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2022 Michigan Kritik
1AC - Fem IR

The assigning of vulnerability disproportionately on feminine subjects creates gendered hierarchies and gendered violence. And, because masculine subjects need to be invulnerable, they respond with violence or potential violence with violence, making war inevitable and unending.

Peet and Sjoberg, 2020 (Laura Sjoberg, Professor of Political Science at U Florida; the Late Jessica Peet taught IR at the University of Florida and USC. Introduction to Gender and Civilian Victimization in War (Print Book), SPP)

As scholars, the "lenses" we use "foreground some things, and background others" in our research (V. Peterson and Runyan 1999). Our research questions start with the ideas, concepts, and variables we see as most important in global politics. For example, the scholars who have written on intentional civilian victimization have started with the ideas, concepts, and variables they see as most important in global politics, including regime type, international law, strategy, and culture. Like other scholars in IR, feminist work uses "lenses" to foreground variables of particular interest, specifically sex, gender, and sexuality; gender identity; and gender hierarchy, using "gender lenses" to view global politics (V. Peterson and Runyan 1999: 2). Looking through gender lenses is a way "to focus on gender as a particular kind of power relation, or to trace out the ways in which gender is central to understanding international processes" (Steans 1998: 5). While women's oppression is a primary concern for feminists, "the driving force of feminism is its attention to gender and not simply to women .... [T]he concept, nature and practice of gender are key" (Zalewski 1995). Feminists, then, "ask what assumptions about gender (and race, class, nationality, and sexuality) are necessary to make particular statements, policies, and actions meaningful" (Wilcox 2009). In our analysis of civilian victimization, we focus on how the concept, nature, and practice of gender influences states' and other war-fighting parties' decisions to target civilians and ask what assumptions about gender are necessary to make intentional civilian victimization appealing, despite the non-combatant immunity norm. With this focus, we also look at the intersections of gender, race, ethnicity, and nationalism in constituting both the idea of the civilian and her vulnerability. In order to fully grasp why those are important questions, we need to spend a little time understanding what feminists mean by 'sex' and by 'gender' in this context. Many people see sex as biology - male and fem ale sex organs make people men or women. 4 In the conventional wisdom, then, gender is directly related to, and maps onto, sex - men are masculine and women are feminine. However, feminist scholarship has "questioned the conventional assumption that gender differences (and subordination) are rooted in biological differences between women and men" (Scott 1987; Sjoberg 2006a: 32). Instead, feminist scholars suggest that the relation between sex and gender is presumed rather than natural, where masculinity and femininity are separable from maleness and femaleness. Masculine characteristics, like strength, protectiveness, rationality, aggressiveness, presence in public life, domination, and leadership, then, are perceived as related to maleness, while in reality they are not reserved for men. Conversely, traits associated with femininity, like weakness, vulnerability, emotion, passivity, privacy, submission, and care, are assumed to be the domain of women, while that is not always or even normally the case. Genderings can be read into and back onto sex, which is malleable rather than set, and co-constituted with gender (e.g., Butler 1990, 1993). Applying this understanding, gender cannot be operationalized as a 'yes' or 'no' (or 'male' or 'female' question), or as a matter of degree. It also cannot be accounted for by asking questions about 'what women do' differently than 'what men do' in global politics.5 Instead, it is more of a constellation of significations, where masculinities and femininities are mutually constituted (along with race, class, sexuality, etc.) in specific, hierarchical relation to one another - where ( often) masculinities are prized and powerful, while femininities are seen as undesirable and therefore subordinated. In this context, we can talk not just about men and women and masculinities and femininities but of masculinism and feminization. Masculinism is the prizing of masculinities and the exclusion and/ or devaluing of femininities in social and/ or political contexts. Masculinism leads to feminization - the devaluing of femininities by putting down or putting aside people, groups, or ideas associated with femininities and by associating devalued or marginalized people, groups, or ideas with femininities (V. Peterson 2010; see also V. Peterson and Runyan 2010). 6 V. Spike Peterson describes feminization as devalorization: Not only subjects (women and marginalized men), but also concepts, desires, tastes, styles, "ways of knowing" ... can be feminized - with the effect of reducing their legitimacy, status and value. Importantly, this devalorization is simultaneously ideological (discursive, cultural) and material (structural, economic) .... This devalorization normalizes - with the effect of "legitimating" - the marginalization, subordination, and exploitation of feminized practices and persons ... the "naturalness" of sex difference is generalized to the "naturalness" of masculine (not necessarily male) privilege, so that both aspects come to be taken-for -granted "givens" of social life (V. Peterson 2010). In this vein, a key tenet of feminist theorizing about the global political arena is that it is gender -hierarchical (Sjoberg 2009). Though masculinities and femininities are detectable across known human history, they are not static, temporally, geographically, or culturally. Quite the opposite, the dominant 'masculinity' or 'femininity' is different at different times, and in different places and cultures. While "the exact content of genders varies with various and shifting socio-political contexts, ... gender subordination (defined as the subordination of femininities to masculinities) remains a constant feature of social and political life across time and space" (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 9). Feminist research in IR, then, asks how these complex notions of gender constitute and influence the realities of everyday life in global politics . In this book, we are particularly interested in how gender influences belligerents' (especially states') decisions to attack civilians in war in conjunction with other parts of the 'puzzle' of intentional civilian victimization. Thinking about gender and intentional civilian victimization Revisiting the narratives that began this introduction, it is possible to see gender influencing intentional civilian victimization in what happened to Hassan and Benedicte and their contemporaries. Referencing experiences like Benedicte's, Judith Gardam has explained that rape is never truly aimed at or affecting just one person (1993: 363). Instead, "rape functions as a strategy to deliver a blow against a collective energy by striking at a group of high symbolic value" (Pettman 1996: 190). By raping Benedicte, government forces were attacking non -lvoirians by attacking "their" women, as "xenophobic speech [was] aimed specifically at women from the 'enemy' community," encouraging rape and sexual violence (Amnesty International 2007). As a result, sexual violence became "an intentional strategy to terrorise, demean, and defeat an entire population, as well as a way of engendering hate and destruction" between the rebels and the government in Cote d'Ivoire (Amnesty International 2004). In the 1990s war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, women suffered the brunt of civilian victimization, as a result both of apparently gender -neutral tactics and of a systematic campaign of genocidal rape. Reports of mass rape began appearing in newspaper headlines in August of 1992 (Hansen 2001: 55). Women were raped, both individually and as proxy for the nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina also being 'raped.' The rape of civilian women was also the rape of ('their') nation, an idea that was reiterated by Bosnian ambassador to the United Nations addressing the Security Council in 1993: Excellencies, Bosnia and Herzegovina is being gang-raped ... I do not lightly apply the analogy of a gang rape to the plight of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As we know, systematic rape has been one of the weapons of this aggression against the Bosnian women in particular. (Metrovic 1994: xii) In this statement the rape of Bosnian women is metaphor for the destruction and 'rape' of a nation, literally and figuratively. This sort of "rape happens, not as a consequence of thoughtless, provocative, or unfortunate behavior, but as a question of national warfare" (Hansen 2001: 59). Lene Hansen explains that, in Bosnia, [r ]aping "the nation's women" is not only an act of violence against individual women; it also works to install a disempowered masculinity as constitutive of the identities of the nation's men. The interconnection between individual/ collective and national/ gendered might also be illustrated by the way that a woman impregnated by rape can be represented as a passive "national" container of a child imagined to be the future bearer of the rapist's nationality. In this way, an individual rape can be read for its collective, national significance through the complex sign of the child's imagined future identity as an embodiment of the enemy state. (Hansen 2001: 60) Women were also targeted for violence that was not explicitly sexual. Some Serb policy statements emphasized depriving individual households of nutritional and medical resources necessary for reproduction as a way to target the opponent ethnicities. Even the targeting of men had gendered connotations and implications. Planning for the Srebrenica massacre (where an estimated 8,000 men were killed, selected as men for victimization), the killing was discussed as a strategy for reducing the availability of men, who were characterized as fertilizers and protectors for women. Planners referred to their strategies as "cleaning houses" such that women would pose "less resistance to repopulation" (referring to forced impregnation) without 'their' men. 7 Narratives like this could be and have been told of many wars, genocides, conflicts, and terrorist attacks around the world. In this book, we present evidence that when belligerents intentionally victimize civilians, they are actually attacking women because of women's actual and symbolic position in the life, livelihood, and nationalist narratives of the opponent's state and/ or nation. While most people who read Benedicte and Hasan's stories assume that Benedicte's experience was a gendered form of civilian victimization and Hasan's experience was tragic but a case of 'normal' or ungendered civilian victimization, we argue that it is not just in sexual violence against civilians that civilian victimization is gendered. Instead, when civilians are attacked in war, often 'civilian' is in important ways a proxy for women, not as female bodies but for how they are positioned in and symbolic of nation and state. Wartime sexual violence is {like other civilian victimization tactics) a way to get to the 'heart' of the opponent by destroying both crucial resources and the very parts of their society which legitimate the fighting of the war in the first place - pure, innocent women that good men fight just wars to protect (see, e.g., Elshtain 1987). Along these lines, we theorize intentional civilian victimization through gender lenses. Expanding on feminist work about nationalism and war generally, and the noncombatant immunity principle specifically, we contend that the very same logic that makes belligerents so eager to 'protect' their innocent women from wars also encourages them to attack the women who are seen as belonging to their enemies. In war stories, just warriors fight the good fight to protect their innocent women and children from those foreign or outside men who would attack them (Huston 1983). Just warriors, then, legitimate not only wars generally but also their masculinities specifically by protecting women back home (Sjoberg 2006b). Attacking the women that motivate the opponent to fight - the women that symbolize his state and/ or nation and whose protection legitimates his war - attacks both the will to fight a particular war and the logic of war-fighting. In these terms, as we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 3, intentional civilian victimization can be seen as a product of the gendered narratives that legitimate and sustain nationhood and the practices of the making and fighting of wars. We are, of course, not arguing that women and only women are killed in the victimization of civilians. Such an argument would be both inaccurate and oversimplified. We are instead arguing that 'civilian victimization' is, sometimes consciously and sometimes not, an attack on women, where 'civilian' is in important ways a proxy for women. But this proxy is not a simple, one-to-one mapping where belligerents think 'civilian' but mean 'women' (as women), even to the extent that belligerents are willing to admit attacking civilians. Rather the proxy is a complex indicator of state/nation, based on actual and perceived strength. Belligerents attack (women) civilians for the same reason they claim protection for their own - because the 'protection racket' is an underlying justification for states, governments, and their wars (see, e.g., S. Peterson 1977). Insomuch as women are indicators, signifiers, and reproducers of state and nation, belligerents attack women to attack the state and nation. We contend that such an explanation, when compared to the others that have been presented up to this point, provides both greater theoretical leverage towards understanding the problem of civilian targeting and greater empirical explanatory power for the particulars of cases of civilian victimization in war. In the remainder of this introduction, we outline how this book makes that argument and presents both quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence to support it.

2022 Michigan Kritik
1AC - Fem IR

Debate has always been constructed though the masculine feminine dichotomy. Feminine debaters are forced to distance themselves from their femininity in order to be taken seriously and be competitive within the activity. However, when they do that too much, they are too bitchy. It is a game that becomes impossible to win. Instead, we need to challenge the dichotomy, allowing feminine debaters to embrace their individual identities.

(Bjork et al 99, Rebecca S., University of Utah, Dauber, Cori, University of North Carolina, Dix, Lisa, University of tah, Hobbs, Lisa, University of North Carolina, Kidder, Beck, University of Michigan, Ouding, Jenni, University of Michigan, and Rhyne, Joy, University of North Carolina, “Women in Debate: Reflections on the Ongoing Struggle,” http://web.archive.org/web/20011012220529/members.aol.com/womynindebate/article3.htm)//RB

Debate has been an overwhelmingly positive experience for me. That is not to say that there have not been negative aspects. I think that it is important for every woman in debate to be honest with herself. We are unfortunately the victims of sexual harassment and discrimination, but I do not believe that means we are destined to inferiority. It is imperative that we fight against rigidly defined gender roles in order to become full and equal participants in the debate community--that is not to say that women must deny their femininity to be successful debaters. Instead, I think each woman should be true to her own identity; if her femininity is an important part of her psyche, then she should by no means feel compelled to deny it or try to hide it in exchange for increased debate achievements .As a Southern woman, I think the pressures I felt within the debate community were great. At the beginning of my collegiate debate career I was not very focused on the competitive aspects of debate. My partner and I would win some debates, but what was most important to me at that time was socializing with other debaters. I do not encourage other women in debate to adopt such an attitude, but I also do not think that women who have such an attitude should be stigmatized. I found that as one of the few females on the debate circuit I was accepted socially by almost every other debater I met, whether they were junior-varsity participants or one of the top first-rounds. I was able to have fun with these people and it did not seem to matter that I was often much less successful in debate than they were. In fact, I think that it was easier for them to "hang out" with me because I was not in direct competition with them. When I changed partners and became part of a first-round team, things changed. I can recall countless occasions when friends of mine virtually ignored me in discussions about debate rounds or issues and addressed all of their questions to my male partner. This kind of behavior marginalized my worth as a debater. It always amazed me that other debaters (who were my friends) could totally ignore me as a "debater"; I was only truly recognized in a social context. I think the social side of debate is important--some of my best friends are debaters--but every debater should have the opportunity to develop both the social and the competitive sides of debate.I do not mean to imply that women in debate have little hope of becoming true equals to the men of debate or that they are destined to occupy only a social role and will forever remain at the peripheries of debate success. However, I do believe that feminine women face special challenges because they seem to fit the traditionally defined gender roles of our society at large. Women are not taught to be competitive; such ambitions are reserved for men. Argumentation itself has traditionally been associated with men because they are thought to be more rational and logical than women, who are supposedly driven by their emotions. In society, these views have started to change. Women have become successful in these so-called "male areas" and I think that debate as well will increasingly come to reflect these changes. A woman can be feminine and still excel at argumentation and logical reasoning. I fundamentally disagree with those in the debate community who would urge women to become more "masculine" in order to achieve a higher level of debate success. Giving into stereotypes will only serve to perpetuate such myths. As a debater, I resisted such pressures, held on to my femininity, and still managed to have a successful debate experience. I encourage other women in debate to do the same. We must fight the pressure and be true to ourselves; there is no fundamental reason why only "masculine" women can succeed in debate.As a final note, I think that it is important for all of us to encourage more women (and minorities as well) to participate in collegiate debate. I know that many female high school debaters decide against debating in college because they feel the activity is too hostile to women. I think that this is a tragedy and that coaches and debaters alike should discourage such attitudes. After all, our society is sexist, but does that mean women should avoid becoming active participants and leaders? Of course not. In the same way, women should not shy away from collegiate debate. I can honestly say that I have acquired many valuable skills through my involvement in debate. Giving up is not the answer. Raising awareness will certainly help, but I think the key really lies with the women in debate themselves. We must decide to stay involved, encourage other women we know to participate, and most importantly, refuse to settle for anything less than real equality and complete autonomy. LISA DIXKaren Finley, one of my favorite poets, writes with power and knowledge of her experiences as a woman. Her poem entitled "I Was Not Expected To Be Talented" is for me a powerful expression of my feelings about being a woman in debate. The poem goes like this ...Just smile, act pretty, open the door, and clean the toilet. You say one day at a time well, it's a slow death! Remember the homeless, the poor, the suffering. Well, I'm suffering inside!...You know why I only feel comfortable around the collapsed, the broken, the inebriated, the helpless and the poor-'CAUSE THEY LOOK LIKE WHAT I FEEL INSIDE! They look, they look, they look like what I feel inside! You see, I WAS NOT EXPECTED TO BE TALENTED. I am using this poem to relate to my experiences in debate as a woman. I feel that it is important for me to be as honest as I can about my experiences, yet at the same time to relate a message that is positive for women who are entering the activity. The story I'm about to tell is a coming to terms about my "place" in debate as a woman. I am a policy debater at the University of Utah. I did not debate in high school, although I did do some individual events. From my experience in high school, I think individual events were sort of the "woman's place." I was not expected to be talented in debate; however, I feel that women can be VERY talented if they are just encouraged to participate. This is the reason I am writing this paper. I believe that by subverting the notion of a "woman's place" in debate, and by being able to define our own "place" as women, more women will be encouraged to participate in debate at the high school and collegiate levels.The first time I was aware of my "place" in debate as a woman was at a regular season tournament. I was at the awards ceremony listening to the top twenty speaker awards; not one of them was a woman. Women were winning awards at the novice and junior levels, but for varsity women to win speaker awards was out of the question. I thought to myself, at least we were winning some awards, but my coach quickly told me that not very many women ever win speaker awards past the junior and novice levels. I guess I am very reluctant to accept that novice and junior debate is the only "place" for women. I am not taking anything away from novice and junior women debaters; my argument is that these women deserve a chance to win on the varsity level as well. Another experience that reminded me quickly where my "place" in debate is was in a round at the beginning of last season. A male debater put his arm around me during cross examination and said, "chill out, babe." I quickly thought to myself, "I am not your babe," but I said nothing and immediately sat down. I felt very objectified, humiliated, and angry. By treating me as a sex object, that male debater quickly put me in my "place."Women in debate have to deal with a double standard. If we are not feminine enough we are thought of as "bitchy," yet if we are too feminine, we are not taken seriously. I urge all women to hold on to both. We need to construct ourselves outside of the masculine/ feminine dichotomy-we should be able to have a place in debate because we are talented. At the 1992 National Debate Tournament, my partner (who is a woman) and I noticed that there were only four women teams at the tournament (76 teams total), and none of the women teams advanced to the double octafinal round. In fact, only four women cleared at all. Not one woman won a speaker award. I am proud of those women who were in the out-rounds. I am also proud of all the women who are in debate. It is time for women to demand a "place." It is past time for women in debate to be considered talented. I feel that if women are encouraged on the high school level to start and stay with debate, we will not be the minority or the marginalized. Only then can we truly get past being placed in a subordinate position; we will be able to define our own "place" in debate on our own terms.

2022 Michigan Kritik
1AC - Fem IR

USFG action can never solve gendered violence and war -- NATO will always been framed as the savoir and “righteous defender” of vulnerable feminine bodies in order to justify violence against other countries. In Kosovo, the media did exactly this, they strove to “protect” the “victims” there only so they could remain these feminized, vulnerable, victims that NATO can use to promote their own invulnerability agendas

(Kozol 04, Wendy. , Wendy Kozol is a professor in the American Studies department at Oberlin College , “Domesticating NATO’s War in Kosovo/a: (In) Visible Bodies and the Dilemma of Photojournalism.” Meridians, vol. 4, no. 2, 2004, pp. 1–38. JSTOR, .) // RB

Media Coverage of NATO Bombings Throughout the 1990s, the American news media represented the Balkans as a violent region rocked by ethnic cleansing following the collapse of communist regimes at the end of the Cold War. Reports on concentration camps, torture, mass murder, and expulsion of thousands from their homes reinforced a narrative about the failure of democracies rather than the failure of market economies to emerge. Moreover, by mid-decade, reporters began to discuss the extraordinarily high levels of sexual violence by Serbian and Yugoslav forces in this region, especially in Bosnia. Feminist analyses foreground the associations between Serbian national- ism, rape warfare, and ethnic cleansing in order to understand rape as a military and political tool (Milic 1993; B. Allen 1996; Rejali 1998). Lynda Boose, for instance, argues that the sexual sadism of Serbian brutality was crucial to this "orgy of nationalism" (2002, 74). Statistics vary widely but conservative estimates of women raped in Bosnia range from twenty thousand to fifty thousand. (Boose 2002) U.S. media attention turned to Kosovo/a in the late 1990s as violence escalated against Albanian Muslim populations. The moment of most intense interest in the region came during the NATO bombings when the United States was directly involved in the conflict through its military presence. NATO operations never achieved the popular support of the Gulf War, coming as they did shortly after the impeachment hearings of President Clinton. Instead, the bomb- ings provoked intense debates about appropriate methods of humanitarian intervention as well as exposed the problematic nature of NATO's very existence after 1991. Television, newspapers, and the major newsmagazines all provided extensive coverage of the war. Even with the pervasiveness of television, Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News continue to influence a wide variety of Americans because "nearly every high school, public and academic library" purchases them (Ulrich's Periodical Directory 2003). Major media con- glomerates that own Time (Time-Warner) and Newsweek (Washington Post, Inc.) - U.S. News is independently published - are part of the powerful network of American and European news media that control "what much of the world reads, watches, and hears in its foreign news ..." (Shulman 1994, 108). Crucially, these newsmagazines frame global economic, political, and social conflicts through racial and gender categories that in turn justify the U.S. government's encroaching and imperialist notions of globalization. The first two weeks of the bombings in April 1999 were a crucial period during which the news magazines established narrative conventions for reporting the bombings. The first week's coverage featured lengthy discussions of U.S. military and political strategies, as well as articles on Milosevic as the locus of nationalist violence and reports on ethnic cleansing. Photographs show U.S. military and political leaders, Milosevic, maps of the region that depict US/NATO strategies for attack, and some pictures of refugees. Coverage in the second week focused more exten- sively on the refugees with numerous photographs of people walking along roads or railroad tracks and in the camps, photographs of military and political leaders, as well as more maps and pictures of U.S. soldiers. Articles continued to focus primarily on U.S. and NATO policies and military strategies, although reporters included more discussion of Albanian Kosovars' experiences of Serbian brutality. Visual culture scholars are increasingly exploring the power of the visual to shape and mediate knowledge beyond simplistic models of propaganda or image manipulation (Liss 1998, xviii). Frequently reproduced and revered photographs of war, like Robert Capa's "Death of a Loyalist Soldier" (1936) or Nick Ut's "Terror of War" (the 1973 photograph of a young Vietnamese girl running naked from a Napalm attack) are not those with the most detail but those with the greatest symbolic value (Griffin 1999). As Liss writes, "At stake are the ways in which photographs are set in motion, how they are employed to stand in for wrenching, almost unrepresentable events" (1998, xii). This study provides detailed visual analyses of news photographs in Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News & World Report to examine which photographs "stand in" or represent the bombing campaign. Because of publishing deadlines, weekly news- magazines function like a "news digest" that recapitulates television and newspaper reports on events of the previous week, using photographs as visual "highlights" (Griffin and Lee 1995, 814). These visual highlights are less important as factual reportage than they are for their symbolic function. I will analyze the similarities in topics of coverage, narrative strategies, and visual conventions, including some repetition of specific photographs.7 This article, however, does not address the interpretive audiences of these news reports, whose readings, of course, will always be plural.8 All three magazines promoted a narrative of American rescue of victims in a dangerous and unstable region.9 An April 12 photograph from US News, for instance, shows a white American soldier in full combat gear in the extreme foreground. He frames the picture so that the viewer looks with him into the background at several cars on a desolate road. The viewer thus "sees" what the soldier is there to protect (presumably these are civilian refugees although the people in the cars remain unidentified). Above the photograph, the headline "Can the Cavalry Ride to the Rescue?" aligns a racial ideal of hegemonic masculinity with U.S. military efforts in this visual rescue narrative. Although the question mark suggest ambiguity in the situation, the exclusive focus in the article on the relative merits of different military strategies raises questions about policy rather than social or ethical concerns. This tag line, moreover, invokes American narratives of the frontier, referencing the imperialist imaginary of the U.S. cavalry protecting white settlers from dangerous Indians. Here, the picture and the tag line connect whiteness and masculinity to the rescue narrative through a mythic temporality in which social actors enact historically defined roles (Fabian 1983). The three newsmagazines reported on U.S. military and political leaders, military technology and strategies, and the political debates over the utility of air strikes. Other NATO political leaders were rarely dis- cussed, with only occasional references to the military capabilities of the allied countries.10 Reporters paid little attention to the reasons for the conflict, except to blame the violence on the nationalist ambitions of Milosevic, whom one U.S. official referred to as the "tinhorn dictator of Serbia" (Time April 5, 40). Like discussions of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War (Shohat 1994), the U.S. news media focused almost exclusively on the national leader, turning this conflict into a personalized fight against the excessive evils of nationalism. News reports described him as a dictator, a thug, a communist party hack, and a man of no political convictions except to stay in power. Feminist scholars have challenged representations of the Balkan conflicts that focus solely on individual leaders through documentation of the collective and localized dimensions of ethnic/political violence. Mertus (1999a) and Boose (2002), for instance, offer analyses of how the gender and sexual rhetorics of Serbian national- ism played into and exacerbated local ethnic tensions and conflicts. Instead of more complex historical analyses, news narratives typically provide American viewers with an easily identified enemy, a narrative of us/ them frequently structured on racial logics. This news strategy is apparent once again in George W. Bush's "war on terrorism," which initially focused almost exclusively on Osama bin Laden as the leader of Al Qaeda. When the U.S. military failed to capture him, the Bush administration then turned to Saddam Hussein. Milosevic's European and white identities precluded the racial logic that characterize representations of Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. Rather, the media demonized the Serbian leader through references to World War II, associating ethnic cleansing with the Holocaust and Milosevic with Hitler.11 Drawing these parallels provides the symbolic connection to a historical genocide that in turn locates the Serbian leader, and by extension Serbia itself, as outside of civilized nationhood. Individualizing this violence, furthermore, dehistori- cizes the complexities of the situation (including European and U.S. historical involvement in this conflict). As Fabian (1983) argues, this symbolic association positions the other, in this case Milosevic, in a past distinct from the temporal space of the viewer. In the second week, for instance, all three magazines published the same photograph of a long train filled to overflowing with refugees, many of whom are hanging out of the windows. Extending across the entire frame of the composition from the left foreground into the right background, the train effectively blocks any view of the city behind. This keeps the gaze in the foreground where hundreds of people stand on the train platform. Pictures like this one accentuate the cultural and geographical distance from the United States to Kosovo/a. As other analysts of American news practices have noted, the media typically represent distant places, espe- cially outside of the West, as a "world of trouble" where disasters, wars, and the breakdown of the social order occur (Morley 2000, 183). The train photograph explicitly historicizes the scene through the visual allusion to the trains used by the Nazis to bring the Jews to the death camps. Such references (and there are many in these reports) render the scene familiar, and presumably sympathetic, to Americans who have at least a popular understanding of the Holocaust. Written texts further link ethnic cleansing to a historical narrative of fascism and ethnic hatred through references to Neville Chamberlain and Czechoslovakia. Using the historical specter of appeasement as a plea for intervention, reporters quoted political leaders who spoke of the possibility of violence spreading to the rest of Europe. Western commentators supportive of the NATO air strikes often warned of the dangers of appeasement as part of a larger appeal on behalf of human rights. The problem, however, is that "this purely humanitarian-ethical legitimization . . . depoliticizes the military intervention" (Zizek 2000, 57). I2 Specifically, the narrative of "humanitarian" military intervention depoliticizes the racial selectivity that determines such intervention. A racialized narrative is evident in the photographs in which Albanian Muslims look white, like the presumed reader, if a little backward. Critical commentators at the time identified NATO's racial selectivity in contrast to the lack of international military campaigns to stop the genocide in Rwanda, or other sites of ethnic/political conflict such as Sierra Leone and Palestine (Chomsky 1999; Haynes 1999). Throughout the 1990s, American news media extensively reported on genocidal acts of ethnic cleansing and other forms of oppression by Serbian nationalists against ethnic populations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. Beginning in 1998, Serbian and Yugoslav forces began an increasingly escalated campaign against Alba- nians in Kosovo. According to some critics, however, mass expulsions and killings associated with ethnic cleansing did not occur until after the bombings started on March 24. In the words of NATO Supreme Allied Commander Wesley Clark, it was "entirely predictable" that Serbian violence would escalate once the bombings started (Chomsky 1999, 37). Critics have charged that NATO and the United States did not wait to exhaust diplomatic and economic options, but instead retrospectively used evidence of ethnic cleansing to justify the bombings (Chomsky 1999; Haynes 1999). While humanitarian issues were of concern to many, NATO prestige was also on the line. Since the end of the Cold War, to reconfigure its legitimacy as an international institution. Interventions in the Balkans were part of a larger effort by NATO to extend its reach to a wider geopolitical arena than the original purpose of the European Alliance. As British Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain explained, "To walk away now would destroy NATO's credibility" (Chomsky 1999, 40). Arguments about humanitarian intervention also ignore the substantial material interests at stake for NATO and the United States. These interests include investments by arms manufactures and Western businesses, oil companies' efforts to secure pipelines across the Balkans, and the role of the IMF-World Bank in the region. In the late 1980s and 1990s, for in- stance, IMF-World Bank policies that demanded austerity programs to secure debt repayment increased the economic instabilities of the region. Moreover, as the former Yugoslavia broke up, recognition or non-recogni- tion of states by Western countries had a significant and unequal impact on their political economies. Pressure on the Clinton administration also came from expatriate groups in the United States as well as businesses advocating international policies that increased their access to global markets (Haynes 1999). Penezic argues that Western news depictions of nationalist conflict in post-communist states reproduce a Cold War paradigm that blames ethnic violence and the rise of economic disasters on the former communist regimes and on nationalist overreactions. "Whether or not this was true for the Eastern Bloc, Yugoslavia's situation was not quite that simple. The country has been decentered and federal, with multilingual education, publishing, press, television, and so forth. While this regulated and strictly controlled ethnic tolerance might not have been enough to assuage nationalist hungers, reducing the causes of war to nationalism only is, in my opinion, overly simplistic" (Penezic 1995, 63). None of the news coverage of the NATO bombings discussed the unstable economic and political conditions in the post-communist period, especially the region's relationship to the West and to global economic forces. Instead, all three magazines displayed a U.S. -centered analysis that reproduced a familiar narrative of Western rescue of victims in a dangerously unstable region. As Koshy points out, the American media "still remains primarily oriented to a national context and is thus unable to generate a transnational frame- work of understanding adequate to the complex problems of globaliza- tion" (1999, 20). Rescue narratives emphasized the vulnerability of Kosovars and the humanitarianism of military intervention. Crucially, the newsmagazines characterized the Balkans as an agricultural area that still relies on primi- tive farming techniques and a place of historic ethnic rivalries. Pictures show people fleeing in primitive modes of transportation, walking in single file on railroad tracks to avoid land mines or walking in desolate landscapes. In Newsweek, for instance, an April 12 photograph shows a man in the foreground pushing a wheelbarrow in which sits an elderly woman wrapped in a headscarf, winter coat, and blanket. Behind them another man also pushes an elderly person in a wheelbarrow and two others walk along the road. This primitive mode of transportation underscores the refugees' vulnerable status while the desolate landscape offers no clues to specific geographical, temporal, or cultural locations. Old helpless women, cared for by men, all of whom appear white, with limited re- sources (wheelbarrows) create a sympathetic portrait. It also renders men solely within a subordinate masculinity that depends on the protection of outside forces while women are visualized as vulnerable and needy because of their age, race, and gender. The exclusive gaze at peasants in a pre- modern setting, of course, also erases the range of material resources and cultural experiences of the Albanian Kosovars.13 Physically locating the conflict in this nightmarish space, pictures like this one and the one of the train station participate in creating what Zizek refers to as the "imagined cartography" of the Balkans that depicts this region as a "terrain of ethnic horrors" still fighting centuries-old battles presumably in contrast to the advanced democratic status of the West (Zizek 2000, 4-5). While this perhaps raises the question of what is the West, it also resecures a cultural map that defines Europe as the countries of Western Europe while the Balkans remain somewhere on the fringes of civilization. These images also play into Cold War narratives that visualize socialism as a failure of modernity. Such narratives deny how transnational dependencies and determinations shape the region's economy. Hyper- inflation, austerity measures, and other economic constraints since the collapse of communist regimes in the region have intensified social and political unrest. Escalating debt increasingly weakened the region's economies, led to worker protests, and fostered the prestige of nationalist solutions by Milosevic and his supporters (Haynes 1999). Yet, news media ignored or minimized local, regional, and transnational factors that have shaped ethnic conflict in the Balkans in favor of representations of NATO heroics. The lack of references to Albanian politics ignores the complicated and hybrid nature of Albanian identities and political activisms. Moreover, it promotes American national interests at the expense of local and regional factors. The only coverage of Albanian responses to Serbian violence was reports on the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a small militant group. None of the magazines, for instance, discussed the nonviolent agenda of the Albanian intellectual and political leader Ibrahim Rugova (Chomsky 1999; Mertus 1999a, 6). Photographs instead featured male soldiers of the KLA in combat uniforms, yet there are no signs of actual combat.14 Compared with detailed discussions of American military equipment, strategy, and personnel, reports on the KLA emphasized the lack of equipment, training, and even incompetence of these fighters. This contrast further eliminates political alternatives to the spectacle of victim- ization. Zizek argues that NATO intervened to protect Kosovar victims while making sure they would remain victims; that is, no international support backed the Albanians to become full political agents, or to sustain an armed resistance. He describes this as the "paradox of victimization: the Other to be protected is good in so Jar as it remains a victim" (2000, 59, 60). News coverage of victims waiting to be rescued erases U.S. and European nations' complicity in the economic and political instabilities in the region. Petras further argues that innocent victimization also ignores the violence perpetrated by the KLA. He writes that the "triumphal returns and euphoric rhetoric of the NATO leaders covers up the brutal reality of massive ethnic cleansing, systematic assassinations, pillage and destruc- tion of churches, houses, farms, and businesses by NATO-backed Alba- nian KLA terrorists and their paramilitary supporters" (1999, 13). As important as it is to publicize the horrors of war and ethnic cleans- ing, these photographs elide any representations of the subjectivity and agency of the Albanians. Cameras do not depict the diversity of experiences and cultures in Kosovo/a (Mertus 1999a). No pictures show people working in an urban setting or creating a makeshift home or treating the injured.15 Nor do readers encounter photographs of Albanian doctors, social workers, community leaders, etc. Instead, photographs depict fearful and/or exhausted refugees.16 In a half-page picture featured in U.S. News on April 12, for instance, the photographer used a high angle shot of a group of refugees. The high angle makes the crowd appear very large as people spread out to the very edges of the background. In the center foreground, a woman holds out her hands in a supplicant pose with the , "Pleading. A woman from Kosovo asks Macedonian police officers to let her cross the border. Thousands waited without food or water." As the focal point of the composition, the female supplicant stands as the representative of the "waiting" group. Women such as the suppli- cant become, in Zizek's words, the "ideal subject-victim in aid" (2000, 57- 58) who do not struggle for their own survival or fight back but remain the feminized object of the Western gaze. These pictures provide the visual alibi for U.S. and NATO intervention by establishing a national narrative about U.S. power and political good in contrast to Milosevic and his Serbian forces. The racial logic is here reinforced because few signs recognizable to Western viewers would identify the refugees as Muslim. Racial and religious differences are elided in this portrayal of Albanians as allies. Instead, gender is foregrounded through prominently featured photographs of mothers with small chil- dren, namely on two magazine covers and as the opening two-page spread in all three magazines the second week. Collapsing the body with experi- ence and identity, photojournalism relies on the bodies of mothers and babies to function as metonyms for the Kosovo/a crisis. Recent feminist scholarship on embodiment has explored with great insight how identity, especially sexual, gender, and racial identities are produced and repro- duced through visible bodies.17 In the news coverage of the NATO bomb- ings, the visual embodiment of white motherhood, however, does not so much produce knowledge or understanding of trauma as it turns subjects into spectacles of suffering. As metonyms for victimization, photographs of women and children collapse motherhood with the home (Morley 2000, 65) and in so doing become the visible symbol of what is being threatened and what needs to be saved. For instance, a tightly framed photograph in U.S. News from April 12 shows a group of refugees enclosed in an space that appears to be surrounded by barbed wire (the caption explains that the wire is part of the back of a truck) (fig. 2). In the center of the composition, a woman throws her head back in anguish while a child next to her stares soberly at the camera. This highly emotional expression of innocence and vulnerability establishes the face of suffering for the viewer. In such pictures, sub- jectivities are elided as visible bodies rearticulate racialized gender ideals of domesticity familiar to American audiences (Williams 1994). Despite late twentieth-century social developments that include post-communism, globalization, and new technologies, idealized domesticity continues to {{Fig.2 ommited}} Fig. 2. Photograph by Santiago Lyon. Courtesy of AP/Wide World Photos. have enormous ideological resonance (Morley 2000, 56). Since the Cold War period, the American media have aligned an ideal of the white middle class family with national interests and desires (Kozol 1994). These pictures of refugees from Kosovo/a reveal the powerful place that the racialized mother-child ideal continues to hold in the U.S. cognitive grid. Whiteness, furthermore, contains the otherness of Albanian Kosovars who, like this anguished Albanian mother, lack racial, ethnic or religious markers of difference. If class, racial, gender, and heteronormative ideals shape the cultural alignment of family and nation, what happens when domesticity, that powerful sign of stability and tradition, is figured as the sign of social disorder or breakdown? Media portrayals of the ideal family typically establish boundaries of identity that exclude all those who do not fit these racial, sexual, and class categorizations. Morley, however, compellingly argues that not all representations of domesticity are so intentionally exclusive. Instead, he writes, "it is not the presence of otherness per se which is problematic but only that of undomesticated otherness," pointing out examples of the incorpo- ration of Others, or what he calls, "domesticating alterity" (2000, 223). In other words, the logics of racialization are often dependent upon incorpo- rating otherness within "the relation of domination" (Taguieff 2001, 121). News photographs of Kosovar refugees foreground racialized gender ideals of domesticity in this moment of profound crisis and social disor- der. Narratives about conflicts in the Balkans have historically been mapped onto ethnic rivalries and hostilities that stereotype populations as violent and backward. During the Cold War, for instance, the American media typically collapsed ethnicity and communism in characterizations of Albania as one of the most repressive communist regimes. In contrast, news coverage of refugees in 1999 turned the camera's gaze to mothers and children to figure Albanians as the innocent victims of Serbian aggression. Ideals of domesticity that feature attractive, white looking, mothers elide differences to establish instead the moral position of the refugees. The cover photograph in U.S. News for April 12 exemplifies the process of domesticating alterity. Above the headline, "Balkan Hell," three figures in the center of the composition look out at the camera. With a somber but calm gaze, a young attractive woman holds a small child while an older son leans against her. Although the caption does not identify her religious affiliation, the coverage repeatedly characterized the violence in Kosovo/a as an ethnic conflict between Serbian Christians and Albanian Muslims. That this woman is not specifically identified as a Muslim reinforces the process of incorporation within an American ideal of domesticity. Even more than other mother and child images, this photograph evokes the Western Christian art historical tradition of the Madonna and child flanked by one or more saints. In the extreme foreground a woman with her head covered in a white cloth moves toward the picture plane. Her forward posture suggests movement outside of the camera's frame and into the viewer's space. The triangular position of the main figure group creates a stability that counterbalances the dynamic movement of this foreground figure. The compositional and iconographic stability signified by this Madonna and children, as Morley suggests, domesticates the refugees' alterity. This process occurs through foregrounding heteronormativity, albeit normativity at risk. During the Balkans wars, reporters often told of Serbian detention and killings of fathers and husbands. To see the family without the male figure underscores the social crisis and reinforces the call to rescue the mothers and children. Even as this woman is incorporated within an American cognitive ideal of domesticity, however, she remains other in her (unlabeled) ethnicity and in her state of crisis. She is thus both like and unlike the viewer. Looking at how photographs mobilize domes- ticity reveals the ways in which narratives of war incorporate alterity as part of justifications for military intervention. In the newsmagazines, scenes of destroyed houses, rather than pictures of military battles, further configure the Albanians visually within the private sphere. In American hegemonic culture, the private sphere signifies the privileges of privacy, intimacy, and protection from the external world. On April 5, both Time and Newsweek featured a photograph of a Serbian army tank in front of a destroyed house with signs of still smoldering fires. A Serbian soldier holding a rifle, caught mid-stride in profile, looks defiantly at the camera. Masculinity and militarism foreground the threat to private life and to the vulnerable bodies of the Albanians. The accompa- nying report discusses the invasion of private homes by paramilitary forces where people were either tortured or removed from families and then tortured. Domesticity, as the sign of what is at risk, and hence as the justification for intervention, locates the Albanians within terms recogniz- able to American audiences. In a region such as Kosovo/a, many reasons compel photojournalists to report on the violence that persists there despite juridical and humanitar- ian interventions by international agencies like the UN or military interven- tions like the NATO air strikes. In domesticating alterity, however, Ameri- can news coverage of Kosovo/a relied on conventions of photojournalism, in particular the figure of vulnerable white maternity, to depict the human casualties of violence in the Balkans. News coverage that represents Albanians only as victims ignores their struggles and experiences while promoting narratives of Western benevolent support for needy and inno- cent refugees. Representations of crises outside the United States, as in this case, are typically mediated through the lens of national concerns, such as security or economic interests. As Koshy writes, "On human rights issues, in particular, the statist perspective obscures and distorts the perception of the problem and the construction of the solution . . ." (1999, 21). Thus, what is at stake in media coverage is the relationship between how social crises are represented and how they are managed within a transnational context. Given this critique of photojournalism, how can photographers main- tain the moral imperative of political visibility? The challenge of reportage in this case is made particular acute by the problematics of representing trauma. How can photographers visualize trauma without inevitably turning people into spectacles? If photographers attempt to avoid the spectacle of embodied suffering, what happens if we do not have an embodied victim to pity?

2022 Michigan Kritik
1AC - Toxic Techulinity

The resolution relies on the creation of fake scenarios to try and “strut their stuff” rely on the creation of a crisis which requires a masculine hero to urgently address the impact – results in the creation of self-fulfilling prophecies that will result in serial policy failure that does more destruction than is helps. Emerging tech relies within the realm of fantasy – reject it, as it pushes feminist criticism to the periphery

Griffin, 2015. (Penny, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Australia. “crisis, austerity and gendered governance: a feminist perspective,” in feminist review 109: 49-72, spp)

While globally it seems that ‘we are more or less permanently suspended in states of crisis’ (Otto, 2011: 76), crucially for feminist analyses, accounts that abstract moments of crisis as ‘exceptional’ events dislocate crisis from the nuanced thinking that would challenge the extreme measures that distort human rights and welfare (such as austerity measures and welfare cuts). Crises embody the power to shape our conceptions of world politics but also, crucially, have the capacity to construct and govern our most intimate and everyday practices. They are significant mechanisms of everyday, contemporary governance because they generate discourses of ‘emergency’, ‘speedy diagnosis’ and ‘robust response’, authorising ‘the operation of a more hegemonic legal order’ and reducing (but not eliminating) ‘the space for political contestation and critique’ (ibid.: 80). An alternative way of reading ‘crisis’ (and not something governance mechanisms and actors are likely to countenance) is, however, to concentrate on its fictive content, with ‘the crisis’ understood as a fictive imagining of everyday events that serves particular discursive purposes. Found in media and official portrayals that have represented the crisis in terms of shock, devastation, anxiety, fear, anger and shame (see, e.g., Widmaier, 2010), the neo-liberal governance of crisis has relied intensively on the language of trauma to generate ‘urgent’, wide-ranging but surreptitious social reforms, including the rewriting of institutional power arrangements and the dismantling of protective welfare systems. The reproduction of tropes of urgency, immediacy and muscularity (what we might call neo-liberalism’s ‘conventional’ responses to crisis), mobilised through metaphors of catastrophe and disaster, has, in particular, allowed for ‘a set of otherwise controversial “responses” to receive widespread legitimation’ (Brassett and Clarke, 2012: 5). The extent to which financial risk management has been cast over the course of the twentieth century as ‘a domain of technical expertise’, removed from public debate and placed firmly in the hands of an elite cadre of fiscal ‘experts’ (De Goede, 2004: 200–207), has rendered such decisive interventions yet more realisable. Despite interesting, and critical, engagements with the use of visuality and metaphor in dominant representations of the crisis, how the use of visual and narrative metaphors of enormity, shock and devastation, and the ensuing repetition of the need for robust, or ‘muscular’, interventions, has been gendered has been little discussed. Key financial publications, including, for example, The Financial Times, The Economist and Time magazine, have regularly deployed representational practices that discriminate actively and often between identifi- able and sexed bodies as symbolic of economic success, regulation and recovery in the global political economy. Men appear across these publications in power, holding the power, bearing the burden of responsibility for crisis and resolving crisis, reaffirming the meaning of the global financial system and its practices as symbolic of white, masculine corporate power (Griffin, 2015). This is particularly important with regard to feminism’s attention to governance in its everyday forms and practices, since, by immersing the financial crisis in images of masculinity, popular and policy sources provide a subtle, but thoroughly gendered, grounding for the ideas, methods and practices instituted by instruments of governance in response to the crisis (such as the measures of austerity considered below). The below analysis thus considers how, as everyday practices of global governance, ‘crisis management’ techniques have reproduced the dismissal of ill-fitting feminist critique and co-opted more sympathetic feminist knowledges. This, the paper argues, simply confirms the longevity of neo-liberal, capitalist, imperatives in the global political economy, entrenching the power of existing economic orders and constraining the possibilities, and space, for contestation and critique based on the masculinised reproduction of financial privilege. crisis governance discourse (1): the dismissal of feminism and the social costs of austerity[:] One way to read feminism’s position vis-a`-vis crisis is to note the damaging blow that contemporary governance reactions to ‘crisis’ have dealt feminism. Crises everywhere ‘are a particularly dangerous time for feminism, and indeed for all progressive ways of thinking’ (Otto, 2011: 78). The ‘emergency’ measures initiated by the announcement of ‘crisis’ represent a shift in power away from inclusive law and policy-making towards so-called ‘expertise’ in ‘crisis management’, ‘muscular’ law-making and the entrenchment of executive power, all of which effectively push feminism ‘off the map’ (ibid.: 76–79). Governments in the developed and developing world have further entrenched the reactionary, ‘hard’ law politics of crisis management, using the rhetoric of urgency to adopt far-reaching and increasingly invasive crisis management measures. Under the guise of ‘austerity’, the IMF has even been recalibrated as an institution of worldly fiscal expertise, a notable departure from the derided figure of cookie-cutter policy-making it struck in the aftermath of the Asian and Argentinean financial crises.

2022 Michigan Kritik
1AC - Toxic Techulinity

Revisionism, either ontological or epistemological, essential to disrupting toxic masculinity in IR – vulnerability is a prerequisite to any ethical FIAT in the international arena, we lay the foundation for ethical policy debates.

Youngs 04 (Gillian, Professor of Digital Economy at the University of Brighton, Feminist International Relations: a contradiction in terms? Or: why women and gender are essential to understanding the world ‘we’ live in*, International Affairs, 80, pgs 77-80, JKS)

This discussion will demonstrate, in the ways outlined above, the depth and range of feminist perspectives on power—a prime concern of International Relations and indeed of the whole study of politics. It will illustrate the varied ways in which scholars using these perspectives study power in relation to gender, a nexus largely disregarded in mainstream approaches. From feminist positions, this lacuna marks out mainstream analyses as trapped in a narrow and superficial ontological and epistemological framework. A major part of the problem is the way in which the mainstream takes the appearance of a pre- dominantly male-constructed reality as a given, and thus as the beginning and end of investigation and knowledge-building. Feminism requires an ontological revisionism: a recognition that it is necessary to go behind the appearance and examine how differentiated and gendered power constructs the social relations that form that reality. While it may be empirically accurate to observe that historically and contemporaneously men have dominated the realms of international politics and economics, feminists argue that a full understanding of the nature of those realms must include understanding the intricate patterns of (gendered) inequalities that shape them. Mainstream International Relations, in accepting that because these realms appear to be predominantly man-made, there is no reason to ask how or why that is the case, stop short of taking account of gender. As long as those who adhere to this position continue to accept the sufficiency of the appearances and probe no further, then the ontological and epistemological limitations will continue to be reproduced. Early work in feminist International Relations in the 1980s had to address this problem directly by peeling back the masculinist surface of world politics to reveal its more complex gendered (and racialized) dynamics. Key scholars such as Cynthia Enloe focused on core International Relations issues of war, militarism and security, highlighting the dependence of these concepts on gender structures—e.g. dominant forms of the masculine (warrior) subject as protector/conqueror/exploiter of the feminine/feminized object/other—and thus the fundamental importance of subjecting them to gender analysis. In a series of works, including the early Bananas, beaches and bases: making feminist sense of international politics (1989), Enloe has addressed different aspects of the most overtly masculine realms of international relations, conflict and defence, to reveal their deeper gendered realities.3 This body of work has launched a powerful critique of the taboo that made women and gender most invisible, in theory and practice, where masculinity had its most extreme, defining (and violent) expression. Enloe’s research has provided one of the most comprehensive bodies of evidence for the ontological revisionism required of mainstream International Relations, especially in relation to its core concerns. When Enloe claimed that ‘gender makes the world go round’,4 she was in fact turning the abstract logic of malestream International Relations inside out. This abstract logic saw little need to take theoretical and analytical account of gender as a social force because in practical terms only one gender, the male, appeared to define International Relations. Ann Tickner has recently offered the reminder that this situation persists: ‘During the 1990s, women were admitted to most combat positions in the U.S. military, and the U.S. president appointed the first female secretary of state, but occupations in foreign and military policy- making in most states remain overwhelmingly male, and usually elite male.’5 Nearly a decade earlier, in her groundbreaking work Gender in International Relations: feminist perspectives on achieving global security,6 she had asked the kinds of questions that were foundational to early feminist International Relations: ‘Why is the subject matter of my discipline so distant from women’s lived experiences? Why have women been conspicuous only by their absence in the worlds of diplomacy and military and foreign policy-making?’ Tickner, like Enloe, has interrogated core issues in mainstream International Relations, such as security and peace, providing feminist bases for gendered understanding of issues that have defined it. Her reflection on what has happened since Gender in International Relations was published indicates the prominence of tensions between theory and practice. ‘We may have provided some answers to my questions as to why IR and foreign policymaking remain male-dominated; but breaking down the unequal gender hierarchies that perpetuate these androcentric biases remains a challenge.’7 The persistence of the overriding maleness of international relations in practice is part of the reason for the continued resistance and lack of responsiveness to the analytical relevance feminist International Relations claims. In other words, it is to some extent not surprising that feminist International Relations stands largely outside mainstream International Relations, because the concerns of the former, gender and women, continue to appear to be subsidiary to high politics and diplomacy. One has only to recall the limited attention to gender and women in the recent Afghanistan and Iraq crises to illustrate this point.8 So how have feminists tackled this problem? Necessarily, but problematically, by calling for a deeper level of ontological revisionism. I say problematically because, bearing in mind the limited success of the first kind discussed above, it can be anticipated that this deeper kind is likely to be even more challeng- ing for those in the mainstream camp. The second level of ontological revisionism required relates to critical understanding of why the appearance of international relations as predominantly a sphere of male influence and action continues to seem unproblematic from mainstream perspectives. This entails investigating masculinity itself: the nature of its subject position—including as reflected in the collective realm of politics— and the frameworks and hierarchies that structure its social relations, not only in relation to women but also in relation to men configured as (feminized) ‘others’ because of racial, colonial and other factors, including sexuality. Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart directly captured such an approach as ‘the “man” question in international relations’.9 I would like to suggest that for those sceptical about feminist International Relations, Zalewski’s introductory chapter, ‘From the “woman” question to the “man” question in International Relations’, offers an impressively transparent way in to its substantive terrain.10 Reflecting critically on the editors’ learning process in preparing the volume and working with its contributors, both men and women, Zalewski discusses the various modifications through which the title of the work had moved. These included at different stages the terms ‘women’, ‘masculinity’ and ‘feminism’, finally ending with ‘the “man” question’—signalling once again, I suggest, tensions between theory and practice, the difficulty of escaping the concrete dominance of the male subject position in the realm of international relations. The project’s starting point revealed a faith in the modernist commitment to the political importance of bringing women into the position of subjecthood. We implicitly accepted that women’s subjecthood could be exposed and revealed in the study and practice of international relations, hoping that this would also reveal the nature of male dominance and power. Posing the ‘man’ question instead reflects our diminishing belief that the exclusion of women can be remedied by converting them into subjects.11 Adding women appeared to have failed to ‘destabilize’ the field; so perhaps critically addressing its prime subject ‘man’ head-on could help to do so. ‘This leads us to ask questions about the roles of masculinity in the conduct of international relations and to question the accepted naturalness of the abundance of men in the theory and practice of international relations’ (emphasis added).12 The deeper level of ontological revisionism called for by feminist Inter- national Relations in this regard is as follows. Not only does it press beyond the appearance of international relations as a predominantly masculine terrain by including women in its analysis, it goes further to question the predominant masculinity itself and the accepted naturalness of its power and influence in collective (most significantly state) and individual forms.

2022 Michigan Kritik
1AC - Toxic Techulinity

Our method of embodied politics is what sets the Framework for the topic and the debates that are to be had. WE control the fairness debate and the ground debate – The World of IR determines if ground is valuable or if it is not; this is why Afghanistan was fought to save the women from the men and costed several thousands of lives.

Vaittinen, 2018 (Tiina, Academy of Finland Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Global Health and Social Policy, Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere University, Finland. “Embodied In/Security as Care Needs,” a chapter published in Carol Gentry, Laura J. Shepherd & Laura Sjoberg (eds.) Routledge Handbook in Gender and Security, SPP)

In (neo)liberal political discourses, the ideal subject is an independent homo oeconomicus, that is, a masculine, disembodied being, who is self-sufficient and self-caring, while knowingly making rational, utilitarian, and abstracted ethical choices for the common good of all. The liberal subject is an invulnerable individual, or at least well secured against any risks in life. He is never ill; he does not leak of bodily fluids (because he seems not to have a body); and he never ages. Or, in case he does age, he does so actively and “successfully”, in ways that his body’s care needs would never gain control of his life: the life of a subjective, rational Self. Feminist social and political theory argues that these conceptions of political subjectivity are non-realistic: Such disembodied subjects simply do not exist (cf. Bacchi and Beasley 2002; Beattie and Schick 2013; Cohn 2014; Fineman 2008; Grosz 1994; Hoppania and Vaittinen 2015; Robinson 1999; 2011; Ruddick 1990; Shildrick 2002; 2012; Tronto 1993; Vaittinen 2015; forthcoming) While vulnerable embodiment is discursively associated merely with women, children, and the weak, the truth is that as human beings we all are bodies, and as such vulnerable, relational and dependent. As political subjects we are perhaps meant to “own” our bodies, to be in control of them and our lives. Yet, the bodies that our subjectivity inhabits may in fact both pre-exist and outlive the subjective “I”. We are intercorporeal: conceived, born, raised, and sustained by other bodies. We live _and die _in concrete relations with others. Thus, as opposed to being the self-caring ideal subjects of (neo)liberal politics, as bodies we are dependent, fleshy, and irrational. We are vulnerable, sometimes sick and dis/abled, every day in contact with our own bodily fluids  _and frequently also with those of others. We are made of and sometimes governed by the fluids, bacteria and hormones that move within, without, and between our bodies (cf. Fishel 2015; Irni 2013; Preciado 2013). Our lives are inherently frail. We start ageing and decaying the moment we are born. In other words, the fact of embodiment makes the liberal understanding of subjectivity ultimately an illusion. Nevertheless, global politics and its security policies and practices continue to build on the liberal conceptions of life. In other words, the contemporary security policies and practices tend to build on an illusion. In this chapter, I challenge these illusionary yet prevailing understandings of security through different accounts of embodied in/security. I begin the chapter with a discussion of feminist analysis of vulnerability. Here, I rely on accounts that emerge from the feminist ethics of care tradition (e.g. Robinson 1999; 2011), as well as Carol Cohn’s (2014) recent interrogation of vulnerability in international security discourses. Feminist conceptions of vulnerability and care challenge conventional security practices, and reveal them as unrealistic, by foregrounding the human beings’ existential dependency on each other for survival (e.g. Robinson 2011; Beattie and Schick 2013; Butler 2004). Yet, as I have argued elsewhere (Vaittinen 2015), they also rarely explicitly engage with the body organism and its materiality, which need be recognised if embodied in/security is to be taken seriously. In this chapter, I interrogate the body in more concrete terms. Here, I first show how embodied realities of human life have always been central in feminist security studies, albeit usually in contexts of direct violence and hence in/securities external to the body. I then introduce the concept of the lowest common denominator of embodiment, which emphasises the body’s need of care from other bodies and, while defying essentialism, is applicable to all living bodies at all times (Vaittinen, forthcoming). Unlike in the usual security frames that begin with direct violence, in this conception, embodied in/security becomes defined through to the body’s most basic needs, which necessitate care relations with other bodies at times when we are corporeally incapable of being the liberal individual subjects that we are meant to be. In the concluding section, I juxtapose my conception of embodied in/security with the conceptions that seem to predominate security discourses more generally. I argue that, sometimes also in feminist security studies, the empirical contexts of direct violence, war, and militarism easily (re)produce perceptions of embodied in/security that begin with the threats that bodies pose to other bodies. Here, in/secure bodies are primarily present as subjects and objects of violence, rather than as caring and in need of care. Consequently, the threats that the body, as an organism, poses to itself remain unaddressed. I argue that ultimately at stake here are two contending gendered ontologies of human relatedness through which security policies can be shaped: feminised dependency on other bodies’ care against masculine perceptions of the bodies of others as primarily threatening. Both the conceptions of embodied in/vulnerability are profoundly relational, yet the security practices that they (re)produce are fundamentally different. Existential vulnerability and the ethics of care Feminist literature (e.g. Fineman 2008; Beattie and Schick 2013) has emphasised the necessity to put vulnerability instead of liberal individualism at the centre of political discourses and practices, since vulnerability describes the condition of human life much more realistically than individual, rational autonomy does. This way of thinking is particularly present in the feminist ethics of care tradition, which provides a powerful alternative to liberal individualistic thinking about ethics, morality, and politics. Foregrounding the existential dependency of every human being on each other’s care for survival, feminist accounts of care can also forcefully challenge the conventional security thinking, by presenting the lack of care as a threat to human security (Robinson 2011). Feminist ethics of care argues that practices of care give rise to an alternative moral thinking, which is capable of realistically accounting for the situatedness of the moral subject (see, for example, Tronto 1993; Robinson 1999; 2011; Ruddick 1990). Feminist care ethicists show how moral decisions are never made in a political void or behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, as in the Kantian tradition, but in concrete relations with particular others. Importantly, emphasising practices of care as a source of moral and political relatedness, feminist ethics of care demonstrates how human existential vulnerability - that is, our dependency on care as well as our capacity to respond caringly - is a powerful site and source of politics rather than a realm external to it (Tronto 1993; Robinson 1999; 2011; Vaittinen 2015).

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Thus, we advocate for vulnerability. Only a recognition and embodiment of vulnerability can reshape the manner in which we approach IR and foreign policy that does not replicate the hierarchical logic of the protection racket that dooms us to extinction. Vulnerability gives agency to the oppressed bodies – which allows for the destruction of hierarchal patriotism.

Väyrynen, 2019 (Tarja Väyrynen is a professor of Peace and Conflict Research and a director of Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI). Her research interests include conflict resolution and peacebuilding, feminist theory and post-colonial theory. “Mundane peace and the politics of vulnerability: a nonsolid feminist research agenda,” Peacebuilding, 7:2, 146-159, SPP)

As outlined above, early feminist peace and conflict researchers, such as Elise Boulding and Sara Ruddick, insisted on the importance of the relational body when studying peace. I also argued above that local turn scholarship is limited in its understanding of the everyday and mundane practices of peace. In my view, both the relational body and mundane practices require a more nuanced reading of power, governance and the vulnerabilities that practices of power produce, since the body is always both ‘active and acted upon’.35 In short, practices of governance that are targeted at the body also produce the body.36 Yet the fleshy living body also has agency, which makes it an ‘engaged body-subject’.37 In other words, the body is never a passive target of practices of governance: it also has a capacity to escape these practices.38 Eighty-year-old Kaisu told her story in a Finnish documentary film in 2010.39 She was among the Finnish women accused of having fraternised with German soldiers during the Second World War. She moved to Germany with the withdrawing German troops and was repatriated to Finland after the war. The following is my description of Kaisu’s narrative: VIGNETTE 2 Kaisu was among the women whose bodies were securitised and transferred to the camp immediately on their arrival on the Finnish soil. She calls it the ‘quarantine camp’ as if there had been something contagious in her body that needed purification. Hence medicalisation also takes hold of her body even in her most intimate memories. Her young body had been securitised and medicalised as it was seen to constitute the contagious risk of knowing too much. In the documentary, her body is stiff, but strong when she sits on the porch of the barracks, in which she thinks she was incarcerated sixty years ago. She is smoking a cigarette with a firm hand. Her body and her solemn voice convey her strength. Kaisu recalls how the Security Police had suspected her of being a German mole. She is very proud of the fact that she did not cry during the interrogations: ‘In front of Hautojärvi [the interrogation officer] I did not cry’. In the narrative, her resistance is not just geared towards the interrogation officer, but also towards the Finnish state, whose security apparatus suspected and humiliated her. In her upright body, she resists the forces that sought to silence her.40 When considering mundane peace, Judith Butler’s observation that one way of managing populations is to distribute vulnerability among people unequally is crucial.41 Biopower – power that is about managing the births, deaths, reproduction and illnesses of a population and which is ultimately utilised by the state ostensibly in the protection of life – establishes a norm that allows for measurement, evaluation and hierarchical ranking. As such, it constitutes a mechanism of control and distributes vulnerability and invulnerability among the population.42 In Kaisu’s case, her body was rendered vulnerable – shaped as that of an outcast – through the mechanisms of governance in the post-war Finnish national order. The vignette demonstrates that power is multiple and relational, as it establishes socio-historical relationships that render some bodies more vulnerable than others. Biopower increases efficiency and capacity at the level of individual bodies and whole populations, yet it also distributes vulnerability and invulnerability. This is particularly acute during times of economic, social and political transformation, such as peacebuilding and reconstruction, when social relations must be re-imagined and re-structured. Butler theorises peace and argues that peace is a way of indicating one’s dependency on others and being acknowledged. She not only theorises peace as individual vulnerability but says that it needs to be institutionalised: I think that peace is the active and difficult resistance to the temptation of war; it is the prerogative and the obligation of the injured. Peace is something that has to be vigilantly maintained; it is a vigilance, and it involves temptation, and it does not mean we as human beings are not aggressive. It does not mean that we do not have murderous impulses. This is a mistaken way of understanding non-violence. . . . Peace is a certain resistance to the terrible satisfactions of war. It’s a commitment to living with a certain kind of vulnerability to others and susceptibility to being wounded that actually gives our individual lives meaning. . . I think it needs to be institutionalised. It needs to be part of a community ethos. I think in fact it needs to be part of an entire foreign policy.43 For Butler, therefore, the recognition of vulnerability can lead to more adequate, peaceful responses to different forms of violence and can counter the tendency to react to violence with more violence.44 Alyson Cole has noted that Butler’s view on vulnerability paves the way to ‘nonviolent interaffectivity’.45 Vulnerability does not, in this view, imply weakness or inferiority; rather, it is a human condition, ‘a basic kind of openness to being affected and affecting in both positive and negative ways, which can take diverse forms in different social situations (for example, bodily, psychological, economic, emotional, and legal vulnerabilities)’, as Erin Gilson summarises Butler’s views.46 Understanding oneself as vulnerable involves an understanding of the self as shaped by its relationships to others, the world, power and its environs. This has, in my view, implications for the everyday, as our embodiment and vulnerability are embedded in the everyday – in its historicity, forms of power, materiality and concreteness. Vulnerability is not just a way of referring to the capacity to be wounded, however. It is also a ‘way of indicating one’s dependency on another, a set of institutions, or a circumambient world to be well, to be safe, to be acknowledged’, argues Butler, in the spirit of early feminist peace and conflict researchers’ work.47 While the vulnerable body is often thought to be private and non-political, when in contact with other bodies, the politics of vulnerability comes to the fore – firstly, in the form of the unequal distribution of vulnerabilities, and secondly, in the form of accountability, recognition and acknowledgement. In other words, the way in which vulnerability is recognised, accounted for, acknowledged and responded to is at the core of the political. ‘The political’ is hence an existential relation that we all live out, on a daily basis, in ways that create, re-produce, transcend and challenge differences, hierarchies, discriminations and vulnerabilities between subjectivities and political positions. Furthermore, vulnerable bodies are agentic, as receptivity, accountability and vulnerability are actually the presuppositions of agency, not its opposites.48 In short, vulnerability is enabling for our being in the world; that is, vulnerability is a ‘condition of potential that makes possible other conditions’, including peace. It can be argued that Kaisu’s bold appearance in the documentary film was a political event of claiming back her silenced body and evoking recognition of the existence of the bodies of her kind. Her vulnerable body thereby carried an agentic capacity capable of challenging the existing hierarchies, discriminations and differences. Although vulnerability can be seen as a shared human condition, it is lived and experienced in different ways, as well as distributed unequally, as argued above. The ways in which we live and are affected can be understood only in light of the particularity of embodied, social and mundane experiences. It is in this way that feminist and critical theorising of the body, the everyday and vulnerability open up new pathways to re-theorise peace. Peace is something that becomes expressed and takes place through acts and points of everyday contact between variously situated and variously vulnerable bodies – namely, in corporeal events where accountability, response-ability, recognition and acknowledgement emerge. The pluralistic and critical approaches indicated in my agenda are more sensitive to the changing patterns and dynamics of peace than many abstract, ontologically solid or violence-dependent approaches.

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Emerging technology is only meant to bolster Hegemony. That increases the likelihood of conflict, and justifies sustained structural violence that outweighs the small risk of great power war. The US and the “enemy” will strut their nuclear arsenal until violence finally occurs and collapses humanity.

Sjoberg, 2010 (Laura, Assistant Professor of Political Science at U Florida, PhD in IR and Gender Studies and a law degree specializing in IR. “Gendering Power Transition Theory,” in Gender and International Security edited by Sjoberg, p. 90-93 - spp)

Feminist evaluations of power transition hypotheses A feminist analysis of PTT needs to reformulate the PTT hypotheses. This section applies the feminist critiques of the mechanism (power), the object (great states), and the variables (power parity and dissatisfaction) that PTT uses to explain international conflict to the reformulation of the major PTT hypotheses. It posits alternative explanations and alternative possible solutions and futures (Table 5.1). Relative position, state hegemonic masculinity, and bellicosity: Power transition theorists found that "occupation of a high position in the international hierarchy is associated with war involvement, irrespective of other attributes (ideology, etc.) of the state occupying that position. "88 Even if those states at the top of the international hierarchy are more likely to be involved in wars, 89 feminists question the assumption that this is because nations with the capacity to fight wars are necessarily more likely to fight. Feminist reformulation (R1) (see Table 5.1) posits that the content and salience of a state's hegemonic masculinity will be a factor in its bellicosity. The feminist argument is that the more competitive a state's hegemonic masculinity, the more likely that state is to make war; this risk is compounded by high salience. In World War II Germany, a competitive form of masculinity was very salient. George Mosse's study of the ideal German man90 in the 1930s reveals him as: Tall and muscular, he has no fat on his body and no hair anywhere but on his head. His broad, contoured shoulders narrow to a thin waist. He has a fine colorless chiseled face with a strong prominent square jaw. He is the flawless man . . . , not only did he embody the older aristocratic vlues of bravery, courage, and chivarly, but mirroring bourgeois values, he was also disciplined, orderly, and restrained ... The perfect man, therefore, was committed to sacrifice and heroism, in other words, soldierly values that put the nation ahead of the individual.91 This German masculinity "increasingly came to be linked to ideas about nationalism."92 This idea of masculinity became increasingly salient as "the nationalist press often portrayed Jewish men as the exact opposite of the manly ideal in looks and behavior ... jittery, restless, greedy, selfish, and ... ugly-nearly deformed."93 In the 1930s, "German fascists ... took the notion of masculinity to its awful, ghastly, and seemingly logical extreme."94 Perhaps this can be contrasted with the case of a rising China. Kam Louie, a scholar of Chinese masculinities, explains' that while “Western stereotypes of the 'real man' have described the Occidental male as forming his notion of male-self within images of toughness, courageousness, and decisiveness, ... in the Chinese case, the cerebral male model tends to dominate the macho, brawny male."95 The Communist Revolution in China has further demilitarized Chinese masculinity, since, while "the core meaning of wen-wu still revolves around cultural attainment and martial valour ... [ideal-types of masculinity have been shaped by] Communist insistence that able-bodied citizens work [which] ... has generated idealized images of workers and peasants" rather than soldiers98 Louie suggests that the current Chinese hegemonic masculinity is less aggressive and militaristic, and that it is both more open and less salient now than it has been previously.99 Given these two examples, the feminist reformulation (R 1) would expect bellicosity from 1930s Germany rather than contemporary China. The same empirical evidence that PTT uses could instead support a feminist argument that Germany's level of interest in aggressive masculinity made Germany a belligerent state, and that a dissatisfied China would have less interest in war than the 1930s Germany. A feminist reinterpretation would expect that Germans’ hypercompetitive hegemonic masculinity in the 1930s would motivate German leaders and citizens to try to subordinate other masculinities, while the Chinese government, following their more cerebral hegemonic masculinity, would place less priority on competition with other states.\ Hegemony and Peace: PTT claims that the greater and more stable the concentration of power, the more peaceful that system will be. PIT associates peace with the absence of armed conflict between great powers. As such, the world can still be "at peace" if dozens of civil wars are going on in countries outside of the class of "great powers." The dominant/challenger dichotomy means that PTT ignores all but the most powerful states. Instead of limiting the discourse on security to the concerns of the dominant global power and the (few or even only one) challenger(s), feminists pay attention to the entire global political community. The PTT understanding of "peace" obscures terrible atrocities and conceals a crucial and contradictory effect of the concentration of power in the international arena. Feminist work has consistently shown that, as the powerful wield more power, the weak feel more pressure. This pressure is manifested not only in the form of interstate war, but also in civil war and structural violence. Feminists' interrogation of state centrism suggests that lack of war between great states does not automatically create peace within them, and that the marginalized citizens of great states should be a topic of concern in global politics. Feminists' interest in gender subordination shows that women's security and their lives are constantly at risk. As such, the feminist reformulation (R2) predicts that concentrated power is a net negative, empirically, normatively, and epistemologically. Empirically, it is likely to increase international conflicts and internal unrest outside of the center of power, and to draw attention away from the world's worst humanitarian disasters. As Ann Tickner notes, much of the violence in the world is outside of great power war and, as theorists, "we in the west can no longer afford to privilege a tradition of scholarship that focuses on the concerns and ambitions of great powers." Feminists reject the dominance of the strong over the weak as a mechanism of control in favor of empathy and connectedness. Epistemologically, feminists note different social experience produces different knowledges. A theory of international security that excludes most people also leaves out important knowledge. An empathetic approach might increase the inclusiveness of knowledge about global politics. These insights mean that a feminist perspective would draw attention to the security of the people on the margins rather than focusing on an improbable conflict between the US and China. Feminist insights suggest it is important to recognize that in a world where the US and China compete for dominance, more than four billion other people neither compete nor dominate. Decisions made by states with the preponderance of power-over reverberate around the world. If the US and China decided to fight a nuclear war, their decision would be felt around the world. Even less severe decisions by powerful states have wide-ranging impacts on individuals' lives. For example, the US government’s decision to condition continued military presence in South Korea on mandatory STD testing in Korean prostitution villages impacted the social and economic dynamic between Korean prostitutes. Neither the US nor China provides its poorest citizens adequate humanitarian aid to avoid death from starvation or preventable disease. Yet the US and China are the two biggest military spenders in the world. In real terms, the most marginalized citizens of each nation lose when strategic posturing inspires them to focus on military readiness. Feminists have documented how militarization of women's lives decreases freedoms and changes economic and social patterns.109 Because of the these threats, feminists problematize the assumption that entities called the US and China legitimately merit more consideration than the most marginal citizens within those states or the citizens of states that their dominance subordinates.

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Gender is the core concept of the protection racket – the idea of “saving women from men” is the justification of the violence. This is why masculine qualities are to have hypermilitarized compounds that are ready to fight and “save” the feminized subjects. There is no problem, they were the ones who are insecure about other nations and want to perfect them by securing them.

Peterson 07 Peterson, V. S. (2007). THINKING THROUGH INTERSECTIONALITY AND WAR. Race, Gender & Class, 14(3), 10-27. Retrieved from ttp://search.proquest.com/docview/218850466?accountid=14709 rishi

INTERSECTIONALITY AND "FEMINIZATION AS DEVALORIZATION" For a variety of reasons elaborated elsewhere (Peterson, 2005), I find the theory/practice emerging from feminist and critical race scholarship particularly fruitful for analyzing intersectionality. On the one hand, feminisms have transdisciplinary and complex analytical resources for investigating and theorizing about identity, difference, and structural hierarchies. On the other hand, differences among women have forced feminists (too often reluctantly and always uncomfortably) to reflect critically on the meaning of feminism, operations of power among women, the politics of representation, and the dangers of overgeneralizing. As one consequence, feminist scholarship has contributed to a richer understanding of analytics and politics, or theory and practice, as interdependent. Key to this development is understanding gender as both an empirical and analytical category. The former refers to the embodied and ostensibly biological binary of male-female sex difference. Understood empirically, gender can be deployed as a variable to investigate, for example, how women and men are differently affected by, and differently participate in, political and economic practices. This is the more familiar use of gender in contemporary research, especially in the social sciences. Analytical gender is less familiar; it refers to the signifying system of masculine-feminine differentiations that constitutes a governing code. The claim here is that gender pervades language and culture, systemically shaping not only who we are but how we think and what we do. As historically constituted, the dichotomy of gender codes masculine qualities as oppositional to and more highly valued than feminine qualities. Understanding gender analytically then generates a crucial and transformative feminist insight: the (symbolic, discursive) cultural privileging of that which is identified with masculinity is key to naturalizing the (symbolic, discursive, cultural, corporeal, material, economic) power relations that constitute multiple forms of subjection. This knowledge allows for more adequately theorizing, and hence politicizing, intersectionality. More specifically, feminist research documents the contingent and historical "normalization" of gender as a systemic code valorizing that which is characterized and privileged as masculine (reason, agency, control, objectivity, etc.) at the expense of that which is stigmatized as feminine (emotion, passivity, uncertainty, subjectivity, etc.). Two points are key. First, gender is relational, so that privileging who and what is masculinized is inextricable from devaluing who and what is feminized. Recognizing the interdependence of masculinity and femininity-one "requires" the other-provides particular analytical leverage. It displaces the prevailing tendency to think gender is primarily about women, insisting instead that gender necessarily and invariably involves masculinity as much as femininity. Similarly, it reminds us that gender is systemic, so that manifestations of gender are less individual "choices" than effects of codes, institutionalized norms, and rules. second, the privileging of masculinity does not privilege all men or only men. The claim is rather that gender-with its lauded masculinity and denigrated femininity-pervades language and culture and devalorizes all feminized statuses, including those occupied by subordinated men. Romanticism notwithstanding, the more an individual or a social category is feminized, the more likely (not invariably) that its devaluation is assumed, or presumed to be "explained." In short, diverse hierarchies are linked and ideologically "naturalized" by feminizing those who are subordinated. I understand this insight as key to advancing intersectional analysis. The insight involves several interactive "moves." In one sense, casting the subordinated as feminine devalorizes not only the empirical gender category of women but also sexually, racially, culturally, and economically marginalized men (e.g., "lazy migrants," 'primitive natives," "effeminate gays"). Underpinning this claim is the observation that, while structural hierarchies vary by reference to the "difference" emphasized and modalities of power involved, they typically share a common feature: the denigration of feminized qualities attributed to those who are subordinated (lacking reason, agency, control, etc.). Invoking the "natural" inferiority of the feminine plays a powerful, though not exhaustive, role in legitimating these hierarchies. In a second sense, and understanding gender analytically, not only subjects (women and marginalized men), but also concepts, desires, tastes, styles, "ways of knowing," cultural expressions (art, music), roles, practices, work, and nature, etc., can be feminized-with the effect of reducing their legitimacy, status, and value. Importantly, this devalorization is simultaneously ideological (discursive, cultural) and material (structural, economic). Consider how "women's work"-whether done by women or marginalized men-is typically under paid, or frequently not paid at all; and we hardly notice, in part because the depreciation of feminized activities is so taken for granted. This devalorization normalizes-with the effect of "legitimating"-the marginalization, subordination, and exploitation of feminized practices and persons. Oppressions differ, as do attempts to explain and/or justify them. As Wendy Brown (1997:86-7) states, "not simply the content but the modalities of power producing gender, race, or caste are specific to each production," even though "these powers of subject formation are not separable in the subject itself." Because oppressions take various structural forms, feminization is not the only "normalizing" ideology in operation. I argue, however, that what distinguishes feminization and renders it so ideologically powerful is the unique extent to which it invokes a deeply internalized and naturalized binary-the essentialized concept of sex difference-which is then "available" to naturalize diverse forms of structural oppression. This warrants clarification. Even as sex and gender are increasingly ambiguous to some, most people most of the time take a categorical, essentialized distinction between male and female completely for granted: as biologically "given," reproductively necessary, and psycho-socially "obvious." Yet constructionists argue not only that sex difference itself is produced-through contingent, historical practices and institutionalizations-but also that sex difference as an essentialized binary and masculinism as a system of asymmetrical power are co-constituted. In other words, the deeply sedimented concept of sex difference and historically institutionalized practices of gender hierarchy are mutually constituted. As one effect, the "naturalness" of sex difference is generalized to the "naturalness" of masculine (not necessarily male) privilege, so that both aspects come to be taken-for-granted "givens" of social life. The given cultural code of reason, control, agency, etc., as masculine, and irrationality, weakness, passivity, etc., as feminine is then ideologically available for legitimating other forms of domination as well. Common sense becomes a two-pronged justification of hierarchy. On the one hand, subordinated individuals or groups are devalorized by feminization; depictions range from lack of capacity and being weak or irrational, to being offensive or posing a danger. On the other hand, responding appropriately to such individuals or groups "requires" masculinized practices; these range from patronizing and protectionist behaviors to disciplinary measures and violent coercion. In short, not only are the subordinated devalorized by feminization, but the qualities they "lack" are typically just what the dominating (masculinized) group has to offer, or is "compelled" to practice. This conveniently justifies both the "necessity" of rule and who should rule. The common sense of privileging the masculine and devaluing the feminine is culturally and collectively internalized to such an extent that we are all variously complicit in its reproduction. And it is also implicitly and explicitly manipulated to reproduce inequalities as if this were natural and inevitable, thus making critique and resistance difficult. In short, devalorizing the feminine produces even as it obscures vast inequalities of power, authority, and resource distribution. Exposing how this power operates must be one objective of a critical political agenda. With these points in mind, I argue that the transformative potential of feminist critique lies in exposing and subverting all hierarchies that rely on denigration of "the feminine" to normalize and depoliticize subjection. I am not arguing that gender hierarchy is the "primary" oppression overshadowing race or class or sexuality. The point is rather that gender hierarchy and its elevation of "masculinity" is a historically contingent structural feature of social relations, that the subordination of women is not reducible to other structural oppressions (or vice versa), and that the dichotomy of gender underpins-as the denigration of the feminine naturalizes-hierarchies of gender, class, race, sexualities and geopolitical "difference." Because forms of subjection differ structurally, systematic and comparative analyses of RGCS require attention to "different histories, different mechanisms and sites of power, different discursive formations, different regulatory schemes" (Brown, 1997:86). In this essay, however, my focus is less on the production of subjection than exposing the political work that collective and internalized gender coding does across multiple forms of subjection. I am not presuming that sexist oppression is the most salient or powerful hierarchy in any particular context; I am arguing that investigating feminization as devalorization allows a broader understanding of how racial, sexual, class, and other oppressions are naturalized and provides us with greater analytical/political leverage. While this is only one among a number of critical insights to be expanded and applied,31 consider it a particularly productive vantage point, and especially in relation to militarization and war.INTERSECTIONALITY IN MILITARIZATION AND WARS In a recent volume, Hunt and Rygiel (2006:3) develop the concept of "(en)gendering" war to "disrupt and make visible the masculinized,militarized, racialized, sexualized, and classed dynamics through which war operates." They argue that official "war stories" do political work: they camouflage interests, agendas and politics that underpin war for the purpose of legitimating and gaining support for militarization. A crucial aspect of their effectiveness is the extent to which they depend on gendered ideologies (masculinization and feminization) that are naturalized and therefore go "unnoticed" (2006:5). By going unnoticed ideologies are depoliticized even as the identities and practices they mobilize profoundly affect politics. In the remainder of the paper I use triad analytics to explore how feminization accomplishes typically unnoticed political work in war stories. In other words, how does the valorization of masculinized identities, ideologies, and actions operate in contexts of militarism and war? The most familiar theme in war stories involves constructing the "enemy" as "other": to distinguish "us" from "them," render "others" in some sense inferior, and thereby justify war's violence against "them." The specifics of othering vary by history and context, but invariably involve some form of objectification so that "they" become objects to which norms of respect and non-violation need not be extended. Historical othering ranges from early Greeks characterizing Persians as effeminate, to Christians casting non-believers as immoral, to Europeans depicting "natives" as uncivilized. Thinking through how othering occurs in nationalist, colonial, and contemporary war stories reveals gendered identity investments and ideologies in operation. Critics of European imperialism have produced a wealth of research documenting the manipulation of ideologies to justify colonial wars and obscure their racist, economic, and heteronormative dynamics (Said, 1979; 1993; Spivak, 1987;Chatterjee, 1989; Stoler, 1991;McClintock, 1995). What surface repeatedly are characterizations of the colonized as feminine: weak, passive, irrational, disorderly, unpredictable, lacking self-control, economically and politically incompetent. European power-wielders (not only men or all men) could then justify military interventions by casting themselves in favorable masculinist terms: as uniquely rational, sexually and morally respectable, and more advanced economically and politically. In colonial wars and geopolitical maneuvering, "civilization" became a code word for European superiority, and the identity of "Europeans" was valorized. Through this lens, military interventions were perhaps a regrettable but nonetheless a necessary component of "enlightening" and "civilizing" primitive, unruly (feminized) "others." As Eisenstein (2004:75) observes, while they extolled the virtues of reason as a progressive force, Europeans positioned rationality "against savagery (natives), emotionality (women), and sexuality (racialized others)." At the same time-and complicating simplistic models of gender-the development of European nationalisms and normalization of bourgeois respectability produced an idealized model of femininity, pure, dutiful, maternal. This superficial valorization of femininity is contradicted by the practices it invoked. Women were expected to think and act in feminine ways, and to feel good about their feminine identity. But romanticizing the "maternal feminine" did less to empower women than render them perpetual dependents. Feminine virtue and morality were best assured by confining these qualities-and (bourgeois) women-to a private sphere of domesticity and assigning men the public sphere responsibility of defending and protecting feminized dependents. Rather than empowering European women, the idealization of bourgeois (heteronormative) femininity became a tool for disempowering non-European men. The patronizing and protectionist logic of bourgeois norms provided imperial governments a moral, as well as rational, justification for militarized colonization. In this war story, the barbarity of "other" men was proven by their (allegedly) oppressive treatment of women, and this demanded the rescue of victimized females by honorable, civilized men. In short, the protection of idealized femininity (to paraphrase Spivak's (1987) apt analysis) justified wars by white men to "save" brown women from brown men. The crusading rhetoric and protectionist logic obscured colonial government agendas, and it resurfaces with particular vengeance and new complexities in contemporary militarism and war.4 The US-led "war on terror" exemplifies how the triad of identity investments, ideological commitments, and militarized practices interact. Some argue that George W. Bush's "forceful" response to the 9/11 bombings involved not only his outrage and claim to military leadership, but also his desire to establish a hypermasculine image of himself and the United States. It is well-known that Bush had personal reasons for enhancing his militarist (manly) identity. He had avoided serving in Vietnam, was invested in the image of being a "guy's guy," and arguably hoped to redeem his father's failure to oust Saddam in the first Gulf War. For many Americans, the identity and power of the US had been feminized by its defeat in Vietnam, made more humiliating by losing to a people stereotyped as ethnically/racially inferior. Feminization anxiety was also fueled by the increasing visibility of women in politics and the workplace and the growing strength of LGBT political movements. A yearning to remasculinize the nation ( Jeffords 1989) was already present and readily tapped by Bush and his advisors as the nation responded to 9/11 and its spectacular demonstration of US vulnerability to "penetration" by foreign men. The war story the Bush administration immediately cultivated featured fanatical terrorists inexplicably committed to destroying freedom, democracy, and (implicitly Western) civilization by any means. Enemies this irrational and unpredictable could only be defeated by drawing an absolute line between "good" and "evil" and adopting the strongest possible measures to eliminate those deemed evil. Feminization operates here to construct enemies as so absolutely different from "us" that the only viable strategy is their annihilation. Those who were fearful, skeptical, or who actively opposed Bush's strategies were rendered unequivocally suspect-unpatriotic, anti-American, naively (irrationally) out-of-touch, or quite simply unmanly (lacking the guts to do what must be done). In this instance, feminization operates to deny absolutely the rationality of dissenters or any cogent reasons for critique. It also denied any positive identification with dissent or resistance. Dissenters are simply and irredeemably discredited: unwilling to stand up for their country, ungratefully abandoning the US and free-loading on its military power, and/or failing to grasp "real world politics." Those seeking debate and diplomacy were feminized-cast as behaving like cowardly women and undermining US interests by wimping out of military action. In effect, dissidents become a less stark but ultimately an equally threatening enemy: "If you're not with us you're against us." And as enemies, those who are against us lose any claim to inclusion, respect or (apparently) rights. There is yet another angle to 'notice.' Bush used the logic of crusading protectionism to justify his warring agenda and disable feminist critiques.5 Like earlier imperial powers, as it embarked on its post-9/11 military actions, the US claimed to be liberating women of Afghanistan and Iraq: rescuing "other" women from the "barbaric" conditions of their subjection to the Taliban and Islamic fundamentalists. Zine (2007:34) captures succinctly the political work of this war story: "the archetypal image of the deprived and debased Muslim woman was resurrected to perform her duty as a signifier of the abject difference of Muslims; the barbarity and anti-modernism of Islam and its essential repression of women; and most importantly as camouflage for US military interventions." These were not the only "official" stories told to justify the "war on terror." But the political -work that they did was crucial. They constructed an "enemy" who was unpredictable, religiously (irrationally) motivated, indiscriminately violent, and bent on destroying (Western) civilization. This foreclosed any "reasoned" engagement and legitimated a strategy of annihilation. In conjunction with other factors and forces, these stories worked to build a modicum of "consent" and a modest "coalition of the willing" that enabled the US to proceed with its war and claim it was not acting unilaterally. These stories rendered critique and opposition not just suspect but dangerously treasonous and capable of imperiling the project of saving civilization. Through variously feminizing diverse sets of actors, the Bush administration's war stories undercut dissent and legitimated extremes of surveillance and containment, quickly implemented against those the ruling regime deemed suspect. In short, these official war stories worked powerfully to justify the "war on terror" and gain at least the appearance of consent. The US government and its coalition partners invaded Afghanistan and subsequently Iraq. Investments in gendered identities and commitments to masculinist ideologies mattered for initiating the "war on terror," and they also matter within processes of militarization. Militaries, of course, are quintessential sites of hypermasculinity. Success in war is presumed to demand a constellation of qualities long considered the exclusive province of men: superior physical strength, incomparable male bonding, heroic risk-taking, extremes of violence, and readiness to sacrifice one's life for the cause. Historically, military service afforded decisive proof of manhood and constituted a claim to citizenship. The valorized identities and ideals of military service continue to fuel recruitment and enlistment activities, with the increasingly crucial addition of economic incentives. Masculinist qualities remain key to military life but are complicated in today's services by a variety of differences among men (by ethnicity, race, religion, class, skills) as well as by the inclusion of women. Within militaries, multiple masculinities and their emotional investments are differently mobilized in pursuit of warring objectives.6 More physically powerful and hypermasculine men are valued but subordinated to orders from above; commanding officers, with their presumed leadership competence, enjoy higher prestige and less ambivalent valorization. Increasing reliance on advanced technologies prompts new masculinities. While desk jobs that distance soldiers from the battle front were previously feminized, computer specialists and high-tech operators today are increasingly valorized (Blanchard, 2003). If we consider the education and training required for these positions, classed and raced dimensions of masculinities come into view. Indeed, the techno-war paradigm of the US military presents a new version of western superiority: high tech sophistication, efficiency, and "awesome" power. Intersectional analysis is particularly complicated by the increasing numbers of women in military service, who face conflicting expectations and manipulations of their femininity, masculinity, and sexuality.7 The effects of women's inclusion are variously interpreted, with no easy conclusions. Some analysts argue that women's presence humanizes and democratizes militaries-perhaps even rendering them less masculinist. Others are less optimistic. Given traditional expectations of virile, aggressive hypermasculinity, militaries are treacherous places for anyone who is feminized. Women especially-but not exclusively-are at risk. Through a triadic lens, however much female soldiers struggle to "prove" and sustain their identification as sufficiently masculine, ideologies of male supremacy and practices of sexual violence undermine their efforts. Lack of structural equality (and respect) between men and women in everyday life, enduring stereotypes of female dependence and physical inferiority, the embodiment of sex difference (menstruation, pregnancy), and the objectification of women as sexual targets interact to pose multiple threats to military women.8 These are in addition to the dangers they face as soldiers in war zones. Whether or not the presence of women humanizes militaries, the presumed femininity of women soldiers (contradicting the masculinism demanded of them) is variously manipulated in support of military objectives. The US-led "Operation Iraqi Freedom" provides stunning examples of how the femininity, masculinity, and sexuality of female soldiers can be mobilized. The images from these war stories are familiar, but the gender, racial, and geopolitical politics underpinning them have largely gone unnoticed in public discourse. For instance, soon after the invasion of Iraq, the March 2003 capture of US Army Private Jessica Lynch and her subsequent rescue was a major media event. While initial reports praised her soldiering in the face of enemy fire, these were quickly overshadowed by feminizing her plight: a white woman subject to "rape by Arab men" had to be spectacularly rescued. The story worked to reproduce the virtue and vulnerability of (white) womanhood, the demonization of Iraqi men, and the heroic efforts of US Special Forces to "save" her from presumed abuse. Equally important, the story also served Bush's military agenda by diverting attention from the increasingly visible Iraqi resistance, the flaws in US policy and preparedness, and the larger questions these raised. When accounts of abuse, rape, and torture of prisoners in the Abu Ghraib prison surfaced in late 2003, European and American audiences especially were "shocked" by the photos that were broadcast worldwide. There was the shock of viewing graphic abuse and the shame of coalition ("civilized") soldiers as perpetrators. But most disturbing were photos of American women torturing Arab men. The official war story blamed "a few bad apples," thus avoiding more critical interrogation of behaviors cultivated by militarism, valorized masculinism, and deteriorating security conditions in Iraq. Blaming the few was apparently persuasive to many in the US, where identification as the "good guys" carries deep emotional investments and encourages collective amnesia about US racism and military atrocities. The initial outrage and political furor were quickly eclipsed by the (Western) media's focus not on the implications of torture and the reality of failing military policies, but on the sensational photos. These were both an easier story to "sell" and could serve multiple purposes. Several points warrant our notice. Fascination with the photos derived from many sources and tapped feelings of both repulsion and attraction. The pictures recalled images of Nazi concentration camps for some, and white voyeurism at racial lynchings for others. Even as they depicted abuse, the sexualized poses also eroticized domination. Goldstein (in Brittain, 2006) observes that viewing a pyramid of exposed buttocks invited homoerotic arousal, while the presence of a grinning woman allayed any homosexual anxiety about that arousal. As critiques of US policies and calls for secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's resignation intensified, the media focus shifted. At least 1600 photos were made available for Congressional screening. Presumably there were more numerous images of men abusing men, yet these were displaced by a few photos featuring Lynndie England-a (white) woman-sexually humiliating (brown) men. England quickly became the focal point of condemnation. Details of England's personal life (early divorce, out-of-wedlock pregnancy, romance with an accused wife-beater) effectively constructed her as a very "improper" woman who appeared to revel in doing "improper" things (Brittain, 2006:88). For critics of the US, the Abu Ghraib photos, and especially those of England, confirmed the moral hypocrisy of American righteousness. The US-not alone but most blatantly-was prosecuting a deadly war in the absence of (rational?) foresight and planning, and on the basis of "faulty intelligence" that was increasingly exposed as willful misrepresentations. It was snubbing its nose at (civilized?) international law and human rights conventions, while claiming moral superiority and a crusading protectionist commitment to freedom and democracy. And the arrogance displayed in the photos was demoralizing to all who identified with the Islamic faith and/or sympathized with embattled Iraqis. The damage to US credibility and national interests-including the security of its soldiers and the safety of its homeland-was inestimable. Some feared, others hoped, that the scandal of Abu Ghraib would bring down the Bush administration and prompt a reassessment of the war in Iraq. Instead, Bush staunchly defended Rumsfeld, the war raged on, and the President was re-elected in November. Without denying the enormous complexity of how this transpired, I want to insist that we "notice" the media's complicity and what the official war stories obscured. The most telling point is the timing of these stories and hence their political effects. The shift to sensationalist Abu Ghraib abuse photos and their feminized depravity diverted attention from the implications of the US government's expanding detention activities, engaging in torture, and disregarding international conventions. Pornographic images of a "bad girl" did the political work of side-lining the issue of rights and suppressing debate about the war's objectives and operational practices. A second point is how the gendered and racialized messages in the images camouflaged neo-imperialist interests. Casting England as the ultimate "bad apple" positioned her as the problem, rather than the predominately male power wielders and the policies of the US government. England and a very few others paid with demotions and prison sentences while Bush and his regime escaped blame and accountability. Spoiled femininity took the rap for imperial masculinity. We might also notice how casting England as the depraved figure of femininity avoided all interrogation of privileged (white)masculinity and its arguably "depraved" history of violence. The most obvious examples include racial lynchings, torture and death of detainees, rape as a weapon of war, fire bombings, nuclear weapons, environmental warfare, use of land mines, and the indiscriminate maiming and killing of civilians. In addition, the England story completely diverted attention from the violence cultivated within militaries by hypermasculinist norms-violence which is practiced not only against external enemies but against all who are feminized, including service women themselves. Major media rarely turn their notice to the repetitive incidents of sexual harassment, rape and other forms of violence against women (and gays) in US military organizations. These incidents are now extensively documented, though the accused are rarely prosecuted and-like detention and torture practices-even more rarely punished. Finally, and in spite of the incalculable damage done to individual lives and American reputation by the abuses at Abu Ghraib, the official war stories focused attention in ways that still managed to serve an imperialist agenda: "The images of Arab men being broken, subdued, shamed, and disciplined by a white woman allow for the realization of the 'American dream' of the total demasculinization and humiliation of Arab men" (Brittain, 2006:89), assuring the American public that "they are still on 'top' in terms of their ability to inflict sexual humiliation and violence on the Iraqi enemy" (Brittain, 2006:91). INTERSECTIONALITIES OF MASCULINISM, MILITARISM, AND IMPERIALISM I introduced triad analytics as a tool for improving our analyses of social relations, arguing that emotional investments and cultural productions are inextricable from material practices. I used this framing to explore RGC and S in contexts of militarism and war, and to demonstrate how feminization devalorizes. To conclude, I review how gendered identities, ideologies, and activities are mutually constituted and operate to normalize domination and violence. No one escapes gender socialization and its historically sedimented norms of heterosexism. We cannot help but be invested in identities that our culture deems appropriate, "necessary," and worthy of esteem. While we are not locked into unchanging or monological scripts, following paths of least resistance is easier than not conforming-much less actively criticizing "the way things are." Because the naturalized "given" of binary sex difference is coded into gender identities and ideologies, it gives the status quo inordinate power to obstruct critique and transformation. Females are typically cast as, and socialized into, subjectivities and roles that feature dependence, accommodation, lack of personal autonomy and power, and "consent" to male domination. The effects of conformity "invite" ideologies of protection, if not contempt. Women who defy the stereotypes are deemed suspect, social problems and "unnatural" (African American "matriarchs," "antifamily" career women, "man-hating" feminists, "depraved" torturers). Males are no less-and in important respects, more abusively-socialized into subjectivities and roles that feature aggression, being "in control" (emotionally, physically, politically, economically), and denying anxiety, ambivalence, and vulnerability. Conforming to gender expectations costs men-and women and societies-dearly. As "compensation," men are accorded a sense of entitlement: to autonomy, power, and sexual access. Objectified and subordinate "others" may require protection but are also "at the disposal" of their superiors. This is the central dilemma constituted by gendering: the specific qualities of (weak, agentless) femininity "demand" a corollary exercise of (powerful, entitled) masculinity (see Stiehm, 1982; Brown, 1992; and Young, 2003). Not surprisingly, most men attempt to comply, often at high personal cost. Because the edifice of masculinity is a mythic construction, the pressure to "prove" one's manhood is relentless. However much individual males struggle to sustain their identification as sufficiently masculine, it is perpetually subject to challenge. One can be "unmanned" (feminized) by any evidence, or worse yet, simply the accusation of "gayness," weakness, or lack of control. Potential failure, and the despised vulnerability it invokes, is ever present. This is true for all masculinities, no matter race or class. This relentless pressure is particularly acute on the stage of political and military power. The stakes are high, especially in the context of impending or ongoing war. Leaders and soldiers respond accordingly-with displays of hypermasculinism: President Bush "must" prove himself and US invincibility, civilized nations "must" assert cultural superiority, soldiers "must" torture to secure intelligence, suspect others "must" be detained, civilians "must" be patriotic, critics "must" be silenced, deeper questions "must" be postponed. Official war stories not only camouflage the agenda of power-wielders during war; they also obscure the reproduction of hierarchies in everyday life. Their tacit (and sometimes explicit) manipulation of gender coding does the political work of normalizing, hence, depoliticizing how gender operates to perpetuate inequalities and the violence that attends them. The core dilemma of gender plays throughout: constructing women and feminized others in ways that demand masculinized identities and action. This is so taken for granted that alternative-to say nothing of structurally "equal"-arrangements are rendered unthinkable. In the "war on terror," gender coding reproduces feminized others who must be protected, controlled, detained, or eliminated by masculinized agents of ruling states. Like advocates of neoliberal capitalism are forever telling us: "there is no alternative." The systemic effects constitute a triadic tragedy of global proportions: hypermasculinized identity investments, arrogant ideological claims, and excessive-arguably depraved-military practices. Critics of imperialism have exposed how the idealization of (Western) femininity has been manipulated to justify western wars to "save" "other" women. Understanding feminization as devalorization affords an additional insight: that marginalized men more generally are subject to this crusading and protectionist "logic"-in colonial wars to "modernize" gender relations, nationalist wars to promote idealized families, invasions to "liberate" oppressed groups, wars on terror to eliminate the "irrational religious," wars on poverty that demoralize the (racialized) underclass, and battles against HIV/AIDs that demonize gay men. In sum, official war stories not only camouflage political agendas but also suppress critical thinking about institutionalized racism, sexism, classism, and homophobia. By obscuring the reciprocal constitution of valorized masculinity and vilified femininity these stories avoid critique of gender itself, with the effect of reproducing multiple forms of subjection and violence. My "thinking through" intersectionality tells a different story. It too is limited by its perspective, commitments, erasures, and generalizations. Framed by triad analytics, my story casts emotional commitments, cultural productions, and material practices as mutually constitutive. It foregrounds investments in gendered identities and gender ideologies not to privilege them but to explore how militarism and war-making depend on them. I do not claim that mine is the "superior" story though I believe it is an urgent one. I do claim that gender matters, and especially for "thinking through" militarism and war. More pointedly, I am arguing that we can neither adequately analyze violence, nor effectively advance intersectional analyses, if we ignore how feminization devalorizes.

2022 Michigan Kritik
1AC - Toxic Techulinity

The topic’s proposal of cooperation among the NATO allies positions the “great powers” as a genderless-agents, obfuscating the state as a site of gendered performativity creating a situation of masculine powers vs masculine powers while those who don’t have a nuclear arsenal are left on the side lines to obey and be the “submissive” citizen to the nuclear overlords.

Wadley, 2010. (Jonathan, PhD in IR from Florida and currently professor of IR and sexual politics at San Diego. “Gendering the State: Performativity and Protection in International Security,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, pp. 40-41 - spp)

The analysis presented here challenges the discipline’s tendency to treat states as genderless persons by exploring the role of gender in the security performances of states. In doing so, it draws upon the concept of performativity – the idea that, in the words of Judith Butler, “identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expression’ that are said to be its results.” It argues that performances within the field of security, much like performances within the daily lives of people, carry no intrinsic meaning, but must be made sense of through “a system of symbolic meaning” that cannot be but gendered. Through such performances, identities become salient, and masculine and feminine subjects are created. While this process is less palpable for states than it is for humans, it is nonetheless observable in broad patterns. States can be observed reifying themselves through performances of security, particularly through those which establish them as stable and masculine protectors. Recent work on the politics of protection, particularly that done by Didier Bigo, suggests the constitutive effects that protection has upon both providers and recipients. It stops short, however, of recognizing that these effects may be enabled by the gendered meaning that different forms of protection carry. When such meanings are considered, it becomes evident that by “being” masculine protectors, states can position themselves favorably in relation to other international actors and gain legitimacy from their domestic audiences. This means that states are gendered, and are gendered in much the same way as people are: through repeated performances. When state identity is viewed in this light, the anthropomorphic assumption, as it is commonly used, appears woefully inadequate. To be clear, it is not being suggested that drawing parallels between human subjects and state subjects is bad in-and-of-itself. Indeed, useful parallels can be drawn, despite (or, perhaps, because of) the notion that “both states and persons are fuzzy sets.” The trouble lies in assuming that states, or people, are constituted outside processes of interaction, and that either can be made sense of without considering the relational identities they take on through the systems of symbolic meaning through which they operate. Anthropomorphic assumptions tend to treat the state as a genderless, unitary actor – often, one that is ontologically primitive to its interactions – while neglecting the ways that the “actor-ness” and “unity” of the state are an effect of iterated, gendered performances, particularly in the realm of security. By viewing security performances with an eye toward their constitutive effects, and by moving gender to the center of that analysis, one gains not only a richer understanding of how states reproduce themselves (i.e. where their person-like “identities” come from), but a clearer picture of the hierarchical relations that exist among states and between states and domestic populations. This chapter begins with a consideration of how the state has been conceived of a person throughout the discipline, arguing that such practices almost always import an inadequate understanding of how people are constituted. In both cases, conceptualizing states and conceptualizing humans – this is a result, largely, of substance-oriented, as opposed to process-oriented, approaches. It argues that by making processes, rather than substances, the core of research, scholars will be able to more fully explain how states reproduce themselves as actors in world politics, how they garner power for themselves (in relation to other international actors, particularly states), and how they gain legitimacy from their subjects. Following that, the chapter argues that a theory of performativity can fill this need, especially in the realm of Security Studies. Moreover, such a theory would facilitate the study of gender within these processes and shed light on the incentives states have to behave as masculine actors. The final section of the chapter offers, tentatively, a way for empirical research to bear on the theoretical sketches presented here. It submits that “the rational protector model” may be examined as a type of dominant masculinity for states, one which allows them to “do” security ways that cast them as unitary, masculine actors.

2022 Michigan Kritik
1AC - Toxic Techulinity

NATO is fundamentally a system built on the protection racket. The concept of aggression vs “rouge” entities such as Russia and China as threats to our security because they have nukes begins this endless development of toxic masculinity that ends up with the destruction of human.

Padmi, 2021 (Made Fitri Maya Padmi, IR Scholar, Lecturer at University Jakarta, Master of Science focused in International Security Studies from University of Bristol. “Redifining Gender Role During Wartime: Power Relations, Disparities and Impacts,” Global Insight Journal v. 6 no. 1, ; spp)

In the traditional perspective of international relations, especially the realist one, human behaviour is seen as a reflection of the state’s behaviour. To cope with the anarchic world where competition is the main characteristic, the state has to act rationally and aggressively, and possess great economic and military power in order to survive. While the realists argue that the state is free from gender attributes, feminists challenge this idea by arguing if the state was a human, gender attributes are attached to it. In the realist view of the state’s behaviour, the state represents the value of masculinity. Hobbes’s description in Leviathan emphasises conflict: ‘so that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory’ (Tuck, 1996 cited in Nabulsi, 1999, p.85). In the realist view, the state possesses threats to other state, and to overcome the threats, the state should act rationally in taking action or use aggression if necessary. The state seems to be playing the role of the man in a patriarchal culture by taking up a position as protector from foreign dangers. The state’s performance can be a reflection of the masculine model. Stiehm (1982 cited in Wadley, 2010, p.51) argues that ‘An exposition of the gendered logic of masculine role of protector in relation to women and children illuminates the meaning and effective appeal of a security state that wages war abroad and expects obedience and loyalty at home. In this patriarchal logic, the role of the masculine protector puts those protected, paradigmatically women and children, in a subordinate position of dependence and obedience’. Using militarisation as a means to protect state survival, the state comes up with a rational, defence-offence strategy, one in which war is a legitimate instrument of this strategy. Feminists argue that war and militarisation are products of the masculine and, at the same time, means of masculinizing people. In her book, J. Ann Tickner (2001, cited in Wadley, 2010, p.44) stated that through war, “power is valorised and identified with heroic kind of masculinity”. Agressive character attached to men made them more involve in war, and through their position in politics and military to declare war (Wilcox, 2010). During wartime, men carry the moral responsibilities of nationalism and protection of the country, both of which are portrayals of masculine traits. In the name of protection, using offensive action is often justifiable to be conducted. During World War I and World War II, states were reacting to dangers that were often coming from outside sources. Sjoberg (2006, cited in Wilcox, 2010, p.74) argued that chivalric masculinity is not solely about men; the just narrative involves ‘good guys’ or ‘just warriors’ who fight against ‘bad guys’ for just and valorous reasons. Elshtain (1995, cited in Wilcox, 2010, p.74) added that in order to produce the chivalric masculinity of the ‘just warriors’, a ‘beautiful soul’ and a malevolent other are needed. During World War I the British military engaged in offensive strategies and the cult of offensive to defend civilisation or impose civilising values on the barbarity of Germany (Wilcox, 2010). The notion of protection has become a moral obligation to provide security in domestic environment and international communities. Globalisation has introduced human security as a new agenda for international security. Protecting human rights is a responsibility shared by international communities. When states are unable or unwilling to protect their own citizens, the responsibilities will be shifted to the broader international community. In September 2005, all United Nations member states agreed to accept the concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’. In some cases the responsibility to protect has triggered new wars called humanitarian wars. Feminists view this as an attempt to expand the scope of masculine protection. Anne Orford (1999, cited in Wilcox, 2010, p.76) stated that the various humanitarian wars of the 1990s can be read as a narrative in which NATO and other actors re-invent themselves as masculine, heroic rescuers of weak and passive victims. After the tragedy of September 11, 2001, a series of United States invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq had more of an agenda than simply being a ‘War on Terror’. Invasion also served the image of United States as ‘liberator’ for the weak. The mission of ‘liberating’ Afghan women was used to stoke public opinions to support the invasion of Afghanistan, and served also to reduce feminist protest against the war (Wilcox, 2010; Eisenstein, 2002; Charlesworth and Chinki, 2002). Highlighting the Taliban discrimination of women in Afghanistan has become the justification of the invasion. The mission of ‘liberating’ people also showed up in United States invasion of Iraq. The story of rescuing a defenceless Iraqi people from the evil tyranny and oppression of Saddam Hussein underpinned the heroic quest for protection. Identity, boundaries, ideology, and nationalism are all reasons for men to go for war. For a long time, serving one’s country was seen as a chivalric way to gain honour. Society has an important role in shaping what a man should be and must do. By joining the army and fighting on the battlefield, a man has been understood to be defending his honour and his home. Wilcox (2010) said that the military serves as an important site for the creation and maintenance of gender identity in society. Military training emphasises physical exercise to build up strength, offensive and aggressive techniques, and an ability to cope under stressful conditions on the battlefield. During wartime, the state becomes a citizen-warrior that endorses the value of the warrior’s masculinity. Military training has the aim to create or build the individual characteristics of men. And indeed the military is an institution in which masculine characteristics are the basic requirements, and individuals who want to enter this institution must adjust to its prerequisites. Barry Posen (1984, cited in Wilcox, 2010, p.70) described the attractiveness of offensive doctrines to militaries as resulting from the military as an organisation driven to increase its own autonomy and self-image. Similarly, David Englander (1997, cited in Wilcox, 2010, p.70) argued that the offensive spirit in the British military leading up to World War I expressed the military’s position as the vanguard of a virile, manly nation. Military power has been examined as gender symbolic to show the manliness of a state or decision-makers. A military parade, usually performed during a state’s Independence Day, is an opportunity to exhibit the masculinity of the state. In wartime the construction of a hyper-masculine of state is a necessity to undermine the enemy and characterise them as effeminate objects. As Cohn, Hill and Ruddick (2005) wrote, the using of masculine propaganda, such as ‘We had to prove that we are not eunuchs’ and ‘Made with Viagra’, are frequently used when India exploded five nuclear devices in May 1998. Maruska (2010) stated that the U.S.–led ‘war on terror’ after the 9/11 bombing, was a desire to establish a hyper-masculine image of George H. Bush and the United States.

2022 Michigan Evidence
LIO Good › AT: Can and Chan

Their ev is inconclusive

Can and Chan 22 — Ciwan M. Can, Anson Chan. Preventive or Revisionist Challenge During Power Transition? The Case of China–USA Strategic Competition. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs. 2022;9(1):7-25. doi:10.1177/23477970221076646 WMK

Before we move on to next section, we do find it necessary to clarify that the following article in no way seeks to provide a final argument on the ongoing scholarly debate on China–USA relations. We further acknowledge that we here provide a crude and abstract analysis as this has been necessary for the purpose of our argument and due to limitation on space. That said, we hope this article will be a fruitful and humble contribution to the academic discussions relating to revisionist versus preventive hegemonic confrontations during power transition processes in general, and China–USA relations in particular.

2022 Michigan Evidence
LIO Good › AT: Peacekeepers

Authoritarian spread collapses the UN

Kendall-Taylor 16 – PhD in Political Science @ UCLA, Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). She works on national security challenges facing the United States and Europe, focusing on Russia, populism and threats to democracy, and the state of the Transatlantic alliance (Andrea, “How Democracy’s Decline Would Undermine the International Order,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, )

A slide toward authoritarianism could also challenge the current global order by diluting U.S. influence in critical international institutions, including the United Nations , the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Democratic decline would weaken Western efforts within these institutions to advance issues such as Internet freedom and the responsibility to protect. In the case of Internet governance, for example, Western democracies support an open, largely private, global Internet. Autocracies, in contrast, promote state control over the Internet, including laws and other mechanisms that facilitate their ability to censor and persecute dissidents. Already many autocracies, including Belarus, China, Iran, and Zimbabwe, have coalesced in the “Likeminded Group of Developing Countries” within the United Nations to advocate their interests. Within the IMF and World Bank, autocracies—along with other developing nations—seek to water down conditionality or the reforms that lenders require in exchange for financial support. If successful, diminished conditionality would enfeeble an important incentive for governance reforms. In a more extreme scenario, the rising influence of autocracies could enable these countries to bypass the IMF and World Bank all together. For example, the Chinese-created Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank and the BRICS Bank—which includes Russia, China, and an increasingly authoritarian South Africa—provide countries with the potential to bypass existing global financial institutions when it suits their interests. Authoritarian-led alternatives pose the risk that global economic governance will become fragmented and less effective.

2022 Michigan Evidence
LIO Good › AT: Peacekeepers

Peacekeeping fails even with Chinese support

Autesserre 19 — Séverine Autesserre is a French-American author and researcher. She writes about war and peace, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, the ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and African politics. Autesserre, Severine. "The Crisis of Peacekeeping: Why the UN Can't End Wars." Foreign Affairs, vol. 98, no. 1, Jan.-Feb. 2019, pp. 101+. Gale Academic OneFile, link.gale.com/apps/doc/A566263292/AONE?u=umuser&sid=bookmark-AONE&xid=ce3384aa. Accessed 8 July 2022. WMK

Both the peacekeeping leadership in New York and the rank and file in the field tend to blame all these woes on the Security Council, which provides neither adequate resources nor clear mandates. To ensure success, they say, peacekeepers need more money, more logistical support, and more people, along with more realistic instructions. And, they add, the Security Council needs to force countries that contribute troops to stop interfering with the operations on the ground and instead tell their officers to respect the UN chain of command. But peacekeepers can't hold the Security Council responsible for all their shortcomings. Because they are the product of compromise, mandates are always vague, and they always need to be interpreted. Besides, even when powerful states and troop-contributing countries devote ample resources to a UN mission, the resulting efforts often fail.

The problem is bigger than mandates and resources. Above all, it has to do with two strategic choices the UN frequently makes: first, to work with national elites to stop violence from the top down and, second, to push for quick elections as a way to consolidate the peace. The standard UN approach to ending wars is to host large, costly conferences in order to strike agreements between governments and rebel leaders and then organize a national vote and declare victory. Both tendencies are based on faulty assumptions.

2022 Michigan Evidence
LIO Good › AT: AI

No runaway AI

Edward Moore Geist 15, MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, Former Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the RAND Corporation, Doctorate in History from the University of North Carolina, “Is Artificial Intelligence Really An Existential Threat to Humanity?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 8-9, https://thebulletin.org/2015/08/is-artificial-intelligence-really-an-existential-threat-to-humanity/

Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies is an astonishing book with an alarming thesis: Intelligent machines are “quite possibly the most important and most daunting challenge humanity has ever faced.” In it, Oxford University philosopher Nick Bostrom, who has built his reputation on the study of “existential risk,” argues forcefully that artificial intelligence might be the most apocalyptic technology of all. With intellectual powers beyond human comprehension, he prognosticates, self-improving artificial intelligences could effortlessly enslave or destroy Homo sapiens if they so wished. While he expresses skepticism that such machines can be controlled, Bostrom claims that if we program the right “human-friendly” values into them, they will continue to uphold these virtues, no matter how powerful the machines become.

These views have found an eager audience. In August 2014, PayPal cofounder and electric car magnate Elon Musk tweeted “Worth reading Superintelligence by Bostrom. We need to be super careful with AI. Potentially more dangerous than nukes.” Bill Gates declared, “I agree with Elon Musk and some others on this and don’t understand why some people are not concerned.” More ominously, legendary astrophysicist Stephen Hawking concurred: “I think the development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human race.” Proving his concern went beyond mere rhetoric, Musk donated $10 million to the Future of Life Institute “to support research aimed at keeping AI beneficial for humanity.”

2022 Michigan Evidence
LIO Good › AT: AI

No emerging tech impact.

Pinker et al. ’20 [Steven; PhD, Professor of Psychology @ Harvard; Stuart Russell, Professor of Computer Science @ UC Berkeley; Lucas Perry; “Steven Pinker and Stuart Russell on the Foundations, Benefits, and Possible Existential Threat of AI”; June 29th, 2020; https://futureoflife.org/2020/06/15/steven-pinker-and-stuart-russell-on-the-foundations-benefits-and-possible-existential-risk-of-ai/]

Lucas Perry: Now that’s quite a beautiful picture of the future. There’s a lot of existential hope there. The other side to existential hope is existential risk. Now this is an interesting subject, which Steve and you, Stuart, I believe have disagreements about. So pivoting into this area, and Steve, you can go first here, do you believe that human beings, should we not go extinct in the meantime, will we build artificial superintelligence? And does that pose an existential risk to humanity?

Steven Pinker: Yeah, I’m on record as being skeptical of that scenario and dubious about the value of putting a lot of effort into worrying about it now. The concept of superintelligence is itself obscure. In a lot of the discussions you could replace the word “superintelligence” with “magic” or “miracle” and the sentence would read the same. You read about an AI system that could duplicate brains in silicon, or solve problems like war in the Middle East, or cure cancer.  It’s just imagining the possibility of a solution and assuming that the ability to bring it about will exist, without laying out what that intelligence would consist of, or what would count as a solution to the problem. 

2022 Michigan Evidence
LIO Good › AT: Bioterror

No bioterror impact---it assumes every warrant.

Glenn Cross 21, PhD, Former Deputy National Intelligence Officer, Weapons of Mass Destruction, "Biological Weapons in The ‘Shadow War’," War on the Rocks, 11/09/2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/biological-weapons-in-the-shadow-war/.

The threat of terrorists using biological agents exists but is very limited. The fear of nonstate actors using biological agents rose with Aum Shinrikyo’s 1995 failed efforts to spread botulinum and anthrax in Japan. Fears of bioterror reached its most recent crescendo with the 2001 anthrax letter mailings, coming as they did within weeks after the 9/11 attacks. The threat of further bioterror attacks, however, never materialized.

Despite the fact that terrorist biological weapons attacks have not materialized since the Amerithrax scare, some continue to argue that the supposed ease and lower cost of biological weapons development, production, and use along with the societal disruption of COVID-19 has incentivized bad actors to adopt biological weapons. These concerns have been echoed by others who assume that misuse is inevitable and following the COVID-19 example will result in mass casualties and crippling political, societal, and economic repercussions.

2022 Michigan Evidence
LIO Good › AT: Space War

No space war – it’s hype and systems are redundant

Johnson-Freese and Hitchens 16 [Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese is a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College and author of Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens. Views expressed are those of the author alone. Theresa Hitchens is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), and the former Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva, Switzerland. Stop The Fearmongering Over War In Space: The Sky’s Not Falling, Part 1. December 27, 2016. https://breakingdefense.com/2016/12/stop-the-fearmongering-over-war-in-space-the-skys-not-falling-part-1/]

In the last two years, we’ve seen rising hysteria over a future war in space. Fanning the flames are not only dire assessments from the US military, but also breathless coverage from a cooperative and credulous press. This reporting doesn’t only muddy public debate over whether we really need expensive systems. It could also become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The irony is that nothing makes the currently slim possibility of war in space more likely than fearmongering over the threat of war in space.

Two television programs in the past two years show how egregious this fearmongering can get. In April 2015, the CBS show 60 Minutes ran a segment called “The Battle Above.” In an interview with General John Hyten, the then-chief of U.S. Air Force Space Command, it came across loud and clear that the United States was being forced to prepare for a battle in space — specifically against China — that it really didn’t want.

2022 Michigan Evidence
LIO Good › AT: Noko

No Korea war.

Post ’21 [Daniel; 1/29/21; PhD Candidate in IR @ Brown University; “Deterring North Korea,” ]

With these principles in mind, can deterrence continue to work vis-a-vis North Korea? In short, yes. Throughout the evolution of the U.S-North Korean deterrence relationship, vulnerability has played an important role in the nuclear strategies and policies of both sides. The vulnerability of U.S. allies and assets in the region to North Korea’s intermediate-range missile and artillery barrages has almost certainly been a check on a more aggressive U.S. strategy, whether geared toward nonproliferation or regime change. It is certainly plausible that in the absence of this vulnerability the chances of the U.S. preventively attacking North during the Trump administration would have been higher, especially considering the extremely hawkish views of his national security adviser in 2017. As a result of this vulnerability, the U.S. routinely demonstrates its dedication to security agreements with allies in word and deed. Strategic bomber flights and military exercises, for example, demonstrate to North Korea their own vulnerability to U.S. and allied power in the region. Conversely, although the Kim regime would like nothing more than to unify the Korean Peninsula under North Korean leadership (dubbed the “holy grail of North Korean statecraft” in a recent report), it has refrained from overt and aggressive military action in pursuit of this goal. There is no doubt that Kim, like his predecessors, is wary of such behavior in the face of U.S. and allied military capabilities. Today, North Korea remains vulnerable to U.S. nuclear attacks, while the United States and its regional partners remain vulnerable to nuclear attack or retaliation from North Korea. This mutual vulnerability necessitates caution on both sides.

Recent progress in North Korean missile technology have made portions of the U.S. mainland vulnerable, giving the U.S. further reason to avoid unnecessary provocation. In 2017, North Korea conducted several tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles, two of which demonstrated the capability to potentially reach the continental United States. More recently, North Korea has successfully tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile and has showcased a new and larger submarine-launched ballistic missile at a recent parade. As a result, the United States continues to invest significantly in homeland missile defense, as well as to deploy missile defenses to defend allies and assets in the region. Missile defenses likely contribute to increased feelings of vulnerability among Kim’s regime, which may see the build-up as a prelude to a military offensive. Though imperfect, these attempts to reduce vulnerability enhance deterrence by potentially denying North Korea the expected military gains from a limited missile attack, even as fully effective missile defenses might contribute to strategic instability. Regardless of their effectiveness, Kim will have to factor in these defensive capabilities when assessing the success of engaging in conflict and will question the ability to achieve even limited goals through limited means. For example, in order to ensure the success of a missile attack, Kim would have to increase the size of the salvo in order to compensate for missiles likely to be shot down by U.S. and allied defenses. But knowing that a larger initial attack would be perceived as particularly aggressive and would likely invite a larger counter-attack, he might be deterred from pursuing whatever limited gains a smaller attack might have achieved. From Kim’s perspective, U.S. military capabilities are more than sufficient to make military success for North Korea in any conflict appear difficult and costly. Vulnerability to severe retaliation and punishment from U.S. strategic forces is also currently unavoidable for Kim. In fact, this very vulnerability has driven the North Korean nuclear program toward a capability to directly threaten the U.S., thereby demonstrating its own acknowledgement of vulnerability. In sum, both sides are vulnerable to each other. Most importantly for U.S. decision-makers, there is no likely development in the near to medium term that might remove this sense of vulnerability from Kim’s mind.

2022 Michigan Evidence
LIO Good › AT: Terrorism

No nuke terror.

Christopher J. Fettweis 19. Associate professor of political science at Tulane University. “Pessimism and Nostalgia in the Second Nuclear Age.” Strategic Studies Quarterly 13.1

Finally, despite the string of bleak and terrifying projections from a variety of experts, nuclear weapons have remained well beyond the capabilities of the modern apocalyptic terrorist. The great fear of the SNA literature, that scientific knowledge and technology would gradually become more accessible to nonstate actors, has remained only a dream. Nor does there appear to be a great reservoir of fissile material in the world’s various black markets waiting to be weaponized.58 Just because something has not yet occurred does not mean that it cannot or will not occur eventually. However, it is worth noting that the world has not experienced any close calls regarding nuclear terrorism. Forecasting future unique events is a necessarily dicey enterprise, but one way to improve accuracy is to examine events that have already or almost happened. Given the many complexities involved with nuclear weapons, especially for amateurs as any terrorists would almost certainly be, it is not unreasonable to expect a few failures, or near misses, to precede success. While it is possible that we might not know about all the plots disrupted by international law enforcement, keeping the lid on nuclear near misses would presumably be no small task. As of this writing, the public is aware of no serious attempts to construct, steal, or purchase nuclear weapons, much less smuggle and detonate one. “Leakage” does not seem to be a problem, yet.59 The uniformly pessimistic projections about the second nuclear era have not, at least thus far, been borne out by events. Post–Cold War trends have instead been generally moving in directions opposite to these expectations, with fewer nuclear weapons in the hands of the same number of countries and none pursuing more. Why, then, doesnuclear pessimism persist? What are the roots of the current fashionable unwillingness—or even inability—to detect positive patterns in nuclear security?