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2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Case › 1NC---Kroker Wrong

Kroker is wrong – doesn’t understand biotechnology, doesn’t understand his own philosophy, and ignores that the will to technology is inevitable

Glynn 19 (Andrew Glynn PhD – Doctorate in Philsophy and meta-physician, “Arthur Kroker’s “The Will to Technology”, Dasein42, 13 February 2019, , MG)

Kroker is correct that the science most prevalent in the 20th century is that of biology rather than physics, and the most controversial technology therefore bio-technology. Kroker, like much of the public not actually versed in the technology part of bio-technology, jumps to the assumption that the small successes (such as bio-engineering bacteria to produce insulin) indicate that large scale human bio-engineering is ‘just around the corner’. The reality is far different — having just completed a short stint at a firm involved with Google in producing a genome variant search engine that meets all the security and identity management requirements that each genetic database owner puts on their data, we’re not even at the point where a reasonably simple search for a given genome variant can be accomplished.

Biology itself is in much the same state as physics in 1900 when Planck first called for a quantum theory — there’s a strong sense that our past biology is overly simplistic, but not a clear path forward.

2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Case › 1NC---Kroker Wrong

Kroker is wrong – doesn’t understand biotechnology, doesn’t understand his own philosophy, and ignores that the will to technology is inevitable

Glynn 19 (Andrew Glynn PhD – Doctorate in Philsophy and meta-physician, “Arthur Kroker’s “The Will to Technology”, Dasein42, 13 February 2019, , MG)

Kroker is correct that the science most prevalent in the 20th century is that of biology rather than physics, and the most controversial technology therefore bio-technology. Kroker, like much of the public not actually versed in the technology part of bio-technology, jumps to the assumption that the small successes (such as bio-engineering bacteria to produce insulin) indicate that large scale human bio-engineering is ‘just around the corner’. The reality is far different — having just completed a short stint at a firm involved with Google in producing a genome variant search engine that meets all the security and identity management requirements that each genetic database owner puts on their data, we’re not even at the point where a reasonably simple search for a given genome variant can be accomplished.

Biology itself is in much the same state as physics in 1900 when Planck first called for a quantum theory — there’s a strong sense that our past biology is overly simplistic, but not a clear path forward.

2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Case › 1NC---Kroker Wrong

AND, it’s biologically impossible---the thing that makes humans not chimpanzees is instrumental rationality <<< – they’ll assert that this argument naturalizes our model of thinking BUT that’s not a bad thing since we’re right – it’s their burden to prove efficacy in the short-term or the case obviously outweighs >>>

Søren Riis 11, Carlsberg Research Fellow and Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Science Studies at Roskilde University, Ph.D. from Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, “Towards the origin of modern technology: reconfiguring Martin Heidegger’s thinking,” 2-8-2011

Moreover, Heidegger maintains: ‘‘Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-categorially.’’47 According to Heidegger’s fundamental phenomenology, which he unfolds in detail in Being and Time and reaffirms a decisive part of in ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology,’’ nature is ‘‘primally’’ revealed in its ‘‘usability’’ and ‘‘serviceability-for-;’’ that is to say, ‘‘nature’’ is a resource long before the actual rise of modern and ancient technology, namely simultaneously with the very origin of human beings. That something is primordially revealed in its ‘‘usability’’ and ‘‘serviceability-for-’’ does not imply that it is actually used or serves accordingly, but that it is revealed as standing ready to be utilized in the corresponding context. As such, it is revealed as ‘‘standing-reserve.’’ This, for example, also corresponds to the empirical fact that prehistoric humans settled close to woods and rivers. In these areas they always had stockpiles of timber, power for transportation, and easy access to drinking water. Based on ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and completed through references to Being and Time, we now have an interpretation of the origin of the essence of modern technology, which traces back the characteristic revealing of das Gestell to the beginning of humankind.48 This does not imply that prehistoric technology is identical with contemporary technology; rather the third genealogy of the rule of das Gestell suggests that when ‘‘we still more primally’’ try to consider the origin of the challenging revealing characterizing the rule of das Gestell, we in fact rediscover that it is connected to being human. The rule of das Gestell has challenged humans as long as they have existed. In this sense, humans first and foremost exist under the rule of das Gestell.49 This also entails a revision and precision of Heidegger’s renowned formula characterizing the world-connectedness of human existence: being-in-the-world. Based on the comparison of ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and Being and Time, human existence is better described as being-under-the-spell-of-das-Gestell. Trying to understand the various more-or-less explicit accounts of the origin of the rule of das Gestell in ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and the resulting ambiguity is not just an exercise, nor only a way to criticize Heidegger. Rather, it is a way to better understand the nuances and layers in Heidegger’s thinking concerning technology and to warn against a short-sighted ‘‘saving’’ from an alleged danger. If the challenging revealing of nature, which characterizes the rule of das Gestell is taken seriously, then we cannot avoid it just by revolutionizing our technology, instead, we must revise our very human existence.

2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Case › 1NC---Kroker Wrong

Kroker’s thesis is wrong and they devolve into the same humanistic principles he criticizes

James Steinhoff 16, The University of Western Ontario, “Exits to the Posthuman Future,” Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2016, p. 533-536

In Exits to the Posthuman Future (2014), Arthur Kroker deploys a mutant strain of Marshall McLuhan’s (McLuhan and McLuhan 1988) medium theory to paint a dark picture of high-technology capitalist societies. At its most dire points this book appears to be an affirmation of Friedrich Nietzsche (1964) and Jean Baudrillard’s (1994) theses that God is dead and meaning is impossible. Advanced technology is the primary cause of this condition, which is the posthuman era. Kroker contends that previous conceptions of the posthuman were misguidedly optimistic and that the posthuman must be grasped as a state of total indeterminacy in which a literally living technology dominates human agency. Yet, there is a tension. Throughout the text there are moments of tangible hope for a traditionally humanistic future and, perplexingly, the book closes with an explicit call to recover the social and ethical values lost in the ravages of capitalism. In the end, it is hard to say what this book is intended to do. Kroker’s dark posthumanist prognosis stands starkly juxtaposed with his latent humanism. Arthur Kroker is a postmodernist Canadian theorist who has been studying the intersections of technology and culture since the mid-1980s. This new book consists of several essays comprised of original material and new versions of previously presented material. It is wide-ranging in topic, roving from drone warfare to Obama’s political rhetoric to media theory. In a high-speed and prolix style that recalls William Gibson’s cyberpunk fiction and the work of McLuhan and Paul Virilio, Kroker sets out a way of thinking about contemporary high-technological society' that follows the McLuhanian insistence on the constant and unavoidable influence of media on humans—but inverts it. The theoretical linchpin of this text is the “dark tetrad” (p. 25), Kroker’s inversion of McLuhan’s four laws of media. McLuhan asserted that all media have four effects on individuals and societies: to enhance something, to obsolesce something, to retrieve something that was previously obsolesced, and to intensify something to the point of its reversal (McLuhan & McLuhan, 4988). Kroker presents another side to the tetrad, which he describes, following Jacques Derrida (2006), as “hauntological” (p. 193). The dark tetrad describes disappearance instead of enhancement, substitution instead of obsolescence, abandonment instead of retrieval, and stasis instead of reversal (Kroker, 2014). These four functions describe the actions of media from a non-anthropomorphic standpoint. This dehumanization of McLuhan is necessary, Kroker asserts, because a fundamental feature of the posthuman era is that technology has “in the most literal sense ... now come alive” (p. 28). Yet Kroker’s main interest here is not the autonomous artificial intelligences of transhumanist speculation, nor is it the academic posthumanisms of Katherine Hayles (2008) or Donna Harraway (2000). Kroker’s posthuman age is “that historical moment when the power of technology turns back on itself, effectively undermining traditional concepts such as subjectivity, privacy, and bounded consciousness in order to render all things truly uncertain and unknowable” (p. 7). It is a “dystopian phase of information technology” in which “the informatics of domination has appropriated the resistance spirit of the borderlands” (p. 96). Kroker argues that the permeable human/machine boundaries of Hayles and Hanaway have been superseded by7 all-encompassing machinic control. Kroker’s posthuman is thus a dark time for beings that still think of themselves as human. It is also a dark time because it is quite literally haunted. Kroker holds that: “the essence of the posthuman axiomatic inheres in the fact that technology now eagerly seeks out that which was previously marginalized as simultaneously ways of mobilizing itself as it effectively recodes every aspect of social and nonsocial existence” (p. 6). This is the hauntological aspect of media: that which was previously marginalized is resurrected by technologies to serve as their contents and reasons for being with no logic discernable to humans. The result is the bewildering posthuman era, which Kroker adumbrates using the concepts of acceleration, drift, and crash. Acceleration will be familiar to readers of other postmodernist technology theorists, such as Virilio, and needs little elaboration. Crash depicts the collision between accelerated technologies and traditional human qualities. Drift is Kroker’s most compelling contribution to thinking the posthuman. Drift describes the perturbations of a society no longer directed by human intention, but by myriad, incremental, and unpredictable mutations in the codes that underlie molar reality. Code drift “is the spectral destiny of the story of technology,” (p. 50) but it is also “nothing new,” (p. 52) in that human evolution is a history of sampling errors. The posthuman era is described as one of “drift culture” in that the randomness and non-teleological nature of the molecular realm takes over the molar. The dark tetrad is thus to be understood as a schematic of how code drift rearranges the world without intention or consciousness. Code drift converts humans to “data flesh” that fully absorbs the primary modernist disavowal—the sense of the absurd in all the great referentials—as its key conditions of possibility” (p. 53). Drift culture is the technological proof of existentialism. Kroker is quite brief on suggesting how we ought to proceed with social life in the drifting absurdity of the posthuman era. He devotes only a four-page epilogue to the question of what is to be done now. Not surprisingly, given the existentialist tone of the work, he advocates an aesthetic comportment toward the posthuman. Specifically, he endorses an aesthetics based on Jean-Frangois Lyotard’s (2011) notion of the “figural” or adiscursive gestalt—presumably adapting it to grasp the adiscursivity of ubiquitous code: “Art of this (posthuman) order recodes the question of aesthetics by the creation of a mode of perception that fully opens to the discontinuous, tire fragmentary, the uncertain, the reversal” (Kroker 2014, P-197)- This call for extreme openness evokes Nietzsche’s Dionysian mode of being, in which destruction and creation possess equal valence, but Kroker quickly qualifies this, asserting that since: the posthuman condition has revealed decadence ... as the basic ontology of late capitalism, the point of a figural art that would “harden, worsen, accelerate decadence” would be precisely the reverse, that is to say, it would draw into a greater visibility those intangible, but very real, impulses to social solidarity and ethical probity that haunt the order of the real. (p. 198) This foray into the supposedly posthuman ends with a call for the reinstatement of the most humanistic of principles. The idea seems to be that the novel form of living in the posthuman era is analogous to the collective yearnings of the “spirit of ’68.”

2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Case › 1NC---Policy Debate is Aesthetic

The imagination and debate over competing words is artistic, playful, and scholarly simultaneously.

Chia, 96. (Robert Chia, University of Stirling. “The Problem of Reflexivity in Organizational Research: Towards a Postmodern Science of Organization” Organization, Volume 3, No. 1, February. SAGE Journals. Online.)

One more recent development in organizational theorizing results from taking the problem of reflexivity seriously. Such organizational writers accept that both their own accounts and those generated by others are first and foremost linguistic constructions which operate according to established conventional linguistic codes. Theories of organization are deemed to be self-justifying 'intelligible narratives' which enable a community of inquirers to arrive at some consensus regarding their social experiences. As Gergen (1992) puts it: If there is one theme that unites most of those confronting the postmodern irony, it is a certain sense of ludic humility. The view of knowledge-making as a transcendental pursuit removed from the trivial enthralments of daily life, pristinely rational and transparently virtuous, becomes so much puffery. We should view these bodies of language we call knowledge in a lighter vein-as ways of putting things together, some pretty and others petty. (Gergen, 1992: 215) Hence, 'irony', 'self-reflection' and 'playful seriousness' replace the rational quest for 'certain' or even 'partially true' knowledge of an external organizational reality. For these 'metareflexive' theorists, both the bodyof-knowledge claims in organization theory and their own claims are to be understood in a lighter vein as artistically crafted pieces of work in their own right. Theories generated mirror the concerns and preoccupations of the theorists themselves and do not, as such, claim any absolute, grounded connexion with a reality beyond. Such writers would argue that these crafted pieces of 'linguistic web' contribute to the making of our organizational reality.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Imperialism K Aff › 1NC – Cognitive Warfare

The AFF has misconstrued cognitive warfare, cognitive warfare is both necessary and useful.

Reding & Wells ’22 (Dale Redings, Office of Chief Scientist, NATO Headquarters, Bryan Wells, Office of Chief Scientist, NATO headquarters, “Cognitive Warfare: NATO, COVID-19 and the Impact of Emerging and Disruptive Technologies” )

NATO has shown that we remain ready and able to defend our nations, that allies and partners are supporting each other, and that investing in our Armed Forces is an investment in the strength and resilience of our societies. This readiness was demonstrated in no uncertain terms by our Alliance’s vital role in fighting this deadly pandemic. This capacity stretches across the maritime, land, air, cyber, and space domains, as well as the information or cognitive sphere. Taken together, this will help us build the resilience of our societies, and building resilience in our communities requires a whole-of-society approach. Everyone has a role to play; the media, the private sector, academia, civil society, of course, the whole-of-government. But it also includes all the relevant groups in our communities to ensure that our institutions and citizens are equipped for today’s digital realities. Beyond the nations that make up the Alliance, we must work in concert with our partners to strengthen our collective ability to prevent crisis and address challenges. It is clear that no nation alone, no continent alone, can cope with the magnitude of the challenges we are now facing as democratic societies. NATO is about security, but it’s also about values, shared values, and shared interests. This Alliance is about freedom, and I think our nations, especially those coming from behind the Iron Curtain, appreciate that strong narrative. To ensure our success and resilience in the face of adversity, we must unambiguously and proactively communicate our core narrative, intent and actions to our publics, our potential rivals, and adversaries. But the pandemic also showed us that resilience is a whole-of-society concern. But to correctly assess this societal resilience, we need better to understand the nature, diffusion and power of disinformation. With this understanding, we may define even more precise indicators, metrics, and analytics to help Allied nations cope. Leveraging modern research in social and information sciences will support this work. This book will play a small but essential part in building such resilience, representing a whole-of-society perspective including academia, industry, and NATO scientists. But it also crucial to understand that the speed of innovation and technology implementation and how this might change operations across the operational domains, including the information sphere. Understanding how current and future developments of emerging disruptive technologies (EDTs) will impact these domains of operation will be essential to our operational success. We will need to harness the research, technological and analytical talent in our societies. Bring our universities together, bring our scientists together, bring our top experts, and embed our values and ethical and moral code in our technologies. If we succeed, and I’m very confident that we will, we will maintain our edge and keep our societies safe and resilient. And that is the concept of NATO. It is not only strong together dedicated to looking forward, introducing innovation, understanding the realities and technologies of today, countering disinformation and propaganda, bringing together the best of our scientific and technological base. I think all our citizens are and will continue to be safer because of that. This book captures and contributes to the collaborative effort of the nations which make up the Alliance and its partners. It promotes a shared understanding of the information sphere, outlines the attempts to undermine the Alliance during the COVID-19 pandemic, and contextualizes the hazards of disinformation and propaganda. It will guide our travels through and competition for ideas within the information sphere as we evolve as an Alliance.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Imperialism K Aff › 1NC – Cognitive Warfare

Cognitive warfare is necessary to combat foreign disinformation.

Reding & Wells ’22 (Dale Redings, Office of Chief Scientist, NATO Headquarters, Bryan Wells, Office of Chief Scientist, NATO headquarters, “Cognitive Warfare: NATO, COVID-19 and the Impact of Emerging and Disruptive Technologies” )

As NATO moves towards the future, it finds itself confronting the challenges of a changing world. As noted in the NATO2030 process (Maizière et al., 2020; NATO, 2021a), NATO will need to address a host of returning and emergent challenges such as Russia’s aggressive actions, the threat of terrorism, cyber-attacks, emerging and disruptive technologies, the security impact of climate change, and the rise of China. The solutions to these challenges require a delicate blend of political and military action married with the deep collective wisdom contained within the Alliance. Within the three core missions specified by NATO’s 2010 strategic concept (collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security) (NATO, 2020d), the Alliance is focused on five operational imperatives: cognitive superiority, layered resilience, influence and power projection, cross-domain command, and integrated multi-domain defence (NATO, 2021c). These imperatives and the overarching challenges outlined in NATO2030 have led NATO to expand its operational domains from three (air, land, sea) to include cyber (NATO, 2019) and space (NATO, 2021b). However, a school of thought exists that has strongly advocated that the cognitive domain should be given equal importance and noting that it is an area where Alliance nations are particularly vulnerable (Cole & Le Guyader, 2020). Recent examples of the ever-growing threat presented by disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda, including actions taken during the COVID-19 crisis, would support such an assertion. It is worthwhile at this point to clarify the definitions necessary to consider conflict in the cognitive domain. First, misinformation may be taken to mean the creation and dissemination of false and/or manipulated information, without malicious intent. Similarly,weaponised misinformation, otherwise known as disinformation, is defined by NATO as “the deliberate creation and dissemination of false and/or manipulated information with the intent to deceive and/or mislead” (NATO, 2020b). The key distinguishing difference between the two is that disseminating disinformation is an act conducted with malice and forethought. The organised dissemination of disinformation is often called a disinformation campaign, which may also mix in selected facts so as to obscure or confuse. On the other hand, propaganda disseminates information or narratives that may be factual, false, highly selected or manipulated in nature but are intended to put a country or social group in a particular light (positive or negative) or influence opinion. More succinctly, it is information with an agenda (DiResta, 2018). The more insidious modern form, computational propaganda, is defined as “the assemblage of social media platforms, autonomous agents, and big data tasked with the manipulation of public opinion” (Woolley, 2016). The employment of computational disinformation has meant that the costs of creating a disruptive disinformation campaign have significantly been reduced, along with a dramatic increase in effectiveness, focus and agility. Information warfare has always been part of organized conflict (e.g., Tzu, 2018). Nevertheless, a more modern definition, drawn from Russian doctrine, definesinformation warfare (or operations) “[as the] conscious employment of information to enable the user to achieve his political, economic, military, or other goals … [to be] conducted constantly, in peacetime, in the period of threats … and in wartime … [by] committing all available forces and software and hardware potentialities to impact the opponent’s information capabilities and protect our own against similar actions by the opponent” (Ball, 2017). Information warfare is not about armed forces, equipment or infrastructure in the physical domain but rather a part of a strategic campaign to influence, affect perceptions, and validate realities that support national power agendas (Carr, 2019). In US doctrine information warfare consists of five aspects: electronic warfare, computer network operations, PsyOps (psychological operations), military deception, and operational security (Bernal et al., 2020). More concisely, “information warfare works to control the flow of information” (Bernal et al., 2020; Cluzel, 2020). One of the critical challenges of defensive information warfare is to recognise when an attack is occurring (Nimmo, 2016) and to act accordingly. In addition, defensive information warfare may also be used as a means of developing a narrative to inoculate one’s citizens against an actual or perceived information attack (Dumitrescu, 2019). Narratives are stories about stories (Verdon, 2019). Beliefs, history, information, disinformation, misinformation, propaganda and mythmaking are all part of the development of a strategic narrative defined as “a means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the past, present, and future of international politics to shape the behaviour of domestic and international actors. Strategic narratives are a tool for political actors to extend their influence, manage expectations, and change the discursive environment in which they operate. They are narratives about bothstates and the system itself, both about who we are and what kind of order we want. The point of strategic narratives is to influence the behaviour of others” (O’Loughlin et al., 2013). Strategic narratives are a double-edged sword, playing a role in societies as tools for defensive information warfare (potentially based on disinformation) or as a means of increasing social resilience to cognitive conflict (Dumitrescu, 2019). Cognitive warfare is a generalisation and extension of information warfare beyond the battlefield. It is best defined as an attack on knowledge, or more clearly, it is a means of conflict designed to impact how individuals, groups or nations think about an issue, event or situation. Ultimately, “destabilisation and influence are the fundamental goals of cognitive warfare” (Cluzel, 2020). The difference between information and cognitive warfare is significant (Bienvenue et al., 2018). It lies in the process of turning information into knowledge, as per the first two steps of the OODA loop (Osinga, 2005). In cognitive warfare, the weapon is information, but the domain of operation is cognitive. Cognitive warfare is part of the larger concepts of grey zone or hybrid warfare. Grey zone warfare describes conflict conducted below the level of engagement that could initiate traditional military actions. “The Gray Zone is characterised by intense political, economic, informational, and military competition more fervent in nature than normal steady-state diplomacy, yet short of conventional war” (Votel et al., 2016), with the Cold War being the quintessential example. NATO considers hybrid warfare as “a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures … employed in a highly integrated design” (Hoffman, 2018). This definition describes the use of mixed military-political tools of conflict used within the grey zone of operations. NATO nations have recognised the threat of hybrid and grey zone conflict. At the 2018 Brussels Summit, heads of state noted that “We face hybrid challenges, including disinformation campaigns and malicious cyber activities.” This was followed up in 2019 at the London Summit with heads of state noting that NATO will be “strengthening [its] ability to prepare for, deter, and defend against hybrid tactics that seek to undermine our security and societies”, a point reinforced once again at the 2021 NATO summit in Brussels. In the intervening years, NATO has developed a clear strategy to counter disinformation based on promulgating factual narratives. Disinformation is countered by offering a counter-narrative built on refuting, debunking, providing relevant facts and sources, and supporting the actions of a free press. Alliance nations share best practices, approaches, lessons learned, and insights among themselves and partners such as the EU and UN. This counter disinformation strategy includes continued research in disinformation methods and grey-zone tactics. NATO S&T has played a vital role in supporting NATO efforts to understand better and counter disinformation, whether through the Science for Peace and Security Program, working with partner nations, or through the collaborative efforts of the Science and Technology Organization. The COVID-19 pandemic is not a consequence of geostrategic conflict. Nevertheless, the pandemic has had a direct and adverse effect on all Alliance nations, particularly their medical, political, and economic systems. Exploiting this crisis, several countries and groups with partisan agendas attempted to create a watershed moment in global security by undermining Alliance cohesion and national resolve. As noted by the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Director-General at the 2020 Munich Security Conference, “We’re not just fighting an epidemic; we’re fighting an infodemic” (Zarocostas, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic presented an information exploitation opportunity for some strategic actors as part of existing grey zone conflicts. At the same time, this has raised awareness of the enduring challenge of countering misinformation, disinformation and outright propaganda. These attacks can, and have, imposed considerable costs to the nations and has needlessly increased the death rate from COVID-19. However, in any complex crisis, such as that experienced during pandemics, information transparency and open communication builds trust and ultimately saves lives. Over the initial phases of the COVID-19 crises, Russian disinformation campaigns focused on stories such as (EEAS, 2021): COVID-19 was developed in NATO laboratories, global elites are imposing tyranny, and the EU is disintegrating. As time went on, these attacks expanded to include those designed to increase doubt on vaccine efficacy, safety and availability, accusing countries of genocide for not using the Russian vaccine (Sputnik V), suggesting that migrants (or NATO) have been spreading the virus across Europe, as well as implying that degenerate geopolitical and commercial interests were over-riding the interests of European and North American citizens. While some of these attacks are homegrown, there has also been a trend towards amplifying attacks from secondary sources (e.g., right & left-wing groups, Iran, ISIS, China, anti-vaxxers, etc.). This approach maintains a veneer of plausible deniability and evades responsibility for accurate reporting. At the same time, these efforts have presented an inflated narrative of Russian (and to some extent Chinese) generosity and scientific, military and societal strength. This narrative was supported by logistics and medical support provided to groups with deep historical and linguistic ties to Russia or Kremlin-friendly forces (Ozawa, 2020). In late April of 2020, Russia launched three harmonised disinformation attacks on NATO (NATO, 2020b). First, a fake letter was published, purportedly from Jen Stoltenberg, NATO’s Secretary-General, to Raimundus Karoblis, Lithuania’s Minister of Defence. The letter noted that NATO had decided to withdraw its multinational battlegroup from Lithuania due to rising COVID-19 infections. The letters were posted on blogs in English and Lithuanian and were later picked up by various websites and social media platforms. Fake accounts, created days before, were used to spread the disinformation further. Following this, an edited YouTube video was released suggesting that COVID-19 within the multinational battlegroup was the single agenda item for a recent NATO Defence Ministers meeting. Finally, the letter was sent directly to NATO Headquarters via a spoofed NATO e-mail address. Surprisingly, given the care taken to orchestrate this attack, the letter contained many formatting, structural and grammatical mistakes, and was recognized quickly as a fake. Ultimately the attack was a failure and died out quickly. NATO responded rapidly to discredit the story, as did the Lithuanian Defence Ministry. Early identification (understand) and rapid reaction (engage) nullified the attack. As noted by the Secretary-General, “They have not been successful because, first of all, it has been clearly revealed that this is a fake letter; secondly, we’ve seen that NATO allies remain committed, remain united, and are actually helping each other in the midst of the coronavirus crisis” (NATO, 2020b). Disinformation has been a constant threat to the Alliance since its inception. Nevertheless, with the increased use of asymmetric (hybrid) warfare and the attendant growth of social media, disinformation and its institutional twin of propaganda have significantly increased in volume and precision. Moreover, these efforts are part of more significant military and geopolitical trends, such as those presented by hybrid or grey zone warfare, where success is defined through operations in the cognitive sphere.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › 2NC – AT: France Willpower

France will cooperate with all of Europe – European security helps them too

Bugos ’20 [Shannon; March of 2020; Senior Policy Analyst at the Arms Control Association, research assistant in the International Scholars Program at the University of Notre Dame; "France Offers Nuclear Deterrent to All Europe," Arms Control Association, //smarx, AZG]

French President Emmanuel Macron offered to begin discussing with other European countries the role that France’s nuclear deterrent can play in their collective security.

France’s nuclear forces “strengthen the security of Europe through their very existence,” Macron said at the military school École de Guerre in Paris on Feb. 7. An erosion of “the comprehensive security framework” that protects Europe affects France’s defense strategy, he said, which means that “France’s vital interests now have a European dimension.” France’s nuclear deterrence “ensures our independence, our freedom to assess, make decisions, and take action. It prevents adversaries from betting on escalation, intimidation, and blackmailing to achieve their ends,” he said before extending the offer.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › 2NC – AT: Deterrence

The EU can jointly contribute to deterrence – new efforts can achieve atomic weapons

Schult ’22 [Christoph; 04/14/22; M.A. in School of Oriental and African Studies with the University of London; and Britta Sandberg, studied political science, history and American studies at the LMU in Munich and at the Institut des Sciences Politiques in Paris; and René Pfister, studied political science in Munich and completed an apprenticeship at the German School of Journalism, Office manager in Washington DC since summer 2019; "A European Bomb: Debate over Nuclear Deterrence Heats Up in the EU," Der Spiegel, //smarx, AZG]

It is a diplomatic way of saying that Germany must prepare for a scenario in which the Americans can no longer be relied on. Heusgen served Merkel in the Chancellery for 12 years and is one of the most experienced security policy practitioners in Europe. In summer 2017, half a year after Trump’s inauguration, Heusgen was sent to New York as Germany’s ambassador to the United Nations, and he is now head of the Munich Security Conference. The time he spent at the UN convinced Heusgen that the old trans-Atlantic certainties not longer apply. That, too, has motivated him to speak up.

Europeans must be prepared to do far more for deterrence and defense, Heusgen says. He views the 100-billion-euro spending package for the German military to be an absolute necessity. "But in addition to that, I believe we should begin a strategic dialogue with France focused on whether and how Europeans can jointly contribute to a nuclear deterrence against Russia. One model could involve the German government and other EU member states contributing financially to the French nuclear weapons program in return for a say in the planning and deployment of French atomic weapons."

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › 2NC – AT: Deterrence

EU-NATO cooperation solves deterrence – broad coordination allows for extended deterrence

Nagashima ’21 [Jun; 05/18/21; Master’s in European Security from the Tsukuba University, Adjunct Professor, Graduate School of Security Studies, National Defense Academy, Lieutenant General (Retired); "European Strategic Autonomy and Nuclear Deterrence- Progress of EU-NATO Cooperation and Impact on the Indo-Pacific Region –," International Information Network Analysis | SPF, //smarx, AZG]

In view of the circumstances surrounding the EU, the best solution for responding to the nuclear threat that Europe faces is not to use the European nuclear deterrence approach proposed by France, but to develop a cooperative nuclear posture through loosely-based cooperation, within a scope that does not violate the sovereignty of the nuclear countries(U.S., U.K. and France), as a part of the strengthening of the current EU-NATO relationship. This means a political process in which the items related to nuclear deterrence will be added to EU-NATO cooperation, and consultations and coordination on specific nuclear cooperation are started at a working-level. Albeit in the form of NATO's provision of extended nuclear deterrence to the EU, this is a realistic response that the EU, with its complicated nuclear issues, can tolerate in terms of strategic autonomy.

In other words, it is difficult for the European Union to achieve strategic autonomy in the core part of its nuclear deterrence strategy, and the solution is cooperation with NATO. Needless to say, NATO is an alliance centered on the United States, which contradicts the direction of Europe's strategic autonomy. However, I think that realistic decisions made by the EU, without being swept away by ideals, should be appreciated from a broader perspective.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › 2NC – AT: Deterrence

The EU’s recent initiatives establish enough deterrence to meet today’s security challenge – they’ve shifted priorities

Latici ’18 [Tania; July of 2018; Fellow with the Transatlantic Leadership Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, doing a PhD on transatlantic defense cooperation at the University of Ghent and with the European Security and Defence College; "European Deterrence Initiative: the transatlantic security guarantee," European Parliament, //smarx, AZG]

The illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014 marked a crucial moment for European, transatlantic and international security. Acting like a wake-up call, this event redefined strategic and security considerations in individual EU Member States, in the United States and in international organisations such as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Russia's increasingly assertive military posture is unsettling for its European neighbours. Four years ago, in June 2014, US President Obama announced what was to become a key security guarantee from America to Europe. The European Reassurance Initiative, as it was called during the first half of its existence, is a military programme supporting the activities of the US military and its allies in Europe. In 2017, it was renamed the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) to reflect the shift in the international security environment characterised by a prioritisation of deterrence. Activities under the EDI include training of forces, multinational military exercises and development of military equipment and capabilities. They all take place under the umbrella of Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) whose core mission is to enhance deterrence. Despite recent turmoil in transatlantic relations, the budget for building up defences in central and eastern Europe through the EDI has seen major increases; even under the Trump administration. The EDI has deepened security and defence cooperation between the US and the main beneficiaries of OAR, namely Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. The US European Command, which coordinates all EDI and OAR activities, is working to forge enhanced interoperability between different countries' military forces through joint training, staff exchanges and exercises. The Command's leadership also recognises the cyber domain as a pressing area where integration is needed, although the EDI budget for 2019 makes no mention of it. The recent proliferation of EU defence initiatives and the revamp of EU-NATO relations should also contribute to EDI's core mission: to establish a strong deterrence posture able to meet today's security challenges.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › 1NC – Solvency – Cyber

EU’s Strategic Compass solves cyber deterrence

Constantine Atlamazoglou and Jason C. Moyer 2022, Constantine Atlamazoglou is a European Security Analyst/Journalist at the Wilson Center and holds a master's degree on security studies and European affairs from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; Jason C. Moyer is a Program Associate for the Global Europe Program at The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Previously, he was the Program Manager for the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins SAIS, the Dean's research institute, and he was the Program Coordinator for the Center for Transatlantic Relations, a transatlantic think tank. He is also a Fellow for the Transatlantic Leadership Network.; “A Strategic Compass: The European Union expands its toolbox”, //skwon

In Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s class at Georgetown University, she likened each element of U.S. power - development aid, sanctions, bilateral diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy - to a tool in the U.S. problem-solving toolbox. When faced with a challenge, the United States can employ one or more of these tools. With the launch of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, the European Union is adding a handful of new tools to its own toolbox, to better respond to current and future challenges.

Promising a “quantum leap” in decisive security matters in the next decade, the EU is stepping into its role as a security provider and global actor. The document is significant for the EU; it can be seen as a parallel to the United States’ National Security Strategy in its scope.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › 2NC – France

EU is increasing its military defense—US decline means that Europe must step up to protect itself

Tom Sauer 2019, Tom Sauer is a post-doctoral research fellow of the Flemish Fund for Scientific Research and a lecturer at the Department of Politics at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium, December 2019, “Power and Nuclear Weapons: The Case of the European Union”, //skwon

The EU is generally regarded as a soft or “normative” power (Manners 2002). While the original goal of the European project in the 1950 s was maintaining peace, its main instrument was economic cooperation. That said, already in 1952 the European Defense Community was set up, only to be vetoed by the French Assembly two years later. It is probably no coincidence that in the same period French Prime Minister Mendès-France started up a secret nuclear weapons program. Jean Monnet – one of the founding fathers of the European Community – was against the force de frappe because in his view it was incompatible with the fact that Germany was constitutionally not allowed to possess nuclear weapons.

Since then, European integration made progress on a step-by-step basis, including the establishment of the European Economic Community and Euratom in 1957, the latter aiming to create a European free zone for nuclear fuel, i.e. uranium4. Unsurprisingly, Europe was called “a civilian power”. Duchène (1972), then director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), predicted in the beginning of the 1970 s: “Europe would be the first major area of the Old World where the age-old process of war and indirect violence could be translated into something more in tune with the twentieth-century citizen’s notion of civilized politics. In such a context, Western Europe could in a sense be the first of the world’s civilian centres of power” … ’Europe will be a giant middle power’. Similar ideas were still heard in the 1990 s, despite the announcement of a Common Foreign and Security Policy by the Treaty of Maastricht (1991). Christopher Hill (1996, my emphasis), for instance, stated: “Where [European Political Cooperation] is weak in leverage, it is strong on values … and European diplomacy has steadily become associated in the public mind with a distinct set of principles”. Earlier on, Hill (1990) had characterized the EU “a civilian power”. Later on, Manners (2002, 241, my emphasis) triggered a lively academic debate describing the EU as “a normative power”. He argued: “This combination of historical context, hybrid polity and legal constitution has, in the post-cold war period, accelerated a commitment to placing universal norms and principles at the centre of its relations with its member states and the world”. Also Sjursen (2003, 38) claimed that “the EU has considerable impact on the international system”, in a liberalist sense.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › 2NC – France

US conventional deterrence is unsustainable—waning public approval and Asia Pivot means European allies must be at the forefront of European deterrence

Geddings,Larry Jr V. 2018, Project Convergence Director at US Army Futures and Concepts Center at Us Army, May 2018, “European Deterrence for European Assurance: The United States and Russian Adventurism in the Crimea”, School of Advanced Military Studies US Army Command and General Staff College //skwon

Unsustainable Reassurance and Deterrence The United States’ conventional deterrence policy initially labeled the European Reassurance Initiative, and later re-titled the European Deterrence Initiative, was, and will remain, unsustainable in the face of a resurgent Russia in the early twenty-first century. The US deterrent strategy in Europe was in direct competition for US military presence and influence with other regions of the world. A perceived lack of return on investment, fiscal considerations, and a general weariness caused an erosion of American interest in a uniquely European problem. Without European allies and partners taking a front row seat in the security and stability of Eastern Europe, the threat of overt Russian adventurism will remain.

The United States’ tenure as a patron in Europe will continue, but, at a less intensive level than the expenditure and effort seen between 2014 and 2017. The fiscal expenditure of continual Army Armored Brigade Combat Team deployments, colossal military construction costs for forward positioning air forces and basing, and the political capital spent for national and international consensus will certainly curtail as the tangible outcomes of the reassurance and deterrence efforts become more common and less palatable by the voting American public. Fading images of “little green men” in Crimea from memory will lead to the questions of the necessity and effectiveness of US deterrence measures and the expected outcomes of those efforts.50 Additionally, the sustainability of a forward positioned rotation of almost exclusively US forces against a patient adversary is fiscally unlikely. A persistent Russia looking to regain hegemonic power far away from American shores will tax the American citizen in time, dollars, and perseverance making the possibility of a long-term commitment untenable. Finally, America cannot afford to wager on the European theater as the next significant defense and political challenge with a rising China in the Asia-Pacific region.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › 2NC – France

France nuclear deterrent solves—Macron announced intention to create a European based nuclear deterrent

Benjamin Hautecouverture 2020, He is a Senior research fellow for arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament issues at the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique. He is the Technical Director of the EU Partner to Partner programme of the European Union for the implementation and universalisation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), at Expertise France. He is also a founding member as well as a manager of the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium since 2010., September 2020, “President Macron on French Nuclear Deterrence”, //skwon

Deterrence with a European Dimension, Arms Control and Disarmament

A much-anticipated part of last February’s speech was the role of French deterrence in the European context. Macron followed on his predecessors by taking a further step in opening up to European partners. Thus, “France lives in a web of interests that extends beyond its borders. It is not isolated. Western Europe as a whole cannot therefore fail to benefit indirectly from French strategy, which is a stable and determining factor in European security.” This broader interpretation of France’s vital interests is therefore reaffirmed, Macron stating that “our nuclear forces ... strengthen European security by their very existence and in this respect have a genuinely European dimension.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg---Counterplans › CP Theory › Aff---Condo Bad

Conditionality is bad for policy making---it prevents spillup

Thanassis 21 — Cambanis Thanassis Cambanis is a senior fellow and director of Century International, The Century Foundation’s international research and policy center. Thanassis Cambanis, "No Strings Attached: Why Aid Conditionality Just Doesn’t Work," DAWN, 08-17-2021, https://dawnmena.org/no-strings-attached-why-aid-conditionality-just-doesnt-work/, accessed 7-3-2022 WMK

Intent is key to understanding how aid conditionality is supposed to work, and why it doesn't. The short answer is that the donor government—in this case, the United States—is not actually committed to any reform agenda that is nominally attached to its aid flows. In the Middle East, the U.S. goes to great lengths to overlook routine, endemic violations of the conditions attached to aid by U.S. law. Washington skirts or ignores outright those legal obligations, in the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act and the so-called Leahy Laws. Even when the U.S. does withhold aid, it doesn't seem to change regime behavior.

Look no further than the Obama administration's frustrating response to the 2013 coup in Egypt, which the White House embarrassingly refused to call a coup. The U.S. government temporarily withheld some weapons transfers, which Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's regime claimed were a serious impediment to its domestic counterterrorism operations. But Egypt didn't make any concessions during the year and a half that it was deprived of American weapons to which it felt entitled. Sure enough, by the spring of 2015, U.S. military aid resumed—with no change in Egypt's behavior.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg---Counterplans › CP Theory › Neg---Condo Good

Heavy condo good—official US position

ÜLgen 21 — Ülgen is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where his research focuses on Turkish foreign policy, nuclear policy, cyberpolicy, and transatlantic relations. Sinan ÜLgen, "Redefining the U.S.-Turkey Relationship," Carnegie Europe, 7-26-2021, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/07/26/redefining-u.s.-turkey-relationship-pub-85016, accessed 6-20-2022 WMK

This heavy conditionality has now become the official position of the United States in the Biden era. It is, however, a hugely challenging political condition for Erdoğan, who has relentlessly defended the S-400 decision at home. The question, now, is this: can Turkey and the United States find a mutually satisfactory compromise to overcome this strategic divide?

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg---Counterplans › CP Theory › AT: Intl Fiat Bad

Develops critical thinking and checks ethnocentrism—net benefit alone fails

Hulme 11 – Ph.D. Candidate (Michael, March 23, “Education for Global Citizenship in America”, http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/uncg/f/Hulme_uncg_0154D_10611.pdf)

The richness and diversity of sources reinforces the need for their critical evaluation. This is more than understanding that all „data‟ are more or less partial, in the senses of being both biased and incomplete: a compounding factor is the extent to which interpretation may be influenced, possibly unintentionally, by the mediating influence of one‟s own (possibly ethnocentric, certainly partial) view of the world. Even where ethnocentrism is not a factor, interactions with others might nevertheless be perceived as ethnocentric, especially in the minds of those whose understanding of the US and Americans have already been adversely prejudiced, in the same way as some Americans have internalized prejudices against others. This points to a greater need to develop the willingness to try to see the world through the eyes of others – and conversely to help others to see the world through American eyes (though without imparting any sense of superiority). Developing this skill, and generally developing awareness and understanding of others‟ perspectives, might additionally inform students‟ perceptions of bias in domestic media, domestic political representations, and other domestic sources. It should also provide insights into the extent to which media channels reinforce the prejudices of their respective audiences, no matter how ‘false’ those prejudices might be, effectively stifling critical thinking.

An example of a particular lesson here is to compare and deconstruct the various stories presented about a particular event or phenomenon in another country, whether contemporary or historical. These various presentations might include historical records, news media coverage, „official‟ statements, and stories shared by individuals with whom relationships have been established on the one hand, and the domestic equivalents on the other.87 Comparisons of this sort may well provide significant insights into how others (even those essentially friendly to the US) view the US and Americans, and why they do so. This in turn might lead to some understanding of others‟ behavior, which would otherwise remain opaque. Some of the findings set out in Chapter IV constitute cases in point, two example being on the one side you say we want to assist you, but on the other side you are pointing fingers at us. So which way do you want to be, a devil or an angel?

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg---Counterplans › CP Theory › AT: Intl Fiat Bad

Ethnocentrism—scholars that isolate the US role are suspect

McFaul 9 (Michael, Democracy Badass @ Stanford, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/res/2278/Evaluating_International_Influences_-_Transitions_-_Concept_Paper.pdf)

A second shortcoming stems from the fact that the existing analyses on international democracy promotion focuses on the democracy promotion efforts (the “supply side”) of individual countries, notably the United States. 15 In reality, it is never the case that the United States alone - or any other external actor for that matter - plays an independent causal role in the development of democratization in another country. The unique American contribution to democratic development in a given country can only be isolated if all other external variables are included in the analysis. There was a time when the United States government was the only major actor in the world promoting democracy, but that time has passed. As noted above, today, the European Union, individual European governments and their democracy-promoting foundations and NGOs, the United Nations, NATO, the World Bank, and hundreds if not thousands of transnational networks and private foundations also contribute to the democracy promotion business. Simply focusing on the American contribution to a case of democratization (or the lack thereof) is methodologically suspect and therefore empirically flawed. There is some analysis on the role of Western European governments and supranational European institutions (particularly the European Union) in promoting democracy abroad, 16 but American and European insights are rarely integrated, and few studies are prepared to look at a range of international actors and processes. 17 Consequently there has been little systematic thinking about the spectrum of forces shaping the international “democratic environment,” not to mention the interaction of the external environment with domestic processes.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg---Counterplans › CP Theory › AT: Negation Theory

Negation theory---if we win the counterplan is competitive then it’s worth considering---any other standard results in incomplete policy analysis---competition debates are good because they force strategic thinking and an in-depth understanding of cost-benefit analysis---outweighs any other value for debate

Strait and Wallace ’7 [L. Paul, USC and Brett, George Mason U., The Scope of Negative Fiat and the Logic of Decision Making, Policy Cures? Health Assistance to Africa, Debaters Research Guide, p. A2]

More to the point, debate certainly helps teach a lot of skills, yet we believe that the way policy debate participation encourages you to think is the most valuable educational benefit, because how someone makes decisions determines how they will employ the rest of their abilities, including the research and communication skills that debate builds. Plenty of debate theory articles have explained either the value of debate, or the way in which alternate actor strategies are detrimental to real-world education, but none so far have attempted to tie these concepts together. We will now explain how decision-making skill development is the foremost value of policy debate and how this benefit is the decision-rule to resolving all theoretical discussions about negative fiat. Why debate? Some do it for scholarships, some do it for social purposes, and many just believe it is fun. These are certainly all relevant considerations when making the decision to join the debate team, but as debate theorists they aren’t the focus of our concern. Our concern is finding a framework for debate that educates the largest quantity of students with the highest quality of skills, while at the same time preserving competitive equity. The ability to make decisions deriving from discussions, argumentation or debate, is the key skill. It is the one thing every single one of us will do every day of our lives besides breathing. Decision-making transcends boundaries between categories of learning learning like “policy education” and “kritik education,” it makes irrelevant considerations of whether we will eventually be policymakers, and it transcends questions of what substantive content a debate round should contain. The implication for this analysis is that the critical thinking and argumentative skills offered by real-world decision-making are comparatively greater than any educational disadvantage weighed against them. It is the skills we learn, not the content of our arguments, that can best improve all of our lives. While policy comparison skills are going to be learned through debate in one way or another, those skills are useless if they are not grounded in the kind of logic actually used to make decisions.

Any action could make the plan more likely.