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2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Impact › Impact---Militarization---1NC

CYBERCOM primacy wrecks CMR and unleashes World War III.

Benjamin Jensen 18, holds a dual academic appointment at Marine Corps University and American University, School of International Service and is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council; and J.D. Work, the Bren Chair for Cyber Conflict and Security at Marine Corps University and an adjunct associate professor at the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, 9/04/2018, “CYBER CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: BALANCING INTERESTS ON THE DIGITAL FRONTIER,” , cc

Parallel to these efforts, the National Security Council and U.S. Cyber Command are rescinding and replacing Presidential Policy Directive 20, an Obama-era policy framework governing offensive cyber operations. According to Politico, “in rescinding PPD-20, [President] Trump put cyberattacks on the same level as kinetic operations, which do not require high-level approval or interagency discussions.” In theory, this change empowers Cyber Command to conduct short-notice attacks without White House approval or interagency coordination. Seen in the context of civil-military relations, this shift assumes positive objective control: a professional military cyber force capable of autonomously protecting society absent constant civilian oversight.

Under the Obama administration, offensive cyber operations required extensive interagency vetting and executive approval, similar to what Samuel Huntington called subjective control. In an article for the Washington Post, reporter Ellen Nakashima quoted the State Department’s former cyber coordinator on the need to balance the desire for offensive cyber operations with “ ‘other national equities’ … to ensure that a cyber operation does not compromise intelligence collection, law enforcement investigations and diplomatic relations.” Multiple officials complained this interagency staffing process slowed or stalled cyber operations as officials struggled to get buy-in from different stakeholders. Subjective control reduced the efficacy of cyber operations.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Impact › Impact---NC3---AT: Defense---2NC

The fed agrees.

Julia Berghofer 19, ELN Policy Fellow and Project Manager for the YGLN, 5/09/2019, “Apocalypse now? Cyber threats and nuclear weapons systems,” , cc

Governments and legislators are struggling to keep pace with the rapid development of cyber capabilities. As military systems become more technically complex it would be easy to assume that they are more secure. The opposite is true. Increased automation and connectivity increases vulnerabilities to cyber attacks. Measures such as air-gapping a system (ie. de-connecting it from the internet) can fall short. A recent US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report assessed the cyber security of US weapons systems and found “mission critical cyber vulnerabilities in nearly all weapons systems […] under development.“ While the report does not make reference to any specific system type, one can reasonably assume that nuclear weapons systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Impact › Impact---NC3---AT: Safe---2NC

The software’s vulnerable.

Suzanne Smalley 6/15, reporter covering intelligence and disinformation at CyberScoop and former Mandiant exec tapped to run CTIIC, ODNI's cyber threat intelligence center, 6/15/2022, “House Armed Services chair calls national security software, systems 'too vulnerable',” , cc

Rep. Adam Smith, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said Tuesday that the United States needs to invest far more in protecting national security communications and software.

“Our number one biggest vulnerability in the cyber world is we have systems that are too vulnerable to attack right now because they’re old and we just, we haven’t updated those systems,” the Washington Democrat said. “Rather than buying another how many ever F-35s [combat planes] … I’d rather pour that money into developing the JADC2 [Joint All-Domain Command and Control] vision of a secure communication system that we can protect.”

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Impact › Impact---NC3---Coop Key---2NC

Overlaps in authority wreck NC3 defenses---but unity of command solves.

Morgan Dwyer 20, fellow in the International Security Program and deputy director for policy analysis in the DefenseIndustrial Initiatives Group at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 10/15/2020, “Cross-domain Competition,” , cc

When separate authority stovepipes intersect but values conflict, cooperation is challenging, even in the context of shared missions.43 In these circumstances, outside intervention is required to determine which organization is actually in charge. For example, in the traditional nuclear community—which not only includes the military services and Strategic Command but also the Department of Energy (DOE)—policymakers established the Nuclear Weapons Council.44 The authorities and responsibilities for council participants are specified by law, policy, and memorandums of agreement between DOD and DOE.45 Without a similar governance structure or single authority capable of compelling interorganizational change, it seems unlikely that DOD’s separate space or cyber institutions will poactively declassify any capabilities, even those which might help deter attacks on NC3.46

Separate authority stovepipes may also create barriers to employing offensive weapons. For example, if an adversary attacks the NC3 architecture in the cyber domain, and DOD does not wish to retaliate using a nuclear weapon,47 which combatant command is in charge of the response, Strategic or Cyber Command? DOD’s cyber doctrine specifies that Cyber Command’s role vis-à-vis the other combatant commands varies as a function of whether operations are local or global.48 Furthermore, it states that the support/supporting relationships between commands are established on a by-mission basis.49 These public statements, of course, leave the unanswered the question of which combatant command—Cyber or Strategic Command—is in charge of non-nuclear responses to cyberattacks on NC3.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › 1NC › NSA DA---1NC

Rapid response and info-transmission avoid cyberattacks on NC3 systems---those go nuclear.

Michael Klare 19, professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association, November 2019, “Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation,” , cc

These links exist because the NC3 systems of the United States and other nuclear-armed states are heavily dependent on computers and other digital processors for virtually every aspect of their operation and because those systems are highly vulnerable to cyberattack. Every nuclear force is composed, most basically, of weapons, early-warning radars, launch facilities, and the top officials, usually presidents or prime ministers, empowered to initiate a nuclear exchange. Connecting them all, however, is an extended network of communications and data-processing systems, all reliant on cyberspace. Warning systems, ground- and space-based, must constantly watch for and analyze possible enemy missile launches. Data on actual threats must rapidly be communicated to decision-makers, who must then weigh possible responses and communicate chosen outcomes to launch facilities, which in turn must provide attack vectors to delivery systems. All of this involves operations in cyberspace, and it is in this domain that great power rivals seek vulnerabilities to exploit in a constant struggle for advantage.

The use of cyberspace to gain an advantage over adversaries takes many forms and is not always aimed at nuclear systems. China has been accused of engaging in widespread cyberespionage to steal technical secrets from U.S. firms for economic and military advantages. Russia has been accused, most extensively in the Robert Mueller report, of exploiting cyberspace to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Nonstate actors, including terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State group, have used the internet for recruiting combatants and spreading fear. Criminal groups, including some thought to be allied with state actors, such as North Korea, have used cyberspace to extort money from banks, municipalities, and individuals.4 Attacks such as these occupy most of the time and attention of civilian and military cybersecurity organizations that attempt to thwart such attacks. Yet for those who worry about strategic stability and the risks of nuclear escalation, it is the threat of cyberattacks on NC3 systems that provokes the greatest concern.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › 1NC › NSA DA---1NC

That split erodes unity of command, decimating speed and communication in cyberdefense.

Chris Demchak 21, Grace M. Hopper Chair of Cyber Security and Senior Cyber Scholar, Cyber and Innovation Policy Institute, U.S. Naval War College, 3/05/2021, “FIVE REASONS NOT TO SPLIT CYBER COMMAND FROM THE NSA ANY TIME SOON – IF EVER,” , cc

Nonetheless, a divorce of this kind is the wrong long-term solution for both agencies and for the nation. Cutting up what’s known as the “dual hat” — an arrangement under which the same leader runs both Cyber Command and the NSA — fragments American “defend forward” capabilities when the nation needs them to be integrated the most. These capabilities allow Cyber Command in particular to operate outside of formal military networks to disrupt malicious attacks at their sources, and are deeply dependent on the closely combined skills of both organizations. The proposal risks reigniting turf battles between the intelligence and operations arms of the secretary of defense and mistakes the intertwined relationship between defense and offense in cybered conflict. Instead of simplistic organizational surgery, therefore, what’s needed is a longer-term plan incorporating Cyber Command and, especially, the capabilities of the National Security Agency into a resilient and adaptive whole-of-society cyber defense system.

Reasons to Avoid Recreating Silos

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › 1NC › NSA DA---1NC

Funneling more resources and responsibility to CYBERCOM gives it unprecedented autonomy, spurring separation from the NSA.

Jon R. Lindsay 20, assistant professor at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy and the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto, 10/30/2020, “Cyber conflict vs. Cyber Command: hidden dangers in the American military solution to a large-scale intelligence problem,” Intelligence and National Security 36(2), https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2020.1840746, cc

Classic organization theory stresses that bureaucratic organizations seek resources, autonomy, and control, guided by their historical cultural heritage or essential identity.64 For military organizations this translates into a predilection for offensive doctrines, often described as ‘the cult of the offensive,’ because they require expensive capabilities, necessitate authority for independent operations, reduce uncertainty by setting the operational tempo, and are consistent with a warrior ethos.65 The institution of the U.S. Air Force is an instructive example in this regard. Even when the Air Corps was formally part of the U.S. Army, airmen developed an ambitious new doctrine – strategic bombing – that advertised the ability to deliver victory independently of the other services.66 The ideology of strategic bombing served the Air Force well in interservice competition during its formative years as an independent service, even if the theory often proved disappointing in practice.67 A doctrine of independent strategic effects helped to bolster the legitimacy of a newly independent command. The newly autonomous U.S. Space Force tends to advance similar arguments, cribbed from classic airpower theory, about the unique strategic importance of the space domain and the specialized technical skills needed to exploit it.68

From this perspective, CYBERCOM’s doctrine of persistent engagement plays a similar institutional role as strategic bombing did for the early Air Force. New ideas about cyber campaigns, and accompanying authorities to carry them out, are supposed to enable CYBERCOM to create meaningful strategic effects. CYBERCOM advertises its intention to act beneath the threshold of war to influence strategic adversaries. Persistent engagement, from this perspective, might be described as a nonlethal version of strategic bombing. Much as the Air Force seeks to attack critical nodes in an enemy target system, using technology to create strategic effects, cyber campaigns target critical information nodes in the adversary’s computer network to shape its behavior. The comparison to the Air Force experience may be more than metaphorical. As Sarah White notes in her study of U.S. military cyber subcultures, ‘By the end of 2007, the Air Force had emerged as the recognized service leader in cyberspace. While the other services were engaged in the patchwork pursuit of various cyberspacerelated initiatives, neither the Army nor the Navy had the level of decisive senior leader engagement or senior leader direction that existed in the Air Force in 2007.’69 The Air Force approach, which has been influential in CYBERCOM’s doctrinal ruminations, was ‘marked by the firm distinction of cyberspace as a warfighting domain, the increasingly aggressive pursuit of autonomy in cyberspace operations and organizations, and the creation of a dedicated cyberspace career field.’70

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › 1NC › NSA DA---1NC

The DOD’s Cyber Command will remain wedded to the NSA for now, but growing capacity for CYBERCOM can break it off.

Mark Pomerleau 22, reporter for DefenseScoop, covering information warfare and cyberspace, 3/08/2022, “Cyber Command and NSA still working to meet measures necessary to split,” , cc

Several years ago, in response to rumors a split was imminent, Congress felt such a decision was premature and Cyber Command was not ready to stand alone. As such, Congress outlined a series of metrics for the Pentagon to meet in the 2016 annual defense policy bill. Those metrics were then tweaked in the 2017 policy bill adding more restrictions necessary to split the dual hat. They included that each organization have robust command and control systems for planning, deconflicting and executing military cyber operations and national intelligence operations as well as ensuring tools and weapons used in cyber operations are sufficient for achieving required effects. It also sought to ensure that Cyber Command can acquire or develop these tools, weapons, and accesses.

In recent years, Cyber Command has gained significant, yet still maturing, acquisition authority to purchase its own capabilities. It also developed what it calls the Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture, which guides the command’s acquisition priorities and includes major programs for infrastructure and tools separate from those of the NSA.

2022 Michigan Negative
CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › *1NC---Misinformation

Impact---Fire

Herbert Lin 19, senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University, “The existential threat from cyber-enabled information warfare,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75(4), pp. 187-196, T&F, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2019.1629574, Marsh

On the existential threat from cyber-enabled information warfare

Corruption of the information ecosystem has become an existential threat to civilization as we know it because prosperity and advancement depend on a secure information infrastructure and environment that provides human beings with contextualized, reliable, trustworthy information when and where it is needed. Information is as much a part of human ecology and the essence of being human as DNA (itself a form of information!) is a part of the evolutionary processes in biological systems.

2022 Michigan Negative
CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › *1NC---Misinformation

CYBERCOM is tackling information warfare, but maintained resources are key.

Mark Pomerleau 22, reporter for DefenseScoop, covering information warfare and cyberspace, 3/11/22, “Cyber Command moving toward an integrated information warfare approach,” https://www.fedscoop.com/cyber-command-moving-toward-an-integrated-information-warfare-approach/, Marsh

U.S. Cyber Command is looking to more tightly link cyberspace “effects” operations with information operations, according to its deputy commander.

When asked where he sees the command headed in the next five to 10 years, Lt. Gen. Charles Moore said he hopes it will broaden the concept of a “truly synchronized and integrated information warfare approach.”

2022 Michigan Negative
CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › 2NC---Taiwan---Impact

An invasion is on the horizon.

Kathrin Hille 6/7, Greater China Correspondent at FT; and Demetri Sevastopulo, US-China Correspondent at FT, 6/07/2022, “Taiwan: preparing for a potential Chinese invasion,” , cc

“This is the decade of concern, particularly the period between now and 2027,” says Phil Davidson, a retired admiral who commanded US forces in the Indo-Pacific until last year. “I make that assessment because of the staggering improvements in Chinese military capabilities and capacities, the political timeline for Xi Jinping and the long-range economic challenges in China’s future.”

Taipei wants to retain military capabilities, such as its F-5 fighter jets, to counter Chinese incursions © Ritchie B Tongo/EPA-EFE

2022 Michigan Negative
CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › 2NC---Taiwan---CYBERCOM Key

Only cyber cooperation can stop a swift Chinese strike.

Klon Kitchen 22, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, 1/13/2022, “Securing Taiwan Requires Immediate Unprecedented Cyber Action,” https://www.lawfareblog.com/securing-taiwan-requires-immediate-unprecedented-cyber-action, Marsh

As the head of Taiwan’s Department of Cyber Security noted, Taiwan’s “critical infrastructure, such as gas, water and electricity are highly digitized,” meaning that the right cyberattack from China could prove catastrophic and leave the island in disarray. More than a few commentators have suggested that, in the event of an invasion, Beijing would very likely seek a fait accompli victory—a decisively rapid takeover of the island involving a debilitating cyberattack that would avoid a longer and more costly war with the U.S. Due to Taiwan’s level of networked sophistication and Beijing’s strategic imperatives, the unprecedented use of cyberwarfare in Taiwan is more likely than not. 

But emerging cyberwarfare tactics differ markedly from conventional dynamics, not least in the degree to which they are covert and preemptive. Networks can be infiltrated silently and exploited months later in an explosive instant. And while the estimated 200-400 cyberattacks that Taiwan endures from China each month don’t constitute acts of war, even one successful attempt to worm into Taiwan’s networks could prove more destructive than any bomb if a military conflict were to kick off. Put simply, cyberwarfare would commence well before formal conflict. 

2022 Michigan Negative
CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › 1NC---Taiwan

Invasion swiftly goes nuclear.

Stacie L. Pettyjohn 22, senior fellow and director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security; and Becca Wasser, a fellow in the defense program and co-lead of The Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security, 5/20/2022, “A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-20/fight-over-taiwan-could-go-nuclear/, BB

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe.

A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan—mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear.

2022 Michigan Negative
CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › 1NC---Taiwan

Expansive CYBERCOM resources cushion a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Joel Wuthnow 21, Senior Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, 12/29/2021, “Defending Taiwan in an Expanded Competitive Space,” https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2884395/defending-taiwan-in-an-expanded-competitive-space/, cc

Taiwan’s defense has always been precarious, and the dangers are only likely to grow as China’s power increases.1 Chinese economic inducement since the 1990s has done little to persuade Taiwan’s citizens to embrace China’s vision of a “one country, two system” model for cross-strait relations, prospects that are even lower with China’s recent steps to erode political freedoms in Hong Kong. To deter Taiwan independence and to pressure Taiwan’s leaders to accept Beijing’s proposals, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has amassed significant forces across the Taiwan Strait, including more than 600 short-range ballistic missiles opposite the island.2 Taiwan’s will to resist Chinese pressure depends, in part, on the speed and efficacy of U.S. intervention in a conflict. China’s military has thus built an arsenal of long-range missiles and supporting capabilities to try to keep the United States out of the fight.

China’s basic advantages in any Taiwan scenario include a high level of political will—reunification is a “core interest” for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which aspires to resolve the problem on its own terms by the centennial of the People’s Republic of China in 2049—and a local military balance that pits a regional heavyweight against a small island with few diplomatic allies and limited resources. Taiwan’s proximity to the mainland and the “tyranny of distance” facing an attempt to surge U.S. forces across the Western Pacific are liabilities for the defense.

2022 Michigan Negative
CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › 2NC---NC3---Impact

The fed agrees.

Julia Berghofer 19, ELN Policy Fellow and Project Manager for the YGLN, 5/09/2019, “Apocalypse now? Cyber threats and nuclear weapons systems,” https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/understanding-and-addressing-cyber-threats-to-nuclear-weapons-systems/, cc

Governments and legislators are struggling to keep pace with the rapid development of cyber capabilities. As military systems become more technically complex it would be easy to assume that they are more secure. The opposite is true. Increased automation and connectivity increases vulnerabilities to cyber attacks. Measures such as air-gapping a system (ie. de-connecting it from the internet) can fall short. A recent US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report assessed the cyber security of US weapons systems and found “mission critical cyber vulnerabilities in nearly all weapons systems […] under development.“ While the report does not make reference to any specific system type, one can reasonably assume that nuclear weapons systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks.

2022 Michigan Negative
CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › 2NC---NC3---CYBERCOM Key

Offensive cyber posture is expensive, trading-off with defensive measures.

Jason Healey 22, Senior Research Scholar and adjunct faculty at Columbia University’s School for International and Public Affairs and president of the Cyber Conflict Studies Association, 6/24/2022, “The Cyber Budget Shows What the U.S. Values—And It Isn’t Defense,” https://www.lawfareblog.com/cyber-budget-shows-what-us-values%E2%80%94and-it-isnt-defense, Marsh

The most obvious implication for national security is that more could be done to reduce America’s significant cyber vulnerabilities. Defense through offense may be a promising experiment or operational concept, but it may not be fully developed as a strategy. The government, both the executive and legislative branches, must work to rebalance these efforts with significantly more funding for federal cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, information sharing and a wide range of other defensive priorities.

The Cyberspace Solarium Commission noted that within the Homeland Security budget, only 15 percent is “committed to initiatives supporting the private sector.” Overall, that is perhaps 1 percent of Defense Department funding. This percentage must increase many times over, targeted at embracing those innovations that give defenders the greatest advantages over attackers at the greatest scale and least cost; working toward major political goals, such as getting to zero botnets; creating new organizations to directly collaborate on response and not just share information; and countless other critical civilian cyber tasks. The U.S. strategy should place non-state actors, with their unique agility and capabilities, at the center of defense and help fund them accordingly.

2022 Michigan Negative
CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › 1NC---NC3

Hamstrung resources directly trade off with NC3 defenses.

Morgan Dwyer 20, fellow in the International Security Program and deputy director for policy analysis in the DefenseIndustrial Initiatives Group at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 10/15/2020, “Cross-domain Competition,” http://defense360.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Dwyer_NuclearNexus_Cross-domain-competition1.pdf, cc

Faced with budget constraints, however, Cyber Command’s focus on persistent engagement may require trade-offs, such as allocating less funding towards preparing for future kinetic conflicts.29 Already, several reports have noted that DOD has insufficiently prioritized efforts to identify and mitigate cyber threats to its weapon systems, including threats to NC3.30 In 2018, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) stated that DOD did not know the full extent of the cyber vulnerabilities in its weapon systems.31 In 2020, the Cyberspace Solarium Commission echoed the GAO’s concerns and recommended that Congress require DOD to annually assess the NC3 system for potential cyber vulnerabilities.32 More broadly, American University’s Joshua Rovner noted that Cyber Command’s focus on “persistent engagement” may create risks to the command’s support to traditional DOD missions; in particular, Rovner warned that “if great-power hostilities continue to rise, Cyber Command may have to pump the brakes on persistent engagement and devote more attention to the missions for which it was originally designed.”33 Those missions, of course, include preparing for future wars—presumably by defending DOD’s weapon systems, including NC3.

2022 Michigan Negative
CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › 2NC---Democracy---Impact

Shoring up democracy solves every impact

Dr. Joseph S. Nye 17, University Distinguished Service Professor at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, January/February 2017, “Will the Liberal Order Survive?,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/system/files/pdf/anthologies/2017/b0033_0.pdf

The order will inevitably look somewhat different as the twenty-first century progresses. China, India, and other economies will continue to grow, and the U.S. share of the world economy will drop. But no other country, including China, is poised to displace the United States from its dominant position. Even so, the order may still be threatened by a general diffusion of power away from governments toward nonstate actors. The information revolution is putting a number of transnational issues, such as financial stability, climate change, terrorism, pandemics, and cybersecurity, on the global agenda at the same time as it is weakening the ability of all governments to respond.Complexity is growing, and world politics will soon not be the sole province of governments. Individuals and private organizations—from corporations and nongovernmental organizations to terrorists and social movements—are being empowered, and informal networks will undercut the monopoly on power of traditional bureaucracies. Governments will continue to possess power and resources, but the stage on which they play will become ever more crowded, and they will have less ability to direct the action.Even if the United States remains the largest power, accordingly, it will not be able to achieve many of its international goals acting alone. For example, international financial stability is vital to the prosperity of Americans, but the United States needs the cooperation of others to ensure it. Global climate change and rising sea levels will affect the quality of life, but Americans cannot manage these problems by themselves. And in a world where borders are becoming more porous, letting in everything from drugs to infectious diseases to terrorism, nations must use soft power to develop networks and build institutions to address shared threats and challenges.China is unlikely to surpass the United States in power anytime soon.Washington can provide some important global public goods largely by itself. The U.S. Navy is crucial when it comes to policing the law of the seas and defending freedom of navigation, and the U.S. Federal Reserve undergirds international financial stability by serving as a lender of last resort. On the new transnational issues, however, success will require the cooperation of others—and thus empowering others can help the United States accomplish its own goals. In this sense, power becomes a positive-sum game: one needs to think of not just the United States’ power over others but also the power to solve problems that the United States can acquire by working with others. In such a world, the ability to connect with others becomes a major source of power, and here, too, the United States leads the pack. The United States comes first in the Lowy Institute’s ranking of nations by number of embassies, consulates, and missions. It has some 60 treaty allies, and The Economist estimates that nearly 100 of the 150 largest countries lean toward it, while only 21 lean against it.Increasingly, however, the openness that enables the United States to build networks, maintain institutions, and sustain alliances is itself under siege. This is why the most important challenge to the provision of world order in the twenty-first century comes not from without but from within.

2022 Michigan Negative
CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › 2NC---Democracy---Impact

It causes extinction---there are multiple scenarios

Dr. Eric W. Orts 18, Guardsmark Professor of Legal Studies & Business Ethics and Professor of Management at The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, MA in Political Science from the New School for Social Research, LLM from Columbia Law School, JD from the University of Michigan School of Law, BA in Government from Oberlin College, “Foreign Affairs: Six Future Scenarios (and a Seventh)”, 6/27/2018, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/foreign-affairs-six-future-scenarios-seventh-eric-orts/

7. Fascist Nationalism. There is another possible future that the Foreign Affairs scenarios do not contemplate, and it’s a dark world in which Trump, Putin, Xi, Erdogan, and others construct regimes that are authoritarian and nationalist. Fascism is possible in the United States and elsewhere if big business can be seduced by promises of riches in return for the institutional keys to democracy. Perhaps Foreign Affairs editors are right to leave this dark world out, for it would be very dark: nationalist wars with risks of escalation into global nuclear conflict, further digital militarization (even Terminator-style scenarios of smart military robots), and unchecked climate disasters.

2022 Michigan Negative
CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA › 2NC---Elections---Key to Democracy

Election security and its public trust is the lifeline of democracy---otherwise, extinction.

Jennifer Panning 21, Chair of Northwood Board of Trustees, 4/12/21, “Election Integrity Is an Important Product of the Rule of Law,” https://www.northwood.edu/afeu/when-free-to-choose/election-integrity-is-an-important-product-of-the-rule-of-law, [gendered language edited], Marsh

Rule of law is a fundamental component of The Northwood Idea. Society cannot exist without it. It is the wall between freedom and anarchy.

Elections are a part of American life where the rule of law is especially important. Many brave men and women [people] have fought for our freedom, including the privilege and duty to vote for our leaders, and we owe it to them to conduct our elections with high standards of integrity. Democracy is the greatest form of governance ever devised, a system by which free people choose their leaders and hold them accountable. In other words, a government of, by, and for the people. We might not always be happy with how our democracy functions, but it beats any and all alternatives.