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2023 ENDI Disadvantage
1NC Shell

Uniqueness - Fiscal federalism is stable now – the states and federal government have clear roles in fiscal redistribution, and states have a high level of autonomy

Yıldız Özkök & İbrahim Çütcü, 21. *Ozkok is an economist and Research Assistant at Hasan Kalyoncu University. Dr. Cutcu is an Associate Professor at Hasan Kalyoncu University. “Does fiscal federalism matter for economic growth? Evidence from the United States,” Applied Economics (2021), 1-15. Taylor & Francis.

Following the Great Depression in 1929, there was widespread government intervention into economic life, which prevailed until the 1970s. Accordingly, since the 1970s traditional public administration has weakened and been replaced by a more flexible, decentralized, autonomous, transparent, and accountable organizational structure called the New Public Administration approach. At this point, fiscal federalism became an important concept because it essentially means giving more responsibility and authority to subnational governments for their spending and revenue, namely increasing the autonomy of local governments. Moreover, He (2006) indicates that a degree of distribution in the fiscal responsibilities and tasks between different government levels exists generally for institutions and agencies that have been categorized by centrally-administered and locally-administered classification. These institutions or agencies are financially covered mainly by governments at different levels Although fiscal federalism was initially adopted in the Unites States of America (USA), later on this concept started to gain attention and has been used as a political campaign tool in many countries. It is assumed that fiscal federalism can improve the macroeconomic performance of a country by increasing the efficiency and performance of the public sector owing to the fact that local governments have better knowledge of the regional preferences and needs than the central government. The most fundamental principle of fiscal federalism is that when local governments decide on the type and quantity of local public goods it is better for the whole economy because local government units can be more responsible and accountable than central government while evaluating regional preferences (Aslim and Neyapti 2014). Fiscal federalism essentially means that the power to make fiscal decisions is placed with multi-level government units (Moges 2013). Fiscal federalism involves the transfer of authority from the national government to the states and local government units. Accordingly, fiscal federalism covers two interrelated areas: the distribution of authority for public revenue and spending among different levels of government and how independent subnational governments are in their decision-making (Kesner-Škreb 2009). The core point of this concept is to give the authority for making spending decisions to local governments and accordingly to determine their revenue independently. Fiscal federalism theory focuses on the distribution of public sector functions and fiscal relations among the layers of government (Bird 1999). The literature divides fiscal federalism approaches into two branches: first- and second-generation fiscal federalism. First-generation fiscal federalism is shaped by the view of public finance, which is based on the classical normative economics of the 1950s and 1960s. Oates named the first-generation theory as the traditional theory of fiscal federalism (Oates 2005). Regarding the first-generation fiscal federalism theories, it is seen that the studies in the economics literature belong to Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972) who were the first advocates of the idea that fiscal federalism can affect economic efficiency and thus macroeconomic performance.

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
2AC – AT: Federalism solves Economy

Fiscal federalism negatively effects economic growth

Yuanshuo Xu & Mildred E. Warner, 22. *Dr. Xu is an Assistant Professor and Doctoral supervisor in Urban and Regional Governance and Urban and Regional Planning. *Warner is a Professor at Cornell University in Architecture Art and Planning. “Crowding Out Development: Fiscal Federalism after the Great Recession.” Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space. 54.2 (2022): 215-429.

Since the onset of the Great Recession, austerity has become more common at the national and local levels throughout the OECD. As states pass expenditure responsibilities down to the local level, this causes a shift toward mandatory spending at the local level which may undermine discretionary spending for social and physical infrastructure. We use Census of Government Finance data from 2012 for all county areas in the continental US to model the expenditure gap between current operations and capital investment, and show how this crowd out affects growth. Our structural equation models find fiscal decentralization has direct negative effects on local growth and indirect negative effects on growth by increasing the local current-capital expenditure gap. This local expenditure gap is larger where decentralization of spending responsibility is higher and state aid is lower, especially in places with greater need (poverty, older infrastructure, and rural areas). In contrast to the theoretical claims of fiscal efficiency, we find fiscal decentralization may be undermining local economic growth by increasing the gap between local current and capital expenditure. We argue that fiscal federalism (decentralization) is “broken” in the US because states have structural incentives to shift fiscal responsibility downward to local government, and local governments face increased social and economic need, especially since the Great Recession.

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
2AC – AT: Economy Impact

No impact to economic decline --- 2008 financial crisis should have triggered the link

Daniel W. Drezner 14. Professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. “The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession,” World Politics, Vol. 66.1, January 2014, p. 123-164, Emory Libraries.

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder.

The aggregate data suggest otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."43

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
1AR – Federalism Bad/Democracy Turn

Federalism ruins democracy – distorts policy, encourages polarization

Colin Gordon, 22. Professor of history at the University of Iowa and the author, most recently, of Citizen Brown: Race, Democracy, and Inequality in the St. Louis Suburbs. “American Federalism Isn’t a Boon for Democracy — It’s a Disease.” October 6, 2022. https://jacobin.com/2022/10/us-federalism-states-democracy-gop-democrats

Laboratories of Plutocracy In Laboratories Against Democracy, Grumbach offers both a thoughtful examination of US federalism’s inherent perils and limits and a searching interpretation of how they are compounded in our current political climate. The picture is not a pretty one. “Rather than ushering in democratic responsiveness, social harmony, and economic prosperity,” Grumbach writes, devolution “since the 1970s has coincided with a weakening of democratic institutions, the precipitous rise of economic inequality, and growing mass polarization and discontent.” The core argument — developed over a series of chapters and underwritten by a close analysis of the available data — is this: Political polarization since the 1970s has yielded policy paralysis at the national level, where control over the executive and legislative branches has been consistently divided. That gridlock has shifted political attention to the states. In the states, however, polarization is far more likely to take the form of unified “trifecta” control by one party. The result is wider variation across the states — Republican states lurching right, Democratic ones tugging left — in almost every realm of policy, with the notable exception of the bipartisan investment in mass incarceration. The polarization of policy, as Grumbach argues, is driven not by a polarized electorate (on most issues, polling shows a widening gap between policy outcomes and popular aspirations) but by the ability and willingness of national political interests to capture state policymaking. These interests (including national partisan groups like the Republican Governors Association, multi-issue clearinghouses like the right-wing American Legislative Exchange Council, and single-issue lobbies like the antiabortion National Right to Life) have both the willingness and the capacity to push their agendas across venues and jurisdictions. The result is distorted policy within the states and across them. Hard-line measures (like race-to-the-bottom minimum wage rates and refusals to expand Medicaid) fly in the face of the interests and preferences of most ordinary people. And to the degree that states look to each other as policy laboratories, their attention is confined to ideological peers and their experiments become a form of partisan leapfrog: who can legislate the strictest abortion ban, the most scurrilous attack on public sector workers, the leanest and meanest social policies.

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
1AR – Federalism Bad/Democracy Turn

Federalism creates laboratories against democracy

Colin Gordon, 22. Professor of history at the University of Iowa and the author, most recently, of Citizen Brown: Race, Democracy, and Inequality in the St. Louis Suburbs. “American Federalism Isn’t a Boon for Democracy — It’s a Disease.” October 6, 2022. https://jacobin.com/2022/10/us-federalism-states-democracy-gop-democrats

The promise of US federalism is that states will be “laboratories of democracy,” more responsive and more innovative than the federal government. The reality is that states are more often laboratories of authoritarianism, dominated by the rich and powerful. Between 2017 and 2020, the Mississippi Department of Human Services squandered nearly a quarter of its federal block grant under the Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) program on kickbacks, phantom services, and vanity projects for retired football players. In the summer of 2021, twenty-six states — all Republican-led — cut short their participation in the federal programs that expanded unemployment insurance in response to the pandemic; five of those states then extended benefits to workers who were fired or quit because they refused to abide by a workplace vaccine mandate. Earlier this fall, governors Ron DeSantis of Florida and Greg Abbott of Texas made headlines by shipping migrants to Martha’s Vineyard and to the residence of Vice President Kamala Harris in Washington. The common thread running through these episodes (aside from the sleaze and cruelty) is the peculiar logic of contemporary US federalism. State governments, especially those under GOP control, are actively legislating against the material and expressed interests of their residents. They use and abuse their discretion under “shared” programs like TANF to punish the poor and line their own pockets. They refuse federal dollars (extended unemployment, Medicaid expansion, disaster relief) for no better reason than to make a thin political point. And they squander state resources on political grandstanding for national audiences and national donors. They have become, as Jacob Grumbach’s brilliant new book puts it, “laboratories against democracy.”

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
2AC – Federalism Bad/Democracy Turn

Federalism is way worse for democracy – states turn on each other

Darrell M. West, 22. Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Center for Technology Innovation Douglas Dillon Chair in Governmental Studies. “Why federalism has become risky for American democracy.” Brookings Institute. September 23, 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2022/09/23/why-federalism-has-become-risky-for-american-democracy/

State and local governments long have been considered “laboratories of democracy” that spawn valuable innovation. But recently states have taken this a step farther entering a risky new phase that pits blue states against red ones and blue cities against red states, and threatens democracy as a whole. As opposed to tolerating policy experimentation by different jurisdictions, some leaders are seeking to impose their own policy views on other places. Taken to an extreme, this behavior likely would intensify conflict and escalate policy nullification on a broad scale. Take, for instance, the recent intensification of arguments over immigration. Governors Ron DeSantis of Florida and Greg Abbott of Texas have bussed unwanted arrivals from the southern border to New York City, Washington, DC, and Martha’s Vineyard as a way to express their discontent with national policy. These leaders are upset over so-called “sanctuary cities” that are pro-immigrant and seeking to attract media attention to their cause. While successful at generating press coverage, this confrontational stance puts innocent people in the middle of policy disputes and disrupts social service delivery in the targeted states. Another area is abortion policy where the Supreme Court reversal of Roe v. Wade turned that issue back to the states and transformed the politics of that subject. A number of states used that decision not only to outlaw abortion but to criminalize actions that provided help for those wanting abortions. The stark differences in how state legislatures have responded to the Roe aftermath suggests federalism is moving in a destructive direction and putting states on a collision path with one another. Similar issues have popped in regard to marijuana legalization. For a number of years, that area has pitted states wanting to relax prohibitions and spawn new businesses against existing laws preventing interstate commerce involving illegal drugs or using the national banking system to transfer money. The resulting jurisdictional conflicts have strained federalism and made it difficult for businesses to know whose laws they should obey. And in the gun area, California recently enacted a law allowing people to sue those who make or distribute assault weapons. Modeled after Texas legislation that enabled lawsuits against those who aid women seeking abortions, the legislation demonstrates how states are turning on one another and restricting personal activity on a much broader scale than before. It no longer is enough for states and localities to take decisive policy stances, but rather they are aiming their enforcement against people living elsewhere who have different points of view. Even within individual states, there are risks for governance and democracy. Increasingly, there is preemption between red states and blue cities whereby Republican-controlled legislatures are putting major restrictions on the ability of Democratically-controlled cities to spend money, set policy, and address social issues. These within-state conflicts are eroding the capacity of cities to innovate and undertake useful policy experiments. By restricting local prerogatives, state legislatures are upsetting the balance of power within their boundaries and relegating cities to purely administrative functions. From these and other actions, it appears federalism is entering an intolerant terrain that threatens democracy itself. There is a power reshuffling that likely will have profound ramifications for questions of who decides and what they decide on many topics. Large-scale political and institutional shifts on abortion policy, immigration enforcement, gun safety, and marijuana legalization are rippling through many jurisdictions and eroding the traditional prerogatives of state and local government. In the past, trend-setting localities have piloted projects that experimented with new ideas and became models for the country as a whole. As part of our system of local rule, different jurisdictions had freedom to test policies such as welfare work requirements, school choice, and cannabis legalization, and that was considered a strength of American governance. Yet in recent years, federalism has entered a new phase. In my Brookings Institution Press book, Power Politics: Trump and the Assault on American Democracy, I argue the extreme polarization and radicalization that afflicts contemporary politics has recast federalism in an entirely different light. States are innovating in more polarized and extreme directions, and criminalizing behavior that is perfectly lawful in other places.

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
1AR – AT: Federalism Solves Democracy

Federalism doesn’t solve democracy

Larry Yackle, 14. Professor of Law and Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University. “COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM: FIVE CLARIFYING QUESTIONS ” Boston University Law Review, 94:1403 (2014) http://www.bu.edu/bulawreview/files/2014/08/YACKLE.pdf

My third question is whether competitive federalism comports with democracy. On one level, of course, it plainly does not, cannot, and need not. Anything that exists by virtue of a judicially enforced Constitution is, to that extent, antidemocratic in the obvious sense that a higher law that trumps majoritarian choices necessarily must be. Professor Greve, however, seems affirmatively to celebrate overrides of democratic choices. One might say, indeed, that democracy is the villain of his piece. In the abstract, Greve allows that democracy is the “safest form of government.”67 I take this to mean not that democracy is genuinely good, but rather (with Churchill) that democracy is actually bad, only better than the alternatives. In the next breath, Greve decries democratic government as “dangerous” inasmuch as it enables “rapacious majorit[ies].”68 The “constant challenge” to the competitive federalism he champions is “populist passion,”69 which, in his view, entails “interest group politics.”70 The federalism we actually have, in Greve’s view to our misfortune, has come in response to “democratic demands.”71 This “cartel” federalism emerged with the New Deal, which itself was the product of an “unusually high political consensus” during the Great Depression.72 Back then, according to Greve, the idea was to achieve a “more ‘democratic’ Constitution.”73 The federalism that followed was “more open to the demands of distributional coalitions and progressive social movements.”74 The result, in Greve’s telling, has been “opportunistic interest group bargains”75 congealing in social policies having a “very social-democratic feel.”76 Greve thinks that, “ideally,” the rules for our structural arrangements should be “self-enforcing.”77 But competitive federalism is not a machine that would go of itself. Given their head, Congress and the states will not preserve state competition, but will, instead, cooperate with each other, thus to produce “surplus.”78 Greve explains, then, that “[i]f competitive federalism is your cup of tea, . . . you’ll want to entrust the federal structure principally to the courts”79 – specifically “a federal judiciary armed to the teeth with procompetitive federalism provisions”80 like the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Joinder Clause.81 It is in the enforcement of those provisions, along with similar safeguards for competition fashioned judicially (like dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence) that the Supreme Court fulfills its essential function to prevent the agents of government from discarding the constitutionally ordained competitive structure.82 This, Greve contends, “is our Founders’ constitutional arrangement.”83

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
2AC – AT: Federalism Solves Democracy

Federalism can’t solve democracy or development – local predators will capture reforms

Anne Lan K. Candelaria, 18. Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Ateneo de Manila University. “It’s complicated: The Relationship between Federalism, Development, and Democracy,” April 24, 2018. https://www.bworldonline.com/its-complicated-the-relationship-between-federalism-development-and-democracy/

The viewpoint that binds federalism, development, and democratization is heavily linked to neoliberal economics where, in broad terms, the preference is less of government and more of market. Particularly needed to make this work is the redistribution of power from central to subnational levels of government and the establishment of market facilitating institutions, which is attributed to what scholars call the neo-institutionalist project. In doing so, it fosters efficiency, encourages innovation, and limits predation. This kind of thinking has been prominent among international development organizations such the World Bank, USAID, and the ADB that, in turn, has influenced many decentralization projects in developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s including the Philippines. However, the link between federalism, development, and democracy is not as straightforward as one may think it is. Empirical evidence from the extensive literature on decentralization and federalism is, at best, mixed. LOCALIZING DEVELOPMENT The sweeping statements that connect federalism and development in the current debates in the country are worrying. There are many aspects of development that people assumed as true such as the belief that raising individual incomes will reduce inter-jurisdictional disparities, or that a decentralized fiscal policy will allow for better matching of demands and eventually overall satisfaction of needs of the community. However, economic development is unavoidably uneven and this has little to do with the presence or absence of a decentralized fiscal policy. Some scholars believe that the reason for this unevenness has more to do with the place’s histories rather than policies. In fact, policies emerge as a response to the contextual challenges rather than the other way around. In some cases, economic development preceded the demand for autonomy and not the other way around. Hence, more than the distribution of goods and services, decentralization as a policy should consider how power is distributed between the state and society. Particularly interesting would be to determine whose interests are at play, how production was pursued, what the nature of the relationship is between public and private sector, and how the labor-management relations is structured. It will be irresponsible to talk about the federal project that is detached from the social realities, local government capacities, and histories of particular places. The tendency to discuss its consequences from a national perspective is therefore misleading. Any discussion on the effects of a multilevel system of governance on development must be localized, because after all, development happens in particular places. LOCALIZING DEMOCRACY Neo-institutionalists embrace rationality in decision-making and therefore assume that decentralization and federalism will neutralize vested interests and therefore lead to democratization. However, diverging outcomes are seen across municipalities, cities, and provinces in the Philippines’ 27 years of devolution. This is also true even across countries and regions. Why is there so much disparity even though spaces for citizens participation in local development and planning is in place? One way of understanding this is to look at democracy not just a state but as a process that requires strong and genuine local opposition parties that will continuously challenge the status quo. When preferences are not expressed in the people’s votes, then there is very little opportunity for democracy to deepen. If there is one concern that must be raised at this point, it is the fact that local predatory powers remain resilient despite the establishment of democratic institutions after Martial Law. Democracy has shifted power from the top to below, but it was mostly the local elites that benefited from this. That the country is dominated by political dynasties, some as old as a century, is an indication of power not being able to permeate to the grassroots. The current federal project should not be hijacked by local predatory interests. What we do not want to happen is to transfer power to the local level but there is no avenue for local power to be contested. A broad range of societal actors should be allowed to take part in the discourse and debate on the technical, legal, and political aspects of federalism. Cases of decentralization as a “failed experiment” in some African and Southeast Asian countries are attributed to it being an external project not rooted on the quality and capacity of the country’s local participatory institutions. And in cases where citizens participation is observed, they remain to be passive players in local policies and politics. FEDERALISM AS SOCIAL JUSTICE A restructuring of institutions does not guarantee the intended reform outcomes. Hence we must be cautious to assume that decentralization and federalism leads to development and democratization. This points to two important intermediaries that connect federalism, development, and democracy. First, we know that institutions matter, but which ones? And second, do these institutions support genuine local political competition, or do they perpetuate predatory tendencies that stifle participation in the local policy processes? Particularly for developing countries, it must be pointed out that federalism’s role is not creating growth at the local level, but redistributing economic benefits that would narrow the gap between the rich and poor. In other words, development in the context of decentralization should not be about growth, but it must be about social justice. Debates therefore should focus on how the processes can be fair and inclusive rather than the normative principles behind. What it means to be poor in one municipality is different in another. Therefore, what it will take to correct this inequality should be different from one place to another. In doing so, institutional reform policies must take into account the history, context, and specificity of the place or places. Local political realities constrain even the most well-thought and well-designed policy. The path toward greater local autonomy, whether in a devolved or federal form, should be gradual but strategic because the constraints that our local governments have are deeply embedded. The gravity and seriousness of these constraints necessitates a process of reform that is mindful of the realities of the local institutions. It, therefore, should not be viewed as simply a technical or policy strategy, but a political process that is influenced by the distribution and contestation of power. Hence, to look at federalism as this one pill that cures the illnesses of political and economic inequality is a dangerous path to undertake. It is important that we distinguish between symptoms and causes. If not, we might, at the end of the process, end up be being more sick than well.

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
1AR - Federalism Resilient

States can’t solve warming

Jim Krane, 17. Wallace S. Wilson Fellow for Energy Studies at Rice University's Baker Institute. "Can America Comply with The Paris Accords Without Trump? Only If Red States Join In," Jun 7, 2017. https://www.forbes.com/sites/thebakersinstitute/2017/06/07/can-america-comply-with-the-paris-accords-without-trump-only-if-red-states-join-in/2/#2a1f8c9933c9

Hours after President Trump ejected America from the Paris climate agreement, a group of US state, local and corporate leaders vowed to pursue America’s abandoned pledge – without the help of the federal government. Heartening as it was to see Americans reject Trump’s plan to free-ride on the backs of the rest of the world, there are serious questions about any climate plan that sidelines the federal government. Can an insurgent group of CEOs, governors and mayors cut a quarter of America’s greenhouse gas emissions by 2025? The goal is a noble one, but difficult. First of all, the Trump administration is not just withdrawing from Paris. The administration is actively working at cross-purposes to the treaty’s goals. Trump and his appointees have gone out of their way to favor coal over natural gas and renewables. They’d like to see coal companies return to past dumping practices, while freeing petroleum producers from fixing methane leaks, and encouraging Detroit to walk away from fuel efficiency standards. Each of these moves takes America further from its pledge. In other words, the new United States Climate Alliance won’t be starting its anti-GHG drive from the 20-yard line. They’ll be starting deep in their own end zone. Even then, making an end-run around the White House is the easy part. The federal government has only modest influence over US energy policy. More control is devolved to statehouses, two-thirds of which sit in Republican hands. With few exceptions, Republican Party leaders publicly claim that global warming is either a hoax or caused by natural phenomena. As Fig. 1 shows, this stance is unusual outside the United States. Denial is a big problem because, when it comes to cutting emissions, the low-hanging fruit lies in Republican states, where political leaders are least likely to act. In fact, a state’s carbon intensity is a strong predictor of the way its residents voted. Each of the top 13 per capita emitting states – led by Wyoming, with 110 metric tons per person per year – went for Trump. In Wyoming, nearly 90% of voters backed the New York tycoon. Wyoming also happens to produce 40% of America’s coal that emits about 13% of US CO2. Unsurprisingly, Wyoming’s state and federal leaders are still grappling with science. Following Wyoming in the carbon intensity rankings are West Virginia, North Dakota, Louisiana and Montana. Attorneys general from two of those states, West Virginia and Louisiana, went so far as to send Trump a letter backing the Paris pullout. (So did AGs from Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, South Carolina, Texas and Wisconsin.) By contrast, Hillary Clinton won states with the lowest carbon intensity, including the bottom five: New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, California and Maryland. The highest per capita emissions from a Hillary state flowed from New Mexico, which ranks at No. 14, with 24 metric tons/resident/year. This red-blue carbon dichotomy begs the question whether can blue states cut 25% of US emissions by themselves.

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
1AR - Federalism Resilient

Climate models are wrong – we can adapt

Matthew Lau, 18. Contributing writer to Canadians for Affordable Energy, citing peer reviewed studies from journal nature climate change and Journal of Climate, “Climate change data is wildly overestimated,” August 14, 2018. https://torontosun.com/opinion/columnists/guest-column-climate-change-data-is-wildly-over-estimated

A study last year by Thorsten Mauritsen and Robert Pincus in the journal Nature Climate Change and another one this year by Nicholas Lewis and Judith Curry in the Journal of Climate, produced median estimates suggesting that a doubling in atmospheric carbon dioxide would increase global temperatures by only about half of what Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) models predict.

Recently, two Heritage Foundation scholars and Canadian economist Ross McKitrick re-estimated the social cost of carbon dioxide emissions using earlier empirical estimates from Lewis and Curry, instead of relying on simulated estimates of the sensitivity of temperature to carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere. In one model, the social cost of carbon fell 40-50% and in another the costs dropped a staggering 80%.

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
1AR - Federalism Resilient

Centralization's key to clean tech development

Dr. Benjamin K. Sovacool, 08. Research Fellow in the Energy Governance Program at the Centre on Asia and Globalization, "The Best of Both Worlds: Environmental Federalism and the Need for Federal Action on Renewable Energy and Climate Change," June 2008, 27 Stanford Environmental Law Journal 397, Lexis.

A. Centralized Federalism Those in favor of centralizing environmental decision making note that federal intervention brings with it a number of important benefits: (i) it is the most efficient way to address spillovers or transboundary pollution; (ii) it provides a degree of uniformity for manufacturers and investors; (iii) it produces economies of scale; and (iv) it promotes distributive justice and a minimum standard of environmental quality, thus preventing a race to the bottom among the states. 1. Interstate pollution and spillovers. Proponents of centralized federalism argue that decentralized environmental decision making can create welfare losses and externalities - costs (or benefits) not fully internalized or priced by the existing market system - that are not easily addressed on a state-by-state basis. n92 In the absence of federal regulation, states [*419] have an incentive to pollute excessively because they are able to externalize the costs of pollution while maintaining the economic benefits of the activities that produce that pollution - such as jobs and tax revenue. Daniel C. Esty argues that "when problems are transboundary in scope, and especially when jurisdictions are in separate countries, decentralized enforcement breaks down entirely." n93 Therefore, "because state boundaries often do not fully encompass airsheds and watersheds, interjurisdictional externalities arise. Given a fixed extent of pollution, it is axiomatic that decentralization will create more borders and therefore more transboundary spillovers." n94 Empirical evidence - along with economic theory - suggests that states and industries will under-provide public goods and positive externalities (because these go uncompensated) but will over-produce negative externalities (because their cost is distributed throughout all of society). "For example, prairie potholes in South Dakota perform various ecological functions. Some of these functions, such as providing habitat for migratory waterfowl, may provide substantial benefits to residents of other states for which South Dakota is not compensated." South Dakota thus lacks a full incentive to sufficiently protect and manage Prairie potholes. n95 "Similarly, ... the existence of Yellowstone National Park provides benefits to all American citizens for which Wyoming and Montana are not compensated." They thus lack the incentive to invest fully in conserving the park. n96 Along these lines, Thomas W. Merrill notes that state environmental policymakers have been reluctant to pursue meaningful regulation of transboundary or interstate pollution. n97 Merrill has identified six factors complicating state efforts to address such "spillover" pollution. First, states often disagree on questions of attribution and whether a source state is legally [*420] responsible for pollution emanating from its facilities. Second, states disagree on questions of causation, or on what standards of proof are appropriate to establish that their pollution injured another state. Third, they differ on questions of standard care and liability, or on whether or not the source state causing injury has acted unreasonably or negligently. Fourth, even when these first three factors are agreed upon, most states will disagree over an appropriate remedy or course of action. Fifth, most states have a litigate-or-settle mentality, and are therefore reluctant to engage in lawsuits given uncertain outcomes and expenses, especially losses in the form of attorney fees and costs. And sixth, few cases of pure or unidirectional transboundary pollution exist. Instead, all states involved in negotiations are usually responsible for pollution going somewhere; that is, pollution is reciprocal. Most states will therefore ignore such problems completely rather than risk admitting liability once discussions about interstate pollution commence. Given that these six factors often compound together, Merrill concludes that the reality is that a legal system does not act like a machine, automatically churning out the prescribed response to identified problems. Instead, it represents a kind of regulatory commons, where effective action is dependent upon alliances of groups overcoming collective action barriers and pressuring administrators to respond. If structural factors act as an impediment to achieving effective regulation in the international arena, it is not unlikely that they will also frustrate effective collective action within a developed legal system. n98 Christina C. Caplan adds that addressing environmental spillovers in a decentralized system is virtually impossible for a number of reasons: First, leaving states to negotiate solutions amongst themselves is time-consuming and costly. Second, negotiation alone may be ineffective, since upwind and upstream states do not suffer the social costs of pollution, and thus have little political incentive to take these costs into account when setting their environmental policy... . Third, downwind and downstream states have little bargaining power with upwind and upstream states. Their only leverage is the threat of a nuisance suit, but such litigation is [*421] time-consuming, expensive, and likely to fail on issues of causation. n99 In this "regulatory commons," states from which pollution originates have little incentive to curb interstate pollution since they benefit from externalizing the harmful effects while enjoying the economic benefits of polluting. Bilateral exchanges and bargaining between the source state and injured states to minimize losses from the spillover are costly, and the position of the injured states is typically weakened precisely because of the dispersion of pollutants. Ultimately, as Rena I. Steinzor notes, devolution, taken to its logical extreme, will cause unacceptable - and irrevocable - harm to [people's] core interests. For state and local officials, unrestricted devolution means that they must shoulder primary responsibility for solving difficult problems, including transboundary pollution. For industry, unrestricted devolution could mean either that chronic violators gain competitive advantage in states with weak enforcement or that a patchwork of expensive and contradictory state regulation emerges. And for the public, unrestricted devolution means not only losing ground in our steady progress to protect the natural environment, but postponing, once again, the long-overdue campaign to conquer maladies ... that so severely diminish the enjoyment of life. n100 2. Uniformity and consistency. Advocates of centralization point out that single federal standards make for a more efficient regulatory environment than a multiplicity of state standards. Differing state standards tend to heighten barriers to interstate trade, and uniformity helps manufacturers and industry by providing a consistent and predictable statutory environment. n101 Proponents of centralized [*422] federalism point out that centralization and uniformity can, in some situations, reduce social costs. A single national currency is cheaper to use than fifty separate state currencies. A uniform national gauge for railway tracks makes more sense than a patchwork of competing rules. Consider the history of daylight saving time, a mechanism recently utilized by the federal government to reduce energy consumption. For a brief period in the late 1950s, Minnesotans waged a battle over whether to adopt daylight saving time. While a majority were in support of "fast time," as it was called then, rural farmers complained that they could not get into the field any faster, "because the morning sun does not dry the dew "on daylight savings time.'" n102 Unwilling to take a firm stand either way, state legislators passed a bill that allowed some counties to adopt their own rules. In the meantime, an alliance of movie theater owners, worried that people would not go to the movies when it was light out, sued the state. Their efforts backfired when the Minnesota Supreme Court issued a ruling that barred counties from adopting a different time from the rest of the state and encouraged the state legislature to resolve the issue. But, in a contortion of legal reasoning that would make a justice's eyes cross, the state's Attorney General declared that the high court's action could not be enforced against counties that kept whatever time they wanted. The result was that some parts of the state were on a different time than others - including within the state capitol, where the Governor's Office adopted daylight saving time, while the Legislature and Supreme Court remained on standard time. n103 Minnesota's rebel counties were joined by others across the nation, until a tangle of state and local legislation created as much confusion as a British farce. At one point, if you drove the thirty-five miles from Steubenville, Ohio to Moundsville, West Virginia and wanted your watch to keep local time, you would have to change it seven times en route. n104 The chaos created by multiple time zones could not stand for long. Congress tired of the hodgepodge of time zones dividing the [*423] nation and in 1966 passed a law that preempted the states and made daylight saving time uniform across the country. Under the 2005 Energy Policy Act n105 signed into law by President George W. Bush on August 18, 2005, daylight saving time was moved up to the second Sunday in March, starting in 2007, in an effort to reduce peak electricity loads in the Midwest and Northeast. n106 Thus, Steven G. Calabresi comments that "sometimes variety is not the spice of life; as to some items it may be a downright nuisance and an expensive one at that. National government eliminates these potential deadweight social costs with general gains in social utility as a result." n107 In terms of environmental policymaking, it may make sense in some circumstances to have single, harmonized standards instead of multiple, confusing rules and regulations. 3. Economies of scale. Absent centralized regulation, independent state regulators can duplicate each other or engage in time-consuming and complex negotiations to divide labor and resources. Technical capacities such as data collection are generally weakened by devolution. Advocates for centralized federalism conclude that "it makes no sense to ask every state, city or town to measure the level, size, and type of particulates in its air, determine their connection to respiratory failure and other health problems, identify the safe level of emissions, and design cost-effective policy responses." n108 The federal government is much better suited for "data collection and quality control, fate and transport studies, epidemiological and ecological analyses, and [highly technical] risk assessments" because of its fiscal power and established research organizations. n109 As one prominent example, consider that the National [*424] Weather Service, a federal agency that "measures rainfall with more than 10,000 gages nationwide, providing data for weather and climate forecasts," and collects snowfall data in cities and rural areas at more than 670 sites. n110 A state-by-state approach towards such a complicated task would present immense transaction costs for building facilities, improving forecasting techniques, and sharing data. As a second example, consider acid rain. Technically referred to as "acid deposition," acid rain "occurs when sulfur dioxide or nitrogen oxide emissions undergo a chemical reaction in the atmosphere and become sulfuric or nitric acid." n111 Emissions in the case of sulfur dioxide first change to sulfates, fine particles that can be transported hundreds and even thousands of miles. Sulfur dioxide can return to land in dry form, becoming sulfuric acid when inhaled or moistened, or as acid rain when washed out of the atmosphere by precipitation. Researching such a complicated form of pollution is especially difficult given that the process converting pollutant emissions into acid rain occurs at high altitudes, and that "prevailing winds often carry the damaging precipitate far from the source." n112 Thus, polluting states have little incentive to study the atmospheric science behind acid rain because polluting regions are not the polluted ones. Furthermore, proponents of centralization note that in highly technical areas like energy and the environment, "although many states may benefit from better information, no state may have an incentive to provide this information on its own" n113 - and none has an incentive to research the situation in other states unless they are directly suffering from the effects of transboundary pollution. The states thus lack sufficient incentives to provide public goods, such as scientific or economic research, that would improve their decision-making capability. Even when they do, their expertise will be tailored to their unique situation and not [*425] necessarily applicable in other areas of the country. Federal information collection can better assess interstate problems, and create a unified set of indicators, making up for disparities in the funding of state environmental programs. Thus, federal regulation can reduce transaction costs related to collection of data, standard-setting, and research and development.

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
1AR - Federalism Resilient

Warming doesn’t trigger extinction

IBD, 18. Investor’s Business Daily, Citing Study from Peer reviewed journal, “Here's One Global Warming Study Nobody Wants You To See,” April 25, 2018. https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/global-warming-computer-models-co2-emissions/

Settled Science: A new study published in a peer-reviewed journal finds that climate models exaggerate the global warming from CO2 emissions by as much as 45%. If these findings hold true, it's huge news. No wonder the mainstream press is ignoring it.

In the study, authors Nic Lewis and Judith Curry looked at actual temperature records and compared them with climate change computer models. What they found is that the planet has shown itself to be far less sensitive to increases in CO2 than the climate models say. As a result, they say, the planet will warm less than the models predict, even if we continue pumping CO2 into the atmosphere.

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
1AR - Federalism Resilient

Federalism isn’t zero-sum

Erin Ryan, 12. Fulbright Scholar, Professor of Law at Lewis and Clark College. 7-3-2012, "Spending power bargaining after Obamacare." July 3, 2012. OUPblog. https://blog.oup.com/2012/07/spending-power-bargaining-after-obamacare

It’s important to get these things right because an awful lot of American governance really is negotiated between state and federal actors this way. Federalism champions often mistakenly assume a “zero-sum” model of American federalism that emphasizes winner-takes-all competition between state and federal actors for power. But countless real-world examples show that the boundary between state and federal authority is really a project of ongoing negotiation, one that effectively harnesses the regulatory innovation and interjurisdictional synergy that is the hallmark of our federal system. Understanding state-federal relations as heavily mediated by negotiation betrays the growing gap between the rhetoric and reality of American federalism—and it offers hope for moving beyond the paralyzing features of the zero-sum discourse. Still, a core feature making the overall system work is that intergovernmental bargaining must be fairly secured by genuine consent.

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
2AC - Federalism Resilient

Federalism is resilient and flexible

Larry Greston, 07. Larry appears twice weekly as the political analyst at NBC Bay Area television. He has been interviewed on NBC Nightly News, CBS Evening News, BBC, NPR, and CNN’s Inside Politics. He has written more than 150 op-ed articles and has been quoted in national print media including The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, USA Today, Los Angeles Times, and Roll Call. American Federalism: A Concise Introduction, p. 13-14. Routledge.

To be sure, over the past two hundred twenty years, the powers of some institutions have been clarified, while the resources of others have evolved considerably. Even more remarkable, some power relationships have shifted over time, revealing a profound flexibility within the American government framework. More times than not, such shifts in power have not occurred with unanimity. In fact, great debates over the appropriate assignments of government functions continue to this day. Nevertheless, the basic elements of American federalism remain in place, even if the applications are different. And other than the Civil War nearly one hundred and fifty years ago, the political “operating system” of the nation has functioned without serious bloodshed. Along with resilient adaptability, American federalism has demonstrated a great sense of continuity.

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
1AR – No Internal Link – No Modelling

Federalism empirically isn’t modeled – U.S. law is seen as inapplicable and dangerous

Andrew Moravcsik, 05. Professor of Politics at Princeton University, “Dream On, America,” Newsweek, January 31, 2005. http://www.fsteiger.com/DreamOnAmerica.html

Once upon a time, the U.S. Constitution was a revolutionary document, full of epochal innovations--free elections, judicial review, checks and balances, federalism and, perhaps most important, a Bill of Rights. In the 19th and 20th centuries, countries around the world copied the document, not least in Latin America. So did Germany and Japan after World War II. Today? When nations write a new constitution, as dozens have in the past two decades, they seldom look to the American model. When the soviets withdrew from Central Europe, U.S. constitutional experts rushed in. They got a polite hearing, and were sent home. Jiri Pehe, adviser to former president Vaclav Havel, recalls the Czechs' firm decision to adopt a European-style parliamentary system with strict limits on campaigning. "For Europeans, money talks too much in American democracy. It's very prone to certain kinds of corruption, or at least influence from powerful lobbies," he says. "Europeans would not want to follow that route." They also sought to limit the dominance of television, unlike in American campaigns where, Pehe says, "TV debates and photogenic looks govern election victories." So it is elsewhere. After American planes and bombs freed the country, Kosovo opted for a European constitution. Drafting a post-apartheid constitution, South Africa rejected American-style federalism in favor of a German model, which leaders deemed appropriate for the social-welfare state they hoped to construct. Now fledgling African democracies look to South Africa as their inspiration, says John Stremlau, a former U.S. State Department official who currently heads the international relations department at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg: "We can't rely on the Americans." The new democracies are looking for a constitution written in modern times and reflecting their progressive concerns about racial and social equality, he explains. "To borrow Lincoln's phrase, South Africa is now Africa's 'last great hope'." Much in American law and society troubles the world these days. Nearly all countries reject the United States' right to bear arms as a quirky and dangerous anachronism. They abhor the death penalty and demand broader privacy protections. Above all, once most foreign systems reach a reasonable level of affluence, they follow the Europeans in treating the provision of adequate social welfare is a basic right. All this, says Bruce Ackerman at Yale University Law School, contributes to the growing sense that American law, once the world standard, has become "provincial." The United States' refusal to apply the Geneva Conventions to certain terrorist suspects, to ratify global human-rights treaties such as the innocuous Convention on the Rights of the Child or to endorse the International Criminal Court (coupled with the abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo) only reinforces the conviction that America's Constitution and legal system are out of step with the rest of the world.

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
2AC – No Internal Link – No Modelling

Best data shows federalism modeling is irrelevant and overwhelmed by domestic politics

Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, 13. Ginsburg is a Professor of International Law, Ludwig and Hilde Wolf Research Scholar, and Professor of Political Science at UChicago Law, JD and PhD from UC Berkeley. *Mila Versteeg is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Virginia, PhD from Oxford, “Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review?” University of Virginia School of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, September 2013, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2319363

Constitutional review has spread around the world in recent decades, and various theories have arisen to account for this development. We have canvassed several different types of theories: (1) ideational theories which view constitutional review adoption as a product of a growing consciousness of the rule-of-law and protection of individual liberties; (2) coordination and commitment theories that draw on functional political logics of federalism and economic growth; (3) electoral market theories that hold that constitutional review is adopted when constitutionmakers envision themselves out of power after the adoption of the constitution; and (4) diffusion theories that posit that constitutional review is adopted in response to international audiences and constitutional developments in foreign states. Drawing on a new and unique quantitative dataset that documents the development of this institution across the globe since 1781, we used a fixed effects spatial lag model to develop the most extensive empirical test so far of these alternative accounts. Our results provide strong support for the insurance-based theory, and less support for the alternative accounts. The adoption of constitutional review is above all a response to domestic political incentives, rather than ideas, the demands of federalism, or diffusion pressures. The lack of support for diffusion-based accounts is particularly important, given that other work has demonstrated the role of diffusion with regard to constitutional provisions on human rights. We suggest that this reflects the relatively low cost of adopting rights provisions relative to institutional structures in national constitutions. Rights may represent “cheap talk,” while institutions are likely to develop a self-enforcing quality so that constitutional designers must treat them as involving higher stakes.

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
2AC – Link Defense

No link – their link is to status quo UBI programs that were unconstitutional because they discriminate based on race – the plan doesn’t do that. It’s a universal basic income to all people in the US.

Aaron Sibarium, 22. Sibarium is associate editor at the Washington Free Beacon. He graduated from Yale University, where he was the opinion editor of the Yale Daily News. “Universal Basic Income Hits the Bay Area—If You’re Black.” December 13, 2022. https://freebeacon.com/latest-news/universal-basic-income-hits-the-bay-area-if-youre-black/

The programs—all of which are publicly funded—violate both the United States and the California state constitution, lawyers say, as well as civil rights laws that ban race discrimination in contracting and by the recipients of government funds. The initiatives include the Black Economic Equity Movement, which provides $500 a month exclusively to "Black young adults," the Abundant Birth Project, which provides $1,000 a month to "Black and Pacific Islander mothers," and the Guaranteed Income for Transgender People program, which will dole out $1,200 a month and "prioritize enrollment" of transgender "Black, Indigenous, or People of Color (BIPOC)." They are financed by the National Institutes of Health, the California Department of Social Services, and the city of San Francisco, respectively. These programs offer a preview of what could soon be the norm in the Golden State. In July 2021, California lawmakers set aside $35 million dollars in grant funding for guaranteed income pilots across the state. Though the law did not include any racial or ethnic qualifiers, in keeping with the California constitution, the state’s social services department said that it would only give out the grants to pilots that "center equity." Grant applicants were encouraged to "embed an equity-focused approach throughout each dimension" of their programs, including their "eligibility." "It’s astonishing to me how brazen the State of California and its various Bay Areas local governments have become in violating the many laws and constitutional provisions prohibiting race discrimination," said Gail Heriot, a member of the United States Commission on Civil Rights and a professor at the University of San Diego School of Law. All three initiatives appear to violate the 14th Amendment, which bans states from discriminating based on race, said Dan Morenoff, the executive director of the American Civil Rights Project, as well as the California constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which ban racial discrimination in contracting. In addition, the Black Economic Equity Movement appears to violate Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which bans racial discrimination by the recipients of federal funds. The National Institutes of Health, whose "health equity" initiative funded the program, did not respond to a request for comment. The blueprint for these programs comes from private philanthropic ventures, which have experimented with supplemental income schemes in Jackson, Miss., and Atlanta that are only available to black women. Though both the Mississippi program, underwritten by the W.K. Kellogg foundation, and the Atlanta program, funded by the Georgia Resilience and Opportunity Fund, discriminate based on race, they probably don’t violate any laws, said David Bernstein, a professor of constitutional law at George Mason Law School. But their California counterparts are another ball game. "The publicly funded programs are clearly unconstitutional," Bernstein said. "It’s not a close call."

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
1AR - Thumper

Federalism is about to be destroyed – new SCOTUS cases

Donald F. Kettl, 23. Columnist for Governing, professor emeritus and the former dean of the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, College Park. “5 Ways the Tensions of Federalism Will Play Out in 2023.” January 4, 2023.

The year that just ended proved to be a wild and woolly one for federalism, with some issues and policies percolating down to states and localities from Washington while others boiled up through our federal system. The year began with yet another COVID-19 wave, which severely taxed state and local public health agencies without providing them with more cash. Meanwhile, however, state and local governments welcomed billions of dollars flowing from the Treasury for infrastructure and a host of other programs. And then there was the Supreme Court’s Dobbs v. Jackson ruling, pushing the fundamental and explosive decisions about abortion back to the states.

As we ring in the new year, one thing is clear: 2023 is sure to be another wild one as we continue the endless effort of trying to sort out the roles each level of government will play. Here are five predictions for this year; I’ll let you make your own — and keep score on mine:

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
1AR - Thumper

Federalism about to get wrecked – upcoming court case

Mario H. Lopez, 22. President of the Hispanic Leadership Fund, a public policy advocacy organization that promotes liberty, opportunity, and prosperity for all Americans. “An animal rights case could impact federalism and weaken the Constitution.” The Hill, October 18, 2022. https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/3690956-an-animal-rights-case-could-impact-federalism-and-weaken-the-constitution/

A case before the U.S. Supreme Court could have surprising, and perhaps counterintuitive, implications for supporters of federalism and the long-protected ability of states and municipalities to regulate their own commerce and pass what is broadly known as “morals-based” legislation.

The nine justices on Oct. 11 heard arguments in National Pork Producers Council (NPPC) v. Ross, which centers around California’s Proposition 12, a law passed in 2018 with overwhelming support from voters of both political parties.

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
2AC – Thumper

Federalism is about to be destroyed – numerous 2023 challenges before the 2024 election

Donald F. Kettl, 23. Columnist for Governing, professor emeritus and the former dean of the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, College Park. “5 Ways the Tensions of Federalism Will Play Out in 2023.” January 4, 2023. https://www.governing.com/now/5-ways-the-tensions-of-federalism-will-play-out-in-2023

That leads to a two-part prediction for 2023: The new Republican-controlled House will turn up the heat on immigration issues. But Republican governors, especially Texas’ Greg Abbott and Florida’s Ron DeSantis, will jostle for control of the spotlight. Not much will happen, but the glare of the klieg lights will be blinding.

And here’s a bonus prediction about something else that won’t happen: The good old days where budget battles dominated state legislatures and local governments will take a back seat in 2023. It’s not that they won’t be important — it’s always a good time to fight about money. But it will be a year when Republicans at every level of government will line up instead behind social policies, from abortion to immigration to library books to crime. Democrats, meanwhile, will try to advance policies like California’s positions against big oil and “forever chemicals.” Rules, not money, will be the basic currency in 2023.