2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Aff – UBI › AT: Money Printing CP › 2AC---Progressive Taxes Good
Nezih Guner et al 23, researcher at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, associated to CEPR and IZA. 6-24-2023, "'With a proportional income tax, the best universal basic income can be more generous'," Le Monde,
The current transfers in the US take various forms: wage subsidies, per-child transfers, food vouchers, childcare subsidies, housing assistance, or direct cash transfers, all targeted at households with no or low earnings. For some demographic groups, such as single mothers, transfers represent a significant source of income. Transfers and other government expenditures are financed by different forms of taxation, but mainly by a progressive income tax.
Proportional income tax
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Aff – UBI › AT: Money Printing CP › 1AR---Inflation Turn
Jon Miltimore 22, previously served in editorial roles at The History Channel magazine, Intellectual Takeout, and Scout. 11-8-2022, "Kevin O’Leary on Inflation: You Printed $7 Trillion in 30 Months. What Did you Think Would Happen?," FEE Stories,
While it’s true that Putin and Biden deserve some blame—particularly in terms of high energy prices—there seems to be an unspoken bipartisan consensus to ignore the elephant in the room: the Federal Reserve’s unprecedented money printing.
One person not playing the game is Kevin O’Leary, the Canadian entrepreneur and investor who regularly appears on ABC’s Shark Tank. While speaking to journalist Daniela Cambone, O’Leary bluntly explained why Americans are experiencing the highest inflation in generations.
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Aff – UBI › AT: Money Printing CP › 1AR---Inflation Turn
Ryan A. Hughes 23, Founder and Portfolio Manager at Bull Oak Capital, 1/27/23, “Universal Basic Income is a Bad Idea,” https://bulloakcapital.com/blog/universal-basic-income-is-a-bad-idea/
In other words, if the nation’s printing press produces money at a greater rate than its economy can produce, the result will be higher inflation levels. Printing an extra $3.8T yearly will surely cause inflation to roar. If our irresponsible fiscal spending habits during 2020 and 2021 taught us anything, it is that handing out money to anybody and everybody does not contribute to low inflation levels.
CONCLUSION
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Aff – UBI › AT: Money Printing CP › 2AC---Inflation Turn
Zilvinas Silenas 20, President of the Foundation for Economic Education (FEE). 5-19-2020, "What Weimar Germany Teaches Us about Universal Basic Income," FEE Stories, https://fee.org/articles/what-weimar-germany-teaches-us-about-universal-basic-income/
If your high school history teacher skipped this story, here's a bullet-point recap:
Germany lost World War I in 1918.
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Aff – UBI › AT: States CP › 1AR---Balanced Budget Amendment
Joe Stone 14, Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Oregon, PhD, Economics, Michigan State University, M.A., Economics, Michigan State University, July 20 (“Do balanced-budget rules increase growth?” https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57605/13/MPRA_paper_57605.pdf)
VI. DISCUSSION Given the regression estimates in Table (2), we are now in a position to discuss whether or not BBRs change the effect of debt on growth, and if so, how. The significantly positive coefficient for the ACIR-debt interaction suggests that the answer to the first question is ‘yes’: more stringent BBRs make debt more productive, consistent with the WW view that these rules increase the productiveness of debt by restricting borrowing to productive public infrastructure. This effect could work either directly through the greater productivity of investments in public infrastructure or more indirectly by assuring lenders that future borrowing will be limited to public infrastructure, resulting in lower costs of borrowing. Both channels are consistent with the evidence in Alt and Lowry (1997) and others that borrowing costs are lower for states with more stringent budget rules. How large is the effect of BBRs on the productivity of debt in terms of growth? With no BBR in place (i.e., with an ACIR index of zero) and evaluated at sample means, the coefficients in Table (2) indicate that a one standard-deviation increase in the stock of debt (an increase of 5.6 percent of personal income) decreases the steady-state (five-year) growth rate by 17.4 percent of real income—just over 3 percent per year. However, with a strict BBR in place (i.e., with an ACIR index of 10), the coefficients predict instead an increase in the steady-state (fiveyear) growth rate of about 15 percent for a one-standard-deviation increase in debt. VII. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS Evidence elsewhere indicates that balanced-budget rules [BBRs] lower borrowing costs and restrain levels of state and local debt. Our evidence also indicates that high levels of debt can slow growth, but our unique contribution is to provide an arguably well-identified test of the hypothesis that state-level balanced-budget restrictions [BBRs] in the U. S. increase growth by restricting borrowing to productive public infrastructure. Evidence that state balanced-budget restrictions increase growth via this channel provides the first formal test of the WW hypothesis and adds a new perspective to the effects of balanced-budget rules by suggesting that the benefits of tax smoothing and fiscal flexibility (permitted in the absence of a balanced-budget restriction) may come at the expense of lower growth. We close however, with caveats; we provide evidence relevant to the WW hypothesis, not a comprehensive analysis of the merits of balanced-budget and other fiscal restrictions. In particular, the context for fiscal policy differs in obvious and important ways for countries and sub-national states. Auerbach (2007) for example, analyzes federal fiscal policy ‘rules’ and issues for recent decades.
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Aff – UBI › AT: States CP › 1AR---AT: State Taxes
Melissa Hellmann 22, The Center for Public Integrity, 9/14/22, “How state taxes make inequality worse,” https://publicintegrity.org/podcasts/integrity-out-loud/taxes-inequality-worse-progressive-tax/
All but a handful of states make poor residents contribute a greater share of their income to taxes than wealthy people do. Economists call that upside-down approach “regressive.” Nationwide, the share the lowest-income earners pay to state and local taxes is 54% higher than what the top earners pay, according to the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy.
And those policies hit communities of color the hardest.
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Aff – UBI › AT: States CP › 1AR---Budget Deficit
Stephanie Cutler 19 graduated from Duke University in May 2021 with a bachelor's degree in Public Policy and Visual and Media Studies, with; Brennan Zook graduated from Duke University in 2021 with a degree in Public Policy, Political Science, and an Arts Innovation & Entrepreneurship Certificate, *Elijah Williams is a graduate of Duke University and current Enterprise Associate Account Executive at Amazon Web Services (AWS); “Universal Basic Income and Job Guarantees: Feasible or Unrealistic?” https://sites.duke.edu/policylab/files/2019/10/Brockman-UBI-Job-Guarantee-Memo.pdf
Universal Basic Income: Universal Basic Income (UBI) offers potential on a national level, but currently is not sustainable at the state level to address unemployment and poverty. It is intended to be an individual, unconditional, and frequent payment, in order to counter job-loss from automation.11 Traditional UBI policy lacks means-based testing or work requirements typical in welfare policy.
Barrier: State-Level Funding
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Aff – UBI › AT: States CP › 1AR---Budget Deficit
Robyn Sundlee 19, research fellow at the USC Annenberg Center on Communication Leadership and Policy, 2019, “Alaska’s Universal Basic Income Problem,” https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/9/5/20849020/alaska-permanent-fund-universal-basic-income
For decades, Hammond’s system was an unprecedented success. But in 2015, plunging oil prices created major shortfalls in the state’s budget. In response, then-Gov. Bill Walker deviated from the traditional PFD formula and reduced the value of the check for 2016. Doing so allowed the government to continue funding state services and ensured the sustainability of the fund. Instead of a check for $2,052, as they would have received with the traditional formula, Alaskans that year got a comparatively paltry $1,022.
In 2018, Republican state Sen. Mike Dunleavy saw an opportunity. Despite traditional Republican aversions to handouts, Dunleavy ran for governor on the campaign platform of increasing the PFD. He promised every resident up to $6,700, to make up for Walker’s cuts in 2016 and 2017 — though he was foggy on how the state could pay.
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Aff – UBI › AT: States CP › 2AC---AT: States CP
Jonathan Rodden 11, Professor, Department of Political Science, W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, (“Market Discipline and U.S. Federalism,” in Peter Conti-Brown and David Skeel, eds., When States Go Broke: Origins, Context, and Solutions for the American States in Fiscal Crisis, Cambridge University Press, July 2011, https://web.stanford.edu/~jrodden/rodden_chapter_final.pdf
The states typically adjust to revenue downturns rather quickly, and most likely because of their balanced budget rules, they do not smooth expenditures over the business cycle through borrowing. In fact, the revenues and expenditures of the U.S. states are both extremely pro-cyclical. Negative revenue shocks are met with rapid expenditure cuts (Rodden and Wibbels 2010). In the most recent downturns, these cuts have been so severe as to almost completely offset the impact of any federal government attempts at fiscal stimulus (see Aizenman and Pasricha 2011).
Empirical studies suggest that the balanced budget rules that emerged in the 1840s are an important part of the explanation for cross-state variation in the speed of adjustment (e.g. Poterba 1995). While states have devised a variety of tricks and gimmicks to circumvent their balanced budget requirements, including delaying payments into the next fiscal year and underfunding pensions, these rules are probably part of the explanation for the fact that as a share of gross state product, general obligation bond debts of the states have been modest throughout the 20th century.
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Aff – UBI › AT: States CP › 2AC---AT: States CP
Liz Farmer 23, Route Fifty, 4/4/23, “As States Plan for Next Year’s Budget, the Economy Flashes Mixed Signals,” https://www.route-fifty.com/finance/2023/04/states-plan-next-years-budget-economy-flashes-mixed-signals/384784/
But there are signs that the slowdown policymakers keep planning for is getting closer. Recent data from the Urban Institute indicates that state revenue growth, when adjusted for inflation, has started to stall. While sales tax revenue growth has remained strong, income tax revenue is sliding more than expected. Moreover, since the start of this year, the stock market has fallen roughly 5%, tech companies have laid off thousands of workers and the ramifications of Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse are still playing out.
Now, a more mixed picture of state fiscal health is starting to emerge as some states are managing shortfalls even as others report record surpluses.
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Aff – UBI › AT: Topicality › 1AR---WM---UBI = Redistributive
Michalis Nikiforos 17, PhD in Economics, Levy Institute research scholar working in the State of the US and World Economies Program, with; Marshall Steinbaum and Gennaro Zezza; August 2017, “Modeling the Macroeconomic Effects of a Universal Basic Income,” https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RI-Macroeconomic-Effects-of-UBI-201708.pdf
The Levy model is a purely macro model: it contains aggregate economic actors and treats them as individuals. For example, the “household sector” is one large household, the “corporate sector” is one large firm, and the “government” is one unitary organization that conducts both fiscal and monetary policy. This is standard in the macroeconomics literature but is not necessarily well suited to study the effect of a UBI on the macroeconomy, because a UBI inherently affects the distribution of income among households. If the distribution of income matters for macroeconomic outcomes—and there is reason to think that it does—then a policy like UBI that alters the distribution of income among households needs to be interpreted in light of a distributional model in order to forecast its macroeconomic effect. We thus modify the basic model with adjustments for heterogeneity in income taxes paid and in propensity to consume across households, both of which (we show) are relevant to forecasting the macroeconomic impact of UBI.
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Aff – UBI › AT: Topicality › 2AC---AT: T - No UBI
David Coady 20, social spending expert in the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department, with; Nghia-Piotr Le; June 2020, “Designing Fiscal Redistribution: The Role of Universal and Targeted Transfers,” IMF Working Paper
Although increasing income inequality has been observed in many countries, the varying experiences across countries, with inequality even decreasing in a sizeable share of countries, suggests that public policy and institutions play and important role in determining such outcomes.2 In this respect, fiscal redistribution (i.e., the transfer of income from higher to lower income households via tax and transfer schemes) has a key role to play in addressing income inequality. For instance, evidence from studies of fiscal redistribution shows that over threequarters of the difference in average disposable income inequality between advanced and Latin American countries (with the lowest and highest average disposable income inequality, respectively) is accounted for by differences in the extent of fiscal redistribution rather than by differences in market incomes (Bastagli, Coady and Gupta, 2015).
This paper focuses on the design of fiscal redistribution through income taxes and transfers in advanced and developing countries.3 In particular, it focuses on the growing debate on the relative merits of universal and targeted social assistance transfers in achieving income redistribution objectives (Atkinson, 2015; Brown, Ravallion, and van de Walle, 2017; Gentilini et al., 2020). It argues that the fixation of the policy debate on the narrow targeting of transfers to lower-income groups (i.e., avoiding leakage of transfers to higher-income groups) in large part reflects an unbalanced framing of the issue with an undesirably narrow focus on the transfer side of fiscal redistribution neglecting the potential redistributive role of taxes. It also reflects an overly narrow focus on incentive (or efficiency) costs with insufficient attention to the administrative, social and political costs of targeting that in practice affect the feasible set of redistributive taxes and transfers available to governments and which need to be balanced against efficiency costs.
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Aff – UBI › AT: Topicality › 2AC---AT: T - No UBI
Mohammad Rasoolinejad 21, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Northwestern University Kellogg School of Management, 2021, “Universal Basic Income: The Last Bullet in the Darkness,” https://arxiv.org/pdf/1910.05658.pdf
As mentioned in the last section, the traditional monetary easing and asset purchasing barely 3 introduced any inflation as most of the money got absorbed by financial markets and increased the wealth of the wealthy. UBI, on the other hand, does not treat the wealthy differently and is fair to everybody, as each person receives the same amount of money. The same payment increases more the wealth of the poor and middle class in relative terms. So, in a deflationary or low-inflation environment (which might be caused by wealth disparity itself), the equal UBI payment to everybody tends to decrease the wealth disparity and Gini coefficient. The new Gini coefficient is calculated as:
G new = M3 M3 + U G old (1)
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Aff – UBI › Automation Advantage › 1AR---XT: Plan Solves---SNAP Fails
Joseph Llobrera 21, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 7/15/21, “More Adequate SNAP Benefits Would Help Millions of Participants Better Afford Food,” https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/more-adequate-snap-benefits-would-help-millions-of-participants-better
Despite the program’s success, millions of people across the United States, including roughly half of all households participating in SNAP, were food insecure even before the pandemic. (Food insecurity is a lack of consistent access to enough food to support an active, healthy life.) Food hardships grew at an alarming rate as the pandemic’s economic effects took hold, disproportionately affecting households with children and people of color. The number of households reporting in Census Bureau data that they had trouble getting enough to eat spiked in the spring of 2020 and rose further in the fall. Despite improvements in early 2021 since the peak in December 2020, levels of food hardship remain much higher than pre-pandemic levels.
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Aff – UBI › Automation Advantage › 2AC---AT: Horse-Trading DA
Michael D. Tanner 19, CATO Institute, 3/23/19, “Universal Basic Income Might Fix Our Broken Welfare System — Give It the Serious, Scholarly Debate It Deserves,” https://www.cato.org/commentary/universal-basic-income-might-fix-our-broken-welfare-system-give-it-serious-scholarly
A UBI has several things to recommend it over traditional welfare.
First, a UBI would be far simpler and more transparent than the current hodgepodge of more than 100 existing federal and state programs. With overlapping and often contradictory eligibility levels, work requirements and other restrictions, our existing welfare system is a nightmare of unaccountability.
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Aff – UBI › Econ Advantage › 1AR---AT: Taxes Collapse
Seidman 13 [Laurence Seidman Professor of Economics University of Delaware November 2013 http://lerner.udel.edu/sites/default/files/ECON/PDFs/RePEc/dlw/WorkingPapers/2014/UDWP2014-02.pdf]
Here is a rough estimate of how much the new earmarked taxes would need to be as a percent of GDP. Today U.S. medical costs are 18% of GDP while no other country exceeds 12%. Suppose Medicare for All aims to cut the huge 6 percentage point gap in half to 3%, so that U.S. medical costs are 15% of GDP. If Medicare for All succeeds in using its single-payer bargaining power (as explained below) to achieve its medical cost target of 15% of GDP, then Medicare for All taxes would need to be 15% of GDP. Government (federal and state) spending on Medicare, Medicaid, and other government health programs is currently about 7% of GDP (U.S. Congressional Budget Office 2012), so new earmarked taxes would need to be roughly 8% of GDP. To put this 8% of GDP number in perspective, in 2007 (before the Great Recession caused a plunge in tax revenue), U.S. taxes (federal, state, and local) were about 30% of GDP. Thus, taxes would rise by 8% of GDP from 30% to 38% (federal taxes would rise by 9.5% of GDP while state taxes would fall by 1.5% of GDP due to the reduction in state Medicaid expenses), which would still leave U.S. taxes as a percent of GDP slightly lower than the average of the economically advanced OECD countries (roughly 40%) and far below the Scandinavian countries (roughly 50%). At the same time, U.S. medical costs would be 3% of GDP lower every year (15% instead of 18% of GDP) so goods and services other than medical care would be 3% of GDP higher every year (85% instead of 82% of GDP). Each year Americans would enjoy 3% of GDP more goods and services other than medical care while still having the highest medical care spending in the world (15% of GDP when all other countries spend 12% of GDP or less). Medicare for All would have to bargain over prices and budget caps with medical providers in order to keep Medicare for All spending from exceeding the earmarked revenues it collects. If a gap occurs, Congress would have to bridge the gap by either raising earmarked taxes or reducing medical prices and budget caps. Once Medicare for All taxes are in place, political resistance to raising the rates of these earmarked taxes would help contain the rise in medical costs under Medicare for All. Would the efficiency cost imposed by increasing the tax burden from 30 to 38 percent of GDP be large or small? A huge literature by economists addresses this question, and I make no attempt to review that literature here. I will cite just one economist’s empirical work here that has influenced my own thinking, while acknowledging that not all economists agree with his empirical results. In his monograph on social spending and economic growth in economically advanced countries over the past three centuries, Peter Lindert (2004, p16-17) wrote: “Knowing that higher tax rates and higher subsidies to people who don’t produce could discourage productivity, many of us naturally suspect that taxes and transfers should reduce the productivity of the whole economy…Yet the history of economic growth is unkind to this natural suspicion…Nine decades of historical experience fail to show that transferring a larger share of GDP from taxpayers to transfer recipients has a negative correlation with either the level or rate of growth of GDP per person. The average correlation is essentially zero.” Lindert then gave his explanation (p31): “In general, high-budget welfare states have a more pro-growth and regressive mix of taxes…They rely more heavily on labor income taxes and flat consumption (or value-added) taxes…Granted, the rates of overall taxation are still higher in the high-budget countries, yet their attention to the side-effects on economic growth seems to have led them to choose types of taxes that minimize or eliminate any damage to growth.”
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Aff – UBI › Econ Advantage › 2AC---AT: Taxes
Noah Smith 17, Bloomberg; 7/26/17; A Wealth Tax Looks Like It Can Make a Country Richer; https://www.bloombergquint.com/opinion/2016/07/25/a-wealth-tax-looks-like-it-can-make-a-country-richer
(Bloomberg View) -- Standard economic theory says that taxation reduces productivity. If you tax income, you reduce the incentive to work. If you tax capital gains, you reduce the incentive to invest, and so on. When you discourage useful economic activity, the economy becomes less efficient.
But what if it were possible to impose taxes in a way that also increased productivity? That’s the promise of a clever new theory by economists Daphne Chen, Fatih Guvenen, Gueorgui Kambourov and Burhanettin Kuruscu.
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Aff – UBI › Econ Advantage › 2AC---AT: Taxes
Kate Davidson 17, covers the Federal Reserve and U.S. economy from the Wall Street Journal's Washington bureau, 10-1-2017, "The Link Between Economic Growth and Tax Cuts Is Tenuous ," WSJ, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-link-between-economic-growth-and-tax-cuts-is-tenuous-1506873601
The Trump administration and congressional Republicans are counting on an overhaul of the U.S. tax code to rev up the anemic U.S. economic growth rate. History suggests that isn’t a sure outcome. John F. Kennedy, a Democrat, in 1963 proposed and Lyndon Johnson, also a Democrat, in 1964 signed into a law a cut in the top tax rate from 91% to 70% and a slightly lower corporate tax rate. Economic output expanded at a swift 4.7% rate for the rest of the decade. Republican Ronald Reagan signed a tax cut into law in 1981 and later reduced the corporate tax rate, and economic output expanded at 3.8% for the rest of the decade. Those examples suggest a strong connection between tax cuts and growth. Other examples cut the other way. George H.W. Bush, a Republican, and then Bill Clinton, a Democrat, advanced increases in the top tax rate that became effective in 1991 and 1993, and U.S. output nevertheless expanded at a robust 4.1% annual rate for the rest of the 1990s. George W. Bush, a Republican, cut taxes in 2001 and 2003, and growth expanded at an anemic 1.7% rate for the rest of the decade. And back in the 1950s, when a top rate of 91% prevailed, the economy nevertheless expanded at a steaming 4.5% annual rate. Joel Slemrod, a University of Michigan economics professor and co-author of the book, “Taxing Ourselves,” a study of tax-policy changes over time, looked all the way back to the 1870s and found a tenuous connection between economic growth rates and taxes. He also found tenuous connections when comparing tax and growth between countries. For example, output per person in Sweden, a high-tax country, grew faster between 1970 and 2012 than in Switzerland, a relatively low-tax country, during the same period. Turkey, a low tax country, didn’t keep up with Luxembourg, a relatively high tax country, during the same period. “It’s really hard to just look at countries’ growth rates over time, relate that to what their tax rates and structures are, and say, ‘Ah, here’s the silver bullet,’ ” said Mr. Slemrod. One complicating factor is the interplay between taxes, interest rates and growth. The U.S. economy boomed in the 1980s in part because the Federal Reserve beat down inflation with high interest rates and then, after a deep recession, cut interest rates aggressively. In the 1990s, interest rates were held down by a worker-productivity boom that helped to keep inflation lower than the Fed expected. Tax and deficit policies can directly affect the level of interest rates and growth. In the 1990s, for example, U.S. policy makers counted on deficit cuts to keep interest rates low and spur economic growth. Some economists say big deficits, by pushing up public debt, crowd out private investment and growth. Some warn that deficit increases now could spur the Fed to raise interest rates faster than expected, potentially offsetting some of the benefits of lower tax rates. Economists generally agree tax cuts that aren’t offset by a decrease in government spending will boost the deficit. “Can tax cuts pay for themselves? The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that this is not true,” Mr. Slemrod said. “If it takes a modest deficit to get really good tax policy, I suppose that’s fine,” said Columbia Business School dean Glenn Hubbard, former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under George W. Bush. “If it were a gigantic deficit I don’t think that would be fine at all.” The Trump administration is aiming for a 3% growth rate, compared with the 1.9% rate that has prevailed since 2000. Many factors affect a nation’s economic growth rate. The productivity of the workforce—driven not just by policy change in Washington but also by innovations like the internet and the education of workers—is critical. When productivity boomed in the 1990s, it spurred growth, and when it slowed in the 2000s, it held growth back. Labor-force participation is also key. The 1970s, a decade marred by high inflation and slowing productivity, nevertheless produced a 3.4% growth rate, which was better than the 2000s, because baby boomers and women joined the workforce in droves. The key to effective tax policy is thus whether it can drive productivity and labor-force participation higher. Lower income-tax rates in theory should increase labor-market participation because it means individuals get a bigger after-tax payoff from working. That is offset to some degree because it means individuals also don’t need to work as many hours to keep their after-tax income and standard-of-living level stable. The net effect of individual-tax-rate reductions on participation seems to be modestly positive. Raj Chetty, a Stanford University professor, found that a 10% increase in after-tax wages led to a 4% increase in hours worked. Matthew Shapiro, another Michigan economics professor, said tax-policy changes can have important short-run effects on business investment as well, but the effects tended to fade over time. “Most changes are fairly temporary, and there’s a big incentive to take advantage of those temporary changes,” he said. In other words, firms might shift investment plans forward to take advantage of a temporary change. The impact of permanent changes to the tax code lasted longer but were less pronounced, Mr. Shapiro said.
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Aff – UBI › Econ Advantage › 2AC---AT: Jobs Turn
Andrew V. Kennedy 23, artist and writer, 4/4/23, “AI Is About to Decimate Millions of Jobs. It's Time for Universal Basic Income | Opinion,” https://www.newsweek.com/ai-about-decimate-millions-jobs-its-time-universal-basic-income-opinion-1792501
But worries about disincentivizing work in an age of AI seem odd anyway. The whole problem with an AI based economy is that there will be less work to go around. To be sure, there will be some people who waste their UBI money. Social media would probably be filled with images of foolish youthful indulgence with UBI funds. Yet I honestly believe that the vast majority of working people would use the money to pay bills, and take care of their families.
Even before the coming AI takeover, the average worker needs more money to meet their basic needs and actually feel like they are getting ahead financially. It's a deflating feeling to work full time, yet to be one car problem or medical bill away from financial instability.
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Aff – UBI › Econ Advantage › 2AC---AT: Jobs Turn
John Feffer 22, director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, 6/28/22, “Is universal basic income part of a just transition?” https://www.resilience.org/stories/2022-06-28/is-universal-basic-income-part-of-a-just-transition/
One criticism of basic income payments is that they discourage recipients from seeking employment. The SEED project demonstrated the opposite. At the beginning of the experiment, only 28 percent of recipients had fulltime employment. One year later, that number had grown to 40 percent.
“Recipients were able to leverage the payment to improve their employment prospects,” Coltrera says. “The $500 allowed participants to reduce part-time work to finish training or coursework that then led to fulltime employment.”