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K—Racial IR—FMPS › Links › Link---Humanitarian Aid
Lynch 19(Cecilia, Professor in the department of political science at the University of California, Irvine, “The moral aporia of race in international relations”, CS)
This humanitarian order brings together western and transnationalized publics with states and U.N. agencies to create new forms of ‘partnership’ (one of the new buzzwords for implementing post-Cold War moral codes).68 In these relationships, nongovernmental organizations are delegated to give ‘early warning’ of conflict, and provide aid in sites of suffering. The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) and the International Criminal Court, new components of the IR/IP architecture, provide post-Cold War justifications for varying degrees of military intervention.69 These interventions privilege interference in Africa and Asia while overlooking crimes against humanity committed by countries such as the United States and United Kingdom in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to critics.70 Economic intervention occurs in the form of humanitarian and development aid by a complex of nongovernmental organizations, UN agencies, and state donor agencies. Such aid has become ‘neoliberalized’ into a kind of Foucauldian governmentality, in which nongovernmental humanitarian organizations work hand-in-glove with state and UN agencies to provide assistance according to market logics. These logics promote interventions that seek (albeit often unsuccessfully) to obtain quick results for limited investment of time and money,71 in the process inscribing racialized victimhood on populations of the global south. Humanitarian government highlights violence to non-white bodies, but does so in ways that erase white/northern responsibility for the fragility of political and economic structures within the global south. These interventions inherit and continue the racialized phantasms of earlier interventions in Congo and Biafra, among numerous others. Cilas Kemedjio, for example, argues that the moral discourses of nongovernmental groups who wanted to aid starving Biafrans in the late 1960s established the foundation for contemporary military interventionism in the present. Kemedjio highlights in particular, the racialization of late-colonial and postcolonial moral codes that seek to save non-white bodies from themselves and their environments.72 Although realists and liberals debate the degree to which state interests should limit or foster intervention in societies riven by violence, critics show how the ‘humanitarian international’ established and perpetuates a ‘white saviour industrial complex’ that has the effect, in both IP and IR, of once again locking ‘non-whites … in[to] their supposed origins’.73
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K—Racial IR—FMPS › Links › Link---Hegemony
Lake et al. 21(David, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, Bianca Freedman, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at UC San Diego, D.G. Kim, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, “Race in International Relations: Beyond the “Norm Against Noticing””, CS)
Although engagement varies across the movement of critical race theories and Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), much of the work within these reconstructive traditions has sought to uncover the ongoing dynamics of racialized power that constitute international law and relations. The racialization of international law can be seen in several contemporary legal and political trends that are at least implicitly premised on a conception of non-White-majority countries as being deficient and in need of assistance or corrective action by North American or European states. Good governance. The program of good governance and its strategic promotion in the non-European world illustrates this point. A term that gained considerable prominence in the field during the 1990s, good governance became a way of organizing, interpreting, and deploying legal doctrines in international politics. While norms entrepreneurs in various international and non-governmental organizations herald the concept as an advance in international law, critics note that it bears an old lineage of racialized dispossession. Influential development institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as well as human rights groups, promote standards of governance that are seen as already perfected in the European world. On the other hand, non-White-majority societies are imagined in perpetual lack of the good governance needed for stability and progress. Countries that lack good governance, thus, are understood as lacking some quality implicitly assigned to White countries. According to Anghie (2006), good governance was invoked to create non-European governments that would facilitate European commercial expansion. Grovogui (1996) similarly explicates international law as “outside administration” by a West that seeks to maintain its imperial holdings long after its withdrawal. Status of Forces Agreements. Extraterritoriality in US Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) betrays similar assumptions about state capacity and governance. SOFAs establish when and how the domestic laws of host governments are applied to US military personnel stationed in those countries (Yeo 2014, Efrat 2022). While these agreements stop short of immunizing US troops against criminal sanctions, SOFAs effectively constrain the legal authority host countries exercise over US forces. At their core, SOFAs attempt to reconcile US interest in safeguarding soldiers’ rights with deeply held beliefs about the inferiority of non-European institutions and courts (Freeman 2021).Foreign basing contracts like SOFAs—a bargained concept of hierarchy—are not beyond prevailing symbols of subordination that reinforce pathologies of colonial legal regimes (Cooley 2017,Allen et al. 2020). The notion that non-Europeans lack “government suited to the white man” has long been embraced as “just cause” for extraterritorial jurisdiction, and in some cases, capitulation(Grovogui 1996, p. 51). A hallmark of Western foreign policy, extraterritoriality declares a kind of state of emergency where normal rules do not apply (Ruskola 2008). Variation in US SOFA jurisdiction conveys a similar story. The United States imposes concurrent jurisdiction to govern its interactions with predominantly European host states, allowing these peer countries to try US personnel while withholding this same right from most non-European host partners, ceteris pribus (Freeman 2021). Since immunity relies on the premise of inherent difference between peoples and societies (Cassel 2011), it affirms prevailing beliefs about racial difference. Thus, hierarchical conceptions of race are reified through extraterritorial jurisdiction and its codification into the SOFA Responsibility to Protect. Unanimously endorsed at the UN World Summit in 2005, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) represents a collective commitment to atrocity prevention. Viewing authorized intervention as responsibility constitutes a departure from the norm of nonintervention established in the Montevideo Convention of 1933 and incorporated into the UN Char-ter. R2P engenders and reproduces international hierarchy through its normative diminution of sovereignty (Getachew 2019a). Integral to this process is the recasting of sovereignty as responsibility, a concept that invents the conditions for intervention in ways that are racially biased. Notwithstanding the African origins of R2P, often cited to thwart charges of neo-imperialism, the doctrine of responsibility appeals to the paternal protection common in colonial philosophy. To be sure, the shadow of racial hierarchy in international law is long. From the Berlin Treaty, which “enshrined the responsibility of Europe in watching over and improving the conditions of native populations” (Gathii 1998, p. 202; emphasis original), to the League of Nations settlement, which excluded those lowest in the race hierarchy from its international supervisory mechanism (the mandate system), racism and the rhetoric of responsibility are constitutive of the principle and need for intervention (Gathii 1998, Grovogui 1996). R2P is no exception. The principle renders sovereignty conditional upon the evaluations of international institutions (like the UN Security Council) that are empowered to decide when a state has failed to fulfill its responsibility (Getachew2019a). At its core, R2P reflects the same projection of deficiency onto non-White countries, promoting the idea that countries lack either the will or the capacity to treat their domestic populations equitably and fairly. The fruit of this alleged failure of responsibility is the near-exclusive application of R2P toward African states
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K—Racial IR—FMPS › Links › Link---Fem
Howell and Richter-Montpetit 20(Alison, Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Melanie, Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Advanced International Theory, “Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School”, CS)
First, feminist scholars of securitization theory have questioned whether the theory can account for gender relations (Hansen, 2000; Heck and Schlag, 2013; Hoogensen and Rottem, 2004; H. Hudson, 2005; N. F. Hudson, 2009; Kearns, 2017). Much of this research is inspired by Hansen’s (2000) widely cited article that argues that classic securitization theory’s limitations regarding gender are methodological: speech act theory cannot account for the gendered power dynamics that underpin situations when speech is not possible. Hansen illustrates these methodological shortcomings through the fable of the Little Mermaid, wittily locating the analysis in Copenhagen, then abruptly travels to Pakistan and Bosnia for empirical evidence. There, Hansen (2000: 299) finds ‘honour killings’ and ‘raped Muslim women’ who are deemed to be silent. This Orientalist imaginary constructs a racial opposition: white Western women, who have achieved legitimacy as vocal political actors, versus ‘silent’ subaltern women (Abu-Lughod, 2002; on securitization theory, see Bertrand, 2018). This elides gendered insecurity in places like Denmark, where ‘gender equality’ is often figured in white supremacist discourses as a mark of civilization threatened, for instance, by Muslimified (Richter-Montpetit, 2014: 45) immigrants. So, in core feminist securitization theory texts, we find that Eurocentric and racist thought is reaffirmed rather than challenged. Second, securitization theory’s Eurocentrism has been challenged by scholarship that asks whether applying securitization theory to the non-West upends or modifies the theory (Bilgin, 2010, 2011; Wilkinson, 2007), a question echoed by some of securitization theory’s original proponents (see Greenwood and Wæver, 2013). However, securitization theory has never ignored the ‘non-West’. As we will show, it draws heavily on racist accounts of spaces outside Europe that reify a stark division between ‘West’ and ‘non-West’ without examining colonial relationalities. Critics of securitization theory’s Eurocentrism assert that we cannot assume a (functioning, democratic) European state in non-West spaces, but ignore the (settler-)colonial underpinnings of the state system and border cartographies. Seeing the issue solely as the analytical exclusion of the ‘non-West’, they decry ‘Eurocentrism’ while retaining racist political thought. We adopt a more robust analysis (see Sabaratnam, 2013) that views Eurocentrism as involving the ideas that: (1) ‘Europe’ or ‘the West’ is ontologically distinctive; (2) European development was endogenous; and (3) European cultural and political achievements were subsequently diffused across the world. Additionally, we deploy concepts beyond Eurocentrism (civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack racism) to grapple with the role of racist political thought in securitization theory.
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K—Racial IR—FMPS › Links › Link---Econ/Trade
Lake et al. 21(David, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, Bianca Freedman, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at UC San Diego, D.G. Kim, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, “Race in International Relations: Beyond the “Norm Against Noticing””, CS)
Foreign economic policy. The effects of race and racism can also be found in foreign economic policy. Critical race scholarship in IR has long pointed out the enduring legacies of colonialism as manifested, for instance, in the global labor regime. Immigrant laborers continue to be subject to the racialized practices of labor exploitation (Persaud 2001). Racialized global inequality also permeates other domains such as North–South trade relations and aid regimes. Rosenberg (2019)provides systematic evidence of how racism affects global migration flows, showing that migrants from majority-Black states migrate significantly less than they would under a racially blind hypothetical scenario. Focusing on the role of more subtle forms of modern-day racism, Singh (2017)shows that the global North continues to offer unfavorable trade terms to the global South. Scholars have also placed racism at the center of the global aid regimes, finding that paternalism (Baker2015, Baker & Prather 2021) and racial resentment (Simon & Moltz 2019) play a large role in garnering public support for foreign aid. One particularly promising area of research centers on the increasing racialization of international trade, engaging conventional theories of trade policy preference in international political economy. Utilizing survey experiments and multiyear public opinion surveys, a group of scholars finds that the racial identity of a potential trading partner has become increasingly important for American public support for overseas trade, often at the cost of the respondent’s material self-interest. These recent studies find that such racial considerations are most prominent among White Americans who have become far more protectionist than other racial groups in the country (Guisinger 2017). Supported by evidence from multiple surveys, Mutz et al. (2020) point to higher levels of racial prejudice among Whites as one potential source of the growing race gap in trade attitudes. As the United States comes closer to becoming a “majority-minority” nation, future research might further investigate the sources and political consequences of the race gap in trade and other foreign policy issues.
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K—Racial IR—FMPS › Links › Link---Democracy
Del Negro 20(Justin, third-year student pursuing a dual degree in International Relations at Western University and Business Administration at Ivey Business School, “Confronting the Racist Roots of International Relations”, CS)
In 1944, Karl Polanyi described the nineteenth century world as a dictum that has become the of this period in global affairs. It is true that conflict between the six or even twelve prominent Western powers when compared to previous or later centuries. However, considering conquests against weaker states and colonial wars against non-state actors produces approximately in which major powers were involved. Britain was almost during this period – either via territorial expansion or suppressing violent colonial uprisings. The Indian Revolt of 1857 alone resulted in over due to the violence and resulting famine. How can such consistent conflict occur during a period supposedly marked for its enduring peace? In international relations discourse, war is almost as an act between “sovereign powers.” Violent acts on any political entity other than a “state” (i.e. native territories, proto-states, warlords, etc.), or those committed by political entities other than a “state”, such as the British East India Company, are conveniently removed from the purview of international relations. This abstraction instantly sanitizes a violent world history, committed overwhelmingly against non-whites, that the modern international order is built upon. The distortionary impact of such a model is exemplified by the widely popular democratic peace theory, which proposes that democracies are less likely to engage in war than non-democracies. This proposition is if one simply includes a democracy’s colonial conflicts, and yet democratic peace theory has been by Western leaders during the invasion of Iraq and in other occupations of non-democratic, non-white countries. The valorization of the sovereign state, which , serves to privilege the Western model in international affairs and justify colonial and neo-colonial violence today. Both liberalism and realism, the dominant paradigms of contemporary international relations, operate from a conception of global anarchy which in many ways enforces the hierarchical racial dualism associated with early international relations theory. International relations’ conception of anarchy in the Hobbesian state of nature, which is presumed to occur in the absence of the state. However, Hobbes’ only real-life example of those in the state of nature can be found in Implicit in this analysis is the belief that while civilized democratic states established international order among themselves, the undesirable condition of anarchy was found in the backwards, non-white areas, which relied upon civilized people to impose order for them. Sampson argues that underlying the definition of anarchy is a trope of African primitivism, a developed by British anthropologists in the 1930s and 1940s which imagines a decentralized, depersonalized and uncivilized society. This representation of international politics inserts an implicit theoretical narrative which assumes racist and of a primitivism and civility, suggesting that only civilized Western powers have the authority to initiate meaningful change at the international level. The inability of international relations as an academic field to confront its Eurocentric, colonial biases makes it unfit to provide an accurate understanding of the modern state system. Just as racism impacted colonial policies abroad and domestic attitudes towards imperialism, anti-Japanese racism American engagement in World War II, and domestic racism has America’s willingness to adopt a leadership role in promoting international human rights. Race has and continues to , which shapes innumerable international decisions. The wave of white nationalism and Islamophobia across Europe in response to the Syrian refugee crisis is a testament to the modern impact of racism on foreign policy. To evolve past its harmful Eurocentric biases, international relations must abandon its colonial-era precepts and formally integrate the critical role of race within its theoretical framework.
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K—Racial IR—FMPS › Links › Link---Climate
Agathangelou, 21—Associate Professor, Department of Politics, York University (Anna, “On the question of time, racial capitalism, and the planetary,” Globalizations, 18:6, 880-897, dml) [brackets in original]
Physicists, spiritual leaders, and theorists argue ‘time is not real’ (Martin, 2020; Rovelli, 2018). It is a ‘human construct … to help us differentiate between now and our perception of the past’ (Martin, 2020). As a meaning that human groups have given to change (Tabboni, 2001), it organizes our systems of thought and our everyday lives. Time has special meaning in politics, where ‘the very distinction between truth and fiction has been made redundant’ so that ‘the criterion is no longer accuracy – it’s conformity to the needs of the moment’ (Klein, 2014; emphasis added). Our present analytical and political challenge is to grapple with the ways time is entangled with the ‘needs of the moment’ in areas of energy and climate change. Yet the politics of the ecological require understanding time. Notions like succession, simultaneity, duration, urgency, waiting, speed, geological revolutions, money, and death are expressions of time and are entangled with the ecological and its models of development.
The increasing risks to the environment as a result of the extraction of conventional oil and natural gas resources and the increased greenhouse emissions have led to what the experts have called the climate crisis. Yet as Klein says, ‘despite being convinced of the necessity of addressing our behavior as regards energy consumption, collective consciousness appears at once paralyzed and indecisive … frozen in the face of the obstacle’ (Klein, 2014). Instead of frozen time, Bourriaud points to the acceleration of time and what this has wrought: ‘the great acceleration also lies within the process of the naturalization of capitalism: now it has become both organic and universal, it is the natural law of the Anthropocene’ (cited in Chiambaretta, 2017). Mbembe (2021) expands this argument of the relations of time with the planetary by arguing the politics and aesthetics of the ecological require understanding the coloniality of power and its contemporary temporal mutations. Imperial expansion, Mbembe argues, was (is) a planetary project driven by nationalist states and companies to reallocate the earth’s resources through military might and privatization. Colonial epistemes and practices of time block the potentiality and affirmation of a planetary beyond capture and conquest (Marriott, 2011) but national decolonization cannot be ‘what gives deep breathing for the world’ (Mbembe, 2021). Some physicists speak of ‘eternity in relation to time’, wherein ‘atoms and the emptiness of the universe are infinite, uncreated, and imperishable’ (Oestreicher, 2012, p. 435). Others speak of chronological and cyclical time, attributing the first to the West and the latter to the East. Newton (1643–1727) defined time as a mathematical variable with one dimension. The only two ‘topological objects with this characteristic’ are a ‘line and a circle … . It thus follows that time is either infinite or cyclic’ (Oestreicher, 2012, p. 436). Grappling with the question of social death, Frank Wilderson argues that assembling black life into a series of historical events, into a narrative with a plot ‘is a catastrophe for narrative at a meta-level rather than a crisis or aporia within a particular narrative’ (Wilderson, 2015b). For him,
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K—Racial IR—FMPS › Links › Link---China
Lake et al. 21(David, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, Bianca Freedman, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at UC San Diego, D.G. Kim, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, “Race in International Relations: Beyond the “Norm Against Noticing””, CS)
Power shifts. As Reus-Smit (2017) notes, challenges to prevailing regimes of cultural stratification become most pronounced in the face of shifting material balances of power. Racial prejudice, after all, is activated by perceived competition with subordinate racial others in order to maintain the status quo hierarchy (Bobo 1999). Racialized threat perceptions, in other words, can have the most palpable effects on world politics under the condition of major power shifts. In conjunction with their newfound material capabilities, rising but racially subordinate states can trigger racialized fears and foreign policy aggression from declining but racially dominant states. As Adler-Nissen& Zarakol (2021) point out, the current challenge to the liberal international order partly comes from rising non-Western powers such as China who seek to redress their grievances against what they perceive to be a Western-centric, and thus White-dominant, global order. Historically, Japan’s revisionist foreign policy in the early 1930s has also been explained as motivated in large part by the rising power’s frustration with the then more explicitly racialized Western-dominated inter-national order (Ward 2013). Dominant powers simultaneously tend to perceive such challenges with a racial lens, giving rise to racialized foreign policy narratives, most famously exemplified by the still popular “Yellow Peril” discourse (Búzás 2013, Ward 2013). Perceived racial affinity, on the contrary, appears to substantially ameliorate fears and uncertainty under power shifts, again as suggested by the fin de siècle Anglo–American rapprochement (Vucetic 2011a,b; Edelstein 2017).Future research should investigate whether racial fears inflate threats from a rising China, produce public support for hawkish policies, and potentially aggravate military tensions. More studies are needed, for example, on the extent to which contemporary public opinion on China is racialized, how top-down anti-China rhetoric can activate racial fears, and the potential mechanisms by which racial prejudice affects actual policy making and crisis management (see Miller &Taylor 2017; Dionne 2020; Han & Marwecki 2020; Kim 2020, 2021; Ebner & Medenica 2021). In parallel, researchers can pay more attention to how a rising China produces and manages its own racialized narratives as it promulgates the discourse of the century of humiliation by the West.
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Gani and Marshal 22(Jasmine, PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics, Jenna, PhD Political Science, Queen Mary University of London, “The impact of colonialism on policy and knowledge production in International Relations”, CS)
Given the historical and ongoing mutual complicity between knowledge producers and policy-makers in upholding imperial and racial orders, we now consider the responsibilities, possibilities and challenges faced in altering the nature of that nexus. Doing so requires turning to what Danso and Aning call an ‘episteme of alternativity’;41 and the primary way for academics to enact this would be to draw on anti-colonial practice and legacies, rather than imperial competition, as the foundation of their theorizing. Thus, in his article, Sizwe Mpofu-Walsh forefronts global South policy-makers and focuses on the nuclear order (a topic that is typically associated with realist IR) to demonstrate how it can be approached through an alternative, critical epistemology.42 Disrupting the ‘Great Power gaze’, Mpofu-Walsh asks what the politics of non-proliferation looks like from the perspective of the global South, especially the African continent as the sole nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ). There, denuclearization is fundamentally linked to decolonization. Thus anti-colonial goals, rather than hegemonic/imperialist competition, are at the root of both policy and theorizing. How different would IR knowledge and theories on nuclear weapons be if African praxis and the importance of NWFZs were taken seriously? Turning to the Middle East, Gani similarly argues in her article that the inclusion of non-western history and voices—from policy-makers to activists and scholars—in think-tank discussions can mitigate the latent colonialism that shapes western policy.43 Nevertheless, even with an incorporation of non-western practice and knowledge in policy making and scholarly theorizing, multiple perspectives that are marginalized even in the local context, owing to class or gender, may continue challenge such patterns is by adopting a more expansive reading of what constitutes ‘knowledge’ and indeed ‘practice’. In doing so, we can dismantle some of the constructed and false hierarchies between elite ‘knowledge’ and ‘research’ on one hand, and local ‘tradition’ on the other.45 The former is assumed to be objective, reliable and associated with western (and western-validated) universities; while the latter is viewed as subjective, unscientific and commonly associated with Indigenous, racialized, grassroots communities. Assumptions about who counts as a true knowledge producer or ‘expert’ is not only elitist but heavily racialized and gendered. Definitions of who counts as a ‘practitioner’ are equally narrow, so that scholars or policy-makers may place much weight on the views and actions of state, global governance and corporate practitioners, but do not view as equal practitioners those involved in everyday practice in their communities—those who in fact sustain their ecology, livelihoods, security and identities, all while having to navigate the impact of top-down policies.46 Both the articles by Jan Wilkens and Alvine Datchoua-Tirvaudey on climate justice, and by Althea Rivas and Mariam Safi on the organizing and practices of Afghan women, share knowledge from non-elite local communities and challenge the above binaries and hierarchies. In their article on climate justice in the Arctic and the Mediterranean, Wilkens and Datchoua-Tirvaudey explain that academic– practitioner knowledge exchange has often been a contributing factor in continued climate injustice.47 The existing patterns of this knowledge exchange on climate governance are dependent on hierarchies of knowledge, namely, the valorization of western/‘scientific’ knowledge production at the expense of the needs and knowledges of the Indigenous and local communities most affected by climate change (i.e. the community-based practitioners, rather than the institutional/state ones). Moreover, the spaces where such knowledge exchange takes place are often exclusionary (in who is invited, in the parameters of discourse and/or in the extortionate costs of participating), producing an intra-elite debate.48 Having identified these racialized patterns, they offer a corrective decolonial strategy for ethical climate governance, founded on practice-based knowledge and diverse ways of knowing that bring in those excluded insights. The article by Rivas and Safi also provides an example of how the academic– practitioner nexus can be ‘decolonized’, one in which everyday knowledges of Afghan women, in all their diversity and complexity, are centred in peacebuilding efforts.49 Their article, co-written by an academic and a local practitioner, offers a methodology of how to take into account the internal hierarchies of positionality, interests and knowledges that are always present when engaging with grassroots communities for the sake of ‘research’. Rivas and Safi also demonstrate the importance of registering and valuing the unlooked-for, atypical knowledges from below, such as the subtle observations offered by Afghan women in rural areas that, contrary to wider assumptions, reflect their political engagement and interest. Caution against extractivism in the search for such local knowledge exchange is at the forefront of both the above contributions.50 Thus academics should remain reflexive in what the purpose of their research is, and who really benefits. Moreover, a praxis of decolonizing such research necessarily entails taking time in a way that is at odds with the current culture of speedy and multitudinous productivity in academia: the rapid churning out of articles from ‘the field’ should raise appropriate questions about how, why and for whom that research is being conducted.
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Búzás 12(Zoltán I, Associate Professor at the Keough School of Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame, “Race and International Politics: How Racial Prejudice Can Shape Discord and Cooperation among Great Powers”, CS)
Identity influences foreign policy behavior in several ways. It may serve as an ideological device to justify self-interested policies, it may influence the cost of policy options, it may restrict the menu of possible foreign policies, or it may provide foreign policy preferences.244 My approach is closest to the latter two. Identities influence action by narrowing the menu of foreign policy options and by giving actors “primary reasons for action” or providing them with “motivational and behavioral dispositions.”245 I link racial identities to behavior through a relaxed version of the “logic of habit.” 246 Once activated, racial prejudices embedded in racial identities shape threat perceptions and create behavioral dispositions habitually and relatively automatically. All else equal, racial identity shapes patterns of discord and cooperation as follows. Through the lens of their racial identity agents perceive racial others as more threatening, which facilitates discord and impedes cooperation. In turn, agents perceive those with shared racial identity as less threatening, which facilitates cooperation and impedes discord. In this view, “structures of identity that yield systematically biased perceptions” sustain enduring patterns of conflict and cooperation.247 The endurance of these behavioral patterns is supported by the self-fulfilling nature of prejudices. The perceiver acts unconsciously on prejudices, which elicits prejudice-consistent behavior from target agents, validating prejudices and reinforcing their impact on the behavior of the prejudiced agent.248 Although a relaxed logic of habit does not obviate the role of agency, rationality, and uncertainty, it reduces their significance. Agents may refuse to act on a particular prejudice if they recognize it as such, but since most of the time prejudices work unconsciously or are not recognized as prejudices, agents tend to act on them. States may still rationally calculate what their best options are. However, their agency will be constrained and rationality “bounded” as states will consider and act on a menu of foreign policy options limited by racial prejudices. This relaxed logic of habit does not exclude the logic of consequences where actors are driven by cost-benefit calculations, but it sets the parameters within which this latter can operate. Uncertainty plays a role in initial stages of threat assessment, but once racial prejudices are activated, they dissipate uncertainty by imposing a false certainty on threats. The process through which difference in racial identity predisposes agents towards discord is similar to that through which “misplaced certainty” facilitates conflict.249 In the absence of significant threats decision makers may nonetheless be certain that they perceive threats. This can give rise to a series of escalatory actions and reactions which can facilitate conflict.
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Platon 15(Mircea Alexandru, Doctor of Philosophy, Ohio State University, History ““PROTRACTED CONFLICT” The Foreign Policy Research Institute “Defense Intellectuals” and Their Cold War Struggle with Race and Human Rights”, CS) Marked for ableist language
The FPRI literature produced by Possony, Strausz-Hupé, Kintner, and their constant collaborators argued that the only way to defend White Western Civilization against Communist “Oriental despotism” was the development out of a military confederation such as NATO of an Atlantic Union— a political confederation under American hegemony, and, as Possony argued as early as 1949, the creation of a world police (Possony 1949 , 1953 ). This institutional structure would allow “Western democracies” a virtual monopoly on technology, natural resources, and violence. As a Cold Warrior impatient with the “verbal magic” of the empty legal formulas of international organizations and agreements, Possony maintained that there was no other way to maintain peace than war and the increase of the capacity to wage war, defined as “the purge of the enemies of the new order” (1949, pp. 294-295). For Strausz-Hupé, the United States was “the most powerful nation of European stock” (1945, p. 108), a fact of enormous importance according to the theories of Third Reich geopolitician Michael Hess, quoted by Strausz-Hupé. Hess argued that only the “white race”—through its mastery of technology—was “truly ‘space-bridging,’” the other races being of the space-bound variety (Strausz-Hupé 1942 , p. 91). That meant that both the geographical position and its technological prowess designated the United States as the main “arsenal” of an “international police force,” and as the master of the “nucleus” of great powers that would control the balance and the stability of the “new and universal order” after the defeat of the Axis powers (Strausz-Hupé 1942 , p. 194-195). Quoting Karl Haushofer’s judgment that the United States “possessed all the geopolitical prerequisites” for achieving global hegemony, Strausz-Hupé warned that Haushofer had hoped that the Americans would eventually fail in their bid for world supremacy because they were “race-biologically retarded” and torn apart by internal racial tensions (Strausz-Hupé 1942 , pp. 66-67). The keen interest manifested by Strausz-Hupé, Possony, and Kintner for the role played by “race” during the Cold War seems to betray their fear that Haushofer was right and that lack of racial homogeneity would indeed compromise the U.S. bid for global leadership (Glaser and Possony, 1979 ). It is indeed difficult to understand Strausz-Hupé’s work without taking into consideration the way in which Nazi geopolitical theories informed his racialized approach to the Cold War (Crampton and Tuathaila, 1996 ; Raffestin et al., 1995 ). Nazi Geopolitik—with its concept of a dynamic frontier and perpetual international instability fostered by the dynamic of growing, expanding versus shrinking, and dying, states—was interpreted by Strausz-Hupé in terms of an opposition between the stable, “civilized order” of Europe and “the Asiatic aversion to fixed boundaries” (Strausz-Hupé 1942 , p. 220). Europeans, Strausz-Hupé argued, could not be reasonably expected to forget the “pungent meaning of Asia” (1942, p. 91). Strausz-Hupé discovered some sense even in Hitler’s frenzied attacks on “Asiatic bolshevism” and warned that, since the history of Russia bore the mark of the Mongols and since Russia had inherited the role of Asian oppressor of Europe, the Cold War was merely another stage of the eternal clash of “men of the steppe against the man of the sown; the mounted horde against the dwellers of the city; mass against form” (1952, p. 82). These premises allowed FPRI intellectuals to defend both the legacy of old-fashioned European colonialism and new-fangled American imperialism by denouncing any anti-colonial movement or non-aligned state as an “Asiatic,” unruly, “primitive” threat against the “real,” civilized, democratic “New Order” dominated by the United States (Strausz-Hupé 1942 , p. 196). The United States led the Free World in a global struggle for the “preservation of the Western Community” (Strausz-Hupé 1952 , p. 3). Since this struggle was a psychomachia, a clashing of spiritual worlds, StrauszHupé rejected any “optimistic idea” about a meeting of the cultures and argued that only a “whole,” “unitary,” and pure Western culture could hope to successfully meet the challenge of the East. According to Strausz-Hupé, one of the ways in which the West could transform the “discrete whole” of European culture into a world culture was to abandon the antiquated and ultimately petty cult of national heroes and promote instead the “heroes of its common undertakings,” the conquerors and colonizers who were the true global heralds of the West: “The exploits of Cortes, Pizzaro, Clive, Stanley, Bugeaud, Lyautey, Rhodes, Muraviev were conquests on an Asiatic scale” (1952, pp. 7-8, 12-13). Western colonial expansion indicated a thriving Western culture (although the West was supposed to be at the same time essentially static, a victim of Asiatic restlessness). In order to defend this way of life, America had to vigorously embrace military, economic, and cultural imperialism, a benign form of imperialism whose weapons were not merely “military force or political coercion,” but also “anti-imperialist” discourses (Strausz-Hupé 1952 , p. 294). It also had to create an Atlantic Union and increase spending on propaganda in order to advance the vertical and horizontal integration of Western culture, that is to discourage the multiplication of people with lower IQ levels and to encourage the adoption of the same Weberian pro-capitalist Protestant values by the entire “Free World.” The creation of an Atlantic Union would be both the result and the safeguard of these efforts.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
K—Racial IR—FMPS › K---1NC
Lake et al. 21(David, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, Bianca Freedman, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at UC San Diego, D.G. Kim, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, “Race in International Relations: Beyond the “Norm Against Noticing””, CS)
The field of IR is grappling with renewed calls to reform its longstanding elision of race, manifested most recently in Foreign Policy(Bhambra et al. 2020, Shilliam 2020a, Zvobgo & Loken2020) and Foreign Affairs(Blain 2020). These interventions have since been complemented by various public speaker series, webinars, and discussion forums, each retrieving important contributions that criticize IR scholarship as silent on race. Those that expose and contest this silence aptly describe it as particularly tenacious in mainstream IR, especially research that appears in the discipline’s top journals. While new efforts are being made to take race seriously, such as Búzás’s(2021) piece in the 75th anniversary special issue of International Organization and the special issue calls on race by Security Studies and Security Dialogue, IR scholars are still coming to terms with a discipline that is historically reluctant to address questions of race. The notion that IR is colorblind has long been interrogated. Seminal critiques of this notion, of which the norm against noticing is a contemporary interpretation, lay bare the centrality of race and racism in the making of an intellectual and professional discipline. The mythology of a colorblind tradition in American IR was rendered explicit by early disciplinary work on the role of White supremacy in world making. To the forebears of this critique, what was often taken to be race neutral was, in practice, silence and evasion about the African presence in world politics. As Krishna (2001) explains, race constitutes a crucial epistemic silence around which modern IR is continuously made and coheres. For Krishna, contemporary IR discourse is predicated on a systematic politics of forgetting, an abstraction from the role of racialized violence in the construction of nation-states and the system they inhabit. As the discipline developed, the timeless problems of anarchy and the security dilemma came to define the core questions of IR in line with Cold War imperatives, making race irrelevant for many scholars. Relations between states, where material power and national interest shape behavior, were assumed to occur above the supposedly domestic issue of race. Intellectual commitment to the assumption of anarchy in world politics, however, was coterminous with the discipline’s willful amnesia about race. Indeed, while implicitly equating anarchy with the primitive, and equating the resulting state of nature with supposedly violent peoples outside Europe, scholars stripped anarchy of any notion of race and racism (Sampson 2002). For some, the norm against noticing reflects a common difficulty in accepting the idea that the “international” in international relations was imagined along the color line (Vitalis 2015).For critical theorists, forgetting race cannot be reduced to discomfort, disinterest, or unaware-ness among scholars (Sabaratnam 2020). By implication, the invisibility of race in IR was not accidental but designed. Similar observations have been made about the makeup of the IR as mostly White and male, an institutionalized feature that produces and reproduces itself (Doty1993; Henderson 2007, 2013; Lake 2016; Rutazibwa 2020). That which was made most visible in IR—its distinguishing intuitions and methodologies—is also that which conceals race, denying the possibility of its explanatory power.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey PIC › 2NC – AT: Radars – Israel
Safael ’21 [Sajjad; 09/17/21; postdoc fellow at Germany’s Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology; "Israel Isn’t Strong Enough to Attack Iran," Foreign Policy, smarx, AZG]
To be sure, Israel has in the past carried out relatively limited operations against Iran—such as raids on Iranian allies in Syria and nuclear sabotage—and may continue to do so in the future. But to what extent should we believe Tel Aviv is truly ready and willing to launch a strike on Iran because of advances in the Iranian nuclear program, knowing full well that this is likely to push the two countries and their allies into war? The political and military constraints on Israeli decision-makers suggests such a military showdown is highly unlikely.
To speak of an imminent and undisguised IDF strike deep inside Iranian territory is to overlook a long-established norm that has for decades governed U.S.-Israel relations: Israel cannot simply ignore the wishes and concerns of its chief patron, especially when core U.S. foreign policy priorities are at stake.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey PIC › 2NC – AT: Radars – Iran
Abtar ’22 [Rana; 07/21/22; Masters in translation at the Saint Joseph University of Beirut; "US Lawmakers Introduce Bill to Track Iran Nuclear Efforts," Asharq Al-Awsat, //smarx, AZG]
Democratic and Republican lawmakers have introduced a bill requiring the US administration to assess Iranian threats and develop a clear strategy to deal with them.
The "Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability Monitoring Act of 2022" was presented by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez and Senator Lindsey Graham.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey PIC › 2NC – AT: Radars – Iran
Oberhaus ’20 [Daniel; 01/08/20; staff writer at WIRED; “How the US Knew Iranian Missiles Were Coming Before They Hit,” WIRED, smarx, AZG]
ON TUESDAY, IRAN launched more than a dozen missiles targeting two Iraqi military bases housing American soldiers. The attack was retaliation for the US drone strike that killed Qasem Soleimani, a top-ranking Iranian military general. In a televised speech on Wednesday, President Donald Trump said “minimal damage was sustained” during the attack and that no American or Iraqi lives were lost. Considering that Iran has developed missiles that are accurate to within a few tens of meters, it’s remarkable that all personnel at the base emerged unscathed.
According to Trump, this had nothing to do with luck or bad aim. Instead, he attributed it to “an early warning system that worked very well.” The US has a vast network of radars and satellites dedicated to tracking missile launches around the globe, which allowed troops stationed at the Iraqi bases to take cover before the missiles struck their targets. The system worked as intended, but as the missile technology of America’s adversaries continues to improve, some experts wonder if the country’s first line of defense will be able to keep up.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey PIC › 2NC – Net Benefit – Swinland
Haltiwanger ’22 [John; 7-19-2022; Senior politics reporter at Business Inside, BA in History from St. Mary's College of Maryland, MSc in International Relations from the University of Glasgow, “Right before meeting with Putin in Iran, Turkey's Erdogan threatens to 'freeze' Sweden and Finland's NATO membership,” Business Insider; ] Accessed – 7/20/2022, WWIS
Erdogan on Monday once again threatened to derail Finland and Sweden's NATO ambitions.
Turkey has accused the Nordic countries of being too friendly with Kurdish groups it considers to be terrorists.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey PIC › 2NC – Net Benefit – Swinland
Askonas 22 [Jonathan Askonas is an assistant professor of politics at the Catholic University of America and a fellow at its Center for the Study of Statesmanship and Gil Barndollar is a senior research fellow at the Catholic University of America’s Center for the Study of Statesmanship; "With Finland and Sweden in NATO, the U.S. Can Finally Pivot to the Pacific"; 7-12-2022; Foreign Policy; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/12/finland-sweden-nato-us-europe-pacific-military-pivot-strategy-geopolitics/]//AShah
Amid all of this “more,” both supporters and opponents of greater U.S. commitment to Europe have talked about possible Finnish and Swedish membership as if it was just another step in the alliance’s established process of expansion. But adding the two Nordic nations to the bloc could be an opportunity for far more: These countries could fundamentally transform NATO in ways that expand Washington’s global freedom of action. Whether the United States will seize this opportunity is another question.
Some and advocates of have opposed admitting Finland and Sweden to the alliance on the grounds that doing so would further extend the United States’ already unsustainable commitments to Europe and its potential conflicts. They are wrong: Adding Sweden and Finland will actually make it less likely that Americans will die fighting for these countries—and also reduce the odds that Americans will die for NATO’s likeliest flash point: the Baltic states.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey PIC › 2NC – Net Benefit – Swinland
Slawson 7-20 [Darryl S. Slawson is passionate about the digital world, finance and trading has been one of his biggest hobbies. He is an expert in digital marketing and has been working on high quality content for EuropeWorldnews since October 2019; "Erdogan regrets that the Scandinavian countries have become "centres for the spawn of terrorist"."; 7-20-2022; Europe & World News; https://www.europeworldnews.com/erdogan-regrets-that-the-scandinavian-countries-have-become-centres-for-the-spawn-of-terrorism/]//AShah
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan lamented on Wednesday that the Scandinavian countries had become a “centre for the emergence of terrorism” and stressed that Ankara had “made clear its conditions” to Finland and Sweden to allow these countries to join NATO to perform .
“We made it clear,” he assured, before reiterating that Turkey’s terms include those countries ending the activities of terrorist organizations in their respective territories and allowing suspected terrorists to be deported to Turkey.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey PIC › 1NC – Net Benefit – Cohesion – Readiness
Got 20 [Antoine Got is based in Europe and works on security and defense issues. He wrote for War on the Rocks, a platform for analysis and debate on strategy, defense, and foreign affairs; "Turkey’s Crisis with the West: How a New Low in Relations Risks Paralyzing NATO"; 11-19-2020; War on the Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/turkeys-crisis-with-the-west-how-a-new-low-in-relations-risks-paralyzing-nato/]//AShah
NATO’s most important challenge today may not come from Russia, but from within. With the number of disputes between Turkey and several European allies yet again on the rise, the two parties’ souring relations have begun undermining the organization’s cohesion and ability to make timely collective decisions. If left unaddressed, these tensions could cause serious damage to the world’s most powerful alliance.
The latest flashpoint came from Turkey’s open backing of Azerbaijan’s war effort in the small landlocked enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, which ended abruptly in early November thanks to a Russian-brokered deal. Reports of military assistance and alleged Syrian mercenaries sent by Turkey placed Ankara at loggerheads with its NATO allies’ calls for a peaceful, negotiated resolution to the conflict. The deal, which foresees Baku reacquiring sizeable portions of the disputed enclave, has made Turkey one of the obvious winners of the recent flare-up, while its Western allies remain on the sidelines. For some, this could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back, adding to a long list of complaints they have recently leveled against their NATO ally.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey PIC › 1NC – Net Benefit – Cohesion – Laundry List
Ben-Meir 17 [Dr. Alon Ben Meir is a professor and Retired Senior Fellow at New York University’s Center for Global Affairs and Senior Fellow at the World Policy Institute; "Time to Kick Turkey Out of NATO?"; 11-9-2017; Globalist; https://www.theglobalist.com/turkey-erdogan-press-freedom-human-rights-nato-democracy/]//AShah
Turkey, as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), has violated every provision of NATO’s founding treaty regarding human rights.
Indeed, each to fully adhere to “…safeguard[ing] the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey PIC › 1NC – Net Benefit – Cohesion – General
Kuczyński 19 [Grzegorz Kuczyński graduated in history at the University of Bialystok and specialized Eastern studies at the University of Warsaw; "Is Turkey NATO's Weak Link"; 7-22-2019; https://warsawinstitute.org/turkey-natos-weak-link/]//AShah
Russia’s firm entrance to the Syrian conflict became a decisive point, initially leading to strains in ties with Ankara that ran high after Turkey had shot down a Russian aircraft. Moscow’s response consisted in boosting military involvement in the region and waging the trade war with Turkey, back then in favor of toppling the government of Bashar al-Assad. Six months passed since that moment, marking a sharp tilt in Turkish-Russian relations and prompting the two countries to forget about past resentments and start to cooperate. Ankara seeks to foster both an economic aspect of this partnership, including Russian trade outlets, tourists, Russian-sourced gas and building a nuclear power plant, and a common stance on Syria. Having no other choice to choose its partners in Syria’s war theater, Erdogan focused on bolstering cooperation with Moscow and Tehran under the Astana format. Ankara’s ties with Israel have dramatically deteriorated while those with the United States are getting worse and worse, given that the latter offers firm support to the Kurds, a useful ally in the war against the Islamic State in Syria. Also, Turkey has solidified cooperation with Qatar, hinting worse relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. But what makes matters worse is that this strikes a blow against NATO’s internal cohesion. Turkey has long made efforts to procure air defense missile systems; a few years later, the country had almost sealed the deal with China but had to resign amid pressure from Ankara’s Western allies. Having taken advantage of ever-closer cooperation with Putin, Erdogan inked an agreement to purchase Russian S-400s. Turkey and Russia signed in late 2017 an accord to supply Ankara with surface-to-air missile batteries, worth $2.5 billion. Since then, Washington had made several unsuccessful attempts to dissuade Turkey from acquiring Russian-made military hardware, also by offering at the end of 2018 to sell air defense systems Patriot for $3.5 billion. And Donald Trump is right when blaming the previous presidential administration for what is taking place now, with both Barack Obama and the then Congress having impeded the delivery of Patriots missiles to Ankara. This, along with Turkey’s ever-growing isolation in the West, played to the advantage of Moscow that cleverly ignited and co-created the conflict between Turkey on the one hand and the United States and NATO on the other.