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2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › AT Thesis

Sweeping theories of radical indigenous ontological difference ignore the nuances of actual struggles that strategically repurpose settler categories

Rosenow, 19—Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Oxford Brookes University (Doerthe, “Decolonising the Decolonisers? Of Ontological Encounters in the GMO Controversy and Beyond,” Global Society, 33:1, 82-99)

Despite the force and importance of this argument, I have felt slightly uneasy when reading those conclusions. Focusing on radical ontological difference can easily lead to a romanticised reification of other peoples’ difference that is in danger of ignoring actual political struggles and demands on the ground. As Cusicanqui argues, those struggles might very well emerge out of an “indigenous modernity”, rather than an insistence on the right to one’s difference. By this she means that some Indigenous people aim to formulate a hegemonic vision for how to structure a society that is valid for everyone (Indigenous AND non-Indigenous): they work for a society that is in their “image and likeness”, and to use modern notions such as “citizenship” for this purpose, rather than rejecting the latter as irreconcilable with one’s own world.39 By contrast, some North American Indigenous intellectuals call for an Indigenous “resurgence” that, rather than seeking hegemony, altogether turns away from seeking recognition by wider (colonial) “society”. As Leanne Betasamosake Simpson points out, in such “resurgent mobilization … there is virtually no room for white people”. 40 But my unease was also emerging from something else, which is what I want to focus on in this article: the problem that encounters and conflicts are yet again made sense of within overarching structures of knowledge production rather than cultivation (despite the intention to do otherwise). As de la Cadena herself makes clear in the quotation above, what is encountered as “different” is inevitably described “in forms that I could understand” (my emphasis)—even whilst simultaneously recognising that one’s description does not capture what the encountered practices actually do. Sense-making, for de la Cadena, takes place at what could be called two levels: At a first level, there is the inevitable process of making sense of an alienating affective experience on the spot, from within one’s own framework of understanding the world. At a second level, then, de la Cadena attempts to make legible her grappling and not-understanding in the context of a book for an academically literate and interested audience—in other words, in the writing-up of her ethnographic research. In Rojas’ and Blaney and Tickner’s case, given that their articles do not aim to make an empirical contribution, sense-making takes place at what could be called a third level: what is drawn upon is the understanding that emerged out of the ethnographic work of others, which is brought into conversation with various bodies of theoretical work in order to make a conceptual contribution. This takes place via the coining of central concepts and the outlining of all-encompassing frameworks that are meant to help us understand the analytical, normative and political consequences of their argument for scholarly work more broadly. The ontological encounters of others are used to delineate the merits of ontological encounters in general, in IR and beyond. This objective leads to a particular way of developing and structuring a generic argument that makes it difficult to move beyond sense-making frameworks that are necessarily geared towards settling all those unsettling and disconcerting experiences that were the focus of the articles in the first place. This is also the problem of some central decolonial work. Drawing on Edouard Glissant, Mignolo, for example, critiques the “requirement of transparency” that forms the basis for understanding in Western social science scholarship. He argues for the “right to opacity” of those located on the other side of the colonial difference.41 But this claim sits at odds with his simultaneous desire to write a new, all-encompassing history of “the modern/colonial world system”. 42 And like in Rojas’ and Blaney and Tickner’s articles, terms such as “pluriversality”43 or “diversality”44 are coined in order to have a (one!) concept for a similarly all-encompassing solution to domination. While de la Cadena is critical of her own “anxiety to understand coherently (with which I meant clearly and without contradiction”), and while she points out how this “was often out of place”, 45 Mignolo as well as Rojas and Blaney and Tickner seek to place such anxiety in yet another coherent framework that holds everything together. The question arises whether this can be any different in scholarly work that is not directly based on ethnographic research itself, and which can therefore not lay claim to a direct experience of ontological controversies. This has become an important question for my own (likewise third-level) work on anti-GMO activism. My work to date has primarily aimed at making a conceptual contribution, and has relied on a conversation between the ethnographic research of others and various bodies of conceptual work, including decolonial and “ontological turn” literature.46 But as I have already indicated in relation to de la Cadena’s work, when writing up their research for academic purposes, even those who have directly experienced ontological encounters find it hard to resist the tendency to conclude their work with stringent, overarching, coherent conclusions that the Westerneducated reader can grasp and “take home”. In the next section, I will draw on two anthropological ethnographic texts that are significant for research on the GMO controversy to show how this works. The two texts that will be analysed in the next section engage with the GMO controversy in Paraguay and Mexico respectively, and they have stood out for me in the way they manage to convey a sense of unease and grappling with ontological encounters and conflicts. However, as the next section will show, they as well end up providing a framework and conclusions that can accommodate and make sense of the encountered ontological difference. 3. Ontological Encounters in the GMO Controversy According to Susana Carro-Ripalda and Marta Astier, much of the research that is carried out in relation to the question of what smallholder producers in the Global South truly think of (and say about) agricultural biotechnology is unable to grasp the “ontological incompatibility” that exists between the experienced human/nonhuman relations in small-scale agriculture on the one hand, and the logic that underlies genetic engineering (GE) on the other.47 This is precisely because most social research is itself grounded in the crucial modern/colonial nature-culture divide: the former can only be known through scientific means, while the latter can be known through the study of social/cultural/political practices. Knowledge about nature is about establishing “facts”, which are either true or false (i.e. nature as “one” is either correctly or incorrectly represented), while knowledge about culture is about studying meaning, which is necessarily (due to the existence of different cultures) multiple. The question of whether GMOs do or do not pose a “factual” danger consequently lies outside of the remit of the social sciences, which therefore focus on the social dimension of statements that are made about nature. But as Kregg Hetherington’s reflections on his own anthropological research journey in Paraguay make clear, this tacit signing-up to modern ontology can lead to difficulties in understanding the reality of the people one is interested in.48 Coming from a position in which he took for granted the scientific distinction between (proven) “fact” and “error”, Hetherington explains how he “translate[d]” the claims of the leader of a local peasant movement49 (Antonio) about the truth of (GM) soy “killer beans” into something else: Until this point, I had approached ethnography as an extended discussion with and about humans, and I was less interested in beans than I was with what Antonio said about them … To be blunt, Antonio kept pointing at the beans, and I kept looking at him … I was comfortable saying that this was a figure of speech, a kind of political rhetoric, or even to claim that this is what Antonio believed, all of which explicitly framed ‘la soja mata’ (soy kills) as data for social analysis, rather than analysis itself worthy of response.50 However, Hetherington points out that not believing in the truth of the killer bean did not prevent him from “participating in Antonio’s knowledge practices”. 51 Becoming involved in the anti-soy bean activism of the peasants, Hetherington became “part of the situation” that made the killer bean turn into a crucial agent in a court case that was brought against two soy farmers for the murder of two activist peasants. As a result, killer beans became transformed into a matter of national concern. Crucially for Hetherington, participation involved more than joining the situation in spite of his lack of belief: it led to him becoming immersed in a relation with both peasants and beans that started to have a physical impact on him—in de la Cadena’s words, he indeed became “partially connected”: 52 Beans didn’t scare me at first. Indeed, as a foreigner to the situation that gives rise to killer beans (a Canadian no less), giant fields of soy were a familiar, even a comforting sight. But it took only a few months with Antonio for me to start feeling the menace from those fields. Soon, the sweetish smell of glyphosate, recently applied, and especially the corpselike smell of 2, 4-D mixed with Tordon, could ruin my appetite and make me expect to see people emerge from their homes to show me pustules on their legs and stomachs.53 Similar observations are also found in Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s contribution to the 2014 Agriculture and Human Values symposium on the challenges of making smallholder producer voices being heard in relation to agricultural biotechnology.54 While most of the contributions to the symposium concentrate on how to tease out smallholders’ “real” voices in the most effective way, Carro-Ripalda and Astier critically reflect on their own perceived failure to become knowledgeable about smallholders’ voices in their research on GM maize cultivation in Mexico. It was through ethnographic fieldwork in rural areas in Central Mexico, in-depth structured interviews, focus groups, participant observation and, finally, a National Workshop in Mexico City with over 50 stakeholders (including smallholder producers) that Carro-Ripalda and Astier attempted to get a better sense of what the actual voices of peasants in the GM controversy were trying to convey.55 However, particularly the final workshop, which aimed to create conditions under which Mexican smallholder producers could speak on their own terms about GM maize cultivation, “unwittingly reproduced the conditions of exclusive, techno-scientific and regulatory spaces”. 56 The public discourse that centres on questions of safety, science, possibilities of regulation and problems of potential contamination, and which is upheld by both GM maize proponents and antiGMO activists, dominated the workshop debate. Even when present smallholders raised different concerns, the discussion always returned to the previous, main ones, as if those who had spoken differently “had not spoken at all”. The way that smallholders could articulate “their perceptions, ideas, and desires” was thereby “severely limited”. 57 Carro-Ripalda and Astier are focused on the dominance of one particular (techno-scientific, regulatory) discourse that, they maintain, disabled smallholder voices engaged in different discourses from speaking up or, when speaking, from being heard. In other words, smallholders were unable to adequately represent their own understanding of what is at stake in the GM maize controversy in Mexico. Considering what I have pointed out in the previous section, based on Rojas, difference is thereby transformed into an epistemological, rather than an ontological one: Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s argument is implicitly based on the assumption that, under the right conditions, difference can be translated into something that can be communicated to, and discussed with, other stakeholders. But the term “ontological incompatibility” that the authors themselves use indicates there is something else at play, which cannot easily be translated: the nature of the relation of smallholder producers to their “land, seed, crop, climate … as told and understood by themselves”; the “central place” that Maize continues to occupy in Mesoamerican pre-Hispanic cosmology, and “the social and cultural significance” that goes along with that.58 Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s emphasis on the problem of the dominant discourse, and the overarching Mexican structures of domination this discourse is related to (such as the “neoliberal vision of the Mexican agricultural future”59), makes it occasionally difficult to understand what the problem of “ontological incompatibility” really is about. At the end of the article, the place of the smallholder producers whom they have engaged seems once again clearly delineated and knowable: at stake for smallholders are, Carro-Ripalda and Astier argue, “their lives as maize cultivators, their pride in their craft and knowledge, and their ceremonially demanded right to information, choice and access to their ‘own resources’”. It is not just about “retaining ‘traditional’ ways of agriculture”, as the anti-GMO movement maintains, but also about claiming “political, economic and socio-cultural rights.”60 Though this certainly adds a significant dimension to the debate, it indeed simply seems to add to, rather than radically challenge, the frameworks that are conventionally used in the anti-GMO debate, as well as the frameworks that focus on how to bring out and represent other people’s “voices” in a better way. Is this simply unavoidable when it comes to the production of academic knowledge through/in academic writing? As already indicated in the previous section, academic writing pursues by definition the objective of enhancing knowledge and providing improved insight into a certain situation. In its very structure, an academic piece of work aims to resolve and settle, rather than to dislocate, to destabilise, or to provide discomfort. Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s article is meant to render legible their own encounter of ontological difference for an academic audience. Is it possible for the reader to dig below these representational strategies, and to relate more directly to their encounter of what they themselves call ontological incompatibility? And which has led them to brand their final workshop, in a quite un-academic way, as a “failure”? There are a few places in the article in which their inability to put into words and arguments all of “the complexity of experiences, relations and reasons that bind people to maize”61 is more obvious. Becoming attuned to this complexity is linked to the authors having to become at least “partially connected”—to yet again use de la Cadena’s phrase—to the relations they attempt to trace. It is interesting, for example, that Carro-Ripalda and Astier talk about “voices” as going beyond the semantic level, as conveying something acoustically, and as requiring a form of listening that shies away from asking pre-given questions. It is also interesting that some of that took place when they literally walked together with their interlocutors; precisely as it is emphasised by Blaney and Tickner:62 Despite the shortcomings of the workshop … we felt that that, through our research on the ground, we had engaged with male and female farmers, heard about their perspectives on GM and their visions of a rural future, and accompanied them to work in milpas and markets. So, what do smallholder farmers’ voices sound like? What meanings did they convey to us? We will provide here but a few of those sounds and meanings … 63 Despite returning to the idea of voices as conveying “meaning” in this quote, meaning is related to sounds, to walking together, to particular places with their own sounds, smells, and colours. The sample of actual “voices” Carro-Ripalda and Astier then choose to present yet again invoke an intricate sense of the relationality of farmers and nonhumans: It is a joy to plant, getting hold of the maize, of a beautiful cob which is pleasant, to go to the harvest, to look at pretty cobs, all regular. Because this is what sustains me. You can see the difference in the seeds straight away … You need to look at the cob and as soon as I grab it I see the difference. It is the person who knows the seed the one who chooses it [for replanting the following year].64 By contrast, GM maize is associated by the smallholders whom Carro-Ripalda and Astier cite with feelings of “artificiality, estrangement and distrust towards the created object (the GMO) in itself, not only because of deep ontological considerations … but because of the political and economic motives which are ‘assembled’ into it.”65 Although the authors make a distinction between ontology and politics/ economics here, their invoking of the “assemblage” precisely shows how the latter becomes part of ontology itself, and then (as in the case of Hetherington) impacts on the sensual, bodily connection with the maize. Understanding the relation between “things” in this way allows for an analysis of power and domination that has at least the potential of moving beyond pre-given frameworks; strategically suspending them in order to “sharpen [the] analysis of exactly how power operates, how relations are made and undermined, and with what consequences”. 66 Genetically modified maize is a problem because it is part of particular Mexican neoliberal visions and strategies, but in the context outlined by Carro-Ripalda and Astier, that vision is not only (and not even primarily) made sense of through given frames of knowledge, such as Marxist theories of the exploitation of labour, but sensually, through the way it disrupts the (physical) pleasure and joy that has sustained the farmer-maize-assemblage so far.67 GM technology externalises the maize from farmers and estrange them from their ways of life; and it is only through this externalisation that GM maize becomes perceivable as a potential source of “contamination”, as a danger against which farmers need to “defend” their seeds.68 Now, some might counter that the previous paragraph in practice only provides a fancy repackaging of the two well-rehearsed arguments brought forward by many anti-GMO activists: (a) that the problem of GMOs is an intrinsic property that makes it “unsafe” (which activists try to scientifically prove), and/or (b) that the fundamental problem of agricultural biotechnology is that it estranges farmers from their traditional, ancestral way of life, that it allows for their exploitation, and that it provides a further foothold for neoliberal visions of how the world should be ordered. Both arguments are grounded in modern ontology: the first goes down the route of science (contesting “facts” about the “nature” of GMOs on the basis of science itself), while the second goes down the “social” route by either making a case for the need to respect cultural multiplicity, or for the need to prevent economic exploitation. Some activists make use of all of these routes and arguments. Famous environmental activist and intellectual Vandana Shiva, for example, determines the alienating character of the GMO to be an intrinsic property, while at the same time depicting smallholder producers as intrinsic “‘reservoirs’ of local or indigenous knowledge or as ‘natural’ conservators of biodiversity through their traditional practices”. 69 According to Carro-Ripalda and Astier, this “unwittingly reinforce[es] images of smallholder producers as passive, timeless and voiceless.”70 This leads to precisely the sort of romanticised reification of “difference” that I have critiqued in the previous section of this article—paradoxically, in this case, on the basis of an ontology that is deeply modern, as it regards both “things” and “people” as ontologically stable and classifiable. By contrast, the authors of the two texts I have analysed in this section trace ontological encounters that cannot be contained by the nature/culture dichotomy. There is no pre-given (social) theory of neoliberalism and global power relations that dictates how the “voice” of the farmer needs to be made sense of. There is also no pregiven understanding of the “factual” (scientific) nature of GMOs. The notion of radical difference that comes up in these two texts emerged from precisely the “misunderstandings” that the encounter of ethnographers with “other people” and their relations brought to the fore; but importantly, it did not make any clearer to the ethnographer what the “stuff” that grounded the misunderstandings is actually composed of.71 Yet, somewhat paradoxically, despite all this emphasis on misunderstandings, incompatibility, grappling, failure, and critical self-reflection of one’s own assumptions—at the end of the day what is left for the readers (at least if they do not explicitly focus on the “ethnographic excess” found in the writings) is the impression that they know more about “stuff” than they did before: that they understand the situation better, that new knowledge has been produced, that the object of analysis is more transparent than it has been before. How can this subjugation of the encountered ontologically difference to academic strategies of comprehensive sense-making avoided (if at all)? This article itself is now coming up to what would normally be a conclusion—i.e. the treacherous waters of nailing its contribution to knowledge. Given that this article is yet again another “third-level” engagement with questions of ontology and decoloniality, the question is whether there is any way to avoid this pull of hegemonic modes of academic knowledge production. Rather than providing a conclusion and reiterate the core argument that the article has made, I will attempt to finish this piece by raising even more questions, and by providing some further reflections. 4. Turtles all the Way Down: (Further) Reflections on What Questions to Ask The pull of hegemonic systems of academic knowledge production is difficult to avoid. This is the case even in writings that are directly based on ontological encounters and controversies, and that reflect on the displacement that encountering different ontologies has entailed. But as I have indicated, this problem is even more pronounced in writings—like my own—that provide what I have previously called “third-level” sense-making of ontological encounters. The contribution of third-level analysis is usually a conceptual one, which makes it by definition veer towards the general and abstract rather than the concrete. In relation to the literature on decolonial thought and the ontological turn, this becomes manifest in three different (yet interrelated) ways: first, in the desire to provide an understanding of ontology that enables a conceptualisation of the former as multiple. Drawing on the work of Mario Blaser and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro respectively, Rojas and Blaney and Tickner argue that ontology can be thought of as multiple if reality is understood as always being “enacted” or “performed”. 72 This is what Blaser calls an understanding of ontology as “materialsemiotic”: one that defines reality as “always in the making through the dynamic relations of hybrid assemblages”. 73 Pinpointing it like this is inevitably geared towards answering the question of what reality as such, in general is about. Secondly, there is an ambition to coin the general normative-political project that arises out of this understanding with a singular concept, such as the pluriverse. Thirdly, arguments about ontological multiplicity and the emancipatory-decolonial political projects that arise out of its recognition are written for an audience of a particular discipline, such as IR: the aim is to provide a wholesale, general rethinking, or, indeed, “reconstruction” of the latter.74 What sort of questions drive conceptual work into that direction, and what desire “to know” underlies the questions? According to Cherokee philosopher Brian Yazzie Burkhart, for Native Americans “the questions we choose to ask are more important than any truths we might hope to discover in asking such questions”. 75 By contrast, Western knowledge is always (at least in the mainstream) propositional knowledge: “knowledge of the form ‘that something is so’”. Here, knowledge cannot be verified by referring to direct experiences: “there must be something underlying them and justifying them”. 76 Burkhart gives the example of the “routine response” given by “Western people” to Indigenous accounts of creation: “In [one] account, the earth rests on the back of a turtle. The Western response to this account is simply the question, ‘What holds the turtle?’” This question makes no sense to the Native storyteller, because the truth of the story lies in the paths to rightful action that it outlines, rather than what it has to say about the “reality” of the world. But when the Westerner insists on the question, the answer finally is: “‘Well, then there must be turtles all the way down’.”77 Equating Rojas’ and Blaney and Tickner’s work with European mainstream (hence analytic) philosophy seems, at first glance, incredibly unfair. After all, those authors precisely advocate the cultivating of knowledge by direct awareness or acquaintance in exactly the way that Burkhart identifies as typical for Native Americans. But on the other hand, the framework that circumscribes their emphasis on the need for “concreteness” is still an abstract one that wants to answer the question of how things really are and should be: enacted, performed, pluriversal, … The point is not whether this argument about reality and politics is right or wrong. The point is to recognise that it is driven by particular questions that might make no sense in the context of other intelligence systems, but that need to be addressed in an academic article in order to make a conceptual argument compelling, convincing and original for an audience that primarily sits (whether it likes it or not) within a Western, colonial, hegemonic system of knowledge production.78 And even when the contribution to knowledge production is not primarily conceptual, as in the “second-level” work that I have analysed in the previous section in relation to the GMO controversy, the final argument that is made (e.g. about peasants’ economic and cultural rights) is yet again lucid and comprehensible to an audience that seeks to comprehend “stuff” within modern parameters. Where to go from here (particularly as a white, European scholar)? As suggested by Tucker, one way might be to engage in much more direct, ethnographic research, which would enable more direct experience of ontological encounters. Despite previously-mentioned problems of even that research not going far enough, there is without doubt more space for providing a sense of grappling and dislocation if the originality of a piece of work is not purely grounded in the conceptual contribution it aims to make. However, not every scholar is able— body-, context- or funding-wise—to spend extensive periods of time in different places, and the ethical and political pitfalls of researching “radical difference” through fieldwork with—but often rather on—others have been pointed out by Indigenous scholars numerous times.79 But even for those unable or unwilling to do more primary, empirical research, there is space to push the boundaries of what can and should be written about (and how). For decades there have been attempts to provide “innovative” platforms, for example at conferences, to talk about “stuff” in different ways (e.g. through storytelling or artistic practices; not at least by e.g. Indigenous peoples themselves80). However, these “innovations” are still at the margins, and they will most likely never be able to compete with acknowledged knowledge production outlets such as journal articles and scholarly books. But even within the latter, there is always at least some space to push for more open-endedness, more reflection on the author’s embodied positionality, more auto-critique, more uncertainty and grappling (even if this is based on reading about the ontological encounters of others). Although this sort of embodied self-reflection on a writer’s “situatedness” (which in my own case means being “on the colonising side of a divide”81) has obviously been advanced by many critical scholars for decades (including feminists and post- as well as decolonial scholars), this article has hopefully shown that there is still (always) a need to go further, in order to more fundamentally challenge hegemonic, modern/colonial modes of knowledge production. The sense of unease that I have outlined in section two was particularly strong when reading conclusions that were geared towards making recommendations for the discipline of IR, or for “international politics”, as such. Aiming to make generic conclusions for entire disciplines, political fields, or global “issues” pushes the generality and abstraction of a contribution even further away from an advocacy of the concrete. Why, and to whom, does it matter whether IR, as a discipline, or international politics, as object of study, becomes more pluriversal or not? What are the actual benefits of the concept of the pluriverse in the first place? Or to pick up the theme of this special issue: why does it matter whether IR is, or should move into, a mode of affirmation rather than critique?82 Why is this a good question to ask—and for whom? This is not just a theoretical problem, but it has real-life consequences for actually-existing decolonial struggles. The desire for making a generic argument about relational ontologies and a pluriversal politics harbours the danger of making a huge variety of demands and struggles that often exist in tension and contradiction with each other commensurable. Indigenous demands for the repatriation of “their” land might be at odds with the social justice demands for redistribution and “the commons”. 83 For Blaney and Tickner, decolonial thought is commensurable with not just the ontological turn literature, but also feminist and other critical interventions.84 Mignolo and Arturo Escobar advocate a transnational fight for global justice and are enthusiastic about the potential of global movements to achieve that aim together.85 Like Mignolo, Rojas explicitly draws on the World Social Forum slogan “Another world is possible” as well as the Zapatistas slogan of “a world where many words fit” to make her case about the need for a pluriversal understanding of emancipatory-decolonial politics.86 While it can be argued that this problem of seeing all these struggles and demands as commensurable goes back to a lack of actual engagement with particular decolonial practices and battles, what I have argued in this article is that it is also related to the problem of how and what sort of knowledge is produced and valued in the Western academy: knowledge that is abstract, generic, and applicable beyond a specific context. Knowledge that is driven by the desire to know what is. Knowledge that desires to know what holds the turtle—all the way down.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › AT Thesis

Settler colonialism is an essentialist framework – in its desire to simplify the Native/Settler binary, it reproduces epistemological whiteness and undermines Indigenous knowledge

Andersen 9 (Chris, Associate Professor of Native Studies at Alberta, “critical indigenous studies From Difference to Density”, Cultural Studies Review, Vol. 15 No 2 2009, pg. 80-100) //Don Markos

Champagne’s abstraction, imprecision and internal contradictions make it difficult to produce definitive conclusions about his work. However, Indigeneity-as-different constitutes a major staple of his argument and even a sympathetic reading requires some agility to avoid the essentialism which grounds it. My point is this: Champagne’s argument that the ‘continued emphasis on how race and ethnic identity in mainstream institutions tends to overshadow the less well understood perspectives of an Indigenous paradigm grounded in the cultures, sovereignty, identities, land, and nation building of indigenous peoples’42 loses its relevance if it fails to include a precise explanation of what the latter terms mean and how they differ from ‘race’ and ‘ethnic identity’. His repeated failure to delineate them leaves little analytical purchase to deal with the complexities of being Indigenous in modern, Western societies, either with respect to how we identify ourselves, how we critique dominant, whitestream representations or how we employ Western discursive authorities in our daily struggles. For example, Champagne proposes that ‘[i]mproving existing theories or categorizations [of Western disciplines] will involve significant revision, and it is doubtful that existing theories can conceptualize or explain the cultural, land, self-government, and col- onial histories of Indigenous nations’;43 and further, that ‘most current theories do not provide powerful enough tools for explaining the Indigenous experience’.44 One of many questions which arise from such statements, of course, is the extent to which Indigenous studies—which must necessarily place itself within the same academic relations of power that shape ‘Western’ disciplines—can under any circumstances cash the kind of cheque Champagne is writing on its behalf (more on this in part three). Of more immediate concern: given that Native studies must operate within the forms of power and associated conditions of possibility that characterise other academic disciplines, what allows it to step outside in ways the other disciplines cannot? For Champagne, it is our valorisation of Indigenous epistemologies. Given the centrality of his criticism of Western concepts, his positioning of their central terms deserves to be quoted in their full length, pre- cisely because they explicate the conceptual bases from which he launches his critique of Western disciplines: race: ‘Race and critical race theories focus on marginalization of socially conceived racial groups and provide critiques of dominant group methods of oppression and control ... the focus of race and critical race theories tends to assume achievement of equality and inclusion into US society as a primary goal.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › AT Thesis

Now is the time to rethink the way we think about outer space by shifting to an indigenous engagement with it

Smiles 20 (Deondre, “The Settler Logic of (Outer) Space”, October 26, 2020, AB

Indigenous Engagement with ‘Space’ [image omitted] "River of Souls" by Carl Gawboy (as published in Indian Country Today, 4/2/16) I want to now turn our attention towards the possibilities that exist regarding Indigenous engagement with outer space. After all, the timing could not be more urgent to do so—we are now at a point where after generations and generations of building the myth that America was built out of nothing, we are now ready to resume the project of extending the reach of American military and economic might in space. To be fair, there are plenty of advances that can be made scientifically with a renewed focus on space exploration. However, history shows us that space exploration has been historically tied to military hegemony, and there is nothing in Mr. Trump’s temperament or attitude towards a re-engagement with space that suggest that his push toward the stars will be anything different. A sustained conversation needs to be had—will this exploration be ethical and beneficial to all Americans? One potential avenue of Indigenous involvement comes through the active involvement of Indigenous peoples and Indigenous perspectives in space exploration, of course. This involvement can be possible through viewing outer space through a ‘decolonial’ lens, for instance. Astronomers such as Prescod-Weinstein and Walkowicz have spoken about the need to avoid replicating colonial frameworks of occupation and use of space when exploring places such as Mars, for example (Mandelbaum, 2018). The rise of logics of resource extraction in outer-space bodies have led to engagements by other academics such as Alice Gorman on the agency and personhood of the Moon. Collaborations between Indigenous people and space agencies such as NASA help provide the Indigenous perspective inside space exploration and the information that is gleaned from it, with implications both in space and on a Earth that is dealing with climate crisis (Bean, 2018; Bartels, 2019). Another potential avenue of engagement with Indigenous methodologies and epistemologies related to space comes with engaging with Indigenous thinkers who are already deeply immersed into explorations of Indigenous ‘space’ here on Earth—the recent works of Indigenous thinkers such as Waziyatawin (2008) Leanne Betasamosake Simpson (2017), Natchee Blu Barnd (2018) and others provide a unique viewpoint into the ways that Indigenous peoples make and remake space—perhaps this can provide another blueprint for how we might engage with space beyond Earth. And that is just the work that exists within the academic canon. Indigenous people have always been engaged with the worlds beyond the Earth, in ways that often stood counter to accepted ‘settler’ conventions of space exploration (Young, 1987). In one example, when asked about the Moon landings, several Inuit said, "We didn't know this was the first time you white people had been to the moon. Our shamans have been going for years. They go all the time...We do go to visit the moon and moon people all the time. The issue is not whether we go to visit our relatives, but how we treat them and their homeland when we go (Young, 1987: 272).” In another example, turning to my own people, the Ojibwe, we have long standing cultural connections to the stars that influence storytelling, governance, and religious tenets (CHIN, 2003). This engagement continues through to the present day, and points to a promising future. A new generation of Indigenous artists, filmmakers, and writers are beginning to create works that place the Indigenous individual themselves into narratives of space travel and futurity, unsettling existing settler notions of what our future in space might look like. As Leo Cornum (2015) writes, “Outer space, perhaps because of its appeal to our sense of endless possibility, has become the imaginative site for re-envisioning how black, indigenous and other oppressed people can relate to each other outside of and despite the colonial gaze.” [image omitted] (Photo Credit: Indigenous Education Institute) These previous examples should serve as a reminder that the historical underpinnings of our great national myth are built upon shaky intellectual ground—we need to be honest about this. America did not just spring forth out of nothing; it came from the brutal occupation and control of Native lands. Despite the best efforts of the settler state, Native people are still here, we still exist and make vital contributions to both our tribal communities and science. We cannot expect Donald Trump to turn his back on the national myth of what made the United States the United States—in his mind, this is the glorious history of what made America great in the past. And it should serve as no surprise that Trump and others wish to extend this history into outer space. Even when Trump’s days in the White House are over, the settler colonial logics that underpin our engagement with land on Earth will still loom large over the ways that we may potentially engage with outer space. But for those of us who do work in Indigenous geographies and Indigenous studies, it becomes even more vital that we heed the calls of Indigenous thinkers inside and outside formal academic structures, validate Indigenous histories, and push to deconstruct the American settler myth and to provide a new way of looking at the stars, especially at a crucial moment where the settler state turns its gaze towards the same. [i] While this essay focuses on an American context, I highly recommend reading Alice Gorman’s piece “The cultural landscape of interplanetary space” for some examples outside of the United States, such as the British/Australian Woomera rocket range and its effects upon Aboriginal peoples.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › K -- Capitalism › 1NC -- Link -- Pessimism

Pessimism is a predictable response to the alienation capitalism creates but encouraging its practice leads many drifting towards the right and promoting liberalism – the very ideology the aff wants to challenge.

Terry Eagleton, 1996, is a British literary theorist, critic, and public intellectual. He is currently Distinguished Professor of English Literature at Lancaster University. Eagleton has published over forty books, but remains best known for Literary Theory: An Introduction, which has sold over 750,000 copies. (The Illusions of Postmodernism). Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 1996. Print.

Imagine a radical movement which had suffered an emphatic defeat. So emphatic, in fact, that it seemed unlikely to resurface for the length of a lifetime, if even then. The defeat I have in mind is not just the kind of rebuff with which the political left is depressingly familiar, but a repulse so definitive that it seemed to discredit the very paradigms with which such politics had traditionally worked. It would now be less a matter of hotly contesting these notions than of contemplating them with something of the mild antiquarian interest with which one might regard Ptolemaic cosmology or the scholasticism of Duns Scotus. They, and the language of conventional society, would now seem less ferociously at odds than simply incommensurable– the discourses of different planets rather than of adjacent nations. What if the left were suddenly to find itself less overwhelmed or out-manoeuvred than simply washed up, speaking a discourse so quaintly out of tune with the modern era that, as with the language of Gnosticism or courtly love, nobody even bothered any longer to enquire into its truth value? What if the vanguard were to become the remnant, its arguments still dimly intelligible but spinning off rapidly into some metaphysical outer space where they became nothing but a muffled cry? What would be the likely reaction of the political left to such a defeat? Many, no doubt, would drift either cynically or sincerely to the right, regretting their earlier views as infantile idealism. Others would keep the faith out of habit or nostalgia, clinging anxiously to an imaginary identity and risking the neurosis which this is likely to bring in its wake. There are, after all, those devotees for whom nothing whatsoever could count as a falsification of their beliefs– those Christians, for example, who true to what the philosophers of science call the ‘under-determination of data by theory’, would continue to gather joyfully around the eucharistic table even if it had been shown to everyone else’s satisfaction that the gospels were fraudulent from start to finish. Indeed there are members of the Anglican church today who behave in more or less this way. But other responses could be expected too. A small clutch of left triumphalists, incurably sanguine, would no doubt carry on detecting impending signs of revolution in the faintest flicker of militancy. In others the radical impulse would persist, but would be forced to migrate elsewhere. The governing assumption of such an epoch, one imagines, would be that the system itself was unbreachable; and a great many radical positions which might seem superficially unrelated could be seen to flow from this gloomy presupposition. One might expect, for example, that there would be an upsurge of interest in the margins and crevices of the system– in those ambiguous, indeterminate spots where its power seemed less implacable, the shadowy margins where it trailed off into silence. The system could not be breached; but it could at least be momentarily transgressed, probed for those neuralgic points where its authority faltered and unravelled. Fascinated by these fault-lines, one might even come to imagine that there is no centre to society after all; but while this might be a convenient way of rationalizing one’s own lack of power, it could only be at the cost of acknowledging that there can logically be no margins either. One might expect this fact itself might be calculated into the theory– that a bleak awareness of the collusion between centre and margins, power and rupture, of the stealthy cat-and-mouse game played out between them, would go hand in hand with a more heady affirmation of whatever the system itself expelled as so much detritus, of whatever its ruling rationality seemed not to incorporate. One could envisage much celebration of the marginal and minority as positive in themselves– an absurd enough view, of course, since margins and minorities currently include neo-Nazis, UFO buffs, the international bourgeoisie and those who believe in lashing delinquent adolescents until the blood runs down their thighs. The idea of a creative majority movement, for this habit of mind as much as for the old-style liberalism of a John Stuart Mill, would come to seem like a contradiction in terms, precisely because this style of thought, suitably amnesiac, could no longer remember any instance of a beneficent system or an appealing mass movement. At its extreme, such a case ought to find it hard to cope with a previously marginal current becoming politically dominant (the African National Congress, for example), given its formalist prejudice against ‘dominance’ as such. Logically speaking, it could only hope that its own values would never come to power. The ideas of system, consensus and organization would themselves become demonized in vaguely anarchistic fashion, denounced as absolute ills by those committed to a tolerant relativism. The historical basis of this belief would be that political movements which were at once mass, central and productive had temporarily gone out of business; but it ill befits an historicizing brand of thought to generalize this to a universal doctrine. It would be the theory of those who were too young to recall a mass radical politics, but who had a good deal of glum experience of drearily oppressive majorities. The notions of law and authority might also be indiscriminately devalued, as though there was no such thing as a protective law or a benign authority. Theorists would mock the madness of the Law in suburban enclaves protected by private security guards, celebrating transgression as inherently good while worrying about child abuse. Protest would still be possible; but because the system would instantly recongeal around this irritant like a jellyfish, the radical sensibility would be accordingly divided– between a brittle pessimism on the one hand, and an exhilarated vision of ceaseless difference, mobility, disruption on the other.

Reform through the lens of identity politics tokenizes and commodifies

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › K -- Capitalism › 1NC -- Link -- Pessimism

Pessimism inhibits social change and fails to address the material changes in the status quo – not being able to recognize the necessity for change impedes anti-capitalist movements.

Sam Gindin, 2009, a Canadian intellectual and activist known for his expertise on the labour movement and the economics of the automobile industry. Gindin is a graduate of the University of Manitoba. (Transcending Pessimism: Rekindling Socialist Imagination). Mar 18, 2009

At the same time, however, we still live in an era of foreclosed hope in the possibility of a better world. What makes the tragedy of Willie Loman so universal now is that even people who wonder whether the capitalist dream isn’t the wrong dream see no way of realizing a life beyond capitalism, or fear that any attempt to do so can only result in another nightmare. Overcoming this debilitating political pessimism is the most important question anyone seriously interested in social change must confront. Socialists search for what direction to take under these conditions, it helps to know that others before have faced the same problem. How to make ‘the defeated man ... try the outside world again’ was precisely the question that impelled Ernst Bloch in the 1930s to write his magnum opus, The Principle ofHope.2Pessimism – ‘paralysis per se’ – was the first obstacle to be confronted:...people who do not believe at all in a happy end impede changing the world almost as much as the sweet swindlers, the marriage-swindlers, the charlatans of apotheosis. Unconditional pessimism therefore promotes the business of reaction not much less than artificially conditioned optimism; the latter is nevertheless not so stupid that it does not believe in anything at all. It does not immortalize the trudging of the little life, does not give humanity the face of a chloroformed gravestone. It does not give the world the deathly sad background in front of which it is not worth doing anything at all. In contrast to a pessimism which itself belongs to rotten-ness and may serve it, a tested optimism, when the scales fall from the eyes, does not deny the goal-belief in general; on the contrary, what matters now is to find the right one and to prove it… In recent years we have seen all too many disillusioned people on the left ‘coming to their senses’ by abandoning the goal of socialism. Some have succumbed to a post-modernist pessimism, which has indeed proved to be ‘paralysis per se’. Even more seem to have jumped from what Bloch called the ‘evils of putschist activism’ all the way to social democracy’s ‘third way’, whose presumption that neo-liberal prescriptions of efficiency are compatible with social justice is the contemporary expression of what Bloch designated as one of the key hallmarks of ideology – ‘the premature harmonization of social contradictions’ within the confines of existing social relations. Frustrated by their inability to change the world overnight through sheer activism, they have not so much abandoned the idea of change but, like the Greek God Procrustes who adjusted the size of his guests to fit the size of his bed, they have shrunk the meaning of change to fit what capital and the state will accommodate. Yet it is increasingly apparent from the extreme limitations of the ‘third way’ in practice that reviving the goal of socialism is necessary even to make small improvements in the current state of the world. As Bloch put it: ‘If the will-content of the goal is missing, then even the good probable is left undone; if the goal remains, however, then even the improbable can be done, or at least made more probable for later.’

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › K -- Capitalism › 1NC -- Link -- Atonality

The aff starts from a politics of queer atonality – a reduction of queerness to basic deviance that deprives it of moral or political force – instead, we should have a politics of queer communality that refuses the 1AC’s strong commitment to anti-normativity in favor of direct institutional transformation

Galloway 2014 (Alexander, Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, “Queer Atonality,” http://cultureandcommunication.org/galloway/queer-atonality)

Rosenberg devotes much of her attention to queer theory’s “subjectless turn” and the shift toward what David Eng, Judith Halberstam, and José Muñoz in 2005 called the “wide field of normalization.” Yet here the question is not so much a shift within queer theory, but a growing normalization--and a newfound trendiness perhaps--of the concept of queer in culture at large. Thus today any number of folks in straight relationships might still wish to label themselves “queer,” just as there is a growing trend to think about queer societies, queer animals, and indeed queer organisms, queer molecules, and queer ontologies. Rosenberg calls out Tim Morton's essay “Queer Ecology,” but the trend is wider than a single text can reveal, as evidenced by Karen Barad's work on “Nature’s Queer Performativity,” or the promulgation in other circles of what we might call a Queer-Deleuzian metaphysics. Borrowing the concept of the "atonal" (atone) from Badiou's theory of points, it is possible to assign a name to the specific form of queerness that Rosenberg finds unnerving: queer atonality. By queer atonality we mean the notion that queerness can be abstracted to mean deviation as such, aleatoriness as such, or openness as such, and thus, through such extreme abstraction, queerness may be assigned as a proper monicker for biological and even ontological systems. In other words, if biology is that thing that works via difference and radical openness, then it is, by definition, queer. Or if ontology is a scenario of swerves and deviations, then it is, by definition, queer. As Rosenberg puts it, on the one hand “biology [is understood] as a kind of sheer queerness (or, aleatoriness),” and, on the other, matter “is coded as ontologically 'queer.'” But “do we truly want to be unleashed into pure aleatoriness?” wonders Rosenberg. Such is the Pyrrhic victory of queer atonality: “If queerness is nothing but the productive force of matter, then why continue to call it queer?” As a deviation from normality, queerness has typically carried a kind of ethical or political force simply by virtue of intervening and resisting. We're here, we're queer demands acknowledgement, and thus a disruption of bourgeois morality. In this sense, queer means essentially "queering." As Nicholas de Villiers writes in his book on queer opacity, queering is a tactic aimed at appropriating, transforming, or deviating from a particular normative category. In this way, queer might have no ontological dimension per se, but rather might be defined as that thing unable to be integrated into existing symbolic economies, be they sexual or otherwise. But if today, following in the wake of the new queer metaphysics, matter and organic life themselves are queer, then the queer intervention becomes as atonal as anything else: the queerness of quantum superposition, the queerness of interspecies viral transfection, the queerness of non-carbon-based life forms. What started as a process of strategic intervention, has now congealed into a state of "sheer" queerness. Further, ontologizing queerness produces a number of secondary effects, not all of which we can discuss here. One important additional issue though--and this parallels some of my previous commentary on Catherine Malabou, whose work I find tremendously useful--is what might be called the “morality conundrum.” In short: if ontology is pure aleatoriness and if ontology has no particular political or moral valence, then, barring the kind of unmitigated nihilism that makes all politics impossible, one is obligated to graft on a secondary moral theory to supplement the primary ontological one. Consider Malabou: if all is plasticity, then how can an individual judge good plasticity from bad plasticity? By what criterion may we assert, with confidence, that capitalist precarity (one form of plasticity) is odious, while neuronal adaptiveness (another form of plasticity) is not? Such is the curious irony of queer atonality. What began as a movement that, in part, sought to purge itself of the priggish prejudices of sexual moralism, and the bigotry and oppression that goes with it, must now author its own treatise on morality! Having been elevated to the level of being, queer theory must demonstrate its own deviation from being. Having been neutralized, queerness must now un-neutralize itself. I follow this thread not to revel in futility, nor to expose queer theory to another kind of derision, now from the left rather than the right. Instead let's ask what we might gain from ontologizing queerness? And what we might lose? Or to put the question another way: if there were a queering of ontology, what should it look like? I can think of two ways to address the question, one more negative and the other more affirmative. But there are certainly many other possible approaches suggested by others. Response A: Viewed skeptically, queer ontology appears to be something of a contradiction in terms, simply because ontology itself is offensive and oppressive to queer life and identity. Ontology reproduces the very structure of queer alterity, given how ontology tends to be transcendental, abstracting, totalizing, and tied historically to concepts of hierarchy and morality, etc. “Ontology,” Frantz Fanon wrote in Black Skin, White Masks, “does not permit us to understand the being of the black man.” And thus, by homology, ontology does not permit us to understand the being of the queer. This response seems absolutely valid and yet at the same time somewhat limiting. Absolutely valid--in the sense that metaphysics has often been used as a weapon against the poor, women, people of color, or anyone on the losing end of moral or metaphysical models of alterity. But also limiting--in the sense that ignoring such questions will not magically cause them to disappear; any theoretical undertaking, when pursued long enough, must come to terms with questions of being, appearing, and existing. Indeed, ontology “does not permit”--as Fanon rightly said--but only when ontology is understood as representation or metaphysics. What if there were such a thing as a non-standard ontology? Could a non-standard ontology allow us to withdraw from structures of oppression? And could it facilitate such a withdrawal, while avoiding the problem of atonality and maintaining the many specificities of people's real culture and history? Response B: This leads to a second response, one that I see as much more useful: a queer theory of ontology is indeed possible. But how would it look? It might not “look queer” in the aforementioned sense of queer atonality that Rosenberg calls into question, that is, an ontology rooted in aleatoriness, deviation, non-normativity, and so on. Such a new queer theory of ontology would not be queer per se--that's by design--but would be roomy enough for queerness, along with other forms of life and other kinds of being in the world. Consider two different approaches. The first is a kind of hypertrophic instance of what, in theoretical circles, is called intersectionalism. We can understand such hypertrophic intersectionalism as a maximally heterogenous set of all forms of difference, brought into community without sacrificing the specificity and difference of all members of the set. This is not unlike how Hardt & Negri have defined the “multitude,” the multitude as capacious heterogeneity unmarked by homogenizing abstractions like “the masses” or “the people.” (It would take another blog post to demonstrate how the multitude is not simply a new form of queer atonality; but I think the argument can be made effectively.) The second approach comes from a different angle. If intersectionalism is maximally heterogenous, a different approach also exists, the minimally heterogenous. Here, the community of alterity is defined not in terms of radical difference, but radical commonality. Similar to the concept of the “generic” in Laruelle or Badiou, I see a new potential for queer ontology to be understood in terms of radical equality via axiomatic exploration of the insufficiency of identity. Indeed, Rosenberg links queerness to the concept of collectivity. This is the crucial step in my view. Summoning the allegorical style of Fredric Jameson, Rosenberg directs our attention not to “the subject per se, or 'the human,' but the collective.” And isn't this what materialism has always sought? “Surely the collective is that aleatory togetherness of which the ontological turn dreams.” So, instead of queerness as the productive force of aleatory matter, we might pursue instead the concept of a “queer event” or the “event of queer collectivity.” I suspect that such an event would not follow some of the more familiar models from the past: event as deviation, difference, or alterity. Given that queer atonality is simply the macro form of such smaller deviations--the model of turbulence and churn described so well in Queer Deleuzianism--such theories of deviation have a limited utility. In addition, the queer event would most certainly not follow a productive or reproductive mandate; this being one of the most powerful discoveries of queer theory, that the queer body is not obligated to make anything. Instead we might explore the concept of a queer communism, or what Rosenberg simply labels the collectivity. This strikes me as particularly useful and urgent today. In other words, Rosenberg's essay reveals that today's onto-primitivism is really a march toward proletarianization, which we might simply define as the bracketing of social collectivity in the name of material necessity. Such proletarianization must be identified as such, and resisted as frequently and as thoroughly as possible. Or as Rosenberg puts it, “Let it never be said of us that our consciousness was sheerly molecular, that we truly believed that all the baleful historical foreclosures of capitalism were ontologically true.” Never believe that capitalism is ontologically true... This is, in essence, the first step toward exploring any form of collectivity. Queer atonality blocks such a movement, not because queerness has been fully co-opted and hence has nothing more to offer. On the contrary, the problem with queer ontology lies in ontology not queerness, for the standard model of ontology is one that is sufficient to itself and thus promulgates a structure of transcendental mastery, rational autonomy, and sufficiency for all. Queer communism, by contrast, resides in the making-insufficient of such philosophical structures. Queer communism reorients queerness away from deviation and alterity and toward the “weak” insufficiency of collectivity, a life lived in common with others, whosoever they may be.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › K -- Capitalism › 1NC -- Link -- Transgression

The affirmative ossifies queerness as transgression that individuates resistance and precludes socialist struggle by engaging bourgeois myths.

Struggle Sessions, 21 [Struggle Sessions, run by Maoist revolutionaries from Peru, “Letter to the Editor: Class Struggle or Sexual Liberation?,” July 12, 2021]//Townes

We take the class stand of the proletariat, applying Marxism to our conditions and putting proletarian politics at the center of our theoretical work. Questions of sex and sexuality are secondary to the collective demands of revolutionary politics, in particular here the mobilization of working women for their emancipation through socialist revolution.

Postmodernism raises the specter of sexual liberation to combat the proletarian line of women’s emancipation through socialist revolution, creating a false politicization of sex which in fact functions to depoliticize, to remove the question of class standpoint and political struggle. With postmodernism, all questions are reduced to the interpersonal and the interpersonal, frequently, is reduced to sexual relations. This reduction to the interpersonal means stripping away the basis which determines social relations, i.e. the basis in production, the struggle for existence. Decadence, promiscuity, and non-conformity are hailed as liberatory while organizing women and the working class for collective liberation is labeled exclusionary and reductionist.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › K -- Settler Colonialism › 1NC -- Alt -- Decolonization

The alternative is incommensurability – decolonization is a project that requires the repatriation of indigenous lands, the abolition of slavery and property, and the dismantling of the imperial metropole.

Tuck & Yang 12 [Eve Tuck is Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto. She is Canada Research Chair of Indigenous Methodologies with Youth and Communities. K. Wayne Yang writes about decolonization and everyday epic organizing, particularly from underneath ghetto colonialism, often with his frequent collaborator, Eve Tuck. Currently, they are convening The Land Relationships Super Collective, editing the book series, Indigenous and Decolonizing Studies in Education, and editing the journal, Critical Ethnic Studies. He is interested in the complex role of cities in global affairs: cities as sites of settler colonialism, as stages for empire, as places of resettlement and gentrification, and as always-already on Indigenous lands. *Sometimes he writes as la paperson, an avatar that irregularly calls.“Decolonization is not a metaphor,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol 1 No 1 (2012) //tjb]

Having elaborated on settler moves to innocence, we give a synopsis of the imbrication of settler colonialism with transnationalist, abolitionist, and critical pedagogy movements - efforts that are often thought of as exempt from Indigenous decolonizing analyses - as a synthesis of how decolonization as material, not metaphor, unsettles the innocence of these movements. These are interruptions which destabilize, un-balance, and repatriate the very terms and assumptions of some of the most radical efforts to reimagine human power relations. We argue that the opportunities for solidarity lie in what is incommensurable rather than what is common across these efforts. We offer these perspectives on unsettling innocence because they are examples of what we might call an ethic of incommensurability, which recognizes what is distinct, what is sovereign for project(s) of decolonization in relation to human and civil rights based social justice projects. There are portions of these projects that simply cannot speak to one another, cannot be aligned or allied. We make these notations to highlight opportunities for what can only ever be strategic and contingent collaborations, and to indicate the reasons that lasting solidarities may be elusive, even undesirable. Below we point to unsettling themes that challenge the coalescence of social justice endeavors broadly assembled into three areas: Transnational or Third World decolonizations, Abolition, and Critical Space-Place Pedagogies. For each of these areas, we offer entry points into the literature - beginning a sort of bibliography of incommensurability. Third world decolonizations The anti-colonial turn towards the transnational can sometimes involve ignoring the settler colonial context where one resides and how that inhabitation is implicated in settler colonialism, in order to establish “global” solidarities that presumably suffer fewer complicities and complications. This deliberate not-seeing is morally convenient but avoids an important feature of the aforementioned selective collapsibility of settler colonial-nations states. Expressions such as “the Global South within the Global North” and “the Third World in the First World” neglect the Four Directions via a Flat Earth perspective and ambiguate First Nations with Third World migrants. For people writing on Third World decolonizations, but who do so upon Native land, we invite you to consider the permanent settler war as the theater for all imperial wars: ● the Orientalism of Indigenous Americans (Berger, 2004; Marez, 2007) ● discovery, invasion, occupation, and Commons as the claims of settler sovereignty (Ford, 2010) ● heteropatriarchy as the imposition of settler sexuality (Morgensen, 2011) ● citizenship as coercive and forced assimilation into the white settler normative (Bruyneel, 2004; Somerville, 2010) ● religion as covenant for settler nation-state (A.J. Barker, 2009; Maldonado-Torres, 2008) ● the frontier as the first and always the site of invasion and war (Byrd, 2011), ● U.S. imperialism as the expansion of settler colonialism (ibid) ● Asian settler colonialism (Fujikane, 2012; Fujikane, & Okamura, 2008, Saranillio, 2010a, 2010b) ● the frontier as the language of ‘progress’ and discovery (Maldonado-Torres, 2008) ● rape as settler colonial structure (Deer, 2009; 2010) ● the discourse of terrorism as the terror of Native retribution (Tuck & Ree, forthcoming) ● Native Feminisms as incommensurable with other feminisms (Arvin, Tuck, Morrill, forthcoming; Goeman & Denetdale, 2009). Abolition The abolition of slavery often presumes the expansion of settlers who own Native land and life via inclusion of emancipated slaves and prisoners into the settler nation-state. As we have noted, it is no accident that the U.S. government promised 40 acres of Indian land as reparations for plantation slavery. Likewise, indentured European laborers were often awarded tracts of ‘unsettled’ Indigenous land as payment at the end of their service (McCoy, forthcoming). Communal ownership of land has figured centrally in various movements for autonomous, self-determined communities. “The land belongs to those who work it,” disturbingly parrots Lockean justifications for seizing Native land as property, ‘earned’ through one’s labor in clearing and cultivating ‘virgin’ land. For writers on the prison industrial complex, il/legality, and other forms of slavery, we urge you to consider how enslavement is a twofold procedure: removal from land and the creation of property (land and bodies). Thus, abolition is likewise twofold, requiring the repatriation of land and the abolition of property (land and bodies). Abolition means self-possession but not object-possession, repatriation but not reparation: ● “The animals of the world exist for their own reasons. They were not made for humans any more than black people were made for white, or women created for men” (Alice Walker, describing the work of Marjorie Spiegel, in the in the preface to Spigel’s 1988 book, The Dreaded Comparison). ● Enslavement/removal of Native Americans (Gallay, 2009) ● Slaves who become slave-owners, savagery as enslavability, chattel slavery as a sign of civilization (Gallay, 2009) ● Black fugitivity, undercommons, and radical dispossession (Moten, 2008; Moten & Harney, 2004; Moten & Harney, 2010) ● Incarceration as a settler colonialism strategy of land dispossession (Ross, 1998; Watson, 2007) ● Native land and Native people as co-constituitive (Meyer, 2008; Kawagley, 2010) Critical pedagogies The many critical pedagogies that engage emancipatory education, place based education, environmental education, critical multiculturalism, and urban education often position land as public Commons or seek commonalities between struggles. Although we believe that “we must be fluent” in each other’s stories and struggles (paraphrasing Alexander, 2002, p.91), we detect precisely this lack of fluency in land and Indigenous sovereignty. Yupiaq scholar, Oscar Kawagley’s assertion, “We know that Mother Nature has a culture, and it is a Native culture” (2010, p. xiii), directs us to think through land as “more than a site upon which humans make history or as a location that accumulates history” (Goeman, 2008, p.24). The forthcoming special issue in Environmental Education Research, “Land Education: Indigenous, postcolonial, and decolonizing perspectives on place and environmental education research” might be a good starting point to consider the incommensurability of place-based, environmentalist, urban pedagogies with land education. ● The urban as Indigenous (Bang, 2009; Belin, 1999; Friedel, 2011; Goeman, 2008; Intertribal Friendship House & Lobo, 2002) ● Indigenous storied land as disrupting settler maps (Goeman, 2008) ● Novels, poetry, and essays by Greg Sarris, Craig Womack, Joy Harjo, Gerald Vizenor ● To Remain an Indian (Lomawaima & McCarty, 2006) ● Shadow Curriculum (Richardson, 2011) ● Red Pedagogy (Grande, 2004) ● Land Education (McCoy, Tuck, McKenzie, forthcoming) More on incommensurability Incommensurability is an acknowledgement that decolonization will require a change in the order of the world (Fanon, 1963). This is not to say that Indigenous peoples or Black and brown peoples take positions of dominance over white settlers; the goal is not for everyone to merely swap spots on the settler-colonial triad, to take another turn on the merry-go-round. The goal is to break the relentless structuring of the triad - a break and not a compromise (Memmi, 1991). Breaking the settler colonial triad, in direct terms, means repatriating land to sovereign Native tribes and nations, abolition of slavery in its contemporary forms, and the dismantling of the imperial metropole. Decolonization “here” is intimately connected to anti-imperialism elsewhere. However, decolonial struggles here/there are not parallel, not shared equally, nor do they bring neat closure to the concerns of all involved - particularly not for settlers. Decolonization is not equivocal to other anti-colonial struggles. It is incommensurable. There is so much that is incommensurable, so many overlaps that can’t be figured, that cannot be resolved. Settler colonialism fuels imperialism all around the globe. Oil is the motor and motive for war and so was salt, so will be water. Settler sovereignty over these very pieces of earth, air, and water is what makes possible these imperialisms. The same yellow pollen in the water of the Laguna Pueblo reservation in New Mexico, Leslie Marmon Silko reminds us, is the same uranium that annihilated over 200,000 strangers in 2 flashes. The same yellow pollen that poisons the land from where it came. Used in the same war that took a generation of young Pueblo men. Through the voice of her character Betonie, Silko writes, “Thirty thousand years ago they were not strangers. You saw what the evil had done; you saw the witchery ranging as wide as the world" (Silko, 1982, p. 174). In Tucson, Arizona, where Silko lives, her books are now banned in schools. Only curricular materials affirming the settler innocence, ingenuity, and right to America may be taught. In “No”, her response to the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq, Mvskoke/Creek poet Joy Harjo (2004) writes, “Yes, that was me you saw shaking with bravery, with a government issued rifle on my back. I’m sorry I could not greet you, as you deserved, my relative.” Don’t Native Americans participate in greater rates in the military? asks the young-ish man from Viet Nam. “Indian Country” was/is the term used in Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iraq by the U.S. military for ‘enemy territory’. The first Black American President said without blinking, “There was a point before folks had left, before we had gotten everybody back on the helicopter and were flying back to base, where they said Geronimo has been killed, and Geronimo was the code name for bin Laden.” Elmer Pratt, Black Panther leader, falsely imprisoned for 27 years, was a Vietnam Veteran, was nicknamed ‘Geronimo’. Geronimo is settler nickname for the Bedonkohe Apache warrior who fought Mexican and then U.S. expansion into Apache tribal lands. The Colt .45 was perfected to kill Indigenous people during the ‘liberation’ of what became the Philippines, but it was first invented for the ‘Indian Wars’ in North America alongside The Hotchkiss Canon- a gattling gun that shot canonballs. The technologies of the permanent settler war are reserviced for foreign wars, including boarding schools, colonial schools, urban schools run by military personnel. It is properly called Indian Country. Ideologies of US settler colonialism directly informed Australian settler colonialism. South African apartheid townships, the kill-zones in what became the Philippine colony, then nation-state, the checkerboarding of Palestinian land with checkpoints, were modeled after U.S. seizures of land and containments of Indian bodies to reservations. The racial science developed in the U.S. (a settler colonial racial science) informed Hitler’s designs on racial purity (“This book is my bible” he said of Madison Grant’s The Passing of the Great Race). The admiration is sometimes mutual, the doctors and administrators of forced sterilizations of black, Native, disabled, poor, and mostly female people - The Sterilization Act accompanied the Racial Integrity Act and the Pocohontas Exception - praised the Nazi eugenics program. Forced sterilizations became illegal in California in 1964.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › K -- Settler Colonialism › 1NC -- Ontology

The settler colonial project requires the disappearance or assimilation of the Native, who produces Settler anxieties that confound national belonging – this is an ongoing genocide that also exists in premature moves to reconciliation and the desire to not have to deal with the Indian problem anymore.

Tuck & Yang 12 [Eve Tuck is Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto. She is Canada Research Chair of Indigenous Methodologies with Youth and Communities. K. Wayne Yang writes about decolonization and everyday epic organizing, particularly from underneath ghetto colonialism, often with his frequent collaborator, Eve Tuck. Currently, they are convening The Land Relationships Super Collective, editing the book series, Indigenous and Decolonizing Studies in Education, and editing the journal, Critical Ethnic Studies. He is interested in the complex role of cities in global affairs: cities as sites of settler colonialism, as stages for empire, as places of resettlement and gentrification, and as always-already on Indigenous lands. *Sometimes he writes as la paperson, an avatar that irregularly calls.“Decolonization is not a metaphor,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol 1 No 1 (2012) //tjb]

Recently in a symposium on the significance of Liberal Arts education in the United States, Eve presented an argument that Liberal Arts education has historically excluded any attention to or analysis of settler colonialism. This, Eve posited, makes Liberal Arts education complicit in the project of settler colonialism and, more so, has rendered the truer project of Liberal Arts education something like trying to make the settler indigenous to the land he occupies. The attendees were titillated by this idea, nodding and murmuring in approval and it was then that Eve realized that she was trying to say something incommensurable with what they expected her to say. She was completely misunderstood. Many in the audience heard this observation: that the work of Liberal Arts education is in part to teach settlers to be indigenous, as something admirable, worthwhile, something wholesome, not as a problematic point of evidence about the reach of the settler colonial erasure. Philip Deloria (1998) explores how and why the settler wants to be made indigenous, even if only through disguise, or other forms of playing Indian. Playing Indian is a powerful U.S. pastime, from the Boston Tea Party, to fraternal organizations, to new age trends, to even those aforementioned Native print underwear. Deloria maintains that, “From the colonial period to the present, the Indian has skulked in and out of the most important stories various Americans have told about themselves” (p. 5). The indeterminacy of American identities stems, in part, from the nation’s inability to deal with Indian people. Americans wanted to feel a natural affinity with the continent, and it was Indians who could teach them such aboriginal closeness. Yet, in order to control the landscape they had to destroy the original inhabitants. (Deloria, 1998, p.5) L. Frank Baum (author of The Wizard of Oz) famously asserted in 1890 that the safety of white settlers was only guaranteed by the “total annihilation of the few remaining Indians” (as quoted in Hastings, 2007). D.H. Lawrence, reading James Fenimore Cooper (discussed at length later in this article), Nathaniel Hawthorne, Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, Henry David Thoreau, Herman Melville, Walt Whitman and others for his Studies in Classic American Literature (1924), describes Americans’ fascination with Indigeneity as one of simultaneous desire and repulsion (Deloria, 1998). “No place,” Lawrence observed, “exerts its full influence upon a newcomer until the old inhabitant is dead or absorbed.” Lawrence argued that in order to meet the “demon of the continent” head on and this finalize the “unexpressed spirit of America,” white Americans needed either to destroy Indians of assimilate them into a white American world...both aimed at making Indians vanish from the landscape. (Lawrence, as quoted in Deloria, 1998, p. 4). Everything within a settler colonial society strains to destroy or assimilate the Native in order to disappear them from the land - this is how a society can have multiple simultaneous and conflicting messages about Indigenous peoples, such as all Indians are dead, located in faraway reservations, that contemporary Indigenous people are less indigenous than prior generations, and that all Americans are a “little bit Indian.” These desires to erase - to let time do its thing and wait for the older form of living to die out, or to even help speed things along (euthanize) because the death of pre-modern ways of life is thought to be inevitable - these are all desires for another kind of resolve to the colonial situation, resolved through the absolute and total destruction or assimilation of original inhabitants. Numerous scholars have observed that Indigeneity prompts multiple forms of settler anxiety, even if only because the presence of Indigenous peoples - who make a priori claims to land and ways of being - is a constant reminder that the settler colonial project is incomplete (Fanon, 1963; Vine Deloria, 1988; Grande, 2004; Bruyneel, 2007). The easy adoption of decolonization as a metaphor (and nothing else) is a form of this anxiety, because it is a premature attempt at reconciliation. The absorption of decolonization by settler social justice frameworks is one way the settler, disturbed by her own settler status, tries to escape or contain the unbearable searchlight of complicity, of having harmed others just by being one’s self. The desire to reconcile is just as relentless as the desire to disappear the Native; it is a desire to not have to deal with this (Indian) problem anymore.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › K -- Settler Colonialism › 1NC -- Link -- Queer Pessimism

Edleman is correct that the white child should not be the center of society but incorrect about futurity. The investment of no future is just a rehashing of settler colonial tactics. Any form of decolonization should grapple with the histories and futures of indigenous sovereignty and ways of knowing.

Arvin, Tuck, and Morrill 2013 (Maile, assistant professor of Ethnic Studies at UC Riverside, Eve, Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at University of Toronto, Angie, Director of Title VI Indian Education Program for Portland Public Schools, “Decolonizing Feminism: Challenging Connections between Settler Colonialism and Heteropatriarchy, Feminist Formations, Vol. 25 No. 1, Spring)

As our discussions of Indigenous epistemologies about land and sovereignty have demonstrated, recognizing that Indigenous sovereignty struggles are gendered frequently requires revising conventional concepts of sovereignty, decolonization, and social change altogether. For us, the real promise of Native feminist theories lies precisely in the ways that, along with recognizing the very real challenges that Indigenous peoples face daily, these theories are simultaneously constructing what Smith (2008b) compellingly describes as “the history of the future of sovereignty, what sovereignty could mean for Native peoples” (257). By directing our attention toward the beautifully evocative “history of the future of sovereignty,” she is reframing futurity—a concept important to a number of disciplines, including queer studies and performance studies—with Indigenous peoples at the center. Thus, Smith demonstrates that one of the most radical and necessary moves toward decolonization requires imagining and enacting a future for Indigenous peoples—a future based on terms of their own making. In a GLQ special issue titled “Sexuality, Nationality, Indigeneity,” Smith (2010) specifically elaborates on the concept of futurity as theorized by queer theorist Lee Edelman. She notes that Edelman’s book No Future forwards a useful critique of the figure of “the Child” as the symbol of society’s reproductive future and an excuse for justifying the reproduction of the existing social order (46). Yet, Smith also demonstrates that refusing to participate in the reproduction of society by declining to reproduce the Child is a mode of radical activism that is only possible, desirable, and otherwise “thinkable” for certain economically privileged white queers. She argues that [a]n indigenous critique must question the value of “no future” in the context of genocide, where Native peoples have already been determined by settler colonialism to have no future. If the goal of queerness is to challenge the reproduction of the social order, then the Native child may already be queered. For instance, Colonel John Chivington, the leader of the famous massacre at Sand Creek, charged his followers to not only kill Native adults but to mutilate their reproductive organs and to kill their children because “nits make lice.” In this context, the Native Child is not the guarantor of the reproductive future of white supremacy; it is the nit that undoes it. (48) Smith’s critique exposes the ways that radical queer theory can participate in the “ascendancy of whiteness” even when it disavows it—in Edelman’s case, because he fails to acknowledge or consider the ways that having children is a privilege that has been historically denied to many nonwhite and nonaffluent people. Given the pervasive violence perpetuated on Indigenous peoples through campaigns focused on managing Indigenous reproduction and childrearing (from boarding schools to eugenics and forced sterilization), proposing to invest in “no future” seems not only irrelevant to Indigenous peoples, but a rehashing of previous settler colonial tactics. Smith’s critique is meant to be a generative one, insisting on making real connections between Native and queer studies for the future of both fields and all of the peoples these fields engage. She further argues that “while both ‘tradition’ and ‘the future’ must be critically engaged, it does not follow that they can be dismissed” (ibid.). We also place importance on ideas of Indigenous futures, which are always also interlaced with Indigenous traditions, histories, and even ghosts, in our own theories of decolonization. Eve Tuck (2009) has written about desire-based research as a key counterpoint to damage-centered research frameworks, which too often present Indigenous peoples as broken, arguing that “[d]esire is involved with the not yet and, at times, the not anymore. . . . Desire is about longing, about a present that is enriched by both the past and the future” (417). Angie Morrill (forthcoming) further writes that “[g]hosts haunt the future with expectations,” noting that we share desires with ghosts, therefore Native desire is a kind of time machine. For Maile Arvin (forthcoming), decolonization involves regeneration, which she defines as “desires and practices oriented by transforming settler colonial dispossession and recreating a people-possessed (rather than an individually self-possessed) Indigenous future.” In each of our approaches toward decolonization, we do not intend to recommend to our readers one proper set of decolonial practices, but rather create spaces in which decolonization can be deeply considered and experimented with in the specific contexts of different places. Overall, with this challenge to recognize Indigenous ways of knowing, we insist that it is most important to acknowledge Indigenous concepts and epistemologies as complex, knowledgeable, and full of both history and desire. Engaging Indigenous epistemologies, without appropriating them or viewing them merely as a mystical metaphor, is a method of decolonization that could play a significant role in creating a future for Indigenous peoples and Indigenous ways of knowing.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › K -- Settler Colonialism › 1NC -- Link -- Queer Pessimism

The AFFs queer pessimism operationalizes nativeness and the state of nature in order to cohere death as queer. Reject the desire of biopolitical settler sovereignty to become native.

Schotten, 2018 (C. Heike – Associate Professor of Political Science @ the University of Massachusetts-Boston, Queer Terror: Life, Death, and Desire in the Settler Colony, p. 49-61, shae)

THE FUTURE IS SETTLER COLONIAL Despite my emphasis so far on life and survival, the production of "death" through the inauguration of temporality is just as important as the constitution of life. After all, if life only becomes recognizable as life retrospectively, the same can and must be true about death. Thus, while the sovereign is consistently presented as the beacon of peace in Leviathan, war and death are just as much his creations as are peace and life. This is one, merely formal way of substantiating the claim that biopolitics is simultaneously and necessarily a necropolitics. However, what is also evident in Hobbes (but notably absent in Edelman) is the important qualification of this bio/necropolitics as specifically colonial. Closer examination of the time/place that is the state of nature makes clear that Hobbes's championing of life is a celebration and protection only of the lives of those who are "civilized," a safeguarding that comes at the necessary expense, obliteration, transfer, removal, and dispossession of "savage" others. In other words, "life" in biopolitical sovereignty is specifically settler life, characterized as "civilization," while" death" demarcates "savagery," or all those who cannot or will not conform to this particular political formation, as its foremost threat. In other words, it is the specifically settler character of "life" that explains the simultaneity and coincidence of sovereignty's bio- and necropolitics. Returning once more to that notorious state of nature, recall my claim that time cannot exist there. Hobbes might potentially be seen as acknowledging this fact insofar as he refers to the state of nature as not only a "time" but also a "condition," two terms he seems to use interchangeably throughout chapter 13. For example, in the first sentence of the paragraph about war, he writes that "during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre."68 Later, entertaining objections to his arguments about the state of nature, he muses, "It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of warre as this." 69 He then further complicates things by proceeding to conflate time and condition with geographical location, noting immediately thereafter, "and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now"70 – for example, "the savage people in many places of America."71 These ambiguous and confusing characterizations of the state of nature nevertheless cohere around one feature that unites them, which is their ultimately civilizationalist character. First, as already discussed, if the state of nature is a time-an era, say, or an epoch-it is simultaneously a moment that is completely timeless, an existence lacking any dynamism or principle of change. Indeed, although Hobbes famously characterizes life in the state of nature as "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short,"72 that last adjective is simply unwarranted given that no time is possible there. However rhetorically effective it may be, lodged at the end of a litany of dreary adjectives, life in the state of nature cannot be characterized as short any more than it can be characterized as long or even average because, as Hobbes makes clear, temporality does not pertain to it.73 However, if the state of nature is instead a condition, then it is one of "savagery," as Hobbes makes explicit. Bolstering the view that the state of nature is a story about humanity's prehistory, Hobbes here rehearses the colonialist trope of indigenous peoples as European humanity's ancestors or premodern childhood. Savagery is therefore associated with stalled temporality, timelessness, and the failure of forward movement or progress. Conclusively, however, when referenced as geographical location, Hobbes materializes the state of nature in "America" and the seventeenth-century European notion of the New World, an uncharted territory ripe for exploration and conquest. The specifications of the state of nature as premodern, timeless, "savage," and "America" make clear that the establishment of the commonwealth imposes a distinction not simply between life and death, peace and war, but also between progress and timelessness, modernity and backwardness, civilization and savagery. Each of these categorial pairs functions as a surrogate for the others; taken together, they suggest the deep implication of categories of life and death with colonization and conquest for European political theory. Once sovereignty, civilization, and peace are established as the domain of life, the state of nature, "savagery," and war are established as the domain of death. Nichols writes, "The 'savage' of the Americas thus becomes the symbolic negative – the embodiment of the state of nature itself, and thus all which is to be avoided by civilized men living in civil (political) society."74 The state of nature is most concrete, in Hobbes's varying descriptions of it, as a place-that is, "America." Immediately after declaring this, however, he concedes: But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of warre against one another; yet in all times, Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours, which is a posture of War. But because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men.75 Rescinding his prior example of native North Americans, Hobbes concedes that there never really was any such time or condition as this state of nature. Not only are native peoples not in a state of nature, then, but also, and quite literally, there is no state of nature because, as we have seen, no time is possible there. Instead, Hobbes now claims, in "all times," the situation of international relations is like that of the state of nature, because heads of state are in perpetual warfare with one another. The state of nature, then, is neither a time nor a condition nor a place but, rather, an allegory of interstate behavior. And yet, even in this new global location, anarchy does not lead to the misery of the state of nature Hobbes described earlier because, as he says, sovereigns engage in foreign wars in the interest of securing their domestic subjects (rather than their own personages, presumably). Thus even as a metaphor the state of nature does not exist. It is a time that is no time, a condition that cannot exist in its unconditionality, a place that is nowhere, a representation of the unrepresentable.76 Hobbes's vacillation, confusion, and ultimate retraction of any concrete examples of the state of nature can be productively deciphered by linking it to theories of settler colonialism, on the one hand, and Edelman's critique of futurism, on the other. Regarding the first, Lorenzo Veracini has argued that settler colonialism is distinct from other types of colonialism insofar as its seeks consistently to erase itself as settler colonial, to “supersede the conditions of its operation."77 Following Patrick Wolfe's argument that settler colonialism pursues a “logic of elimination" whereby settlers seek to replace the natives and indigenize themselves post facto,78 Veracini argues that because it aims at the elimination of the native, settler colonialism necessarily aims at its own elimination: The successful settler colonies "tame" a variety of wildernesses, end up establishing independent nations, effectively repress, co-opt, and extinguish indigenous alterities, and productively manage ethnic diversity. By the end of this trajectory, they claim to be no longer settler colonial (they are putatively "settled" and "postcolonial"-except that unsettling anxieties remain, and references to a postcolonial condition appear hollow as soon as indigenous disadvantage is taken into account). Settler colonialism thus covers its tracks and operates towards its self-supersession (this is why, paradoxically, settler colonialism is most recognizable when it is most imperfect-say, 1950s Kenya or 1970s Zimbabwe-and least visible in the settler cities).79 The truly “successful" settler colonial project, in other words, would manage to efface the native entirely, whether through genocide or assimilation or some other form of disappearance-more recently, via a politics of recognition, as Glen Coulthard has argued.80 One way this happens is through the narration of settlement itself, which disappears the native through discourses of nonexistence, invisibility, or terra nullius.81 In Hobbes, this emerges as his inability to definitively locate or circumscribe the state of nature. This is consistent with the originary imaginings of all settler polities. As Veracini observes, “It is not a coincidence that the cultural traditions of the settler polities often focus on real or imaginary locales putatively epitomising specific national attributes: the 'outback,' the 'backblocks,' and, most famously, the 'frontier.' Generally speaking, these are not specific locations, and their most important characteristic is to be always somewhere else.”82 The state of nature is one such highly abstract geographical imagining and, as we have seen, Hobbes displaces it from a time to a condition to a place to a metaphor, eventually determining that it never existed at all, even as a hermeneutic. Of course, regardless of how Hobbes defines or determines the "state of nature," the fact of the matter is that neither settlement nor indigenous people are, in fact, "elsewhere," but ever-present facts of the here and now.83 Yet Veracini argues that settler colonialism must nevertheless constantly imagine native peoples as elsewhere, an act of symbolic displacement that effaces the actual existence of native peoples and erases them even in their existence: If the indigene is fundamental to the settler relation, where the indigene is located does matter. Thus, the "real" indigence is always somewhere else; that is why, to play on Philip J. Deloria's insight, he is always "unexpected" in actual places. Likewise, indigenous peoples are generally not seen in the settler cities, the places where the settlers live. Examples abound; the main point is that discursive devices aimed at redirecting attention away from emplaced settler-indigenous relationships are indeed many. 84 Veracini suggests that all forms of indigenous removal can be characterized as different versions of "transfer," which he argues is foundational to the settler colonial project.85 Regardless of whether we call it transfer or elimination, however, unless and until it is accomplished, settler states engage in all sorts of contortions, both political and ideological, to obscure the native in order to naturalize conquest. In short, disappearance of the land's indigenous inhabitants and subsequent attempts to "indigenize" settlers are the means by which land expropriation is simultaneously naturalized and obscured. Veracini presents this iterative, imaginary displacement either as conceptually embedded in the definition of settler colonialism or else as a kind of bad faith on the settlers' part, potentially implying that a guilty conscience gives rise to a host of defense mechanisms to ward off (knowledge of) conquest. In other contexts, political theorists have considered that such recursive movement is definitive of sovereignty itself, which can establish the law only via a prior, extralegal, and illegitimate assertion of force. Yet the recursive ideological contortions of settler sovereignty are neither the result of guilt nor somehow intrinsic to its conceptual definitions. Robert Nichols has already persuasively argued that the recursive character of settlement is a means of facilitating dispossession, denying the existence of indigenous peoples, and disregarding their claims to land and sovereignty.86 So the materiality of this operation is clear. Yet what to make of the specifically ideological character of this recursivity? What explains the reiterative rationales for conquest that attempt to erase it as conquest at all? Borrowing from Edelman, one might say that while these ideological contortions are fundamental to settler colonialism, they are also fundamental to any futurist narrativization of "life." In other words, the reason why Hobbes cannot definitively locate or circumscribe the state of nature is the same the reason why the settler state seeks ideologically to naturalize settlers as native to the lands they have conquered. It is because, to use Edelman's vocabulary, both are futurist narrativizations of the drive, his Lacanian term for that aspect of human existence that resists any temporal or symbolic determination. Hobbes talks about this in terms of "endeavor." But Edelman's drive/Hobbes's endeavor is what in fact defines the unending present that is the time/condition/place of the state of nature; indeed, Hobbes's state of nature is effectively an attempt at a representation of this drive/endeavor, which both thinkers are clear is unrepresentable. For, while Hobbes defines the motion of human life in terms of desire and aversion, these terms are only appropriate monikers for motion once it becomes perceptible. Before it is manifest in the form of desire, it exists as "small beginnings of Motion, within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions."87 In other words, it is only once endeavor takes an object and becomes motion toward something that it becomes simultaneously apprehensible and also properly called desire, while endeavor away from an object "is generally called AVERSION."88 This drive/endeavor is not only prior to or outside of representation, but it also has no intrinsic justification, much less any clear or uncontroversial narrative articulation. It simply is. Thus any imposition of terms onto it – in order to render it apprehensible, coherent, or legible – is precisely that, an imposition, and thus an explicitly ideological move that serves a particular political agenda. For Edelman, this act of transforming the otherwise unsignifiable endeavor of human existence into "the fictive form of a narrative" 89 is the very definition of politics. As he says, "politics is a name for the temporalization of desire, for its translation into a narrative, for its teleological determination."90 This definition of politics explains his insistence that politics is necessarily "conservative" – because "it works to affirm a structure, to authenticate a social order"91 in its very existence – and also destined to fail. For Edelman, futurism perpetuates "the fantasy of meaning's eventual realization," a realization that is by definition impossible insofar as endeavor itself has no intrinsic meaning and "the future" as its justification is always only ever to come. As the future, it is just out of reach, ever beyond our grasp, “an always about-to-be-realized identity."92 Rather than confront its own, necessary impossibility, Edelman argues that futurism instead generates scapegoats to distract from and take the fall for it, people or places or events that become the displaced, villainized obstacles to futurism's otherwise successful realization. His name for these scapegoats is “queer." This queerness, also unrepresentable because it is another name for the drive/endeavor that politics (that is, narrativization) impossibly seeks to domesticate and resolve, takes on the figure of whatever or whoever threatens the disarticulation of the self and social order, which are ideologically presumed to be the prepolitical premises of our existence. This futile and fantasmatic futurism is a surprisingly apt characterization of the settler state, the full realization of which would, as Veracini notes, effect its erasure. Settler colonies resort to any number of destructive forms of managing futurism's failings, of course, from transfer and removal to outright extermination through war, massacre, starvation, and disease. (There are also a multitude of cultural forms of indigenous “transfer," whether it be the usage of indigenous peoples as sports team mascots, the fetishization of indigenous religious and spiritual practices in order to deny Indianness to Indians while claiming it for settlers, or the racialization of Indians into minority populations.) Yet this anxious, reiterative activity is wholly predictable from an Edelmanian perspective and ineliminable from the structure of settler sovereignty, because the futurist narration of the drive/endeavor has rendered settlers beholden to an unsustainable temporality that must produce queerness or death in order to continue to produce meaning, survival, and civilization for itself. Settler sovereignty cannot, in other words, do without the death-native it brings into being; the native as death must exist in order to purchase life and survival for the settler and is the figure of queerness in this futurist scheme. "Queerness" in Hobbes is represented, figured, or embodied by those who fail to conform to the lineaments of rationality that his particular sovereign formation takes for granted-in this case, the rational character of life and its value. Hobbes calls these figures "absurd" rather than queer, but the meaning is the same. The queer or absurd are those who do not seek to preserve themselves or flee death. Such figures barely show up in this text and are largely incomprehensible in his schema. They both instantiate death and invite it as the only proper response to their incomprehensible and insupportable rejection of the social order. For example, any remaining holdouts in the state of nature unwilling to join a majority decision to create a commonwealth must be forced to go along with them "or be left in the condition of warre he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever."93 This is the rationalization of conquest, however abstract, unmarked, or "rational" it may seem to be. For, as has become clear, those who do not recognize the value of life are not simply absurd or irrational; they are specifically those "savage" or precivilizational people(s) who have no concept of time or established system of governance. Of course, the "savage" as deathly threat has been produced precisely as that threat by the settler polity itself, which can only sustain itself via this anxious, recursive, and impossible-to-resolve dynamic of producing and eliminating the enemy of its own order, the enemy that it requires if it is to be an order at all and yet that it must eliminate if it is to "overcome" what it is. As Alyosha Goldstein observes, "United States colonialism is a continuously failing-or at least a perpetually incomplete-project that labors to find a workable means of resolution to sustain its logic of possession and inevitability by disavowing the ongoing contestation with which it is confronted and violent displacement that it demands."94 This constant aspiration toward an unrealizable future is a promise bought at the expense of effacing the founding violence that is the institution of settler sovereignty itself. Because that foundation is impossible to leave behind, because the native has not been finally eliminated once and for all, because the subjects of the commonwealth remain settlers, they cannot rest. They cannot rest until the last trace of the native has been eliminated, such that settlement can become a truly legitimate commonwealth founded on the basis of a free and equal social contract of its "native" citizens. In the face of the impossibility of this achievement, however, they must find other outlets for their anxious desire. This is how and why the settler colonial foundation of biopolitical sovereignty transforms itself into an expansionist, imperial security state that finds new enemies abroad, new obstacles to its endless expansion, thereby solving (albeit only ever temporarily and incompletely) the problem of futurist failure that constituted settlement to begin with. This transformation is immediately apparent in Hobbes's astute psychology of the life of futurist desire. Regarding desire, Hobbes claims that one seeks not simply "enjoyment" in the present or "to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time." Rather, one seeks ''to assure for ever, the way of his future desire."95 If the nature of desire is such that we seek to assure satisfaction forever, indefinitely into the future, then life/desire is inevitably bound up with anxiety, on the one hand, and power-seeking, on the other. Perpetually uncertain about the prospects of successfully getting what we want, we must continually seek to enlarge our power in order to secure the objects of our desire. It is important to note that this ever-expanding sphere of influence is not the result of a snowballing or addictive sort of pleasure-seeking behavior, nor is it due to some essential will to power at the heart of human nature. It is, rather, simply what is required in order to preserve the status quo: ''It is not alwayes that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more."96 Mere maintenance of the present, in other words, requires accumulation, undertaken in perpetual reference to an uncertain future. The successful maintenance of an indefinite present is, for Hobbes, the content of human happiness: "Continuall successe in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continuall prospering, is that men call Felicity."97 Such felicity is impossible, of course, as Hobbes concedes in the very next sentence: "I mean the Felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetuall Tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because Life itself is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without Peare, no more than without Sense."98 Hobbes acknowledges, in other words, that, based on his own futurist accounting of life/desire and in fact precisely because of it, "happiness" (that is, getting what you want) is impossible. Even supposing one were able to secure the requisite amount of power necessary to maintain the status quo, such an (impossible) achievement would mean that our desire would be satisfied, and therefore extinguished. It would mean, in other words, no longer being alive, since "to have no desire is to be dead."99 As he explains, To which we are to consider, that the Felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such Finis ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor Summum Bon um, (greatest Good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers. Nor can a man any more live, whose Desires are at an end, than he, whose Senses and Imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continuall progress of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the later.100 Suggesting that (attainment of) the highest good of Aristotelian ethics is itself a kind of stasis or death, Hobbes plainly rejects the idea that the endless motion that characterizes human life could come to a halt in some fashion that does not entail death. Understood psychologically, he is making clear that human happiness-the only kind available to us in “this life" -means never actually being satisfied. The perpetuity of enjoyment at which desire aims is a consumption that is never, can never fully be (allowed to be) complete(d). Hobbes's specifically futurist and expansionist understanding of desire makes clear that, rather than confront the impossibility of security, happiness, and immortality, he instead offers the commonwealth and an everexpanding pursuit of power as a substitutive satisfaction. In other words, he both institutes life and pushes it forward via a futurist narrativization of endeavor into an insatiable, accumulative desire. Rather than face the founding violence that brought peace and "life itself" into being, Hobbes instead naturalizes this act by declaring it to be "a generall inclination of all mankind" to engage in "a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death."101 Yet while desire may push us ever forward, ever beyond the initial moments of settlement, it cannot erase that settlement or relieve settler sovereignty of the burden of conquest. This is neither because of settler colonialism's theoretical definition nor because settlers secretly feel guilty about conquest, but rather because of the impossibility of fulfilling futurism's fantastical promises. Empire functions as a kind of substitutive satisfaction to compensate for the failure of settler sovereignty to finally and fully exterminate indigenous peoples. The pleasures of endless imperial expansion-the restless desire of "power after power" in an attempt to secure the future, once and for all-relieve the burden of the failed "completion" of the settler colonial project and the impossible promise of happiness. Empire is thus the settler impulse turned outward. It is a salve for settlement in its promise of an impossible, if now-externalized, future happiness and security.102 Built into Hobbes's understanding of desire, then (and, therefore, the Commonwealth), is the failed teleology of futurism, which, as Edelman instructs, is fundamentally and futilely political. The reason the commonwealth cannot alleviate the anxiety that runs apace with desire is because it cannot eliminate the foundations of its existence and the basis of its regime: on the one hand, indigenous removal and dispossession; on the other, the futurist constitution of "life" and/as desire. Indigenous removal and dispossession are accomplished, therefore, not only via the exertion of violence, domination, war, famine, genocide, and disease, but also via a specifically ideological imposition of the meaning of "life" and" death" that requires an indigenous removal and dispossession that it cannot accomplish without killing itself. This intractable dilemma explains the transformation of settler societies into security states, which reformulates the indigenous threat of "savagery" and death into external, terroristic opponents of its "way of life." As Jodi Byrd observes, "Indianness becomes a site through which U.S. empire orients and replicates itself by transforming those to be colonized into 'Indians' through continual reiterations of pioneer logics, whether in the Pacific, the Caribbean, or the Middle East."103 Empire, in other words, relocates the state of nature from the domain of the indigenous "savage" to the "wilderness" abroad, itself in need of taming and civilizing if life and its value are to be satisfactorily protected. Twenty-first-century empire is thus legible, as Byrd and others have argued, as an outgrowth of the settlement of the United States and a contemporary episode of its ongoing structure.104 Stephen Silliman has documented the US military's usage of "Indian country" to describe Iraq and Afghanistan in the War on Terror. While the Revolutionary War or Civil War possess just as much "resonance in the psyche of the United States as wars for freedom, unity, and democracy," nevertheless "soldiers in the Middle East draw on the 'Indian wars' of the 19th century to inform their daily experiences in combat."105 Silliman argues that ''The efficacy of this metaphor relies not in the accuracy of the historical or cultural details ... but on the believability and acceptability of them as part of a narrative of conquest and nation building."106 The "Indian country" characterization serves, in other words, to naturalize the "success" of the conquest of North America by casting contemporary US empire as an inevitably victorious, if now-worldwide, battle against ''savagery," this time in the form of lslam and ''terrorism." Of George W. Bush's expressed desire to "smoke" Osama Bin Laden ''out of his cave," for example, Alex Lubin writes, The invocation of the Western drama of settler colonialism has always animated American thinking about and activity in the Middle East, and Bush is merely tapping into a well of affective politics that links the United States to the Middle East as well as provides support for increased surveillance and the suspension of rights domestically. Yet, in the contemporary era of neoliberal globalization, the United States' comparative rendering of the Middle East through its own settler colonial past has been multiplied and transformed into a "global war on terror." That is, the United States' unparalleled superpower status enables it to universalize and globalize its comparative politics into a global "clash of civilizations."107 Simultaneously, then, as the "terrorist" obstacles to empire become projected versions of Indians, Indians become retroactively legible as the first or foundational examples of ''terrorism." Of the Declaration of Independence, for example, which complains that King George "has endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions," Byrd observes, The non-discriminating, proto-inclusive "merciless Indian Savage" stands as the terrorist, externalized from "our frontiers," and functions as abjected horror through whom civilization is articulated oppositionally. This non-recuperative category, a derealization of the Other, serves as a paranoid foundation for what Jasbir K. Puar defines in Terrorist Assemblages as Islamic "monster-terrorist-fags," the affectively produced and queered West Asian (including South Asian, Arab American, and Muslim) body that is targeted for surveillance and destruction by U.S. patriotic pathology.108 The "terrorist" of today, the contemporary obstacle to empire, is the native of an alleged “yesterday," the archaic obstacle to settlement. Whether in the domain of conquest or empire, however, the failed futurism of settler colonial sovereignty produces abjected queer repositories of death that stand as a threat to the civilized life of the settler society.109 Their interconnection is crucial; the logic that connects them continuous. Unsurprisingly, then, Hobbes's political theory serves as a justification for what it claimed only to describe. While an unmarked self-preservation and fear of death have typically been taken to be the natural and logical preconditions of the sovereign politics Hobbes institutes in Leviathan, an Edelmanian approach to this text reveals them to be the premier values settler sovereignty ideologically seeks retroactively to (re)produce and uphold. What this means, then, is that Hobbes's entire state of nature story is an anachronism. Like all origin stories, it is fundamentally ideological and offered primarily in order to legitimate an already-existing political order and the political commitment of its storyteller.110 The particular agenda being naturalized in Hobbes's biopolitical story of the state of nature is settler conquest, and its futurist determination is the reason why he cannot decide when and where it is, and also why settler colonial societies seek constantly to erase themselves as settler societies. m The insecurity lodged at the heart of settler colonialism's futurist desire renders satisfaction impossible, an impossibility that remains unacknowledged and is instead foisted onto those “savages” who refuse collaboration with its ideological ruses. Leviathan is thus a settler colonial text par excellence. Like Agamben in this regard, it is a rationalization of empire that ignores all those queered by its machinations. Unlike Agamben, however, it makes explicit the connection between the biopolitics of settler colonialism and that of contemporary empire, revealing the futurist temporality that links them together and renders them continuous projects.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › K -- Settler Colonialism › 1NC -- Link -- Anti-Normativity

Adopting the position of queer anti-normativity inverts rather than eliminates the structures of oppression.

Oswin, 2008 (Natalie – Department of Geography @ the National University of Singapore, “Critical Geographies and the Uses of Sexuality: Deconstructing Queer Space”, Progress in Human Geography 32.1, shae)

This move to distinguish queer geographies from the mere study of sexual others is a productive one since queer is indeed not merely a synonym for LGBT. Queer theory is a critical approach that interrogates sexual normativities and orthodoxies. And it recognizes sexuality as a non-essential or unfixed aspect of subjectivity. But to state that subjectivity is unfixed is not to state that it is fluid and capable of obliterating boundaries. Browne states that she does not see ‘queer’ as a ‘simplistically appropriated identity category’ (2006a: 888). Yet she does not repudiate identity politics and ponders what constitutes queer subjectivities and queer spatialities. So, though not a straightforward process, for Browne it is possible to live queer lives. Even if we accept this proposition that queer is a thing that can be possessed or animated by individuals, we must call attention to the fact that no individual that lives in the social world is free-floating or disembodied. As Judith Halberstam argues, ‘postmodern gender theory has largely been (wrongly) interpreted as both a description of and a call for greater degrees of flexibility and fluidity’ (2005: 19). As are all binaries, the binary division of fluidity or rigidity is a fiction that is more productively deconstructed than embraced. So while I agree with Browne that queer and LGBT are not synonymous, I question the analytical usefulness of defining queer as fluid and beyond normativity. Such a move does not reconfigure the mapping of resistant/oppressive onto homosexuals/ heterosexuals. It merely supplants the homosexuals in this equation with ‘queers’ and dismisses Foucault’s lesson that ‘where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power’ (Foucault, 1978: 95).

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › K -- Settler Colonialism › 1NC -- Link -- Queer Subject Formation

Queer Subject formation depends upon indigeneity as a transitive site for the manifestation of desire as a subject.

Jodi A. Byrd 18 (citizen of the Chickasaw Nation of Oklahoma and associate professor of English and Gender and Women's Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign where she is also a faculty affiliate at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications, “LOVING UNBECOMING: The Queer Politics of the Transitive Native,” CRITICALLY SOVEREIGN: Indigenous Gender, Sexuality, and Feminist Studies, joanne barker,-editor, /ejb)

As an emergent field in its own right, then, queer Indigenous studies has begun to stage difficult and important questions about the nature of identity and its discontents, posing quandaries about the possibilities and limits of the transformative politics of gender and sexuality especially where they intersect with race, transnationalism, and colonialism. As queer Indigenous studies begins to articulate some of the stakes for culturally and tribally inflected counter-practices of gender and sexuality, kinship, governance, and relationally, one of the remaining challenges for the field is to interrogate whether the queer in Indigenous studies is the same as the queer in queer studies. At first blush, it might be tempting to assume that the answer is self-evident, the question slightly coy. The question, however, might trouble some of the methodological, theoretical, and quotidian horizons that intersectionality and interdisciplinarity seek to make visible within the fields of Indigenous, gender, and sexuality studies. The queer within Indigenous studies has already come to signify a range of prescribed practices attached to decolonizing desire, gender performance, kinship socialities, and relationities to land and community. Faced with the quandaries that the colonial, racial, gendered, and historical disjunctions of encounter, contact, and orientation have left us, what can desire and grief mean to the colonized if they signal, at their core, modes of dispossession, undoing, firsting, and lasting? What might the subjectlessness that Andrea Smith suggests as intervention to ethnographic entrapment offer queer Indigenous critique if it disallows anything fixed, grounded, located, or, most important, accountable to community, relationality, and connection? As a concept, indigeneity admittedly has had and has required a political referent that is tied to land, relation, and community, even if such referents are fluid and mutable. But at the same time, and as an ideological referent that is always up for grabs, indigeneity remains elusive, ontologically ephemeral, temporally challenged, and captured within the discourses of discovery, enlightennment, and sovereignty. Caught within modes of possession and its lack, Indigenous subjectlessness at the site of the queer simultaneously straddles the threshold between the colonialist practices of replacing the Indigenous, on the one hand, and emptying the Indigenous of any prior signification, on the other. In the grammars of empire where subject formation occurs through the Hegelian dialectics of freedom and enslavement, ownership and property, civilized and savage, sovereign and beast, the Indigenous might be understood as the domain or register in which the tensions between and among these antagonisms become sensible. Indigeneity’s challenge to settler colonial subjectivity and its loss, then, requires us to shift the frame slightly askew to apprehend how the processes of subjectivity—be they queer or normative—cohere, entangle, and unravel in relation to what Elizabeth Povinelli has identified as the governance of the prior. That governance, defined as “the priority of the prior person (or people) as a natural right of all persons and the people as such emerged as an impediment to the previous logics of kingly seizure and to the emergent logic of colonial governance,” hinges on an unresolvable temporal paradox that produces the conditions of indigeneity as prior to and a priority of the law at the same time that the law abjects indigeneity from having any priority at all.24 Returning to a distinction within the conceptualization of subjectless critique may help parse some of these tensions that exist within and between the queer and the Indigenous that have made questions of subjectivity and its temporality so fraught. In Imagine Otherwise, Kandice Chuh advocates for the creation of subjectlessness as a way to “prioritize difference by foregrounding the discursive constructedness of subjectivity,” where the subject “only becomes recognizable and can act as such by conforming to certain regulatory matrices.”25 I want to pry open this space of subjectivity, its regulatory matrices, and its queer refusals to posit that a prior presence, whether we name it Indigenous or something else, retains key transitive properties that enable and, in fact, are required to adhere relationality within the intimacies and violence of empire. According to Karen Elizabeth Gordon, transitive verbs “are those that cannot complete their meaning without the help of a direct object.”26 Like vampires, such verbs feed off an object to sustain, fulfill, and extend themselves in embodied orientations that require the object in order to exist. Such orientations, after Sara Ahmed, “are about the intimacy of bodies and their dwelling places”; they “allow us then to rethink the phenomenality of space—that is, how space is dependent on bodily inhabitance.” 27 Caught in a transitive relationality with indigeneity, settlers cannot achieve their sovereign subjectivities and embodiments without the help of the Native as object to orient them. In other words, the discursive frameworks and “regulatory matrices” of the subject have already been formulated in response to the colonization of American Indians. Within the structuring elements of settler colonialism, subjectivity, claiming to be, and speaking for have gone hand in hand with the theft of lands, the politics of replacement, and the forced normativities of compulsory heterosexuality and lineal descent. The fraught and contradictory desires for and against subjectivities embedded within the ontological orientations of empire are located within the diversity of experiences that have shaped such positionalities as settler, arrivant, and Native. These colonial contexts inform modern claims to Indigenous identity within the racial regimes of U.S. neoliberal multiculturalism and intersect with those queer politics that disrupt static, essential, and normalized privileges of race, class, and gender, on the one hand, and Indigenous identities that are tied to community recognition, sovereignty, and land, on the other. How might desire—which, as Holland has argued, is imbricated within quotidian racist practices—function to reproduce the logics of dispossession at the site of reinvention and becoming for the other? The U.S. Supreme Court, building on an interlocking foundation of precedence for its juridical authority, issued four rulings in June 2013 that hinged on equal protection to arbitrate the triad of sexuality, race, and indigeneity. In the process of maintaining white normativity within heterosexual—and now, by extension, same-sex— family units, the court inveighed on Indigenous identity, fearing the possibility of a remote Indian ancestor to be a disability hampering a child’s full incorporation into the rights due her as a transracial Indian-into- white subject. That fear not only demonstrates the degree to which the legal normativities of embodied ability depend on racializing and colonizing logics to produce the righted subject, but also highlights the transitive form through which the law interpellates indigeneity as difference and recourse. But how did indigeneity become transitive within the regulative fictions of rights and liberties? That answer might be found within the racial integrity acts of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that the Loving v. Virginia landmark ruling in 1967 purportedly overturned. By framing these concerns at a slight slant, it is my hope that we might be able to begin to apprehend how desire and identity function within the context of an ongoing colonialism that adjudicates inclusion and exclusion through a transitive relationality that requires the Native other to make visible the biopolitical structures of race, sexuality, gender, and sovereignty

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › K -- Settler Colonialism › 1NC -- Root Cause -- Heteropatriarchy

Feminist work needs to center settler colonialism—the aff devolves to a liberal multiculturalism where the demands of Indigenous women can never be met. Decolonization is necessary to any true project of emancipation—anything else furthers whiteness and its global settling missions like the war on terror.

Arvin, Tuck, and Morrill 2013 (Maile, assistant professor of Ethnic Studies at UC Riverside, Eve, Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at University of Toronto, Angie, Director of Title VI Indian Education Program for Portland Public Schools, “Decolonizing Feminism: Challenging Connections between Settler Colonialism and Heteropatriarchy, Feminist Formations, Vol. 25 No. 1, Spring)

Native feminist theories centrally address two intertwined ideas that are significant but often overlooked in feminist discourses: the United States and many other Western countries, including Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, are settler colonial nation-states, and settler colonialism has been and continues to be a gendered process. Because the United States is balanced upon notions of white supremacy and heteropatriarchy, everyone living in the country is not only racialized and gendered, but also has a relationship to settler colonialism. Native feminist theories offer new and reclaimed ways of thinking through not only how settler colonialism has impacted Indigenous and settler communities, but also how feminist theories can imagine and realize different modes of nationalism and alliances in the future (see also Smith 2007).1 This article highlights five central challenges that Native feminist theories pose to gender and women’s studies. With these challenges, we offer suggestions for meaningful engagement, arguing overall that attending to the links between heteropatriarchy and settler colonialism is intellectually and politically imperative. Although this article focuses primarily on gender and women’s studies, Native feminist theories also importantly highlight how ethnic studies has failed to adequately address settler colonialism. Attending to settler colonialism requires a significant departure from how gender and women’s studies and ethnic studies are regularly understood and taught. Conventionally, it is assumed that gender and women’s studies is inclusive of those who identify as women and indeed all people who are gendered, and that ethnic studies addresses Indigenous concerns, along with those of other ethnic groups. These fields teach people to think about themselves in relation to a gendered and racialized society (Omi and Winant 1994). However, engaging settler colonialism involves different frameworks from the ones these fields often prioritize. While both gender and women’s studies and ethnic studies unmask gender and race as social constructions, with often devastating material effects for women and nonwhite people, respectively, these fields also expose various mythologies about gender and race, including the myth of misogyny and racism as to-be-expected characteristics of human nature. Yet, within this important work, too often the consideration of Indigenous peoples remains rooted in understanding colonialism (like statesanctioned slavery) as an historical point in time away from which our society has progressed. Centering settler colonialism within gender and women’s studies and ethnic studies instead exposes the still-existing structure of settler colonization and its powerful effects on Indigenous peoples and others. This recognition within gender and women’s studies and ethnic studies makes possible new visions of what decolonization might look like for all peoples. It also opens up the possibility of new forms of activism based on critically thought-out alliances, rather than always taking the shape of alliances within and between seemingly naturally formed and identifiable groups of people—namely, women and people of color—as given. In fact, the prevalence of liberal multicultural discourses today effectively works to maintain settler colonialism because they make it easy to assume that all minorities and ethnic groups are different though working toward inclusion and equality, each in its own similar and parallel way. Justice is often put in terms that coincide with the expansion of the settler state (see Scott Lauria Morgensen [2011] for a discussion of the compatibility of queer politics with white normativity and settler society). While Indigenous peoples do form important alliances with people of color, Indigenous communities’ concerns are often not about achieving formal equality or civil rights within a nationstate, but instead achieving substantial independence from a Western nationstate— independence decided on their own terms. The feminist concerns of white women, women of color, and Indigenous women thus often differ and conflict with one another. In other words, within the context of land and settler colonialism, the issues facing Indigenous women, as inseparable from the issues facing Indigenous peoples as a whole, are resolved via decolonization and sovereignty, not (just) parity. We write as three Indigenous women–identified scholars situated variously in the disciplines of ethnic studies, education, and Indigenous studies.2 Each of us works to apply Indigenous theories and decolonizing frameworks to contemporary social realities in order to contest the rampant misrepresentations of Indigenous peoples and their lives in school curricula, the media, and the sociological imagination, and Native feminism has given us important tools to do such work. We believe that the challenges this article describes will be relevant to many disciplines, including our home disciplines of ethnic studies, education, and Indigenous studies, where feminist theories have long been important. Yet, we address this article primarily to theorists and activists of mainstream, or “whitestream,” feminism, as well as to other feminisms and nationalisms, including Asian, black, Latina, third world, transnational, and queer feminisms and nationalisms, because greater engagement between Native feminist theories and other feminisms is sorely needed.3 Our challenges respectfully push both conventional modes of feminism and more radical ones, as we see the need to interrogate everywhere what Rey Chow has termed “the ascendancy of whiteness,” a concept denoting the multiple ways that the condition of being white, and enjoying the often nationalist privileges of that whiteness, is made to seem neutral and inviting or inclusive of racial, sexual, and other minorities (Chow, qtd. in Morgensen 2010, 105; see also Puar 2007). By being included (whether by choice, coercion, or force) in whiteness, a wide array of Indigenous peoples, people of color, and queer communities are given the “opportunity” to take part in the settling processes that dispossess just such “other-ed” peoples globally. Such opportunities include everything from participating in the global War on Terror, as scholars like Jasbir K. Puar (2007) brilliantly critique, to naturalizing and maintaining settler colonialism in the United States. We argue that allying one’s self with feminism should not require consenting to inclusion within a larger agenda of whiteness; indeed, we believe that Native feminist theories demonstrate that feminisms, when allied with other key causes, hold a unique potential to decolonize the ascendancy of whiteness in many global contexts.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › K -- Settler Colonialism › 1NC -- Root Cause -- Heteropatriarchy

Gender and settlerism are intrinsically tied together- Heteropatriarchal colonialism has sexualized indigenous lands while transforming native people into violable subjugated kin to be assimilated into white settler societies- colonial heteropatriarchy structures the lives of all indigenous persons, and that divesting from it will be necessary to collective work for decolonisation.

Scott Lauria Morgensen (2012) Theorising Gender, Sexualityand Settler Colonialism: An Introduction, Settler Colonial Studies, 2:2, 2-22, DOI:10.1080/2201473X.2012.10648839, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/2201473X.2012.10648839

Indigenous feminist and LGBTQ/Two-Spirit criticisms have established the ineluctably gendered and sexual quality of settlers’ attempted conquest of indigenous peoples. This literature teaches that heteropatriarchal colonialism has sexualised indigenous lands and peoples as violable, subjugated indigenous kin ties as perverse, attacked familial ties and traditional gender roles, and all to transform indigenous peoples for assimilation within or excision from the political and economic structures of white settler societies.1 Although these lessons are recorded in scholarly texts, the violences they name have been challenged by indigenous women and LGBTQ/Two-Spirit people who organise for their own and their people’s liberations. Among many examples, the Aboriginal women’s movement in Canada, Two-Spirit organising across North America, and takatapui organising in Aotearoa New Zealand offer grounded theories of gendered and sexual colonisation and of indigenous resistance.2 Crucially, such movements do not restrict their address to persons so-identified, for they argue that colonial heteropatriarchy structures the lives of all indigenous persons, and that divesting from it will be necessary to collective work for decolonisation. Activist and intellectual legacies such as these make possible this collection and its investigations of gender, sexuality, and settler colonialism, and recur continually in our accounts. ‘Calling’, Karangatia, invokes the opening of an exchange of words in which Morgensen, ‘Theorising Gender, Sexuality, and Settler Colonialism’ 5 many will listen and may eventually speak, but within a context first defined by indigenous women who call a diversity of gendered and sexual subjects into conversation. This title, by Michelle Erai’s suggestion, positions both the issue’s contents and our collaboration as co-editors. Whereas I write this introduction as sole author, I do so to present my response as a white settler critic to a context of speaking, listening, learning, and acting that has been defined by the calls of indigenous feminist and LGBTQ/Two-Spirit scholars and activists. With these histories in mind, this introduction and our collection theorise gender, sexuality, and settler colonialism by advancing beyond similar scholarship in colonial studies. For some time now, the very ubiquity of feminist and queer accounts in colonial studies has appeared to explain gender and sexuality in settler-colonial situations. Yet as recent scholarship indicates, the specificity of settler colonialism is obscured if it is presumed to have been explained by general theories of ‘colonialism’.3 All such theories must be revisited to ask if they erroneously generalise specific colonial situations, and to provincialise all such situations by positioning them comparatively. Scholars in colonial and postcolonial studies long have observed that colonial rule comes into being by mobilising gendered and sexual power. Yet this observation in itself does not denaturalise gender or sexuality, as is apparent when even major texts in these fields leave the impression that a natural gendered or sexual order underlies what colonial violence produced.4 Anticolonial feminist and queer accounts show that colonisation’s sexual and gendered methods are inventive, not foreordained; and that liberation will follow disturbing all that colonisation taught, so that distinctive ways of life might be recalled or imagined. Such accounts position ‘gender’ and ‘sexuality’ alongside ‘race’ and ‘nation’ as analytical categories that are freed from any universal referent, in that they designate power-laden arenas of contested knowledge and embodied practice that call for critical and creative engagement. While such insights appear diversely without cohering in any single body of work, they were made possible by the signal contributions of critics within feminist antiracist and anticolonial movements. Indigenous, Black, US/Third World, and women of Morgensen, ‘Theorising Gender, Sexuality, and Settler Colonialism’ 6 colour feminisms synergised with feminists engaged in anticolonial and postcolonial nationalism to displace white settler and Western feminist thought: a history that at the end of the 20th century produced postcolonial and transnational feminisms as arenas where scholars across the global north and south could form alliances in critiquing colonial, racial, gendered, and sexual power.5 The scholarly projects of queer of colour and queer diasporic critique formed in relation to these lineages, as have transnational queer studies that trouble racial or diasporic identity to address the global and imperial scales of sexual power.6 Denaturalising gender, sexuality, race, and nation is a hallmark of such work, as when Chandra Mohanty’s review of writings from the 1980s argued for ‘the inherently political definition of the term women of color’ as designating ‘a political constituency, not a biological or even sociological one’ that coheres around ‘a common context of struggle’. 7 Jacqui Alexander joined Chandra Mohanty in emphasising their commitments to decolonisation, arguing that if ‘decolonization involves thinking oneself out of the spaces of domination’, then this will transpire only ‘through praxis’, which they sought by holding their work responsible to ‘the concrete analyses of collective and organizational practice within feminist communities that offer provisional strategies for dismantling the psychic and social constellations put in place by colonization’. 8

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › K -- Settler Colonialism › 1NC -- Root Cause -- Heteropatriarchy

Analyzing colonialism is a pre-req to addressing the patriarchy – they ignore the sovereignty of native nations

Smith 10 (Andrea, Smith is an American academic, feminist, and activist against violence. Smith's work focuses on issues of violence against women of color and their communities, specifically Native American women. A co-founder of INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence, the Boarding School Healing Project, and the Chicago chapter of Women of All Red Nations, Smith has based her activism and her scholarship on the lives of women of color and long claimed to be Cherokee. Formerly an assistant professor of American Culture and Women's Studies at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Smith currently serves as an associate professor in the Department of Media and Cultural Studies at University of California, Riverside, “Queer Theory and Native Studies” pg 58-60 accessed 7/10 //um-tw)

The question arises, then, why is settler colonialism so seriously undertheorized in queer studies, even within queer of color critique? One possibility may be that∂ queer studies has not considered the possibility of alternative forms of national-ism that are not structured by nation-states. To be fair, queer theory does offer strong critiques of the heteronormativity of the nation-state as well as the heter-onormativity of the citizen, particularly the U.S. citizen. Puar’s and Gopinath’swork demonstrates how the noncitizen, particularly in the figure of the refugee or the immigrant, queers the state’s heteronormativity. Berlant also looks at how queer activist groups within the United States attempt to reconfigure citizenship within the current nation-state and even to question the “censoring imaginary of the state.”∂ 66∂ Muñoz similarly gestures to “beyond” the current political system when he says, “Our charge as spectators and actors is to continue disidentifying with this world until we achieve new ones.”∂ 67∂ Thus, queer theorists seem to exhibit some desire to think beyond the nation-state .At the same time, queer theory seems to lapse back into presuming the givenness of the nation-state in general, and the United States in particular. Forinstance, Berlant contends: “It must be emphasized . . . that disidentification with U.S. nationality is not, at this moment, even a theoretical option for queer citizens. . . .We are compelled, then, to read America’s lips. What can we do to force the offi-cially constituted nation to speak a new political tongue?”∂ 68∂ This statement curi-ously occludes the struggles of many indigenous peoples who have articulated themselves as belonging to sovereign nations rather than as being U.S. citizens.The reason for this occlusion can be found in another statement: Berlant contendsthat Native peoples “have long experienced simultaneously the wish to be fullcitizens and the violence of their partial citizenship.”∂ 69∂ She collapses Native peo-ples into the category of racial minority rather than recognize them as colonized peoples struggling against a settler state. So the settler state is presumed within queer theory, while (as mentionedpreviously) indigenous nationhood is imagined as simply a primitive mirror image of a heteronormative state. However, many Native scholars and activists are offering internal critiques of contemporary Native politics to imagine potentially nonheter-onormative forms of indigenous nationhood. As Taiaiake Alfred, Glen Coulthard,Denetdale, and others note, Native sovereignty struggles are themselves often articulated within, rather than in resistance to, the logics of settler colonialism.∂ 70∂ That is, articulations of Native governance and sovereignty often mimic the logics of the settler state rather than draw on forms of indigenous governance that call into question many of the logics of nation-state forms of governance. As they argue, Native sovereignty struggles often focus on gaining recognition from the surround-ing settler state. To gain this recognition, Native nations model themselves after∂ colonial states, mirroring their similar colonial logics. Coulthard explains that this politics of recognition also entraps colonized peoples in a death dance with their colonizers. The “key problem with the politics of recognition when applied to thecolonial context . . . [is that it] rests on the problematic assumption that the flour-ishing of Indigenous Peoples as distinct and self-determining agents is somehow dependent on their being granted recognition and institutional accommodation from the surrounding settler-state and society. . . . Not only will the terms of rec-ognition tend to remain the property of those in power to grant to their inferiorsin ways that they deem appropriate, but also under these conditions, the Indig-enous population will often come to see their limited and structurally constrained terms of recognition granted to them as∂ their own∂ . In effect, the colonized come to∂ identify∂ with ‘white liberty and white justice.’ ”∂ 71∂ He calls on indigenous activiststo shift their focus from seeking recognition from the settler state to seeking rec-ognition from each other as well as other oppressed communities. Native peoples’ethnographic entrapment within the academy presumes the politics of recognitionthat Coulthard critiques. That is, Native peoples are compelled to represent them-selves properly in order to gain recognition within the academy — they are notsupposed to define the terms of discourse itself. ∂ As I have discussed elsewhere, these alternative models of sovereignty are not based on a narrow definition of nation that entails a closely bounded com-munity and ethnic cleansing. Native activists often articulate indigenous forms of nationhood organized around a logic of citizenship based less on rights withina nation and more on a system of interrelatedness and mutual responsibility.∂ 72∂ Because these visions of national liberation do not necessarily entail a nation-state form of governance as their end goal, they do not imagine a social struc-ture based on social domination. As such, they can∂ potentially∂ challenge logics of heteronormativity because heteropatriarchy is a logic that naturalizes socialhierarchy. That is, if under the logic of heteropatriarchy, men are supposed torule women on the basis of biology, this social hierarchy becomes naturalized. As Karen Warren notes, social domination is effective primarily because it seemsnatural — otherwise, there is no reason why people would want to live under con-ditions of domination.∂ 73∂ Once we challenge the idea that domination is somehow “human nature,” we have the potential to question the naturalization of all its manifestations, including heteropatriarchy

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › K -- Settler Colonialism › 1NC -- Root Cause -- Heteropatriarchy

Theorizations of queerness that don’t centralize settler colonialism recreate queer citizenship and homonationalism

Morgensen 10 [2010, Scott Lauria Morgensen, SETTLER HOMONATIONALISM, GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, Volume 16, Number 1-2: 105-131]

Modern sexuality arose in the United States as crucial to a colonial society of normalization. The violent sexual regulation of Native peoples became a proving ground for forming settler subjects as agents and beneficiaries of modern sexuality. Their subject positions arose relationally within the colonial biopolitics of modern sexuality and call for broad analysis in queer, American, and Native studies. 40 I now ask how colonial histories made settlement a primary condition of the formation of modern queer subjects and politics in the United States. I reexamine scholarship in queer studies that suggests this claim, and I mark how future queer scholarship can center the study of settler colonialism, including as a condition of homonationalism. Settler colonialism is the open secret in most historical work in U.S. sexuality studies and queer studies. Settler colonialism conditioned every aspect of the history of sexuality in the United States, but only rarely has it been made a focus of study. My account has suggested a convergence between the sexual colonization of Native peoples and the growth in the United States of techniques of modern sexuality. These proliferated in the decades following the frontier’s “closure,” a time that in fact represented a heyday of state and religious efforts to institute a colonial education of desire, as in the events at the Crow Agency or during the 1879 – 1918 tenure of the Carlisle Indian School. Far from reflecting finality, this period witnessed tense negotiations of active and contested settlement. In such a time, any iteration of modern sexuality that placed Native people in the past knew itself to be a contingent claim that remained open to challenge. Thus scholars must recognize that modern sexuality is not a product of settler colonialism, as if it came into being in the United States after settlement transpired. Modern sexuality arose in the United States as a method to produce settler colonialism, and settler subjects, by facilitating ongoing conquest and naturalizing its effects. The normative function of settlement is to appear inevitable and final. It is naturalized again whenever sexuality or queer studies scholars inscribe it as an unexamined backdrop to the historical formation of modern U.S. sexual cultures and politics. Scholars in Native and American studies have theorized settler colonialism as the social processes and narratives that displace Native people while granting settlers belonging to Native land and settler society. With Renée Bergland and James Cox, I examine how this displacement is enabled by settler narratives of Native absence or disappearance.41 Both terms share a quality of invoking the very thing being argued as not present. Stories of Native absence or disappearance thus precisely do not erase Native people but produce particular forms of knowledge about Native people, as already or inevitably gone. Cox argues that tales of Native disappearance should also be read as narratives of settlement. The very absence of Native people in a story is telling us a story about qualities of settler subjects, cultures, and social life. Queer scholarship on race and sexuality has been effective at marking colonial relations and discourses and inviting the study of settlement. Scholars reveal that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, sexual sciences and civil institutions distinguished primitive from civilized sexuality in order to define queer margins for sexual normality. Eithne Luibhéid and Roderick Ferguson explain how Asian immigrants and conquered Mexicans after the midnineteenth century, and African Americans during slavery and the Jim Crow society, were produced as racial and sexual populations for national regulation.42 Queers of color in such contexts were targeted for control, but as emblems of entire racial populations to be queered as the primitive margins of national whiteness and its civilizational sexuality.43 In turn, Jennifer Terry and George Chauncey, among others, explain how sexual sciences classified perversions by documenting white subjects as degenerates who had regressed to prior stages of racial evolution. 44 In early activism, white sexual minorities reversed discourse on sexual primitivity in order to embrace it as a nature deserving recognition by modern citizenship. In the United States, Harry Hay organized the Mattachine Society by referencing stories of berdache as the primitive nature of sexual minorities and as a primitive model of acceptance that modern societies could emulate — themes that were sustained in homophile and gay and lesbian civil rights activism.45 Each such moment is illuminated by its relation to settlement. As Luibhéid’s remarkable historical research suggests, the structural locations of non- Native people of color within the biopolitics of modern sexuality in the colonial and imperial United States align with those assigned to Native peoples by sexual colonization.46 Their distinctive encounters with racial and sexual power thus may be examined as interrelated effects of the United States forming as a colonial power through processes of settlement. Yet studying their ties also will mark the many nonidentical locations occupied by non-Natives, including queers of color, in relation to Native people under colonial conditions of settlement. In turn, white U.S. sexual minorities who defended their sexual primitivity articulated normative practices of settler citizenship. Philip Deloria and Amy Kaplan have examined settler citizenship as based on the conquest and incorporation of primitivity, so that primitivity becomes a resource to be drawn on when asserting the unique strengths of a settler civilization.47 Modern sexuality discourses also taught white U.S. American men to tap and control their primitive roots, as when G. Stanley Hall’s recapitulation theory of play or youth health movements in the YMCA invited white youth to explore primitive developmental stages so as to become civilized adults with virile sex and sexuality.48 White U.S. sexual minorities thus organized in a political culture that already validated a journey to personhood and citizenship that translated primitive roots into settler modernity. Defending primitive sexual nature, which could include appropriating Native American culture as part of their history, translated their queer marginality into a normative assertion of settler citizenship. Focusing on settlement also marks the way that theories of degeneration assigned to modern queers in the early-twentieth-century United States presumed Native disappearance. As degenerates, modern queers appeared as failed subjects, incapable of representing either white civilization or authentic primitivity. Yet this framing also naturalized them across racial differences as non-Native, in that it presumed that authentic Native people had already disappeared from the modern and settled spaces where queer degenerates would be found. If living Native people ever did appear in those spaces, they tended to present as out of place. For instance, Nayan Shah’s compelling history of sexuality and migration cites a California police report from 1918, which criminalized a relationship between a South Asian migrant man and an American Indian youth by narrating it as sexual predation. This regulatory moment occurred amid recent histories of scalp bounties and massacres targeting Native peoples across Northern California, including only two years after the death of Ishi, famed survivor of the Yahi tribe. How might popular narratives of lost Native authenticity have shaped the police description of the youth only by his town of origin (Truckee) and his assimilation into a multiracial underclass? How, still, might tales of sexual primitivity persist, as his framing as the passive object of his racialized partner’s desire suggests (without naming) the logic of berdache? 49 In turn, Siobhan Somerville and Kevin Mumford have shown how popular stories and social practices in the early twentieth century linked homosexuality to miscegenation, including representing it as emblematic of white “slumming” for sexual adventure in African American districts of New York City and Chicago.50 Yet in the Northeast, blackness already connoted historical miscegenation with Indianness. Amy den Ouden has explained how in the wake of normative associations of Native people with blackness in New England, Native communities with black family lines could be marked by white authorities as racially inauthentic, thereby delegitimating their Native identities and land claims. In light of this, by the early twentieth century, how did discourses on sexual perversion tie Indianness and blackness to homosexuality, and how did they interlink? Did the histories of black-Indian communities and of their regulation shape modern racial theories of homosexuality? What would a queer history of homosexuality and miscegenation look like if Indianness — as an identity, or an object of colonial discourse — were crucial to analysis?51 Queer studies must center settler colonialism and processes of settlement in order to pursue these directions in scholarship. Settler colonialism appears in the relational of colonial and modern sexual regimes; in narratives of sexuality and gender based on Native absence and disappearance, despite evidence of Native survival and resistance; and in the normative formation of settler sexual subjects, cultures, and politics. I argue that queer accounts of settler colonialism will be supported by studying the colonial biopolitics of modern sexuality. The frame of colonial biopolitics makes the discursive and institutional relationality of Native and settler subject positions relevant to any account of modern sexuality in the United States. While such accounts have tended to exclude Native people, biopolitics marks erasure as meaningful to narrating settlement, even as that move can be investigated for evidence of the irruption of Native people amid stories of their demise. The frame of colonial biopolitics will also mark how the power relations structuring “Native” and “settler” articulate diverse people, cultures, and politics across differences of race, nation, class, disability, gender, and sexuality that exceed these two terms and their opposition. Yet the normativity of the terms within colonial biopolitics will still inform every U.S. formation of modern sexuality. Studying their relationality can recall that the locations they define for Native people always are exceeded by the discrepant histories and epistemologies of Native people’s interdependent and resistant lives. In turn, the term non-Native can help mark how subjects outside Native communities incompletely fit the term settler — whether excluded from it categorically or asked to pass through or appeal to it — as they negotiate varied non-Native lives in a settler society. Differences among non-Native people of color, or between them and white people, thus will not be erased by marking their shared inheritance of settler colonialism; indeed, doing so will mark those differences, even as their distinctive relationships to settler colonialism and its naturalization become relevant to study.52 In the process, analyzing the colonial biopolitics of modern sexuality will focus queer studies on the work of denaturalizing settlement. I mean here not just that settler colonialism will be marked as a condition of all modern sexual power in the United States but also that the meaningfulness of its naturalization will become a major area of study. We need many more, and more detailed accounts of the subjects, institutions, and power relations that form whenever settler colonialism is naturalized within modern queer projects in the United States. My argument invites scholars to return to homonationalism and explain it as one crucial effect of the settler histories of modern sexuality in the United States. We will see that if non-Native queers become sexual subjects of life, they will do so by joining a colonial biopolitics of modern sexuality that functions to produce modern queers as settler subjects in relation to Native peoples. Normatively white and national queer politics will arise here by naturalizing settler colonialism, notably when appeals to the settler state fail to trouble its colonial relation to Native peoples and its enforcement of a settler society.53 To invoke Puar, the settler formation of U.S. queer projects will make them “queer as regulatory” over Native peoples, whose social lives will appear distant in time and space despite the continued existence of collective and allied Native activisms for decolonization and calls to non-Natives to join. Homonationalism will arise here, where the historical and contemporary activity of settler colonialism conditions queer modernities in the United States.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › K -- Settler Colonialism › 1NC -- Root Cause -- Heteropatriarchy

Settler colonialism is at the core of the heteropatriarchy, and critiques of such heteronormativity that fail to first comprehend that role recreate settler colonialism – only a prior breakdown of the politics of the settler can resolve either impact

Morgensen 11 (Scott Lauria, assistant professor of gender studies at Queen’s University, “Spaces between Us: Queer Settler Colonialism and Indigenous Decolonization”, University of Minnesota Press, 11/17/11, pp. 1-28)//JSL

This book examines how settler colonial power relations among native and non-native people define the status "queer." It argues that modern queer subjects, cultures, and politics have developed among natives and non-natives in linked, yet distinct, ways. The imposition of colonial heteropatriarchy relegates native people and all non-native people of color to queered statuses as racialized populations amid colonial efforts to eliminate native nationality and settle native lands. Modern sexuality comes into existence when the heteropatriarchal advancement of white settlers appears to vanquish sexual primitivity, which white settlers nevertheless adopt as their own history. When modern sexuality queers white settlers, their effort to reclaim a place within settler society produces white and non-native queer politics for recognition by the state. Yet memories and practices of discrepant sexual cultures among Indigenous peoples and peoples of color persistently trouble the white settler logics of sexual modernity. For instance, native modes of kinship, embodiment, and desire such as those today called "Two-Spirit" produce Native queer modernities that denaturalize settler colonialism. the comparative studies in this book show settler colonialism as the context in which non-native and native people produce modern queer subjects, cultures, and politics. A methodological shift in native studies heralded by such scholars as Linda Tuhiwai Smith and Robert warrior theorizes settler colonialism by tracing the "intellectual histories" (Warrior) and methods of Native peoples practicing survival, resistance, and decolonization.2 Scholarship in settler colonial studies must support this turn, as when Patrick Wolfe theorizes settler colonialism as "a structure, not an event" that calls for a sustained denaturalizing critique.3 Andrea Smith calls on Native studies to refuse its "ethnographic entrapment" in the description of Native cultures and instead become an interdisciplinary site for explaining and transforming a world defined by settler colonialism.4 She promotes this shift by invoking queer theory, which displaced the description of sexual minorities in gay/lesbian studies by theorizing heteronormativity as a power relation that conditions all subjects and social life.5 Scholars at the intersections of Native and queer studies have responded to these calls by demonstrating that each field is intrinsic to the other.6 Smith explains that "the heteronormativity of settler colonialism" has subjected Native and non-Native people to settler colonial rule and regimes of modern sexuality. In this context, "queer" statuses accrue to nonheteronormative identities—such as gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, or queer—after colonial heteropatriarchy first redefines embodiment, desire, and kinship to eliminate Native culture, control racialized populations, and secure, in Sherene Razack's term, a "white settler society." In this book, queer will refer to statuses produced by the heteropatriarchal power of white supremacist settler colonialism. My analysis joins critics of homo-normativity in arguing that all "queer" statuses are not equivalent.7 Jasbir Puar critiques "homonationalism" as the process whereby whiteness and imperialism create U.S. queer subjects as "regulatory" over peoples queered by U.S. rule.8 I resituate Puar's account to argue that in a white settler society, queer politics produces a settler homonationalism that will persist unless settler colonialism is challenged directly as a condition of queer modernities.9 Native and queer studies must regard settler colonialism as a key condition of modern sexuality on stolen land, and use this analysis to explain the power of settler colonialism among Native and non-Native people. This book investigates how settler colonialism produces what I call "non-Native queer modernities," in which modern queers appear definitively not Native—separated from, yet in perpetual (negative) relationship to, the original peoples of the lands where they live. The phrase suggests a settler colonial logic that disappears indigeneity so it can be recalled by modern non-natives as a relationship to native culture and land that might reconcile them to inheriting conquest.10 Thus, "non-native" signifies not a racial or ethnic identity but a location within settler colonialism. non-native queer modernities naturalize settler colonialism when they confront queer differences as racial or diasporic in a manner that sustains native disappearance. If queer subjects align with whiteness or homonationalism, their settler colonial roots may seem clear. But even multiracial and transnational queer critiques of racism and imperialism can erase native people and naturalize settler colonialism in ways that indirectly or directly define queer modernity as not native. This book examines "native queer modernities" as projects that formed historically precisely to displace the settler colonial logics that sustain "non-native queer modernities."

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › K -- Settler Colonialism › 1NC -- Root Cause -- Heteropatriarchy

Heteronormativity in today’s society can be directly traced back to settler colonialism

Morgensen 11 (Scott Lauria, assistant professor of gender studies at Queen’s University, “Spaces between Us: Queer Settler Colonialism and Indigenous Decolonization”, University of Minnesota Press, 11/17/11, pp. 31-53)//JSL

Modern sexuality arises in settler societies as a function of the biopolitics of settler colonialism. In the United States, the sexual colonization of Native peoples produced modern sexuality as "settler sexuality": a white and national heteronormativity formed by regulating native sexuality and gender while appearing to supplant them with the sexual modernity of settlers. Queer modernities in a settler society are produced in contextual relationship to the settler colonial conditions of modern sexuality. White settlers promulgating colonial heteropatriarchy queered native peoples and all racialized subject populations for elimination and regulation by the biopolitics of settler colonialism. Achille Mbembe has adapted Giorgio Agamben's account of biopower to colonial situations by explaining colonial rule as "necropolitics," or a positioning of the space-time of the colony in a state of exception to Western imperial rule.1 Mbembe invites revisiting the racialization and sexualization of colonial situations, including in white settler societies in the Americas that formed multiracial societies from the transatlantic slave trade, colonized indentured labor, and genocidal control of Indigenous peoples under European settlement. However, to pursue such an account, scholars must explain how the colony comes to be located in a state of exception in context of white-supremacist settler colonialism and the logic of Indigenous elimination. Mbembe's account limited its analysis to modern regimes of colonial biopolitics that arose in the nineteenth-century European franchise colonization of Africa and Asia. As a practice that is not past but continues today, the biopolitics of settler colonialism requires specific study.2 This chapter names necessary elements to such an account, narrowed to explain the settler colonial necropolitics that queered native peoples in the Americas by targeting modes of embodiment, desire, and kinship that Native queer and Two-Spirit people reclaim as their and their peoples' histories. I argue that the biopolitics of settler colonialism produces settler sexuality as the context traversed by non-Native and Native people formulating queer modernities. The queering of native peoples defined not only settler sexuality, broadly, but also the definition of queer subjects among white settlers: as a primitive, racialized sexual margin akin to what white settlers attempted to conquer among natives. when queer white settlers reversed such discourses—notably by laying claim to the colonial object berdache3—they argued their inclusion in settler society by traversing normative paths to settler citizenship, which incorporate and transcend ties to native roots to achieve national belonging. non-native queer modernities form by gathering a multiracial, transnational constituency as a diversity that exists in a non-native relationship to disappearing indigeneity. Yet, narrating native disappearance distinguishes non-native queer modernities from the survival of native queer people, who negotiate settler sexuality by recalling knowledges and practices queered by colonial hetero-patriarchy. native people defined unique identities, including two-Spirit, as modern, decolonizing native critiques of settler colonialism and its structuring of non-native queer projects. this chapter grounds my interpretation of non-native and native queer modernities within a genealogy of white-supremacist settler colonialism as the condition of sexual modernity and its contestation in a settler society.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › K -- Settler Colonialism › 1NC -- Link -- Competing Pedagogies

Engaging in critical theories and pedagogies in order to have a competing narrative of oppression distracts from the initial problem of settler colonialism that enabled that oppression in the first place

Byrd 11 (Jodi A., citizen of the Chickasaw Nation of Oklahoma and assistant professor of American Indian studies and English at the University of Illinois at Urbanandash;Champaign. “The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism,” University of Minessota Press) AF

There is more than one way to frame the concerns of The Transit of Empire and more than one way to enter into the possibilities that transit might allow for comparative studies. On the one hand, I am seeking to join ongoing conversations about sovereignty, power, and indigeneity—and the epistemological debates that each of these terms engender—within and across disparate and at times incommensurable disciplines and geographies. American studies, queer studies, postcolonial studies, American In dian studies, and area studies have all attempted to apprehend injury and redress, melancholy and grief that exist in the distances and sutures of state recognitions and belongings. Those distances and sutures of recognitions and belongings, melancholy and grief, take this book from the worlds of Southeastern Indians to Hawai'i, from the Poston War Relocation Center to Jonestown, Guyana, in order to consider how ideas of “Indianness” have created conditions of possibility for U. S. empire to manifest its intent. As liberal multicultural settler colonialism attempts to flex the exceptions and exclusions that first constituted the United States to now provisionally include those people othered and abjected from the nation-states origins, it instead creates a cacophony of moral claims that help to deflect progressive and transformative activism from dismantling the ongoing conditions of colonialism that continue to make the United States a desired state formation within which to be included. That cacophony of competing strug gles for hegemony within and outside institutions of power, no matter how those struggles might challenge the state through loci of race, class, gender, and sexuality, serves to misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism that made the United States possible as oppressor in the first place. As a result, the cacophony produced through U.S. colonialism and imperialism domestically and abroad often coerces struggles for social justice for queers, racial minorities, and immigrants into complicity with settler colonialism.