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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › AFF › AT Prolif---Turkey Specific
George Perkovich & Sinan ÜLgen 15. Perkovich is the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Chair and vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Ülgen is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, “Why Turkey Won’t Go Nuclear”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,4-10-2015, https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/10/why-turkey-won-t-go-nuclear-pub-59756//SJ
Turkey has valid economic arguments for developing the capacity to produce nuclear energy. Primary energy imports comprise almost half of Turkey’s chronic current-account deficit, because the country imports more than 90% of its oil and natural gas. Moreover, unlike in Europe, Turkey’s electricity demand continues to grow at 5-6% per year. Turkish policymakers see nuclear power as an almost indispensable tool for enhancing energy security and reducing the import bill.
These economic interests, combined with national-security considerations, give Turkey an incentive not to seek nuclear weapons. As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Turkey is prohibited from developing military applications of the technology. If it were perceived to be breaking this commitment, other states, including those that would otherwise contribute to its nuclear energy program, would turn against it and jeopardize its ability to meet growing demand at an affordable cost. This, in turn, would undermine the economic growth that has been central to sustaining the government’s popular support over the past two decades.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › AFF › AT Prolif---Turkey Specific
Nonprolif regime, no materials
Hakan Mehmetcik 18. Associate professor at the Department of International Relations at Marmara University, PhD in political science and international relations from Yildiz Technical University, “Nuclear Latency: The Turkish Case”, Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, November 2018, Vol. 6. Issue 2. p. 246-265//SJ
Conclusion
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › AFF › AT Greece-Turkey
Carassava 6/1 — Journalist at The Times. Anthee Carassava, "Greek Forces on High Alert over Crisis with Turkey," VOA, 6-1-2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/greek-forces-on-high-alert-over-crisis-with-turkey/6598746.html, accessed 6-25-2022, WMK
Greece's armed forces are on high alert in the Eastern Aegean Sea as tensions escalate with Turkey. Officials have been responding to what they say are mounting provocations by Turkey's leadership.
Senior Greek Defense Ministry sources say the military intelligence they have gathered point to the prospect of so-called hybrid threats that Greece may face from its neighbor Turkey as the two NATO allies compete for oil and gas drilling rights in contested parts of the Aegean and Mediterranean seas.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › AFF › AT ISIS---Dead
Anchal Vohra 22, columnist for Foreign Policy and a freelance TV correspondent and commentator on the Middle East based in Beirut, “ISIS Can't Even Direct Lone-Wolf Attacks Anymore”, Foreign Policy, 04-26-2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/26/the-islamic-state-cant-even-pull-off-lone-wolf-attacks-anymore///SJ
The jihadi Islamic State group recently called on its supporters to resume attacks in Europe while the West is focused on Russia’s Ukraine invasion. In a speech posted online last week, Islamic State spokesman Abu Omar al-Muhajir asked supporters to take advantage of the “crusaders fighting each other” by launching a global offensive to take revenge for a former Islamic State chief killed during a raid by U.S. special forces in northwest Syria earlier this year. He also asked sympathizers in Israel to “arm themselves” against the Israeli state and claimed that only the return of an Islamic caliphate could liberate Palestinians.
Since the Islamic State was territorially defeated in 2019, analysts have been debating whether the group will reemerge as a major threat. That conversation became urgent in January when the group carried out a prison break in Hasakah, northeast Syria, to free thousands of its members. In 2020, the group claimed an average of 45 attacks in Syria every month. It has also gained strength in Afghanistan and in parts of Africa over the last few years. At least two recent terrorist attacks in Israel, in the cities of Beersheba and Hadera, were claimed by Islamic State sympathizers.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › AFF › AT ISIS---High Now
Al-Hajj 3/15/22 [Taim Al-Hajj, Investigative Syrian journalist, Carnegie Middle East Center; “The Insurgency of ISIS in Syria”; March 15, 2022; DOA: 6/25/22; ; Lowell-ES]
In January 20, 2022, insurgents affiliated with the Islamic State (ISIS), attacked Al-Sina prison in the Ghweiran neighborhood in the city of al-Hasakah in Syria’s far northeast. The attack sent a message to many beyond the borders of the small city that the organization has significant military, financial, and media abilities. The raid, one of a long series of multi-pronged attacks in Syria and its neighboring Iraq, highlights ISIS’ resolve to model its post-caliphate strategy for insurgencies that are not necessarily contingent on territorial control.
Such a departure from the group’s basic creed was unimaginable back in 2014 when ISIS was at the height of its power under the leadership of its forefathers Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Abu Ibrahim al-Qurashi. A close reading of the group’s recent escalated attacks reveals that ISIS is using a pattern of tactics that are very similar to the ones they adopted prior to 2010 when they relied on traditional combat, attrition attacks, and guerrilla wars.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › AFF › LT---xt: Erdogan is Peaceful
Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco 22. Researcher in the Strategic Studies Department at TRENDS, Research & Advisory, MA degree in Comparative International Relations from Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, “Turkey’s delicate balancing act: Mediating between the West, Russia, and Ukraine”, Trend Research, 06-17-2022, https://trendsresearch.org/insight/turkeys-delicate-balancing-act-mediating-between-the-west-russia-and-ukraine///SJ
From a foreign politics perspective, Turkey envisages its mediation efforts in the Ukraine-Russia war as an opportunity to boost its global stance. Indeed, with Turkey walking a fine line with the West and gradually mending fences with major players in the Middle East,[46] Ankara has a vested interest in presenting itself as a great regional power that has the leverage to tilt the balance of power in the event of an international crisis.
The idea of presenting itself as a central state reflects the national role conception [47] of the Turkish leadership, which is a recurrent pattern in the political discourse of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the party led by President Erdoğan. [48] Thus, taking on the role of ‘mediator-in-chief’ and being a key player in the brokering of a peace deal as the world holds its breath fits perfectly with Turkey’s current agenda, which will ultimately serve to boost its diplomatic credentials and status among its NATO allies and EU partners.[49]
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › AFF › LT---Coop Solves Crises
Got ‘20 – Author based in Europe and works on security and defense issues (Antoine, War on the Rocks, “TURKEY’S CRISIS WITH THE WEST: HOW A NEW LOW IN RELATIONS RISKS PARALYZING NATO”, November 19, 2020, )//RG
Ultimately, however, fears of a Turkish realignment with Russia are likely overblown. Moscow and Ankara’s relations have historically been fraught, and the recent rapprochement stems more from opportunism and coinciding interests than a major reorientation in Turkish foreign policy at the expense of its traditional alliances. In fact, Turkey’s forceful posturing is making it steadily more at odds with Russia in conflict environments where both operate, including Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, and Libya. Its growing involvement in the Caucasus, for instance, has brought it dangerously close to armed confrontation with NATO’s primary contestant, Russia, which supports Armenia under the Collective Security Treaty Organization framework. This was highlighted by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s underscoring of Russia’s “obligations to Armenia.” Though the violence ended there, Turkey’s proxy saber-rattling contributes to increase risks of accident or miscalculation leading to armed confrontation with Russia — something all parties are eager to avoid. With antagonistic security interests at stake, Turkey and Russia are ultimately more likely to balance against rather than align with each other, though several NATO allies continue to regard Ankara’s ties to Moscow with a deep-seated sense of suspicion. A Constructive Role for NATO As Turkey and the European Union ramp up their rhetorical joust, it is perhaps no surprise that NATO is better placed to act as a forum for the de-escalation of the crisis. It is indeed Turkey’s membership to NATO, and the daily staff-to-staff contacts which it generates, that makes the alliance able to work as a platform where their diplomats can negotiate, exchange information, and address issues of common strategic interest with European counterparts, thus helping to undermine the “us-versus-them” mentality which at times prevails across E.U. institutions. As the latter hardens its rhetoric, NATO can generate the much-needed safety valve where diplomatic efforts have a chance of succeeding. To this end, the alliance should capitalize on the consultative function of its institutions to allow for parties to sit together, express their views and concerns on national and collective security considerations, and improve mechanisms to reach a consensus on the means to address any perceived challenges. Consultations have indeed always been at the core of the alliance, and remain important vectors for addressing intermember disagreements. The recent announcement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg that a military de-confliction mechanism would be established between Greece and Turkey is but one example of the productive results that such diplomatic efforts can yield, and an encouraging sign that the two sides are not willing to see their relations deteriorate further. Yet a limited arrangement between Greece and Turkey is also unlikely to address the deep-seated causes of the political turmoil between Ankara and European allies, and NATO should find new and improved ways to act as a forum to discuss, and to act, where necessary, on issues affecting the security interests of its member states. This is key if the organization wants to remain flexible and relevant in the increasingly contested and fast-paced security environment of today.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › AFF › LT---Coop Moderates Erdogan
Kirişci 22, nonresident senior fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe's Turkey Project at Brookings, with an expertise in Turkish foreign policy and migration studies. From 2013 until 2020, he was TÜSİAD senior fellow at Brookings and director of the Turkey Project (Kemal, “Can the Russia-Ukraine crisis offer an opportunity to re-anchor Turkey in NATO?,” Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/16/can-the-russia-ukraine-crisis-offer-an-opportunity-to-re-anchor-turkey-in-nato/)//BB
However, all is not lost. The Ukrainian crisis has increasing questions about the wisdom of Turkey’s cozy relationship with Russia and a greater appreciation of NATO’s value, recently reiterated by two prominent retired Turkish ambassadors. Interestingly, their reasoning is not that different than the Turkish diplomats and ministers of foreign affairs from the 1940s and 1950s who played a central role in negotiating Turkey’s entry into NATO, revealing the continuity that comes with geography but also the persistent commitment to a Western vocation dating from Ottoman times. Moving forward, revitalizing Turkey’s traditional Western vocation and its NATO membership will be dependent on two developments. Erdoğan is failing to address Turkey’s mounting problems. His approval ratings have dropped from almost 56% at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic to 38.6% at the end of 2021, while the governing AKP has also steadily lost support and was down to 23.9%. Under these circumstances, the opposition stands a growing chance of winning the next elections if they are reasonably free. However, the opposition led by the social democratic People’s Republican Party (CHP) has remained by and large quiet on foreign policy issues and shied from advocating pro-Western policies. This would need to change, and the opposition would need to adopt an informed and rational platform that dispels prejudices and better explains to the public why revitalizing stronger relations with the West would benefit Turkey’s interests. The West needs to do its part too. Foremost, there needs to be a recognition that there is political change in the offing in Turkey. It is far from certain but there is a decent likelihood that the next elections would be won by the opposition. In the meantime, it will be important for the U.S. to recognize that the current crisis over Ukraine has once more shown the strategic value of Turkey to NATO and develop, together with other allies, a constructive narrative that would welcome a post-election Turkey back into the core of the trans-Atlantic alliance. Given the stalling out of its enlargement process, the EU is unlikely to be able to play the robust role it did in reforming Turkish democracy in the 2000s. But just like 70 years ago, Turkey’s NATO membership could become a conduit for mutually reinforcing Turkey’s Western vocation and its democracy while benefiting European security, including that of Ukraine.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › AFF › NU---Cooperation Now
Ertan 4/6 — Nazlan Ertan is Al-Monitor's former culture editor. She is a Turkish blogger, journalist and editor who has worked in Ankara, Paris and Brussels for various Turkish and international publications, including the Hurriyet Daily News, CNN Turk and BBC Turkish Service."Turkey, US launch new strategic mechanism amid Ukraine crisis," Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East, 4-6-2022, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/04/turkey-us-launch-new-strategic-mechanism-amid-ukraine-crisis, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK
Following months of diplomacy, Turkey and the United States have launched a strategic mechanism to boost cooperation in areas such as economy and defense.
“There is a new energy in ties,” Victoria Nuland, the US State Department's undersecretary for political affairs, told the Turkish media after meeting with Turkish Foreign Ministry and Presidency officials. The new mechanism allows Turkish and American officials to talk about all of the issues, from trade to human rights and civil society, or regional issues from Syria to Ukraine, she added.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › AFF › NU---Cooperation Now
Kim and Utku 5-10 (Prof Dr Tongfi Kim is the Programme Director of the BA in International Affairs and Professor at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) of the Brussels School of Governance (BSoG-VUB) and a Senior Researcher at the KF-VUB Korea Chair. Mehmet Algin Utku is a research intern at the Brussels School of Governance. Brussels Times, 10 May 2022, “It’s time to bind Turkey to NATO,” ; accessed 6/23/2022) ng
The West has greater leverage The West, however, has its own tools to bind Turkey to NATO. Most importantly, the West has a superior power to reward Turkey. For instance, analysts often refer to close economic ties between Turkey and Russia, but the EU is by far Turkey’s largest trading partner and main source of investments, accounting for 33.4% of Turkey’s imports and 41.3% of its exports in 2020 (and 21 out of the 27 EU member states are also members of NATO). Military relations between Turkey and NATO also favour the West. NATO’s collective defense protects Turkey, and the decades-old alliance ties have made Turkey far more dependent on the West than on Russia. The S-400 system is expensive, but the delivery to Turkey began only in 2019, and Russia accounts for only 5% of arms import by Turkey in the last ten years between 2012 and 2021. During the decade, Russia ranked below other weapons suppliers of Turkey such as the United States (51%), Italy (16%), Spain (13%), and South Korea (6%) according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s Arms Transfers Database. For binding Turkey to NATO and wedging Turkey away from Russia, we recommend reward-based strategies rather than coercion. Academic literature suggests that positive sanctions work better and that a coercive approach is chosen by those with weaker reward power. A coercive strategy can easily antagonize the target, whereas a reward-based strategy is unlikely to worsen the status quo. Reward-binding is particularly important in relation to the Turkish public, who have resented the West’s treatment of their country in the aftermath of the Syrian refugee crisis and the 2016 coup attempt against Erdoğan. This anti-Western sentiment has been further exacerbated by pro-government Turkish media. In fact, unlike the seemingly neutral position of the Turkish government in this Russia-Ukraine war, Turkish mass media is dominated by anti-Western discourse and criticism against NATO. A poll in March revealed that 48.3% of Turks blamed the United States and NATO for the current situation in Ukraine and only 33.7% thought Russia was responsible. In the same poll, 51.7% of Turks see the United States as the biggest threat to their country as opposed to Russia (19.4%). As a Turkish scholar points out, anti-Western sentiments that developed for years will not easily disappear from the Turkish public opinion even after Erdoğan’s recent U-turn. In international security and diplomacy, NATO allies have already begun taking a conciliatory approach toward Ankara. This can be seen in the recent Franco-Turkish rapprochement and the Biden administration’s support for “appropriate U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.” Economic reward-binding by NATO allies is likely to be appreciated by Erdoğan, who faces the presidential election in 2023. More importantly, this is a chance for the West to offer the olive branch to the Turkish public as Turkey experiences the highest level of inflation in 20 years, with Erdoğan’s economic mismanagement, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine creating a perfect storm for the economy. Deepening of the EU-Turkey customs union and other positive economic incentives are useful tools to improve media freedom and human rights in Turkey, and the West should ask for domestic political concessions from Erdoğan. Rather than using Turkey’s political problems as excuses to keep Turkey at distance, however, economic rewards should be employed to bind the hearts of the Turkish public to NATO.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › PROLIFERATION › Prolif---Impact---AT: Norms
Philseo Kim et al 22. Department of Nuclear and Quantum Engineering, KAIST. Jihee Kim is at the School of Business and Technology Management, College of Business, KAIST. Man-Sung Yim works at Institute for Basic Science, “Assessing proliferation uncertainty in civilian nuclear cooperation under new power dynamics of the international nuclear trade”, Energy Policy, 2022 https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0301421522000775//SJ
Second, our results suggest that countries have certain military motivations in engaging in the more concrete form of nuclear cooperation: they can leverage higher levels of nuclear cooperation to strengthen their weak military alliance. According to our results from Case 3, the supplier and client countries tend to complement their weak military alliance (such as entente) with concrete nuclear cooperation. This implies that the exporter countries seek other newcomer countries with whom they have not shared a defense pact. In particular, this phenomenon is more evident in Russia, one of the major export countries. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has entered into defense pacts mainly with the former Soviet Union countries or Eastern European countries (Gibler, 2008). Thus, the results imply that Russia, which is currently expanding its nuclear exports, could use nuclear cooperation as an opportunity to expand its international ties with more countries. Turkey, Finland, Bulgaria, and China are such examples of client countries. Russia is now engaged in concrete cooperation with Turkey, Finland, and Bulgaria with whom Russia has only shared an entente pact. In addition, Russia supplied several cases of concrete nuclear cooperation with China (although China is not a newcomer country) whom they share only an entente pact. Moreover, South Korea and UAE is another related example to support this view. These countries committed nuclear power plant construction projects in 2009 while not forming any military alliance (defense or entente). Initiated by this cooperation, however, they are currently looking to strengthen their economic partnership and deepen their military cooperation (Rahman, 2021; YONHAP NEWS AGENCY, 2021). This is in line with our results that concrete cooperation could be leveraged as strengthening the military alliance.
Moreover, this result on military motivations is partly driven by the fact that some countries with the strongest military alliance (such as the defense pact) already had gone through concrete cooperation before 2000, thereby low motivation to form concrete nuclear cooperation. Canada-Argentina and the US-Poland are such examples. These country pairs formed concrete cooperation before 2000 (Fuhrmann, 2009b), but the more recent dataset of ours indicates supportive cooperation only.12
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › PROLIFERATION › Prolif---Impact---AT: Means
Debalina Ghoshal 20, Non-Resident Fellow, Council on International Policy and an Asia-Pacific Fellow, East-West Institute, “Will Turkey Acquire Nuclear Weapons from Pakistan?”, Defense.info,3-4-2020, https://defense.info/re-shaping-defense-security/2020/03/will-turkey-acquire-nuclear-weapons-from-pakistan///SJ
In October 2019, there were reports that Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed his dissatisfaction that it was unfair on the West’s side to keep Turkey away from developing nuclear bomb.
Turkey though is under the nuclear umbrella of the United States- that is the United States hosts its tactical nuclear weapon (TNW) in Turkey, there is little doubt that Turkey would be more than happy to have its own nuclear weapons under its own command and control channels.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › PROLIFERATION › Prolif---Impact---AT: Means
Gerhard Arnold 22. Theologian, Publisher, Middle East correspondent, “Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and North Africa?”, European, 05-22-2022, https://magazine-the-european.com/2022/05/22/nuclear-proliferation-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa///SJ
Turkey’s leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, told supporters of his AKP party in a speech on 4th September 2019, that it was unacceptable to want to ban Turkey from possessing nuclear weapons. All developed states have them, he said. Moreover, Turkey has nuclear armed Israel in its neighbourhood – a source of serious concern for other states in the region.
This stance is surprising because Turkey joined the NPT in 1980. The country has its own uranium reserves and operates a research reactor. Technically, the path to enriched uranium would be open by reprocessing uranium waste. Also troubling are the intensive military ties that Erdogan has cultivated with Pakistan, which has already provided nuclear know-how to other countries, such as North Korea and Libya.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › PROLIFERATION › Prolif---Impact---Turns Arms Racing
Henri J. Barkey 09, visiting scholars in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East program and the Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen Professor at Lehigh University, “TURKEY'S PERSPECTIVES ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DISARMAMENT”, Nuclear Security Studies, 2009, https://ir.cas.lehigh.edu/sites/ir.cas2.lehigh.edu/files/HenriBarkey_TurkeyPerspectivesNuclearWeapons.pdf//SJ
The likelihood that Turkey would seek its own path to a nuclear capability, however long this might take, would increase in the event of such a regional nuclear arms race. Domestic political pressure and the regions anarchic character would be sufficient to propel any Turkish government to begin its own program. In the meantime, the presence of US weapons on its soil would serve as a security bridge.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › PROLIFERATION › Prolif---Impact---2NC
Aykan Erdemir & Philip Kowalski 20. Erdemir is the senior director of the Turkey Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former member of the Turkish parliament. Kowalski is a research associate at the Turkey Program of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, “‘Blue Homeland’ and the Irredentist Future of Turkish Foreign Policy”, War on the Rocks,9-30-2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/blue-homeland-and-the-irredentist-future-of-turkish-foreign-policy///SJ
Turkey and Greece, two NATO allies, nearly experienced a full-fledged military conflict in August. Two of their warships collided during a naval standoff over hydrocarbon exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean. This follows a similar naval incident in June between three Turkish vessels and the frigate of another NATO ally, France, prompting an inquiry that the alliance has been trying to keep under wraps to prevent further discord among its ranks. Behind these incidents lies Turkey’s embrace of an assertive naval concept, namely the “blue homeland,” that is poised to disrupt the transatlantic alliance in the years to come.
The “blue homeland” is an irredentist concept that claims vast sections of the Aegean and Mediterranean seas, including Greek and Cypriot maritime borders and hydrocarbon deposits, for Turkey. What began as a fringe idea among the anti-Western brass of the Turkish navy has morphed into a popular nationalist aspiration fronted by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. “Blue homeland” will continue to damage Ankara’s diplomatic relations, since Erdoğan will find it difficult to step away from maximalist claims he has personally cultivated.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › PROLIFERATION › Prolif---Internal---AT: No Turkey Prolif
Gevorg Novshadyan 20, Former Contributing Writer, “Erdogan’s Nuclear Itch: Why Turkey’s Nuclear Program is a Threat to Regional Stability and the International Nonproliferation Regime — THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW”, International Affairs Review, 09-08-2020, https://www.iar-gwu.org/blog/erdogans-nuclear-itchstrong-strongwhy-turkeys-nuclear-program-is-a-threat-to-regional-stability-and-the-international-nonproliferation-regime//SJ
The nuclear bombs at Incirlik aren’t the only way Turkey can acquire that information. Turkey’s burgeoning nuclear energy industry, aided by Russian nuclear exports, presents serious proliferation concerns, especially if Erdogan’s displeasure with the status quo is turned into policy. In the coming decades, Turkey could acquire enough technical knowledge and experience to pursue its own indigenous nuclear capabilities, and the international community could be powerless in stopping it.
Turkey is a signatory to all major IAEA protocols, and its contract with Rosatom, the Russian state nuclear agency, for the nuclear plant at Akkuyu is “proliferation resistant,” according to experts. Rosatom having effective control over Turkey’s nuclear reactor reduces the likelihood that Turkey could attain a nuclear weapon, but Turkish engineers working in the Akkuyu plant can gain valuable knowledge which they could then apply to a weapons program. Even so, experts believe that it is in Turkey’s best interest to continue abiding by its agreements and that Erdogan’s words are just bluster designed to play into the prevailing domestic anti-Western mood.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › PROLIFERATION › Prolif---Internal---2NC
Vipin Narang 22. Frank Stanton Professor of Nuclear Security and Political Science and a member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Ph.D. from the Department of Government at Harvard, “Seeking the Bomb”, Princeton University Press, 01-08-2022, Vol. 188, p. 292-337, Project Muse //SJ
How does one stop sheltered pursuers? Major powers make a decision to extend shelter, pricing in the tolerance of the pursuer’s nuclear weapons program to the cost of their broader geopolitical goals. A smart sheltered pursuer—and nuclear aspirants are usually quite smart—will attempt to exploit the shelter to weaponize its nuclear capabilities as quickly as possible, before the shelter potentially disappears. Short of convincing a sheltered pursuer that they do not want or need nuclear weapons after all, the only way to stop sheltered pursuers is to eliminate their shelter from sanctions or military attempts at prevention. In some cases, shelter might evaporate because the patron state independently decides that the nuclear aspirant they are sheltering is no longer worth the hassle or that the price of their future entry into the nuclear club is too steep to bear. This is what Pakistan feared when it benefited from U.S. shelter to develop nuclear weapons in the 1980s. Islamabad understood that U.S. forbearance depended on the continuation of the war in Afghanistan. Without the war, the United States would have had less need for Pakistan and therefore less willingness to protect their nuclear program. It is in fact plausible that Pakistan played a double game with the United States and attempted to prolong the Afghanistan war in order to extend the shelter and largesse it was receiving from Washington for as long as possible. The United States was a willing participant in this game, however. This was a strategic—and not an inevitable—choice, one the United States could have reversed at any time.
If shelter does not evaporate on its own, other major powers might engage the patron state (rather than the nuclear aspirant) to convince them to stop protecting the proliferator. This is the strategy the United States attempted with China over North Korea’s nuclear program during the Six Party Talks—seeking to get Beijing’s buy-in on stopping North Korean proliferation. China was fundamentally unpersuaded and continued to shield Pyongyang and issue denials about its progress while simultaneously appearing to support—but slow-roll—diplomacy and effective sanctions. There are no cases where a third party has successfully coerced or cajoled a patron state to stop protecting a “sheltered pursuer,” but driving a wedge between the nuclear pursuer and its patron if no wedge appears naturally remains the only logical option to reverse a sheltered pursuit strategy. If that can be achieved, the erstwhile sheltered pursuer would be exposed in two ways. First, the existence of a nuclear program would now be implausibly deniable and, second, the proliferator could now be vulnerable to economic or military coercion. But the difficulty of peeling off another major power’s shelter for a proliferator should not be understated, as it would be no easy task, and likely priced in by the shelter prior to extending protection to the proliferator. Major powers have—both under the bipolar Cold War configuration and after—decided that nuclear proliferation is tolerable in pursuit of other geopolitical priorities. It is likely to occur again and identifying where it might be possible provides insight into the future nuclear landscape, as a sheltered pursuit strategy—if it can be selected—has a high probability of leading to a nuclear weapons capability. As such, states like Saudi Arabia and Turkey (American frenemies) that may be able to select this strategy have a high likelihood of becoming independent nuclear states if they ever choose to do so.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › PROLIFERATION › Prolif---Internal---2NC
Burak Bekdil 22, Ankara-based political analyst and a fellow at the Middle East Forum., “Erdoğan Must Be Opposed, not Appeased”, Middle East Forum,5-26-2022, https://www.meforum.org/63261/erdogan-must-be-opposed-not-appeased//SJ
‘The West's appeasement will, unfortunately, only embolden Erdoğan and push him further into the Russian orbit, both politically as a covert ally and militarily as a client of critical weapons systems. Erdoğan has long been playing the old oriental carpet-selling game: pitting potential buyers against each other to get the best price -- Turkey is hoping to be sold to the highest bidder.
The West's appeasement will just further embolden Erdoğan to keep blackmailing it: If you do not sell me F-35s or F-16s, I will buy fighter jets from Russia. Erdoğan then turns to Putin: I am your man in NATO. If you do not want me to be a real NATO ally, you must give me something. Erdoğan's double-play has to be stopped. For that, is needed a determined Western bloc who will remind him that he will not get what he wants from his (theoretical) allies in the West by blackmailing them
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › PROLIFERATION › U---No Prolif Now
Can Kasapoğlu 19, IPC-Stiftung Mercator Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS), “Turkey’s Nuclear Onset: Military Policy, Techno-Nationalism Trends and Defense Industrial Capabilities”, October 2019, https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/turkeys-nuclear-onset///SJ
Turkey’s roadmap for defense modernization is expected to remain on track and pursue further progress on items that have been in the limelight, such as unmanned systems, blue-water naval capabilities, strategic air and missile defense and smart conventional weaponry across the spectrum. Tactical aviation and Turkey’s upgrade to fifth-generation systems looms large as the biggest unknown, revolving around the F-35 issue, Russia’s charm offensives and the national combat aircraft project (Milli Muharip Uçak – MMU). The ballistic missile program will likely be limited to the short range (< 1,000 km) in the foreseeable future, focusing on producing tactical assets for battlefield use. Turkey can further advance its GEZGIN cruise missile project and reach a range of beyond 1,000 km. However, the GEZGIN project is designed to develop conventional long-range strike capabilities for naval platforms, mimicking the US Tomahawk and Russian Kalibr missiles.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › PROLIFERATION › U---No Prolif Now
Can Kasapoğlu 19, IPC-Stiftung Mercator Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS), “Turkey’s Nuclear Onset: Military Policy, Techno-Nationalism Trends and Defense Industrial Capabilities”, October 2019,
Turkey’s ballistic missile program remains solely conventional
A closer look at Turkey’s ballistic missile program gives a hint as to Ankara’s most probable motives with regard to its nuclear rhetoric.