Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 Michigan Affirmative
Solvency › Advocates---Office of Strategic Narratives › Solvency---Office of Strategic Narratives

The United States federal government should, via Executive Order, create and establish an Office of Strategic Narratives

Luke Karl et al. 18 (Maj. Luke Karl is an active-duty officer in the Air Force and a graduate of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School in Washington, D.C., Maj. Joseph Lane is an active-duty officer in the Army and a graduate of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School in Washington, D.C., Cmdr. David Sanchez is an active-duty officer in the U.S. Navy and a graduate of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School in Washington, D.C, 7-26-2018, "How to Stop Losing the Information War," Defense One, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/07/how-stop-losing-information-war/150056/, DOA: 6-22-2022//Smarx Ahsan)

--- has some possible arguments to the DoS counterplan in here, but im not sure how topical this is.

Russia “is waging the most amazing information-warfare blitzkrieg in the history of information warfare,” Gen. Philip Breedlove told NATO leaders at their 2014 summit. There’s no evidence that Moscow’s efforts have since slackened—nor that the United States is institutionally equipped to develop an effective response.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Solvency › Advocates---Innovation Center › Solvency---Innovation Center

NATO action is key---only expanding Article V to hybrid warfare, promoting innovation centers, and supporting national governance prevents Russian hybrid tactics.

Dr. Chris Dolan 22, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Masters of Science Program in Intelligence and Security Studies at Lebanon Valley College, two-time Fulbright U.S. Scholar in international security in North Macedonia and Kosovo, Ph.D. in International Relations and National Security Studies from the University of South Carolina, 2/15/2022, "NATO Must Boost Hybrid Warfare Defenses," https://www.justsecurity.org/80176/nato-must-boost-hybrid-warfare-defenses/, RMax

Russia could launch a conventional military invasion of Ukraine at any moment, but it could also destabilize and undermine it without ever firing a shot. Russian military exercises and positioning are powerful tools of unpredictability that keep NATO and Ukraine off balance while Russian operatives and their proxies wage a hybrid war through covert operations, coordinated disinformation campaigns, and cyber attacks. To build resilience against hybrid warfare, NATO should collaborate with the private sector and devote more resources to technology literacy and innovation.

Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Strategy

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Solvency › Advocates---Broad Cooperation › Solvency Advocate---Best Practices/Broad Coop

Current NATO counter-disinformation tactics fail, BUT the plan’s approach centered around strengthening both national and international resilience by coordinating best practices and integrating effective tactics into NATO doctrine solves.

Linda Sanchez 21, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, United States House Representative from California’s 38th District, active competitor in the annual Congressional Baseball Game, October 2021, “Bolstering the Democratic Resilience of the Alliance Against Disinformation and Propaganda,” https://www.illiberalism.org/linda-sanchez-bolstering-the-democratic-resilience-of-the-alliance-against-disinformation-and-propaganda/, RMax

1. Increase NATO’s capacity to understand and respond to threats in the information space

66. Member states should expand NATO’s human, financial, and technological resources dedicated to fighting disinformation and propaganda to match both the level of the threat and the Alliance’s ambitions to counter it. Such resources would help strengthen NATO’s capacity to monitor the information environment in which it operates and respond to any hostile information activity.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › IL---Anti-Nuclear Movements › IL---Anti-Nuclear Movements

Targeted misinformation campaigns erode NATO cohesion and distract from regulation of Russian nuclear stockpiling.

Lesley Kucharski 18, Counterproliferation Analyst at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, “Russian Multi-Domain Strategy against NATO: information confrontation and U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe,” , cy

Western philosophical and moral principles incline strategic thinkers in democratic societies to reject the notion that information can be used as a weapon or a domain of warfare instead of a tool of freedom and truth. International law suggests that the vast majority of societies and governments agree that freedom of information and truth are crucial to healthy societies. In practice, however, there are also governments that perceive them as both a form of strategic deception and as a vulnerability that can be exploited through information operations.

An increasingly common dimension of Russian strategy against the United States and its NATO allies and partners is information confrontation [informatsionnoe protivoborstvo], or IPb. Russia actively pursues a strategy of exploiting perceived vulnerabilities of these democratic societies by carrying out informational-technical (e.g., cyber) and informational-psychological operations below the threshold of open military conflict in order to exacerbate pre-existing societal, political, and military divisions, thereby degrading NATO cohesion. 1 The literature on IPb suggests that a key element of this strategy is an effort to create confusion and sow doubt in the existence of truth.2 Russia has also applied these operations alongside traditional military means of armed conflict in NATO partner states, Georgia and Ukraine, in order to slow down the decision-making processes in those countries as well as throughout the international community. In Georgia and Ukraine, Russia has employed both aspects of IPb to challenge the Westphalian international order and achieve a fait accompli with a limited use of military force.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › Impacts---Democracy › Impact---Democracy---BioD

Biodiversity Loss causes Extinction.

Torres 16 Phil Torres 4-11-2016 “Biodiversity loss: An existential risk comparable to climate change” thebulletin.org/biodiversity-loss-existential-risk-comparable-climate-change9329 (founder of the X-Risks Institute, an affiliate scholar at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies)

The sixth extinction. The repercussions of biodiversity loss are potentially as severe as those anticipated from climate change, or even a nuclear conflict. For example, according to a 2015 study published in Science Advances, the best available evidence reveals “an exceptionally rapid loss of biodiversity over the last few centuries, indicating that a sixth mass extinction is already under way.” This conclusion holds, even on the most optimistic assumptions about the background rate of species losses and the current rate of vertebrate extinctions. The group classified as “vertebrates” includes mammals, birds, reptiles, fish, and all other creatures with a backbone. The article argues that, using its conservative figures, the average loss of vertebrate species was 100 times higher in the past century relative to the background rate of extinction. (Other scientists have suggested that the current extinction rate could be as much as 10,000 times higher than normal.) As the authors write, “The evidence is incontrovertible that recent extinction rates are unprecedented in human history and highly unusual in Earth’s history.” Perhaps the term “Big Six” should enter the popular lexicon—to add the current extinction to the previous “Big Five,” the last of which wiped out the dinosaurs 66 million years ago. But the concept of biodiversity encompasses more than just the total number of species on the planet. It also refers to the size of different populations of species. With respect to this phenomenon, multiple studies have confirmed that wild populations around the world are dwindling and disappearing at an alarming rate. For example, the 2010 Global Biodiversity Outlook report found that the population of wild vertebrates living in the tropics dropped by 59 percent between 1970 and 2006. The report also found that the population of farmland birds in Europe has dropped by 50 percent since 1980; bird populations in the grasslands of North America declined by almost 40 percent between 1968 and 2003; and the population of birds in North American arid lands has fallen by almost 30 percent since the 1960s. Similarly, 42 percent of all amphibian species (a type of vertebrate that is sometimes called an “ecological indicator”) are undergoing population declines, and 23 percent of all plant species “are estimated to be threatened with extinction.” Other studies have found that some 20 percent of all reptile species, 48 percent of the world’s primates, and 50 percent of freshwater turtles are threatened. Underwater, about 10 percent of all coral reefs are now dead, and another 60 percent are in danger of dying. Consistent with these data, the 2014 Living Planet Report shows that the global population of wild vertebrates dropped by 52 percent in only four decades—from 1970 to 2010. While biologists often avoid projecting historical trends into the future because of the complexity of ecological systems, it’s tempting to extrapolate this figure to, say, the year 2050, which is four decades from 2010. As it happens, a 2006 study published in Science does precisely this: It projects past trends of marine biodiversity loss into the 21st century, concluding that, unless significant changes are made to patterns of human activity, there will be virtually no more wild-caught seafood by 2048. Catastrophic consequences for civilization. The consequences of this rapid pruning of the evolutionary tree of life extend beyond the obvious. There could be surprising effects of biodiversity loss that scientists are unable to fully anticipate in advance. For example, prior research has shown that localized ecosystems can undergo abrupt and irreversible shifts when they reach a tipping point. According to a 2012 paper published in Nature, there are reasons for thinking that we may be approaching a tipping point of this sort in the global ecosystem, beyond which the consequences could be catastrophic for civilization. As the authors write, a planetary-scale transition could precipitate “substantial losses of ecosystem services required to sustain the human population.” An ecosystem service is any ecological process that benefits humanity, such as food production and crop pollination. If the global ecosystem were to cross a tipping point and substantial ecosystem services were lost, the results could be “widespread social unrest, economic instability, and loss of human life.” According to Missouri Botanical Garden ecologist Adam Smith, one of the paper’s co-authors, this could occur in a matter of decades—far more quickly than most of the expected consequences of climate change, yet equally destructive. Biodiversity loss is a “threat multiplier” that, by pushing societies to the brink of collapse, will exacerbate existing conflicts and introduce entirely new struggles between state and non-state actors. Indeed, it could even fuel the rise of terrorism. (After all, climate change has been linked to the emergence of ISIS in Syria, and multiple high-ranking US officials, such as former US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and CIA director John Brennan, have affirmed that climate change and terrorism are connected.) The reality is that we are entering the sixth mass extinction in the 3.8-billion-year history of life on Earth, and the impact of this event could be felt by civilization “in as little as three human lifetimes,” as the aforementioned 2012 Nature paper notes. Furthermore, the widespread decline of biological populations could plausibly initiate a dramatic transformation of the global ecosystem on an even faster timescale: perhaps a single human lifetime. The unavoidable conclusion is that biodiversity loss constitutes an existential threat in its own right. As such, it ought to be considered alongside climate change and nuclear weapons as one of the most significant contemporary risks to human prosperity and survival.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › Impacts---Democracy › Impact---Democracy---BioD

Democracy solves biodiversity - it provides political accountability, compliance with international treaties, and effective political lobbying

Oskar Ryden 19, a PhD Student in political science. My general research interest includes issues with equivalence in the measurement of social science concepts, Alexander Zizka is a postdoctoral researcher at the EA lab and synthesis group of the German Centre for Integrative Biodiversity Research (iDiv) in Leipzig, Germany, Sverker Carlsson Jagers is a Professor at University of Gothenburg and guest-professor at Luleå University of Technology, director of CeCAR (Centre for Collective Action Research), Staffan I. Lindberg holds a PhD (2005) from Lund University, Sweden. His dissertation won the American Political Science Association's Juan Linz Award for best dissertation 2005. He was assistant professor at Kent State University (2005-2006), assistant/associate professor at University of Florida (2006-2013), and has been with University of Gothenburg since 2010, full professor since 2013, Alexandre Antonelli is the Director of Science at the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, June 2019, "Linking democracy and biodiversity conservation: Empirical evidence and research gaps," The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s13280-019-01210-0.pdf //AShah

Political institutions are relevant for biodiversity conservation since the national management of biodiversity can be understood as a case of decision-making in the political system. Thus, variation in the political institutions (i.e. being more or less democratic) that structure the selection of decision-makers, and the processes of decision-making, should be expected to impact the success of biodiversity conservation across countries. Specifically, there are three categories of hypothetical and non-directional arguments why democracy can be related to biodiversity conservation, all of them related to the opportunity structure that actors face (see e.g. Midlarsky 1998; Neumayer 2002; Li and Reuveny 2006 for a more detailed description of the links between democracy, biodiversity conservation, and environmental quality in general). First, the political rights, normally associated with democracy, including the freedom of association, the freedom of expression, and the freedom of press, together allow for a more productive involvement of citizens in politics, both through political parties and civil society organizations and to participate in or lobby decision-making. Political rights also allow for the media and other actors to address biodiversity issues through shaping the public opinion and affecting the policy agenda (Li and Reuveny 2006). Second, when the faith of political leaders are largely decided by citizens through repeated, free, and fair elections with universal suffrage, the expectation is that this vertical accountability electoral mechanism should promote the distribution of environmental public goods (Li and Reuveny 2006), including positive impacts on biodiversity conservation. Additionally, elections as the normal way of selecting leaders tend to reduce short-term uncertainty about political survival (i.e. fear of being removed from office) thus allowing actors to allocate more resources to long-term strategies (Wurster 2013). This can be expected to, for example, promote policies that are better aligned with future needs (i.e. conserving biodiversity for future generations) or allow political parties to compete for support with more or less ‘‘green’’ agendas. Third, through the political constraints that leaders face with increasing liberal democratic institutions, for example the rule of law, judicial constraints, and legislative constraints can foster compliance with legislation and international treaties (Li and Reuveny 2006). Constraining leaders also decreases their possibilities to act opportunistically, which should provide incentives for other actors to cooperate in the management of biodiversity as it introduces stronger mutual expectations of lawful behaviour (Sjo¨stedt 2013). This may well be expected to have a positive effect on biodiversity.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › Impacts---Democracy › Impact---Democracy---Kasparaov

Democracy solves extinction

Kasparov 17, Chairman of the Human Rights Foundation, 2/16/2017 Garry, “Democracy and Human Rights: The Case for U.S. Leadership”

The Soviet Union was an existential threat, and this focused the attention of the world, and the American people. There existential threat today is not found on a map, but it is very real. The forces of the past are making steady progress against the modern world order. Terrorist movements in the Middle East, extremist parties across Europe, a paranoid tyrant in North Korea threatening nuclear blackmail, and, at the center of the web, an aggressive KGB dictator in Russia. They all want to turn the world back to a dark past because their survival is threatened by the values of the free world, epitomized by the United States. And they are thriving as the U.S. has retreated.The global freedom index has declined for ten consecutive years. No one like to talk about the United States as a global policeman, but this is what happens when there is no cop on the beat. American leadership begins at home, right here. America cannot lead the world on democracy and human rights if there is no unity on the meaning and importance of these things. Leadership is required to make that case clearly and powerfully. Right now, Americans are engaged in politics at a level not seen in decades. It is an opportunity for them to rediscover that making America great begins with believing America can be great. The Cold War was won on American values that were shared by both parties and nearly every American. Institutions that were created by a Democrat, Truman, were triumphant forty years later thanks to the courage of a Republican, Reagan. This bipartisan consistency created the decades of strategic stability that is the great strength of democracies. Strong institutions that outlast politicians allow for long-range planning. In contrast, dictators can operate only tactically, not strategically, because they are not constrained by the balance of powers, but cannot afford to think beyond their own survival. This is why a dictator like Putin has an advantage in chaos, the ability to move quickly. This can only be met by strategy, by long-term goals that are based on shared values, not on polls and cable news. The fear of making things worse has paralyzed the United States from trying to make things better. There will always be setbacks, but the United States cannot quit. The spread of democracy is the only proven remedy for nearly every crisis that plagues the world today. War, famine, poverty, terrorism–all are generated and exacerbated by authoritarian regimes. A policy of America First inevitably puts American security last.American leadership is required because there is no one else, and because it is good for America. There is no weapon or wall that is more powerful for security than America being envied, imitated, and admired around the world. Admired not for being perfect, but for having the exceptional courage to always try to be better. Thank you.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › IL---Democracy › IL---Democracy---AT: Alt-Causes

No alt causes---disinformation is the largest threat to democracy.

David Sloss 22, Professor of Law at the Santa Clara University, internationally renowned scholar who has published three books, 2022, “Policy Analysis: Weighing Costs and Benefits,” Tyrants on Twitter: Protecting Democracies from Information Warfare, Chapter Seven, https://doi.org/10.1515/9781503631151, RMax, shoutout to sk for the book

Accordingly, the argument in this chapter is directed toward a target audience who agree that democratic decay is a significant problem and that foreign threats to liberal democracy are significant causal factors contributing to that problem. If those two assumptions are correct, it follows almost inexorably that Chinese and Russian information warfare constitutes a significant threat to liberal democracy. Clearly the category of foreign threats to liberal democracy is broader than just information warfare (see figure 3 in chapter 1). Nevertheless, there is a broad consensus among relevant experts that Chinese and Russian information warfare is one of the most salient foreign threats— if not the most salient foreign threat— to liberal democracy. This chapter assumes that the expert consensus is correct. The analysis of costs and benefits proceeds from that premise.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › IL---Democracy › IL---Democracy---Canadian

Unrestricted Russian misinformation campaigns erode Canadian democracy.

Marcus Kolga 22, senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, “Russian propagandists are exploiting protests to destabilize our democracy,” , cy

Despite repeated warnings about the threat of Russian and Chinese information warfare to Canadian democracy over the past years, policy-makers have done nothing to address it. We’re now seeing the consequences of our negligence, and we can no longer hesitate to defend ourselves against it.

From Chinese government interference in Canada’s last federal election to Russian disinformation targeting COVID vaccines, lockdowns and ethnic communities, foreign information warfare and influence operations are threatening to tear apart the core fabric of our democracy and society.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › IL---Democracy › IL---Democracy---Russia---AT: Exaggerated

Experts conclude AFF. Information gets circulated AND it targets those susceptible.

Mathew Ingram 19, CJR’s chief digital writer. “Researchers say fears about ‘fake news’ are exaggerated,” Columbia Journalism Review (CJR), //chico

This might come as a surprise to Kathleen Hall Jamieson. She’s a veteran public policy researcher who published a book last year entitled Cyberwar: How Russian Hackers and Trolls Helped Elect a President. Jamieson, whose colleagues call her “the Drill Sergeant” for her no-nonsense attitude, has more 40 years of studying human behavior under her belt. In the book, she says the evidence suggests misinformation propagated by Russian trolls likely influenced the outcome of the election, in part because of the number of “swing” or undecided voters who were susceptible to those kinds of tactics. Jamieson also notes that the traditional news media played a key role in spreading this fake news and propaganda, by writing innumerable articles about Hillary Clinton’s emails. And she argues fake news wouldn’t have had to make much of an impact to influence the election, since a fairly small number of votes gave Trump the electoral college wins he needed.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › IL---Democracy › IL---Democracy---Russia

Russia disinformation campaigns destabilize institutions and damage democracy - they disseminate propaganda so fast that it is difficult for the West to keep up

Rani Gold 19, Master's Student at Georgetown University in German and European Political Studies, May 2019, "How Russia Uses Disinformation to Undermine Democracy Abroad, and What Can Be Done to Stop It," Democratic Erosion, https://www.democratic-erosion.com/2019/05/03/how-russia-uses-disinformation-to-undermine-democracy-abroad-and-what-can-be-done-to-stop-it/ //AShah

In the past, the word “authoritarian” brought to mind images of violent repression, censorship, and intensive surveillance, an image that. Today, however, autocrats have a new set of tools that allow them to be subtler in their methods of control, both at home and abroad. The internet and social media are key to autocrats’ strategies for domestic stability and have been used to great effect in damaging confidence in democracy worldwide. Though it is not the only country to use social media in this way, in the American consciousness Russia is the most controversial and sensational, and a perfect case study of the ways authoritarian governments use the internet and disinformation to increase control at home and destabilize the idea of liberal democracy.

How is disinformation used within Russia?

2022 Michigan Affirmative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › UQ---Democracy › UQ---Democracy

Russia and China threaten liberal democracy—US social media exploited for information warfare—US gov key

David L. Sloss 2022, He is a professor at Santa Clara University School of Law, received his JD from Stanford University, MPP from Harvard University Kennedy School of Government, and BA from Hampshire College. He worked as a litigation associate at Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati in Palo Alto and clerked for Senior Judge Joseph T. Sneed, U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, San Francisco. He also worked for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for nine years before he attended law school., “Tyrants on Twitter”, pg 3-5// SK

Similarly, in the modern era of social media, many techno- utopians mistakenly believe that any government regulation of social media is an unwarranted infringement of individual liberty. In fact, such regulation is necessary to protect our body politic from the threat posed by Russian and Chinese information warfare. Let us be clear: Liberal democracy is under attack, not just in the United States but around the world. As of 2019: “For the first time since 2001, there are more autocracies than democracies in the world.”2 To protect our cherished liberties, we need to protect democracies from Chinese and Russian cyber troops because democratic self- government is the foundation of individual liberty. The big technology companies are not up to the task. We need government regulation so that Facebook, Twitter, and other social media companies do not continue to function as Trojan horses, allowing the virus of information warfare to infect and ultimately subvert liberal democracy. In the current geopolitical and technological environment, proponents of liberal democracy and liberal internationalism— and I openly declare myself a proponent of both— confront a difficult choice. Advocates of liberal democracy are committed to freedom of expression, with minimal government controls. Advocates of liberal internationalism are committed to reducing barriers to transnational fl ows of people, goods, and information. Russia and China are working “to upend the Western liberal order by turning Western virtues of openness . . . into vulnerabilities to be exploited.”3 Unfortunately, their strategy is working because democratic governments have failed to regulate social media to protect democracy. If we want to preserve both liberal democracy and liberal internationalism, Western democracies must restrict the ability of Chinese and Russian cyber troops to exploit social media to conduct information warfare. Until now, democratic governments have given social media companies carte blanche to decide who is entitled to create and operate accounts on their platforms. The companies have adopted open- door policies, allowing almost all people from all countries to create social media accounts. Consequently, Chinese and Russian cyber troops have developed an active presence on U.S. social media platforms. Russia has taken advantage of U.S. social media platforms to interfere with democratic elections and to erode faith in democratic institutions.4 China has exploited U.S. social media platforms to disseminate foreign propaganda extolling the virtues of its authoritarian system and highlighting the flaws of liberal democracy.5 By granting Chinese and Russian agents unrestricted access to U.S. social media platforms, democratic governments are inadvertently making a significant, albeit indirect, contribution to the worldwide erosion of liberal democratic norms. For the foreseeable future, the world will be divided between democratic and authoritarian states. The United States will continue to be the most powerful country in the democratic camp. China and Russia will be the most powerful countries in the authoritarian camp. The United States and its allies will engage in geopolitical competition with China and Russia in both military and economic domains. However, the present era differs from the Cold War in several respects. Most importantly, for the purposes of this book, due to the spread of information technology, the domain of information operations has become a much more significant battleground in the broader geopolitical landscape. As one commentator noted: “The new great- power competition won’t necessarily take place on battlefields . . . it will happen on smartphones, computers, and other connected devices and on the digital infrastructure that supports them.”6 Currently, U.S. social media platforms— primarily Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram— are critical battlefields in the ongoing competition between democratic and authoritarian states. Russian citizens use VK to communicate with each other via social media, but Russian agents exploit U.S. social media platforms to conduct information warfare in foreign countries. Chinese citizens use Sina Weibo and other platforms to communicate with each other, but Chinese cyber troops often use U.S. social media platforms to disseminate foreign propaganda. (Chinese agents also use WeChat, a Chinese platform, for this purpose.7 ) The power of democratic governments to regulate social media could potentially give liberal democracies a major strategic advantage in the information warfare domain. Until now, Western democracies have squandered that advantage by granting Chinese and Russian agents unrestricted access to U.S. social media platforms. Those platforms are some of the most powerful weapons available in the modern information warfare arsenal. Chinese and Russian cyber troops are deploying those weapons with great effect to undermine liberal democratic norms. U.S. technology companies are effectively subsidizing their information warfare activities by granting them access to U.S. social media platforms.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › UQ---Democracy › UQ---Democracy

LIO and NATO is backsliding now. Sino-Russo disinformation during the height of the pandemic put us on the brink.

Gill and Goolsby 22, Ritu Gill has a PhD in psychology from Carleton university, Rebbeca Goolsby is the co-Lead of a NATO Research Technology Group on cyberdiplomacy and communications, “COVID-19 Disinformation: A Multi-National, Whole of Society Perspective,” Advanced Science and Technology for Security Applications, ISBN 978-3-030-94824-5, Springer Cham, DOI: , p. XXII, 213 (under “Foreword”) //chico

Information warfare involves several deceptive and manipulative tactics employed by adversaries to achieve desired goals (Gill et al., 2019). This includes the use of disinformation, which refers to a deceptive technique that is based on the dissemina- tion of untrue information with the intention to deceive, manipulate, create division and discord, and sow doubt and fear, versus misinformation in which the disseminator is unaware that the information is untrue and has no intention to deceive (Pamment et al., 2018). The goal of disinformation is to divide, foster confusion, and demotivate people. Disinformation is not new, it is part of an old playbook of active measures; however what is new is the development of the internet, more specifically social media platforms, creating a new medium to disseminate messages, expediting the ability to propagate disinformation (Gill et al., 2019). Weaponizing the internet and social media for disinformation purposes, adversaries have an extensive network of internet trolls, bots, and sock puppets to generate and spread disinformation, permeating all areas of the internet most likely to exert influence over people and their perceptions (Gill et al., 2019). Dominant disinformation narratives surrounding COVID-19 reveals that both Russia and China have capitalized on the confusion generated by the pandemic to spread disinformation and shape narratives consistent with their goals of undermining key Western and European Union nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Duncan et al., 2020).

2022 Michigan Affirmative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › IL---Truth Decay › IL---Truth Decay

Russian attacks erode public confidence in institutions.

Justin Pelletier 22, Director of the Cyber Range and Training Center in RIT's Global Cybersecurity Institute, “Russia could unleash disruptive cyberattacks against the US – but efforts to sow confusion and division are more likely,” , cy

As tensions mount between Russia and the West over Ukraine, the threat of Russian cyberattacks against the U.S. increases. The Department of Homeland Security issued an intelligence bulletin on Jan. 23, 2022, warning that Russia has the capability to carry out a range of attacks, from denial-of-service attacks on websites to disrupting critical infrastructure like power grids.

“We assess that Russia would consider initiating a cyber attack against the Homeland if it perceived a US or NATO response to a possible Russian invasion of Ukraine threatened its long-term national security,” the DHS stated in the bulletin, which it sent to law enforcement agencies, state and local governments, and critical infrastructure operators.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › IL---Truth Decay › IL---Truth Decay

NATO interconnectedness is the problem and the solution--- a system wide approach to combat disinformation is key to solving truth decay.

Kathleen J. McInnis 21, senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security's Transatlantic Security Initiative; Clementine G. Starling is the deputy director of Forward Defense and resident fellow of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council, “The Case for a Comprehensive Approach 2.0: How NATO Can Combat Chinese and Russian Political Warfare,” , cy

Beyond these US, UK, and Finnish examples, comprehensive approaches to political warfare among NATO members and partners are less prominent. Perhaps in part owing to bureaucratic stovepiping and policymaking preferences, many capitals of NATO member states that are targets of these campaigns tend to view each of Moscow and Beijing’s actions discretely rather than as constituent parts of a holistic strategy. Failure to consider these activities and their implications holistically—and, therefore, failing to address their respective behaviors in a likewise holistic manner— risks the United States and its allies taking actions that achieve short-term successes at the expense of longer-term gains. Progress on areas like the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), for example, which seeks to replace bilateral trade agreements between EU members and China with a common EU-wide investment framework, can present longer-term strategic risks to European states, including increased vulnerability to Chinese economic coercion and influence campaigns—not to mention heightened tensions in the transatlantic relationship due to increasingly divergent strategic approaches to China.47 In other words, a strategic-level approach between NATO, its member states and partners, the private sector, and like-minded multilateral organizations like the EU is needed, as is a framework to turn strategic consensus into concrete action. Fortunately, both by treaty and by recent operational practice, NATO is well positioned to serve as a bedrock for both. The Alliance can, therefore, usefully serve as a catalyst for developing a Comprehensive Approach to combat coercion and political warfare.

Article 2 and the Art of the Political: NATO’s Strategic Role in Countering Political Warfare

2022 Michigan Affirmative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › IL---Info Ecosystem › IL---Russia Key

No alt causes. Russia’s diverse array of tactics magnifies the internal link.

Herbert Lin 19, senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University, June 2019, “The existential threat from cyber-enabled information warfare,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 75, No. 4, p. 187-196 //chico

At the same time, advances in information technology have a dark side. The same increases in the volume and velocity of information have created a louder and more chaotic information environment that stimulates fast, angry, reflexive, intuitive, and visceral thinking, reaction, and action in people and thus displaces more complex, reflective, and rational thought. In a chaotic environment of information overload, people are more likely to use mental shortcuts as a way to reduce the cognitive bur- den that such an environment places on their thinking.

In recent years, we have seen how the Internet, social media, and mobile devices (and other technologies) can be used by foreign adversaries to interfere in elections and to disrupt the democratic process. We have seen:

2022 Michigan Affirmative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › IL---Info Ecosystem › IL---Grid

Information warfare manipulates the behavior of citizens—grid shut down and blackouts

Gururaghav Raman et al. 2020, PhD in Computer Engineering and Research Fellow at Future Resilient Systems Programme; Bedoor is an Assistant Professor of Computational Social Science at New York University Abu Dhabi, UAE. She received her PhD in Interdisciplinary Engineering in 2017 from Masdar Institute of Science and Technology, and her MSc in Computer Science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Marcin Waniek is a Post-Doctoral Associate at New York University Abu Dhabi; Talal Rahwan is an Associate Professor of Computer Science at New York University Abu Dhabi, UAE. He received his Ph.D. in Computer Science in 2007 from The University of Southampton, UK, where he received the Dean’s Award for Early Career Researcher; Jimmy Chih-Hsien Peng received the B.E. and Ph.D. degrees in electrical and computer engineering from The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand, in 2008 and 2012, respectively. He is currently an Assistant Professor in electrical and computer engineering with the National University of Singapore, Singapore.; “How weaponizing disinformation can bring down a city's power grid”, Aug 2020//SK

Social media has dramatically altered the ways in which conflicts are fought. By allowing belligerents to command the public narrative, these technologies have created a paradigm wherein the most viral information can influence the outcome of wars [1]. This phenomenon has been exacerbated by social media algorithms that value virality over veracity [2,3]. Unsurprisingly, many notable skirmishes in recent years have used disinformation to manipulate peoples' behavior [1,4]. Such campaigns have become particularly effective due to the ever-increasing prevalence of big data and machine learning techniques that allow the behavioral patterns of the masses to be analyzed with unprecedented precision. Among the clearest manifestations of such campaigns are the alleged Russian interference into the 2016 US presidential election and the Brexit referendum [5,6]. These incidents suggest that the microtargeting capabilities provided by companies such as Cambridge Analytica [7] can be weaponized [8] to influence the long-term decisions of a society. While many studies have analyzed campaigns targeting long-term social behavior manipulation [2,9-12], little attention has been given to targeted attacks that use disinformation as a weapon to manipulate social behavior within a limited time span.

One particularly sensitive target that is vulnerable to behavioral manipulation is critical infrastructure, the attack of which may have drastic implications nationwide. For instance, despite high levels of security, human operators proved to be the weakest link during the Stuxnet attack on the Iranian nuclear program, unwittingly introducing malware into the facilities [13,14]. Another attack of this kind that drew concern from governments worldwide was the Ukrainian power grid cyberattack of 2015 [15,16]. In this incident, attackers deliberately cut off the power supply for 230,000 residents for several hours using operator credentials harvested through one particular form of disinformation, namely, spear-phishing [17].

2022 Michigan Affirmative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › IL---Info Ecosystem › IL---Vaccines

Combatting adversaries solve COVID “truther” sentiments. Russia and China are uniquely responsibly for misinformation.

---Also doubles as combatting China and Russia key warrant

Kathleen Mary Carley 22, Professor of Computer Science, Institute for Software Research at Carnegie Mellon University, “COVID-19 Disinformation: A Multi-National, Whole of Society Perspective,” Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, ISBN 978-3-030-94824-5, Springer Cham, DOI: , p. 13-14 (found under, “Chapter 1: A Political Disinfodemic”) //chico

Although this is a small exploration, it does show a connection among conspiracy theories. It also shows an interesting link to China. In a further examination, we also found that the anti-vax community had more members who followed the state spon- sored media accounts from China and/or Russia. In other words, the anti-vax groups are getting fodder for their conspiracies in part from the disinformation coming from foreign states. We also found that there were more bots among the anti-vaccination community than among the pro-vaccination community. And, the bots on the anti- vaccination side often promoted stories about Bill Gates inventing the virus or 5G towers used to control people.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › IL---Info Ecosystem › IL---Science Diplomacy

Disinformation erodes public trust in CDC, WHO, and medical and institutional authority writ large. That emboldens anti-science movements and the far-right

Gill and Goolsby 22, Ritu Gill has a PhD in psychology from Carleton university, Rebbeca Goolsby is the co-Lead of a NATO Research Technology Group on cyberdiplomacy and communications, “COVID-19 Disinformation: A Multi-National, Whole of Society Perspective,” Advanced Science and Technology for Security Applications, ISBN 978-3-030-94824-5, Springer Cham, DOI: , p. 7 //chico

Messages such as drink corona beer to get the corona virus, or to prevent it, were sometimes sent for fun. Disinformation in the form of conspiracy theories appear to be sent to recruit new believers, and to reinforce or extend the conspiracy story. Other disinformation appears orchestrated and is part of larger influence campaigns. In some of these cases there are likely to be behind the scene marketers making money by spreading disinformation as has happened in various elections around the world. False images about the size of the re-open protests, disinformation about anti-reopen public proponents, stories about empty hospitals and the like are types of disinfor- mation used to promote social behaviors such as protests, voting, and belief in public institutions. Disinformation about the CDC, WHO, and various medical authorities was used to reduce trust in these public institutions. Disinformation linking different vaccines, social distancing, and facemasks was used to build bridges between diverse groups in attempts to create or strengthen particular movements and political agendas. Such disinformation supported the anti-science movement and a far-right political agenda. Disinformation regarding the actions of governments, police, or leaders such as false descriptions of lock down procedures or their role in promoting a vaccine was used to discredit and so decrease trust in these actors or to bring them undue credit. Some disinformation was aimed at specific minority groups—sometimes to harm and sometimes to keep their voice out of the public debate.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
ADV---Information Ecosystem › IL---Info Ecosystem › IL---Science Diplomacy

AND, disinformation spills over to collapse broader science diplomacy.

Dr. Marga Guai Soler et al 21, molecular biologist and the founder of SciDipGLOBAL, Dr. Mande Horford, associate professor in Chemistry at Hunter College and CUNY-Graduate Center, with scientific appointments at The American Museum of Natural History and Weill Cornell Medicine, Dr. Tolullah Oni is a public health physician and urban epidemiologist, principal of Oni et al. and the founder of UrbanBetter, “Twelve Months of COVID-19: Shaping the Next Era of Science Diplomacy,” AAAS Center for Science Diplomacy, 1/22/21, https://www.sciencediplomacy.org/editorial/2021/twelve-months-covid-19-shaping-next-era-science-diplomacy

COVID-19 is the first global crisis that affects virtually every person on the planet at the same time. The pandemic has been a stress test for the relationship between science and diplomacy,2 triggering a reckoning of how transnational crises of planetary scale—infectious diseases, the looming climate crisis, biodiversity collapse—interlink humanity’s destiny. Despite the predictability of an existential threat of this nature, most countries were insufficiently prepared. Their responses exposed a profound disconnect between the scientific and foreign policy domains and underscore the urgency of bringing science from the margins to the center of global policy.

While international research collaboration on SARS-CoV-2 thrived and achieved unprecedented breakthroughs at record speed, many world leaders ignored scientific recommendations and retreated from multilateral coordination, resulting in fragmented measures that often contradicted those of neighboring nations. These governmental responses manifested the inadequacy of current international science-policy interface structures to address the challenges facing humanity and the planet. With effective vaccines now available, the end of the pandemic is in sight, but vaccine diplomacy is being revealed as a battle for international leadership and geopolitical influence,4 rather than the global cooperation and solidarity this moment calls for.