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2022 Michigan Negative
Kritiks › Capitalism › Cap K---Link---Info Warfare

Countering disinformation relies on a false, ideological narrative of media objectivity---that naturalizes capitalism and the security state

Joseph Bernstein 21 is a senior reporter at BuzzFeed News and a 2021 Nieman Fellow. “Bad News: Selling the story of disinformation,” Harper’s Magazine, //chico

An even more vexing issue for the disinformation field, though, is the supposedly objective stance media researchers and journalists take toward the information ecosystem to which they themselves belong. Somewhat amazingly, this attempt has taken place alongside an agonizing and overdue questioning within the media of the harm done by unexamined professional standards of objectivity. Like journalism, scholarship, and all other forms of knowledge creation, disinformation research reflects the culture, aspirations, and assumptions of its creators. A quick scan of the institutions that publish most frequently and influentially about disinformation: Harvard University, the New York Times, Stanford University, MIT, NBC, the Atlantic Council, the Council on Foreign Relations, etc. That the most prestigious liberal institutions of the pre-digital age are the most invested in fighting disinformation reveals a lot about what they stand to lose, or hope to regain. Whatever the brilliance of the individual disinformation researchers and reporters, the nature of the project inevitably places them in a regrettably defensive position in the contemporary debate about media representation, objectivity, image-making, and public knowledge. However well-intentioned these professionals are, they don’t have special access to the fabric of reality.

This spring, in light of new reporting and a renewed, bipartisan political effort to investigate the origins of COVID-19, Facebook announced that it would no longer remove posts that claimed that the coronavirus was man-made or manufactured. Many disinformation workers, who spent months calling for social-media companies to ban such claims on the grounds that they were conspiracy theories, have been awkwardly silent as scientists have begun to admit that an accidental leak from a Wuhan lab is an unlikely, but plausible, possibility.

2022 Michigan Negative
Counterplans › EU › 1NC---CP---EU

The Counterplan solves disinformation – our evidence assumes Russia conflict

Arthur Laudrain 22 (Arthur Laudrain, DPhil candidate in Cybersecurity at the University of Oxford (Wolfson College), Rotary Scholar for Global Peace, and Fellow at the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative, Arthur de Liedekerke is a Project Manager at political advisory Rasmussen Global and a non-resident fellow at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK), Germany, 3-30-2022, "Russia’s Cyber War: What’s Next and What the European Union Should Do.," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/blog/russias-cyber-war-whats-next-and-what-european-union-should-do, DOA: 6-22-2022//Smarx Ahsan)

Contrary to widespread expectations, the use of cyberweaponry in the Russian war with Ukraine has so far been limited. To date, the only significant, sophisticated operations with suspected Russian involvement are the attacks on communications giant Viasat’s satellite networks, attempts to install data-wiping malware on Ukrainian government systems, and attacks against two major Ukrainian telecommunications firms.

There are several reasons that can plausibly explain why cyber operations have remained marginal in the conflict. First, the Ukrainians have done a good job at bolstering their digital defenses, helped in part by their American allies. There are also the inherent limitations of cyberattacks: in an all-out kinetic war, missiles offer a faster and more effective means of achieving strategic objectives than lines of code.

2022 Michigan Negative
Counterplans › DOS/Non-Military › Solvency---DOS---Information Warfare

The State Department has the capabilities to fight disinformation --- Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy proves

Nike Ching 21 (Nike Ching, VOA’s State Department Bureau Chief, she has traveled with four secretaries of state under Democratic and Republican administrations, 10-27-2021, "US State Department Creates Bureau to Tackle Digital Threats," VOA, https://www.voanews.com/a/us-state-department-creates-bureau-to-tackle-digital-threats/6288123.html, DOA: 6-30-2022//Smarx Ahsan)

WASHINGTON — The State Department is creating a new Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy to focus on tackling cybersecurity challenges at a time of growing threats from opponents. There will also be a new special envoy for critical and emerging technology, who will lead the technology diplomacy agenda with U.S. allies.

On Wednesday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the organizational changes underscore the need for a robust approach for dealing with cyber threats.

2022 Michigan Negative
Counterplans › DOS/Non-Military › Solvency---DOS---Information Warfare

The DoS can effectively beat Russian information operations --- Africa Proves

Pecquet 22 (Julian Pecquet, the founder and editor of Foreign Lobby Report, a US news site that offers comprehensive coverage of foreign influence operations in Washington and beyond, 5-25-2022 "US looks to expose Russian propaganda in Africa," Africa Report, https://www.theafricareport.com/207268/us-looks-to-expose-russian-propaganda-in-africa/, DOA: 6-30-2022//Smarx Ahsan---Edited for Spelling)

The State Department's counter-propaganda arm has released its first-ever report on Russian disinformation in Africa as the Joe Biden administration looks to expose the Kremlin following the invasion of Ukraine.

The Global Engagement Centre, which leads and coordinates US efforts to “recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign propaganda and disinformation”, released a three-page bulletin on Russian activities on 24 May. The report focuses particularly on Mali and other Sahel countries where the Kremlin-linked Wagner Group of mercenaries operates.

2022 Michigan Negative
Counterplans › DOS/Non-Military › Solvency---DOS---Information Warfare

The State Department has the means to counter authoritarian disinformation

Bechara and Novelo 22 (Diego Ramos Bechara, covering National Security at the nation’s capital as a full-time journalist, Allison Novelo, journalist at Northwestern University, Medill News Service, 3-15-2022, "State Department: We're fighting spread of propaganda, disinformation from Russia," UPI, https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2022/03/15/senate-hearing-authoritarianism-vladimir-putin/5921647351139/, DOA: 6-30-2022//Smarx Ahsan)

WASHINGTON, March 15 (UPI) -- The State Department is conducting "extensive media outreach" to fight the spread of propaganda and disinformation coming from Russia, officials told lawmakers Tuesday.

"That includes two Russian language media, like Meduza, as well as two U.S. government-supported Russian language media like DRL and Voice of America," State Department official Jennifer Hall Godfrey told members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during a hearing on combating authoritarianism.

2022 Michigan Negative
Counterplans › DOS/Non-Military › Solvency---DOS---Information Warfare

The DoS has the capabilities to counter Chinese and Russian disinformation operations --- GEC proves

Bill Gertz 22 (Bill Gertz, a national security correspondent for The Washington Times, studied English literature at Washington College in Chestertown, Md., and journalism at George Washington University, 4-7-2022, "State Department works to counter Ukraine disinformation from China," Washington Times, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/apr/7/state-department-working-debunk-chinese-disinforma/, DOA: 6-28-2022//Smarx Ahsan)

China’s propaganda and disinformation operations are actively promoting pro-Russian narratives about the invasion of Ukraine, supporting Moscow‘s positions and blaming the U.S. for the conflict, according to the State Department center involved in trying to counter the operations.

The department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) is leading U.S. government efforts to expose foreign propaganda efforts, including Chinese state media reports and official statements claiming that the Pentagon is developing biological and chemical weapons in Ukraine, a spokesman tells The Washington Times.

2022 Michigan Negative
Counterplans › DOS/Non-Military › Solvency---DOS---Information Warfare

The DoS solves---old agencies for countering disinformation were reorganized and placed in the jurisdiction of the DoS and multiple empirics prove.

USACPD 20, United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, tasked by Congress with "appraising U.S. Government activities intended to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics and to increase the understanding of, and support for, these same activities.” “PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE NEW “OLD” WAR: COUNTERING STATE-SPONSORED DISINFORMATION” //lenox

As we gathered background information for this report, we noticed a pattern: experts and practitioners alike became quick to turn to the past for cues on how to proceed in the future. In fact, the discussion of the historical framework of disinformation as a threat area revealed a common understanding that the challenge of disinformation is “not new.” Several of our interlocutors spoke reverently of the tools of the Cold War and cited the merits of the United States Information Agency (USIA), Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), and, most notably, the Active Measures Working Group (AMWG) as successful instruments of PD in countering disinformation.2 However, these experts agreed that they might be over-emphasizing the similarities between the disinformation threat then and now, while perhaps unintentionally underestimating the differences. Much of the apparatus that supported Cold War-era counter disinformation efforts still exists today, albeit in a somewhat disaggregated form. In 1999, USIA closed down as an independent foreign affairs agency. Its information, cultural, and exchange components were integrated into the Department of State as, respectively, the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA). Meanwhile, oversight of USIA's regional programs was turned over to the State Department’s geographic bureaus. USIA’s broadcasting components became part of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG–now the U.S. Agency for Global Media, or USAGM). The AMWG was formally disbanded in 1992 with no heir apparent; and at the BBG, the establishment of an independent board of directors removed direct USG editorial oversight and created a firewall between Congress and the independent journalism operations within the VOA and RFE/RL. In addition to the structural changes that have occurred since the integration of USIA functions into the Department of State, the rapid convergence of connection technologies -- the internet, mobile and social networks -- have fundamentally altered the domain in which information competition occurs. About half of the world’s population has access to one another via the combination of internet and social media access and mobile phones, which allow for disintermediated peer-to-peer communication at scale. The global information space is marked by a constant fight for attention, and viewership is determined by complex interactions among algorithms, professional media outlets, corporate brands, and user generated content via apps on mobile devices. As a consequence, modern public diplomacy practitioners find themselves in an environment that offers an overabundance of information—what Joseph Nye presciently described as a “paradox of plenty” that leads to a “scarcity of attention.”3 This shift has irrevocably changed the information environment in which PD officers operate, and it gives an asymmetric advantage to those who would attempt to alter, obscure, or destroy the very concept of objective truth. Initial efforts to meet the most recent iteration of these challenges began in the 2010s, during a period of what some have described as U.S. government “overexuberance” about the ability of emerging social media technologies to advance democratic values. By the time the Arab Spring began to unfold in 2011, new policies were established that encouraged State Department officials to establish online profiles and pages with the intent to amplify public affairs messaging through these increasingly influential mediums. However, constrained by bureaucratic inertia and, perhaps, overconfident that “traditional” public diplomacy measures transposed to the online space (i.e., press releases, photos from speaking events and conferences, etc.) would have the intended effect, innovation on USG social media platforms largely stopped there. While these official Department social media accounts now number in the hundreds, most PD officials agree that for a number of reasons, including but not limited to the risk aversion that arises from engaging in an often-frenetic online environment, the overall impact remained relatively muted. With the intensification of Russian disinformation efforts following Ukraine’s “revolution of dignity” and the subsequent annexation of Crimea in 2014, it became increasingly clear that the social media space had become, in effect, the front line in a new global competition for influence. Shortly thereafter, the threat of disinformation expanded far beyond the borders of Eastern Europe to become the subject of intense focus from Washington, D.C. to the Silicon Valley. The 2017 National Security Strategy included a section on Information Statecraft warning about the exploitation of “marketing techniques.”4 Meanwhile, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg described efforts to combat disinformation on his platform as an “arms race,”5 and Apple CEO Tim Cook warned that personal data was being “weaponized against us with military efficiency.”6 To paraphrase Peter W. Singer, whose 2019 book LikeWar7 explored this phenomenon in depth, tech executives were starting to sound more like national security experts, and national security experts were starting to sound more like tech executives. Recognizing a Resurgent State-Sponsored Disinformation Threat: 2016-2017 In the early stages of Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s integrity in the global information space, the State Department’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR) developed a nascent set of counter-disinformation tactics. But formal and far reaching alterations to PD CSD infrastructure originated with the passage of the May 2016 Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act, which became a part of the 2017 NDAA. The first legislation tasking an official lead in government-wide counter disinformation efforts since the Cold War, the NDAA signaled that the USG once again recognized disinformation as a high-priority threat that warranted immediate action. The State Department’s GEC, established by Executive Order in March 2016, became the prime vehicle for CSD. It was originally envisioned as a mechanism to counter violent extremist (CVE) messaging and “foreign propaganda and disinformation” operations.

2022 Michigan Negative
Disads › DOD Tradeoff › Link---enforcement

Even if the center’s inexpensive, enforcement isn’t.

DHS 21, Department of homeland security, “Combatting Targeted Disinformation Campaigns,” , cy

An alternative to naming specific domestic threat actors is to alert information consumers to those threat actors who assume fake persona or claim to have credentials which they do not have. The status of the threat actor plays an important role in influencing the perceived trustworthiness of that threat actor.20 Someone who claims to be an epidemiologist will likely be viewed as more reliable on the topic of coronaviruses than a person who claims to be a bus driver.

Information consumers who assume fake personas or claim fake credentials to deceive others for illegitimate purposes have no moral or legal standing for protection for their fraud, which is a form of disinformation. Revealing that credentials are fake can be accomplished without identifying the threat actor by name or by other information which can be tied to a specific person.

2022 Michigan Negative
Disads › DOD Tradeoff › Link---reach calculation

Even calculating reach of misinformation is a resource drain.

Clare Wardle and Nic Dias 18, U.S. Director of First Draft, Joint Doctoral Student in Communication and Political Science , cy

When should we publish stories about mis- and dis-information? How much traffic should a piece of mis- and dis-information have before we address it? In other words, what is the “tipping point,” and how do we measure it? On Twitter, for example, do we check whether a hashtag made it to a country’s top 10 trending topics?

How do we think about the impact of mis- and dis-information, particularly on Twitter? Do we care about how many people see the content? Or do we care about who sees the content? In particular, is Twitter important in virtue of the number of people who use it, or is it important because certain groups, like news organizations and politicians, use it? How do our answers to these questions change how we evaluate the impact of information?

2022 Michigan Negative
Topicality › T-Cybersecurity › 2NC---Intent to exclude

Cybersecurity refers to info and cyber operations---preventing disinformation is neither.

Eneken Tikk and Mike Kertutten 20, Executive Producer of the Cyber Policy Institute, Estonia, and lead of the 1nternat10nal Law project at CPI and the Erik Castrén Institute, University of Helsinki, Finland, and Director of Strategy at the Cyber Policy Institute, and Senior Research Scientist at the Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia, “Routledge Handbook of International Cybersecurity,” published in 2020 by Routledge

Since this is a handbook of cybersecurity, the relationship between the concepts information operation and cyber operations deserves special attention here. The main difference between the concepts is that cyber operations are method-driven whereas information operations are purpose-driven. Cyber operations refer to actions conveyed in or via cyberspace. Information operations, on the other hand, are defined by the objective of affecting decision-making or opinion. This conceptual relationship has only been explicit in the US military doctrine since 2013 (United States Joint Staff, 2013, p. I-5). In the light of this conceptual relationship, the two concepts effectively intersect: information operations are realized by cyber operations. An example of the intersection is the alleged Russian influence on the US presidential elections in 2016, in which cyber methods were deployed to collect the information needed in the information operations against Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton.

Disinformation is often associated with information operations, with the connection between disinformation and propaganda being thoroughly discussed in the literature on the latter. Even if the common perception of propaganda often assumes that it is based on lies, disinformation is not a defining characteristic of propaganda. Indeed, disinformation is often avoided in propaganda in order to preserve its credibility. Following the established relationship between disinformation and propaganda, we exclude disinformation as a defining characteristic of our definition of information operations, even if it may be regarded as a method in the process.

2022 Michigan Negative
Topicality › T-Cybersecurity › 1NC---T Cyberattacks

Cybersecurity means protecting and recovering networks from cyberattacks.

Alison Grace Johansen 22, writer for Norton, an American software company, “What is Cyber Security? What you need to know.” Norton, 4/28/22, https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-cybersecurity-what-you-need-to-know.html

Cyber security is the state or process of protecting and recovering networks, devices, and programs from any type of cyberattack.

Cyberattacks are an evolving danger to organizations, employees, and consumers. These attacks may be designed to access or destroy sensitive data or extort money.  They can, in effect, destroy businesses and damage your financial and personal lives —  especially if you’re the victim of identity theft.

2022 Michigan Kritik

2ac positivism good

Valid, descriptive theories of the world are an essential prerequisite to emancipatory critique – epistemic shifts from Eurocentric thought are impossible without reclaiming the concept of objectivity.

Jones 04 – (August 2004, Branwen Gruffydd, PhD in Development Studies from the University of Sussex, Senior Lecturer in International Political Economy at Goldsmiths University of London, “From Eurocentrism to Epistemological Internationalism: power, knowledge and objectivity in International Relations,” Paper presented at Theorising Ontology, Annual Conference of the International Association for Critical Realism, University of Cambridge, http://www.csog.group.cam.ac.uk/iacr/papers/Jones.pdf)

The rejection of positivism which is a central element of recent critiques of mainstream IR has tended to extend to rejection of the notion and possibility of science itself. Science, often written in quotation marks ‘science’, is seen as inherently part of the project of Enlightenment-modernity, a mode of technical instrumental knowledge which is necessarily a means of control and domination of both society and nature 22 . An important component of the critique of the positivist orthodoxy is exposure of its coincidence with the interests of the powerful. Dominant ideas and methods which rest on claims of value-free scientificity and neutrality are shown to mask or legitimise the interests of the powerful and the exercise of power and domination. The very claim to be able to produce value-free, neutral scientific truth is rejected in a world of inherently conflicting interests. Instead, the ‘illusion of objectivism must be replaced with the recognition that knowledge is always constituted in reflection of interests’ (Ashley 1981: 207).

2022 Michigan Kritik

1ar no-scale up

Psychoanalysis can’t be scaled up to explain society or politics

Sharpe 10 [Matthew, lecturer, philosophy and psychoanalytic studies, and Geoff Goucher, senior lecturer, literary and psychoanalytic studies, Deakin University

Matthew and Geoff, Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 182-185]

2022 Michigan Kritik

2ac psychoanalysis wrong

Psycho-analysis is wrong---terrible methodology, every refutable claim has been disproven, ineffective results

Robert Bud and Mario Bunge 10 {Robert Bud is principal curator of medicine at the Science Museum in London. 9-29-2010. “Should psychoanalysis be in the Science Museum?” (link credit to EM)

WE SHOULD congratulate the Science Museum for setting up an exhibition on psychoanalysis. Exposure to pseudoscience greatly helps understand genuine science, just as learning about tyranny helps in understanding democracy. Over the past 30 years, psychoanalysis has quietly been displaced in academia by scientific psychology. But it persists in popular culture as well as being a lucrative profession. It is the psychology of those who have not bothered to learn psychology, and the psychotherapy of choice for those who believe in the power of immaterial mind over body. Psychoanalysis is a bogus science because its practitioners do not do scientific research. When the field turned 100, a group of psychoanalysts admitted this gap and endeavoured to fill it. They claimed to have performed the first experiment showing that patients benefited from their treatment. Regrettably, they did not include a control group and did not entertain the possibility of placebo effects. Hence, their claim remains untested (The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, vol 81, p 513). More recently, a meta-analysis published in American Psychologist (vol 65, p 98) purported to support the claim that a form of psychoanalysis called psychodynamic therapy is effective. However, once again, the original studies did not involve control groups. In 110 years, psychoanalysts have not set up a single lab. They do not participate in scientific congresses, do not submit their papers to scientific journals and are foreign to the scientific community - a marginality typical of pseudoscience. This does not mean their hypotheses have never been put to the test. True, they are so vague that they are hard to test and some of them are, by Freud's own admission, irrefutable. Still, most of the testable ones have been soundly refuted. For example, most dreams have no sexual content. The Oedipus complex is a myth; boys do not hate their fathers because they would like to have sex with their mothers. The list goes on. As for therapeutic efficacy, little is known because psychoanalysts do not perform double-blind clinical trials or follow-up studies. Psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience. Its concepts are woolly and untestable yet are regarded as unassailable axioms. As a result of such dogmatism, psychoanalysis has remained basically stagnant for more than a century, in contrast with scientific psychology, which is thriving.

2022 Michigan Kritik

2ac at: k of deterrence/military

Every central premise in their criticism of deterrence is wrong---retaining military force as a deterrent against highly destructive conflict is compatible with and key to long-term anti-imperialist goals of eliminating militarism and oppression. Even if violence exists on a continuum, the difference between war and its absence is still highly salient. And their approach utterly fails to provide a strategy for dealing with the possibility of conflict, which makes it complicit if we win our impact

Peach 4 [Lucinda Joy, Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religion at American University, 2004, “A Pragmatist Feminist Approach to the Ethics of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives, ed. Hashmi, p. 436-441]

The pragmatist feminist perspective that I develop in this chapter is deeply indebted to and affirms in many respects the antiwar feminist approach outlined by Carol Cohn and Sara Ruddick in the preceding chapter, but with some marked differences. These differences, I argue, reveal more completely both the promise and the limitations of antiwar feminism. At the outset, it is important to note that there is neither a single "feminism" nor a single "pragmatism" with which it might be aligned. Instead, there are multiple feminisms, just as there are multiple pragmatisms. The "pragmatist feminism" developed in this essay draws on several elements from American Pragmatism, a philosophical school developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most prominently by Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead. Despite the many differences among the pragmatists, they tend to share several features. Perhaps most salient to the subject of this volume is their presumption "that human agency in all of its higher manifestations has evolved from ... concrete circumstances in which a vulnerable organism is confronted, often (if not usually) in concert with other organisms of the same species, with possibilities of both injury and fulfillment."' It is the continuous reminder of "human fallibility and finitude"' that constrains pragmatists from positions such as foundationalism and dogmatism and thus against ideologies that encourage the use of armed force, and especially of WMD, in all but the most extreme circumstances. It is also a reminder that armed conflicts are composed of embodied human beings, each of whom has the capacity for suffering as well as happiness, a point stressed by feminist analyses of armed conflicts. There are several significant points of commonality or intersection between pragmatism and feminism.3 Perhaps most important for thinking about the ethics of weapons of mass destruction is that both are actively engaged in attempting to solve social problems. The early pragmatists viewed the purpose of philosophical reflection to be "the intelligent overcoming of oppressive conditions." Dewey, for example, recommended the criticism of beliefs underlying society that have led to "unsatisfactory conditions in order to radically reconstruct our society according to non-oppressive and cooperative standards."5 Feminist goals of liberating women from oppression thus echo pragmatist ones. While most often feminist movements have been focused specifically on ending the male domination and oppression of women, a more inclusive feminist vision has as its object the elimination of all hierarchical and oppressive relationships, including the oppression of so-called third world or developing nations (especially of the Global South) by those of the so-called first world or industrialized nations (especially of the Global North), of ethnic, cultural, racial, or religious minorities by majorities, homosexuals by heterosexuals, the poor by the wealthy, children by adults, and so on. In addition, pragmatists advocate the elimination of sharp divisions between theory and practice, reason and experience, and knowing and doing.8 Pragmatists focus much more on consequences rather than on a priori abstract conceptualizing, captured in the phrase that pragmatists assign value on the basis of "what works" or what provides "emotional satisfaction."9 From a pragmatist perspective, the most important questions are practical ones. Pragmatists consider moral agents to be actors within a concrete particular context that both influences what is experienced and is influenced by those experiences. The inextricability of the perceiver from what is perceived means that action, whether in the context of armed conflict and the use of WMD or otherwise, must be situated within the larger context of which it is a part. Since every decision to enter or engage in an armed conflict and every decision to deploy WMD, of whatever type, must be considered within the full context of other relevant actors, agencies, and term strategies or results,12 a pragmatist perspective is unlikely to result in the kind of abstract thinking that antiwar feminism criticizes in dominant just war and realist approaches.13 Feminism also shares pragmatism's rejection of traditional rationalist and empiricist approaches and its commitment to the inseparability of theory and practice.14 Both believe that reason must be grounded in experience and requires being supplemented, at least in particular circumstances, by emotion.15 In this respect, feminists also favor a posteriori rather than a priori forms of knowledge, those that develop on the basis of experience rather than those that are posited prior to it.16 In sum, both pragmatism and feminism accord a central place to the particular, the concrete, and the factual elements of experience, as opposed to the universal, the generalizable, and the abstract.17 This opposition to abstraction is apparent, for example, in feminist understandings of women's "different voice" and Dewey's views about the importance of the qualitative background of situations. In contrast to mainstream philosophy, both feminist and pragmatist perspectives focus on everyday life and emphasize respect for others and the constitutiveness of community. The pragmatists' sensitivity to the social embeddedness of persons led them to understand the "I" "only in relation to other selves, so that the autonomy of individual agents needed to be integrated with their status as social beings" existing in community. 18 This common conception of the "relational self" suggests that both pragmatists and feminists will resist turning others into "the Other," who can then be demonized and made into "the enemy," suitable to be killed. The feminist commitment to the well-being of others, in both the local and the global community, is well illustrated by Carol Cohn's and Sara Ruddick's contribution to this volume. However, this commitment also provides the basis for the pragmatist feminist position articulated here that refuses to categorically rule out the moral legitimacy of any resort to armed force or war, since such resort may be morally imperative to protect innocent others. In addition to these marked similarities, it is also important to acknowledge how a pragmatist feminism differs significantly from American Pragmatism. Perhaps most important is pragmatist feminism's attention to the gendered character of the social world and gender's impact on the formation and maintenance of male and female identities. These subjects largely were ignored by the American Pragmatists19 but influence the analysis of the ethics of WMD outlined here. In addition, feminists tend to give greater import to the cognitive aspects of affect than pragmatists, even though, as already discussed, pragmatists recognize the importance of emotions to agency and cognition. Despite its differences from more mainstream strands of feminism, pragmatist feminism shares the goals of many strands of feminism to make gender a central consideration of the analysis (here of armed force and WMD)20 and to eradicate (patriarchal) oppression and domination. These goals result in a strong presumption against the use of any weapons, not only WMD, since they are in their very inception designed as tools for domination and suppression of others designated as "the enemy." This opposition to the use of armed force is related to feminist observations of the patriarchal and hierarchical, male-dominated and -controlled character of the military and the oppressive effects of war and militarism around the world, especially on women and children. In addition, the pragmatist feminist view described here affirms much in the "constitutive positions" of antiwar feminism articulated by Cohn and Ruddick,21 especially its observation of the gendered character of war and militarism, its suspicion of masculinist approaches to war and conflict resolution, and its critique of the dominant tradition for its focus on the physical, military, and strategic effects of these weapons separate from their embeddedness in the rest of social and political life. With this brief overview in mind, in the following section, I describe how a pragmatist feminist perspective compares with the antiwar feminist position outlined by Cohn and Ruddick in Chapter 21 with respect to the specific issues addressed by this volume. SOURCES AND PRINCIPLES Although pragmatist feminism itself does not directly provide general norms governing the use of weapons in war, it does so indirectly through its affirmation of elements of justwar theory, as described below. Pragmatist feminism does not categorically rule out the use of armed force or engagement in war. Its pragmatist perspective steers in a different direction from the antiwar feminists' "practical" opposition to war. Whereas the realist tradition has been unduly pessimistic in its assumption that war and armed conflict are necessary, certain, and inevitable, on a pragmatist feminist view, antiwar feminist thinking tends to be unduly optimistic about the human capacity to transcend the use of violent methods of resolving disputes, given the consistent and continual resort to such means throughout most of human history. From a pragmatist feminist perspective, the historical and contemporary experience of the repeated resort to violence and the inability of humanity thus far to develop alternative mechanisms for resolving large-scale disputes suggests the likelihood of future wars and armed conflicts. In light of this history, overcoming the "war culture" that antiwar feminists view so unfavorably can be possible only outside the immediate situation of armed conflict. Once the aggressor has struck or threatens to do so imminently, it is too late to change our societies and ourselves in order to avoid war. Rather, it is then necessary to act in order to avoid annihilation in one form or another. Given its view that some wars and some opposition to war and armed conflicts are morally necessary to protect ourselves and others from harm, pragmatist feminists seek to impose moral limits on the harm and suffering to the minimum necessary. Despite an awareness of its limitations,22 a pragmatist feminist perspective considers just war theory to provide a flexible and modifiable set of criteria for attempting to act morally and in accordance with principles of justice, both in entering into an armed conflict (jus ad bellum) and in the actual engagement of that conflict (jus in bello). In particular, pragmatist feminism shares just war's starting premise of a strong presumption against the legitimacy of the use of armed force and violence to resolve conflicts. A pragmatist feminist perspective thus rejects Cohn's and Ruddick's contention that justwar theorists "implicitly accept war as a practice even when condemning particular wars."23 Recognizing the historical and global reality of war making and armed force as means of resolving conflicts and adopting strategies to maximize justice and minimize immorality when such means are adopted is not the same as "implicitly accepting the practices of war," at least in the absence of demonstrably effective means of eliminating such conflicts. To ignore the reality of the continuing resort to war and armed force is itself to revert to abstraction rather than offering a practical method for eliminating the human suffering and incalculable damage caused by war and armed conflict. Here Colin and Ruddick reveal (intentionally or otherwise) their situatedness as citizens of a war-making state, one that has had the choice in many, if not all, instances since the mid-twentieth century, at least, of deciding whether or not to go to war. Just as Cohn and Ruddick criticize just war theory for failing to explore nonviolent alternatives once a just cause is determined or war has begun, their antiwar feminist approach fails to offer concrete suggestions for avoiding armed conflict when a nation or people is confronted with armed aggression or assault by others, the situation where the options boil down to "fight or die." This perspective fails to look at war from the point of view of the aggressed-against, when armed conflict becomes a necessity in order to retain national and/or cultural and/or ethnic identity from subjugation by the aggressor(s). In such circumstances, the moral necessity of armed force looks quite different. And in such circumstances, the threatened use of WMD can be seen as less evil than the alternatives, such as doing nothing and being conquered or fighting a conventional war and faring poorly. Rather than reverting to abstract thinking about war, pragmatist feminism affirms just war theory's casuistic approach to particular armed conflicts as well as its position that such means are sometimes morally justifiable or even morally obligator)' in order to protect oneself (individual or nation) or innocent third parties. Further, pragmatist feminism affirms just war thinking's attention to particular conflicts rather than war in the abstract and its stance of moderation and of imposing the minimal suffering necessary to accomplish the objective of restoring the peace.24 Thus, with respect to the military response of the United States to the September 11 terrorist attacks, a pragmatist feminist application of just war criteria yields the conclusion that the jus ad bellum principles of "last resort" and "proportionality," as well as the in hello principles of "proportionality" and "discrimination," were not satisfied. A second difference in the two feminist perspectives emerges out of the antiwar feminist observation that war and militarism are not separate from everyday life but integral aspects of it.25 While this is an extremely important insight into the underlying conditions of war and militarism, it needs to be joined with alternative proposals for addressing the "large-scale military conflict." There has been scant attention to this issue in antiwar feminist scholarship. Even if one assumes, as antiwar feminists do, that war is a "presence" in everyday life and not merely a discrete "event" that occasionally "erupts,"26 it is nonetheless the case that "war" is more damaging and harmful, and creates greater suffering in a multiplicity of ways, than the absence of war. Pragmatist feminist thinking about the ethics of WMD is attentive to how such differences in consequences differentiate war from “everyday life.” A third significant area of difference between the two types of feminist theories concerns responses to the causes of war. Whereas pragmatist feminists agree with antiwar feminists that wars are partially a mutual construction, they also insist that some wars have much more to do with unjust aggression for which opposing sides do not share equal responsibility. Antiwar feminism fails to accept that some wars are not only necessary as a matter of prudence, but also morally justifiable on feminist grounds, for example, humanitarian intervention to end the severe oppression of innocent victims. For a pragmatist feminist, the current state of international affairs unfortunately requires consideration of the circumstances in which the threatened or actual use of such weapons for defensive or deterrent purposes may be morally allowable or even morally necessary. Given these circumstances, pragmatist feminism considers the just war tradition to provide a morally useful source of norms relating to the use of weapons in war.

2022 Michigan Kritik

2ac at: nukespeak

Only effective discursive stewardship and technological power prevents the rogue usage of nuclear weapons – this turns and outweighs the K and proves the permutation is possible and desirable.

Futterman 94. J.A.H. Futterman, Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin and Physicist at the University of California’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, “Obscenity and Peace: Meditations on the Bomb,” http://web.archive.org/web/20060106211941/http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html

Now this contrasts with the argument of those who would "reinvent government" by putting up bureaucratic roadblocks to maintaining the reliability of the US nuclear arsenal through research and testing. They reason that if the reliability of everyone's nuclear arsenals declines, everyone will be less likely to try using them. The problem is that some "adventurer-conqueror" may arise and use everyone's doubt about their arsenals to risk massive conventional war instead. An expansionist dictatorship might even risk nuclear war with weapons that are simpler, cruder, less powerful, much riskier (in terms of the possibility of accidental detonation) but much more reliable than our own may eventually become without adequate "stockpile stewardship."[14] But the inhibitory effect of reliable nuclear weapons goes deeper than Shirer's deterrence of adventurer-conquerors. It changes the way we think individually and culturally, preparing us for a future we cannot now imagine. Jungian psychiatrist Anthony J. Stevens states, [15] "History would indicate that people cannot rise above their narrow sectarian concerns without some overwhelming paroxysm. It took the War of Independence and the Civil War to forge the United States, World War I to create the League of Nations, World War II to create the United Nations Organization and the European Economic Community. Only catastrophe, it seems, forces people to take the wider view. Or what about fear? Can the horror which we all experience when we contemplate the possibility of nuclear extinction mobilize in us sufficient libidinal energy to resist the archetypes of war? Certainly, the moment we become blasé about the possibility of holocaust we are lost. As long as horror of nuclear exchange remains uppermost we can recognize that nothing is worth it. War becomes the impossible option. Perhaps horror, the experience of horror, the consciousness of horror, is our only hope. Perhaps horror alone will enable us to overcome the otherwise invincible attraction of war." Thus I also continue engaging in nuclear weapons work to help fire that world-historical warning shot I mentioned above, namely, that as our beneficial technologies become more powerful, so will our weapons technologies, unless genuine peace precludes it. We must build a future more peaceful than our past, if we are to have a future at all, with or without nuclear weapons — a fact we had better learn before worse things than nuclear weapons are invented. If you're a philosopher, this means that I regard the nature of humankind as mutable rather than fixed, but that I think most people welcome change in their personalities and cultures with all the enthusiasm that they welcome death — thus, the fear of nuclear annihilation of ourselves and all our values may be what we require in order to become peaceful enough to survive our future technological breakthroughs.[16]

2022 Michigan Kritik

2ac at: nuclear language bad

We need to use the language of nuclear experts to challenge them --- solves co-option

Hogan 94 [J. Michael Hogan, Professor of Communication Arts and Sciences at Pennsylvania State University, The Nuclear Freeze Campaign: Rhetoric and Foreign Policy in the Telepolitical Age, p. 6-7]

Most former freeze activists retain at least some faith in the democratic process. According to Solo, the freeze campaign at least began a long process of “educating” the public, and for a time it successfully transformed “the issues and the language used by politicians” to facilitate discussion of nuclear issues, breaking from “the dominant discourse of arms control and the cold war.” But just as this “war of ideas” was beginning to bear fruit, according to Solo, “the movement narrowed its agenda, which in turn constrained its educational program and confined its politics.” Concerned with answering its right-wing critics and remaining “respectable” among “political and arms control elites,” freeze advocates began defending the initiative on “technical grounds,” thereby straying from their “original goal of breaking out of arms control ‘negotiations as usual’ and challenging the new militarism.” For Solo, the lesson is clear: that in order “to develop a mass base” with “potential to develop political power without being co-opted,” peace activists must “promote political literacy with a dynamic education strategy that recognizes the peculiarities of our culture and language and does not overlook the continuing impact of television on our political life as a nation.”

2022 Michigan Kritik

2ac mcgowan/perm

McGowan votes for the perm---can integrate K’s insights and the 1AC

Daniel Tutt 13, Interviewing Todd McGowan, October 27, “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: Interview with Philosopher Todd McGowan”, http://danieltutt.com/2013/10/27/enjoying-what-we-dont-have-interview-with-philosopher-todd-mcgowan/

DT. It seems to me that a frequent critique of psychoanalysis and politics is that in its inability, and perhaps unwillingness to propose concrete policy reforms or political projects, it falls back on a notion that everyone should just undergo analysis. Do you think that a political project that is informed by psychoanalytic teachings implies that we should all undergo analysis? You write in your book for instance that fantasy is a crucial point for facilitating a sort of un-bonding process from the larger capitalist mode of subjectivity. What do you see as the role of analysis and political emancipatory work?¶ TM. I will alienate many of my analyst friends with this response, but I have no political investment at all in psychoanalytic practice. I’ve undergone some analysis myself. However, I don’t believe that everyone undergoing psychoanalysis would change much at all politically. What is important about psychoanalysis to me is its theoretical intervention, its discovery of the death drive and the role that fantasy plays in our psyche. This is the great advance. And political struggle can integrate these theoretical insights without any help from actual psychoanalysis. What allows one to disinvest in the capitalist mode of subjectivity is not, in my view, the psychoanalytic session. Instead it is the confrontation with a mode of enjoyment that ceases to provide the satisfaction that it promises. This prompts one to think about alternatives. Obviously, not everyone can become a theorist, but in a sense, everyone already is a theorist. We theorize our enjoyment when we think through our day and plan out where we’re going to do. Even watching a television show requires an elaborate theoretical exercise. Making this theorizing evident and thus arousing an interest in theory is to me much more important than having a lot of people undergo psychoanalysis. In response to your question about the universalization of psychoanalytic practice, I have more faith in a universalization of psychoanalytic theory.

2022 Michigan Kritik

2ac framework

Debating about policy is good, it’s the only way to reflect upon personal boundaries and engage with contingency – their model excludes that and causes dissatisfaction through thematizing politics

Turnbull 05 (Nick Turnbull PhD – Lecturer in Politics at the University of Manchester, “Policy in question: from problem solving to problematology”, University of New South Wales, February 2005, https://www.academia.edu/download/66798539/SOURCE02.pdf, MG)

The key to moving beyond both positivism and the deconstruction of meaning is the foundation of questioning and the concept of the problematological answer. Politics is surely the sphere of debate over the meaning of public problems and how to solve them. If we disagree on a question, we argue about it, add to it with other questions, weaken it, and debate the pro and con of the possible answers. A plurality of meanings means a plurality of answers, which indicates contingency, but it is not an aporia (an impassable obstruction to knowledge) (see Derrida 1993). It simply entails that meaning is in question.74 This establishes rhetoric as a legitimate dimension of discourse because problematological answers have an equal status, as answers, to apocritical answers. Some questions cannot be solved beyond dispute but they can be expressed and then debated. In fact, as I pointed out in Chapter Four, there is no argumentation in poststructuralism, because if signification were a free play of meaning it would be impossible to indicate one answer to a question over another (Meyer 1995: 238). Similarly, while Foucault depicts a figurative picture of discourse (see Foucault 1970) he has no argumentation, which perhaps accounts for the feeling that agency is absent in his work. But while we are ‘prisoners’ of language, defined by it in important ways, we can reflect upon our boundaries as well, through questioning, even if this is difficult. Knowledge has its own inertia because we operate on the basis of presumed answers and so reality appears continuous (Meyer 2000; see also Chapter Seven). Nonetheless, it is also open to question and therefore we are not always powerless. Even those working within an established discourse have to continually reinforce its legitimating power, and therefore can escape responsibility only by rhetorical means. Hence powerful elites have a strategic interest in arguing for particular ways of framing problems. Agency and structure are in reason, and we can understand both in terms of questioning. Rationality is still possible, so our task should be to reverse the fragmentary reductionism of science and the internal fragmentation of radical poststructuralism but without reimposing the problem solving model upon reality as the sole, unjustified criterion of resolution. By drawing on Meyer’s concept of problematological answers, we can establish what is rational and what is irrational about politics without judging it in scientific terms. This is essential if we are to understand policymaking, which is multidisciplinary.