2022
Michigan
Evidence
Neg › War Inevitable › 2NC – Semiconductors
CJ Werleman 21, Global Correspondent for Byline Times, 10/8/2021, "A US-China War Over Taiwan Appears Not Only Inevitable, But Imminent – Byline Times," https://bylinetimes.com/2021/10/08/a-us-china-war-over-taiwan-appears-not-only-inevitable-but-imminent/, sg
Today, however, the territory that stands at the crossroads of geopolitical fixation and contestation, is the island state of Taiwan – according to recent Chinese and American behaviour.
Barely two weeks after the US, the UK and Australia announced the formation of AUKUS – a security alliance between the three Anglosphere countries to contain and deter Chinese military aggression in Indo Pacific – Taiwan’s defence ministry reported that a record 56 Chinese military aircraft entered Taiwanese airspace on multiple occasions on 4 October, which followed the previous record set on both Friday and then Saturday, with 38 and 39 aircraft reported, respectively.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
Neg › War Inevitable › 2NC – Relations
Jude Blanchette 21, Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, being interviewed by Isaac Chotiner, 11/20/2021, "The Fraying of U.S.-China Relations," https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/the-fraying-of-us-china-relations, sg
During the past several years, the U.S.-China relationship has reached its lowest point in decades. This week, after a virtual summit with Xi Jinping that lasted more than three hours, President Biden referred to “commonsense guardrails” that were needed to keep the relationship from spiralling further downward. But the summit did not end with any concrete agreements—or even a joint statement—on the issues affecting the relationship, which run from trade and technological development to human rights in Hong Kong and Xinjiang to the future of Taiwan. The lack of agreement underscored the reality that the problems between the two countries appear largely intractable, despite an urgent need for coöperation on issues such as climate change.
I recently spoke by phone with Jude Blanchette, the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington, D.C., about his view of the summit. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed whether to think about the Chinese-American relationship as zero-sum, Xi Jinping’s refusal to leave China during the past twenty-one months, and why a conflict over Taiwan may be less imminent than many in Washington fear.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
Neg › War Inevitable › 2NC – Relations
Kevin Rudd 22, global president of the Asia Society and former prime minister of Australia, 4/4/2022, "A U.S.-China War Would Dwarf the Destruction in Ukraine. Both Sides Must Act Now to Avoid It," https://time.com/6164184/how-us-china-avoid-war/, sg
War between the United States and China is not inevitable. But U.S.-China relations continue to spiral downward, their strategic relationship adrift and buffeted by growing global crises. Muddling through will be wholly insufficient to avoid conflict. To avoid sleepwalking into a war, both countries must construct a joint strategic framework to maintain the peace—and quickly.
In my new book, The Avoidable War: the Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping’s China, I offer one such framework, which I call “managed strategic competition.” The idea is relatively simple.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
Neg › War Inevitable › 2NC – Modernization
John Dobson 21, prestigious British foreign policy diplomat under the Major administration, 4/3/2021, "Is a war between U.S. and China over Taiwan inevitable?," https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/world/war-u-s-china-taiwan-inevitable, sg
‘China considers establishing full control over Taiwan to be its number one priority”, said Admiral John Aquilno during a Congressional hearing in March confirming him as the next commander of US forces in the Pacific. “We ought to be prepared today as in my opinion this problem is much closer to us than most think.” Retired General H.R. McMaster agrees. “Taiwan is the most significant flashpoint now that could lead to a large scale war”, said the former US National Security Adviser last month.
For the past four decades, the United States has played a critical role in deterring China from using force against Taiwan, as Beijing cannot be sure that the US would stand aside in the face of Chinese aggression. Similarly, the US has deterred Taiwan from seeking formal independence, as Taipei cannot be certain that the US would come to its defence should it provoke a Chinese assault. Taiwan has long been the most volatile issue between the US and China and both sides have avoided war by leaving unsettled the question of who actually owns the island.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
Neg › War Inevitable › 2NC – Modernization
Cunningham ’21 [Fiona S; 06-17-2021; Scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Ph.D. at the Political Science Department at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, fellowships at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Stanford University, Harvard University and Renmin University of China, assistant professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, former assistant professor of political science and international affairs at the George Washington University; “Cooperation under Asymmetry? The Future of US-China Nuclear Relations” in The Washington Quarterly, Volume 44, 2021 – Issue 2, p. 159-180, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934253] Accessed – 7/11/2022, WWIS
China and the United States are both in the midst of modernizing their nuclear arsenals and adding capabilities that concern the other. In the early 2010s, the United States embarked on a US$1.2 trillion nuclear modernization program over the next three decades. More recently, the United States has enhanced its non-strategic nuclear weapons, primarily to deter a perceived Russian willingness to use nuclear weapons first in a limited manner. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review called for low-yield, submarine-launched “supplemental capabilities” to enhance US options for limited nuclear strikes.17 The United States has also enhanced its missile defense capabilities, primarily to counter North Korean nuclear missiles. It plans to increase the number of its ground-based mid-course interceptors for homeland missile defense from 44 to 64, indicated that it would study options for space-based missile defense, and tested its SM-3 Block IIA interceptors on an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) for the first time.18 The US modernization plan, supplemental capabilities, and growing homeland missile defenses are frequently cited by Chinese experts as evidence of a destabilizing US pursuit of nuclear superiority.19
Five aspects of China’s nuclear modernization, coupled with a perception of more assertive Chinese behavior, generate concern in the United States. First, China has deployed two new ICBMs, the DF-41, China’s first road-mobile missile armed with a multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV), and the DF-31AG, a delivery system with improved mobility that is believed to carry a single warhead. Second, China has fielded a new, more accurate and mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), the dual-use DF-26. The US government also worries that China is exploring the option of fielding low-yield nuclear warheads in the future.20 Third, China is moving toward a full nuclear triad for the first time, although its air and sea legs are much less survivable than its land-based missile force.21 Fourth, the Pentagon estimates that China’s current stockpile of 200–300 nuclear warheads will at least double as these new delivery systems are fielded. Fifth, China is acquiring capabilities that could enable it to shift to a launch-on-warning alert status in the future. It has received Russian assistance with its early warning system and is building out a space-based early warning architecture.22 US reports and officials indicate that China might already keep some portion of its nuclear force on day-to-day alert.23
2022
Michigan
Evidence
Neg › War Inevitable › 2NC – General
Michael Klare 21, professor emeritus of peace and world-security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association, 7/15/2021, "Is a War With China Inevitable?," https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/is-a-war-with-china-inevitable/, sg
It’s the summer of 2026, five years after the Biden administration identified the People’s Republic of China as the principal threat to US security and Congress passed a raft of laws mandating a society-wide mobilization to ensure permanent US domination of the Asia-Pacific region. Although major armed conflict between the United States and China has not yet broken out, numerous crises have erupted in the western Pacific and the two countries are constantly poised for war. International diplomacy has largely broken down, with talks over climate change, pandemic relief, and nuclear nonproliferation at a standstill. For most security analysts, it’s not a matter of if a US-China war will erupt, but when.
Does this sound fanciful? Not if you read the statements coming out of the Department of Defense (DoD) and the upper ranks of Congress these days.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
Neg › War Inevitable › 2NC – Econ
Hal Brands 21, Henry A. Kissinger distinguished professor of global affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; Michael Beckley, associate professor of political science at Tufts University and a Jeane Kirkpatrick visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute9/24/2021, "China Is a Declining Power—and That’s the Problem," https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/24/china-great-power-united-states/, sg
This is the real trap the United States should worry about regarding China today—the trap in which an aspiring superpower peaks and then refuses to bear the painful consequences of descent.
China’s rise is no mirage: Decades of growth have given Beijing the economic sinews of global power. Major investments in key technologies and communications infrastructure have yielded a strong position in the struggle for geoeconomic influence; China is using a multi-continent Belt and Road Initiative to bring other states into its orbit. Most alarming, think tank assessments and U.S. Defense Department reports show China’s increasingly formidable military now stands a real chance of winning a war against the United States in the Western Pacific.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
Neg › War Inevitable › 1NC – War Inevitable
Brandon Yoder 19; Ph.D., Department of Politics, University of Virginia, Research Fellow at the National University of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Centre on Asia and Globalisation, January 28th, 2019, “Uncertainty, Shifting Power and Credible Signals in US-China Relations: Why the “Thucydides Trap” Is Real, but Limited”, Journal of Chinese Political Science, Volume 24, Issue 1,
This logic has not been well-recognized by either US foreign policymakers or scholars of US-China relations, however. On economic issues, the US adopted a strategy of unconditional cooperation for the first two decades of China’s rise. This strategy was not necessarily misguided. However, absent any degree of hedging by the US, China’s cooperation with the US-led economic order should have been seen as largely non-credible. A rising China had strong incentives to misrepresent any hypothetically-revisionist intentions it might have held, as long as doing so would elicit continued US accommodation that facilitated China’s rapid power gains. Yet many China experts took China’s cooperative behavior during this period at face value, ignoring its incentives to misrepresent and drawing overly optimistic conclusions that China truly shared American preferences for the international order [29, 32, 56, 61]. Even more troublingly, the Trump administration has recently expressed confident beliefs that China’s intentions are hostile, and consequently begun to implement policies of escalating economic containment toward China. Yet this conclusion is also unwarranted: China’s revisionist behavior has been generally limited to its territorial disputes in the South China Sea, whereas its economic and institutional actions are either ambiguous or supportive of the US-led liberal order [31]. Ironically, the Trump administration’s emerging strategy of economic containment, which has been adopted due to ill-formed pessimistic beliefs about China’s intentions, lends considerable (though incomplete) credibility to China’s cooperative signals on economic and institutional dimensions. To the extent that China continues to defend and advocate a rules-based liberal economic order in the face of Trump’s economic containment, this is a much more credible signal of China’s benign intentions than its previous cooperation under unconditional US accommodation. Thus, current US foreign policy turns the logic of hedging on its head: rather than hedging due to uncertainty and updating their beliefs in response to China’s subsequent behavior, policymakers have assumed China’s hostility and are initiating what appears to be a strategy of unconditional containment. Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and US-China Relations The Thucydides trap is not a new concept – it is fundamentally equivalent to what Jack Levy referred to more than three decades ago as the preventive motivation for war [9, 42]. When a declining state knows that its preferences conflict with those of a rising state, war can occur due to the well-known “commitment problem,” which refers to a rising state’s inability to commit to not use its future power gains to exploit the declining state [13, 54]. Under complete information, there is always a range of peaceful bargains that both the riser and decliner would prefer to war, if the bargain could be guaranteed to endure into the future. However, as the rising state gains power its bargaining leverage would increase, giving it an ex post incentive to revise the settlement in its own favor at the decliner’s expense. Thus, when the power shift is sufficiently large, the declining state prefers a winner-take-all war in the present to the eventual settlement the riser will impose in the future if the decliner were to acquiesce to the power shift. Note, however, that the commitment problem obtains only when the rising and declining states have sufficiently divergent preferences over the shape of the international order. If the rising and declining states have highly compatible preferences, the decliner sacrifices little by allowing the riser to gain power. This “benign” riser (from the decliner’s perspective) would simply use its power to maintain the same order that the decliner prefers. Conversely, however, if the riser’s preferences are highly incompatible with the decliner’s, then it will use its power gains to radically revise the international order in ways that are at odds with the decliner’s preferences. It is with this sort of “hostile” rising state that commitment problems obtain under complete information, yielding strong incentives for the decliner to initiate preventive war. Commitment problems do not obtain when the rising state is known to be benign ([36]:119; [67]). This raises the question of what the decliner should do when it is uncertain about the compatibility of the rising state’s preferences with its own. As discussed below, this is the situation that characterizes contemporary US-China relations. It is this sort of uncertainty that lies at the heart of the security dilemma, the phenomenon by which conflict can occur even between states with mutually-compatible preferences due to misplaced (but rational) distrust of the other’s intentions. Under the combination of shifting power and uncertainty, commitment problems potentially obtain if the rising state turns out to be hostile. In this case, the decliner may not be willing to risk accommodating the rising state if the consequences of exploitation by a hostile riser outweigh the benefits of cooperation with a benign one. Instead, the decliner would initiate preventive conflict. Yet because there is some probability that the rising state is actually benign, this opens up the possibility of “tragic” conflict between truly compatible states. If uncertainty about the riser’s intentions cannot be overcome, or at least mitigated, a sufficiently large power shift would produce war even between rational states whose interests do not conflict at all. A prominent subset of realist scholars has compellingly argued that this is often the case: large power shifts engender formidable barriers to the credibility of rising states’ cooperative signals, such that uncertainty about others’ intentions is intractable and declining states must make worst-case assumptions about rising states’ intentions [9, 12, 45, 53]. This is because hostile rising states have strong incentives to misrepresent their intentions while relatively weak, by mimicking the cooperative behaviors of benign risers and refraining from attempting to revise the international order. These realists argue that for hostile risers the costs of foregoing immediate revision are outweighed by the prospects of avoiding opposition from the decliner and attempting revision under a more favorable distribution of power in the future. As such, if cooperative signals are likely to be sent by both benign and hostile risers alike, such signals are non-credible, and declining states should remain highly uncertain about any rising state’s future intentions. This exacerbates the security dilemma, and gives declining states strong incentives to take preventive action even against risers that have exhibited cooperative behavior. This barrier to credible signaling during power shifts has also been applied to contemporary US-China relations. For many realists, it is entirely possible that “China is just practicing common sense and behaving itself until it is a more powerful and consolidated entity” ([33]:203), and “pursuing a peaceful policy today in order to strengthen itself to confront the United States tomorrow” ([40]:14). As such, a common conclusion has been that “we cannot tell much about China’s future behavior, because it [currently] has such limited capacity to act aggressively” ([46]:385).
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › War Not Inev › 2AC – Thucydides Trap
Lawrence Freedman 22, emeritus professor of war studies at King's College London, 1/12/2022, "What the Thucydides Trap gets wrong about China," https://www.newstatesman.com/international-politics/geopolitics/2022/01/what-the-thucydides-trap-gets-wrong-about-china, sg
The alarming possibility of a major conflict between the US and China has been framed as a likely consequence of a pattern of great power behaviour first identified by the fifth-century BCE historian Thucydides. In his study of the Peloponnesian War, the Greek wrote: “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.” This argument is now most associated with the Harvard academic Graham Allison, who claims to have identified 16 instances in which a dominant power has sought to suppress an emerging rival before they became too strong. He notes, disconcertingly, that 12 of these ended in war.
Allison first presented his thesis of the “Thucydides Trap” in the Atlantic in 2015, and developed it in a book, Destined for War, in 2017. Since then, Allison’s argument that the relationship between the US and China is growing increasingly volatile has gained even more credibility with tensions over trade, the South China Sea and Taiwan.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › War Not Inev › 2AC – Tech
Kyungwon Suh 22; Syracuse University, PhD Student, BA in Political Science from Sungkyunkwan University and MA in Political Science from Yonsei University; “Nuclear balance and the initiation of nuclear crises: Does superiority matter?” Journal of Peace Research. May 2022. doi:10.1177/00223433211067899
Discussion and conclusion Does achieving nuclear superiority lead to a reduced risk of nuclear crisis? This article finds that there is no statistical evidence for this proposition: a favorable balance of nuclear forces fails to produce the predicted effect on the probability of the initiation of nuclear crises. These null results are not artifacts of using a particular measure of the nuclear balance and a specific model specification; even after using alternative model specifications and new indicators of nuclear superiority that capture important dimensions of nuclear capabilities that the total warhead count cannot capture, those results remain unaltered. Furthermore, more qualified hypotheses that posit the conditional effects of nuclear superiority also do not find empirical support. By directly testing a key prediction of the nuclear competition school in a new empirical context, this article attempts to shed new light on the theoretical debate over the political benefits of a superior nuclear arsenal. Although my article does not conclusively disconfirm the validity of the nuclear competition school as a whole, it encourages researchers to reconsider the benefit of maintaining a favorable nuclear balance of power, which has been argued by the nuclear competition school.
This article also engages with a broader discussion on quantitative studies on nuclear weapons by acknowledging the importance of improving empirical measures of important variables. While previous quantitative studies substantially advanced our knowledge on nuclear weapons, they are not free from criticisms. For instance, several authors note that statistical analysis on nuclear weapons must carefully code theoretically important variables and take into account important issues such as heterogeneity among cases and the small-N problem (Montgomery & Sagan, 2009; Gavin, 2014). Others also point out that several findings of quantitative research on nuclear weapons are not as reliable as originally believed, demonstrating the significant methodological challenges scholars on nuclear security are facing (Bell, 2016; Winter & Lenine, 2020). Improving our measures of key variables using various open-source data on nuclear weapons is one way of addressing those challenges. By employing multiple measures of the nuclear balance of power, this article attempts to minimize the effect of the imperfect nature of those measures on the validity of statistical inference.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › War Not Inev › 2AC – Taiwan
Harlan Ullman 22, member of the Senior Advisory Group for Supreme Allied Commander Europe and is currently the senior adviser the Atlantic Council, 2/18/2022, "Reality Check #10: China will not invade Taiwan," https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/reality-check/reality-check-10-china-will-not-invade-taiwan/, sg
The definitive document on what size force would be required to seize Taiwan in a full-out landing was drafted by the US military in the late stages of World War II in the Pacific. In 1944, Operation Causeway was the US plan for retaking Formosa, as it was then called, from 30,000 starving Japanese soldiers. The planned invasion force was double the size of Operation Overlord, the Normandy landing: 400,000 soldiers and marines deployed on 4,000 ships. With a potential defending force of 450,000 Taiwanese today, using the traditional three-to-one ratio of attackers to defenders taught at war colleges, China would need to deploy over 1.2 million soldiers (out of a total active force of over 2 million). Many thousands of ships would be required to land all those forces, and doing so would take weeks. How many occupation forces would be required to pacify the Taiwanese? Surely the lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq are not lost on the PLA leadership.
China possesses a small fraction of the necessary ships to execute a landing of that size and lacks the capacity to do so for the foreseeable future. Nor are there any current plans suggesting China is intent on procuring such a force, though that could change.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › War Not Inev › 2AC – Taiwan
Alex Lo 22, post columnist covering major issues affecting Hong Kong and the rest of China. A journalist for 25 years, he has worked for various publications in Hong Kong and Toronto as a news reporter and editor, 4/26/2022, "For the umpteenth time, China will not invade Taiwan," https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3175598/umpteenth-time-china-will-not-invade-taiwan, sg
Another day, another warning from the West about China’s upcoming invasion of Taiwan. That has been the pattern ever since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in late February. It’s really not about China learning the right or wrong lesson from Russia’s invasion, but for Western pundits making this improbable warning to learn some military basics.
If you don’t like reading war books, at least watch the opening harrowing scenes of Saving Private Ryan. In general, there is a world of difference between a land invasion and one by sea. In particular, the island chains and the main island of Taiwan present formidable defences against an invasion force, as opposed to a land invasion across Ukraine borders.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › War Not Inev › 2AC – Russia-China Alliance
Elizabeth Wishnick 22; PhD; Professor of Political Science at Montclair State University; “The Paradox of Sino-Russian Partnership: Global Normative Alignment and Regional Ontological Insecurity”. In: Yoder, B.K. (eds) The United States and Contemporary China-Russia Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. 2022 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93982-3_7
Lack of Regional Integration: Explanations and Examples If Chinese exhortations about “win–win” cooperation on the regional level fall flat, it is because China and Russia lack a shared sense of regional identity, leading to incompatible security interests, at least where identity issues are concerned. This means that even projects that provide mutual benefit may raise challenges to Russia’s identity, undermining its commitment to regional integration (Russo and Stoddard 2018, 34). Jennifer Mitzen argues that states seek identity security, not just physical security. In fact, Mitzen argues that states may be willing to forego cooperation and tolerate interstate conflict if the price is greater stability in their identity (Mitzen 2016, 342). Security dilemmas may emerge when a group’s action, taken to secure its identity, cause a reaction in another group, thereby resulting in the insecurity of both (Olesker 2011, 382).
The Sino-Russian Border Regions While Chinese officials and experts may be frustrated by what they call “China threat” views—regarding their country’s purported intentions to take over neighboring lands and encourage migration there, China, too, has its own identity concerns with respect to its neighbors on the Steppe. Historians explain how China’s identity was formed in opposition to these neighbors who are portrayed as starkly different, despite commonalities (MacKay 2016, 472–473). In the neighboring countries, narratives of history and memories of border displacements create dissonance with Chinese interpretations and underlie suspicions of China’s current intentions.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › War Not Inev › 2AC – Relations
Timothy Heath 17, senior international defense research analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and member of the Pardee RAND Graduate School faculty; William Thompson, Distinguished and Rogers Professor at Indiana University and an adjunct researcher at RAND, 5/1/2017, "U.S.-China Tensions Are Unlikely to Lead to War," https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/05/us-china-tensions-are-unlikely-to-lead-to-war.html, sg
Graham Allison's April 12 article, “How America and China Could Stumble to War,” explores how misperceptions and bureaucratic dysfunction could accelerate a militarized crisis involving the United States and China into an unwanted war. However, the article fails to persuade because it neglects the key political and geostrategic conditions that make war plausible in the first place. Without those conditions in place, the risk that a crisis could accidentally escalate into war becomes far lower. The U.S.-China relationship today may be trending towards greater tension, but the relative stability and overall low level of hostility make the prospect of an accidental escalation to war extremely unlikely.
In a series of scenarios centered around the South China Sea, Taiwan and the East China Sea, Allison explored how well-established flashpoints involving China and the United States and its allies could spiral into unwanted war. Allison's article argues that given the context of strategic rivalry between a rising power and a status-quo power, organizational and bureaucratic misjudgments increase the likelihood of unintended escalation. According to Allison, “the underlying stress created by China's disruptive rise creates conditions in which accidental, otherwise inconsequential events could trigger a large-scale conflict.” This argument appears persuasive on its surface, in no small part because it evokes insights from some of Allison's groundbreaking work on the organizational pathologies that made the Cuban Missile Crisis so dangerous.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › War Not Inev › 2AC – Not Revisionist
Hugh White 21, Professor of Strategic Studies in the School of International, Political & Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, 8/1/2021, "China threatens the West’s primacy, not its democratic systems," https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-threatens-west-s-primacy-not-its-democratic-systems, sg
The first relates to China’s intentions. As former Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade secretary Peter Varghese among others has argued, there is no evidence that Beijing seeks to remodel the world in its image. China is not like the Soviet Union in its heyday, which really did aim to make the world communist. The CCP will do whatever it can to protect its own system from being undermined from without, but unlike the Soviet Union – and many in the West – it does not seem to believe that this requires the rest of the world to adopt its model.
But intentions can change, so the stronger reason to doubt the Cold War view of our contest with China relates to its capabilities. Even if Beijing does seek to undermine democracy around the world, is there any reason to think it might succeed? Here again, the contrast with the Soviet Union is instructive.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › War Not Inev › 2AC – Not Revisionist
Stephen Walt 21, columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, 3/31/2021, "China Wants a ‘Rules-Based International Order,’ Too," https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/31/china-wants-a-rules-based-international-order-too/, sg
But the distinction between the United States’ supposed commitment to a system of rules and China’s alleged lack thereof is misleading in at least three ways. First, it overlooks the United States’ own willingness to ignore, evade, or rewrite the rules whenever they seem inconvenient. If we are honest with ourselves, we have to acknowledge that Washington sometimes thinks it is perfectly okay for might to make right and for winners to take all. The collapse of the Soviet Union, when the United States took full advantage of a weakened post-Soviet Russia, is a perfect example.
Second, as Harvard University’s Alastair Iain Johnston has shown, China accepts and even defends many principles of the existing order, although of course not all of them. That situation may change in the future, of course, but even a vastly more powerful China would undoubtedly seek to retain whatever features of the present order serve its interests.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › War Not Inev › 2AC – Not Revisionist
Xiang Lanxin 21, Director of China Policy Analysis at HEID. Xiang Lanxin held the Henry A. Kissinger Chair of Foreign Policy and International Affairs at the Library of Congress in Washington, DC, “Panic of Decline – Which Is the Revisionist Power, the US or China?”, //lenox
A central premise of the Biden foreign-policy team is that China is trying to challenge the status quo, which is defined as US primacy in the world system. China is seen as a rising power with a huge grudge against the existing international system. In short, it could be said that there are parallels between the second decade of the twenty-first century and the early twentieth century, when a democratic England struggled with a rising, economically powerful but authoritarian Germany. This analogy, however, that of a “Wilhelmine China”, is flawed: it is hardly obvious, in the year 2021, just who is defending the status quo. The irony is, at the very moment of China’s decision to integrate fully into the international system, the United States seems to have started the process of changing that system. It is abandoning the rules it established at the end of the Second World War, especially the liberal international economic order, which was based on free trade and the mechanism of market competition. After more than forty years of reform and opening, China is on the verge of becoming a lead player in the existing international economic system. Just as China aspires to become a “normal state” for the first time in its long and self-isolated history, the criterion for “normal” is changing. When China became multilateral in its foreign relations, America became unilateral under the Trump administration, and this policy has continued under Biden. There’s no question that the US, rather than China, is a leading revisionist power today, because the Washington establishment of both political parties is trapped in another wave of panic: the morbid fear of a US decline. How do good times happen? What makes the bad times come? Why do we fall, and who helps us come back, if anyone can? Declinism has the same fascination for historians that love has for romantic poets. The people who want to set up China as the new monster are obliged to explain why the US is declining. Ironically, they cannot do it convincingly, since the intellectual predecessors of the new declinist, Joe Biden, are all declinists, too. He has to face insurmountable logical absurdity by insisting that the previous era was actually a peak rather than the valley that the previous declinists thought were actually valleys. The popularity of declinism was established in 1918, in the book that gave decline a profitable name in publishing: the German historian Oswald Spengler’s best-selling work “The Decline of the West”. For many in Washington, Spengler was far-sighted in his pessimism and attempt to foretell the decline of liberalism in the face of the spread of totalitarianism. But this is not enough — they have also to revive Spenger’s racism to justify their animosity toward China. Hence, the Yellow Peril narrative came in handy for the Trump administration. Trumpism is stoking a fierce racial war in the United States and abroad; hostility towards the Yellow Peril has been kindled simultaneously. This is no accident. While Trump’s China policy was openly racist (phrases such as “Kung Flu” have certainly been responsible for current anti-Asian hate crimes), Biden’s China policy is more subtle. However, its Yellow Peril undertone is unmistakable. Since the political elite in Washington are horrified by a crumbling world order built on “unipolar fantasy”, it is not surprising that they are, subconsciously perhaps, seeking inspiration from Spengler, the guru of the racialist school of decline. The combination of declinism and the Yellow Peril narrative produces a perfect rhetorical tool for China-bashing today. Spengler, the original prophet of a declining West, left a horrible proposition for the Western people over a century ago: if the decline of the West is caused by its own doing, i.e., internecine wars, then you have no one to blame. But if the rise of the non-white peoples causes the West to decline, how should the white world deal with them? Either by eliminating them or simply retarding the advancement of their societies. The worst solution, according to Spengler, is to ‘integrate’ them. The America Firsters have peddled this message loud and clear. Nazi Germany chose to eliminate an entire ethnic group, while the US prefers to return to the idea of economic retardation and launch a military chokehold against the most advanced non-white country, China. Not by accident, Spengler also provided a handy theory for technological “decoupling” with China. He vehemently opposed technological advances in general, for fear of non-White people getting hold of them to destroy Western civilisation. More importantly, the China-bashing campaign is shrouded in a moralistic halo. Despite the volumes of Western books that have been written on Chinese foreign policy, a serious study of the conceptual history of China’s foreign relations has barely begun. The US administration fails to understand the fact that the meaning of Chinese foreign relations can only be grasped in a specific Chinese context of political legitimacy, not through some universal principles that allegedly guide the international behaviour of states. Confucian culture stresses that endogenous factors dictate the rise and decay of a state system, based on moral standards. Traditionally, Chinese do not believe that a regime’s legitimacy can be enhanced through the expansion of the Mandate of Heaven into an outer sphere beyond Chinese culture, either through the conquest of outlying territories, or legitimate states inhabited by non-Chinese. Foreign adventure and territorial expansion for resettlement purposes had never occurred to Chinese rulers as an effective medicine to cure immanent moral illnesses that inevitably give rise to political chaos at home. The non-expansionist attitude contrasts sharply with the persistent missionary zeal in the Christian West, which at least from the Crusades onwards, has been obsessed with “spiritual” promotion (today it is also called democratic promotion) in faraway foreign lands, often with military force. A traditional consensus is that, if a morally corrupt system (the US is no exception) does not undergo serious reforms, it will not be able to sustain itself for long. Jim Crowism is alive and strong in the US, but it is not the fault of the Chinese. Even though little morality has been demonstrated by the recent foreign policies of the United States, not many in Washington are willing to admit that the US, as a self-appointed moral leader, faces a major crisis, and that the existing global system, long characterised by benign US hegemonic control, is in need of fundamental reforms. If the current US-China tension continues, we are sleepwalking into 1914.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › War Not Inev › 2AC – Not Revisionist
Rahul Jaybhay 20, Master's student in Politics and International Studies at School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, “Why is China “still” not a revisionist power?” //lenox
The parameters to test whether China is altering the military order include – distribution of power and territorial disputes. Distribution of power measures whether China has “” and whether such military expenditures affect the balance of power (BoP) in the South-East Asian region. Official estimates suggest that “multiplied by almost 12 times in nominal terms between 1994 and 2012 – a double-digit annual growth rate”. But in sharp contrast, for nearly a decade (2009-2017) Chinese military expenditures ““. This suggests in recent times Chinese expenditure has relatively softened, but not absolutely. Moreover, China is financing much more defensive capabilities, rather than offensive capabilities. US “ has compelled China to invest heavily in A2/AD defensive capabilities to deter American aggression. In short, China is defensively balancing against American offence in the East Asian region. In response to China’s growth, most of the countries in the Southeast Asian region have. This suggests regional BoP is heavily skewed towards defence while measuring offence-defence balance. To conclude as “balance of power will remain stable for years to come” in the region. Regarding territorial disputes, we assess the issue of sovereignty of Taiwan, past disputes in the South China Sea and its outcome. China lacks actual control over Taiwan and won’t accept its formal independence. But the accusation that China is violating the. UN documents on decolonization and national liberation in the 1960s acknowledged the right of oppressed people to set up their own sovereign state, but “it also attempted to protect newly independent, decolonized states from further dismemberment”. China’s case is similar to other countries like India, thus any conclusion based on this fact is incomplete. At this moment, China’s coercive diplomacy in the South China Sea is getting a lot of attention. But such coercive measures are evident in the past also (such behaviour is observed in any states involved in territorial disputes). In the 1970s to 1990s China used its naval power “ ” the ” territorial features (Parcels 1974, Johnson South reef 1988) and established a new presence on “Mischief reef in 1990s”. China enhanced its military and naval presence in the South China sea in 2009 and 2010, as a response to more assertive “ by other claimants to establish legal boundaries of their claims”. Similarly, in 2012 when Japan nationalized Senkaku islands (disputed territory between China and Japan), China responded with the coast guard to ““. Moreover, when Japan to monitor control over Senkaku, China responded with its own ADIZ move. Regionally, China has taken unilateral action to resolve the existing disputes, even though it neglected the judgement given by the international arbitration tribunal in 2016 challenging the UN Convention on the Law of Sea to resolve disputes. In short, since the past three decades China is actively present in the South China Sea, thus claims that China is “more assertive” in the region, at this moment, is simply exaggerated. Moreover, China in the above two cases responded to the actions of other claimants to establish control over disputed territory. Thus revisionist tendencies are seen only when China is provoked. Politico-economic order The parameters to test whether China is revising the politico-economic order include – first cooperation with the hegemon (US), second China’s approach to various international institutions. Cooperation with the hegemon measures cooperative actions over a range of issues and voting congruence in the UN. Cooperative actions and congruence in multiple issues between the US and China are measured with the help of the dataset provided by the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS – (Fig 1 below)). Contrary to the current narrative where China is projected as more assertive, Chinese statements and actions towards the US are “overwhelmingly cooperative“. The second measure is the degree of voting congruence between the US and China. This is measured through UNGA ideal point data (Fig 2 below) which captures China’s position vis-a-vis the US. The absolute distance between the US and China’s ideal points varied across time, but as compared to the 1990s, the gap in 2015 has narrowed. China’s approach to international institutions includes first, China’s participation rate in international institutions and second whether China challenges or breaks the rules and norms of such institutions. Between the 1960s and 1990s, Chinese membership to international organizations jumped from zero to 80 percent of compared states. Some international organizations like IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO are supported by both the US and China, while other institutions are more or less opposed by both including ICJ, ICC. Most importantly, the common method to check a state’s compliance with international organizations is to compare that state’s approach to the US. But the US has consistently opposed the rules and norms of international order. For instance, China’s rejection to comply with the decision of the International arbitration tribunal in 2016 concerning the South China Sea dispute is regarded as violative of an international norm, then why not the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its adventure in Afghanistan. As regards, institutions such as UNSC, China remains a staunch defender of it. China has contributed to the peacemaking mission at the behest of the UN. China is currently involved in major arms control institutions. But both China and the US remained outside of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and opposed the Treaty of Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. In short, as Steve Chan concluded, participation in IGO’s reflects national satisfaction with the world order, though the evidence regarding the breaking of rules and norms remains contested (should be analyzed relative to other states’ response to international institutions). Conclusion To sum up, the above pieces of evidence suggest that the “revisionist” narrative is much more exaggerated and overstated. In some domains, China’s assertiveness, to some degree, has increased, but in other domains, it remained satisfied with other liberal orders. In other words, the overall picture remains pretty complex and “revisionist characterization” is simply a conjecture.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › War Not Inev › 2AC – China Peaceful
Lieven, 20 – (Anatol Lieven- British author, journalist, and policy analyst best known for his expertise on the Taliban of Afghanistan. He is currently a visiting professor at King's College London and senior fellow at the Quincy Institute, "Stay Calm About China", 8-26-20, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/26/china-existential-threat-united-states-xi-jinping/)//mishelle
U.S. competition with China is real, serious, and bound to increase. That is inevitable, both for economic reasons and because of the incompatibility between Chinese ambitions and the U.S. establishment’s determination to maintain U.S. global leadership. However, it is not an existential struggle between two fundamentally opposed systems, nor is it a universal struggle that must be fought in every corner of the world. A comparison with basic features of the Cold War should make the difference clear. China is not promoting communist revolution around the world. In fact there is no evidence at all that it is aiming at the overthrow of existing states. As a great capitalist trading power, it has a strong stake in the stability of markets and the safety of Chinese investments. If the Chinese government in principle prefers authoritarian states, it has as yet done nothing to foster such systems. Chinese influence operations in the West are real and should be resisted, but they are intended to influence Western policies toward China, not cause state collapse and revolution. And the United States has an old and tried arsenal of international influence operations of its own that it can deploy in response. As to the U.S. political system, the impact of Chinese (and Russian) covert propaganda on U.S. politics has been minimal compared to the impact of the United States’ own domestic problems. It was not China that killed George Floyd. As a capitalist trading state, China is dependent on the health and stability of the international capitalist system. Unlike the Soviet Union, it needs a degree of rules-based international order—though not if (as seen from China) this means a system in which the United States sets all the rules and then breaks them whenever it wishes. On the other hand, China has certainly sought with great determination to increase its international influence through international capitalism. Some of these efforts (like Huawei’s role in fifth-generation telecommunications technology) must be strongly resisted. They do not however as yet greatly exceed past U.S. patterns of international economic influence. The defense and strengthening of U.S. capitalism in competition with China is indeed essential, but needs to be seen not just in terms of tariffs on Chinese imports (as the Trump administration has seen it), but as requiring a massive program of U.S. domestic economic reform and investment in infrastructure and technology—in other words, the way the Chinese government conducts this competition.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › War Not Inev › 2AC – China Peaceful
Need to recut if aff reads SCS/Maritime/Taiwan scenario – this card is defense for that
Not sure how much this links to the aff scenario – probably does to some extent though
Hediger ’22 [Peter; 6-21-2022; Former Senior Analyst for defense and security policy issues of China and of the Asia Pacific region in the Department of Defense, Protection of Population, and Sports (Swiss Ministry of Defense). Officer in the Swiss Army with peacekeeping missions with the Swiss Delegation to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission for the Armistice in Korea at Panmunjom (1982-1983). Swiss Defense Attaché in China and later in Japan with side accreditations to D.P.R.K., Mongolia, Singapore, and R.O.K., Indonesia, and Thailand respectively (1999-2008); “No reason to doubt peaceful character of China’s rise” ] Accessed – 7/9/2022, WWIS