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2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***1AC Core*** › 1AC – Solvency

Utopian analysis is necessary to go beyond what we know – UBI can be rigorously scrutinized without every detail – NO plan captures every detail

Philippe Van Parijs, Hoover Chair of Economic and Social Ethics @ University of Louvain, Louvain, Belgium, Nuffield College, Oxford, UK, ’13, “The Universal Basic Income: Why Utopian Thinking Matters, and How Sociologists Can Contribute to It” Politics & Society 41(2) 171–182, accessed June 29, 2023, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0032329213483106

The objective of this utopian thinking must not be to specify all minute details of what a perfect society would look like. It must rather be (1) to formulate proposals for radical reforms to the present social order, (2) to justify these by reference to normative principles or values to which on reflection one is willing to commit, combined with the best possible scientific analysis of the root causes of the problems which the proposals are meant to address, and (3) to subject the proposals to unindulgent critical scrutiny, scanning relentlessly for all possible perverse effects, all to be evaluated in the light of explicit normative considerations. Such utopian thinking is not meant to be value-neutral but it does not make social scientific truth depend on valued judgments. Utopian thinking requires answers to many factual questions about likely effects, about compatibility, about sustainability. It is perfectly legitimate for the choice of these factual questions to be guided by value judgments, but it is essential that the answers to these questions be shielded from the inference of both our interests and our values. Utopian thinking is not to be confused with wishful thinking. It requires tough disciplining by a demanding, multidisciplinary scientific community in order to dissuade us from believing and asserting what we would like to be true but is not. This crucial demand of intellectual integrity, however, should never make us shy away from our collective mission of helping design a better yet feasible future, of helping give hope, reasonable hope to our generation and generations to come, of fashioning realistic utopias.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***1AC Core*** › 1AC – Solvency

UBI is better than welfare – any trade-offs make social net more sustainable and effective

Thomas Straubhaar, University of Hamburg, ’17. “On the Economics of a Universal Basic Income,” INTERECONOMICS, Volume 52, 2017 · Number 2 · pp. 74–80, accessed June 29, 2023, https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2017/number/2/article/on-the-economics-of-a-universal-basic-income.html

While the extent of redistribution requires a (normative) political discussion, the (positive) economic analysis can convincingly demonstrate that a “blind” social policy is the most effective, most efficient and thus the most equitable social policy.21 An efficient social policy should support people, and not specific factors of production or regional or sectoral industries. Furthermore, it should refrain from paternalistic behaviour and simply flow unconditionally. The fundamental aim should be to redistribute some degree of purchasing power from people with higher incomes to those with lower incomes. Direct individual payments to economically weaker people are more targeted, less expensive and more effective than indirect measures which require the fulfilment of specific criteria, particular preconditions or certain behaviours, for example, the requirement of being employed or at least searching for employment, or the attainment of a specified age.

It is part of the tragedy of a misunderstood social policy that it attempts to reach a political goal with unsuitable means. Social-politically motivated interventions in the markets’ mechanisms are inappropriate. In many cases, they provoke outcomes that are the opposite of what should be achieved. They lead to unnecessary duplicate structures and an expensive bureaucracy. Many people receive financial support through the current procedure via the social insurance system, only to have that support contradicted through the tax system.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***1AC Core*** › 1AC – Solvency

UBI increases employment and economically stable households – studies Prove

Lu, Science Writer at Guardian Australia, 2020

[Donna, 5/6/20, NewScientist, “Universal basic income seems to improve employment and well-being,” https://www.newscientist.com/article/2242937-universal-basic-income-seems-to-improve-employment-and-well-being/, 6/27/23, PE, accessed June 29, 2023]

The world’s most robust study of universal basic income has concluded that it boosts recipients’ mental and financial well-being, as well as modestly improving employment. Finland ran a two-year universal basic income study in 2017 and 2018, during which the government gave 2000 unemployed people aged between 25 and 58 monthly payments with no strings attached. The payments of €560 per month weren’t means tested and were unconditional, so they weren’t reduced if an individual got a job or later had a pay rise. The study was nationwide and selected recipients weren’t able to opt out, because the test was written into legislation. Minna Ylikännö at the Social Insurance Institution of Finland announced the findings in Helsinki today via livestream. The study compared the employment and well-being of basic income recipients against a control group of 173,000 people who were on unemployment benefits. Between November 2017 and October 2018, people on basic income worked an average of 78 days, which was six days more than those on unemployment benefits. There was a greater increase in employment for people in families with children, as well as those whose first language wasn’t Finnish or Swedish – but the researchers aren’t yet sure why. When surveyed, people who received universal basic income instead of regular unemployment benefits reported better financial well-being, mental health and cognitive functioning, as well as higher levels of confidence in the future. When asked whether basic income could help people dealing with situations such as the economic fallout of the covid-19 pandemic, Ylikännö said that it could help alleviate stress at an uncertain time. “I think it would bring people security in very insecure situations when they don’t know whether they’re going to have an income,” she said. The findings suggest that basic income doesn’t seem to provide a disincentive for people to work. However, the effect of basic income was complicated by legislation known as the “activation model”, which the Finnish government introduced at the beginning of 2018. It made the conditions for accessing unemployment benefits stricter. The timing made it difficult to separate the effects of the basic income experiment from the policy change, said Ylikännö. “We can only say that the employment effect that we observed was as a joint result of the experiment and activation model,” she said. Preliminary findings, released in February last year, had previously found no difference between the two groups for the number of days worked in 2017. “Money matters, but alone it’s not sufficient to significantly promote either labour supply or demand,” said Ylikännö.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***1AC Core*** › 1AC Advantage – Economy

Economic instability risks global war.

Sundaram and Popov ‘19—(Sundaram - former economics professor, was United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Development, and received the Wassily Leontief Prize for Advancing the Frontiers of Economic Thought; Popov - former senior economics researcher in the Soviet Union, Russia and the United Nations Secretariat, is now Research Director at the Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute in Berlin). Jomo Kwame Sundaram and Vladimir Popov. “Economic Crisis Can Trigger World War”, Inter Press Service, February, .

Economic recovery efforts since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis have mainly depended on unconventional monetary policies. As fears rise of yet another international financial crisis, there are growing concerns about the increased possibility of large-scale military conflict. More worryingly, in the current political landscape, prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising economic inequality, chauvinistic ethno-populism as well as aggressive jingoist rhetoric, including threats, could easily spin out of control and ‘morph’ into military conflict, and worse, world war. Crisis responses limited The 2008-2009 global financial crisis almost ‘bankrupted’ governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the world economy from the brink, but soon switched from counter-cyclical fiscal efforts to unconventional monetary measures, primarily ‘quantitative easing’ and very low, if not negative real interest rates. But while these monetary interventions averted realization of the worst fears at the time by turning the US economy around, they did little to address underlying economic weaknesses, largely due to the ascendance of finance in recent decades at the expense of the real economy. Since then, despite promising to do so, policymakers have not seriously pursued, let alone achieved, such needed reforms. Instead, ostensible structural reformers have taken advantage of the crisis to pursue largely irrelevant efforts to further ‘casualize’ labour markets. This lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented liquidity central banks injected into economies has not been well allocated to stimulate resurgence of the real economy. From bust to bubble Instead, easy credit raised asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. US house prices are now 8% more than at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, while its price-to-earnings ratio in late 2018 was even higher than in 2008 and in 1929, when the Wall Street Crash precipitated the Great Depression. As monetary tightening checks asset price bubbles, another economic crisis — possibly more severe than the last, as the economy has become less responsive to such blunt monetary interventions — is considered likely. A decade of such unconventional monetary policies, with very low interest rates, has greatly depleted their ability to revive the economy. The implications beyond the economy of such developments and policy responses are already being seen. Prolonged economic distress has worsened public antipathy towards the culturally alien — not only abroad, but also within. Thus, another round of economic stress is deemed likely to foment unrest, conflict, even war as it is blamed on the foreign. International trade shrank by two-thirds within half a decade after the US passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930, at the start of the Great Depression, ostensibly to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition! Liberalization’s discontents Rising economic insecurity, inequalities and deprivation are expected to strengthen ethno-populist and jingoistic nationalist sentiments, and increase social tensions and turmoil, especially among the growing precariat and others who feel vulnerable or threatened. Thus, ethno-populist inspired chauvinistic nationalism may exacerbate tensions, leading to conflicts and tensions among countries, as in the 1930s. Opportunistic leaders have been blaming such misfortunes on outsiders and may seek to reverse policies associated with the perceived causes, such as ‘globalist’ economic liberalization. Policies which successfully check such problems may reduce social tensions, as well as the likelihood of social turmoil and conflict, including among countries. However, these may also inadvertently exacerbate problems. The recent spread of anti-globalization sentiment appears correlated to slow, if not negative per capita income growth and increased economic inequality. To be sure, globalization and liberalization are statistically associated with growing economic inequality and rising ethno-populism. Declining real incomes and growing economic insecurity have apparently strengthened ethno-populism and nationalistic chauvinism, threatening economic liberalization itself, both within and among countries. Insecurity, populism, conflict Thomas Piketty has argued that a sudden increase in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Although causality is difficult to prove, with wealth and income inequality now at historical highs, this should give cause for concern. Of course, other factors also contribute to or exacerbate civil and international tensions, with some due to policies intended for other purposes. Nevertheless, even if unintended, such developments could inadvertently catalyse future crises and conflicts. Publics often have good reason to be restless, if not angry, but the emotional appeals of ethno-populism and jingoistic nationalism are leading to chauvinistic policy measures which only make things worse. At the international level, despite the world’s unprecedented and still growing interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed as the US increasingly resorts to unilateral, sovereigntist policies without bothering to even build coalitions with its usual allies. Avoiding Thucydides’ iceberg Thus, protracted economic distress, economic conflicts or another financial crisis could lead to military confrontation by the protagonists, even if unintended. Less than a decade after the Great Depression started, the Second World War had begun as the Axis powers challenged the earlier entrenched colonial powers. They patently ignored Thucydides’ warning, in chronicling the Peloponnesian wars over two millennia before, when the rise of Athens threatened the established dominance of Sparta! Anticipating and addressing such possibilities may well serve to help avoid otherwise imminent disasters by undertaking pre-emptive collective action, as difficult as that may be. The international community has no excuse for being like the owners and captain of the Titanic, conceitedly convinced that no iceberg could possibly sink the great ship.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***1AC Core*** › 1AC Advantage – Economy

The direction of U.S. growth determines global economic stability

Kose, World Bank Group Deputy Chief Economist, et al., 17

[M. Ayhan Kose, Csilla Lakatos, Prospects Group of the Macroeconomics, Trade & Investment Global Practice Senior Economist, Franziska Ohnsorge, World Bank Manager of the Prospects Group in the Equitable Growth, Finance and Institutions (EFI) Practice Group at the World Bank, Marc Stocker, World Bank Senior Economist, 10 Feb 2017, SSRN, “The Global Role of the U.S. Economy: Linkages, Policies and Spillovers, accessed June 29, 2023, , 6/26/2023, EJ]

Developments in the U.S. economy, because of its size and international linkages, are bound to have substantial implications for the global economy. The United States is the world’s single largest economy (at market exchange rates), accounting for almost 22 percent of global output and over a third of stock market capitalization. It is prominent in virtually every global market, accounting for about one-tenth of global trade flows, one-fifth of global FDI stock, close to one-fifth of remittances, and one-fifth of global energy demand. Since the U.S. dollar is the most widely used currency in global trade and financial transactions, changes in U.S. monetary policy and investor sentiment play a major role in driving global financing conditions.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***1AC Core*** › 1AC Advantage – Economy

UBI is key to long-term social cohesion – prerequisite to economic stability and international peace

KANNI WIGNARAJA UN Assistant Secretary-General and UNDP Regional Director for Asia and the Pacific, ’20, July 10, “The case for a universal basic income,” UNDP, accessed June 29, 2023, https://www.undp.org/blog/case-universal-basic-income

These plans are essential, but they need to be strategic and sustainable. Because in addressing the current crises, we must avoid sowing seeds of new ones, as the stakes are incredibly high.

It is time to add a new element to the policy packages that governments are introducing, one we know but have abandoned: Universal Basic Income (UBI). It is needed as part of the package that will help us to get out of this yawning pit.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***1AC Core*** › 1AC Advantage – Economy

UBI allows for transformative risk-taking which spurs big growth

Thomas Straubhaar, University of Hamburg, ’17. “On the Economics of a Universal Basic Income,” INTERECONOMICS, Volume 52, 2017 · Number 2 · pp. 74–80, accessed June 29, 2023,

The UBI would empower people to more readily take on some risks of daily life. If people are assured that a failure will not lead to a bottomless case of destitution and poverty, and that their subsistence minimum is secured, they will assess future challenges as opportunities rather than threats. This applies to all people, and not just to those who behave in accordance with social norms and traditional values or behaviours. On the contrary, nonconformists often help to see the world through different eyes and from novel perspectives. New ideas and innovative solutions can emerge from the new thinking of outsiders.

The economics of insurance behaviour can convincingly show that insured people are willing to accept more risks.24 And a larger share of risk-takers within the total population correlates positively with the macroeconomic performance of a society. This empirical observation is the justification for compulsory insurance, for example motor vehicle liability insurance or health and accident insurance. However, the positive correlation between being insured and taking more risks also contains sound economic reasons for a state social policy which serves the purpose of securing the subsistence minimum for everybody.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***1AC Core*** › 1AC Advantage – Economy

UBI is a net positive for the economy – revives industry, increases GDP, reduces poverty

A2 Costs trillions

Scott Singer Ph.D. candidate in international relations at the University of Oxford and Ben Silvian ’21, November 09, Silvian is a Master’s candidate in technology management at Georgetown University “How Universal Basic Income Can Advance the United States’ China Strategy,” THE DIPLOMAT, accessed June 26, 2023 https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/how-universal-basic-income-can-advance-the-united-states-china-strategy/

At its core, UBI is a direct investment in American human capital, distributing the immense economic gains of technology advancements throughout the populace. The policy, popularized by Andrew Yang as a “Freedom Dividend,” would guarantee direct cash payments every month. Cash is highly flexible and fungible, meaning it can be used to overcome the recipient’s most pressing financial pain points.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***1AC Core*** › 1AC Advantage – Economy

Recession coming—US economy going to collapse soon

Goodkind, Senior Market Reporter, ‘23

[Nico, May 12, 2023, CNN, “Why current US recession warnings are unlike all the others,” accessed June 29, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/12/investing/premarket-stocks-trading/index.html, 6-26,DG]

Economic experts are once again ringing the alarm bells over an imminent downturn. A US recession is coming, they say, in the second half of 2023. That time frame begins less than three weeks from now. JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon warned on Thursday of great economic danger lurking just over the horizon. Given the risks that lie ahead, he told Bloomberg news, “I would take a mild recession happily.” Billionaire investor Stan Druckenmiller didn’t mince his words this week at the Sohn Investment Conference. A hard landing is coming, he cautioned, and “it’s just naive not to be open-minded to something really, really bad happening.” For more than a year CEOs, economists, analysts and their kind have been warning of an imminent economic downturn, The economy, meanwhile, has remained relatively resilient through it all. Things weren’t great last year: Inflation hit a 40-year peak, gas prices were elevated, consumer sentiment plunged and markets fell by 20%. Still, the United States managed to avoid a recession. “This has been the most predicted potential recession in memory,” said Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond President Tom Barkin way back in January. So why should we listen now? There are two reasons, noted Paul Christopher, head of investment strategy at Wells Fargo: Higher interest rates and tightening credit. The Federal Reserve has raised rates higher and more quickly than they have in decades, and some say that the ongoing US regional banking crisis is an early warning sign of stress on the system. The Fed’s own experts predicted in March that “the potential economic effects of the recent banking-sector developments,” would lead to “a mild recession starting later this year.” Bank failures can make borrowing harder, which can curb spending and weigh on economic activity. A Fed survey, released Monday, confirmed that lenders are stiffening their standards in the wake of the banking collapses — demand for and supply of loans is now close to 2008 levels. “The bottom line for markets is that with inflation still at 5%, well above the [Fed’s] 2% inflation target, and the Fed not cutting rates anytime soon, credit conditions will continue to tighten and, as a result, a recession is coming that could be deeper or longer than the consensus currently expects,” said Torsten Slok, chief economist at Apollo Global Management.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***1AC Core*** › 1AC Advantage – Innovation

Competitive American AI capability is key to deter revisionism culminating in nuclear great power war

Kroenig, Professor of Government @ Georgetown, ‘21

Matthew; 2021; PhD, Berkeley, Professor of Government at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University; Air University, “Will Emerging Technology Cause Nuclear War? Bringing Geopolitics Back In,” vol. 15 no. 4.

Will emerging technology cause nuclear war? For more than 70 years, the world has avoided major-power conflict, and many attribute this era of peace to nuclear weapons.1 In situations of mutually assured destruction, neither side has an incentive to launch a nuclear first strike because doing so will only result in self-annihilation. Maintaining secure, second-strike capabilities—the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating counterattack—is the key to deterrence.2 Recently, analysts have begun to worry, however, that new military technologies may call into question this model of global strategic stability.3 The world is experiencing a fourth industrial revolution (4IR) in which a wave of new and transformative technologies is being developed, including artificial intelligence (AI), additive manufacturing, quantum information technology, hypersonic missiles, biotechnology, and directed energy.4 While these technologies are expected to have profound implications for societies and economies, most are dual use and will also affect national security, including nuclear strategic stability. According to an emerging conventional wisdom, new technology may upset nuclear strategic stability by calling into question the survivability of nuclear forces.5 The solution, according to some analysts, is for nuclear-armed states to eschew military applications of at least some of these technologies and lead an international effort to control their spread.6 But these studies too often consider new technology and nuclear strategy in the abstract without adequately considering the prevailing geopolitical context into which these new technologies have been introduced. This article argues understanding the link between new technology and nuclear stability must consider the prevailing geopolitical context. For the past several decades, the United States, its Allies, and like-minded partners have formed the core of the existing international order.7 They have benefited from this system and would like to see it strengthened, revitalized, and defended. If the new technologies of the 4IR are incorporated into US, Ally, and partner militaries, then any advantages they provide will likely reinforce the prevailing distribution of power and existing sources of strategic stability. In contrast, China and Russia are revisionist powers intent on disrupting or displacing the US-led system, and they would likely employ new technological advantages to pursue revisionist aims. The greatest danger from emerging technology for nuclear stability, therefore, may result from the possibility that new technology provides Russia or China an enhanced military advantage over vulnerable US Allies and partners, leading to a regional conflict with a significant risk of nuclear escalation.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***1AC Core*** › 1AC Advantage – Innovation

UBI will allow for momentous tech investments and development that will expand AI

Santens, Senior Advisor for Humanity Forward, ‘16 (Scott, Senior Advisor for Humanity Forward and also serve on the board of directors of the Gerald Huff Fund for Humanity and as the editor of Basic Income Today — a daily UBI news hub., Universal Basic Income Will Accelerate Innovation by Reducing Our Fear of Failure,11-30-16, accessed June 29, 2023, https://medium.com/basic-income/universal-basic-income-will-accelerate-innovation-by-reducing-our-fear-of-failure-b81ee65a254)-TL

Risks as Genetic Mutation Taking risks is equivalent to random genetic mutation in this biological analogy. A new product or service introduced into the market can result in success or failure. The outcome is entirely unknown until it’s tried. What succeeds can make someone rich and what fails can bankrupt someone. That’s a big risk. We traditionally like to think of these risk-takers as a special kind of person, but really they’re mostly just those who are economically secure enough to feel failure isn’t scarier than the potential for success. As a prime example, Elon Musk is one of today’s most well-known and highly successful risk takers. Back in his college years he challenged himself to live on $1 a day for a month. Why did he do that? He figured that if he could successfully survive with very little money, he could survive any failure. With that knowledge gained, the risk of failure in his mind was reduced enough to not prevent him from risking everything to succeed. This isn’t just anecdotal evidence either. Studies have shown that the very existence of food stamps — just knowing they are there as an option in case of failure — increases rates of entrepreneurship. A study of a reform to the French unemployment insurance system that allowed workers to remain eligible for benefits if they started a business found that the reform resulted in more entrepreneurs starting their own businesses. In Canada, a reform was made to their maternity leave policy, where new mothers were guaranteed a job after a year of leave. A study of the results of this policy change showed a 35% increase in entrepreneurship due to women basically asking themselves, “What have I got to lose? If I fail, I’m guaranteed my paycheck back anyway.” Meanwhile, entrepreneurship is currently on a downward trend. Businesses that were less than five years old used to comprise half of all businesses three decades ago. Now they comprise about one-third. Businesses are also closing their doors faster than new businesses are opening them. Until recently, this had never previously been true here in the US for as long as such data had been recorded. Startup rates are falling. Why? Risk aversion due to rising insecurity. Growing Insecurity For decades now our economy has been going through some very significant changes thanks to advancements in technology, and we have simultaneously been actively eroding the institutions that pooled risk like trade unions and our public safety net. Incomes adjusted for inflation have not budged for decades, and the jobs providing those incomes have gone from secure careers to insecure jobs, part-time and contract work, and now recently even gig labor in the sharing economy. Decreasing economic security means a population decreasingly likely to take risks. Looking at it this way, of course startups have been on the decline. How can you take the leap of faith required for a startup when you’re more and more worried about just being able to pay the rent? None of this should be surprising. The entire insurance industry exists to reduce risk. When someone is able to insure something, they are more willing to take risks. Would there be as many restaurants if there was no insurance in case of fire? Of course not. The corporation itself exists to reduce personal risk. Entrepreneurship and risk are inextricably linked. Reducing risk aversion is paramount to innovation. Failure as Evolution So the question becomes, how do we reduce the risks of failure so that more people take more risks? Better yet, how do we increase the rate of failure? It may sound counter-intuitive, but failure is not something to avoid. It’s only through failure that we learn what doesn’t work and what might work instead. This is basically the scientific method in a nutshell. It’s designed to rule out what isn’t true, not to determine what is true. There is a very important difference between the two. This is also how evolution works, through failure after failure. Nature isn’t determining the winner. Nature is simply determining all the losers, and those who don’t lose, win the game of evolution by default. So, the higher the rate of mutation, the more mutations can fail or not fail, and therefore the quicker an organism can adapt to a changing environment. In the same way, the higher the rate of failure in a market economy, the quicker the economy can evolve. There’s also something else very important to understand about failure and success. One success can outweigh 100,000 failures. Venture capitalist Paul Graham of Y Combinator has described this as Black Swan Farming. When it comes to truly transformative ideas, they aren’t obviously great ideas, or else they’d already be more than just an idea, and when it comes to taking a risk on investing in a startup, the question is not so much if it will succeed, but if it will succeed BIG. What’s so interesting is that the biggest ideas tend to be seen as the least likely to succeed. Now translate that to people themselves. What if the people most likely to massively change the world for the better, the Einsteins so to speak — the Black Swans, are oftentimes those least likely to be seen as deserving social investment? In that case, the smart approach would be to cast an extremely large net of social investment, in full recognition that even at such great cost, the ROI from the innovation of the Black Swans would far surpass the cost. This happens to be exactly what Buckminster Fuller was thinking when he said, “We must do away with the absolutely specious notion that everybody has to earn a living. It is a fact today that one in ten thousand of us can make a technological breakthrough capable of supporting all the rest.” That is a fact, and it then begs the question, “How do we make sure we invest in every single one of those people such that all of society maximizes its collective ROI?” What if our insistence on making people earn their living is preventing those one in ten thousand from making incredible achievements that would benefit all the rest of us in ways we can’t even imagine? What if our fears of each other being fully free to pursue whatever most interests us, including nothing, is an obstacle to an explosion of entrepreneurship and truly huge innovations the likes of which have never been seen? “I must not fear. Fear is the mind-killer. Fear is the little-death that brings total obliteration. I will face my fear.” — Frank Herbert, Dune Fear as Death What it all comes down to is fear. FDR was absolutely right when he said the only thing we have to fear is fear itself. Fear prevents risk-taking, which prevents failure, which prevents innovation. If the great fears are of hunger and homelessness, and they prevent many people from taking risks who would otherwise take risks, then the answer is to simply take hunger and homelessness off the table. Don’t just hope some people are unafraid enough. Eliminate what people fear so they are no longer afraid. If everyone received as an absolute minimum, a sufficient amount of money each month to cover their basic needs for that month no matter what — an unconditional basic income — then the fear of hunger and homelessness is eliminated. It’s gone. And with it, the risks of failure considered too steep to take a chance on something. But the effects of basic income don’t stop with a reduction of risk. Basic income is also basic capital. It enables more people to actually afford to create a new product or service instead of just think about it, and even better, it enables people to be the consumers who purchase those new products and services, and in so doing decide what succeeds and what fails through an even more widely distributed and further decentralized free market system. Such market effects have even been observed in universal basic income experiments in Namibia and India where local markets flourished thanks to a tripling of entrepreneurs and the enabling of everyone to be a consumer with a minimum amount of buying power. Basic income would even help power the sharing economy. For example, imagine how much an unconditional monthly income would enable people within the Open Source Software (OSS) and free software movements (FSM) to do the unpaid work that is essentially the foundation of the internet itself.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***1AC Core*** › 1AC Advantage – Innovation

China threatens to win the AI race – UBI super-charges U.S. competitiveness

Scott Singer Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at the University of Oxford and Ben Silvian ’21, November 09, Silvian is a Master’s candidate in technology management at Georgetown University “How Universal Basic Income Can Advance the United States’ China Strategy,” THE DIPLOMAT, accessed June 26, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/how-universal-basic-income-can-advance-the-united-states-china-strategy/

Earlier this summer, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken outlined his foreign policy strategy of “domestic renewal,” aimed directly at arming the United States to compete with China. The strategy, articulated in an August 9 speech at the University of Maryland, focused predominantly on increasing infrastructure investment at home, reflecting the potential foreign policy benefits of the bipartisan infrastructure bill Congress passed last week.

In the weeks following the “domestic renewal” speech, we patiently awaited further elaboration of Blinken and President Joe Biden’s domestic policy-oriented China policy, some next steps to integrate the oft-segregated domestic and foreign policy worlds.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***1AC Core*** › 1AC Advantage – Innovation

China is quickly rising – will soon surpass the U.S. as world leader in innovation

Ian Clay and Robert D. Atkinson, widely published author, ‘23, January 23, “Wake Up, America: China Is Overtaking the United States in Innovation Capacity,” INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION FOUNDATION, accessed June 29, 2023,

Many U.S. elites comfort themselves with the narrative that China, at least under the leadership of Xi Jinping, cannot truly innovate and that the U.S. therefore has little to worry about. But this view is premised on too-narrow a view of innovation, largely one referring to the development of science-based, new-to-the-world products. Not only is this definition too narrow for assessing advanced-industry strength, but it is also not clear that this still even rings true given China’s recent gains in areas such as space exploration, genomics, AI, and quantum computing.

Much of the discussion of China’s capabilities is on a proportional basis, which is surely important for determining how innovation-based an economy is. Indeed, if only total capabilities mattered, nations such as Taiwan, Israel, and Singapore could be ignored when it comes to innovation. But even here, China is performing well, not having yet caught up to the United States but being poised to do so within the next decade or so. This is especially true if the United States remains tethered to the status quo of laissez faire ideology on the right and anti-corporate populism on the left.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***1AC Core*** › 1AC Advantage – Inequality

Economic inequality erodes institutional capacity---causes extinction.

Andreas T. Schmidt & Daan Juijn 21. Associate Professor of Political Theory at the Faculty of Philosophy and the PPE Centre at the University of Groningen. Researcher/consultant within the Economics department at CE Delft, an independent research and consultancy organization. “Economic inequality and the long-term future.” May 2021. GPI Working Paper. https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Inequality-and-the-Long-Term-Future_Andreas-Schmidt-and-Daan-Juijn-reupload.pdf

It is often argued that a country’s long-term performance depends to a significant extent on the quality of its institutions, including its political and legal institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005). Economic research mostly focuses on explaining long-term differences in growth rates. As seen above, some researchers argue that high inequality will reduce growth rates, among other things, because it can worsen institutional quality. However, besides facilitating economic growth, public institutions have other functions that matter from a long-term perspective. For example, disaster preparedness, education, public health, foreign policy, science policy, and many other areas could influence long-term trajectories. If such things go badly, they could increase existential risk. Conversely, good institutions will help reduce existential risk. For many existential risk reduction strategies likely require public goods and collective action, which in turn require good public institutions (among other reasons, because some such public goods are unlikely to be provided by markets). So, it seems reasonable to assume that, with most other societal goals, good institutions can help deliver existential risk reduction. Here is a cheesy analogy: targeted actions like washing your hands regularly or getting a flu shot can reduce your risk of dying from an infection. But you will also do well investing in a strong immune system, as that is an ‘all-purpose goods’ in lowering your risk of dying from any bacterium or virus. Investing in good institutions might similarly be an all-purpose-good: rather than tackling individual sources of existential risk directly, we improve conditions for tackling whatever existential risks may come our way. There are at least two reasons why higher inequality could decrease institutional capacities for longtermist public goods. First, there is some direct evidence that, whatever the causal pathway, inequality reduces institutional quality (which in turn typically leads to more inequality) (Chong and Gradstein 2007; Savoia, Easaw, and McKay 2010). Second, high inequality can lead to elite capture. Empirical work on studying political and de facto legal power is difficult, yet there is a growing consensus that high levels of inequality can lead to elite capture and thereby reduce the long-term quality of legal and political institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008; 2013; Bartels 2018; Bavel 2016; Chong and Gradstein 2007; Cummins and Rodriguez 2010; Savoia, Easaw, and McKay 2010). Further, if institutions are disproportionately geared towards elite interests, then they might be less likely to be geared towards positive longterm trajectories. We might see more rent-seeking and less investment in public goods. Moreover, if elite capture is strong enough, such capture, and the potential inequality that comes with it, can intensify going forward (Chong and Gradstein 2007). Now, one might object and wonder whether elite interests and longtermist interests will necessarily be misaligned. Could an enlightened elite not even be more longtermist than a more democratic system? Here are two potential arguments. First, wealthy donors fund a significant part of research and direct action on existential risk and longtermism (the Open Philanthropy Project, for example). Indirectly, inequality might thus reduce existential risk through such funding. Second, rich people might have a lower rate of pure time preference than less well-off people, which would make them more naturally aligned with investing in long-term causes. In response to the first argument, remember we here focus on income inequality reductions. Private funding only requires ‘enough’ wealth inequality going forward, it need not require elite capture. And reducing income inequality is unlikely to eradicate the required wealth inequality and the existence of big donors. In response to the second argument, we are somewhat sceptical that elite capture would translate a lower impatience rate into longtermist strategies in policy. A successful 14 transmission would require influence to be systematic and well-coordinated across time and, probably, across different elite actors. Yet lobbying and elite influence must often capitalise on shorter windows of opportunities, which makes well-coordinated intertemporal, and positive longtermist, policy capture less likely. Of course, such considerations are speculative. But, in any case, we think that, on balance, there are stronger reasons to believe elite capture would increase – rather than decrease – existential risk. First, elite capture often comes with rent seeking, which lowers institutional quality (Chong and Gradstein 2007). Second, industries like oil, gas, weapons and others are often concentrated and well organised in exerting influence in law and legislation. Their interests and influence overall are likely to be more short-term than longtermist. Third, recent decades have seen a shift towards a stronger shareholder value orientation in corporate governance. A common criticism of this shift is that it incentivises more short-term decisions. Accordingly, corporate influence into public institutions will likely display short-termist bias too. Finally, we can of course imagine that ‘prolongtermist elite capture’ could happen and gamble on that possibility. However, if strong democratic and legal oversight and the power to check elite influence is lost, we might struggle to reverse our gamble. Second, high inequality is likely to reduce social capital and trust (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Knack and Keefer 1997; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). Social capital and trust in public institutions in turn are important for effective public goods provision (Knack and Keefer 1997; Beugelsdijk, Groot, and Schaik 2004). Effective public goods provision, in turn, is important for (some) effective measures to reduce existential risk (and, more generally, to coordinate towards more valuable long-term trajectories). Therefore, high inequality could reduce societies’ capacities to effectively respond to large-scale challenges like existential risk. Finally, some limited direct evidence suggests societies with higher social capital and lower inequality exhibit better preventive and adaptive outcomes for environmental risks and can show greater resilience to external shocks (Bavel and Curtis 2019; Kahn 2005). For example, Matthew Kahn provides some evidence that more equal countries, when controlled for GDP, have significantly lower death rates in natural catastrophes (Kahn 2005). While smaller natural catastrophes are different from global catastrophic risk scenarios, resilience in such events might be somewhat indicative of societies’ resilience to catastrophic risks. So, good social and institutional conditions could help reduce existential risk. Consider next how, conversely, bad conditions might increase existential risk. A key driver of existential risk is conflict, both between and within nation-states (or what (Ord 2020, 175–79) calls a ‘risk factor’). Conflicts and arms races raise human-induced existential risks such as nuclear war, the outbreak of a bioengineered virus or the launch of misaligned artificial intelligence. Note that an existential catastrophe could be set in motion either purposefully or accidentally. Both are more likely during conflict. Nuclear warheads, cyberweapons, and bioweapons could all be used purposefully to attack enemy states, leading to potential global escalation. But as past nuclear incidents and close calls during the Cold War show, arms races also increase the probability of accidental catastrophes (Schlosser 2013). Esteban and Schneider find that formal and empirical evidence suggests that political and social polarization increases the risk of violent conflict, both intra-nationally and internationally (Esteban and Schneider 2008). If income inequality increases polarization, inequality may indirectly drive existential risk. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that income inequality can increase the degree of polarization between groups of citizens. Bonica et al. find that the degree of polarization within the US House of Representatives, for example, is accurately tracked by domestic income inequality, with correlation coefficients rising up to 0.95 depending on the chosen time-period (Bonica et al. 2013, 105–8). Of course, correlation does not imply causation and the correlation is likely at least partially the result of reverse causation or a confounding variable. That said, we should assign a non-negligible credence to inequality partially causing polarization. Moreover, inequality and polarisation might also play some role in getting polarising and populist candidates elected (Piketty 2018). In a preliminary analysis of US election data, Darvas and Efstathiou find that more unequal states were more likely to vote for Donald Trump, after controlling for variables such as income, race and education (Darvas and Efstathiou 2016). Populist politicians – like Trump, Bolsonaro and others – are likely bad news for existential risk reduction. They are less cooperative in delivering regional and global public goods and typically prefer riskier, and more conflictual and nationalistic policy styles.

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Populism goes nuclear

McCoy, Harrington Professor of history at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, ‘17

Alfred McCoy – Alfred McCoy is the Harrington professor of history at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. War is Boring. The Bloodstained Rise of Global Populism. . April 4, 2017. Accessed: 04/0/23. AR.

Scholar Michael Lee suggests that a populist leader succeeds by rhetorically defining his or her national community by both its supposedly “shared characteristics” and its inevitable common “enemy,” whether Mexican “rapists” or Muslim refugees, much as the Nazis created a powerful sense of national selfhood by excluding certain groups by “blood.” In addition, he argues, such movements share the desire for an “apocalyptic confrontation” through a final “mythic battle” as “the vehicle to revolutionary change.” Although scholars such as Lee emphasize the ways in which populist demagogues rely on violent rhetoric for their success, they tend to focus less on another crucial aspect of such populists globally — actual violence. These movements might still be in their relatively benign phase in the United States and Europe, but in less developed democracies around the world populist leaders haven’t hesitated to inscribe their newfound power on the battered bodies of their victims. For more than a decade, for instance, Russian president Vladimir Putin, a reasonable candidate for sparking this wave of populism, has demonstrated his famously bare-chested version of power politics by ensuring that opponents and critics meet grim ends under “mysterious” circumstances. These include the lethal spritz of polonium 210 that killed Russian secret police defector Alexander Litvinenko in London in 2006, the shooting of journalist and Putin critic Anna Politkovskaya outside her Moscow apartment that same year, a dose of rare Himalayan plant poison for banker and Putin nemesis Alexander Perepilichny in London in 2012, a fusillade that felled opposition leader Boris Nemtsov in downtown Moscow in 2015 and four fatal bullets this March for refugee whistleblower Denis Voronenkov on a Kiev sidewalk, which Ukraine has denounced as “an act of state terrorism.” As an Islamist populist, Turkish president Recep Erdogan has projected his power through a bloody repression of, and a new war with, the country’s Kurdish minority. He portrays the Kurds as a cancer within the country’s body politic whose identity must be extinguished, much as his forebears rid themselves of the Armenians. In addition, since mid-2016, he’s overseen a wholesale purge of 50,000 officials, journalists, teachers and military officers in the aftermath of a failed coup, and in a brutal round of torture and rape filled Turkish prisons to the brim. In 2014, retired general Prabowo Subianto nearly won Indonesia’s presidency with a populist campaign of “strength and order.” In fact, Prabowo’s military career had long been steeped in such violence. In 1998, when the authoritarian regime of his father-in-law Suharto was at the brink of collapse, Prabowo, then commander of the Kopassus Rangers, staged the kidnapping-disappearance of a dozen student activists, the savage rape of 168 Chinese women — acts meant to incite racial violence — and the burning of 43 shopping malls and 5,109 buildings in Jakarta, the country’s capital, that left more than 1,000 dead. During his first months in power, newly-elected Philippine president Duterte waged his highly publicized war on the drug trade in city slums by loosing the police and vigilantes nationwide in a campaign already marked, in its first six months, by at least 7,000 extrajudicial killings. The bodies of his victims were regularly dumped on Manila’s streets as warnings to others and as down payments on Duterte’s promises of a new, orderly country. And he wasn’t the first populist in Asia to take such a path either. In 2003, Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra launched his “red shirt” movement as a war on his country’s rampant methamphetamine abuse. In just three months under Thaksin’s rule, the police carried out 2,275 extrajudicial killings of suspected drug dealers and users, often leaving the bodies where they fell as a twisted tribute to his power. Such examples of populist political carnage and the likelihood of more to come — including what Trump’s presidency might have in store — raise certain questions. Just what dynamics lie behind the urge toward violence that seems to propel such movements? Why does the virulent campaign rhetoric of populist political movements so often morph into actual violence once a populist wins power? And why is that violence invariably aimed at enemies believed to threaten the imagined integrity of the national community? In their compulsion to “protect” the nation from what are seen as pernicious alien influences, such populist movements are defined by their need for enemies. That need, in turn, infuses them with an almost uncontrollable compulsion for conflict that transcends actual threats or rational political programs. To give this troubling trend its political due, it’s necessary to understand how, at a particular moment in history, global forces have produced a generation of populist leaders with such potential compulsions. And at the moment, there may be no better example to look to than The Philippines. During its last half-century of bloodstained elections, two populists, Ferdinand Marcos and Duterte, won exceptional power by combining the high politics of diplomacy with the low politics of performative violence, scattering corpses scarred by their signature brutality as if they were so many political pamphlets. A quick look at this history offers us an unsettling glimpse of America’s possible political future. Rodrigo Duterte presents a chart illustrating a drug trade network of high-level drug syndicates in The Philippines during a 2016 press conference. Photo via Wikipedia Populism in The Philippines Although now remembered mainly as a “kleptocrat” who plundered his country and enriched himself with shameless abandon — epitomized by the discovery that his wife possessed 3,000 pairs of shoes — Ferdinand Marcos was, in fact, a brilliant populist, thoroughly skilled in the symbolic uses of violence. As his legal term as president came to an end in 1972, Marcos — who, like many populists, saw himself as chosen by destiny to save his people from perdition — used the military to declare martial law. He then jailed 50,000 opponents, including the senators who had blocked his favored legislation and the gossip columnists who had mocked his wife’s pretensions. The first months of his dictatorship actually lacked any official violence. Then, just before dawn on Jan. 15, 1973, Constabulary officers read a presidential execution order and strapped Lim Seng, an overseas Chinese heroin manufacturer, to a post at a Manila military camp. As a battery of press photographers stood by, an eight-man firing squad raised their rifles. Replayed endlessly on television and in movie theaters, the dramatic footage of bullets ripping open the victim’s chest was clearly meant to be a vivid display of the new dictator’s power, as well as an appeal to his country’s ingrained anti-Chinese racism. Lim Seng would be the only victim legally executed in the 14 years of the Marcos dictatorship. Extra-judicial killings were another matter, however. Marcos made clever use of the massive U.S. military bases near Manila to win continuing support for his authoritarian and increasingly bloody rule from three successive American administrations, even effectively neutralizing Pres. Jimmy Carter’s human rights policy. After a decade of dictatorship, however, the economy began to collapse from a too-heavy dose of “crony capitalism” and the political opposition started to challenge Marcos’s self-image as destiny’s chosen one. To either sate or subdue an increasingly restive population, he soon resorted to escalating raw violence. His security squads conducted what were referred to as “salvagings,” more than 2,500 of them — or 77 percent of the 3,257 extrajudicial killings during his 14-year dictatorship. Bodies scarred by torture were regularly abandoned in public plazas or at busy intersections so passers-by could read the transcript of terror in their stigmata. In the capital, Manila, with only 4,000 police for six million residents, the Marcos regime also deputized hundreds of “secret marshals” responsible for more than 30 shoot-on-sight fatalities during May 1985, the program’s first month, alone. Yet the impact of Marcos’s version of populist violence proved mutable — effective at the start of martial law when people yearned for order and counterproductive at its close when Filipinos again longed for freedom. That shift in sentiment soon led to his downfall in the first of the dramatic “people power” revolutions that would challenge autocratic regimes from Beijing to Berlin. Flickr photo Duterte’s violence Rodrigo Duterte, the son of a provincial governor, initially pursued a career as the mayor of Davao City, a site of endemic violence that left a lasting imprint on his political persona. In 1984, after the communist New People’s Army made Davao its testing ground for urban guerilla warfare, the city’s murders soared, doubling to 800, including the assassination of 150 policemen. To check the communists, who took over part of the city, the military mobilized criminals and ex-communists as death squad vigilantes in a lethal counterterror campaign. When I visited Davao in 1987 to investigate death squad killings, that remote southern city already had an unforgettable air of desolation and hopelessness. It was in this context of rising national and local extrajudicial slaughter that the 33-year old Duterte launched his political career as the elected mayor of Davao City. That was in 1988, the first of seven terms that would keep him in office, on and off, for another 21 years until he won the country’s presidency in 2016. His first campaign was hotly contested and he barely beat his rivals, taking only 26 percent of the vote. Around 1996, he reportedly mobilized his own vigilante group, the Davao Death Squad. It would be responsible for many of the city’s 814 extrajudicial killings over the next decade, as victims were dumped on city streets with faces wrapped bizarrely in packing tape. Duterte himself may have killed one or more of the squad’s victims. Apart from liquidating criminals, the Davao Death Squad also conveniently eliminated the mayor’s political rivals. Campaigning for president in 2016, Duterte would proudly point to the killings in Davao City and promise a drug war that would murder 100,000 Filipinos if necessary. In doing so, he was also drawing on historical resonances from the Marcos era that lent some political depth to his violent rhetoric. By specifically praising Marcos, promising to finally bury his body in the National Heroes Cemetery in Manila, and supporting Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. for vice president, Duterte identified himself with a political lineage of populist strongmen epitomized by the old dictator at a time when desperate Filipinos were looking for new hope of a decent life. On taking office, Duterte promptly started his promised anti-drug campaign and dead bodies became commonplace sights on city streets nationwide, sometimes accompanied by a crude cardboard sign reading “I am a pusher,” or simply with their faces wrapped in the by-now trademark packing tape used by the Davao Death Squad. Although Human Rights Watch would declare his drug war a “calamity,” a resounding 85 percent of Filipinos surveyed were “satisfied,” apparently seeing each body sprawled on a city street as another testament to the president’s promise of order. At the same time, like Marcos, Duterte deployed a new style of diplomacy as part of his populist reach for unrestrained power. Amid rising tensions in the South China Sea between Beijing and Washington, he improved his country’s bargaining position by distancing himself from The Philippines’ classic alliance with the United States. At the 2016 ASEAN conference, reacting to Barack Obama’s criticism of his drug war, he said bluntly of the American president, “Your mother’s a whore.” A month later during a state visit to Beijing, Duterte publicly proclaimed “separation from the United States.’’ By setting aside his country’s recent slam-dunk win over China at the Court of Arbitration in the Hague in a legal dispute over rival claims in the South China Sea, Duterte came home with $24 billion in Chinese trade deals and a sense that he was helping establish a new world order. In January 2017, after his police tortured and killed a South Korean businessman on the pretext of a drug bust, he was forced to call a sudden halt to the nationwide killing spree. Like his role model Marcos, however, Duterte’s populism seems to contain an insatiable appetite for violence and so it was not long before bodies were once again being dumped on the streets of Manila, pushing the death toll past 8,000. Davao City. Photo via Wikipedia Success and the strongman The histories of these Filipino strongmen, past and present, reveal two overlooked aspects of the ill-defined phenomenon of global populism: the role of what might be termed performative violence in projecting domestic strength and a complementary need for diplomatic success to show international influence. How skillfully these critical poles of power are balanced may offer one gauge for speculating about the fate of populist strongmen in disparate parts of the globe. In Russia’s case, Putin’s projection of strength through the murder of selected domestic opponents has been matched by unchecked aggression in Georgia and Ukraine — a successful balancing act that has made his country, with its rickety economy the size of Italy’s, seem like a great power again and is likely to extend his autocratic rule into the foreseeable future. In Turkey, Erdogan’s harsh repression of ethnic and political enemies has essentially sunk his bid for entry into the European Union, plunged him into an unwinnable war with Kurdish rebels, and complicated his alliance with the United States against Islamic fundamentalism — all potential barriers to his successful bid for unchecked power. In Indonesia, Prabowo Subianto failed in his critical first step — building a domestic base large enough to sweep him into the presidency, in part because his call for order resonated so discordantly with a public still capable of remembering his earlier bid for power through eerie violence that roiled Jakarta with hundreds of rapes, fires and deaths. Without the popular support generated by his local spectacle of violence, Duterte’s de facto abrogation of his country’s claims to the South China Sea’s rich fishing grounds and oil reserves in his bid for Chinese support risks a popular backlash, a military coup, or both. For the time being, however, Duterte’s deft juxtaposition of international maneuvering and local bloodletting has made him a successful Philippine strongman with, as yet, few apparent checks on his power. While the essential weakness of the Philippine military limits Duterte’s outlets for his populist violence to the police killings of poor street drug dealers, Trump faces no such restraints. Should Congress and the courts check the virulence of his domestic attacks on Muslims, Mexicans or other imagined enemies and should his presidency run into further setbacks like the recent repeal-Obamacare humiliation, he could readily resort to violent military adventures not only in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan and Libya, but even in Iran, not to speak of North Korea, in a bid to recover his populist aura of overweening power. In this way, unlike any other potential populist politician on the planet, he holds the fate of countless millions in his much-discussed hands. If populism’s need for what scholar Michael Lee calls an “apocalyptic confrontation” and a “mythic battle” proves accurate, it might, in the end, lead the Trump administration’s “systemic revolutionaries” far beyond even their most extreme rhetoric into an endlessly escalating cycle of violence against foreign enemies, using whatever weapons are available, whether drones, special operations forces, fighter bombers, naval armadas or even nuclear weapons.

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Automation driven inequality uniquely spurs techno-populism

Hiebert, researcher @Center for International Governance Innovation, ‘22

Kyle Hiebert- professional researcher, editor and analyst with a Master's in Global Citizenship, Identities and Human Rights from the University of Nottingham. Center for International Governance Innovation. Tech-Fuelled Inequality Could Catalyze Populism 2.0. . October 19, 2022. AR.

Similar circumstances across the democratic world have provoked severe political consequences over the past decade. Disaffected populations caught on the wrong side of economic transformations and alienated by the accompanying social changes spurred by globalization have aligned themselves with populists pitching simplistic solutions to complex problems. Polarization has skyrocketed; international cooperation has frayed. As the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution accelerates in coming years, upending how economies and societies operate, a new form of populism rooted in tech-fuelled disparities may eventually consume democratic nations. To avoid this outcome, governments must get serious about harnessing new technologies to make the democratic process more agile and responsive to voters’ frustrations. The Coming Age of Disruptive Automation Since researchers at Oxford University published a landmark study in 2013 estimating that some 47 percent of total US employment was at risk of automation, fears over the prospect of mass displacements of human labour by new technologies have grown. They have also become more urgent in the wake of the pandemic. According to one assessment, the first several months of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 fast-tracked four years’ worth of digital adoption in business operations and supply chains, and seven years’ worth of investment into digital-based products. American academic Erik Brynjolfsson has noted that when it comes to technology’s job-creating potential, past trends are not necessarily guaranteed to play out in the future. “Improvements in technology can improve productivity. For most of the 20th century, those productivity increases were associated with job growth and growing wages. But there is no economic law saying that always has to be the case.” That seems to hold true when looking at the six largest tech companies in the world — Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet (Google’s parent company), Amazon, Tesla and Meta. As of early October, with a combined market valuation of nearly $8 trillion — a bit less than half the GDP of China, the world’s second-largest economy — they collectively employed just 2.25 million people, significantly less than the US federal government. And at least 1.5 million of that total comes from Amazon, which launched an ill-fated pandemic hiring binge and has routinely come under fire for poor working conditions for its staff. When it comes to digital products being created by tech companies, Beijing-based venture capitalist Kai-Fu Lee predicted in 2017 that AI would replace half of all human labour before 2030. That same year, a report by the McKinsey Global Institute appeared to corroborate Lee’s ominous forecast. After analyzing 2,000 different work responsibilities across 800 different job roles, McKinsey suggested “about half the activities people are paid almost US$15 trillion in wages to do in the global economy have the potential to be automated by adapting currently demonstrated technology.” While only five percent of the occupations analyzed by McKinsey could, in theory, disappear entirely, technological progress has accelerated. Clearly, some jobs are in greater jeopardy than others. The positions most susceptible to automation are based on physical activities in highly structured and predictable environments, or the collection and processing of data, say the report’s authors. Among those most vulnerable are low-skilled positions in manufacturing, hospitality and retail commerce. The report claims that “technical, economic and social factors will determine the pace and extent of automation,” but that half of contemporary work activity could be automated by 2055, possibly even as soon as 2035. Others offer a more upbeat assessment, saying AI and automation will create more jobs than they threaten by producing future occupations yet to be imagined. Analysis published in October 2020 by the World Economic Forum — several months after the pandemic was declared, once companies had had time to evaluate the need and opportunities for increased automation — predicted that by 2025, “a shift in the division of labour between humans and machines” might eliminate 85 million jobs, while also creating 97 million new ones. Such positions would see work functions split more evenly between humans, machines and algorithms; machines would handle more physical tasks while algorithms could simplify and augment human-based inputs and decision-making processes. However, while 12 million net new jobs sounds positive, context is important. Ensuring that workers displaced by technology can avoid joblessness by transitioning to new roles will require re-skilling on an enormous scale, at a considerable cost and in an ever-shrinking window of time. For comparison, governments have so far mostly failed in producing credible plans for a “just transition” for a much smaller and more predictable number of fossil fuel workers poised to lose out as the world shifts to alternative energy sources. A decrease in human labour’s share of work responsibilities could also suppress wage growth. Another sector ripe for disruption by automation is transportation, which accounts for approximately 29 workers per 1,000 people in the European Union. Trucking could be hit particularly hard, affecting more than 2.2 million drivers in the United States and hundreds of thousands of workers in Canada. Self-driving vehicles in the freight industry are already being road-tested, with proponents saying autonomous trucks will not only be safer but also reduce shipping operator costs by 40 percent due to not having to hire a human driver. The vast majority of those human drivers, according to labour market research company Zippia, are white males over 48 years old with lower levels of education. Truck-driving is also the highest-paid “low-skilled” large labour segment remaining in the North American economy. Elsewhere, large AI language models, systems that understand and generate text, will eventually compete for millions of low-skilled jobs involving a range of customer support services. Existing models can already provide strikingly accurate and original responses to human interaction — so much so that Google researcher Blake Lemoine caused widespread alarm this past June by claiming that a chatbot based on Google’s LaMDA model had become sentient. Lemoine was later let go by the company. The capabilities of LaMDA and its rivals, such as OpenAI’s GPT-3 — which wrote an op-ed for The Guardian in September 2020 — and Meta’s free version, OPT-175B, will expand exponentially as they incorporate audiovisual material into their data training sets. Right now, these training sets consist only of huge troves of text scoured from across the internet. Moreover, user-friendly machine-learning models such as OpenAI’s Dall-E and those from Midjourney AI are producing increasingly sophisticated computer-generated art and illustrations, while others are generating music. Both will likely eliminate career opportunities in the creative industries. The impacts of technology will also upset social relations in other ways that can exacerbate culture wars and grievance politics. For example, cloud computing and better virtual reality for use in business meetings will provide white-collar workers with ever-greater job flexibility, just as climate change renders blue-collar jobs much more dangerous. This may entrench the sort of contentious digital divide and risk imbalance experienced between office staff and front-line workers during the pandemic. Meanwhile, consumer biotechnology will enable the well-educated and wealthy to live longer, healthier lives that will extend their working careers, possibly narrowing opportunities for young people and new graduates. At the same time, wider adoption of pre-crime and predictive policing tools could aggravate the discrimination and stigmatization already felt within disadvantaged communities. Policies that successfully attract tens of thousands of skilled immigrants to plug labour gaps in the tech sector could inflate local housing prices. Many thinkers are also already confronting questions about when and how — not if — intelligent machines could be granted some equivalent to human rights. In his book Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow, Israeli historian Yuval Noah Harari extrapolates even further. He posits that if this century’s technological advances — and the quasi-religious zeal attached to those gains — mean citizens in liberal democracies eventually cede much of their military and economic usefulness to robots and algorithms, the political system “will stop attaching much value to them.” The result, according to Harari, would be an erosion of the core liberal belief that each human, as an individual, holds intrinsic value and deserves to exercise choice through democratic elections and free markets. Should these scenarios come true, they are likely to worsen the already growing bifurcation within democratic politics — a split between those who believe in open economies and societies, and those seeking primacy for their chosen social and political tribes. The prolonged, uneven fallout of the 2008 financial crisis has already catapulted populist leaders with zero-sum ideologies to various levels of office in democratic nations across the world. Populism Reinvented The prolonged, uneven fallout of the 2008 financial crisis has already catapulted populist leaders with zero-sum ideologies to various levels of office in democratic nations across the world. Everywhere, their base of support is comprised of voters demanding retribution against an undefined set of “elites” perceived as clinging unfairly to the top of the socioeconomic ladder. Indeed, the meritocracy and promise of social mobility that have historically underpinned liberal democracies seem to be faltering. In 2017, Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist Peter Temin laid out an argument that escaping poverty in America takes 20 years of effort combined with uninterrupted good luck. Income inequality among member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development prior to the pandemic was already at its highest levels in five decades, much of it due to the disappearance of middle-class job opportunities. More recently, a report from the UN Development Programme released in September warned that “in a stunning first,” cascading global crises had so impacted life expectancies, education levels and quality of life worldwide that its Human Development Index — a broad country-by-country measurement of human progress — had declined for two years in a row, a change equivalent to “erasing the gains of the preceding five years.” The latest annual World Inequality Report, produced by the Paris-based World Inequality Lab, sheds light on where these losses are being felt (and perceived) the most — the middle and working classes of wealthy nations. The past two decades of globalization have narrowed inequality between rich countries and the developing nations, while simultaneously increasing inequality within countries themselves. “This sharp rise in within country inequalities has meant that despite economic catch-up and strong growth in emerging countries, the world remains particularly unequal today. It also means that inequalities within countries are now even greater than the significant inequalities observed between countries.” The resulting angst is being channelled into democratic societies in visible and distressing ways — from online conspiracies and extremism to the embrace of political violence and victimhood as a source of identity and personal meaning. In short, many people in the Western world in particular are increasingly unable to deal with the dissonance between their subjective expectations for their lives and the objective material realities they must contend with. In 2022, the legacies of pandemic lockdowns and vaccine mandates, combined with a global energy crisis and red-hot inflation eating away at individuals’ purchasing power, are breathing new life into populist movements. And different types of tech-focused populists are emerging to harness this maelstrom of inequality, rage and technological advancement as a pathway to power. Among them are Republican Missouri Senator Josh Hawley, author of a book entitled The Tyranny of Big Tech. In vowing to “fight to recover America’s populist democracy,” Hawley epitomizes a growing number of ideologues and reactionaries, on the far right and far left both, who instinctively point to Google, Amazon, Facebook and Twitter as the cause of a whole range of modern ills, no matter how tenuous the connection. Conversely, the new leader of Canada’s opposition Conservative Party, Pierre Poilievre, has embraced technology’s potential for circumventing established institutions. An outspoken ally of the so-called “freedom convoy” that drew international attention for its weeks-long occupation of downtown Ottawa earlier this year, Poilievre won the Conservative leadership contest by a record margin by promising to make Canada the “freest country on Earth” via downsizing government and eliminating “gatekeepers.” This included Poilievre’s pledge to fire the governor of the Bank of Canada, which he made while avidly promoting cryptocurrencies because, he says, “Canada needs less financial control for politicians and bankers and more financial freedom for the people.” (Poilievre has noticeably toned down his public comments around cryptocurrencies after their recent crash.) However, while leaders of populist movements routinely rail against the excesses of government while in opposition, once they’re elected, manipulating the levers of state power tends to become central to executing their broader agenda. In that light, tech-savvy populists may eventually look to emulate the “techno-authoritarianism” of Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro, or of India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, whose Hindu nationalist government has been accused of encouraging citizens’ enrolment in India’s voluntary biometric ID system — the world’s largest, known as Aadhaar — as a means of gathering information needed to enact exclusionary populist policies that favour Modi’s Hindu nationalist base.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***1AC Core*** › 1AC Advantage – Inequality

Must adjust for automation or inequality will continue to rise

Peter Dizikes- writer at the MIT News Office, ‘23 MIT Technology Review. Automation drives income inequality. . February 21, 2023. Accessed: 06/15/23. AR.

When you use self-checkout machines in supermarkets and drugstores, you are probably not—with all due respect—doing a better job of bagging your purchases than checkout clerks once did. But such automation lets employers cut spending on labor in a way that has contributed significantly to income inequality in the US. A new study coauthored by MIT economist Daron Acemoglu estimates just how much: replacing workers with technology “explains 50 to 70%” of the increase in inequality from 1980 to about 2016. Acemoglu and coauthor Pascual Restrepo, PhD ’16, looked at US Bureau of Economic Analysis statistics on the extent to which human labor was used in 49 industries from 1987 to 2016—as well as data on machinery and software adopted in that time—alongside Census Bureau metrics on worker outcomes for roughly 500 demographic subgroups, broken out by gender, education, age, race and ethnicity, and immigration status. They concluded that since 1980, automation has reduced the wages of men without a high school degree by 8.8% and women without a high school degree by 2.3%, adjusted for inflation. Incomes for people with college and postgraduate degrees have risen substantially during that period. Moreover, they say that although these specific innovations have been good for the corporate bottom line, they have not yielded much in the way of productivity gains that would improve overall quality of life. “These are controversial findings in the sense that they imply a much bigger effect for automation than anyone else has thought,” Acemoglu says.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***1AC Core*** › 1AC Advantage – Inequality

UBI increases labor diversification

Matt Zwolinski, associate professor of philosophy at the University of San Diego, September 28, 2015, “Our welfare system insults the poor. Basic income could do better.”The Washington Post, . Accessed 05/14/23. AR

A basic income program that replaces in-kind transfers like food stamps or Medicaid with a simple, universal cash grant would not only provide more effective aid to the poor, it would provide that aid in a manner more consistent with the values of human dignity and responsibility. The efficiency argument on behalf of cash grants is straightforward: unlike in-kind benefits, people can use cash on whatever they need the most. If what they need is food, they can use the cash they’re given on groceries—and they’re no worse off than if they had received food stamps. But if what they need is something else—to pay their rent, or an overdue utility bill, or maybe even to save a little for the future—then cash is much better. As long as we assume that people know more (and care more) about their own needs than the government does, the case for cash over in-kind benefits is powerful. Cash is flexible. Cash is freedom. This isn’t just theory. There is a growing body of empirical evidence showing that the poor use the freedom cash provides to make real improvements in their lives. From the Bolsa Familia program in Brazil, to cash grants in Uganda and Mexico, we’ve seen that poor people who are given cash grants typically use the money responsibly: purchasing basic necessities and trying to generate sustainable streams of revenue. Those benefits often add up to real, long-term improvements in health and educational outcomes.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***1AC Core*** › 1AC Advantage – Inequality

Rapid widespread labor automation is inevitable – basic income key to a smooth transition for anyone who depends on their job

Kelly, RMIT University in Melbourne, ‘22

Kelly, Lauren. School of Media and Communication, RMIT University, Melbourne Australia, “Re-politicising the future of work: Automation anxieties, universal basic income, and the end of techno-optimism.” Journal of Sociology, 0(0). . October 9, 2022. Accessed: 06/15/23. AR.

Predicting the technological future of work is back on the academic agenda, exemplified by the swathe of influential literature published on the subject since the mid-2010s (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; Ford, 2015; Frey & Osborne, 2013; Kaplan, 2015; Schwab, 2016; Susskind & Susskind, 2015). While history has often been punctuated by concerns of technological job loss (Gorz, 1999; Keynes, 1930; Leontief & Duchin, 1986; Rifkin, 1995), it is now argued that this time it’s different due to advances in particular technologies – namely robotics, big data, and artificial intelligence. The rise of smart machines and automated decision-making technologies now threatens non-routine, professional, and even creative occupations that were, until recently, considered immune to automation. Assumptions of inevitable job loss are widespread and reproduced through the policy recommendations of international organisations, influential consultancy firms, and government white papers.

2023 GDI Disadvantage
Coercion Aff › Redistribution Good- AT: Nozick

Redistribution doesn’t contradict Nozick’s theory

Davis, University of Michigan philosophy Ph.D professor, 1987

[Michael, April 1987, University for Chicago Press Journals, “Nozick's Argument for the Legitimacy of the Welfare State,” https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2381180.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A35ab6a2895de520e9a3d22aba3d96fcb&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=, July 3 2023, ah]

We are now ready for "Nozick's" justification of the welfare state. The "minimal state" consists of two sorts of subjects, those who have joined the "protective association" and now receive full protection, what we may call "full members," and those who, though protected by the association from what its full members might do to them, have not yet joined, what we may call "second-class members." For Nozick, a justification of the welfare state must describe how both sorts of members might move from the "minimal state" to something like the "maximal state" we know without supposing either the state's violation of their rights or their foolhardy donation of liberty, a story more plausible than Nozick's "demoktesis"