2022
Michigan
Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Link—Cyber—Encryption
Joque, 18—PhD from the European Grad School, researches philosophy, technology and media and is the visualization librarian at the University of Michigan, go blue (Justin, “Distributed Denial of Service: Cybernetic Sovereignty,” Deconstruction Machines: Writing in the Age of Cyberwar, Chapter 3, 121-125, dml)
As the state summons a counterwriting against the tendencies of the universe, it increasingly risks itself in the process. As we saw in the example of Tor, it is often the war machine that takes advantage of this counterwriting against, or at least outside, the state. Both the state and the war machine have an uncertain relationship to cryptography and the ability of citizenry to write in secret. The state appears at once to promote and develop cryptography, especially as a support for modern networked-based capitalism, and at the same time it moves to undermine and defeat cryptography. Moreover, since the invention of publickey cryptography, when we speak of the desire for and promotion of cryptography, we must remember that we are referring to the ability not only to send secret messages but also to authenticate and prove one’s identity. Thus both states and war machines arrive at the public realization of the universe’s tendency toward strong cryptography in a difficult situation. If, as Foucault suggests in his lecture series Security, Population, Territory, the function of the modern state is to secure the population, the state both requires cryptography to secure digital spaces and the digital population but must then defeat cryptography to secure its physical population. The ability to guarantee secrets becomes critical for maintaining long-distance communication networks but at the same time threatens to empower secret conspiracies that would turn against the state.
To better understand what is at stake in the state’s relation to cryptography in particular, and more generally in relation to cyberwar and the militarization of networks, it is helpful to trace these developments through Foucault’s work on the state vis-à-vis its population.24 Foucault outlines three historical modes of operation of the state: sovereignty, societies of discipline, and finally, societies of security. He cautions, “There is not a series of successive elements, the appearance of the new causing the earlier ones to disappear. . .what above all changes is the dominant characteristic.”25 Still, the most contemporary in this list, security societies, has as its most notable element the creation of a population that must be secured as a whole. Foucault says of security,
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Link—Cyber—Attribution
Joque, 18—PhD from the European Grad School, researches philosophy, technology and media and is the visualization librarian at the University of Michigan, go blue (Justin, “Buffer Overflow: The Space and Time of Cyberwar,” Deconstruction Machines: Writing in the Age of Cyberwar, Chapter 1, 53-56, dml)
War and politics in this realm then begin not only to fix upon the most important nodes in various economic, legal, and military networks but also to reshape the connections and nodes of these networks to their advantage. War becomes the ability not only to occupy and control nodes or connect and disconnect parts of the network but to shape the space and networks that underlie the global battle space. Perhaps this is part of the reason that late-twentieth- and early-twenty-first-century war begins to fixate so heavily on the spectacle. It may be that, rather than war becoming a purely virtual phenomenon, war has instead taken the naming of reality itself as its object. If one can effectively intervene in the multiple networks that define the twenty-first-century globe, it may now be possible to win conflicts without even fighting them. Through these attempts to win by defining the battle, war has become actively engaged in the process of representing both the world and the ability to destroy it. In that sense, we must add a provision to Galloway’s claim: “There is one game in town: a positivistic dominant of reductive, systemic efficiency and expediency. Offering a counter-aesthetic in the face of such systematicity is the first step toward building a poetics for it, a language of representability adequate to it.”55 These dominant forces are equally invested in destroying this game, in upsetting the positivist investments of their enemies. War machines, states, and corporations are already invested in representing the complex space of these networks and in destroying both networks and their representations. The cases of Comment Crew and Stuxnet demonstrate that there is not merely a reductive system of efficiency. Rather, the powers of war and conflict are invested in both speed and slowness; pure unnamed flow and the poetics of representation; construction and destruction. Thus any resistance to these forces of war and control, while it certainly must utilize these tactics, cannot rely solely on representation and slowness against the speed and complexity of war and domination.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TERRITORIALITY
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Link—Big Data
Kwet 21 (Michael Kwet, Yale Univeristy – Information Society Project, “People’s Tech for People’s Power: A Guide to Digital Self-Defense & Empowerment”, Right2Know Campaign, ) // EL
Surveillance Capitalism Throughout history, surveillance systems have undermined freedom and democracy. In South Africa, surveillance has been central to systems of oppression, from the identity passes issued to indigenous people under colonialism to the reference books (dompas) administered by the apartheid government. With digital technology, the capacity for surveillance has expanded, and is being used by those with power for political, economic, and social control. South Africa is often deemed the “protest capital of the world”, and many protesters are subjected to mass and targeted surveillance. This threatens freedom of expression. Civil society activists and the poor are the most vulnerable, and they face the most violent repercussions for their political activity. Journalists, judges, politicians, whistleblowers, unions, and academics are among the many surveillance targets in recent years. Today’s surveillance is much more pervasive than in times past. A new, digitally-powered form of surveillance capitalism – the economic exploitation of society through corporate and state mass surveillance – is spreading to South Africa from abroad. This threatens our civil rights and liberties by subjecting us to a life continuously watched and recorded by states and corporations. Big Data refers to the drastic expansion of data collected about people and nature in today's digital world, and the use of computers to make sense of it by identifying patterns and correlations. Information about things such as what people like, what websites they visit, and who they are friends with has provided Big Tech corporations with data that can be used to manipulate people’s behavior with targeted advertisements and addictive features. For instance, Silicon Valley corporations are capturing market share by using “brain hacking” – the systematic exploitation of psychological vulnerabilities to hook consumers into their products and services so they will view more ads. Big Data underpins these practices, and is spreading fast across society. US-based transnational corporations, led by “GAFAM” (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft), are the centre of this brave new world. They continuously collect every little detail about us from our computers, mobile phones, and internet activities. As technology advances, they are expanding their data fiefdoms by building surveillance into household gadgets like Amazon Echo and Google Nest. Through the Internet of Things, everyday appliances like “smart” refrigerators, thermostats, trash cans, toothbrushes, and even diapers are being manufactured to collect ever more consumer data.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Link—AI—Perception/Targeting
Amoore 20 (Louise Amoore, Professor of Political Geography at Durham University, “Cloud Ethics: Algorithms and the Attributes of Ourselves and Others”, Duke University Press, 8/30/20, ) // EL
Critical accounts of the rise of algorithms have placed great emphasis on the power of algorithms to visualize, to reprogram vision, or indeed even to “see” that which is not otherwise available to human regimes of visuality. Similar to the spatial arrangement, this primacy of the visual register has also annexed what could count as the ethics and politics of algorithms. There are two curiously twinned accounts of contemporary algorithms in relation to regimes of sight and vision. The first is that algorithms operate on a plane in excess of human visibility and at scales that are inscrutable to the human. The second is that algorithms themselves have an enhanced capacity to visualize the invisible, to see, scan, and search volumes and varieties of data heretofore unavailable to human senses. Indeed, this intersection of machinic and human vision comes to the fore in the espoused ethics of public inquiries into the state’s deployment of automated algorithms for the government of the population. For example, in the UK parliamentary inquiry following the Edward Snowden disclosures of widespread automated data analysis, a peculiar kind of virtue was found in the notion that, in machine learning intelligence, “only a tiny fraction of those collected are ever seen by human eyes.” Similarly in the United States, the former director of national intelligence James Clapper likened the nsa’s algorithmic analysis of citizens’ data to a form of library in which few books are “actually read” and where the output of the system supplies “the books that we need to open up and actually read.” There is an acute problem, then, with the widespread appeal to ethical codes that regulate what algorithms or humans do or do not see. It is a problem, I suggest, with its roots in the privileging of sight and vision over other forms of making things perceptible. “Vision cannot be taken,” writes Orit Halpern in her wonderful book Beautiful Data, “as an isolated form of perception” but must be considered “inseparable from other senses.” To act and to be responsible for action, an algorithm need not “see” or “read” but need only make something or someone perceptible and available to the senses. In this book I situate the ethics and politics of algorithms within a genealogy of technologies of perception. Contemporary algorithms are changing the processes by which people and things are rendered perceptible and brought to attention. This is definitively not merely a matter of making things amenable to vision and indeed is frequently a matter of sustaining something beneath the visual register and yet perceptible. As art historian Jonathan Crary writes, “Ideas about perception and attention were transformed” alongside the historical “emergence of new technological forms of spectacle, display, projection, attention, and recording.” Understood in this way, the transformation of perception involves changes in how the perceiving subject thinks about what could be brought to attention, changes in the horizon of possibility of human action. As with the advent of the technologies of printing press, camera, or cinema, so the advent of the machine learning algorithm implies a reworking of what it means to perceive and mediate things in the world. This is not a process that is effectively captured by the idea that automated systems are undermining or superseding human forms of perception and action. To foreground instruments of perception, or what Henri Bergson terms “organs of perception,” is to breach conventional distinctions between humans and machines and acknowledge the entangled nature of all forms of perception. Bergson insists on the shared limits of perception across science and ordinary everyday experience, so that “ordinary knowledge is forced, like scientific knowledge,” to divide up time into perceptible slices, to “take things in a time broken up into particles.” Whether the organ of perception is microscope, telescope, eye, camera, or algorithm, perception is attuned to action, to the dividing up of movement into points on a trajectory so that they can be acted on. “What you have to explain,” he writes, is not “how perception arises, but how it is limited, since it should be the image of the whole, and is in fact reduced to the image of that which interests you.” Following Bergson’s insight on how an organ of perception seizes the object of interest from its environment, to consider algorithms as instruments of perception is to appreciate the processes of feature extraction, reduction, and condensation through which algorithms generate what is of interest in the data environment. Confronted by something of a moral panic surrounding the expansive volumes of “big data” and powers of surveillance of automated systems, my emphasis on practices of perception foregrounds precisely the opposing process: the reducing, distilling, and condensing of particles of interest from a whole. A defining ethical problem of the algorithm concerns not primarily the power to see, to collect, or to survey a vast data landscape, but the power to perceive and distill something for action. Algorithms function with something like an aperture—an opening that is simultaneously a narrowing, a closure, and an opening onto a scene. Let us consider, for example, an algorithm designer working in the UK defense sector, demonstrating the capacity of his deep neural network algorithms to recognize a mistaken civilian target amid a crowded data environment of drone images. He shows a slice through time as a vehicle travels away from the center of Kandahar, Afghanistan. He explains the problem for the decision: that this could be a suspect vehicle or, crucially, a school bus taking children home to villages outside the city. The algorithms had learned to recognize a school bus through training data that supplied images of predominantly yellow US-style buses. The designer explains that his algorithm is aggregated with many others to generate a single actionable output— target/no target—but to do this he must necessarily reduce and condense the patterns of interest from a volume of input data. The training data—and the humans who labeled it—have conditioned the cnn algorithm to carve out and value some objects and to discard others. In this part of Afghanistan, some of the school buses are indeed in the spatial form of a US-style school bus, but others still are open-back trucks repurposed for transporting scholars. My point is that a potential act of violence, such as a school bus wrongfully targeted by a drone strike, resides not primarily in the vertical surveilling and collecting of data, but in fact in the horizontal arraying of possible patterns of interest lodged within the algorithm itself. As an aperture instrument, the algorithm’s orientation to action has discarded much of the material to which it has been exposed. At the point of the aperture, the vast multiplicity of video data is narrowed to produce a single output on the object. Within this data material resides the capacity for the algorithm to recognize, or to fail to recognize, something or someone as a target of interest. The ethical stakes of what Mark Hansen calls “potential perceptual reconfiguration” applied to my cloud ethics necessarily involves something like a reopening of the process of the algorithm’s reduction of a multiplicity to one. What is happening in this process of condensing plural possible pathways to a single output? When an algorithm determines whether a vehicle is a military or a civilian target, or when it decides if a public protest contains latent dangerous propensities, it reduces the heterogeneity of durational time to perceive the attributes of an object and their differences of degree from other objects encountered in a past set of data. The question of what this crowd could be, what this vehicle might do, the frustrations or discomforts of the actual lived experience of waiting or gathering persist as indeterminacies in the hidden layers of the algorithm. Even within the archive of training data—sometimes just a Google ImageNet dataset of labeled images of school buses—are the residual contingencies of durational time, with all the past lived moments supplying norms and anomalies for the algorithm to learn. “My own duration, such as I live it in the impatience of waiting,” reflects Gilles Deleuze, “serves to reveal other durations that beat to other rhythms, that differ in kind from mine.” To respond to the perceptual power of the algorithm and to prize open the aperture of the single output is to trace the other durations that continue to beat in the discarded data, the multiple other potential pathways that could be mapped between fragments.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Link—AI—Ethics
Amoore 20 (Louise Amoore, Professor of Political Geography at Durham University, “Cloud Ethics: Algorithms and the Attributes of Ourselves and Others”, Duke University Press, 8/30/20, ) // EL
A cloud ethics acknowledges that algorithms contain, within their spatial arrangements, multiple potentials for cruelties, surprises, violences, joys, distillations of racism and prejudice, injustices, probabilities, discrimination, and chance. Indeed, many of the features that some would like to excise from the algorithm—bias, assumptions, weights—are routes into opening up their politics. Algorithms come to act in the world precisely in and through the relations of selves to selves, and selves to others, as these relations are manifest in the clusters and attributes of data. To learn from relations of selves and others, the algorithm must already be replete with values, thresholds, assumptions, probability weightings, and bias. In a real sense, an algorithm must necessarily discriminate to have any traction in the world. The very essence of algorithms is that they afford greater degrees of recognition and value to some features of a scene than they do to others. In so doing, algorithms generate themselves as ethicopolitical beings in the world. If to have ethics is not merely to have a code prohibiting, for example, bias or assumptions, but to work on oneself via relations, then the ethicopolitics of algorithms involves investigations of how they learn to recognize and to act, how they extract assumptions from data relations, and how they learn what ought to be from relations with other humans and algorithms. To be clear, the cloud ethics I propose here does not belong to an episteme of accountability, transparency, and legibility, but on the contrary begins with the opacity, partiality, and illegibility of all forms of giving an account, human and algorithmic. To advance a cloud ethics is to engage the ungrounded politics of all forms of ethical relations. The significant new ethical challenges that algorithms seem to present to society actually manifest novel features of some profoundly old problems of the grounds for ethical action. As Judith Butler explains in her Spinoza lectures, the demand to give an account of oneself will always fall short, for “I cannot give an account of myself without accounting for the conditions under which I emerge.”19 If one assumes that the determination of an unequivocal I who acts is a necessary precondition of ethics, as Butler cautions, then this identifiable self is “dispossessed” by the condition of its emergence in relation to others. For Butler, this persistent failure to give a clear-sighted account does not mark the limit point of ethics. On the contrary, the opaque and unknowable nature of making all kinds of acting subjects is the condition of possibility of having an ethicopolitical life.20 In short, and in contrast to the equation of ethics with transparency and disclosure, ethical responsibility is sustained by conditions of partiality and opacity. My notion of a cloud ethics extends the opacity of the human subject, envisaging a plurality of venues for ethical responsibility in which all selves—human and algorithmic—proceed from their illegibility. The apparent opacity and illegibility of the algorithm should not pose an entirely new problem for human ethics, for the difficulty of locating clear-sighted action was already present. The I who forms the ethical relation was always in question and is now, with algorithms, in question in new ways. Though the mathematical propositions of algorithms cannot be made fully legible, or rendered accountable, they can be called to give accounts of the conditions of their emergence. These conditions include some relations that are identifiably between humans and algorithms—such as the selection and labeling of training data, the setting of target outputs, or the editing of code “in the wild,” for example—but others still are relations of algorithms to another algorithm, such as a classifier supplying the training data from which a neural network will learn. In all such instances of iterative learning, the significant point is that the conditions of an algorithm’s emergence—a composite of human-algorithm relations—are venues for ethicopolitics.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Link—AI—Ethics
Amoore 20 (Louise Amoore, Professor of Political Geography at Durham University, “Cloud Ethics: Algorithms and the Attributes of Ourselves and Others”, Duke University Press, 8/30/20, ) // EL
Ethics of Algorithms At first sight, the potential for violent harm precipitated by algorithms that learn to recognize human propensities appears to be a self-evident matter for critique. Surely, one could say, the ethical terrain of the algorithm resides in the broader political landscape of rights and wrongs, good and evil. After all, one could readily identify a set of rights, already apparently registered as belonging to rights-bearing subjects, that has been contravened by algorithms that generate targets, adjudicating which people may peaceably assemble, or which people are worthy of credit or employment, and on what terms. Indeed, on this terrain of delineating the rights and wrongs of algorithmic actions is precisely where many critical voices on the harms of the algorithm have been heard. Writing in the New York Times, for example, Kate Crawford identifies machine learning’s “white guy problem,” arguing that “we need to be vigilant about how we design and train machine learning systems.”10 The dominant critical perspectives on algorithmic decisions have thus argued for removing the “bias” or the “value judgements” of the algorithm, and for regulating harmful and damaging mathematical models.11 Within each of these critical calls, the ethical problem is thought to dwell in the opacity of the algorithm and in its inscrutability, so that what Frank Pasquale has called the “black box society” is addressed through remedies of transparency and accountability.12 In sum, the rise of algorithmic power in society has been overwhelmingly understood as a problem of opaque and illegible algorithms infringing or undercutting a precisely legible world of rights belonging to human subjects. In such a framing, there is an outside to the algorithm—an accountable human subject who is the locus of responsibility, the source of a code of conduct with which algorithms must comply. To call for the opening of the black box, for transparency and accountability, then, is to seek to institute arrangements that are good, ethical, and normal, and to prevent the transgression of societal norms by the algorithm. Yet, when people gathered to protest on Baltimore streets, or when Facebook users’ data fueled the political and commercial models of Cambridge Analytica (figure I.3), legible rights to peaceable assembly or to electoral due process were not violated primarily by illegible algorithms. Rather, the means by which people could appear in a political forum, the conditions of their appearance, and the capacities they had to make a recognizable political claim in the world were subject to algorithmic regimes of what Michel Foucault calls truth telling and wrongdoing.13 In short, what matters is not primarily the identification and regulation of algorithmic wrongs, but more significantly how algorithms are implicated in new regimes of verification, new forms of identifying a wrong or of truth telling in the world. Understood in these terms, the algorithm already presents itself as an ethicopolitical arrangement of values, assumptions, and propositions about the world. One does not need to look beyond the algorithm for an outside that is properly political and recognizably of ethics. Indeed, there can be no legible human outside the algorithm and underwriting its conduct, for as John Cheney-Lippold reminds us, we are enmeshed in the data that produce each “freshly minted algorithmic truth.”14 One cannot sustain a search for codes of ethics that instill the good, the lawful, or the normal into the algorithm. Contemporary algorithms are not so much transgressing settled societal norms as establishing new patterns of good and bad, new thresholds of normality and abnormality, against which actions are calibrated. Actions one might consider harmful, as William Connolly notes, are not merely “actions by immoral agents who freely transgress the moral law” but are “arbitrary cruelty installed in regular institutional arrangements taken to embody the Law, the Good, and the Normal.”15 Amid the widespread search for new ethical arrangements for the scrutiny and regulation of algorithms, what becomes of the arbitrary harms lodged within embodied algorithmic arrangements? One could imagine a world in which the deep neural networks used in cities like Baltimore are scrutinized and rendered compliant with rules and yet continue to learn to recognize and misrecognize people and to infer intent, to generate rules from the contingent and arbitrary data of many past moments of associative life on the city streets, to refine and edit the code for future uses in unknown future places. I may feel that some notion of legible rights is protected, and yet the attributes generated from my data, in correlation with yours and others’, continue to supply the conditions for future arbitrary actions against unknown others. I draw a distinction here between ethics as code, or what Michel Foucault describes as “the code that determines which acts are permitted or forbidden,” and ethics as the inescapably political formation of the relation of oneself to oneself and to others.16 My argument is that there is a need for a certain kind of ethical practice in relation to algorithms, one that does not merely locate the permissions and prohibitions of their use. This different kind of ethical practice begins from the algorithm as always already an ethicopolitical entity by virtue of being immanently formed through the relational attributes of selves and others. My desire for a different mode of critique and ethical account is animated not by the question, How ought the algorithm be arranged for a good society?, but by the question, How are algorithmic arrangements generating ideas of goodness, transgression, and what society ought to be?
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Link—AI—Autonomous Weapons
Wilson 20 (Neil Wilson, Master’s at Utrecht University, “Understanding the Battle for AI in Warfare through the Practices of Assemblage: A Case Study of Project Maven”, Utrecht University, 8/2/20, ) // EL
2.1. Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems and AI in Warfare Debate relating to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) is a mile wide but an inch deep - vast but as-yet unsubstantiated. Ample discussion surrounds the potential political, legal and moral repercussions of deploying LAWS but there is little theoretically-informed analysis of their development. Given the revolutionary potential of such technologies, there is an urgent need to rectify this imbalance. Political challenges posed by the deployment of LAWS on battlefields are numerous. Unlike nuclear weapons, LAWS would require no hard-to-obtain materials and be relatively cheap to develop, leading some to fear a global robot arms race. Even those contending that “arms race” framing risks escalating rivalries nevertheless agree on the need to manage the proliferation of these technologies. In particular, the risk of LAWS proliferating among non-state actors seeking to “level the playing field” is severe. Even among democratic states, LAWS would overcome the “bodybag” problem and thus lower the threshold for going to war. In such a scenario, however, the obvious attraction of using LAWS - a ‘bloodless’ war between machines - is misguided. A change of footsoldiers does not alter the fundamental objective of war: “imposing and enduring costs to reveal relative capability or resolve.” In the absence of human soldiers to impose costs upon, belligerents may seek alternative means to demonstrate their resolve, e.g. by targeting non-military objectives and civilians. Indeed, as drones have enabled the removal of soldiers from battlefields, the inability for enemies to directly reciprocate violence has instigated fears of “blowback” by other means. Political concerns aside, the legal questions raised by LAWS are momentous. Formal and informal rules have guided conduct in warfare for as long as it has been carried out. Over time, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) has steadily evolved to keep up with the development of new methods of warfighting, as evidenced by bans on the use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, anti-personnel landmines and blinding laser weapons. Throughout history, however, IHL has been developed under the assumption that human intelligence is guiding conduct in combat, not artificial. As existing treaties make no reference to LAWS, it is unclear if they can be banned under the current legal framework. Nevertheless, because it is impossible to confidently predict the outcomes of commands on complex AI systems, there is a possibility of LAWS running afoul of IHL. Can a robot be entrusted with the ability to discriminate between legitimate targets and civilians? If it fails, who can be held accountable? Some fear LAWS subverting the Hague Convention if they can act autonomously but not assume responsibility for the consequences. The ethics of using LAWS are fraught. At first glance, there is obvious appeal in using robots to do the “dull, dirty and dangerous” work in war as in civilian life. A robot never gets tired, stressed or traumatised. Their dispassionate nature, immune to the intoxicating effects of adrenaline, may even reduce the risk of civilian harm in conflict. From this perspective, if LAWS lessens the danger to soldiers and civilians alike, some suggest utilising them is not only judicious but an ethical imperative. Even if LAWs could perfectly adhere to IHL and reduce harm to both combatants and civilians, many question whether they should. As a simple matter of dignity, some insist that taking a human life should involve a human decision. “Delegating the decision to kill to algorithms,” according to Rosert and Sauer, “is inhumane and unacceptable under any circumstances.” A compelling argument, but potentially relativised by the fact that there are many different interpretations of human dignity and many ways it can be violated - technological or otherwise. The political, ethical and legal concerns raised are troubling but overwhelmingly speculative. Are we jumping the (autonomous) gun? Such preoccupation with the future use of killer robots may obscure meaningful debate about their present day development. A few notable contributions from Lewis, Taylor and Verbruggen are to be commended for grappling with the development of these systems, but this remains an under-theorised field. Presumably owing to its novelty, Project Maven has thus far evaded serious academic scrutiny. One notable exception comes from Suchman, however it nevertheless engages primarily with the deployment rather than development of this technology. Common to these conjectural, dystopian perspectives on the future of warfare is the assumption that if LAWS technology exists, it will be used. Not a dramatic leap of faith but nevertheless it seems prudent to question what is driving the demand for these technologies in this domain; thereby drawing the line between where we stand and where some fear we are heading. LAWS will only be deployed, presumably, if there is some strategic, operational and/or tactical need for them. Understanding this will elucidate a fuller picture of why and how they are being developed. To satisfy this curiosity, we turn to the growing field of scholarship on remote warfare.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Aff › AT: Non-Democratic Country PIC › 2ac – a2 – sweden/finland
Reuters, 6-1-2022, "Finland and Sweden say will continue NATO talks with Turkey," https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/finland-says-nato-talks-with-turkey-will-continue-2022-06-01/, accessed 6-25-2022//cpd
The Nordic neighbours applied to join NATO last month in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but they have faced resistance from Turkey, which accuses them of being safe havens for Kurdish militants and wants them to scrap arms export bans. read more
"Together with Sweden, we will do our homework and prepare for the questions Turkey has," Finnish Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto told reporters in Helsinki, commenting on talks that took place in Ankara last week.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Aff › AT: Non-Democratic Country PIC › 2ac – turkey k2 nato
Rachel Ellenhuss 12-2-2019, "Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving," Rachel Ellehuus is deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., https://www.csis.org/analysis/turkey-and-nato-relationship-worth-saving, accessed 6-25-2022//cpd
Yet these foundational factors remain valid: Turkey’s geopolitical position at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa still provides NATO with needed political and operational reach, and Turkey continues to benefit from the collective military power of NATO. With the relationship close to (if not at) its nadir, Turkey and NATO, with the support of the EU, need to take active measures to anchor it for the future, while avoiding steps that could destroy the relationship entirely.
Active measures
2022
Michigan
Negative
Aff › AT: Non-Democratic Country PIC › 2ac – cooperation inev
Seth Cropsey, 6-23-2022, "Diversionary war: Turkey’s actions against Greece are a growing threat to NATO," Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3534155-diversionary-war-turkeys-actions-against-greece-are-a-growing-threat-to-nato/, accessed 6-28-2022//cpd
Turkish obstructionism against Swedish and Finnish NATO membership, its limited offensive in Iraq, and its prospective offensive in Syria have grabbed international attention. But more significant is Turkey’s growing diplomatic tension with Greece, an ever-festering lesion that threatens to burst.
Considering Turkey’s domestic situation and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States must be wary. Turkish President Recip Tayyip Erdogan could capitalize on international distraction and wage a diversionary war to boost his popularity, a conflict that would disrupt NATO’s cohesion and threaten the alliance.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Aff › AT: Non-Democratic Country PIC › 2ac – ukraine thumps
Edward Lucas, 6-7-2022, "NATO Is Out of Shape and Out of Date," Foreign Policy, Edward Lucas is a nonresident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, a Liberal Democratic candidate for the British Parliament, a former senior editor at The Economist, and the author, most recently, of Cyberphobia: Identity, Trust, Security and the Internet. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/07/nato-ukraine-russia-war-alliance-reform-geopolitics-military/, accessed 6-28-2022//cpd (EDITED FOR ABELIST LANGUGE)
Is NATO brain-dead [OBSOLOTE] or back in business? Less than three years ago, French President Emmanuel Macron famously diagnosed “the brain death of NATO.” Rhetoric aside, his point was fair at the time: Europe’s dearth of strategic thinking combined with the unpredictability of U.S. policy under then-President Donald Trump spelled serious trouble for the Cold War-era alliance.
Now, all talk is of NATO’s revival and resurgence. Russia’s war on Ukraine has given an urgent new relevance to the bloc’s core mission of territorial defense. NATO members appear to have found a new unity of purpose, supplying Ukraine with weapons, reassessing the threat from Russia, hiking defense budgets, and bolstering the security of the alliance’s eastern frontier. But the “honeymoon,” in the words of Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, was brief. As the war drags on, strains are showing, and the alliance is still shaky.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Aff › AT: Centralization Bad › Perm
Matthew R. Voke 19, Matthew R. Voke is a major at USAF, “Artificial Intelligence for Command and Control of Air Power,” Air Command and Staff College, June 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Nov/27/2002218265/-1/-1/0/WF_72_VOKE_%20ARTIFICIAL_INTELLIGENCE_FOR_COMMAND_AND_CONTROL_OF_AIR_POWER.PDF//RA
US doctrine prescribes the conduct of joint air operations using the principle of centralized control and decentralized execution.22 An oversimplified synopsis driving this tenet of airpower is that centralization of control enables the 5 senior echelon commanders to control, mass, and lead forces effectively; decentralization of execution allows forces to seize the initiative, respond to uncertain and changing environments, and fosters flexibility in lower echelons.
Technological developments frequently shift the equilibrium of this tenet of airpower. Robust communications connectivity has increased the shared operations picture at all levels, but it has also enabled senior leadership involvement in the finest details of employment.23 This duality has created inherent tension between the imperatives of political control and those of efficient mission accomplishment that leaders must understand.24 Although centralized control and execution are possible in many situations, a conscious effort to delegate execution authority appropriately will ensure the maintenance of US airpower agility.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Aff › AT: Centralization Bad › Centralization Good
DANIELLE C. Tarraf et al. 19, TARRAF, WILLIAM SHELTON, EDWARD PARKER, BRIEN ALKIRE, DIANA GEHLHAUS CAREW, JUSTIN GRANA, ALEXIS LEVEDAHL, JASMIN LÉVEILLÉ, JARED MONDSCHEIN, JAMES RYSEFF, ALI WYNE, DAN ELINOFF, EDWARD GEIST, BENJAMIN N. HARRIS, ERIC HUI, CEDRIC KENNEY, SYDNE NEWBERRY, CHANDLER SACHS, PETER SCHIRMER, DANIELLE SCHLANG, VICTORIA SMITH, ABBIE TINGSTAD, PADMAJA VEDULA, KRISTIN WARREN, Danielle Tarraf is a publisher at Rand Corporation, “The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence,” June 2019, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR4200/RR4229/RAND_RR4229.pdf//RA
The JAIC lacks visibility. The issue of visibility is subtle. The JAIC has been designated, in the summary of the DoD AI strategy, as the focal point for carrying out DoD’s strategy, and is expected to attract and cultivate a world-class AI team. This designation and role presume a certain degree of visibility both within DoD and outside it. This visibility was lacking based on our interviews. Overall, we noted a lack of clarity among our interviewees on the JAIC’s mandate, roles, and activities. We also noted a lack of clarity around how it fits within the broader DoD ecosystem and how it connects to the services and their efforts. That was true of both DoD interviewees and our industry interviewees who had heard of the JAIC (see section “Organization: At the OSD Level” in Appendix B and section “Thoughts Across Industry: On the JAIC” in Appendix C). In addition to the lack of clarity about the JAIC’s current mandate and roles, there were many perspectives about the desired or ideal role for the JAIC as DoD embraces and scales AI. These perspectives ranged from the JAIC as a central repository of information and best practices, to the JAIC as a center of excellence that focuses on discrete tasks (e.g., building the JCF, formalizing standards for VVT&E), to the JAIC’s potential elevation to a field agency or other entity with a direct reporting line to either the Secretary or DSD.
We do not believe this lack of clarity to be simply a question of messaging. More fundamentally, it points to a lack of clarity about the raison d’être of the JAIC and how the specific roles it has been assigned support that. The confusion might not be entirely on the part of the audience. DoD needs to have a clearer view of what it wants the JAIC to be and how DoD can help ensure the success of JAIC’s mission, and therefore DoD’s vision.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Aff › AT: Centralization Bad › Centralization Good
David S. Rubenstein 20, Professor Rubenstein is James R. Ahrens Chair in Constitutional Law and Director of the at Washburn University School of Law. He teaches and writes in the areas of administrative law, constitutional law, artificial intelligence, legislation, jurisprudence, and federal contracting, “Acquiring Ethical AI,” Florida Law Review, Vol. 73, November 1 2020, http://www.floridalawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2_Rubenstein_BOOK.pdf//RA
Ideally, AI can make government more efficient and effective across a wide range of functions: law enforcement, adjudication, rulemaking, national security, resource allocation, in-house management, delivery of public services, and beyond.115 Moreover, with proper design, AI systems can provide greater accuracy than human deciders alone.116 Further, AI systems may be more transparent and accountable than government agents, who might conceal or be unaware of their own cognitive biases.117
The centralization of AI decision-making may also promote greater consistency across cases, both in public-facing operations (such as adjudication and law enforcement) and inward-facing operations (such as personnel retention).118 What’s more, centralized AI decision-making can facilitate audits of external and internal government programs.119
2022
Michigan
Negative
Aff › Advantage Updates › deterrance
Colin Demarest 22, Reporter at C4ISRNET, where he covers military networks, cyber and IT. “McMaster says AI can help beat adversaries, overcome ‘critical challenges’” May 17. //barn
The U.S. must “identify aggression early to deter it,” McMaster told attendees of the daylong event focused on autonomy, AI and the defense policy that underpins it. “This applies to our inability to deter conflict in Ukraine, but also the need to deter conflict in other areas, like Taiwan. And, of course, we have to be able to respond to it quickly and to maintain situational understanding, identify patterns of adversary and enemy activity, and perhaps more importantly, to anticipate pattern breaks.”
Specific applications of AI, McMaster said, include “early warning of hostile actions by enemies and adversaries who possess long-range missile and rocket capabilities,” such as Russia or China. The capability “also applies to North Korea and Iran,” he continued. “It applies to Houthi rebels in Yemen, to Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, or Hamas in Gaza.”
2022
Michigan
Negative
Aff › Advantage Updates › ukraine scenario
Nadine El-bawab 22, A correspondent for ABC news. “NATO's Article 5 could pull the US and its allies further into the Russia-Ukraine conflict” March 01. //barn
President Joe Biden repeatedly has said the United States will not be sending troops to fight Russia in Ukraine, but vowed that the U.S. would defend its NATO allies.
"As I made crystal clear, the United States will defend every inch of NATO territory with the full force of American power," he reiterated in an address Thursday.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Aff › Advantage Updates › ukraine scenario
Brank Marijan 22, A senior researcher at Project Ploughshares, where Brank leads research on the military and security implication of emerging technologies. “Beyond Ukraine: AI and the Next US-Russia Confrontation” February 14. //barn
Two titans from the Cold War era seem set to go another round, this time over the prospect of Ukraine’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which the United States calls a sovereign Ukrainian decision and Russia opposes vehemently. Whatever the outcome of the current standoff, another confrontation between the United States and Russia that merits closer attention is brewing — one that may fundamentally reshape the US-Russia security relationship in the not-so-distant future.
Both states are heavily committed to the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in military systems and operations, including logistics, command and control, and intelligence collection and analysis, as well as to the development of more autonomous weapons. As tensions rise, these countries are likely to employ capabilities that are enhanced by AI and machine learning in cyberattacks and misinformation and disinformation campaigns. Rising political temperatures might well encourage fast-tracking of more autonomous military systems as each side seeks to gain the advantage.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Aff › Advantage Updates › ukraine scenario
Dan Sabbagh 22, Sabbagh is the Defence and Security editor for the guardian. “Russian hackers targeting opponents of Ukraine invasion, warns GCHQ chief” May 10. //barn
Russian hackers are seeking to target western countries supporting Ukraine in its efforts to resist Moscow’s invasion, the head of GCHQ has said.
Jeremy Fleming, the director of the British spy agency, said in a speech on Tuesday morning that while fears of a fully fledged online war between Russia and Ukraine had perhaps failed to materialise, there remained “plenty” of cyber activity as part of the conflict.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Aff › Advantage Updates › ukraine scenario
Digital Watch Observatory (DWO) 22, The Digital Watch is an initiative of the Geneva Internet Platform, supported by the Swiss Confederation and the Republic and Canton of Geneva. “Ukraine conflict: Digital and cyber aspects” June. //barn
The current political climate presents a high possibility for cyberattacks to get out of control and escalate beyond the conflict in Ukraine. Some countries have already expressed their concerns about possible cyberattacks targeting their national critical infrastructures. And there are several possible scenarios for escalations to occur in the near future.
Russia, in line with its aggressive decision to put its nuclear forces on high alert, might respond with devastating cyberattacks. On the other hand, NATO has already confirmed that a cyberattack against any of its members would trigger Article 5 of the NATO Charter, allowing NATO to strike back with all means available. In the past, the USA and its allies have primarily resorted to public attribution of attacks to Russia and, eventually, some sanctions against the individuals involved. With their portfolio of sanctions now almost completely deployed already, there is not much more that they could do to respond economically to such attacks – so counter cyberattacks are a possible option.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Aff › Advantage Updates › ukraine scenario
Richard L. Hudson and Florin Zubașcu 22, Richard was the managing editor of the Wall Street Journal's European edition for six years, and a Journal reporter and editor for twenty-five years. “Science goes to war: western allies step up collaboration in military research” April 07. //barn
The war in Ukraine moved directly into the lab this week, with western governments announcing a series of new measures to coordinate their military research, including on quantum technologies and hypersonic missiles.
But the shift isn’t without controversy, as some European academics urged the EU to keep its civilian and defence research separate.