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2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › K -- Settler Colonialism › 1NC -- Link -- Transgression

The 1ACs approach to queerness as intrinsically subversive, counterhegemonic, and individuated cleaves the ontological from the political generating a settler neutrality that colludes with settler homo-nationalism and turns the case. The desire to dismantle the notion of identity is a settler desire for the elimination of native people.

Rosenburg 14 (Jordana Rosenberg, Literature Professor at UMass Amherst “The Molecularization of Sexuality: On Some Primitivisms of the Present,” Theory & Event Volume 17 Issue 2 GC)

To the extent that queer studies has shifted focus from queer objects to objects more generally, this shift has a double resonance. On the one hand, it represents the critical force of diasporic and queer of color critique to broaden the understanding of sexuality to a set of conjunctural questions that contextualizes the ontological illusion of subjectivity within what Roderick Ferguson describes as the ineluctably political field of subject formation and the production of desire: “If the intersections of race, gender, sexuality and class constitute social formations within liberal capitalism, then queer of color analysis obtains its genealogy within a variety of locations. We may say that women of color feminism names a crucial component of that genealogy as woman of color theorists have historically theorized intersections as the basis of social formations. Queer of color analysis extends women of color feminism by investigating how intersecting racial, gender, and sexual practices antagonize and/or conspire with the normative investments of nation-state and capital.”20

Queer of color critique insists that queerness cannot be understood in isolation from a range of social formations. In doing so, Ferguson notes that this composite of forces (“racial, gender, and sexual practices”) operates with a double valence: an “and/or” logic. It’s this “and/or” that has marked queer theory for the past decade or more. Even as queerness remains a site of resistance to what Elizabeth Freeman has indispensably termed “chrononormativity” – or, what we might understand as the demands of racial capitalism for certain forms of productivity and submission to the status quo – as Jasbir Puar has made clear, queerness has also, in crucial ways, become folded into chrononormativity. For Puar, the conspiring between queer subjects and the nation-state is marked by the “incorporation of queers into the domains of consumer markets and social recognition in the post-civil rights late twentieth century … [as] queers [enter into] the biopolitical optimization of life,” and become “tied to ideas of life and productivity.”21 In both accounts, however, we notice the ways that queer studies has expanded its focus from explicitly “queer” objects to an intersectional or conjunctural account of the social world.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › K -- Settler Colonialism › 1NC -- Link -- Transgression

The AFF’s conception of “queerness as transgression” presumes a foundational whiteness which privileges fluidity, ability, and mobility at the expense of racialized peoples. This upholds an individualist liberal humanism complicit with capitalism and American exceptionalism.

Puar 7 [Jasbir K., Associate Professor of Women's & Gender Studies at Rutgers University, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times, 2007, p. 21-24]

Some may strenuously object to the suggestion that queer identities, like their "less radical" counterparts, homosexual, gay, and lesbian identities, are also implicated in ascendant white American nationalist formations, preferring to see queerness as singularly transgressive of identity norms. This focus on transgression, however is precisely the term by which queerness narrates its own sexual exceptionalism. While we can point to the obvious problems with the emancipatory, missionary pulses of certain (U.S., western) feminisms and of gay and lesbian liberation, queerness has its own exceptionalist desires: exceptionalism is a founding impulse, indeed the very core of a queerness that claims itself as an anti-, trans-, or unidentity. The paradigm or gay liberation and emancipation has produced all sorts of troubling narratives: about the greater homophobia of immigrant communities and communities of color, about the stricter family values and mores in these communities, about a certain prerequisite migration from home, about coming-out teleologies. We have less understanding of queerness as a biopolitical project, one that both parallels and intersects with that of multiculturalism, the ascendancy of whiteness, and may collude with or collapse into liberationist paradigms. While liberal underpinnings serve to constantly recenter the normative gay or lesbian subject as exclusively liberatory, these same tendencies labor to insistently recenter the normative queer subject as an exclusively transgressive one. Queerness here is the modality through which "freedom from norms" becomes a regulatory queer ideal that demarcates the ideal queer. Arguing that "more reflection on queer attachments might allow us to avoid positing assimilation or transgression as choices," Sara Ahmed notes, "The idealization of movement, or transformation of movement into a fetish, depends on the exclusion of others who are already positioned as not free in the same way."55 Individual freedom becomes the barometer of choice in the valuation, and ultimately, regulation, of queerness. Ahmed's post-Marxian frame focuses on the material, cultural, and social capital and resources that might delimit "access" to queerness, suggesting that queerness can be an elite cosmopolitan formulation contingent upon various regimes of mobility. Ironically, "those that have access" to such cultural capital and material resources may constitute the very same populations that many would accuse of assimilation, living out queerness in the most apolitical or conservatively political ways. I am thinking of queerness as exceptional in a way that is wedded to individualism and the rational, liberal humanist subject, what Ahmed denotes as "attachments" and what I would qualify as deep psychic registers of investment that we often cannot account for and are sometimes best seen by others rather than ourselves. "Freedom from norms" resonates with liberal humanism’s authorization of the fully self-possessed speaking subject, untethered by hegemony or false consciousness, enabled by the life/stylization offerings of capitalism, rationally choosing modern individualism over the ensnaring bonds of family. In this problematic definition of queerness, individual agency is legible only as resistance to norms rather than complicity with them, thus equating resistance and agency. Both Saba Mahmood and Ahmed critique this conflation and redirect their attention to agency that supports and consolidates norms, but even this turn presupposes some general universal understanding of what counts as norm, resistance, and complicity. As Mahmood asks, "[Is it] possible to identify a universal category of acts—such as those of resistance—outside of the ethical and political conditions within which such acts acquire their particular meaning?"56 The rhetoric of freedom is also of course a mainstay in philosophies of liberal democracy and is indeed a foundational tenet of American exceptionalism. But finally, queerness as transgression (which is one step ahead of resistance, which has now become a normative act) relies on a normative notion of deviance, always defined in relation to normativity, often universalizing. Thus deviance, despite its claims to freedom and individuality, is ironically cohered to and by regulatory regimes of queerness—through, not despite, any claims to transgression. While Ahmed also looks to queerness as a challenge predominantly to heteronorms, queer theorists such as Cathy Cohen implicate queer politics in an intersectional model that should also ideally challenge race and class norms as they intersect with heteronorms.57 Other queer theorists might articulate queerness as a poststructuralist endeavor that deconstructs not only heteronorms, but the very logic of identity itself. In the first version of queerness, resistance to heteronorms may be privileged in a way that effaces the effects of this resistance in relation to possible complicities with other norms, such as racial, class, gender, and citizenship privileges. Queer intersectional analyses challenge this regulatory queerness, but in doing so may fail to subject their own frames to the very critique they deploy. In this second formulation, queer of color and queer immigrant communities (not to mention queer of color critique) are always beyond reproach, an untenable position given the (class, religious, gender-queer, national, regional, linguistic, generational) tensions within, among, and between queer diasporic, immigrant, and of color communities, thus obfuscating any of their own conservative proclivities. Conversely, it also holds queer of color organizing and theorizing to impossible standards and expectations, always beholden to spaces and actions of resistance, transgression, subversion. In the last instance, all (of one's) identities (not just gender and sexual) must be constantly troubled, reading to an impossible transcendent subject who is always already conscious of the normativizing forces of power and always ready and able to subvert, resist, or transgress them. It is precisely by denying culpability or assuming that one is not implicated in violent relations toward others, that one is outside of them, that violence can be perpetuated. Violence, especially of the liberal varieties, is often most easily perpetrated in the spaces and places where its possibility is unequivocally denounced.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › FW -- Supplement › 1NC---FW

The “United States federal government” is the three branches

U.S. Legal ’16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” ]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › FW -- Supplement › 1NC---FW

Policy simulation key to agency -- the detachment that they criticize is key to its revolutionary benefits.

Eijkman 12 The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] . Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal

Policy simulations stimulate Creativity Participation in policy games has proved to be a highly effective way of developing new combinations of experience and creativity, which is precisely what innovation requires (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). Gaming, whether in analog or digital mode, has the power to stimulate creativity, and is one of the most engaging and liberating ways for making group work productive, challenging and enjoyable. Geurts et al. (2007) cite one instance where, in a National Health Care policy change environment, ‘the many parties involved accepted the invitation to participate in what was a revolutionary and politically very sensitive experiment precisely because it was a game’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 547). Data from other policy simulations also indicate the uncovering of issues of which participants were not aware, the emergence of new ideas not anticipated, and a perception that policy simulations are also an enjoyable way to formulate strategy (Geurts et al. 2007). Gaming puts the players in an ‘experiential learning’ situation, where they discover a concrete, realistic and complex initial situation, and the gaming process of going through multiple learning cycles helps them work through the situation as it unfolds. Policy gaming stimulates ‘learning how to learn’, as in a game, and learning by doing alternates with reflection and discussion. The progression through learning cycles can also be much faster than in real-life (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). The bottom line is that problem solving in policy development processes requires creative experimentation. This cannot be primarily taught via ‘camp-fire’ story telling learning mode but demands hands-on ‘veld learning’ that allow for safe creative and productive experimentation. This is exactly what good policy simulations provide (De Geus, 1997; Ringland, 2006). In simulations participants cannot view issues solely from either their own perspective or that of one dominant stakeholder (Geurts et al. 2007). Policy simulations enable the seeking of Consensus Games are popular because historically people seek and enjoy the tension of competition, positive rivalry and the procedural justice of impartiality in safe and regulated environments. As in games, simulations temporarily remove the participants from their daily routines, political pressures, and the restrictions of real-life protocols. In consensus building, participants engage in extensive debate and need to act on a shared set of meanings and beliefs to guide the policy process in the desired direction

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › FW -- Supplement › 1NC---FW

Educational governmental simulation more likely to produce ethical students than unethical ones

Esberg, Sagan 12 – *Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on. International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND **Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation

(“NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” 2/17 The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1)

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7∂ By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › FW -- Supplement › 1NC---FW

Debates over the specific details of the implementation of a plan breaks cycles of polarization- debates about value systems in the abstract reinforce it.

Wray Herbert 12 {Wray Herbert is the author of the book On Second Thought: Outsmarting Your Mind's Hard-Wired Habits. He is an award-winning journalist who has been writing about psychological science for more than 25 years. He’s citing Philip Fernbach, a psychological scientist at the University of Colorado. 9/26/2012. “Extremist Politics: Debating the Nuts and Bolts.” }//JM

Starting next week and through October, President Barack Obama and Gov. Mitt Romney will face off in a series of four televised debates, designed to clarify the candidates’ positions on the most pressing public policy issues confronting the nation today. In place of the ideals and elegant rhetoric of the campaign trail, the leaders of the two major parties will have an opportunity to describe the nitty-gritty of governing: how they will deal with complex matters like affordable health care, foreign policy in the Middle East, job creation, equitable taxation, and more.

But the unfortunate reality is that Americans won’t get much in the way of detail and explanation. If history is any guide, the debate moderators will not press very hard for nuts and bolts, instead allowing the candidates to evade and attack and talk in unhelpful generalities. They will preach in pre-tested catch phrases to the already converted rather than really explaining the difficult day-to-day realities of decision making in a democracy.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › FW -- Supplement › 1NC---FW

The impact is clash- Advocating actions outside the resolution overstretches negative research burdens, which destroys second-level understanding and turns the case

Grossberg 15 - Morris Davis Distinguished Professor University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Lawrence, We All Want to Change the World THE PARADOX OF THE U.S. LEFT A POLEMIC, http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/ebooks/we_all_want_to_change_the_world.pdf)

I will, in the following description, focus on the situation in the human sciences (rather than the hard sciences), where the explosion of publication creates an ever-expanding circle in which there is always too much to read—too many positions, too many arguments, too much contradictory evidence—so that scholars have to rely on either the author's stature or theoretical and/or political agreement. It has become almost impossible to read everything one must read, everything necessary to legitimate, at least in traditional terms, the claim of academic expertise or scholarship. In fact, given this situation (and its consequences as I will describe below), the most surprising thing is how much good work continues to be produced. This situation has serious consequences: First, one's expertise becomes defined in increasingly narrow terms, resulting in the proliferation of sub-fields.9 [insert footnote 9] For example, one might point to security studies, surveillance studies, transition studies, game studies, code studies, hip-hop studies, horror studies, etc. [Footnote 9 ends] And while each of them is valuable for their interdisciplinary efforts around a new empirical field, they all too often act as if the questions (and the realities they interrogate) are new; unfortunately, they rarely say anything new or surprising, anything that has not been said elsewhere. They frequently simply re-discover in their own empirical "pocket" universe what others have said previously in other fields. For example, all sorts of technologically defined sub-fields rediscover the rather old assumption that media audiences are active. This is partly because, within each subfield, one gets the impression of witnessing endless redistributions of a highly circumscribed set of citations and authors, under a series of ever-changing terms to describe their fields or positions. So, academics create ever shrinking circles in which authors cite a few theoretically and politically compatible works, and then follow the footnotes, all of which ultimately lead back to the original authors, creating an endlessly self-referential closed system of citations, a numbingly predictable, circular tissue of references. Second, one is less likely to read work that appears tangential but may nevertheless be absolutely decisive to producing truly interesting and insightful research. Asking significant questions should demand that one makes reference to all sorts of concepts and questions which would lead one to follow other unexpected traditions and lines of research, since any investigation (e.g., around questions of participation, publics, or leadership, to use only a few examples that have irked me recently) is likely to open up to an entire history of problematization, of conversations and debates, but who can afford the time and energy anymore. Third, one tends to read only the most recent work since so much is being published—in various media—so rapidly that there is little time to go back and read. Fourth, one tends to select one's sources according to criteria that have more to do with theoretical and political sympathies than with an understanding of research as a conversation with difference. One reads selectively, finding those ideas that are already in line with what one assumes one already knows, and one establishes a body of near-sacred texts; fifth, one selects topics that are au courant, partly because there is less scaffolding that one has to build upon and partly because one's work is more likely to gain visibility and impact. Sixth, complexity goes out the door as one increasingly "sees the world in a grain of sand." One can no longer be satisfied claiming to have discovered merely a new piece of a complex puzzle or even an interesting redeployment of an older practice or structure, because such claims do not bring fame and glory—either to oneself or the university. Instead, one has to have discovered the leading edge, the new key or essence. One good but relatively small idea is expanded into a metonym for the entire economy, culture or society. Instead of seeking new discursive forms to embody complexity, uncertainty and humility, one goes with elegance, hyperbole and the ever receding new.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › Case › 1NC -- Turn -- Politics Good

The 1AC’s reductive conceptualization of the political homogenizes queer subjectivity -- locks in oppression and makes change impossible

Power 9 (Nina, Professor at Roehampton University, “Non-Reproductive Futurism” p. 5-6 )

The supposed futural ‘reason’ of representative politics is in effect profoundly fractured and contradictory, not in the least bit reconciled to either its image of the child, or to its image of itself. Edelman’s notion of the queer nevertheless seems to depend on an overly homogenous picture of the social world. To write, as Edelman claims to, from ‘the space outside the framework within which politics as we know it appears and so outside the conflict of visions that share as their presupposition that the body politic must survive’ (Edelman, 2004: 3) involves deliberately superimposing various ‘political’ categories onto various non-political categories. Thus, Edelman conflates democracy with the child, rationality with a naïve concept of progress and heterosexuality with reproduction, sweeping away the possibility of collective organisation and action. As John Brenkman puts it: ‘Edelman compounds his reductive concept of the political realm by in turn postulating an ironclad intermeshing of social reproduction and sexual reproduction’ (Brenkman, 2002: 176). By neglecting the contradictory economic imperatives at work in political conceptions of the family and fusing politics with reason Edelman leaves no room at all for what we could call a ‘queer reason’– queer from the standpoint of representational politics, and neither committed to the child nor to sexual essentialism. It is here that Rancière’s ideas are relevant. If a ‘queer reason’ is to make any sense, it is important to separate out two different kinds of rationalism, which Edelman refuses to do. In a section in Disagreement entitled ‘The Rationality of Disagreement,’ Rancière states the following: Political rationality is only thinkable precisely on the condition that it be freed from the alternative in which a certain rationalism would like to keep it reined in, either as exchange between partners putting their interests or standards up for discussion, or else the violence of the irrational (Rancière, 1999: 43).

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › Case › 1NC -- Turn -- Politics Good

Their theory of the political is incorrect – politics is a site of reform – that’s why people vote, care about the environment and live in communities – there is value in tangible improvements in the human condition

Brenkman 2 (John, Distinguished Professor of English and Comprative Literature at CUNY Graduate Center, Narrative, “Queer Post-Politics”, Volume 10, Issue 2, p. 174-180, Project Muse)

But Edelman interprets this nonrecognition in very different terms from those I have just used. When he asserts that "there are no queers in that future as there can be no future for queers," he is not making a mere statement of protest; rather, he is announcing the theoretical position that is the explicit stake of his entire argument. I [End Page 175] now want to turn to his theoretical project, which involves an argument in political theory and an argument from psychoanalysis and a link between the two. The Political Theory Argument For Edelman the image of the child-as-future is more than a powerful trope in the political discourse of the moment. It in effect defines the political realm: "For politics, however radical the means by which some of its practitioners seek to effect a more desirable social order, is conservative insofar as it necessarily works to affirm a social order, defining various strategies aimed at actualizing social reality and transmitting it into the future it aims to bequeath to its inner child" (19). The burden of this argument is that a genuinely critical discourse cannot arise via the marking or symbolizing of the gap between the present and the future. Such symbolizing has indeed been the defining feature of modern critical social discourse, whether among the Enlightenment's philosophes, French revolutionaries, Marxists, social democrats, or contemporary socialists and democrats. Jürgen Habermas, in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, defines modern time-consciousness itself as a taking of responsibility for the future. Edelman sees in such a time-consciousness an inescapable trap. For him any such political discourse or activity steps into "the logic by which political engagement serves always as the medium for reproducing our social reality" (26). Certainly the political realm—whether viewed from the perspective of the state, the political community and citizenship, or political movements—is a medium of social reproduction, in the sense that it serves the relative continuity of innumerable economic and non-economic institutions. But it is not simply a mechanism of social reproduction; it is also the site and instrument of social change. Nor is it simply the field of existing power relations; it is also the terrain of contestation and compromise. Edelman compounds his reductive concept of the political realm by in turn postulating an ironclad intermeshing of social reproduction and sexual reproduction. Here too he takes a fundamental feature of modern society, or any society, and absolutizes it. Sexual reproduction is a necessary dimension of social reproduction, almost by definition, in the sense that a society's survival depends upon, among many other things, the fact that its members reproduce. Kinship practices, customs, religious authorities, and civil and criminal law variously regulate sexual reproduction. However, that is not to say that the imperatives of social reproduction dictate or determine or fully functionalize the institutions and practices of sexual reproduction. The failure to recognize the relative autonomy of those institutions and practices underestimates how seriously feminism and the gay and lesbian movement have already challenged the norms and institutions of compulsory heterosexuality in our society. They have done so through creative transformations in civil society and everyday life and through cultural initiatives and political and legal reforms. The anti-abortion and anti-gay activism of the Christian Right arose, in response, to alter and reverse the fundamental achievements of these movements. How then to analyze or theorize this struggle? A motif in Edelman's analysis [End Page 176] takes the rhetoric and imagery of the Christian Right and traditional Catholicism to be a more insightful discourse than liberalism when it comes to understanding the underlying politics of sexuality today. I think this is extremely misguided. The Right does not have a truer sense of the social-symbolic order than liberals and radicals; it simply has more reactionary aims and has mobilized with significant effect to impose its phobic and repressive values on civil society and through the state. The Christian Right is itself a "new social movement" that contests the feminist and gay and lesbian social movements. To grant the Right the status of exemplary articulators of "the" social order strikes me as politically self-destructive and theoretically just plain wrong.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › Case › 1NC -- Turn -- Futurism Bad

The promise of better future begs the question of whether future will ever arrive. This future is underwritten by black, brown, and queer death. The only starting point is a refusal of the future that demands the endless accumulation of these deaths. This turns the case which invests in futurity.

Dillon 13

[Stephen Dillon, “’It’s here, it’s that time:’ Race, queer futurity, and the temporality of violence in Born in Flames. Women & Performance, 2013, 38-51. At 44-6. MYY]

Throughout Born in Flames, countless members of theWomen’s Army declare: “This is our time.” The time of the revolution was not the time to abolish anti-blackness, white supremacy, and heteropatriarchy. It was a time that left behind and captured poor (queer) women of color through the progress of democracy and equality. In this way, “our time” and state time are two antagonistic temporalities of violence in the film. As James Scott argues, the modern state’s utopian aim is to reduce the disorderly and chaotic social order under its purview into a mirror of the administrative knowledge central to its observations and governance. The state works to produce temporal and spatial intelligibility with the goal of manufacturing the orderly administration and regulation of the nation’s population, resources, and infrastructure. By disrupting and dismantling spaces, populations, and 0epistemologies that are illegible to its regimes of knowing and governance, the modern state creates a utopia of visibility and legibility that is open to policing and control (Scott 1998, 82). The management of time is central to this process. “Our time” is what the state seeks to capture. In Born in Flames, state time extends and expands the violence of the past, while “our time” is a temporal regime that exceeds and undoes state time. Again, Fanon proves useful for understanding these differences. In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon describes a “time lag, or a difference of rhythm, between the leaders of a nationalist party and the mass of the people” (Fanon 1963, 107). According to Fanon, the rank and file of anti-colonial rebellions demand the complete and utter immediate destruction of the forms of power that render them “more dead than alive,” while both colonial and nationalist governments attempt to manage, temper, and restrain the demands of those who have no more time to give to the promises of a future that is always coming, but never arrives (51). For example, in the film, the state promises that “in the future” there will be jobs, an end to sexual violence, and racial and gender equality. But for Fanon, the “hopeless dregs of humanity” (or the wretched of the earth) are filled with an “uncontrollable rage” and thus exist in a temporal regime apart from that of the party or the nation. This is a time of intensity and immediacy (“the slaves of modern times are impatient”), where the future of the present as it is means no future at all (74). Like the financial, epistemological, and racialized legacies of slavery Baucom sees intensifying in our current moment, Fanon diagnoses the future of colonialism as the accumulation of the social, biological, and living death of the native. The native lives a death in life produced by the racism of slavery and colonialism. The future’s horizon is the accumulation of past forms of racial terror and violence. In this way, Baucom and Fanon draw connections between race and time that are crucial to questions of queer futurity. The relationship between race, gender, death, and the future is central to the immediacy and spontaneity of the Women’s Army and is foundational to the film’s critique of the future. We can turn to the Fanonian-inspired prison writings of George Jackson to further explore the relationship between death, race, and the future. In his 1972 text Blood in My Eye, published shortly after he was shot and killed by guards at San Quentin prison, Jackson writes of racism, death, and revolution: Their line is: “Ain’t nobody but black folks gonna die in the revolution.” This argument completely overlooks the fact that we have always done most of the dying, and still do: dying at the stake, through social neglect or in U.S. foreign wars. The point is now to construct a situation where someone else will join in the dying. If it fails and we have to do most of the dying anyway, we’re certainly no worse off than before. (Jackson 1972, 6) Here, Jackson argues that the social order of the United States is saturated with an anti-blackness that produces, in the words of RuthWilson Gilmore, “the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death” (2007, 28). Jackson’s text is littered with a polemic that links race and death in a way that preemptively echoes Michel Foucault’s declaration that racism is the process of “introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die” (Foucault 2003, 254). When Jackson, Gilmore, and Foucault define race as the production of premature death, they make a connection between race and the future. Race is the accumulation of premature death and dying. For Jackson, race fractures the future so that the future looks like incarceration or the premature death of malnutrition, disease, and exhaustion. The future was not the hopefulness of unknown possibilities. It was rather the devastating weight of knowing that death was coming cloaked in abandonment, neglect, incarceration, or murder. In other words, according to Jackson, death was always and already rushing towards the present of blackness. In the last line of No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, Lee Edelman similarly connects the future to premature death when he references the murder of Matthew Shepard. He writes: “Somewhere, someone else will be savagely beaten and left to die – sacrificed to a future whose beat goes on, like a pulse or a heart – and another corpse will be left like a mangled scarecrow to frighten the birds who are gathering now, who are beating their wings, and who, like the death drive, keep on coming” (Edelman 2004, 154). For Edelman, the future will necessarily continue to produce a world that is unlivable for queer people. In this way, the polemics of black liberation and Edelman’s anti-social thesis share an affinity around the theorization of the future as overdetermined by premature death, yet they diverge in how they imagine death’s relationship to race and power. For Edelman, the future looks like repetition of the death of Matthew Shepard (a white gay man), while for Jackson, it looks like the premature death of incarceration, the ghetto, and chattel slavery’s haunting contortion of the present. In other words, the state and anti-blackness were central to the anti-sociality of the black liberation movement. Within Jackson’s analysis, the state is the primary mechanism for unevenly distributing racialized regimes of value and disposability. Following the writing of Fanon, Jackson argued that for this relationship to be abolished: “The government of the U.S.A and all that it stands for, all that it represents, must be destroyed. This is the starting point, and the end” (Jackson 1972, 54). Jackson’s polemic crescendos when he describes the future he desires: We must accept the eventuality of bringing the U.S.A to its knees; accept the closing off of critical sections of the city with barbed wire, armed pig carriers criss-crossing the city streets, soldiers everywhere, tommy guns pointed at stomach level, smoke curling black against the daylight sky, the smell of cordite, house-to-house searches, doors being kicked down, the commonness of death. (Jackson 1972, 55) If the past and present have produced the accumulation of the premature death of black people, then Jackson imagines the complete undoing of the social order as the way out of temporal capture. The future of the social order means no future, and so the future must come to an end. Fanon similarly imagines the relationship between the native and the future of the social order: “They won’t be reformed characters to please colonial society, fitting in with the morality of its rulers; quite on the contrary, they take for granted the impossibility of their entering the city save by hand grenades and revolvers” (Fanon 1963, 130). Here, the invitation to the safety and security of the city (or the social order as it is) is an offer to continue a life that is a half-life. Possibility comes from a starting point that is an end.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › Case › 1NC -- Turn -- Materiality

Queer theory fails — it provides no solution to improve real living conditions for LGBTQ individuals

Kirsch 2k — Max Kirsch, Associate Professor of Anthropology at Florida Atlantic University, 2000 (“Roles and Subversions: Professing Parody,”Queer Theory and Social Change, PPublished by Routledge Press, ISBN: 0415221854, p. 97-98)

Queerness as a deviant form of heterosexuality results in oppression. When this fact is not confronted, it can lead to maladaptive responses that include the markings of internalized homophobia: depression, psychosis, resignation, and apathy. These are very much reactions to the ways in which we view ourselves, which in turn are, at least in part, due to the ways in which we are constantly told to view ourselves. Here, the production of consciousness takes a very concrete form. Those enduring this form of violence cannot, even in the academy, simply decide to disengage. We cannot simply refuse to acknowledge these facts of social life in our present society, and hope that our circumstances will change. Although the lack of definition is what has inspired the use of "queer," it cannot, as Butler herself asserts, "overcome its constituent history of injury" (1993b: 223). Be that as it may, "queer," as put forward by Queer theorists, has no inherent historical or social context. We continually return to the following question: to whom does it belong and what does it represent? These advocates of "queer" do not acknowledge that queer is produced by social relations, and therefore contains the attributes of existing social relations. As I have shown, Queer theory, particularly as it is expressed in Butler's writings on performativity, dichotomizes the political as personal and the political as social action into a binary that positions political action in impossible terms. The nature of the "political" is never clearly discussed, and remains a chasm (cf. Kaufman and Martin, 1994). However appealing the notion of positioning the self through a reinterpretation of the "I" may be, it is misguided as political action: it cannot generate the collective energy and organization necessary to challenge existing structures of power. As Michael Aglietta observes, "There is no magical road where the most abstract concepts magically command the movement of society" (1979: 43). The question of polities, then, brings us back to where we began: what is the nature of the political and how do we address it? Is it beneficial to maintain alliances with established political parties? Can we adopt the dominant values of our culture and still hope to change the dynamics of those values? How do we form alliances with other oppressed groups? Is there a structural economic basis for such an alliance, or should we look elsewhere? Perhaps most importantly: is it possible, given the tremendous resources represented by the dominant and coercive ideology of our present social relations, to maintain the energy necessary to develop and continue modes of resistance that counter it? In the last question, as I will show, lies an answer to the issue of alliances and structural identification. But first, we need to refocus the discussion.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › Case › 1NC -- Turn -- Materiality

Queer theory fails

Saffin 8 BODIES THAT (DON'T) MATTER: SYSTEMS OF GENDER REGULATION AND INSTITUTIONS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST TRANSGENDER PERSONS: A QUEER/CRITICAL RACE FEMINIST CRITIQUE By LORI A. SAFFIN DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY Program of American Studies AUGUST 2008

Despite the productive and effective strategies offered by Queer Theorizing, I am hesitant to firmly adhere only to this body of knowledge. Many academics and activists alike have challenged the political efficacy of queer theory, pointing out that the pluralizing of identity, though important, continues to denigrate the importance of race, class, and gender, as sexuality becomes the signifying element of identification. Likewise, I have concerns about the open ended politics proclaimed under Queer Theory. As John D'Emilio illustrates in 12 his account of American gay and lesbian politics, "identity" and "difference" have simultaneously served as the crux as well as the crisis for most gay and lesbian organizing.13 So, if "queer" is fluid, boundariless, oppositional, and multiplicitous, how do "we" organize around "difference" or ground in politics? What are these politics, and who sets the agenda? Queer Theory seeks ^definition in order to combat the inherent divisiveness created within identity politics and disrupt rigidly constructed binaries. However, materiality, material reality, and the lived experiences of individuals/communities residing in the margins and overlaps of structural racism, classism, sexism, and heterosexism seem overlooked. Therefore, Queer Theory, perhaps, purports alternative and liberatory strategies in theory, but encounters many difficulties when attempting coalitional politics and everyday activism

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › Case › 1NC -- Turn -- Lesbianism <3

Queer theory assumes a male identity—turns the movement

Jeffreys 94 [Sheila, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Melbourne, “The Queer Disappearance of Lesbians: Sexuality In the Academy,” Women’s Studies International Forum, 1994, JSTOR, 08/01/14]

The appearance of queer theory and queer studies threatens to mean the disappearance of lesbians. The developing field of lesbian and gay studies is dominated now by the queer impulse. Lesbian feminism is conspicuous by its absence. Lesbian feminism starts from the understanding that the interests of lesbians and gay men are in many respects very different because lesbians are members of the political class of women. Lesbian liberation requires, according to this analysis, the destruction of men's power over women. In queer theory and queer studies, lesbians seem to appear only where they can assimilate seamlessly into gay male culture and politics. No difference is generally recognised in interests, culture, history between lesbians and gay men. The new field of the study of 'sexuality' seems similarly to be dominated by gay male sexual politics and interests. Both areas are remarkably free of feminist influence. As I discuss here, there is seldom any mention in queer theorising of sexuality of issues which are of concern to feminists and lesbian feminists, such as sexual violence and pornography or any politics of sexual desire or practice, and there is no recognition of the specificity of lesbian experience. Within traditional Women's Studies, lesbian students and teachers have long been angry at the 'lesbian-free' nature of courses and textbooks. A good example is Rosemarie Tong's Women's Studies reader Feminist Thought (1989). Although many of the feminist theorists covered in the book are lesbians, lesbian feminism is not one of the varieties of feminist thought included here. The index directs the reader to find lesbian feminist thought in three pages under the heading of 'Radical feminism and sexuality' (Tong, 1989). Lesbians might well have expected to find the new lesbian and gay studies more sympathetic to their interests, but that is only true in practice if they see themselves as a variety of gay men rather than as women. The new lesbian and gay studies is 'feminismfree.' By not recognising the different interests, history, culture, experience of lesbians, lesbian and gay studies homogenises the interests of women into those of men. It was precisely this disappearance of women's interests and experience in the malestream academic world which caused the development of Women's Studies in the first place. It cannot therefore be an unalloyed cause for celebration in the 1990s that lesbian and gay studies are becoming sufficiently well recognised to have a whole new journal GLQ and a first reader, The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader (Abelove, Barale, & Halperin, 1993). Both are American in origin and content. Even a casual glance at these publications suggests that lesbians and feminists have considerable cause for concern. It is not simply an abstract desire to right the injustice of lesbian disappearance which motivates my concern at the way that lesbian and gay studies are going. The work of this new field does and will increasingly influence the ideas and practices of lesbian and gay culture. Academia is not hermetically sealed but reflects and influences the world outside the academy. The disappearance of lesbians into an economically powerful commercial gay culture in the streets and the clubs will be exacerbated by what is happening in queer theory. The editorial of the first issue of GLQ celebrates its commitment to 'queer' politics. The queer perspective is not a gender-neutral one. Many lesbians, perhaps the vast majority of lesbian feminists, feel nothing but hostility toward and alienation from the word queer and see queer politics as very specifically masculine. The editorial tells us that the journal will approach all topics through a queer lens. "We seek to publish a journal that will bring a queer perspective to bear on any and all topics touching on sex and sexuality" (Dinshaw & Halperin, GLQ, 1993; p. iii). We are told that the Q in the title of the journal GLQ has two meanings, quarterly and also "the fractious, the disruptive, the irritable, the impatient, the unapologetic, the bitchy, the camp, the queer" (p. iii). This definition of the word 'queer' should alert readers to its masculine bias. The adjectives accompanying it here refer to male gay culture. They arise from traditional notions of what is camp. Camp, as we shall see, lies at the very foundation of queer theory and politics and is inimical to women's and lesbian interests. But before looking at the problems with camp in detail, it is worth considering another way in which this list of adjectives might not sit well with lesbian feminism. Although gay men's rebellion against oppression might well have been so mild that it could be expressed in terms like irritability, this has not been the way that lesbians have traditionally phrased their rebellion. Perhaps because lesbians have a great deal more to fight, that is, the whole system of male supremacy, rage has been a more prevalent emotion than irritability. The early womanifesto of lesbian feminism, the Woman- Identified-Woman paper, expressed it thus: "A Lesbian is the rage of all women condensed to the point of explosion" (Radicalesbians, 1988, p. 17). Irritable is how one might feel about not having garbage collected, not about ending the rape, murder, and torture of women, including lesbians. Some queer studies writers are currently seeking to establish that 'camp' is a fundamental part of 'queer.' There is still a controversy about what constitutes camp, with gay male critics opposing their own notions to that expressed in the famous Susan Sontag piece and pointing out that her version is heterosexist (Miller, 1993; Sontag, 1986). Sontag saw camp as a sensibility and one that was not necessarily queer or gay. Moe Meyer, in the volume the POLITICS and POETICS of CAMP, which is said on the blurb inside the cover to contain essays by "some of the foremost critics working in queer theory" says that camp is "solely a queer discourse" and certainly not just a "sensibility" but "a suppressed and denied oppositional critique embodied in the signifying practices that processually constitute queer identities" (Meyer, 1994b; p. 1). Rather, the function of camp is the "production of queer social visibility" and the "total body of performative practices and strategies used to enact a queer identity" (Meyer, 1994b; p. 5). So camp is defined here not just as one aspect of what it is to be queer, but as absolutely fundamental to queer identity. Camp appears, on examination, to be based largely on a male gay notion of the feminine. As his example of camp political tactics, Meyer uses the Black drag queen, Joan Jett Blakk, who ran as a mayoral candidate in Chicago in 1991. This man ran as a 'Queer Nation' candidate. He is referred to by female pronouns throughout this piece, which raises some difficulties in itself for women who wish to recognize themselves in the text. Meyer tells us that there were some objections from what he calls "assimilationist gays" who saw the drag queen political tactic as "flippant and demeaning." The implication is that men who objected did so for conservative motives, whereas in fact they might have been expressing profeminist sympathies. For women and lesbians who have rejected femininity, the celebration of it by a gay man is likely to be seen as insulting rather than as something with which to identify in 'queer' solidarity. Actually, women might well want more women in parliament rather than men wearing the clothing that has been culturally assigned to women.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › Case › 1NC -- Turn -- Lesbianism <3

Queer theory collapses lesbian theory and asserts violent hegemony over the knowledge industry – this reinscribes categories and makes a broad movement impossible

Goodloe 94 [Amy, instructor of digital writing and new media storytelling for the Program for Writing and Rhetoric at CU Boulder, “Lesbian-Feminism and Queer Theory: Another “Battle of the Sexes?”, Amy Goodloe Blog, 1994, http://amygoodloe.com/papers/lesbian-feminism-and-queer-theory-another-battle-of-the-sexes/, 08/01/14]

Over the past decade scholarship on lesbian and gay issues has rapidly increased not only in scope and size but also in level of acceptance as "valid" research within the academy. Although lesbian-feminist theory has long been a part of the academic field of women's studies, only recently has it begun to gain a degree of critical autonomy, a development that has been attributed to the need of some lesbian theorists to define their projects over against those of both feminist theory and the new darling of academia: "queer theory." While lesbian theory diverges in some important ways from feminist theory, it's opposition with queer theory is, I would argue, much greater and more fundamental, to the extent that the two may be wholly incompatible as politically useful theoretical positions. Not all lesbian theorists would agree, however, as the most recent work on these issues attests; even when lesbian theorists wholeheartedly embrace queer theory, they are often reluctant to give up on some of the basic premises of lesbian feminism. This, I believe, suggests that lesbian-feminism provides a certain type of social and political analysis that is not available through queer theory, a case I intend to make through a critical review of some of the scholarship on these issues produced over the last five years. Some of the issues that divide lesbian-feminists and queer theorists are the very issues that threatened to divide lesbians from feminists in the early stages of the women's movement[1]. The practice of identity politics, with its concern for the nature and boundaries of identity, has been central to most social movements of the past few decades, with perhaps the most visible example being that of the Black Power movement. Identity politics assumes a coherent, unified, and stable identity on the basis of which individuals should not be discriminated against; while activists concerned with ending racism and classism have used identity politics with some success, gender and especially sexuality pose a more difficult problem, as we will see in the work of both lesbian-feminists and queer theorists. Another related issue that divides these two critical perspectives is the nature and function of the sex/gender system; for lesbian-feminists, sex and gender are conceptually interdependent categories, best exemplified by the institution of compulsory heterosexuality, but for queer theorists, sex and gender are and must be conceptually distinct, which opens up the possibility for an analysis of homophobia that excludes the role of sexism[2]. Lesbian-feminists and queer theorists also come to heads over the meaning of "sexual difference," the construction of identities through hierarchical, binary gender roles, and what it means to be "anti-normative." These are but some of the issues that scholars have recently taken up, as a way both of understanding the historical role and importance of lesbian-feminist theory, and of coming to terms with the emergence of queer theory. Arlene Stein's article, "Sisters and Queers: the Decentering of Lesbian Feminism" (1992), offers a brief but thorough account of the history and development of lesbian-feminism, as well as an analysis of the fallout from lesbian feminism's recent encounter with queer theory. According to Stein, the recent increase in lesbian visibility and diversity has led lesbian feminists to reconceptualize what is meant by "lesbian community," since it seems more accurate to refer to lesbian "communities," and to recognize that not all of these communities will identify as feminist (35). But this has certainly not always been the case, and in order to understand the hegemony that lesbian feminism has had over constructions of lesbian identity, Stein reviews the basic assumptions of lesbian feminism as a political philosophy. Early lesbian feminism developed in an attempt to counter the dominant medical construction of lesbianism as the congenital defect of "inversion." The medical model clearly suggested that lesbianism was a biological trait, albeit a defective one, and early homosexual rights advocates used this evidence to claim that lesbians should be pitied for their condition rather than oppressed because of it (37). With the rise of the women's movement in the seventies came an increasing dissatisfaction with the association of lesbianism with biological "abnormality," as early feminists began to analyze other explanations for the existence of lesbians. The theory that came to dominate early lesbian feminism was that lesbians were those who resisted the regime of compulsory heterosexuality, that they, unlike heterosexual women, refused to become part of the male economy by choosing to identify only with other women; thus was born the concept of the "woman-identified woman."[3] Lesbian feminist activists in the seventies claimed not only that lesbianism had nothing to do with a medical, or biologically "essential" condition, but that it was, in fact, a choice available to all women, and a choice that any woman aware of the oppressive nature of heteropatriarchy would make. While lesbian feminism at first sought to "liberate the 'lesbian' in every woman" (38), the movement soon found itself faced with the dilemma of identity politics. In order to gain political ground, lesbian feminists felt the need to fix lesbian identity as somewhat stable and coherent, in order to classify lesbians as a "minority" deserving of protection against discrimination, but the boundaries of this identity were fairly narrow, and excluded those whose experience of being lesbian didn't measure up to the feminist "ideal" (45). The tension produced by this move, away from recognizing lesbianism as a personal and political choice and towards a more essentialist understanding of lesbian identity (ironically not too far removed from the medical models), sowed the seeds for the demise of lesbian feminism as a powerful political force in the eighties, although it also opened up the possibility for more specifically lesbian varieties of political analysis, such as those taken up by the sex-radicals of the early eighties (48).[4] Towards the late eighties, Stein observes, lesbian feminism and lesbian politics in general were separate entities, often with contradictory assumptions and political aims. While the lesbian feminist analysis of oppression assumed an inherent link between sex and gender -- arguing, in the words of Suzanne Pharr, that "homophobia is a weapon of sexism” [5] -- other kinds of lesbian analysis (some of which also insisted on being considered feminist) argued for the "relative autonomy of gender and sexuality, sexism and heterosexism" (50). This latter position more closely resembles that taken by many queer (male) activists in the late eighties and early nineties, with whom these lesbians would come to identify as a way of marking their difference from "traditional" lesbian feminism. "Queerness," for these gay men and lesbians, is understood as "a non-normative sexuality which transcends the binary distinction homosexual/heterosexual to include all who feel disenfranchised by dominant sexual norms" (50). Stein's primary critique of this newly emerging "queer" theory is that it fails to adequately "compensate for real, persistent structural differences in style, ideology, and access to resources among men and women" (50). In other words, it privileges sexuality, in both political analysis and cultural expression, over gender, and thereby threatens to erase or reduce the gender-bound experience of lesbians as women. While feminism may have failed to adequately address the multiplicity of sexual difference in its analysis of the sex/gender system, she argues, the new "queer theory" fails to address gender at all, which makes it an arguably less effective political philosophy for many lesbians. But a possible benefit of the clash between lesbian feminism and queer theory is that lesbian feminists have had to rethink their commitment to the belief in the primacy of the sex/gender system over other forms of oppression, to the extent that they have begun to theorize lesbianism as a provisional identity "situated in a web of multiple oppressions and identities "(51), taking into account differences of race, class, ethnicity in ways that queer theory has so far failed to do. According to Stein, then, this newer version of lesbian feminism, which has shifted away from an exclusive focus on gender towards an understanding of multiple oppressions, is a more "decentered" movement, which "may present new democratic potential" (52). Not all lesbian-feminists have let queer theory off the hook quite so easily, though. While Stein argues that a newly "redesigned" lesbian feminism is more politically useful to lesbians than queer theory, she does not critique the assumptions and indeed arrogance of queer theory to the extent that other scholars have. This is perhaps in part due to the most recent developments in queer theory which Stein may not have been aware of in 1992; by 1994, however, lesbian scholars have become acutely aware of the hegemony that queer theory threatens to hold over all studies of gender and sexuality in the academy, and have thus launched into full-scale critiques of its totalizing tendencies. Perhaps the most scathing critique comes from Sheila Jeffreys, whose work is not always received well by non lesbian feminist scholars because of her tendency to claim to speak for all lesbian feminists, when in fact she only speaks for a particularly radical group. In her most recent article, "The Queer Disappearance of Lesbians: Sexuality in the Academy" (1994), Jeffreys states simply, "The appearance of queer theory and queer studies threatens to mean the disappearance of lesbians" (459). Jeffreys' concern, like that of so many lesbian feminists, is that queer theory threatens to offset the advances made by feminism by failing altogether to recognize its impact in shaping contemporary understanding of sexuality and gender; queer theory, she argues, is "feminism free" (459). Despite its supposedly counter-normative associations, Jeffreys believes the word "queer" has come to signify white gay male, which renders any project associated with this signifier simply "more of the same," while masquerading as "new and uniquely liberating" (469). Thus, unlike Stein, whose critique of queer theory is relatively mild in comparison, Jeffreys accuses this new theoretical discourse of deliberately reinscribing the very oppression(s) that feminists and lesbian feminists have been fighting against for years, in order to privilege (homo)sexuality and gay male culture as the epitome of the "anti-discourse" made so much of by postmodern theory. Central to Jeffreys' critique is that queer theory privileges and indeed naturalizes the masculine in a way that runs counter to the aims and goals of most forms of feminism. The notion of "camp" or "drag," which Jeffreys sees as one of the key concepts of queer theory, is built on gay male notions of performative femininity, which not only excludes biological women but enshrines the dominant construction of masculine as the binary opposite of feminine; a drag queen's enactment of femininity for the pleasure of other men, rather than calling into question the performative nature of all gender roles, instead fixes perceived sexual difference at the core of desire, a claim early lesbian feminists were most anxious to refute. According to Jeffreys, then, while queer theory may claim to expand the limits of gender by "playing" with the terms that constitute it -- by supposedly separating femininity from the female body in the persona of a drag queen, for example -- it in fact fails to account for the sexism inherent in the terms as they are constituted by the dominant culture. A man "playing at" being a coy, submissive woman, for the benefit of other men, is hardly a vision of sophisticated gender analysis to most lesbian feminists -- which is not to criticize drag queens in and of themselves, so much as to point out the inadequacy of drag as core theoretical concept. Jeffreys also criticizes the tendency of queer politics to "[accept] and [celebrate] the minority status of homosexuality." This, she believes, is a politics "which is in contradiction to lesbian feminism" (469) because of its insistence on a stable, coherent albeit counter-normative identity. She continues: Lesbian feminists do not see themselves as being part of a transhistorical minority of 1 in 10 or 1 in 20, but as the model of free womanhood. Rather than wanting acceptance as a minority which is defined in opposition to an accepted and inevitable heterosexual majority, lesbian feminist theorists seek to dismantle heterosexuality, and one strategy is the promotion of lesbianism as a choice for women. (469)

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › Case › 1NC -- Turn -- Binaries Not Violent

Binaries aren’t inherently violent

Carson 9 – PhD in English @ Toronto and MA @ Queen’s, Associate Professor of English – since 2008 - at Hobart and William Smith Colleges (Rob, “DIGESTING THE THIRD: RECONFIGURING BINARIES IN SHAKESPEARE AND EARLY MODERN THOUGHT,” https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/17736/1/Carson_Robert_B_200906_PhD_thesis.pdf)

There seems to be a widespread consensus among current literary critics that there is a problem with binaries, so much so that even the word "binary" itself has taken on a strong pejorative connotation. To begin with, then, I should go on the record as saying that even though the hemiolic strategy that I develop in this chapter sets out to redescribe binary structures using ternary strategies, I am by no means opposed to all binaries whatsoever. Many of them, in fact, seem to me to be entirely unproblematic, if not wholly indispensable: for example, I have no misgivings at all when it comes to flipping light-switches that place "off" and "on" in binary opposition to each other; I am not at all concerned that my computer saves my work in an enormous chain of 1’s and 0’s; I feel no compulsion to seek out creative alternatives to "heads" or "tails" during a coin-toss; and so on. The world is full of a great many wholly sensible binary oppositions, I suggest, and thus one of the shortcomings that I frequently find in post-structuralist and deconstructive critiques of binary thinking is the knee-jerk (or even essentialist?) assumption that binaries are somehow problematic "violent hierarchies" by their very nature. Furthermore, I think it is important to acknowledge that the term "binaries" is used to represent quite a varied range of dyads: not just dichotomous oppositions, but also more open-ended competing alternatives, and even at times dyads that seem to me to be wholly complementary pairs of ideas. We might see a confusion of this sort, I suggest, at the core of Anna Maria Cimitile's argument in Shakespearean Orders, which offers a deconstructive reading of how Shakespeare's plays subvert a whole range of binaries that she envisions as being parallel to one another, including nature and culture, good and evil, justice and mercy, matter and spirit, filiation and usurpation, and commerce and law (23). I would argue in response that there seem to be crucial differences to be found between these dyads. Good and evil, for example, quite clearly form a dichotomous binary opposition, whereas justice and mercy seem to present us with a much more ambiguous pair of partly-competing alternatives, and commerce and law in turn seem to be little more than two vaguely related concepts that Cimitile considers alongside each other. Surely, I suggest, these dyads are not all "binaries" in the same way, structured on a model of presence and absence. I greatly appreciate the work that the past generation of critical theorists has done in drawing attention to the ways in which violent hierarchies of social power are often constructed and maintained through particular binary oppositions in language. However, at the same time, I am far from persuaded by the strategies that both the post-structuralists and the deconstructivists have adopted in their attempts to address this concern. It seems to me that the usual post-structuralist strategy of inverting binaries in order to privilege whatever position had previously been marginalized does little to overcome the problem of binaries, since the inversion of a binary preserves it intact. An upside-down binary, after all, is undoubtedly still a binary nonetheless. This is, as I understand it, the thrust of the complex and convincing argument that Derrida develops against Foucault in "Cogito and the History of Madness." To make the same point much more prosaically, however, I am reminded of the famous quip that the cartoonist Bob Thaves made about Ginger Rogers, namely that she was a better dancer than Fred Astaire because she managed to do everything that he did, only backwards and in high heels. I sometimes find myself thinking the same thing about Foucault and Descartes. Foucault, of course, undoubtedly comes across as the more compelling philosopher as he tackles Enlightenment metaphysics so daringly and so stylishly, but it seems to me that in the end what Foucault is doing is very much the same old song and dance that Descartes did, only backwards and in high heels.9 In cases where binary thinking really is a problem, the post-structuralist response challenges the hierarchy within a binary, privileging the marginalized and validating the undervalued, and although I see this as a worthwhile task in its own right, I do not see how it enables us to overcome the problem of the binary itself.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › Case › 1NC -- Turn -- Identity

Illegibility is insufficient to disrupt heterosexual space and actively shuts down identitarian resistance which is comparatively more effective than the aff

Latchford 14 (Frances J, Associate Professor in the School of Gender, Sexuality and Women’s Studies at York University in Toronto, “Unidentified Remains: The Impolitics of Non-Identity”, Atlantis, Vol. 36, No. 2) DB

Unidentified queers render invisible the possibilities that are queer. As unknown possibilities, unidentified queers reinforce, rather than interrupt, the boundaries of heterosexuality. Moreover, as heterosexuality operates outside as much or more than it does inside queer spaces, a consistent refusal to identify as “queer” is a lost opportunity to resist heterosexuality within its own fields of operation; in contexts that are not queer, heterosexual subjectivity is presumed in the absence of some other identification. Therefore, if queer practice does not exceed queer contexts and the self refuses to be “gay,” “lesbian,” “bisexual,” “trans,” or “queer” in heterosexual contexts, heterosexuality simply knows no resistance. Obviously, the enactment of queer practices in heterosexual spaces (e.g., S&M or fisting in the boardroom) is as impractical as it politically dangerous, but this is just another reason the affirmation of identity is more effective as resistance in so many contexts.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › Case › 1NC -- Turn -- Two Spirit

The gender binary is a settler colonial invention, only by starting our analysis at the subjugation of the Two-Spirit can we have an effective queering of discourse

Singer No Date [Phoenix A., former Transgender Justice Policy Fellow at Basic Rights Oregon and Indigenous and transgender activist. Colonialism, Two-Spirit Identity, and the Logics of White Supremacy. Portland State University.]

Before the colonization of this land, there were as many as six traditional gender orientation roles among numerous tribes (Cameron, 124). However, due to boarding schools erasing these traditions through the Christianization of those who would later become the Elders within our community, the Christianized related the existence of the Two-Spirit as sin (Cameron,124) and this is because we have internalized the dominant culture’s concepts of gender and sexuality (Driskill, 55). The Western Gender Binary is thus superimposed upon all cultures and their histories seen through the gaze of not only male dominance but a male/female paradigm that does not account for the existence of third, fourth, fifth and even more varieties of non-male/female expressions and identities. Colonization, as previously elaborated upon, brought to Indigenous societies the patriarchy and beliefs of natural male dominance. But an overlooked aspect of the patriarchy - this Western gender binary, also found its way impacting Indigenous thought through the process of colonization. The Western Gender Binary does not see the Two-Spirit, the Western Gender Binary only sees a Man acting in “Unmanly” ways or a Woman acting in “Unwomanly” ways. What has resulted from this has been our very own communities becoming hostile to Gay, Lesbian, Bi/Pan, Trans* and Two-Spirit Indigenous peoples due to the influence of violent and assimilative colonialism. Many of these people not being accepted by their own families, by their own tribes, even those with traditions normalizing their existences. A further demonizing of Native bodies occurs when the Native refuses to conform to the invading culture’s normative behaviors of gender expression. The influence of Western culture on the erasure of Indigenous “Queer” and Two -Spirit peoples has created a system of sexual assault, homophobia and transphobia used against our peoples, entangled with the history of colonialism (Driskill, 51). As part of the settler mentality, we can see these actions as colonial violence against the Two-Spirit (ibid) and are also the results of genocide (Driskill, 52). To reiterate previous statements, the Western gender binary is a form of superimposed and universalized colonialism upon Indigenous bodies and minds. Often, the fight for decolonization fails to include or may even openly alienate and exclude Indigenous “Queers,” Two -Spirits, non-cisnormative and non-heteronormative individuals. Even amongst those attempting post colonialism, the adverse effects of gendered colonialism finds itself difficult to erase from the consciousness. Be that as it may one not achieve decolonization without also including an eradication of the Western gender binary. Healing our identities is part of the ongoing process of decolonization (Driskill, 51) because besides our land, our identities are colonized as well (Driskill, 52) and expressing our identities as Two-Spirit peoples is to resist colonialist definitions defining who we are while also proclaiming ourselves sovereign from the identities of the white dominated LGBTQ rights movement (ibid). Two-Spirit is a term used to describe our experiences of intersecting oppressions (race, colonialism, queerness, sexuality transgenderism, two-spirit identity) and is therefore a culturally specific term which cannot be transferred into other cultures (Cameron, 126). Colonization operates as a mechanism of white supremacy which as previously defined is built around paranoia, white solidarity and consensus, white exclusiveness (“otherizing”), defensiveness, colonial aggression and violence. As has been described, white supremacy and settler-colonialism not only colonizes the bodies of Indigenous peoples, but their minds as well. This has effectively been done through the erasure of traditions and introduction of patriarchy imposed upon Indigenous peoples in the boarding schools. Settlers want the Indigenous person to “disappear” and history has shown they’ve attempted this not only through physical genocide but cultural genocide as well. This disappearance of Native peoples includes those often most threatening to patriarchy and Western culture, the Two-Spirit. White supremacy through violence has sought the destruction of the Two-Spirit. White supremacy through paranoia, considering the Two-Spirit to be sin have sought the destruction of the Two-Spirit. White supremacy through white solidarity and consensus has imposed its Western concept of sexuality and gender upon Indigenous peoples, seeking the destruction of the Two-Spirit. Assimilation and annihilation have been tools at the hands of the settler-colonialists to erase Indigenous peoples as people and as a unique set of cultures residing in the United States. Existing is therefore resistance.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › Case › 1NC -- Turn -- Queer Sameness

The fetishization of difference ironically collapses into a singular sameness, as the dominant culture’s white supremacy comes to regulate queerness into an ideal. This works to mystify racial and colonial violence, furthering marginalizing people of color.

Perez 5 [Hiram, Associate Professor of English at Vassar College, “You Can Have My Brown Body and Eat It, Too!” Social Text 23.3/4 (Fall/Winter 2005): 171-191]

The category "Latino," used as a racial descriptor rather than a political affiliation, is nearly as vague as "brown." Consider, for example, how easily "Latin" (or for that matter, "Spanish" and "Hispanic") may substitute for "Latino." However, most uses of "Latina/o" disregard the politics of that ambiguity, together with the differences that the category itself already collapses. Remarkably, queer theory understands the politics of difference as fundamental to its practice, yet it can participate in the circulation of categories like "Latin" without appreciating in the least its function within a complex web of identifications and desires. While the variations on the category "Latina/o" collapse innumerable differences, queer theorizing seems for the most part quite content to let that sameness alone. "Queer" needs to interrogate its own investments in sameness. Ironically, these investments deploy the rhetoric of difference precisely so that the presumed anti-identity of queer might dissimulate profiting by sameness. By this means, establishmentarian queer theory has colluded in rendering material and psychic violences of racialization unintelligible. I agree that communities are bound by fictions, but that does not diminish the violences enacted in constituting those communities. Queer theory has exchanged too hastily the politics of identity for the politics of difference. To combat oppression it is necessary to theorize how communities are bound by shared fantasies and desires, in other words, how they are bound at some level by sameness. This is especially crucial where sameness makes itself transparent, as it does with whiteness. Sometimes, people are not so different from one another. Queer theory, when it privileges difference over sameness absolutely, colludes with institutionalized racism in vanishing, hence retrenching, white privilege. It serves as the magician's assistant to whiteness's disappearing act. Hanson acknowledged that he had anticipated my response and had heard exactly the same protest before. Oddly, these repeated protests only invalidate one another. I should in fact feel shamed at this revelation of the commonplace nature of my thinking. Hanson's accusation constitutes a defensive posture, a way to dismiss criticism. However, I think the solace I received (much of it from white lesbian theorists) may similarly indicate a form of defensiveness. I absolutely experienced solidarity with white lesbian theorists at the conference, but there was also from some an expression of solace that I think masqueraded (and only just barely) as solidarity.231 am sure that reactions to the dispute between Hanson and me had to have been more complicated than the (apparent) polarization, the taking of sides that occurred after the final roundtable. But I also wonder if that] (apparent) polarization did not in fact need to happen to preserve the status quo, to further bind queer theory's white indivisibility. As I alternately inhabited the body of an intransigent and vulgar savage as well as that of a noble one (depending on where you sat), as I performed my brownness—and what choice did I have really, fated to my performance of the unsophisticated and banal—I understood the rupture I witnessed as one that needed to happen in order to fortify that white body of queer theory, to strengthen its immunity against foreign agents. I did experience genuine intellectual engagement with colleagues. Otherwise, I would not waste my energy formulating this critique. However, that engagement was subsumed by a reductive polarization; like the brown body (poor Mario's, Kiko's, my own, and, most important, the brown body missing in action), it was an obligatory sacrifice to the status quo of Gay Shame's queer theorizing. Although the ironies of Ellis Hanson's presentation were lost on me, I was keenly aware of another much crueler irony. The brown body in his schoolboy uniform, invited into the university classroom of a cosmopolitan gay male fantasy for a game of show and tell, remains simultaneously shut out of the university classroom. Increasingly, the brown body finds itself expelled from civil society—if not expelled outright from the nation. Seeing Kiko up on the screen, his dick hanging out of his khaki shorts, made the absence of gay men and lesbians of color at the conference all that much more pronounced. The brown body is variously sacrificed at the exigencies of white privilege and white desire. As peculiar as this may sound, I am not convinced that institutionalized forms of queer theory really care to investigate desire. An established group of queer theorists remain quite riled, understandably, about the normalization of queer. However, queer theory resists the critique of its own even more alarming normalizations. The dominant queer culture, like any dominant culture, demands assimilation. Queer theory does not want to be normalized, but neither does it want to be queered. Unruly subjects are expelled to its margins. This expulsion is telling. Establishmentarian queer theory, despite its oft-professed revulsion at mass culture assimilation, has also quite comfortably settled at the center or, rather, that comfortably furnished space just left of center. We would be deluded to think that queer theory is not invested in protecting the institutional structures that have accommodated it, including, most significantly, white patriarchal structures of knowledge. This does not call for abandoning the field but rather for greater vigilance, imagination, and accountability, as well as a reinvigorated inquiry into the complex trajectories of desire and identity.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › Case › 1NC -- Turn -- Reform Good

The claim that reform, or learning about it, produces queer subjects in any structurally predictive way actually inhibits queer becoming---particular demands for reform enables queer flourishing

Greteman 18—Department of Art Education, School of the Art Institute of Chicago (Adam, “Introduction: An Opening for Queer Thriving,” Sexualities and Genders in Education pp 1-35, springer, dml)

I begin with this general sense of queer youth and the complicated relationship they have to queer adults to draw attention to the everyday complexities that go into being and becoming queer in the twenty-first century. It is, to put it simply, not a straightforward process or experience. I forgo specificity to think broadly about the diverse ways in which queer youth, in varied contexts and realities, are generally going about their day and becoming in relationship to the broader worlds they inhabit. They are, by means of being youth, going about their days thinking less about many of the issues queer scholars engage—including myself in the coming pages—and more about the possibilities and limitations that lie before them. They, with their youthful zest, see a world filled with potential and possibility. It is not a perfect world, as queer youth inching toward an explicit queer relation to the world are far from ignorant of the issues queerness raises in and for their lives. However, it is a world that they are increasingly sure they have a right to inhabit, engage, and transform. They are, unlike other generations, asserting themselves earlier in life and, as such, could benefit from queer opportunities that connect them with queer generations (a topic for the next chapter).

This is, for me, a hopeful image of queer youth and an image that I try to hold with me in my own daily engagements where conversations, by and large, focus on queer youth as victims. It is also the image that propels the purpose of this book—a book that as you will read builds upon decades of queer scholarship that has pushed and prodded the world to become kinder to queers (to put it quite simply). After decades of generating queer scholarship that honors (often perversely) queerness, emerging generations have expanded opportunities to come into presence. To be clear, while I hold this image of queer youth with me, this book is not about queer youth, but about the histories and futures of queer realities that were once youthful and a push for recognizing unseen queer potentials in the youth of the future. This may, for some, sound a bit wishy-washy. The lack of specificity might read unsure or unaware of the specific challenges and realities queer youth and adults face in the present. And this may be the case—I am not an expert in specific realities beyond my own and those within my vicinity. My refusal to specify here is a recognition that queerness—at its heart—is ever shifting and difficult to pin down. Any specific mention of a queer youth, for instance, one who became prom king (or queen) or one who recently committed suicide, would already begin to foreclose other queer possibilities and the complexities therein. For me, the move to specify also feels like a move to use a queer youth to make an argument. I sense queer youth—particularly queer youth who are victimized, bullied, or commit suicide—are taken up in the grind of the media and academy to become a “cause,” often simplified or reduced to a particular talking point. There is, to be sure, a political salience to this and one I myself will take up on several occasions. However, I begin with and honor the general because for me it is helpful in allowing readers to read in their own specifics, in their own contexts, given the diversity of experiences and intersectional realities of our lives. Additionally, I am a “generalist” in education, so I tend toward the general “big picture,” leaving specificity to those more suited to such work. For now, as readers, hopeful queers might see their optimism reflected back at them, but with a recognition that there is work to be done; while pessimistic queers might scoff at such optimism while secretly realizing the world can (and should) be different. Bored queers may simply remain bored, bored by the incessant academizing of queer experiences. But, back to the issues at hand—childhood, children, and queerness.

2022 Michigan Negative
NEG---Cyborg Writing › Case › 1NC -- Turn -- Reform Good

They cause violent to roll-back LBGTQ gains. They also hamper external gains for racial and gender groups.

Levi & Shay 12 [Jennifer Levi and Giovanna Shay. Jennifer Levi is the director of the Transgender Rights Project of GLAD (Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders). Jennifer has participated in successful efforts to pass transgender-inclusive antidiscrimination laws throughout New England. Giovanna Shay is a co-chair of the Corrections Committee of the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section. She has participated in institutional change litigation involving prisons, as well as efforts to enforce the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) and amend the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Both serve on the faculty of Western New England University School of Law. - “The dangers of reform” - Source: The Women's Review of Books. 29.4 (July-August 2012): p30. Info Trac database]

In his recent book, Normal Life, Dean Spade, a law professor at Seattle University School of Law and noted transgender activist, criticizes several law-reform movements, including those to improve prison conditions, win marriage equality for same-sex couples, and ensure that hate crimes and antidiscrimination laws include transgender people. Spade finds fault with LGBTQ rights organizations' efforts to win mainstream acceptance, arguing that instead of pursuing an equality agenda, they should focus on changing "the distribution of life chances," by "demand[ing] radical redistribution of wealth and an end to poverty." Spade's critique has the most force in the context in which it originated--calling for an end to what David Garland first described as mass incarceration, the system many refer to as the "prison industrial complex." It is less persuasive when applied to the realm of free-world LGBTQ rights. Spade's perspective is shaped by the prison-abolitionist movement, as well as, he says, by critical race theory and "woman of color feminism." In 2002, Spade founded the Sylvia Rivera Law Project (SRLP), which provides free legal services to transgender and gender nonconforming people, and whose mission, according to its website (slrp.org/about), is "to guarantee that all people are free to self-determine their gender identity and expression, regardless of income or race, and without facing harassment, discrimination, or violence." Normal Life is rooted in this experience, and fits comfortably within a series of recent prison-abolitionist works focusing on the experiences of queer and transgender people, including Queer (In)Justice: The Criminalization of LGBT People in the United States (2010), and Captive Genders: Trans Embodiment and the Prison Industrial Complex (2011), a collection of essays to which Spade contributed. Spade writes that his purpose in Normal Life is to describe a "critical trans politics ... that demands more than legal recognition and inclusion." Arguing that equality of life chances, or distributive justice, cannot be achieved through law reform alone, he calls for a broader agenda: "prison abolition, the elimination of poverty, access to full health care, and an end to immigration enforcement." These goals, he submits, "cannot be conceptualized or won within the realm of US law." Citing the work of critical race theorist Alan Freeman, Spade questions the focus of antidiscrimination law on violations of individual rights, which, he argues, tends to obscure more systemic and structural kinds of disadvantage. Instead of pursuing a rights-based law reform strategy, Spade writes, the trans movement should focus on "population-level operations of power," such as ending mass incarceration. The models he recommends for pursuing "transformative change" will resonate with those familiar with the work of organizers such as "rebellious lawyering" proponent Gerry Lopez, Brazilian educational reformer Paolo Freire, or civil rights campaigner Ella Baker: "[M]eaningful change," Spade says, "comes from below," and "those most directly impacted" should lead the fight. Normal Life's leftist critique of liberal reform has deep roots in the history of US social movements. For example, in his book Stories of Scottsboro, James Goodman describes how, in 1931, during the trial of the Scottsboro Boys (nine African American teenagers falsely accused of raping two white women), leaders of the International Labor Defense (ILD) organization attacked the NAACP as "an instrument of the white capitalist class for the perpetuation of the slavery of the negro people." ILD members marched with signs equating "lynchers, reformers, and enemies of the Negro people." Then as now, leftists viewed the racialized criminal-punishment system as a tool of broader economic oppression. Spade writes that advocates seeking to remedy prison conditions should beware of inadvertently strengthening the prison system. He explains: We must avoid proposals that include constructing buildings or facilities to house trans prisoners, to hire new staff, or make any other changes that would expand the budget and/or imprisoning capacities of the punishment system. He goes on to say, "[W]e must ensure that legal work is always aimed at dismantling the prison industrial complex ... [k]nowing that the system is likely to try to co-opt our critiques to produce opportunities for expansion." This is essentially the criticism of prison reform leveled by Angela Y. Davis in her 2003 book, Are Prisons Obsolete? She argues that, despite the good intentions of advocates, prison reform can produce more prisons--new and sanitized versions built to reduce overcrowding. Davis warns that discussions of prison reform focus "almost inevitably on generating the changes that will produce a better prison system." Although some reforms may be significant, she writes, "frameworks that rely exclusively on reforms help to produce the stultifying idea that nothing lies beyond prison." It is not only prison abolitionists who share Spade's concern about the unintended consequences of prison reform. The sociologist Heather Schoenfeld writes that prison-conditions litigation in Florida contributed to a prison building boom there. Other commentators--including James Jacobs, Malcolm Feeley, and Van Swearingen--argue that prisoners' rights litigation contributed to the "bureaucratization" of prisons, consolidating administrators' power even as it asserted prisoners' rights. Examples of double-edged US criminal-punishment reforms extend well beyond prison conditions. As described by Kate Stith and Steve Y. Koh (in "The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines," Wake Forest Law Review, 1993), some of the initial proponents of federal sentencing guidelines were liberal academics and judges, who wanted to rationalize sentencing to make it fairer and more consistent. Unfortunately, as innumerable commentators have recounted, the implementation of the guidelines produced draconian sentences, ultimately contributing to the growth of US prisons. In adopting an all-or-nothing approach, however, Spade fails to acknowledge ways in which the liberal prisoners' rights movement has helped to advance critical trans politics. At a minimum, prison-reform litigation generated information, through civil discovery, that advocates used to draw attention to prison conditions. Access to prisoners has been facilitated by the minimal legal protections and professional norms that the prisoners' rights movement helped to achieve. Rather than undermining the radical project that Spade promotes, liberal law-reform efforts arguably laid foundations for the prison-abolitionist movement. As for hate crimes prohibitions, Spade writes that they "strengthen and legitimize the criminal punishment system," which targets poor people of color and singles out poor trans people of color for particular harassment. "Changing what the law explicitly says about a group," he points out, "does not necessarily remedy the structured insecurity faced by that group." We ourselves are agnostic on the question of hate crimes penalties for crimes against LGBTQ people: the exclusion of sexual orientation and gender identity from existing laws not only minimizes the seriousness of anti-LGBTQ violence but also nearly guarantees a dearth of law enforcement resources. Nevertheless, we are also acutely aware of the danger of expanding the already massive criminal-punishment system in any way. In the context of mass incarceration, in which reform can produce ever cleaner and more technologically advanced human warehouses, Spade's arguments are well-taken. His critique is less persuasive when he moves into the broader arena of LGBTQ rights. Spade believes that law reform is at odds with distributive justice. In his view, advocacy that departs from the idealized approach he champions harms the transgender community. While we laud his critique of some elements of liberal law reform, we disagree with his zero-sum frame. Law reform is only one piece of a strategy. It cannot achieve everything, but it is sometimes a necessary precondition to reaching other goals and, at a minimum, is not a causative element for diminished opportunities and status. A transgender equality movement that includes expansion of antidiscrimination laws and marriage equality among its goals is coextensive with the project of "transformative change." Spade argues that antidiscrimination laws "create the false impression that ... fairness has been imposed, and the legitimacy of the distribution of life chances restored." But such protections merely ensure that a person's sexual orientation or gender identity cannot be an obvious basis for an adverse employment action. They are nowhere near broad enough to promise substantive equality, for transgender people or anyone else. However, excluding gender identity and sexual orientation from existing employment protections is far more damaging than committing the resources for the advocacy required to expand them. In addition, organizing to pass antidiscrimination laws has activated and radicalized LGBTQ advocacy organizations. The California-based Transgender Law Center (incubated by the National Center for Lesbian Rights) and the Massachusetts Transgender Political Coalition (first envisioned by GLAD staff members and interns) are two examples of the generativity of liberal law reform efforts. Both organizations share many of the distributive justice goals of SRLP. Spade is not the first to criticize the movement for marriage equality for same-sex couples. In "Arguing Against Arguing for Marriage" (University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2010), Shannon Gilreath claims that "marriage is dangerous for Gays conceptually, in its patriarchal and heteropatriarchical foundations." In less absolute terms, Katherine Franke writes in the New York Times (June 23, 2011) that same-sex marriage is a "mixed blessing," which may undermine other arrangements that LGBTQ people have used to "order our lives in ways that have given us greater freedom than can be found in the one-size-fits-all rules of marriage." Spade goes too far in applying the same critique to both prison reform and marriage equality. Removing gender discrimination from the institution of marriage does not strengthen it in the way that modifying the criminal-punishment system reinforces mass incarceration. The institution of marriage has an evolving social meaning. Extending it to lesbians, gay men, bisexual and transgender people reaffirms our human dignity. Even the most steadfast critics of the marriage-equality movement--including the lesbian activists and law professors Nancy Polikoff and the late Paula Ettelbrick--have acknowledged that critiques of marriage and the marriage equality movement need not be on a collision course. In addition, Spade ignores law-reform efforts spearheaded by LGBTQ legal organizations other than those focused on hate crimes, anti-discrimination, and marriage. These include challenges to discriminatory health care access and to prison regulations that deny essential medical care to transgender inmates; immigration reform advocacy; and support for transgender students and homeless LGBTQ youth. To ignore these efforts is to miss the ocean for the tidal pool beside it.