2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg Solvency Updates** › Bronze Night 2AC – Stacktivism
Lovink 20 – Geert Lovink is the founding director of the Institute of Network Cultures, whose goals are to explore, document and feed the potential for socio-economical change of the new media field through events, publications and open dialogue (Geert, 2020-11-09, “Principles of Stacktivism”, tripleC)
Media historicism (aka archaeology) has so far failed to develop critical concepts to understand the current situation, also known as platform capitalism. There is more to the Internet than the politics of the senses. Notation systems and perception are so 20th century. What matters now is who owns the Internet in terms of data centres, cables and PR; and this is first and foremost a question of material analysis. A comparison with the Roman road system, as described in Innis’s Empire and Communications is more relevant here16. Let’s, for instance, investigate the relation between the modernist stack and the fuzzy post-modern cloud buzzword. How does Bratton’s design relate to recent proposals by stacktivists Francesca Bria and Evgeny Morozov for a European move towards “data sovereignty”? It’s too easy to unmask Bratton as a Californian techno-solutionist. How much is gained by planting this (now effectively empty) label on him? To determine, to think technologically remains an utmost urgency and it is precisely the “stacking” of issues, factors and contexts that will bring us further into the constitutive force of technical systems. The spectacle of clashing characters should not distract us (in fact, the silo phantom, the silence and separation is, oddly, our main problem, in this hyperconnected world). How does self-determination, for instance on a local level, relate to a visible decline in the consensus about the necessity to have global standards and global infrastructures? Is a fear of the Internet’s Balkaniation justified? Right now, open architecture is the one principle that is in most danger. Open standards and protectionism do not go together. What would it mean if we gave up the planetary level and narrowed our collective imaginary to the geo-politics of competing regional empires? In a regulatory wave, platforms can be forced to fork, and, as a result of this, other layers of The Stack can be dragged with them. Many apps are already implicitly regional. Take the AngloSaxon bias of Google Books and contrast this to the (Siberian) multipolar Libgen library. The liberal consensus of some kind of harmonious multi-stakeholder alliance between “global civil society” and tech giants of “global governance as running code” has long lost any credibility. We’re not only talking here about China’s Great Firewall but also latest efforts in Russia, Turkey and Iran (not to mention USA’s exceptionalism, which was one of the many causes of this development). Does the one stack exist or should we rather speak of The Stacks, a rainbow of a thousand stacks, such as Tiziana Terranova’s “red stack”17, the ancient blue stack of IBM and the green stack proposal that wants to tackle the massive energy use of the blockchain and data centres, including our own devices. And how about the European stack? In the aftermath of Snowden, the slogan “The Internet is Broken” started circulating, followed by Tim Berners Lee’s proposals for an alternative architecture of the web, following the Cambridge Analytica/Facebook scandals of 2018/19.
What Bratton’s definition of The Stack lacks is the society layer. We can only guess that his traditional US “globalist” upbringing is the cause of this mishap. A Thatcherite neo-liberal position perhaps lurks within his framework. Or should we rather think of an anarchist disgust with the state? The enlightened digital artist-engineer as Jesuit class? There is, for sure, more to say about this. Infrastructure does not equal society. A contemporary techno-Maoist slogan could be: There is no society, only infrastructure. There is no place either for the user as a civilian actor. What do we draw from this? As long as key layers are missing in such analyses, we can’t really draw new relations between them. After all, nothing only connects with nothing. This is why some in the context of art and hacktivism have proposed redesigning Bratton’s scheme as a “public stack”18. We need to define new forms of collective action that some call the commons that is defined by the ability to act together. The design question here is what comes next after the model of social networks, which has been so compromised and overshadowed by the social media monopolies. This is a digital commons in which collective forms of money is included, a redistribution of wealth that has been produced together and should never again be allowed to be expropriated. We need to collectivise our knowledge and learn from the mistakes that were made in projects such as Wikipedia and Creative Commons, but also of the self-centric notion of free software as promoted by Richard Stallman, who could only think in terms of individual freedom of the singleuser-as-programmer – until his 2019 downfall. What Bratton’s static metaphysical view in particular lacks is the role of actors (and their interests, ideologies). Instead of trashing the stack, the proposition here is to make the model more dynamic (or dialectical) by introducing stackivism. Let’s define stacktivism as a form of Internet activism that no longer bothers with the distractive noise on social media channels and dares to dig deeper in order to make a real difference. Instead of talking only about upload filters, fake news or the deployment of cheap online moderation armies, we are working on a next Internet. The charm of protocoldriven direct action or stacktivism is that it goes both up (from network to platform to stack) and down (protocols, data centres, cables), at the same time. The Internet is more than social media, more than you and your app. This may sound like a simple, self-evident slogan but the integral practice-based vision of stacktivism is a promising one, beyond techno-solutionism and it critics, the liberal-tech engineering status quo procedures, the discontent offline romanticism, liberal privacy concerns, legalistic NGO approaches and the after-the-fact Academic Truth that confines itself to the closed monads of peer-review journals.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg Solvency Updates** › Bronze Night 2AC – Stacktivism
Lovink 20 – Geert Lovink is the founding director of the Institute of Network Cultures, whose goals are to explore, document and feed the potential for socio-economical change of the new media field through events, publications and open dialogue (Geert, 2020-11-09, “Principles of Stacktivism”, tripleC)
Benjamin Bratton also invites us to think tech in relation to geo-politics and location. At the same time The Stack can be seen as method, a mechanism. However, the book is consciously vague about how material infrastructure and ideology relate. In the light of Trump, Putin and Xi Jinping, Bratton’s global engineer seems a tragic, retrograde figure. At best The Stack works well as a multi-disciplinary guideline of past globalist techno-social practices that, ironically, have become outdated since 2016, the year of its publication and the year of Brexit and Trump. For all its ambition to delineate the geo-political contours of techno-operations supposedly occurring on a planetary scale, the book settles with an oddly depoliticised aesthetic imaginary. How can we free up The Stack from its current confinements and turn into an improvised dance? Let’s define a stacktivism, an active and reflective reading of stackson-the-move, that is not afraid of the subject (formerly known as user) and involves action, committed by confused, selfish, messy players. With this I mean grassroots interventions that do not take the current (Internet or IT infrastructure) stack as a given and turn the Will to Totality of the engineering class and their financial backers against itself. In comparison with the hacktivism and (tactical) media activism, stacktivism is indeed Hegelian in scope (Understanding Totality). It is confronting “das Ganze” and can be considered counter regressive as it takes into account the real-existing totality of today’s interrelated tech-architectures as opposed to the shrinking paranoid world of the online self that is in constant danger of collapse under the weight of its own selfimage, surveillance, precarity and depression. Niels ten Oever, Amsterdam-based Internet governance researcher and activist emphasises the importance of linking contexts and levels: “The stack never was and never will be. The stack always was an abstraction, a story that was told to keep people working in an isolated manner, ensuring engineers stuck to their own layer. As long as you worked within your own parameters and delivered what the layer above and below you expected of you, you would not get into trouble. Stacktivism, on the other hand, works across the stack: it is a cross-stack collaboration, an attempt to realign and redesign the interfaces. Looking for interconnections and associations that cannot be drawn from above, that defy standardization. Interconnections that escape abstractions and stereotypes. They are established through dynamic and unpredictable handshakes: questions, answers, and re(-)cognition” 13.
Stacktivism is ambivalent and struggles with totality, the global scale and the planetary whatever. Think big, but act in small steps, that’s the motto. We Are Infrastructure. Stacktivism fights against the comfort of ignorance and tries hard to overcome the designed lure to drift off, hovering above it all in a subconscious fashion. While defining what stackitivism could become, it is good to keep mind that we’re free to use Bratton’s The Stack as a theory toolbox and not interpret it as a hermetic belief system. Designs can intermingle. In line with Bratton, stackivism claims to understand and oversee all levels, from the politics of code, algorithms and AI to the behavioural science manipulation of moods, interface design choices and is alert to 5G electronic smog, phishing emails, fake news and the other sleazy suggestions of your “friends”. How about your bot sensibility? This hyperawareness comes at a high price. Not everyone is a stacktivist. Traditionally, direct action has been put in opposition to the talk fest. When we act, we stop talking and start doing. In the context of hacktivism this means that we no longer consume but start to code in order to be able to hack into computer systems in order to make real, tangible changes in society. Like Robin Hood, let’s define what stackivism-for-good could look like. How do we build rhizomatic links between global governance, protocol design, the ethics-without-consequences industry, code writing and investigative hacking? Who will be in charge of subversive foresight? Can we dream aloud together? How can delegate trust to our think tanks that work in the public interest? Stacktivism is a sovereign attitude in that it is not begging for a correct form of representation and could be considered post-democratic and post-identity, yet remains always all-too-human. Inside Douglas Rushkoff’s Team Human stacktivists take up the task of creating missing links: they are the meme sharers, idea connectors, intercultural fellow travellers, poly-disciplinary networkers. The social creation of new protocols remains an act of common decision. We are fighting at the conceptual forefront of tech. Nobody needs to give us permission. Unlike the tactical media interventions of the 1990s, stacktivism is – by definition– abstract and conceptual in nature, knowing that code is power and power is code. How to dismantle invisible power? Do we fight abstractions with abstractions, design with counter-designs? According to Internet and civil society researcher Corinne Cath we could see stacktivism as a “playful human evolution of Bratton’s concept of The Stack. It critiques its modular conception of world into discrete layers. To remedy this flattening, it calls for the inclusion of the inherent messiness of the Internet: the entangled basement wires, packets lost in translation, rugged governance cultures and the idiosyncratic usages of the humans who rely on it to function flawlessly” 14. Francesca Musiani (CNRS, Paris) found the lessons of decentralisation telling: “Decentralization often becomes a technical, political, economic and social aim in and of itself, reaching outside the ‘hacker’ circles of the early p2p systems. However, this has had side effects. Decentralization has become an objective in and of itself, with little understanding of intent or assessment of actual effects. I love Phil Agre's 2003 observation in this respect when he said: ‘Architecture is politics, but should not be understood as a substitute for politics’. Decentralized protocols are too readily assumed, because of their technical qualities, to bring about decentralized political, social and economic outcomes. A more fine-tuned appreciation of the social dimensions of the stack is likely to improve things in this regard” 15.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg Solvency Updates** › SSA Neg – Debris Tracking Fails
Paul Larsen 18. Taught air and space law for more than forty years at Southern Methodist University and at Georgetown University. “SOLVING THE SPACE DEBRIS CRISIS,” 83 J. Air L. & Com. 475, accessed 8-20-19, p. Nexis Uni.
When the location of space debris is known, it is possible for a maneuverable satellite to avoid collisions. Furthermore, satellite operators will avoid placing their satellites into orbits of known debris. The large debris are most dangerous; thus, the ability to [*482] track them is very important. Nevertheless, all the hundreds of thousands of smaller debris are also threatening. Tracking is an important tool for avoiding collisions in outer space, but it does not solve the space debris problem. The U.S. Air Force Space Surveillance Network (SSN) tracks 23,000 debris larger than ten centimeters in LEO and larger than thirty centimeters in GEO. 34Link to the text of the note The new Air Force Space Fence system will have ten times better tracking capability beginning in 2018. 35Link to the text of the note Only a small percentage of objects tracked are operational and navigable. Almost all the debris are unable to navigate and thus not able to change course to avoid collision.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg Solvency Updates** › SSA Neg – TCBMS Fail
David C. Logan 16. graduate student at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, where he is also a John Parker Compton Memorial Fellow and a Fellow in the Center for International Security Studies., 10-6-2016, "Overconfidence in Confidence Building," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-10-06/overconfidence-confidence-building
In spite of their popularity, such agreements do not always reduce tensions. Hot lines between China and other nations, perhaps the most basic form of a confidence-building measure, have a particularly poor record. In addition to its dedicated line with the former Soviet Union, China has at one time or another established hot lines with Japan, the United States, Vietnam, and South Korea. However, in subsequent crises with those countries, the phone lines were reportedly dead. After North Korea carried out a nuclear test earlier this year, South Korean President Park Geun-hye reportedly tried to reach Chinese President Xi Jinping on the countries’ bilateral hot line for an emergency consultation. Xi apparently declined to answer. In some of the cases, unrelated political disputes led to the complete termination of the hot line. For example, China and Japan had agreed in May 2010 to establish a hot line for managing crises. However, after a September 2010 collision involving a Chinese fishing boat and Japanese coast guard vessels, China, reportedly angered by the Japanese decision to detain the Chinese captain, terminated the hot line. Some Western experts have raised questions about whether China would adhere to confidence-building agreements, and Japanese security analysts have reportedly expressed concerns that while Beijing has shown some willingness to engage with Washington on confidence-building measures, it may be less cooperative with neighboring countries. On top of failing to resolve tensions, the sloppy implementation of such procedures can make bad situations worse. As the scholar Marie-France Desjardins has written, poorly negotiated and implemented confidence-building measures pose several unintended risks, such as inadvertently justifying dangerous or unwanted activities. One Western observer questioned the value of having the United States and the Soviet Union notify each other of large-scale military maneuvers, reportedly saying, “If a suspected adversary tells you he has a gun, even shows it to you, that does not necessarily lessen your apprehension, much less your mistrust of his motives for brandishing the weapon.” The development of bilateral confidence-building measures and the subsequent warming of relations between state parties may spark concern among states that are not party to the agreement. And actual or perceived noncompliance can further poison relations between parties, hobbling future efforts at cooperation. In the South China Sea and elsewhere, China, the United States, and other parties to confidence-building measures must ensure that they follow through on agreements with effective implementation. Noncompliance can occur for several reasons. States may have differing interpretations of their agreements. One of the advantages of confidence-building measures, especially first-generation ones, is that they typically require relatively little political or operational commitment from the parties. Indeed, that’s what makes confidence-building measures attractive as initial steps between distrustful states. The 2014 agreements between China and the United States on military notifications and codes of conduct are distinctive in that compliance with them is both voluntary and confidential. Compliance is not mandatory, and information that is reported, pursuant to the agreement, cannot be shared with other parties. But this tendency toward fewer requirements can make confidence-building agreements overly vague and lead to misunderstandings or large loopholes. For example, Washington and Beijing currently disagree over whether the 2014 agreement applies to encounters in all waters or only those that both recognize as international. Then there is the issue of political will. An insufficient amount can cause confidence-building measures to fall by the wayside. Upon concluding an agreement, leaders often delegate their subordinates with the onerous task of implementing the agreement. Such decentralization may lead to clashes between domestic actors and a state government that struggles to build cohesive policies. Despite Xi’s efforts to consolidate his power, his policy on the South China Sea is fragmented by domestic interest groups such as the State Oceanic Administration, commercial fishing operations, and the competing interests of local governments. These actors often drive Chinese policy in contradictory directions. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a key coordinator for China’s policy in the South China Sea and has reportedly advocated a less confrontational approach. However, its efforts to form a unified and consistent policy front have been hampered by a lack of political authority, given that other bureaucratic actors, such as the People’s Liberation Army or provincial governors, enjoy political standing equal to or above that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. States may also lack the institutional capacity to implement the agreements. Few countries can match the depth and quality of the U.S. national security apparatus. Even China has struggled to muster comparable bureaucratic might. A former director-general of China’s Department of Arms Control in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reported lamenting that his office had “less than 30 staff members, most of whom are very young and have little practical experience in arms control.”
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg Solvency Updates** › SSA Neg – TCBMS Fail
Ram S. Jakhu 12. LLM in International Law, LLM in Air & Space Law, DCL in Law of Outer Space & Telecommunications, Law Professor at McGill University, former Chair of the UN Working Group for Satellite Communications, member of the Global Agenda Council on Space of the World Economic Forum. “Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures for Space Security,” Decoding the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, Pentagon Security International, 2012, pp. 35- 46,
Moreover, TCBMs are merely a means for achieving space security but their effectiveness highly depends upon their precise contents, pertinent scope, uniform and effective implementation, objective compliance monitoring and verification, and the presence of efficient dispute settlement mechanisms. Compliance with non-binding undertakings under TCBMs cannot be fully expected or guaranteed. It is well-known that neither the information sharing regime under the non-binding 2002 Hague Code of Conduct for Ballistic Missiles nor the registration of space objects under the binding 1969 Registration Convention are fully respected by the subscribing States. We should also be aware that there is always a possibility of an abuse of TCBMs, as for example there have been instances when ‘violations’ of the Missile Technology Control Regime—a form of TCBM—had been alleged against some States that were not subscribers to the Regime. Irrespective of the good intentions and the abundance of possible means for preventing an arms race in outer space, the lack of political will, primarily on the part of major space-faring nations, has so far constrained any serious progress in achieving space security. Only time will tell if the recent initiatives being undertaken by the international community on TCBMs in outer space will bear any fruit.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg Solvency Updates** › Bronze Night Neg – Solvency Answers
Wilson 21 [Kate Wilson, 2021, "25. Digital ecosystems components every country needs," Digital Impact Alliance, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/ee3cfcd9-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/ee3cfcd9-en]
Given the many factors that make up digital transformation, political will for inclusive, people-centred approaches at national and global levels is crucial. Without it, solutions risk harming rather than helping well-being, though, for instance, personal data leaks, lack of interoperability, redundant systems and abuse of personal data in government hands. As the world addresses the multiple challenges of climate change, conflict and fragility, and the impact of COVID-19, digital and data systems can be leveraged to maximise scarce resources and bolster preparedness for future crises, but only if the harmful pitfalls can be avoided. This is the role of policy.
Policy should be transparent, inspire trust and minimise potential harms of technology
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg Solvency Updates** › Bronze Night Neg – Solvency Answers
Wilson 21 [Kate Wilson, 2021, "25. Digital ecosystems components every country needs," Digital Impact Alliance, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/ee3cfcd9-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/ee3cfcd9-en]
Digital transformations are multifaceted. To help countries, development actors and other stakeholders should meet needs and priorities that are right for each specific context. Patterns across some of the countries that have led the way in digital transformation, and measurements of national digital transformations1 themselves, suggest that at least five factors are critical, though not all may be initially present. The Digital Impact Alliance (DIAL) has developed a simple 5 Ps framework (Box 25.1). Considering these interrelated areas – each important to building the right digital system – can help actors identify and co-ordinate around manageable problem sets. First is political will from national leadership to achieve a digital economy and (when relevant) an international development community to support such a digital transformation. The second factor is citizen-responsive policies that ensure that the system being built is designed with citizen protection in mind. The third and fourth – supply and demand – factors are commercially attractive pricing and procurement models and the availability of scalable products that can seamlessly connect. Finally, a fifth factor is the depth of digital literacy and capacity among all people, including in development agencies, to implement the policies, manage both the procurements and products, and ultimately build sustainable solutions that can be improved over time. Figure 25.1 elaborates the relationships among these factors, illustrating the critical role played by political will in driving change across the entire process.
Box 25.1. The 5 Ps: A framework to design, implement and assess digital transformation
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg Solvency Updates** › Squo Solves – Generic
Diego Laje, 6-29-2022, "U.S. To Increase Cyber Capabilities, Research and Funding with NATO," SIGNAL Magazine, https://www.afcea.org/content/us-increase-cyber-capabilities-research-and-funding-nato, accessed 7-21-2022//cpd
President Joe Biden announced an expansion of U.S. forces and cyber capabilities to Europe in support of NATO.
"NATO is strong, united, and the steps we're taking during this summit are going to further augment our collective strength," Biden said during the NATO summit in Madrid, Spain, on Wednesday.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg Solvency Updates** › Squo Solves – Generic
John Harper 6-30-2022“New $1B NATO innovation will fund back wide range of emerging Tech”, FedScoop, https://www.fedscoop.com/new-1-billion-nato-innovation-fund-will-back-wide-range-of-emerging-technology///cpd
NATO leaders on Thursday officially launched a $1 billion innovation fund that will invest in companies working on a slew of dual-use technologies with great military potential.
Billed as the world’s first “multi-sovereign” venture capital fund involving 22 nations, it is intended to make long-term investments in startups and other entities developing emerging technologies that the alliance is interested in including artificial intelligence, autonomy, big-data processing, quantum-enabled technologies, biotechnology and human enhancement; novel materials; energy; propulsion and space.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg Solvency Updates** › Turkey Says No
Simon A. Waldman, 6-30-2022, "Two-faced Turkey demands a terrible price for NATO expansion," Haaretz, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/turkey/2022-06-30/ty-article-opinion/.premium/two-faced-turkey-demands-a-terrible-price-for-nato-expansion/00000181-b40c-d445-afbd-bc1cf9960000, accessed 7-20-2022//cpd
Ankara figures that the Turkish she-wolf has no chance against the Russian bear in a head-to-head wrestling match. Instead, Ankara seeks both active engagement with Moscow on a bilateral level, but belligerency through proxies in their overlapping near abroad.
This is how that delicate, if not fragile, balancing act works. Turkey buys Russian S400 surface-to-air missiles and sends ministers to Moscow for strategic discussions, while seeking to advance trade relations. In 2019, before the COVID crisis hit, the volume of that trade stood at $23 billion and the two sides reiterated their goal of making this number reach $100 billion. Energy cooperation is strong with Gazprom having just signed a four-year gas deal with Turkey’s state energy company Botas in January this year, the latest advancement of the Turkstream project, the Russia to Turkey natural gas pipeline. Turkey is predicted to receive 1.5 million Russian tourists this year, including Putin’s oligarchs who can enjoy Turkey’s luxurious resorts without fear of sanction.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg Solvency Updates** › Turkey Says No
Michael Rubin 7-7-2022, “Russia Aims To Paralyze NATO Without A Single Shot”, https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/07/russia-aims-to-paralyze-nato-without-a-single-shot///cpd
Erdogan may be a cynic and Turkey may no longer be deserving of NATO membership, but there is little NATO can do for two reasons: First, there is no mechanism within NATO to expel a wayward member, and, second, the organization governs itself by consensus. There is no difference between the vote of the United States, with 330 million people, Turkey with 85 million, and North Macedonia with 1.8 million.
If Erdogan sympathizes more with Russia than the United States, and all evidence suggests he does, then he and Russian President Vladimir Putin gain more power having Turkey as part of NATO than separate from it because they can use Turkey’s membership to paralyze the alliance from within.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg Solvency Updates** › Turkey Says No
Jonathan Lemire, 6-28-2022, "There’s a strongman holding NATO hostage. And it’s not Putin.," POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/28/nato-kremlin-turkey-00042756, accessed 7-20-2022//cpd
Erdogan has often been the problem child within the alliance.
Despite objections from Washington, Erdogan has purchased S-400 air systems from Russia, helped Iran evade some sanctions and is accused of letting Hamas and ISIS fighters safely transverse his nation’s territory. He stands for reelection next summer after two decades in power, during which he has strengthened his rule through constitutional changes, imprisoning many of his alleged critics and cracking down on the media. Some analysts believe he decided that strong-arming NATO would make for good domestic politics.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg Solvency Updates** › Germany Says No
Judy Dempsey, 1-24-2022, "Why Germany Is Undermining NATO Unity on Russia," Carnegie Europe, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/01/26/why-germany-is-undermining-nato-unity-on-russia-pub-86279, accessed 7-20-2022//cpd
As Russia continues its military buildup along Ukraine’s borders, NATO and the EU are trying to project a strong, united front on these extraordinary and dangerous developments. But Germany is undermining that unity, leaving the West weaker and more divided. Below, Strategic Europe editor-in-chief Judy Dempsey digs into what’s driving Germany’s actions on this latest crisis.
WHY IS GERMANY RELUCTANT TO FOLLOW NATO ALLIES ON UKRAINE?
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg Solvency Updates** › Germany Says No
Peter Rough, 6-16-2022, "Germany’s New Resolve on Russia Is Already Flagging," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/16/germany-scholz-zeitenwende-russia-ukraine-war-defense-security-bundeswehr-nato-military/, accessed 7-20-2022//cpd
When German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stood before his country’s parliament in the first days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and announced a Zeitenwende—or turn of an era—in German foreign policy, his country was agog. So were Germany watchers around the world. The country, Scholz announced, would immediately start rebuilding its military, supplying Ukraine with weapons, and eliminating its energy dependence on Russia. In one speech, he overturned not only decades of Russia policy but also German restraint and pacifism in security and defense. Scholz had taken the initiative without consulting anyone other than his finance minister, flooring even senior members of his own Social Democratic Party, which has a long record advocating for appeasing Russia. For a brief moment, a dramatic shift seemed in the offing.
Alas, the shift has not come to pass. In Berlin last week, German officials and observers described the speech to me as a moment in time rather than a shift in course. In a way, this is unsurprising. A former mayor of Hamburg, Scholz led his party to victory in last year’s election by leaning into the Hanseatic reputation for quiet competence, prudence, and composure. In other words, he sold himself as another version of his predecessor, Angela Merkel, who was known for her understated style and technocratic mastery. Lacking experience in geopolitics, Scholz promised little new in foreign policy.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**Neg Solvency Updates** › France Says No
John Haltiwanger, 7-18-2022, "Former NATO chief rips into Macron for his 'disastrous' suggestion Putin shouldn't be humiliated in Ukraine," Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/former-nato-chief-rips-into-macron-over-approach-to-ukraine-putin-2022-7, accessed 7-20-2022//cpd
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who was secretary-general of NATO from 2009 to 2014, did not pull any punches in his assessment of French President Emmanuel Macron's approach to the Ukraine war and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
In a new interview with the Atlantic, Rasmussen was especially critical of Macron's "disastrous" suggestion that the West should avoid humiliating Putin in Ukraine to keep the door open for a diplomatic resolution to the conflict, while excoriating France in terms of the military aid its provided to Kyiv in comparison to other Western powers. He also took aim at Macron's "unsuccessful" efforts at "telephone diplomacy with Putin."
2022
Michigan
Negative
Warren
Paul McCleary 18. Pentagon Correspondent at Breaking Defense. “Pentagon’s Big AI Program, Maven, Already Hunts Data in Middle East, Africa”. Breaking Defense. 5/1/18. https://breakingdefense.com/2018/05/pentagons-big-ai-program-maven-already-hunts-data-in-middle-east-africa/
Just a year after its birth, the Pentagon’s cornerstone artificial intelligence effort, Project Maven, has already been deployed to half a dozen locations in the Middle East and Africa, where it is helping military analysts sort through the mountains of data their sensors and drones soak up.
Military leaders have said for months that the program was being used to organize and analyze video and data pulled from drones in the Middle East. But its early success and the push from Washington to move out on AI as quickly as possible has led the Pentagon to expand to AFRICOM, one military official involved in the program said on Tuesday.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Warren
Ramsay-Jones 19 – Hayley Ramsay-Jones, Soka Gakkai International, member of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, October 17, 2019, “Racism and Fully Autonomous Weapons UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, workshop on the impact of new information technologies on racial equality, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Racism/SR/Call/campaigntostopkillerrobots.pdf
Fully autonomous weapons can select and attack targets without meaningful human control, they operate based on algorithms and data analysis programming. In essence, this means that machines would have the power to make life-and-death decisions over human beings. The trend towards more autonomy in weaponry without adequate human oversight is alarming especially when we know that digital technologies are not racially neutral. Moreover, when it comes to artificial intelligence (AI) there is an increasing body of evidence that shows that racism operates at every level of the design process and continues to emerge in the production, implementation, distribution and regulation. In this regard AI not only embodies the values and beliefs of the society or individuals that produce them but acts to amplify these biases and the power disparities.iii One example of racism manifesting in AI is the under-representation problem in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) fields, which in itself is a manifestation of structural racism and patriarchy in western society. Technologies in the west are mostly 2 developed by white males, and thus perform better for this group. A 2010 studyiv by researchers at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the University of Texas, found that algorithms designed and tested in East Asia are better at recognizing East Asians, while those designed in Western countries are more accurate at detecting Caucasians. Similarly, sound detecting devices perform better at detecting male, Anglo-American voices and accents, as opposed to female voices, and non-Anglo-American accents. Research by Joy Buolamwini,v reveals that race, skin tone and gender are significant when it comes to facial recognition. Buolamwini demonstrates that facial recognition software recognizes male faces far more accurately than female faces, especially when these faces are white. For darker-skinned people however the error rates were over 19%, and unsurprisingly the systems performed especially badly when presented with the intersection between race and gender, evidenced by a 34.4% error margin when recognizing dark-skinned women. Despite the concerning error rates in these systems, commercially we already see adaptations of faulty facial recognition systems being rolled out in a variety of ways from soap dispensers to self-driving cars. The issue here is what happens if law enforcement and national security become reliant on a system that can recognize white males with just 1% error rate yet fails to recognize dark-skinned women more than one-third of the time? These types of applications of new information technology fail people of color intersectionally at a disturbing rate. The fact that these systems are commercially available reveals a blatant disregard for people of color, it also positions "whiteness"vi as the norm, the standard for objectivity and reason. These applications of new information technology including their weaponization favors whiteness at the expense of all others, it is not merely a disempowerment but an empowerment. In real terms, racism bolsters white people's life chances. Vii
2022
Michigan
Negative
Warren
Adam Smith 22. Adam Smith is a PhD Candidate with the Humans Technology Law Centre and the Australian Centre for Health Law Research located at the School of Law, Queensland University of Technology. Adam researches the boundaries between humans and technology. LAW, Technology, and Humans. “Drones as Techno-legal Assemblages”. https://lthj.qut.edu.au/article/view/2333
Paul Kahn has argued that drone war ‘no longer looks like war’.115 Kahn’s conception of what war looks like involves sovereign states engaging in combat with their regular armed forces using methods that involve mutual risk.116 Since drone wars are not waged against other territorially bound sovereign states, or against a group resembling armed forces, and without mutual risk, Kahn places drone wars in a zone of exception that is neither regulated by normal law nor ordered by the laws of war. 117 However, drone wars as asymmetrical conflicts against non-sovereign groups are not a ‘new form of violence’.118 Rather, as Samuel Moyn observes, they are a successor to colonial warfare.119 Taking a broader perspective heeds the call of Deleuze, for whom ‘the machines don’t explain anything, you have to analyze the collective apparatuses of which the machines are just one component’.120 What separates drone wars from prior conflicts is not, Moyn argues, the technology itself, or who uses it against whom, but rather the place of the law.121 Before 1977, he notes, the laws of war did not apply to insurgents, while today they are ‘highly legalized’.122 Drones are part of a larger trajectory in which the laws of war apply to more subjects, in more spaces, rather than fewer.
Ioannis Kalpouzos notes that lawyers are involved ‘in decision making at different levels and stages of the targeting process’.123 Military lawyers based at the Combined Air and Space Operations Center are part of a plethora of individuals who watch the drone and provide advice.124 These lawyers are called on to dispense immediate advice: ‘target prosecutions must be completed in a matter of minutes.’125 They also provide policies and ‘provide training products so aircrews and (joint terminal attack controllers) are prepared to operate rapidly’.126 The place of lawyers in the drone assemblage highlights what David Kennedy calls the ‘war-generative functions of law’: the military ‘turns to law to discipline the troops, to justify, excuse, and privilege battlefield violence, to build the institutional and logistical framework from which to launch the spear’.127 In 2011, a single drone required up to 185 personnel to operate128 across different bases and continents—an operation that resembles the complexity of an aircraft carrier, ‘requiring a complex and entrenched culture of standard practices and shared experiences, of rules and discipline’.129 Drone operations are so specialised that they are producing new forms of legal expertise.130
2022
Michigan
Negative
Rememory
Docherty, 2018 - senior researcher in the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch [Bonnie August 21, “Heed the Call A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots” Acc 12/27/20 TA]
Due to their lack of emotion and legal and ethical judgment, fully autonomous weapons would face significant obstacles in complying with the principles of humanity. Those principles require the humane treatment of others and respect for human life and human dignity. Humans are motivated to treat each other humanely because they feel compassion and empathy for their fellow humans. Legal and ethical judgment gives people the means to minimize harm; it enables them to make considered decisions based on an understanding of a particular context. As machines, fully autonomous weapons would not be sentient beings capable of feeling compassion. Rather than exercising judgment, such weapons systems would base their actions on pre-programmed algorithms, which do not work well in complex and unpredictable situations. Showing respect for human life entails minimizing killing. Legal and ethical judgment helps humans weigh different factors to prevent arbitrary and unjustified loss of life in armed conflict and beyond. It would be difficult to recreate such judgment, developed over both human history and an individual life, in fully autonomous weapons, and they could not be pre-programmed to deal with every possible scenario in accordance with accepted legal and ethical norms. Furthermore, most humans possess an innate resistance to killing that is based on their understanding of the impact of loss of life, which fully autonomous weapons, as inanimate machines, could not share. Even if fully autonomous weapons could adequately protect human life, they would be incapable of respecting human dignity. Unlike humans, these robots would be unable to appreciate fully the value of a human life and the significance of its loss. They would make life-and-death decisions based on algorithms, reducing their human targets to objects. Fully autonomous weapons would thus violate the principles of humanity on all fronts.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Rememory
Timothy Snyder 22, 4-28-2022, "The War in Ukraine Is a Colonial War," New Yorker, https://www.newyorker.com/news/essay/the-war-in-ukraine-is-a-colonial-war
When Vladimir Putin denies the reality of the Ukrainian state, he is speaking the familiar language of empire. For five hundred years, European conquerors called the societies that they encountered “tribes,” treating them as incapable of governing themselves. As we see in the ruins of Ukrainian cities, and in the Russian practice of mass killing, rape, and deportation, the claim that a nation does not exist is the rhetorical preparation for destroying it. Empire’s story divides subjects from objects. As the philosopher Frantz Fanon argued, colonizers see themselves as actors with purpose, and the colonized as instruments to realize the imperial vision. Putin took a pronounced colonial turn when returning to the Presidency a decade ago. In 2012, he described Russia as a “state-civilization,” which by its nature absorbed smaller cultures such as Ukraine’s. The next year, he claimed that Russians and Ukrainians were joined in “spiritual unity.” In a long essay on “historical unity,” published last July, he argued that Ukraine and Russia were a single country, bound by a shared origin. His vision is of a broken world that must be restored through violence. Russia becomes itself only by annihilating Ukraine. As the objects of this rhetoric, and of the war of destruction that it sanctions, Ukrainians grasp all of this. Ukraine does have a history, of course, and Ukrainians do constitute a nation. But empire enforces objectification on the periphery and amnesia at the center. Thus modern Russian imperialism includes memory laws that forbid serious discussion of the Soviet past. It is illegal for Russians to apply the word “war” to the invasion of Ukraine. It is also illegal to say that Stalin began the Second World War as Hitler’s ally, and used much the same justification to attack Poland as Putin is using to attack Ukraine. When the invasion began, in February, Russian publishers were ordered to purge mentions of Ukraine from textbooks. Faced with the Kremlin’s official mixture of fantasy and taboo, the temptation is to prove the opposite: that it is Ukraine rather than Russia that is eternal, that it is Ukrainians, not Russians, who are always right, and so on. Yet Ukrainian history gives us something more interesting than a mere counter-narrative to empire. We can find Ukrainian national feeling at a very early date. In contemporary Ukraine, though, the nation is not so much anti-colonial, a rejection of a particular imperial power, as post-colonial, the creation of something new.