50 states. Hence, as in welfare, 50 separate systems exist.
Again, the political climate of the 1930s explains this outcome. While many social workers, labor intellectuals, and reformers favored a European style national system with one set of benefit standards, many businessmen and their political allies demanded flexibility, ruling out national uniformity.
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David Paul, 17. President of the Fiscal Strategies Group. “Federalism? It's Not Just For Racists Anymore," HuffPost, July 6, 2017. https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/federalism-its-not-just-for-racists-anymore_us_595dc3a4e4b085e766b51056
The irony of the rise of Trump and red state and rural resentments felt toward coastal elites is that―from a financial vantage point―red states have a pretty good deal. Each year, with a handful of exceptions, red states get back substantially more money than they send to Washington, D.C. This is neither a new nor an accidental phenomenon. When the federal income tax was approved with the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution just over one hundred years ago, it was pushed largely by Democrat populist politicians in southern and western states as a strategy to tax the rich―meaning then, as now, primarily wealthy Republicans. And it worked, to the tune of billions and billions of dollars provided annually to red states, courtesy of blue state taxpayers. The federal income tax has had several consequences, some intended and some not. It has achieved the primary goal of those that promoted it, as it put in place a systematic flow of subsidies from wealthier, more prosperous states to poorer states. Ironically, however, by creating a mechanism to facilitate the raising of revenue at the federal level, it also engendered a shift in power from the states to the federal government. Therefore, what began as a populist-inspired constitutional amendment led directly to the rise of the centralized state, ultimately planting the seeds for the culture of resentment and populist backlash that Donald Trump rode to the White House. Prior to the 16th Amendment, the Constitution provided a very different model for public finances, and public policy overall. It envisioned a weaker central government with limited taxing power. Rather than direct federal taxation, it provided that each state would be “apportioned” its share of federal funding required for annual federal budget purposes. Each state ― for richer or for poorer―was responsible for remitting an equal contribution to the federal treasury on a per capita basis. In the modern context, there could be several advantages for returning to a federalist apportionment model to replace the federal income tax. First and foremost, as French suggests in his article, it would allow each state to pursue public policies that reflect their own unique culture and politics. Thus, in the area of taxation, California might choose a progressive income tax to raise its required federal apportionment, while Texas might choose a flat tax. The Constitution similarly envisioned a decentralized structure for public policy and governance. With taxation decentralized under a return to an apportionment structure, public policy at the state level would become more meaningful. Once states were made directly responsible for raising funds to be sent to Washington, the natural political instinct would be to resist shipping that money to Washington, D.C., creating a natural institutional brake on spending at the federal level. While Republicans have long seen a return to federalist principles as a means to reduce the overbearing role of the federal government over public policy, a federalist structure that returned both fiscal capacity and policy authority to the states could provide blue states with ability to pursue public policies tailored to their own political priorities and culture. Freed of the disproportionate fiscal impact of the federal income tax, California might choose to use its newfound resources to implement a single payer healthcare system, Hawaii a universal basic income to revamp the social safety net, and New York a return to near-free access to higher education. As a nation, returning fiscal resources and authority to the states would reduce the resources and authority now vested in Washington, D.C., and give meaning to the notion of the states as laboratories for public policy innovation. The political divisions that are so prominent today are by no means bounded by state borders; they are as much urban vs. rural as they are coastal or regional. As such, devolving power back to the states would not make those differences go away. But it would make them more local, and, perhaps, inherently more manageable. The bogeyman that is now Washington, D.C. would be closer to home ― Sacramento, Albany or Austin ― and public policy and budget choices would be made closer to where the impacts would be felt. And at the end of the day, residents would be able to vote with their feet as well as at the ballot box, choosing to migrate between states as public policy choices and economic opportunities changed how the states were viewed relative to each other. States would truly become accountable for their own political and policy choices.
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Welton Wang, 19. Managing Editor, Contributor on The Bipartisan Press. “Andrew Yang’s UBI Could Be Illegal.” October 22, 2019. https://www.thebipartisanpress.com/politics/andrew-yangs-ubi-could-be-illegal/
Andrew Yang went from being ignored by major media sites to one of the most talked-about presidential candidates running in 2020. An entrepreneur concerned about the “4th industrial revolution” (read: machines taking over our jobs), Yang built his campaign around his Freedom Dividend (Universal Basic Income) that gives everyone over 18 $1000 a month. Purportedly, the $1000 a month would, “provide money to cover the basics for Americans while enabling us to look for a better job, start our own business, go back to school, take care of our loved ones or work towards our next opportunity.” Funded by a value-added tax, the money would work towards helping people sustain themselves while they pursue other things that they want in life. The fundamental idea of universal basic income may or may not be the right idea, but more importantly, UBI could be unconstitutional. The tenth amendment of the Constitution says, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” Under the tenth amendment, any power not granted to the three branches of the government and not prohibited to the States are up to the States to implement. In other words, Congress can’t make laws regarding things it wasn’t specifically designated to govern. Congress’s powers are granted under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. Specifically, Congress may, “…lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States,” among many other things. In order for Yang to implement his Freedom Dividend, he would have to get Congressional approval. However, under the tenth amendment, Congress doesn’t have the power to impose taxes to fund the Freedom Dividend, nor does it have the ability to distribute it. On its face, it seems like Section 8 is granting Congress the power to use tax money and distribute the Freedom Dividend (“general Welfare of the United States”). However, Paul Engel from The Constitution Study writes, “There are three nouns used in the Constitution to designate the possessor of powers and over whom they can and cannot be applied: the United States, the States, and the People. The term ‘United States’ refers to the union of states and its government. The term ‘States’ or ‘Several States’ refers to the states either individually or collectively. And ‘The People’ refers to individuals.” In this case, the general welfare clause refers to the “United States.” If Congress were to enact a UBI bill, it would be for the welfare of “the People” not “the United States” since universal basic income benefits individual people, not the United States collectively. While the Constitution is written very broadly and open for lots of interpretations, Paul also offers the reasoning behind why “general welfare of the United States” doesn’t apply in this case: “…the United States of America is the name given to the union of states. (Think of a corporation created by stockholders.). Today we tend to think of states as a subdivision of the federal government, but it is, in fact, the other way around. The United States is a creation of the states to which they have delegated some of their powers. In this context, the states have delegated to Congress the power to collect taxes for a limited number of things, common defense and general welfare of the union itself. As James Madison put it, that is a general power. The rest of Article I, Section 8 are the specific powers that make up the common defense and general welfare for the union. So things like Foreign commerce, coining money, creating federal courts, establishing post roads, raising armies, etc. are the things Congress can collect taxes for since they are for the common defense and general welfare of the United States. They are not for the welfare of the states themselves or for the people of those states.” “If the General Welfare Clause gave Congress the power to do anything they could somehow identify as in the general welfare of the people or the states of the United States, then the vast majority of the Constitution, along with the idea of a limited federal government, would be effectively void. Why create a list of powers if they are already included in the term “for the General Welfare”? This is confirmed by James Madison in Federalist Papers #41: “It has been urged and echoed, that the power “to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States,” amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defense or general welfare […] For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power? Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars.— Federalist Papers #41 If giving out UBI isn’t an enumerated power given to Congress under the Constitution, then by the 10th amendment, Congress giving out UBI is unconstitutional and thereby illegal. After all, the United States was founded on the belief of a limited federal government, hence why any power not delegated in the Constitution is reserved for the States unless specifically prohibited, in which case the People hold them.
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Dan Mitchell, 13. Daniel J. Mitchell was a senior fellow at the Cato Institute who specialized in fiscal policy, particularly tax reform, international tax competition, he was educated at George Mason University. “DECENTRALIZATION AND FEDERALISM IS THE LIBERTARIAN WAY TO DETERMINE WHETHER A BASIC INCOME IS PRACTICAL OR DESIRABLE.” Dec 18th, 2013. https://www.libertarianism.org/columns/decentralization-federalism-is-libertarian-way-determine-whether-basic-income-is-practical
Some libertarians argue that the state should provide a minimum basic income, mainly because this approach would be preferable to the costly and bureaucratic amalgamation of redistribution programs that currently exist. It’s hard to disagree with the notion that the current system is a failure. The Cato Institute’s Michael Tanner has produced a searing indictment of the modern welfare state, pointing out that more than $1 trillion is spent every year on redistribution programs for the ostensible purpose of alleviating economic hardship, yet (or more likely as a result) the poverty rate is at an all-time high. Perhaps one reason poverty remains high is that such programs make leisure more attractive than work, as painstakingly illustrated in a study produced by Tanner and Charles Hughes. Moreover, welfare programs create very high implicit marginal tax rates, making it very difficult for poor people to improve their living standards by engaging in additional productive behavior. It’s almost as if the system was designed to create permanent dependency. So it’s very understandable that well-meaning folks want to dismantle the current approach and try something new. The basic income certainly has the merit of being a big, bold idea. And advocates of the basic income can cite some very iconic libertarian figures who support at least some version of their approach, including Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek, and Charles Murray. But if we’re going to launch a very difficult battle to radically reshape well-entrenched bureaucracies and long-standing policies in DC, it seems reasonable to ask whether there might be a better road to Rome. There are several very practical and compelling reasons to be skeptical about the basic income proposal. The first concern is that a guaranteed basic income may simply replace one form of government-financed dependency for another. An economy’s output is a function of the quality and quantity of labor and capital that are productively deployed. That’s an argument for reducing the size of welfare state in order to encourage more work. But it’s not an argument for creating a lump-sum form of redistribution. That being said, a well-designed basic income presumably will not have the punitive implicit tax rates on those who decide to engage in productive behavior. Moreover, the army of bureaucrats who monitor and oversee the current system wouldn’t be necessary (though skeptics understandably wonder whether politicians actually would shrink the federal workforce even if redistribution programs were axed). The second concern revolves around the question of durability. More specifically, there’s no guarantee that politicians in the future won’t re-create the current panoply of programs that the basic income is supposed to replace. The political incentives that existed when those programs were first created, after all, presumably would remain in a world where people get a pre-determined amount of cash from the government. This is largely speculative, to be sure. Interest groups would have an incentive to lobby for the creation of new programs with targeted beneficiaries. But perhaps the general public would understand that even one new handout would be the first step on a slippery slope leading back to something akin to the current system. A third concern is that the basic income may become overly generous, particularly in a fiscal system where a relatively small slice of the population pays an overwhelming share of the tax burden. In that kind of regime, there would be an incentive for a majority of voters to increase the amount of redistribution. It’s unknown whether this would happen. Simply stated, the few experiments that might teach us about incentives with a system of basic income have been too limited to draw any firm conclusions. For those who want to review that literature, Jim Manzi has a good summary showing less-than-robust evidence for a basic income and Megan McArdle raises some very practical objections to the concept. Proponents of the basic income surely would respond by arguing that voters would understand that they were taxing themselves and thus be reluctant to make the basic income too large. The final concern, at least for many libertarians, is that the federal government shouldn’t be in the business of redistributing income. The Constitution, for instance, does not list food stamps, welfare, housing subsidies, or Medicaid as enumerated powers of Congress in Article I, Section VIII.
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Ilya Somin, 16. M.A. in political science from Harvard University, Professor of Law at George Mason University. “Trump, federal power, and the left – why liberals should help make federalism great again,” Washington Post, December 5, 2016.
One of the few beneficial effects of Donald Trump’s unexpected election victory has been a renewed interest in federalism among many on the left. In recent days, prominent liberal legal scholars Noah Feldman and Jeff Rosen, and political scientist Corey Brettschneider have all published notable articles on how state and local governments can use federalism to curb Trump and protect vulnerable minorities. All three argue that liberals should make use of constitutional constraints on federal power traditionally championed by conservatives and libertarians, including the conservative majority on the Supreme Court. Feldman’s article on how federalism can be used to protect sanctuary cities actually makes many of the same points as my own earlier piece on the same subject. Some conservatives and libertarians will be tempted to dismiss the new liberal interest in federalism as unprincipled opportunism. Until recently, most liberals forcefully opposed the pro-federalism Supreme Court decisions many now seek to rely on to shield blue states against Trump. The next time there is a liberal Democrat in the White House, perhaps they will do so again. “Fair weather federalism” is indeed a common phenomenon, on the right as well as the left. Both Democrats and Republicans tend to support expansive federal authority when their side is in power in Washington, and view it more skeptically when they are on the outs. It’s certainly possible that this will turn out to be just another iteration of the same old story. But if we want to break this sad pattern, we should spend less time on recriminations over past inconsistencies and more looking for ways to build a durable cross-ideological coalition in favor of stronger enforcement of constitutional limits on federal power. In this context, it is important to recognize that newfound liberal interest in federalism is not solely a result of their fear of Trump. In recent years, some on the left have shown a greater openness to setting limits on federal power, and scholars such as Heather Gerken have pointed out that state and local governments now often protect vulnerable minorities better than Washington does. Liberals could potentially build on these ideas to use federalism as a bulwark against Trumpian abuses. Their chances of succeeding in this endeavor, however, are likely to be greater if they can form a coalition with at least some like-minded conservatives and libertarians. A cross-ideological case for federalism is more likely to prevail in court challenges to Trump policies (which are likely to be heard a Supreme Court with a conservative majority), and more likely to succeed in the political arena as well. If Trump attempts to implement the populist/nationalist agenda he campaigned on, there might be more opportunities for such alliances than in the past. In addition to drawing opposition on the left, the Trumpist agenda on constitutional and other issues also includes many elements inimical to libertarians and a good many constitutional conservatives – myself most definitely included. Many of us have been arguing for tighter enforcement of constitutional limits on federal power for many years, and would welcome greater cross-ideological cooperation on that front. A good many liberals are understandably hesitant to commit to enforceable limits on the scope of federal power because of a fear that doing so might inhibit federal efforts to protect racial, ethnic, and other minorities against state and local oppression. But even very robust federal antidiscrimination efforts do not require virtually unlimited federal power to regulate anything that might have some effect on the economy, or nearly unconstrained federal authority to use conditional grants to pressure states and localities to do their bidding. Principled liberals can favor broad federal authority to protect minority groups under the Fourteenth Amendment, while simultaneously enforcing tighter limits on Washington’s power in other areas. We can make federalism a bulwark against national government oppression without returning to the bad old days when “states rights” was a shield for slavery and segregation. As the Trump agenda suggests, federal power that has few or no constraints across the board can actually be a menace to minority groups. Other things equal, oppressive federal policies may actually be even more dangerous than comparable state and local ones. Federal policies affect more people, and are more difficult to escape by “voting with your feet” in favor of more tolerant jurisdictions. It would be naive to expect left and right to reach a complete consensus on constitutional federalism anytime soon. There are still many obstacles to cross-ideological cooperation on these issues. Some liberals will continue to support nearly unconstrained federal power. All too many on the right will back Trump’s policies even when they go against their previous commitments on constitutional issues. And, obviously, there will be continued disagreements over interpretative methodology, such as the longstanding conflict between originalism and living constitutionalism (though the former has attracted some new left-wing support in recent years). But, in the wake of Trump, perhaps there can at least be broader agreement that there should be serious, judicially enforceable limits on federal power to coerce state governments (whether directly or through conditional grants), and on federal authority to regulate private activities that are not closely connected to interstate commerce. These, after all, are exactly the tools that a Trump-led GOP could potentially use to break the resistance of dissenting state and local governments. They can also be used to harm immigrants and other minorities in a wide variety of ways, and to stifle liberal state policies, such as marijuana legalization.
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Ilya Somin, 17. Professor of Law at George Mason University. His research focuses on constitutional law, property law, and popular political participation. “Jeffrey Rosen on “federalism for the left and the right,” May 22, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/05/22/jeffrey-rosen-on-federalism-for-the-left-and-the-right/?utm_term=.8c85cf84846f
Many of the issues that recent presidents have tried to decide at the national level through executive orders are best resolved at the state or local levels instead. In an era of fierce partisan divisions, all sides are beginning to see the virtues of our federal system in accommodating differences—and encouraging experimentation—on issues such as immigration, law enforcement and education. Federalism has long been a cause on the right, but now it’s just as likely to be a rallying cry on the left. Rep. Zoe Lofgren, the top Democrat on the House Judiciary’s immigration and border-security subcommittee, recently said: “The Constitution, specifically the Tenth Amendment, protects states’ rights, and it prohibits federal actions that commandeer state and local officials. When it comes to immigration, these principles seem to be overlooked” The framers of the Constitution would be pleased with this emerging consensus. By creating a national government with limited powers, they intended to allow the states and local governments to pursue a range of different policies on matters within what used to be called their “police powers”—that is, their authority to regulate behavior, maintain order and promote the public good within their own territory. The founders considered this arrangement the best way to protect liberty and diversity of opinion, as well as to defend political minorities from nationalist tyranny and concentrated power…. A respect for federalism and state autonomy is perhaps the only way that all sides can peacefully coexist in today’s political environment. With dysfunction now reigning on Capitol Hill and federal courts increasingly ready to strike down the unilateral action of presidents, Americans will at least be able to take some comfort in local autonomy and control. In these polarized times, citizens who strongly disagree with each other may be able to unite around the goal of making federal power less intrusive and national politics less of a contest where the winner takes all.
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Kirk J. Stark, 04. Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. “FISCAL FEDERALISM AND TAX PROGRESSIVITY: SHOULD THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX ENCOURAGE STATE AND LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION?” 51 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1389 (2004). https://www.uclalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/41_51UCLALRev13892003-2004.pdf
The first change, which has its origins in the early Reagan years and Republicans' persistent call for a smaller role for the federal government, involves the devolution of fiscal responsibilities to states and localities. Programs that were previously handled by the federal government, including welfare, housing and job training, are increasingly becoming the responsibility of the states.' The second change, which is more recent but potentially more significant, is an emerging political consensus against the redistribution of wealth. The pending repeal of the federal estate tax and the recent flattening of the federal income tax rate structure are two examples of this nascent trend.' These changes have called into question longstanding institutional arrangements, forcing scholars and policymakers to reexamine several basic questions concerning the division of fiscal responsibilities between the national and subnational governments. Which governmental responsibilities should be undertaken by the federal government and which by the states? What is the effect of interjurisdictional competition on the provision of public goods or the level of public spending? Which level of government should redistribute wealth? Is it even possible for state and local governments to redistribute wealth? Should the federal government encourage or discourage redistributive policies by state and local governments?
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Rochester Business Journal Staff, 17. “Should we think seriously about a universal basic income?” August 4, 2017. https://rbj.net/2017/08/04/should-we-think-seriously-about-a-universal-basic-income/
The concept of a universal basic income has now gotten a lot of attention. This state of affairs has been helped greatly by the support offered to the UBI by luminaries such as Elon Musk of Tesla and Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook. However, before we get on the UBI bandwagon, it is helpful to first ponder the meaning of this concept and to then analyze whether there is a need for a UBI. There is no single and widely accepted definition of a UBI. Even so, most people agree a UBI is a welfare program in which the government makes cash payments to every citizen with no strings attached. This means that it does not matter whether the recipient is destitute or a millionaire, employed or unemployed, sick or healthy. Everyone gets the UBI. The difficulties begin as soon as we get past this basic observation.
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The Independent, 18. A prominent British newspaper. “Universal basic income: Why is Finland giving free money to its unemployed?” April 27, 2018. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/universal-basic-income-finland-results-experiment-pros-cons-unemployed-trial-definition-a8325631.html
What is universal basic income? Universal basic income (UBI) is a welfare programme in which all citizens receive an unconditional sum of money from the government. It is hailed as a progressive system and its proponents include billionaires Mark Zuckerberg, Elon Musk and Richard Branson.
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Sun Lee, 18. Lee has a BA in philosophy with distinction from Stanford, MS in symbolic systems from Stanford, and JD from Harvard. “The Libertarian Case for Universal Basic Income.” February 24, 2018. https://stanfordsphere.wordpress.com/2018/02/24/the-libertarian-case-for-universal-basic-income/
Universal Basic Income (UBI) is a welfare scheme in which all adult citizens receive a regular cash payment regardless of employment status. At first glance, it is easy to see why those self-professed bastions of American freedom – libertarians – oppose this measure so vociferously. Right-libertarians see UBI as overly generous to unemployed, able-bodied people (so called “lazy people”), and also as implying redistribution on a large scale, which conservatives see as a radical expansion of the welfare state. But the impression that UBI is exclusively leftist is a misguided one. There is a strong right wing libertarian case for UBI. In fact, UBI may very well be one of the best means to promote those basic freedoms and rights that libertarians hold so dear. And yes! This does include their undying faith in the free market. Right-libertarians often pride themselves on how open minded and non-dogmatic they are in comparison to the left. In this case, however, the dogma of libertarians has obscured an essential truth: UBI is as libertarian as you get. For inspiration on this issue, libertarians must look no further than their great champion: Milton Friedman. Friedman, indeed, that doyen of anti-socialist and libertarian thought, was vehemently in favour of UBI, particularly in his book Capitalism and Freedom (1962). To be precise, Milton Friedman supported Negative Income Tax (NIT), not UBI. But NIT is an extremely close variant of UBI. NIT also provides benefits “below which no man’s income could fall” – a universal baseline of income. Friedman may as well have been directly advocating for UBI, since UBI with a flat tax rate is equivalent to a negative income tax. Is it time that the American right wing abandon Milton Friedman as their idol for being secretly liberal? Libertarians must grow up, or else renounce their libertarian identity and intellectual champions. UBI is the welfare programme most suited to libertarian tastes. Libertarians like Friedman are not inherently against combating poverty. Nor are they completely indifferent to it. They are very critical, however, of what they perceive as ineffective and redundant welfare programs. UBI should appear more attractive to libertarians than conventional welfare programs. Such collectivist programs as old-age benefits, minimum-wage laws, and pro-union membership from the libertarian perspective seek to improve the conditions of particularly occupational or societal groups as proxies for the poor. By contrast, UBI is far more efficient and directly helps the poor rather than some occupational group which is just likely to be poor.
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Mariely López-Santana & Philip Rocco, 21. *Mariely López-Santana is an associate professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. *Philip Rocco is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Marquette University. “Fiscal Federalism and Economic Crises in the United States: Lessons from the COVID-19 Pandemic and Great Recession.” Publius, 51.3 (2021): 365–395. doi: 10.1093/publius/pjab015
The COVID-19 pandemic has been a stress test for national and subnational political economies. Compared to peer countries, the United States has experienced extraordinarily high rates of infection and mortality, attributable in part to President Donald Trump’s transactional and punitive approach to federalism (; Goelzhauser and Konisky 2020). With little guidance from Washington in 2020, key decisions about public health regulations, as well the coordination and provision of key public goods and services, fell in the hands of governors and mayors. These officials faced an extraordinary policy dilemma: how to control the spread of a highly contagious virus without sacrificing billions in revenue in an environment in which a variety of protective measures have been highly politicized.
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Ryan Nunn et al, 19. *Ryan Nunn is an assistant vice president for applied research in Community Development at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Previously, he was a fellow in Economics Studies at the Brookings Institution and policy director for The Hamilton Project. *Jana Parsons was a Research Analyst with the Hamilton Project in the Economic Studies program at Brookings until August 2020. *Jay Shambaugh is the Under Secretary for International Affairs at Treasury. “Nine facts about state and local policy.” Brookings Institute January 31, 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/research/nine-facts-about-state-and-local-policy/
Fact 2: State budgets focus on public welfare and postsecondary education; local budgets are dominated by K–12 education.
State and local governments have, on average, similar levels of direct general expenditures in 2016, $1.4 trillion and $1.6 trillion, respectively (Census 2016b).[5] In comparison with federal spending, much of which is transfers to individuals or local or state governments, state and local spending is more likely to be direct, nontransfer spending. This is reflected in the fact that combined state and local employment (18.7 million in 2017) is substantially higher than that of the federal government (2.8 million) (Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS] 2017b).
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2NC/1NR - Uniqueness – Fiscal Federalism
Elaine Orr, 81. Director of GAO’s Office of Foreign Visitor and International Audit Organization. “Evolution of U.S. Fiscal Federalism.” October 1, 1981. https://www.gao.gov/products/117388
When the United States was formed, the power to raise revenue was given to the States, with the National Government assigning certain expenses to each one. Under the Constitution, Congress received the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, and excises to pay debts, and provide for the common defense and the general welfare of the United States. Thus the Federal Government had concurrent jurisdiction with the States in nearly all fields of taxation. The Civil War had the effect of weakening the role of State governments and restricting the powers of State legislatures and governors. The structure of the tax system changed radically during the first quarter of the 20th century. By 1927, income taxes comprised 64 percent of Federal and 10 percent of State tax revenues. In addition, consumption taxes had declined markedly as a share of total Federal tax revenue but were increasing at the State level. Property taxes provided almost all local tax revenue. The New Deal created a complex combination of public works projects, work relief, financial assistance, and a social security system under which the States and local governments were called upon to participate and were reimbursed for about half of the costs. The Federal Government's role expanded greatly, not only in terms of financial assistance, but also with respect to regulatory activities. World War II also had a dampening effect on State and local spending patterns. By the 1950's, State and local spending was devoted primarily to schools, roads, and suburban development. During the 1960's, because State and local governments were unable to expand their revenue bases as quickly as residents increased their demands for services, the Federal Government greatly expanded its grants to State and local governments. Some aid was provided for specific functions through categorical grants and some for more general purposes through block grants. Now, the President plans to reduce the number of categorical grants, replace them with block grants, and reduce Federal funding in many areas. It is too soon to project the long-term effects of these initiatives on intergovernmental fiscal relations, but it is fair to say that the balance of responsibility will shift somewhat from the Federal to the State and local levels.
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1NC Shell
Steven G. Calabresi, 95. Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1983, Yale. "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez.” Michigan Law Review, 94.3 (1995): 752-831. JSTOR.
The bitter harvest of the nationalist revolution was gathered in this century with the slaughter of the First and Second World Wars and with the fifty-year Cold War that then followed. These events finally made clear to the great-great-grandchildren of the Enlight- enment that celebration of the nation state could lead to Nazism and Stalinism, to war and genocide, and to totalitarianism and the most complete loss of freedom humankind ever experienced. By 1945, the democratic revolution was still in full flow, but the nationalist revolution was not. World leaders scrambled to replace the still collapsing colonial, imperial transnational structures with new federal and confederal transnational structures.
The fifty years since then have seen the birth of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union, the European Convention on Human Rights, the British Commonwealth, the Confederation of Independent States (CIS), the GATT, the NAFTA, and countless other transnational "federal" entities of varying degrees of importance.24 Many of these were openly inspired by the success story of American federalism, which, for example, led many Europeans to want to build a Common Market that could become a "United States of Europe." While many of these new democratic transnational entities are very weak, they nonetheless have developed important powers: they have helped to keep the peace, and in some instances, as with the European Union, they show real potential for some day attaining essentially all the attributes of sovereignty commonly associated with a federal nation-state, like the United States. The growth and success of transnational confederal forms since 1945 is truly aston- ishing and rightly is viewed by many - either with alarm or with hope - as holding out the eventual prospect of a future global fed- eral government or at least the prospect of several continental-sized federal governments.
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Ruth Mason, 11. Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Associate Professor of Law and Nancy and Bill Trachsel Corporate Law Scholar, University of Connecticut Law School. “Federalism and the Taxing Power,” California Law Review 99.4 (2011): 975-1035, JSTOR.
If Congress uses tax expenditures and penalties to regulate areas traditionally or constitutionally reserved to the states, then such tax regulation raises federalism concerns similar to those raised when Congress makes conditional grants to the states.95 Thus, to the extent that we are concerned about the federalism impact of conditional grants, arguably we also should be concerned about the federalism impact of tax expenditures and penalties. Among the values that federalism promotes is horizontal competition among the states for residents who are free to move to any state in the Union. Competition forces state governments to respond to the political preferences of their residents.96 The states’ smaller size compared to that of the nation also may facilitate political participation,97 at least when a single voter’s voice carries more weight in state than federal elections.98 Similarly, the smaller size of states, coupled with uneven distribution of voter preferences across the country, facilitates policy diversity: each state can adopt policies that reflect the preferences of its residents, which may differ from national preferences or from preferences of residents of other states.99 Closely related to this is the idea that states may devise different ways to pursue similar policy goals, thus serving, in Justice Brandeis’ famous words, as “laborator[ies]” for “social and economic experiments.”100 Federalism also promotes vertical competition between the federal and state governments. Although the federal and state governments do not compete for residents, James Madison predicted that they would compete for the affections of the governed.101 For any regulatory area not exclusively assigned to the federal or state governments by the Constitution, Madison envisioned that the people would choose their regulator.102 If they trusted the federal government more, the people would invest more power with the federal government, or vice versa. 103 In this way, Madison believed that the federal and state governments would check each other, so that neither would become oppressive.104 It is not necessary to repeat at length here the well-known claim that conditional federal spending jeopardizes federalism values.105 Instead, it should suffice to draw the analogy between federal grant spending and federal tax spending. When it conditions grants upon states’ implementation of particular policies, the federal government thereby reduces the scope for state policy experimentation and competition. Similarly, when the federal government uses federal tax law to reach past the states to regulate private taxpayer behavior though tax expenditures and penalties, it may leave less room for states to implement different or contrary policies. Where federal tax incentives reward taxpayers for engaging in particular activities, such as education,106 home ownership,107 and the purchase of private health insurance,108 those tax incentives may displace the expression of local values and local political preferences. Similarly, to at least some extent the federal government may override local political decisions when it uses tax penalties to discourage certain activities, such as smoking, gambling, and driving. If, in order to secure federal subsidies or avoid federal penalties, taxpayers strive to meet federal (rather than local) standards, then the taxing power raises concerns similar to those raised by the spending power.109 Specifically, if the federal government uses its taxing power to enlarge the scope of its regulatory influence beyond its constitutionally enumerated powers, it reduces the areas in which the states can compete with the federal government and with each other. Thus, just as commentators have accused Congress of using conditional federal grants to crowd out state regulation,110 so too may Congress use federal taxes to crowd out state regulation. Ultimately, the extent of this problem depends on unanswered empirical questions regarding the extent to which federal taxing and spending displaces state and local regulation in similar substantive areas. The impact of federal taxes on state legislative choices also depends on legal questions, such as whether the federal government may use taxes to achieve ends that lie beyond its other constitutionally enumerated powers, and whether such regulation can preempt state taxes and regulations. Parts II and III consider these legal issues.