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2022 Michigan Counterplan
Fem IR updates › Neg › Intersectionality

Fem ir is starting to take other marginalized perspectives into account

Anne Runyan, 2019 (Runyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Interview – Anne Sisson Runyan” E-International Relations. March 8, 2019. /// MF)

Where do you see the most exciting research/debates happening in your field?

Since I have long worked at the intersection of International Relations (IR) and Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, heading both women’s studies and politics departments, my sense of what is most exciting is what cuts across those fields. Just as we have seen the emergence and growing centrality of queer, trans, and decolonial scholarship in feminist studies, so too are inroads being made in IR by these modes of inquiry, bringing with them a wider range of theoretical and methodological approaches, accounting in part for the narrative, affective, visual, and temporal turns in critical IR.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Fem IR updates › Neg › Revolutions

Revolutions are key to incorporating feminist points of view into IR

Ann Runyan & V. Spike Peterson, 1991 (Runyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. Peterson, professor of international relations in the School of Government and Public Policy at the University of Arizona. ‘The Radical Future of Realism: Feminist Subversions of IR Theory” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, pgs 67-106. 1991 /// MF)

Coalition politics, however, do not have to entail the modernist dictate of "merging" different interests and identities in pursuit of a uni- fied politics for some "higher" goal. In fact, Christine Sylvester strenu- ously warns of "some dangers in merging feminist and peace projects."84 By invoking the identities, experiences, and projects of women warriors, whether in service to the state or the revolution, she seeks to disrupt the too comfortable fit between Western pacifist femi- nist ideology and the humanist ideology of peace that ultimately sub- sumes it. Although Sylvester admits that "armed women warriors," regardless of why they fight, kill, and die, "do not get their due after the smoke clears,"85 she insists that if there are "no nonpeaceful feminist identities to inspire war on aspects of the humanist establishment which may deny women power" and "no rebellious feminists creating dangerous, disorderly, and somewhat irrational orders within the order,"86 the disruptive nature of feminist strategies will be under- mined and rendered impotent.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Fem IR updates › Neg › AT: already exists

Past feminist based analysis was too narrow –

Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Gender(ed) Lenses on Global Politics, pgs 44-45/// MF)

As feminist IR lenses have shifted, combined, and recombined through a greater multiplicity of theoretical voices and orientations—creating their own productive tensions—subjects of feminist IR inquiry have also shifted. Tickner (2006) expresses this in generational terms: fi rst-generation feminist IR scholars tended to focus on deconstructing key concepts in IR—sovereignty, the state, security, development, and the economy—exposing or unpacking their masculinist bias and underpinnings. Through these openings that put gender inquiry on the IR map, second-generation scholars have applied gender analysis—often in more intersectional ways—to a range of global politics topics both familiar (alliance constructions, state militaries, peacekeeping, peace agreements, trade agreements, UN conventions) and unfamiliar (sex tourism and sex work, homework and domestic service, migration, social movements, and even world art, popular culture, and the cruise industry). 3 In doing so, these scholars have not only greatly expanded what global politics inquiry entails but also have rethought earlier approaches to gender theorizing in IR.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Fem IR updates › Neg › AT: perm

Fem IR has a larger agenda to solve for a litany of risk but the state co-opts it

Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Gender and Global Security, pg. 88/// MF)

The too easy devolution of security into continual justifi cations for violence has also led to feminist wariness of new processes of “securitization” associated with a widening security agenda. On the one hand, the application of the term security to an issue elevates it to a matter of “high politics,” as security (matters of war and peace) has traditionally held pride of place in IR theory and practice. Thus, relatively new conceptions of human security and environmental security, and even more recently, food, water, energy, and health security, have brought welcome international attention to sources of structural violence that undermine the well-being of people and the planet. On the other hand, there is also a tendency to reduce these once again to state security matters to be handled not through more collective and more non-violent means, but more typically through war or some approximation of it. Resource wars, wars on terror, wars on AIDS, wars on drugs, and so on all follow a similar logic. As Zillah Eisenstein argues, the logic of war of any kind is “opposition, diff erentiation, and the other-ing of peoples” (2007: 25). Thus, gendering, racialization, classing, and sexualizing go on unabated (and become even more pronounced) in order to affi x blame and control, contain, and quarantine these “new” threats. For example, racial profi ling becomes a weapon in the “war on terror,” targeting sexual minorities and sex workers becomes the focus of the war on AIDS, and peasant farmers become casualties of the war on drugs. Still, some feminist IR scholars see value in employing such concepts as human and environmental security through an intersectional gender lens that reveals the interrelationships between a range of insecuri-ties produced by and through state security (Tripp, Ferree, and Ewig 2013; Detraz 2012, 2015).

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Fem IR updates › Neg › AT: perm

Adding women reinforces essentialism and doesn’t result in change

Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Gender and Global Security, pgs. 105-106 /// MF)

On the other side of the coin, as Whitworth (2004) argues based on her study of Canadian peacekeeping operations, the UN’s new interest in “adding women and stirring” simply grafts on (essentialist) gender analysis, which assumes women will just ease and assist the already predetermined business of peacekeeping and peace negotiations by bringing information on women and “women’s issues” into these activities. This predetermined business disregards any considerations of militarized masculinity as a major source of prolonged confl ict or such sources of structural violence as neocolonial economic and political relationships and neolib-eral economic restructuring that may lie at the heart of the confl ict (Whitworth 2004: 133, 137). Instead, this business focuses on “when the fi ghting broke out” and how to control, if not cease, it (Whitworth 2004: 133). Thus, rather than causing a rethinking of peacekeeping and peace negotiations, “analyses of women and of gender thus become part of the ‘programmatic solutions’ that form the UN repertoire of responding to confl ict and insecurity around the world, and, in this way, confi rm the appropriateness of the repertoire” (Whitworth 2004: 137). In this sense, like gender equality that is subsumed under neoliberal governmentality, gender perspectives on international peace and security are subsumed under a kind of security governmentality. Nine out of 11 peace agreements by 2005 had involved some focus on including women and providing for their security (mostly with respect to sexual violence), although that dropped to six out of nine agreements by 2010 (Ellerby 2017: 36–37). But the tenuous and minimalist nature of treating women as add-ons to an overall approach to simply managing confl icts underscores Whitworth’s conclusion that the issue is not so much adding more women to peacekeeping and peacemaking operations as it is questioning the sole reli-ance on militaries to do the job of peacekeeping and, by extension, on military leaders and civilian defense elites to do the job of peacemaking (2004: 183).

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Fem IR updates › Neg › AT: perm

Addressing the structural issues, specifically the language used in IR is key to progress

Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Gender(ed) Lenses on Global Politics, pgs 42-43/// MF)

Asking initially “Where are the women?” and subsequently “adding women”—and com-paring their positions to those of men—were and remain productive orientations. They make embodied women (and men) visible in our picture of world politics, illuminate how women and men are diff erently engaged with and aff ected by international politics, and reveal women as agents and activists, as well as victims of sociocultural, economic, and political oppres-sions. But adding women to existing paradigms also raised deeper questions by exposing how the conceptual structures themselves presuppose masculine experience and perspective. For example, women/femininity cannot simply be added to constructions that are constituted as masculine: the public sphere, rationality, political identity, objectivity, “economic man.” Either women as feminine cannot be added (e.g., women must become like men) or the con-structions themselves are transformed (e.g., adding women as feminine alters the masculine premise of the constructions and changes their meaning). In this sense, the exclusions of fem-ininity are not accidental or coincidental but rather are required for the analytical consistency of reigning explanatory frameworks.

The lesson that emerges from these studies is that we cannot systemically add women without rethinking gender—recognizing it not only as an empirical category or variable but also as an analytical category and governing code. Doing so requires acknowledging the constitutive power of language, which is most eff ectively addressed through a feminist poststructuralist (sometimes referred to as postmodern) lens. This redirects our attention from adding women and deploying sex as a variable to analyzing gender as a category of mental ordering that produces masculinity and femininity as hierarchical power relations. In eff ect, examining “the woman question” leads us to examine “the man question,” which, as argued in this text, leads us to examine questions of “race,” “class,” “sexuality,” and “nationality” as well. Doing so requires acknowledging intersectionality, derived from anti-racist and postcolonial feminist thought, as a necessary analytic, which is also further illuminated through poststructuralist lenses. As used in this text, poststructuralist lenses in general reject essentialized categories, unitary meanings, sovereign claims, universalizing solutions, and presumptions of (foundational) objectivity associated with positivist and modernist commit-ments. Moreover, feminist poststructuralists criticize the residual essentialism that haunts references to “women” and other “identity-based” groups, rendering them homogeneous, undiff erentiated wholes and erasing hierarchies within as well as across all groups.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Fem IR updates › Neg › AT: perm

Placing women in power as the solution inevitably fails – keeping a gender lens will result in the same violence that exists in the squo

Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Gender(ed) Lenses on Global Politics, pg 27 /// MF)

In Chapter 1 , the concepts of a gender lens and more intersectional gendered lenses were introduced and elaborated on in terms of the immensity and complexity of power relations and structures we see in global politics when we use them and why it is important to not only attend to the masculine/feminine dichotomous and hierarchical dynamic at work in global politics past and present, but also the way this is enlarged upon and complicated by interre-lated dynamics of racial, sexual, class, and nationality divisions and hierarchies. In this chapter, background is provided on why and how gender and gendered lenses emerged in the study of IR, how they challenge conventional IR lenses, and what signifi cant understandings such lenses, and the research they have generated, have revealed about how the power of gender works in the study and practice of global politics.

As argued in the introductory chapter, the power of gender is an especially resilient and adaptive fi ltering and organizing mechanism, a meta-lens that produces particular ways of seeing, thinking, and acting in the world. Gender may feature in policymaking, women and men may be repositioned, and ideal forms of masculinity may shift, but as long as the power of gender as a meta-lens continues to operate, it will produce and reproduce inequalities, injustices, and crises of global proportion. Here the central case made is that feminist lenses , and particularly intersectional ones, often in concert with other lenses critical of conventional IR approaches, are necessary to reveal the extent of the power of gender to produce and obscure inequalities and the global crises that ensue from and sustain inequalities.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Fem IR updates › Neg › AT: perm

Simply adding women into academia fails

Anne Runyan, 2019 (Runyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Interview – Anne Sisson Runyan” E-International Relations. March 8, 2019. /// MF)

This year’s campaign theme  calls for a gender-balanced world. What do you think is the biggest barrier to achieving gender-balance in academia?

Of course, gender parity across all institutions is necessary as a matter of fair representation and non-asymmetrical access to power and resources that could potentially lead to reassessments of how power and resources are used. However, the appeal for gender balance does not take into account hierarchical differences among those who identify as women and those who identify as men (or neither) and it appears to summon a notion of gender complementarity as opposed to equality, which also appears to rest on essentialist notions of women and men. Moreover, it seems to occlude questions of gender balance for what and under what conditions.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Fem IR updates › Neg › AT: essentialism

Fem IR isn’t rooted in essentialism – rather its rooted in historical ways of thinking like activists

Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Gender and Global Security, pg 84/// MF)

Feminist IR approaches to war and violence and peace and security, as refl ected in FSS scholarship, have their roots especially in the thinking of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century women peace theorists and activists. Many of these early thinkers and activists based their arguments against war on women’s maternalist desires to protect their children from the ravages of war, neither wanting their sons to become cannon fodder nor their daughters to suff er from the destruction of families and communities (Pierson 1987). For those who were steeped in the biological determinism characteristic of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century thought, these maternalist desires were seen as innate, making women “natural” peace support-ers and peacemakers. Maternalist arguments continued through the Cold War, when women’s peace organizations sought to protect future generations from the threat of nuclear war, and into the present day, but more recent feminist peace researchers and activists have argued that maternalism is not innate but rather the result of women being made largely responsible for “maternalist practices” or caring work, whether or not they have children (Ruddick 1984). This makes them more likely to have empathy for “others” and the world’s children and to be against war and its destructive power. Contemporary feminist IR scholars examining mater-nalism in national and international politics (Carreon and Moghadam 2015) refer to this as “political motherhood” and make a distinction between grassroots motherhood politics, which seek to emancipate the nation from unjust rule and/or to bring peace through increas-ing women’s political voice and agency, and state-led, patriarchal motherhood politics which advocate keeping women in the home or expecting them to uphold heteronormative patriarchal family values to serve as conservative symbols of the nation.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Fem IR updates › Neg › AT: essentialism

A gendered lens avoids essentialism and universalism

Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Introduction, pgs 8-9 /// MF)

Contemporary feminist scholars engage in intersectional analysis to avoid the practice of “essentialism,” or the assumption that, for example, all women or all men or all those within a given race or class share the same experiences and interests. Only by recognizing how, for example, some women have benefi ted by the racial, class, sexual, and national origin oppres-sion of other women, whereas many men subordinated by these very characteristics still exercise gender oppression, can we advance a more comprehensive notion of gender equality that sees it as indivisible from racial, class, and sexual equality and equality among nations. Thus, a sole focus on gender equality can fail to address other sources of inequality (such as race and class discrimination) that disadvantage certain groups of women. At the same time, when such eff orts blame only men, and mostly non-elite men, for gender inequality and fail to address forms of discrimination that subordinated men experience (based on class, race, and/or sexuality), then subordinated men may withhold support for gender equality. A narrow focus on gender equality also maintains the power of gender, even as the socio-economic positionings of some women and men may be somewhat altered, as is addressed more in this chapter.

Another reason to avoid essentialism is also to avoid “universalism,” or universal prescriptions for how to achieve comprehensive gender equality. Not only do women not share the same experiences or interests as a result of their multiple identities derive from their differing social locations in the world, but also the sociopolitical, cultural, and historical con-texts in which women live vary significantly, requiring varying strategies for social change. These complex realities have made many feminists skeptical of resorting to “global” solutions just as they have recognized that “global” problems take many and differing “local” forms to which agents of social change must be attentive to create context-specific and context-sensitive solutions that do not backfire (Grewal and Kaplan 1994).

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Fem IR updates › Neg › AT: essentialism

A gendered lens for international relations avoids essentialism

Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Introduction, pg 8/// MF)

Contemporary feminist scholars engage in intersectional analysis to avoid the practice of “essentialism,” or the assumption that, for example, all women or all men or all those within a given race or class share the same experiences and interests. Only by recognizing how, for example, some women have benefi ted by the racial, class, sexual, and national origin oppres-sion of other women, whereas many men subordinated by these very characteristics still exercise gender oppression, can we advance a more comprehensive notion of gender equality that sees it as indivisible from racial, class, and sexual equality and equality among nations. Thus, a sole focus on gender equality can fail to address other sources of inequality (such as race and class discrimination) that disadvantage certain groups of women. At the same time, when such eff orts blame only men, and mostly non-elite men, for gender inequality and fail to address forms of discrimination that subordinated men experience (based on class, race, and/or sexuality), then subordinated men may withhold support for gender equality. A narrow focus on gender equality also maintains the power of gender, even as the socio-economic positionings of some women and men may be somewhat altered, as is addressed more in this chapter.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Fem IR updates › Neg › AT: binaries

A gendered lens is a prereq to solving the existing dichotomies – only the alt solves

Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Gender(ed) Lenses on Global Politics, pgs 39-40/// MF)

This is what is meant by mutually reinforcing: the dichotomy of gender gains its natural-ness by being grounded in the assumption of essentialized sex diff erence; gendered orderings are normalized by being reproduced throughout social life; dichotomies gain their taken-for-granted and even desirable status by being privileged in modernist thought and acquiring credibility through the “reality” of pervasive gendered diff erentiation. The mutually reinforcing interplay of essentializing sex, dichotomizing gender, and the binary logic of positivism generates the constellation of dimensions of the meta-lens of the power of gender. Recog-nizing the power of these coding and fi ltering devices is crucial for improving our ability to see beyond essentialized identities and oppositional “wholes.” Thus, feminists argue that dichotomized thinking cannot be adequately understood, critiqued, or eff ectively transformed without addressing how sex-diff erentiated gender grounds, naturalizes, and reproduces binary thinking.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Fem IR updates › Neg › AT: binaries

Binaries are simply constructed – the k observes the social constructions around the ideas of gender, it doesn’t reinforce the ideas of binaries

Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Introduction, pgs 6-7 /// MF)

Finally, the specifi c meanings and values conferred on masculinity and femininity have also changed over time as well as across cultures. For example, Western ideals of “manliness” have undergone historical shifts: from the early Greeks through the feudal period, the emphasis of idealized masculinity was on military heroism and political prowess through male bonding and risk-taking; whereas more modern meanings of masculinity have stressed “competitive individualism, reason, self-control or self-denial, combining respectability as breadwinner and head of household with calculative rationality in public life” (Hooper 1998: 33). This does not mean, however, that older meanings have gone away, as unbridled military toughness and financial risk-taking can come once again to the fore in times of war and economic restructuring. Moreover, not all cultures have associated such conceptions of masculinity with leadership qualities: “queen mothers” in Ghana and “clan mothers” in many Native American societies have been accorded power and leadership roles in these matrilineal contexts on the basis of the feminine quality of regeneration of the people and the land (Okojo 1994: 286; Guerrero 1997: 215). Furthermore, there is some play in gender roles even within patrilineal or patriarchal cultures, given that men are not exclusively leaders and warriors and women are not exclusively in charge of maintaining the home and caring for children. Cultures also vary in the play allowed to the display of non-conforming gender behavior, such as that not associated with a person’s assigned sex; sometimes even “third genders” are revered. Polities also vary in terms of acceptance of and resources available to people who choose to change their assigned sex. Due to the variation in meanings attached to femininity and masculinity, we know that expressions of gender are not “fi xed” or predetermined; the particulars of gender are always shaped by context.

Because models of appropriate gender behavior are diverse, we know that femininity and masculinity are not timeless or separable from the contexts in which they are embodied, acted out, and observed. This illustrates how gender rests not on biological sex differences but on interpretations or constructions of behavior that are culturally specific, that shift as contexts change, and that typically have little to do with biological differences, which themselves are not fixed as some bodies are born neither “male” nor “female” and gender and sex assignments can be altered. In short, there are multiple genders and gender orderings, but gender is always raced, classed, sexualized, and nationalized, just as race, class, sexuality, and nationality are always gendered. Hence, gender analysis must avoid stereotyping (or reducing people to unfounded caricatures), essentializing (or assuming “natural” and unchanging characteristics), and singling out any one identity as descriptive of a whole person. Instead, gender analysis must adopt intersectional analyses to make sense of our multiple, crosscutting, and differentially valorized identities. However, these variations still rest on concepts of gender differences and do not necessarily disrupt the power of gender as an oppositional dichotomy and as a relation of inequality.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Fem IR updates › Neg › Uq

Previous shifts are not enough, we need a full transition to overcome the mistakes of the past

Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Gender and Global Governance, pg 53/// MF)

These points suggest how this shift in analysis, in turn, shifted strategies: from “adding women” to formal power structures to valorizing feminine traits in order to redefi ne politics from “power-over” to “power-to” (also known as “power-with” or enabling power) and change the standards of political behavior in favor of interdependence and cooperation. Still, this left intact a lingering and limiting referent to “women” that did not de-homogenize the category to recognize power diff erentials among women and the power some women hold over some men. It also left intact the association of embodied women with feminine values, which, on the one hand, led to essentialist assumptions about women as cure-alls for social (and global) ills and, on the other hand, positioned certain embodied men (largely non-Western, non-white, and/or lower class) as the villains of the piece. In the process, attention is defl ected from the complicity of both women and men—particularly those with the most power and privilege—in contributing to global ills. It also misrepresents feminist politics as exclusively about women rather than about resisting gender and gendered hierarchies and the ills they cause globally. This is not to say that raising the status of women and other subjugated people—in politics and other facets of life—is not necessary to increase formal representation and better equalize voice, but to note that it is insuffi cient if there is no attendant ideological shift away from politics as power-over to politics that enables resistance to and transformation of global politics-as-usual, which the power of gender sustains.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Fem IR updates › Neg › Uq

UN actions are too narrow and don’t really create any real change

Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Gender and Global Security, pg. 105 /// MF)

Perhaps most problematic for disrupting the gendered division of violence is that gender and especially sexual violence is repeatedly reduced to violence against women in the WPS agenda, upholding the “sex essentialism” that renders the idea that women can be perpetrators, including rapists, unimaginable (Sjoberg 2016) and misrepresenting much wartime rape as organized, and thus controllable by international policy and punishments, rather than seeing it as part of the disorganization of war itself which is not placed under indictment (Baaz and Stern 2013). Indeed, as sexual violence and contraction of HIV/AIDS in war have become securitized, the agenda is simply to “protect women” from these in wartime (not in peacetime), increasing the power of already powerful states to punish others while regulating rather than actually addressing the inequalities and injustices that enable these violences (Jansson 2017). Ultimately, the WPS agenda reproduces very narrow constructions of gender and gender violence that do not disturb and, in fact, reinforce the international order that is productive of gender harms (Shepherd 2008).

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Fem IR updates › Neg › Uq

Even if liberal feminism was somewhat successful, it coopted the true issue

Marysia Zalewski, 2018 (Zalewshi, author and professor of International Relations at Cardiff University. “Feminist Approaches to International Relations Theory in the Post-Cold War Period” part of The Age of Perplexity: Rethinking the World We Knew /// MF)

How has liberal feminism fared in global politics? There are many women political leaders now, still a minority if perhaps a decreasing one. Women serve in large numbers in militaries around the world and the bans on women serving in close combat are disappearing almost daily.5 Gender as a concept has been mainstreamed in the thinking and practice of many national governments and international organisations. The United Nations is a key actor here, not least since the ground-breaking Security Council Resolution 1325 introduced in 2000 which was the first formal and legal document from the Security Council that required parties in a conflict to prevent violations of women’s rights, to support women’s participation in peace negotiations and in post-conflict reconstruction, and to protect women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence.6 The two most recent relevant Resolutions include SCR 2106&SCR 2122 both in 2013.7

In many ways the success of liberal feminism seems clear. Though for many feminist international relations scholars, this success is dubious. It is the case that the majority of feminist scholars welcome inclusive practices for women, rather the troubling issue relates to the tacit acceptance of conventional (oftentimes articulated as ‘malestream’) political and theoretical agendas and practices. Plus, the acceptance of the standard of ‘human’, which is, by historical default, most often elite, white and male. As a corollary, liberal feminist work tends to support the invisibility and lesser worth of women’s traditional lives, behaviours and work, be default ignoring the imbalances and biases and discriminations this wreaks upon many women globally. In the current geo-political order, liberal feminism has, many argue, been co-opted in the service of neo-liberal agendas and practices. I will return to this point.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Fem IR updates › Neg › Uq

Feminist scholars have been collecting data and working to over throw the current system

Anne Runyan, 2019 (Runyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Interview – Anne Sisson Runyan” E-International Relations. March 8, 2019. /// MF)

How has the way you understand the world changed over time, and what (or who) prompted the most significant shifts in your thinking?

I have lived long enough and through enough epistemological shifts that have chipped away at modernist understandings of the world to be wary of progress narratives. That it appears the world is being revisited by the ghosts of overt patriarchy, racism, and fascism and even the ghosts of nuclearism just when it seemed that all kinds of human rights, gender equality, humanitarian, and environmental protection norms were being secured at the international level is, on one level, dizzying, but on another level, not surprising. It is not as if feminist scholars have not been steadily documenting largely unabated levels of violence, impoverishment, and disposability experienced by women and feminized/racialized others throughout the world, but particularly in the Global South, which belies simplistic “success” stories. It is also not as if feminists have not been tracking the feminization of men’s labour and the self- and other- destruction associated with this. And it is not as if feminists have not also been repeatedly raising concerns about the enclosures and depoliticizations of feminism as it moves through the halls of power within the (neo)liberal order that can undermine it as an oppositional force and thus vulnerabilize it to assaults, particularly from the religious and nationalist right that have been going on for some time.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Cease CP › 2NC – ! – France

French withdrawal creates instability within NATO and decks Europe unity – empirics prove

Blakemore, 2-9 (Erin Blakemore, 2-9-22, journalist and contributor to History.com, “When France Pulled the Plug on a Crucial Part of NATO,” )

Over the years, France had come into conflict with nearly all of its NATO allies, especially the United States and Britain. Though all three countries had founded the steering group from which NATO was born, France had soon fallen out of the driver’s seat. French president Charles de Gaulle still resented what he saw as the United States’ abandonment during the 1956 , when the U.S. effectively forced France to withdraw its forces from the area around the Suez Canal during a conflict over its nationalization by Egypt. And he  French military independence—something he felt could never be achieved within the context of the alliance.

Frustration mounted even more when de Gaulle  that France, the United States and Britain be put on equal footing within NATO in terms of nuclear strategy. The proposal failed, and as a result de Gaulle began  reducing French participation in NATO. He  France from the Mediterranean fleet and refused to store nuclear weapons from other countries on French soil.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Cease CP › 2NC – ! – France

US presence causes France to feel emboldened— strains relations

Pannier, 2-4 (Alice Pannier, 2-4-22, assistant professor of European studies and international relations at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies,

Thirdly, a key element in the quality of French-NATO relations will be the degree of convergence on the new threat landscape, and the respective roles attributed to NATO, individual states and the EU in addressing these threats. When looking at security challenges that France is concerned with (Russia and China’s aggressive foreign policies, hybrid and emerging security threats, terrorism or instability in the Middle East and Africa), French decision-makers see a role for NATO, albeit a limited one, complementing European and national efforts.

Close to Europe, France has supported NATO’s renewed investment in collective defence after the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine. France has taken part in NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) and welcomes NATO’s ability to design a ‘balanced, deterrent and predictable posture’ in Eastern Europe (Ministère des Armées, 2017, p. 23). At the same time, Emmanuel Macron has been viewed by some NATO partners as ambiguous as he has, simultaneously, advocated a renewed dialogue with Russia so as to avoid further misunderstandings.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Cease CP › 2NC – ! – France

US must withdraw – France is pissed over Submarine withdrawal – if not France withdraws from NATO

Shuo, 21 (Wang Shuo, 9-23-21, contributor to Global Times, “Will France play ‘NATO withdrawal’ card after being stabbed in the back by US”, //mahimahi)

Washington has once again stabbed its allies in the back after the troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. This time, the victim is France. Last week, the US, Australia and the UK formed a trilateral security partnership, known as AUKUS. Meanwhile, it urged Australia to break its submarine deal with France by offering US nuclear power technology. As French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said in an interview Saturday, there is a "serious crisis" between the allies which will affect NATO's future. Le Drian's remarks triggered a heated debate: Will France break up with NATO after being stabbed in the back by the US? France has lost a contract worth 31 billion euros ($36.5 billion) and, more importantly, its face. France has always boasted about its global influence, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, in recent years. With a total of 8,000 French soldiers stationed in the region, it has the biggest military presence among Western countries after the US. France has also been participating in a series of US-led military exercises there. But Washington unexpectedly snatched Paris's submarine deal. Besides, it has left Paris in the dark when forming a new security alliance with London and Canberra that focuses on the Indo-Pacific region. Paris might now feel that the US doesn't take its oldest ally seriously. The impact of this incident will spill over into next year's French presidential election. After four years in office, President Emmanuel Macron now faces difficulties in fulfilling most of his promises to the voters. Only his achievements in foreign policy are somewhat recognized by the French public. But just as the presidential election approaches in France, what the US has done overturned it all. Even so, the Macron administration still acts cautiously. First, France's dissatisfaction was expressed by Le Drian with a non-diplomatic tone and language. It leaves room for the future. Second, France canceled Washington's reception, toned down celebrations of the US-French Revolutionary War victory, and recalled its ambassadors to Washington and Canberra. Third, France has been seeking EU support in this case, turning the controversy between Paris and Washington into an issue over transatlantic ties. It is a tactic to increase France's own leverage and to prevent the scenario of fighting alone. In the end, France sent out a signal, whether by accident or on purpose, that it may pull out of NATO.  Yet only a few politicians in France, such as far-left Jean-Luc Mélenchon, have raised serious voices to call their country to withdraw from NATO. Paris' official attitude over the case is so far vague. This is undoubtedly an important "card" in Macron's hand. The Biden administration is paying great efforts to gang up with allies against China. So this is not good news for the US.  According to CNBC, US President Joe Biden on Sunday requested a call with Macron. On Wednesday, Biden and Macron made their first call after the diplomatic crisis exploded over the AUSUS deal. Macron agreed to return his ambassador to Washington. It seems that both sides are trying to deal with the crisis.  But still, in theory, France's "withdrawal" from NATO is not an illusion. France has always pursued independence in defense and has a history of warning to withdraw from NATO. There is no psychological barrier for the country to break up with the bloc again. On the other hand, Macron has repeatedly expressed his disappointment with NATO. He even once described NATO as being "brain dead."