THE FUTURE IS SETTLER COLONIAL Despite my emphasis so far on life and survival, the production of "death" through the inauguration of temporality is just as important as the constitution of life. After all, if life only becomes recognizable as life retrospectively, the same can and must be true about death. Thus, while the sovereign is consistently presented as the beacon of peace in Leviathan, war and death are just as much his creations as are peace and life. This is one, merely formal way of substantiating the claim that biopolitics is simultaneously and necessarily a necropolitics. However, what is also evident in Hobbes (but notably absent in Edelman) is the important qualification of this bio/necropolitics as specifically colonial. Closer examination of the time/place that is the state of nature makes clear that Hobbes's championing of life is a celebration and protection only of the lives of those who are "civilized," a safeguarding that comes at the necessary expense, obliteration, transfer, removal, and dispossession of "savage" others. In other words, "life" in biopolitical sovereignty is specifically settler life, characterized as "civilization," while" death" demarcates "savagery," or all those who cannot or will not conform to this particular political formation, as its foremost threat. In other words, it is the specifically settler character of "life" that explains the simultaneity and coincidence of sovereignty's bio- and necropolitics. Returning once more to that notorious state of nature, recall my claim that time cannot exist there. Hobbes might potentially be seen as acknowledging this fact insofar as he refers to the state of nature as not only a "time" but also a "condition," two terms he seems to use interchangeably throughout chapter 13. For example, in the first sentence of the paragraph about war, he writes that "during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre."68 Later, entertaining objections to his arguments about the state of nature, he muses, "It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of warre as this." 69 He then further complicates things by proceeding to conflate time and condition with geographical location, noting immediately thereafter, "and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now"70 – for example, "the savage people in many places of America."71 These ambiguous and confusing characterizations of the state of nature nevertheless cohere around one feature that unites them, which is their ultimately civilizationalist character. First, as already discussed, if the state of nature is a time-an era, say, or an epoch-it is simultaneously a moment that is completely timeless, an existence lacking any dynamism or principle of change. Indeed, although Hobbes famously characterizes life in the state of nature as "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short,"72 that last adjective is simply unwarranted given that no time is possible there. However rhetorically effective it may be, lodged at the end of a litany of dreary adjectives, life in the state of nature cannot be characterized as short any more than it can be characterized as long or even average because, as Hobbes makes clear, temporality does not pertain to it.73 However, if the state of nature is instead a condition, then it is one of "savagery," as Hobbes makes explicit. Bolstering the view that the state of nature is a story about humanity's prehistory, Hobbes here rehearses the colonialist trope of indigenous peoples as European humanity's ancestors or premodern childhood. Savagery is therefore associated with stalled temporality, timelessness, and the failure of forward movement or progress. Conclusively, however, when referenced as geographical location, Hobbes materializes the state of nature in "America" and the seventeenth-century European notion of the New World, an uncharted territory ripe for exploration and conquest. The specifications of the state of nature as premodern, timeless, "savage," and "America" make clear that the establishment of the commonwealth imposes a distinction not simply between life and death, peace and war, but also between progress and timelessness, modernity and backwardness, civilization and savagery. Each of these categorial pairs functions as a surrogate for the others; taken together, they suggest the deep implication of categories of life and death with colonization and conquest for European political theory. Once sovereignty, civilization, and peace are established as the domain of life, the state of nature, "savagery," and war are established as the domain of death. Nichols writes, "The 'savage' of the Americas thus becomes the symbolic negative – the embodiment of the state of nature itself, and thus all which is to be avoided by civilized men living in civil (political) society."74 The state of nature is most concrete, in Hobbes's varying descriptions of it, as a place-that is, "America." Immediately after declaring this, however, he concedes: But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of warre against one another; yet in all times, Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours, which is a posture of War. But because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men.75 Rescinding his prior example of native North Americans, Hobbes concedes that there never really was any such time or condition as this state of nature. Not only are native peoples not in a state of nature, then, but also, and quite literally, there is no state of nature because, as we have seen, no time is possible there. Instead, Hobbes now claims, in "all times," the situation of international relations is like that of the state of nature, because heads of state are in perpetual warfare with one another. The state of nature, then, is neither a time nor a condition nor a place but, rather, an allegory of interstate behavior. And yet, even in this new global location, anarchy does not lead to the misery of the state of nature Hobbes described earlier because, as he says, sovereigns engage in foreign wars in the interest of securing their domestic subjects (rather than their own personages, presumably). Thus even as a metaphor the state of nature does not exist. It is a time that is no time, a condition that cannot exist in its unconditionality, a place that is nowhere, a representation of the unrepresentable.76 Hobbes's vacillation, confusion, and ultimate retraction of any concrete examples of the state of nature can be productively deciphered by linking it to theories of settler colonialism, on the one hand, and Edelman's critique of futurism, on the other. Regarding the first, Lorenzo Veracini has argued that settler colonialism is distinct from other types of colonialism insofar as its seeks consistently to erase itself as settler colonial, to “supersede the conditions of its operation."77 Following Patrick Wolfe's argument that settler colonialism pursues a “logic of elimination" whereby settlers seek to replace the natives and indigenize themselves post facto,78 Veracini argues that because it aims at the elimination of the native, settler colonialism necessarily aims at its own elimination: The successful settler colonies "tame" a variety of wildernesses, end up establishing independent nations, effectively repress, co-opt, and extinguish indigenous alterities, and productively manage ethnic diversity. By the end of this trajectory, they claim to be no longer settler colonial (they are putatively "settled" and "postcolonial"-except that unsettling anxieties remain, and references to a postcolonial condition appear hollow as soon as indigenous disadvantage is taken into account). Settler colonialism thus covers its tracks and operates towards its self-supersession (this is why, paradoxically, settler colonialism is most recognizable when it is most imperfect-say, 1950s Kenya or 1970s Zimbabwe-and least visible in the settler cities).79 The truly “successful" settler colonial project, in other words, would manage to efface the native entirely, whether through genocide or assimilation or some other form of disappearance-more recently, via a politics of recognition, as Glen Coulthard has argued.80 One way this happens is through the narration of settlement itself, which disappears the native through discourses of nonexistence, invisibility, or terra nullius.81 In Hobbes, this emerges as his inability to definitively locate or circumscribe the state of nature. This is consistent with the originary imaginings of all settler polities. As Veracini observes, “It is not a coincidence that the cultural traditions of the settler polities often focus on real or imaginary locales putatively epitomising specific national attributes: the 'outback,' the 'backblocks,' and, most famously, the 'frontier.' Generally speaking, these are not specific locations, and their most important characteristic is to be always somewhere else.”82 The state of nature is one such highly abstract geographical imagining and, as we have seen, Hobbes displaces it from a time to a condition to a place to a metaphor, eventually determining that it never existed at all, even as a hermeneutic. Of course, regardless of how Hobbes defines or determines the "state of nature," the fact of the matter is that neither settlement nor indigenous people are, in fact, "elsewhere," but ever-present facts of the here and now.83 Yet Veracini argues that settler colonialism must nevertheless constantly imagine native peoples as elsewhere, an act of symbolic displacement that effaces the actual existence of native peoples and erases them even in their existence: If the indigene is fundamental to the settler relation, where the indigene is located does matter. Thus, the "real" indigence is always somewhere else; that is why, to play on Philip J. Deloria's insight, he is always "unexpected" in actual places. Likewise, indigenous peoples are generally not seen in the settler cities, the places where the settlers live. Examples abound; the main point is that discursive devices aimed at redirecting attention away from emplaced settler-indigenous relationships are indeed many. 84 Veracini suggests that all forms of indigenous removal can be characterized as different versions of "transfer," which he argues is foundational to the settler colonial project.85 Regardless of whether we call it transfer or elimination, however, unless and until it is accomplished, settler states engage in all sorts of contortions, both political and ideological, to obscure the native in order to naturalize conquest. In short, disappearance of the land's indigenous inhabitants and subsequent attempts to "indigenize" settlers are the means by which land expropriation is simultaneously naturalized and obscured. Veracini presents this iterative, imaginary displacement either as conceptually embedded in the definition of settler colonialism or else as a kind of bad faith on the settlers' part, potentially implying that a guilty conscience gives rise to a host of defense mechanisms to ward off (knowledge of) conquest. In other contexts, political theorists have considered that such recursive movement is definitive of sovereignty itself, which can establish the law only via a prior, extralegal, and illegitimate assertion of force. Yet the recursive ideological contortions of settler sovereignty are neither the result of guilt nor somehow intrinsic to its conceptual definitions. Robert Nichols has already persuasively argued that the recursive character of settlement is a means of facilitating dispossession, denying the existence of indigenous peoples, and disregarding their claims to land and sovereignty.86 So the materiality of this operation is clear. Yet what to make of the specifically ideological character of this recursivity? What explains the reiterative rationales for conquest that attempt to erase it as conquest at all? Borrowing from Edelman, one might say that while these ideological contortions are fundamental to settler colonialism, they are also fundamental to any futurist narrativization of "life." In other words, the reason why Hobbes cannot definitively locate or circumscribe the state of nature is the same the reason why the settler state seeks ideologically to naturalize settlers as native to the lands they have conquered. It is because, to use Edelman's vocabulary, both are futurist narrativizations of the drive, his Lacanian term for that aspect of human existence that resists any temporal or symbolic determination. Hobbes talks about this in terms of "endeavor." But Edelman's drive/Hobbes's endeavor is what in fact defines the unending present that is the time/condition/place of the state of nature; indeed, Hobbes's state of nature is effectively an attempt at a representation of this drive/endeavor, which both thinkers are clear is unrepresentable. For, while Hobbes defines the motion of human life in terms of desire and aversion, these terms are only appropriate monikers for motion once it becomes perceptible. Before it is manifest in the form of desire, it exists as "small beginnings of Motion, within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions."87 In other words, it is only once endeavor takes an object and becomes motion toward something that it becomes simultaneously apprehensible and also properly called desire, while endeavor away from an object "is generally called AVERSION."88 This drive/endeavor is not only prior to or outside of representation, but it also has no intrinsic justification, much less any clear or uncontroversial narrative articulation. It simply is. Thus any imposition of terms onto it – in order to render it apprehensible, coherent, or legible – is precisely that, an imposition, and thus an explicitly ideological move that serves a particular political agenda. For Edelman, this act of transforming the otherwise unsignifiable endeavor of human existence into "the fictive form of a narrative" 89 is the very definition of politics. As he says, "politics is a name for the temporalization of desire, for its translation into a narrative, for its teleological determination."90 This definition of politics explains his insistence that politics is necessarily "conservative" – because "it works to affirm a structure, to authenticate a social order"91 in its very existence – and also destined to fail. For Edelman, futurism perpetuates "the fantasy of meaning's eventual realization," a realization that is by definition impossible insofar as endeavor itself has no intrinsic meaning and "the future" as its justification is always only ever to come. As the future, it is just out of reach, ever beyond our grasp, “an always about-to-be-realized identity."92 Rather than confront its own, necessary impossibility, Edelman argues that futurism instead generates scapegoats to distract from and take the fall for it, people or places or events that become the displaced, villainized obstacles to futurism's otherwise successful realization. His name for these scapegoats is “queer." This queerness, also unrepresentable because it is another name for the drive/endeavor that politics (that is, narrativization) impossibly seeks to domesticate and resolve, takes on the figure of whatever or whoever threatens the disarticulation of the self and social order, which are ideologically presumed to be the prepolitical premises of our existence. This futile and fantasmatic futurism is a surprisingly apt characterization of the settler state, the full realization of which would, as Veracini notes, effect its erasure. Settler colonies resort to any number of destructive forms of managing futurism's failings, of course, from transfer and removal to outright extermination through war, massacre, starvation, and disease. (There are also a multitude of cultural forms of indigenous “transfer," whether it be the usage of indigenous peoples as sports team mascots, the fetishization of indigenous religious and spiritual practices in order to deny Indianness to Indians while claiming it for settlers, or the racialization of Indians into minority populations.) Yet this anxious, reiterative activity is wholly predictable from an Edelmanian perspective and ineliminable from the structure of settler sovereignty, because the futurist narration of the drive/endeavor has rendered settlers beholden to an unsustainable temporality that must produce queerness or death in order to continue to produce meaning, survival, and civilization for itself. Settler sovereignty cannot, in other words, do without the death-native it brings into being; the native as death must exist in order to purchase life and survival for the settler and is the figure of queerness in this futurist scheme. "Queerness" in Hobbes is represented, figured, or embodied by those who fail to conform to the lineaments of rationality that his particular sovereign formation takes for granted-in this case, the rational character of life and its value. Hobbes calls these figures "absurd" rather than queer, but the meaning is the same. The queer or absurd are those who do not seek to preserve themselves or flee death. Such figures barely show up in this text and are largely incomprehensible in his schema. They both instantiate death and invite it as the only proper response to their incomprehensible and insupportable rejection of the social order. For example, any remaining holdouts in the state of nature unwilling to join a majority decision to create a commonwealth must be forced to go along with them "or be left in the condition of warre he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever."93 This is the rationalization of conquest, however abstract, unmarked, or "rational" it may seem to be. For, as has become clear, those who do not recognize the value of life are not simply absurd or irrational; they are specifically those "savage" or precivilizational people(s) who have no concept of time or established system of governance. Of course, the "savage" as deathly threat has been produced precisely as that threat by the settler polity itself, which can only sustain itself via this anxious, recursive, and impossible-to-resolve dynamic of producing and eliminating the enemy of its own order, the enemy that it requires if it is to be an order at all and yet that it must eliminate if it is to "overcome" what it is. As Alyosha Goldstein observes, "United States colonialism is a continuously failing-or at least a perpetually incomplete-project that labors to find a workable means of resolution to sustain its logic of possession and inevitability by disavowing the ongoing contestation with which it is confronted and violent displacement that it demands."94 This constant aspiration toward an unrealizable future is a promise bought at the expense of effacing the founding violence that is the institution of settler sovereignty itself. Because that foundation is impossible to leave behind, because the native has not been finally eliminated once and for all, because the subjects of the commonwealth remain settlers, they cannot rest. They cannot rest until the last trace of the native has been eliminated, such that settlement can become a truly legitimate commonwealth founded on the basis of a free and equal social contract of its "native" citizens. In the face of the impossibility of this achievement, however, they must find other outlets for their anxious desire. This is how and why the settler colonial foundation of biopolitical sovereignty transforms itself into an expansionist, imperial security state that finds new enemies abroad, new obstacles to its endless expansion, thereby solving (albeit only ever temporarily and incompletely) the problem of futurist failure that constituted settlement to begin with. This transformation is immediately apparent in Hobbes's astute psychology of the life of futurist desire. Regarding desire, Hobbes claims that one seeks not simply "enjoyment" in the present or "to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time." Rather, one seeks ''to assure for ever, the way of his future desire."95 If the nature of desire is such that we seek to assure satisfaction forever, indefinitely into the future, then life/desire is inevitably bound up with anxiety, on the one hand, and power-seeking, on the other. Perpetually uncertain about the prospects of successfully getting what we want, we must continually seek to enlarge our power in order to secure the objects of our desire. It is important to note that this ever-expanding sphere of influence is not the result of a snowballing or addictive sort of pleasure-seeking behavior, nor is it due to some essential will to power at the heart of human nature. It is, rather, simply what is required in order to preserve the status quo: ''It is not alwayes that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more."96 Mere maintenance of the present, in other words, requires accumulation, undertaken in perpetual reference to an uncertain future. The successful maintenance of an indefinite present is, for Hobbes, the content of human happiness: "Continuall successe in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continuall prospering, is that men call Felicity."97 Such felicity is impossible, of course, as Hobbes concedes in the very next sentence: "I mean the Felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetuall Tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because Life itself is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without Peare, no more than without Sense."98 Hobbes acknowledges, in other words, that, based on his own futurist accounting of life/desire and in fact precisely because of it, "happiness" (that is, getting what you want) is impossible. Even supposing one were able to secure the requisite amount of power necessary to maintain the status quo, such an (impossible) achievement would mean that our desire would be satisfied, and therefore extinguished. It would mean, in other words, no longer being alive, since "to have no desire is to be dead."99 As he explains, To which we are to consider, that the Felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such Finis ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor Summum Bon um, (greatest Good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers. Nor can a man any more live, whose Desires are at an end, than he, whose Senses and Imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continuall progress of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the later.100 Suggesting that (attainment of) the highest good of Aristotelian ethics is itself a kind of stasis or death, Hobbes plainly rejects the idea that the endless motion that characterizes human life could come to a halt in some fashion that does not entail death. Understood psychologically, he is making clear that human happiness-the only kind available to us in “this life" -means never actually being satisfied. The perpetuity of enjoyment at which desire aims is a consumption that is never, can never fully be (allowed to be) complete(d). Hobbes's specifically futurist and expansionist understanding of desire makes clear that, rather than confront the impossibility of security, happiness, and immortality, he instead offers the commonwealth and an everexpanding pursuit of power as a substitutive satisfaction. In other words, he both institutes life and pushes it forward via a futurist narrativization of endeavor into an insatiable, accumulative desire. Rather than face the founding violence that brought peace and "life itself" into being, Hobbes instead naturalizes this act by declaring it to be "a generall inclination of all mankind" to engage in "a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death."101 Yet while desire may push us ever forward, ever beyond the initial moments of settlement, it cannot erase that settlement or relieve settler sovereignty of the burden of conquest. This is neither because of settler colonialism's theoretical definition nor because settlers secretly feel guilty about conquest, but rather because of the impossibility of fulfilling futurism's fantastical promises. Empire functions as a kind of substitutive satisfaction to compensate for the failure of settler sovereignty to finally and fully exterminate indigenous peoples. The pleasures of endless imperial expansion-the restless desire of "power after power" in an attempt to secure the future, once and for all-relieve the burden of the failed "completion" of the settler colonial project and the impossible promise of happiness. Empire is thus the settler impulse turned outward. It is a salve for settlement in its promise of an impossible, if now-externalized, future happiness and security.102 Built into Hobbes's understanding of desire, then (and, therefore, the Commonwealth), is the failed teleology of futurism, which, as Edelman instructs, is fundamentally and futilely political. The reason the commonwealth cannot alleviate the anxiety that runs apace with desire is because it cannot eliminate the foundations of its existence and the basis of its regime: on the one hand, indigenous removal and dispossession; on the other, the futurist constitution of "life" and/as desire. Indigenous removal and dispossession are accomplished, therefore, not only via the exertion of violence, domination, war, famine, genocide, and disease, but also via a specifically ideological imposition of the meaning of "life" and" death" that requires an indigenous removal and dispossession that it cannot accomplish without killing itself. This intractable dilemma explains the transformation of settler societies into security states, which reformulates the indigenous threat of "savagery" and death into external, terroristic opponents of its "way of life." As Jodi Byrd observes, "Indianness becomes a site through which U.S. empire orients and replicates itself by transforming those to be colonized into 'Indians' through continual reiterations of pioneer logics, whether in the Pacific, the Caribbean, or the Middle East."103 Empire, in other words, relocates the state of nature from the domain of the indigenous "savage" to the "wilderness" abroad, itself in need of taming and civilizing if life and its value are to be satisfactorily protected. Twenty-first-century empire is thus legible, as Byrd and others have argued, as an outgrowth of the settlement of the United States and a contemporary episode of its ongoing structure.104 Stephen Silliman has documented the US military's usage of "Indian country" to describe Iraq and Afghanistan in the War on Terror. While the Revolutionary War or Civil War possess just as much "resonance in the psyche of the United States as wars for freedom, unity, and democracy," nevertheless "soldiers in the Middle East draw on the 'Indian wars' of the 19th century to inform their daily experiences in combat."105 Silliman argues that ''The efficacy of this metaphor relies not in the accuracy of the historical or cultural details ... but on the believability and acceptability of them as part of a narrative of conquest and nation building."106 The "Indian country" characterization serves, in other words, to naturalize the "success" of the conquest of North America by casting contemporary US empire as an inevitably victorious, if now-worldwide, battle against ''savagery," this time in the form of lslam and ''terrorism." Of George W. Bush's expressed desire to "smoke" Osama Bin Laden ''out of his cave," for example, Alex Lubin writes, The invocation of the Western drama of settler colonialism has always animated American thinking about and activity in the Middle East, and Bush is merely tapping into a well of affective politics that links the United States to the Middle East as well as provides support for increased surveillance and the suspension of rights domestically. Yet, in the contemporary era of neoliberal globalization, the United States' comparative rendering of the Middle East through its own settler colonial past has been multiplied and transformed into a "global war on terror." That is, the United States' unparalleled superpower status enables it to universalize and globalize its comparative politics into a global "clash of civilizations."107 Simultaneously, then, as the "terrorist" obstacles to empire become projected versions of Indians, Indians become retroactively legible as the first or foundational examples of ''terrorism." Of the Declaration of Independence, for example, which complains that King George "has endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions," Byrd observes, The non-discriminating, proto-inclusive "merciless Indian Savage" stands as the terrorist, externalized from "our frontiers," and functions as abjected horror through whom civilization is articulated oppositionally. This non-recuperative category, a derealization of the Other, serves as a paranoid foundation for what Jasbir K. Puar defines in Terrorist Assemblages as Islamic "monster-terrorist-fags," the affectively produced and queered West Asian (including South Asian, Arab American, and Muslim) body that is targeted for surveillance and destruction by U.S. patriotic pathology.108 The "terrorist" of today, the contemporary obstacle to empire, is the native of an alleged “yesterday," the archaic obstacle to settlement. Whether in the domain of conquest or empire, however, the failed futurism of settler colonial sovereignty produces abjected queer repositories of death that stand as a threat to the civilized life of the settler society.109 Their interconnection is crucial; the logic that connects them continuous. Unsurprisingly, then, Hobbes's political theory serves as a justification for what it claimed only to describe. While an unmarked self-preservation and fear of death have typically been taken to be the natural and logical preconditions of the sovereign politics Hobbes institutes in Leviathan, an Edelmanian approach to this text reveals them to be the premier values settler sovereignty ideologically seeks retroactively to (re)produce and uphold. What this means, then, is that Hobbes's entire state of nature story is an anachronism. Like all origin stories, it is fundamentally ideological and offered primarily in order to legitimate an already-existing political order and the political commitment of its storyteller.110 The particular agenda being naturalized in Hobbes's biopolitical story of the state of nature is settler conquest, and its futurist determination is the reason why he cannot decide when and where it is, and also why settler colonial societies seek constantly to erase themselves as settler societies. m The insecurity lodged at the heart of settler colonialism's futurist desire renders satisfaction impossible, an impossibility that remains unacknowledged and is instead foisted onto those “savages” who refuse collaboration with its ideological ruses. Leviathan is thus a settler colonial text par excellence. Like Agamben in this regard, it is a rationalization of empire that ignores all those queered by its machinations. Unlike Agamben, however, it makes explicit the connection between the biopolitics of settler colonialism and that of contemporary empire, revealing the futurist temporality that links them together and renders them continuous projects.