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2022 Michigan Negative
CP › China Adv CP › 2NC---XT: Solvency

Limiting Chinese capabilities is the wrong approach. Implicit understandings should establish that destructive capabilities are only there for deterrence---clarifies thresholds.

Andrew S. Erickson ’19, Professor of strategy and the research director in the U.S. Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute and a visiting professor in full-time residence in Harvard University's Department of Government. “U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relations: Policy Considerations in a Changing Environment”, Asia Policy, Vol. 14, No. 3 (JULY 2019), pp. 123-144 // Ali

Fifth, even absent related agreements, it is possible to pursue some measure of mutual restraint in the most dangerous and volatile areas. On the positive side of the ledger, some degree of cooperation is possible even when both parties face a security dilemma, although factors such as offense vs. defense, technology, and geography must be considered with particular care.43 Yet negotiating durable agreements under a great-power security dilemma can be extremely difficult, as both sides have incentives to cheat, and no outside party can adjudicate effectively.44 Each side’s belief that the other will simply pocket any concessions without reciprocal actions or benefits strongly disincentivizes unilateral restraint or accommodation. Fortunately, effective arms control and deterrence relations need not be limited to formal treaties; they simply require arranging forces in such a way that neither side has the incentive to act adversely toward the other. Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin’s explication of this issue is worth considering in depth.45 A broader, more flexible form of engagement that applies Schelling and Halperin’s conceptual approach to focus on reducing the incentives to use capabilities rather than reducing the capabilities themselves can thus address U.S. and Chinese concerns that would render aspects of formal agreements deal-breakers. China appears absolutely unwilling to accept technical inferiority, and any agreement that attempts to keep the PLA in such a position will fail; nor will the United States voluntarily relinquish capabilities that it has labored and invested to develop, particularly in the face of a security dilemma. Informal understandings may evolve over time through informal communication, and may even lead to more explicit agreements.46 The overall strategic positions of the United States and China are relatively clear; it may be difficult to justify extensive dialogues that fail to go beyond policy platitudes. What could be useful to discuss are operational and perhaps even tactical specifics, which remain far less clear. The most realistic possibility to pursue over time is therefore some form of implicit, non-treaty-based understanding between the United States and China that even if the use of certain lower-end capabilities may be impossible to rule out, other types of capabilities are primarily for deterrence rather than actual operational use. This would help clarify thresholds, an important aspect of risk management.47 As explained previously, however, this approach will only be effective to the extent that both sides restrain themselves. It will fail if Beijing expects preemptive or unilateral concessions from Washington.

2022 Michigan Negative
CP › China Adv CP › 1NC---Adv CP---China War

That solves.

Zhang Tuosheng ‘21 ,academic committee member at the Center for International Security and Strategy, Tsinghua University, and also Chairman of the Academic Committee, Grandview Institution. "Strengthening crisis management, the most urgent task in current China–US and China–Japan security relations." China International Strategy Review 3, no. 1 (2021): 34-55. // Ali

First, at present and in the foreseeable future, the focus of China–US crisis management should be placed on issues concerning the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, and cyberspace. Among these issues, security frictions in the South China Sea and on cybersecurity have emerged as the newest challenges for China and the US over the past 10 years. When strengthening crisis management measures, it is necessary to clarify each party’s bottom line as soon as possible. With regard to the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula, after long-term consultation, both China and the US have a clearer idea of the other’s bottom line. The key to crisis avoidance lies in never crossing one another’s bottom line. In the long run, the East China Sea and outer space will also become important areas that require strengthened crisis management.

Second, for the time being, China and the US should redouble their efforts to prevent contingencies in the sea or air due to the potential for misunderstanding, miscalculation, or accidental discharge of fire. The two sides must earnestly strengthen the military maritime consultation mechanism; strictly observe the rules of conduct for air and maritime encounters in order to ensure safety, as well as the mechanism of notification of major military activities plus the two annexes; and constantly enrich and improve these rules and mechanisms in practice. To this end, in addition to holding annual meetings to analyze the overall situation and evaluate various risks, relevant departments must strengthen regular and ad hoc consultations to eliminate hidden dangers in a timely manner and minimize security risks.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Solvency › 2NC – Terror Likely

Weak adversaries particularly likely to pursue space strikes

Pawel Bernat 19 — (Pawel Bernat; Paweł Bernat Military University of Aviation · Department of Security Studies Doctor of Philosophy, Published: 12/23/2019; " Pawel Bernat & Elżbieta Posłuszna, The Threat of Space Terrorism in the Context of Irregular Warfare Strategies"; Philarchive; Accessed: 6-20-2022; https://philarchive.org/rec/BERTTO-30)//Pen-SY

What is more significant from the safety and security perspective is the fact that the space industry has been gaining more and more strategic importance. Nowadays, we witness an unprecedented process of democratization of space technologies, including weapons, that could become a serious threat for orbital objects in the future. Obviously, weak actors are not in possession of ASAT weapon systems able to destroy satellites in the orbit (as for today, there are just five nation-states that have that capability, i.e., USA, Russia, China, Israel, and India); they do have though significant potential to disrupt / jam signals from and to satellites that may turn out to be lethal. The cases of the latter have already happened. For example, Sri Lankan terrorist group the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, otherwise known as the Tamil Tigers, hacked an Intelsat satellite and used a vacant Ku-band transponder to broadcast its message in Sri Lanka and the surrounding region without Intelsat‘s knowledge for over a year (de Selding, 2007) until Intelsat decided to shut down the satellite transponder in late April 2007 (McCoy, 2007). There might have also been cases of sabotage. In early 2015, a twenty-year-old U.S. Air Force Defence Meteorological Satellite Program Flight 13(DMSP-F13) craft blew up. The U.S., according to S.M. Pekkanen, attributed the event to a power failure and minimized its importance. However, the delay in admitting the event to the public caused speculations, whether it was an actual act of sabotage (Pekkanen, 2015). Of course, for obvious reasons, it is difficult to determine what truly happened. Another case worth mentioning is the launch of four rogue satellites on Indian PSLV launch vehicle on 12 January 2018. The satellites belonged to the Swarm Technologies – a space start-up based in California that had been denied placing them onto the orbit due to the small size of the devices (the concern was that they were too small to be tracked in space) (Christensen, 2018). While, as it seems, this case did not pose any danger for global security, it raises many questions regarding our current control system what is sent to the outer space. If it was possible for an American company to place in the orbit unlicensed satellites, it seems, that any other agent, including weak actors adversaries discussed in this paper, could do the same.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Solvency › 2NC – Terror Likely

Space terror likely and easy to succeed

Pawel Bernat 19 — (Pawel Bernat; Paweł Bernat Military University of Aviation · Department of Security Studies Doctor of Philosophy, Published: 12/23/2019; " Pawel Bernat & Elżbieta Posłuszna, The Threat of Space Terrorism in the Context of Irregular Warfare Strategies"; Philarchive; Accessed: 6-20-2022; https://philarchive.org/rec/BERTTO-30)//Pen-SY

Now, the question arises why the space sector would be an attractive target for weak actors like terrorist groups or individuals. A good way to answer it is to draw an analogy between the space sector and civil aviation because the latter for decades has been subject to various terrorist attacks. J. Laskowski names four main reasons why it has been so, i.e., (1) extensive media coverage, (2) symbolic meaning – by attacking the industry, the terrorist attacks the state the agency or company is registered in, (3) relative easiness to carry out such an attack, and (4) severe economic consequences (Laskowski, 2013:159-162). We can extend this list by the ones recognized by J. Harrison, namely that (5) such attacks are international events, (6) they can generate a sense of shame among the politicians of the attacked state, (7) they are effective (Harrison, 2012: 49-52). It seems that the abovementioned reason could also apply to the space industry and because of the unique and special character of it, like the amount of money involved, its symbolic significance, and worldwide media coverage, any act of space terrorism would release the goals the terrorists had in mind and hoped for. This is also why traditionally weak actors and adversaries of the states like the USA, Russia, or China would be potentially interested in targeting the space industry of those countries. For, a successful attack, i.e. such that would result in death and/or bring a lot of destruction to the infrastructure, would be a real blow to the country‘s internal and external perception, its finances, and would definitely slow down the development of space exploration As we can see in figure 1, all the odds are against strong actors and in favor of the weak ones, like more or less organized terrorist groups. Graphics excluded

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Solvency › 2NC – Terror Alt Cause

Enables space terrorism – building capabilities now and the plan can’t solve private satellites

Ashna Mehmood 21 — (Ashna Mehmood; Student of International Relations at National Defence University, Islamabad, Published: 8-9-2021; "Terrorism in Space: A Possibility"; Vol. 9 No. 1 (2021): A Journal of Strategic Studies; Accessed: 6-20-2022; http://journal.ciss.org.pk/index.php/ciss-insight/article/view/204)//Pen-SY

Threat of Terrorism in space: Possibilities and Capabilities The threat of terrorism in space was highlighted by the US Under secretary of State, Robert Joseph, who warned the public at the George C. Marshall Institute about the potential terrorist attacks on US space assets in 2006.5His view was in conformity with the US 2006 Space policy, which argues about the capabilities and possible role played by transnational actors in interfering with space assets. There are three widely identified categories of ‘potential terrorist acts in space’: measures against satellites, attacks on launch facilities and ground stations, and user/service equipment attacks. An attack against satellites or an attempt to hijack them can cripple any state in today’s digital world since they relay on signals around the world and are used to operate our televisions, telephones, help in navigations through Global Positioning System (GPS), weather and climate prediction and monitoring systems, detecting underwater minerals, and for rapid and efficient communication.6 The ideal way to make affairs of a state on stand-hold would be through eliminating a satellite communication in its uses. However, that can be a difficult task. Other ways to achieve the same objective can be through disruption, denial, degradation, and deception of the space system. Different satellites have different purposes; military satellites are better shielded than a commercial satellite. Therefore a commercial satellite can be a suitable target for terrorists looking for new methods to achieve their objective of mass casualties and psychological effects. In advanced and developed states such as the US, traffic signals are controlled through cyber and satellite signals. A single disruption can cause accidents that can have a domino effect. Eventually it was observed that the first step to attack a satellite is to track it. To do so it only requires minimal technology such as stopwatches, sky maps, personal computers, and binoculars to observe a satellite’s orbital element. That’s why the US Undersecretary of State Robert Joseph showed concern overnon-governmental satellite observers tracking and posting satellite orbits on the internet, which the terrorist organizations can use for achieving their agendas. The simplest way to disrupt the satellite is through electronic interference, i.e. jamming or spoofing the satellite’s signals. Jamming means blocking or disturbing the communication signals travelling to and from the satellite by producing noise of the same radio frequency within the field of view of the satellite's antennas.7In contrast, spoofing is to mimic the characteristics of accurate signal so that the users receive a fake signal.Occurrences of hijacking and jamming are becoming increasingly common. In 2006, Thuraya Satellite Telecommunications of Abu Dhabi pinpointed that months-long intentional jamming of mobile satellite was detected to be originating from three different places in Libya .This major jamming event recorded in commercial satellite sectors were executed by some Libyan nationals. They were smuggling Marlboro cigarettes from Chad or Nigerinto Libya and they were usingThuraya satellite phones8to communicate with each other. They aimed to disrupt the communication signals to prevent the Libyan officials from overhearing their conversation. However, they jammed the signals on a large scale and ended up disrupting the signals beyond Libyan borders as well. As a result, Thuraya suffered huge losses as it tried to expand its network by launching a third satellite. If a gang of cigerrete smugglers in Libya in 2006 can have the capability to jam the signals outside Libyan borders, it is alarming to imagine what terrorists can do now, 14 years later.9Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers (LTTE) are declared terrorists by the US government.10 They hijacked Intelsat Ltd and used satellite transponder to broadcast their propaganda across the Indian subcontinent. Intelsat tried to shutdown LTTE’s pirating, but LTTE continued its satellite piracy for two years. Similarly in China, China’s Falun Gong hijacked the broadcasting signals of nine China Central Television stations, and ten provincial stations and broadcasted their agenda of religious spiritualism in 2002. Later in 2004, they again disrupted AsiaSat signals for 4 hours.Another way to attack satellites is by targeting their sensors with lasers. The laser beam can either interfere with or damage the satellite sensor. Also, it can melt fragile electronic connections as it induces thermo-mechanical stresses and structural damages. Moreover, satellites could be targeted as a whole through energy beams. However, it is a highly technical operation and requires several elements: reliable booster system with payload capacity, type of target that affects the delivery, up-to-date maintenance, and efficient crew, extensive space surveillance and tracking system, a medium to place the target in the range of the weapon, ability to kill the target, and ability to determine if the attack was successful or not. This is dangerous as an attack targeting a satellite may lead to secondary damages in the space orbitand may also hit the astronauts.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Solvency › 2NC – Terror Alt Cause

Space privatization inevitable – lowers costs

Ashna Mehmood 21 — (Ashna Mehmood; Student of International Relations at National Defence University, Islamabad, Published: 8-9-2021; "Terrorism in Space: A Possibility"; Vol. 9 No. 1 (2021): A Journal of Strategic Studies; Accessed: 6-20-2022; http://journal.ciss.org.pk/index.php/ciss-insight/article/view/204)//Pen-SY

The Emergence of New Actors in Space The sixty-year-old paradigm of state-led agencies dominating the space is slowly experiencing a shift. The space sector faces a swarm of privately owned companies that wish to invest in the billion-dollar industry. From providing services and equipment for space missions to space launchers, human spaceflight, space tourism, and asteroid mining. These companies are working to develop easier, cheaper, and faster ways to access the space.16A few examples of these companies are SpaceX, Scaled Composites, Blue Origin, Virgin Galactic, Bigelow Aerospace, and the Sierra Nevada Corporation.The increase in investment in space programs has led to what one might call the commercialization or privatization of space. The emergence of new actors in space brings with it the emergence of new challenges. Unlike before, when a small group of states and big aerospace industries dominated the space, these new actors are likely to transform the oldstable system. As mentioned, the privatization of space will result in a decrease in the cost of space activities. While this does promise a sizeable increase in space development, it does have its fair share of drawbacks. Reduction in cost means increased participation. Furthermore if privatization continues at the same pace, soon it would not remain easy to regulate or control the actors in space. Hence, making it easier for terrorist groups to participate in space activities without attracting too much attention. In addition, reduced costs will allow them to develop their capacity to participate in sophiscated space activities.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Solvency › 1NC – Terror Alt Cause

Too many groups can cyber-attack satellites---terrorists certainly have the capability to inflict catastrophic damage

David Livingstone 16, associate fellow at Chatham House, was policy lead on Military Aid to the Civil Powers at the UK Ministry of Defence between 1994 and 1999; and Patricia M. Lewis is the research director of the International Security Department at Chatham House, September 2016, “Space, the Final Frontier for Cybersecurity?”

Cyberthreats against space-based systems may be classified as follows:

• States setting out to create military advantages in space, or seeking to steal strategic quantities of intellectual property and having sufficient computing power to crack encryption codes, for example;

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Solvency › 1NC – Solar Flare Alt Cause

Various extreme space weather conditions makes satellite disruption inevitable

Dan Swinhoe 21 — (Dan Swinhoe; News Editor at Datacenter Dynamics, Published: 5-7-2021; "Just how resilient are satellites?"; No Publication; Accessed: 6-26-2022; https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/analysis/just-how-resilient-are-satellites/)//Pen-SY

Assuming a satellite survives the launch and calls home without any troubles, it faces a consstant battle for survival out in the harshness of space. Even Earth satellites in low orbits can see temperature swings of minus 50°C (-58°F) to plus 50°C (122°F) every 90 minutes, which can have a big effect on the equipment onboard, as can the lack of air. “Materials that you thought were quite solid can actually have some liquid or gaseous components which can leave into the vacuum of space, changing the properties of the material and causing it to shrink or become brittle,” says Andy Vick, head of disruptive technology at RAL Space. Space weather is another major contributor to satellite failures. Many of these bus-sized, multi-ton satellites are out in GEO, thousands of miles from Earth where there is little atmospheric protection from extreme conditions and large amounts of radiation. And the void can be surprisingly active and unpredictable when it comes to weather. X-rays, ultraviolet rays, radiation, and geomagnetic storms can all wreak havoc on-board; components can be damaged by the high current that discharges into the satellite or damaged by high-energy particles that penetrate the satellite. Space dust – literally tiny particles of rock dust – can hit the sats and become plasma and damage equipment. Sun Outages, where the satellite passes in front of the Sun, don't harm the satellite. However, the sun's interference swamps the signal from the satellite, causing a loss of data. These outages affect the signals from geostationary satellites, and can last for around ten minutes a day during the Equinox - but they are predictable. The University of Reading recently recorded the first ‘space hurricane’ which it described as a ‘1,000km-wide swirling mass of plasma raining electrons several hundred kilometers above the North Pole.’ The most notorious space weather event was the Carrington Event, a solar flare in 1859 that caused auroras as far south as the Caribbean, woke people in the night thinking it was morning, and caused telegraph lines to fail. Smaller events in 1989 caused blackouts and communication failures. A Carrington-level event today would cause worldwide electronics failures, and could wipe out all the satellite networks of the world if action wasn’t taken ahead of time. In a disaster report, space insurance consortium Atrium warned a single anomalously large proton flare or a number of flares in quick succession from our sun could result in a loss of power to all satellites in geosynchronous orbit and cost billions of dollars to fix. Dr. Holger Krag, head of the Space Safety Programme Office for the European Space Agency, tells DCD there is little that can be done to protect satellites from the impact of a solar flare beyond turning off key electrical systems ahead of time. But the unpredictable nature of the sun can make this a difficult task. To better predict coronal ejections from the sun and provide more notice about potential space weather events, the ESA has planned a mission called Lagrange, where spacecraft will be positioned at "Lagrange points", where the gravity of the Earth and Sun balance providing stable locations to observe the sun’s activity a few days ahead of the Earth’s position. “From [the L5] position, it can see the surface of the sun that would turn towards Earth three days later. We can see an advanced view of the activity area on the sun as it’s rotating around its axis towards the Earth,” says Dr. Krag. “At the same time, you can have a side view on the line between Earth and Sun so it can see coronal mass ejection traveling from the Sun to the Earth and it can measure the velocity of the ejections."

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Solvency › 2NC – Shift

Satellites are primarily attacked by targeting ground infra, AND targeting individual ones can’t cause their impacts

Sandra Erwin 5/19, covered the military, the Pentagon, Congress and the defense industry for nearly two decades as editor of NDIA’s National Defense Magazine and Pentagon correspondent for Real Clear Defense, 5/19/2022, “U.S. Space Force to step up protection of satellite ground systems in the wake of Russia’s cyber attacks”, Space News, https://spacenews.com/u-s-space-force-to-step-up-protection-of-satellite-ground-systems-in-the-wake-of-russias-cyber-attacks/

Almost three months into the war in Ukraine, it’s still too early to draw conclusions about Russia’s capabilities to disrupt satellite-based communications but one clear takeaway is the importance of protecting the ground systems and network user equipment that provide many entry points for cyber attackers, a senior U.S. Space Force official said May 19.

Space Force Lt. Gen. B. Chance Saltzman, deputy chief of space operations for nuclear and cyber, said he has been briefed on the details of Russian cyber attacks aimed at Ukrainian users of satellite internet services. “One of the observations that I would offer on that is that, if you think the only way to dismantle space capabilities is by shooting down satellites, you’re missing the bigger picture … as these cyber attacks are on ground networks,” Saltzman told reporters at a Defense Writers Group breakfast meeting.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Solvency › 2NC – Shift

They could even strike ground stations.

Harrison '17 [Todd; October 2017; director of the Aerospace Security Project and the director of Defense Budget Analysis at CSIS, et al; "Escalation & Deterrence in the Second Space Age," https://www.csis.org/analysis/escalation-and-deterrence-second-space-age]

Rather than attacking the satellites on-orbit, an adversary could achieve similar effects by attacking the ground stations that support them. Ground stations are perhaps more vulnerable to attack, because they are often highly visible, located in foreign countries, and relatively soft targets. For military communications satellites, the data transmitted to and from forward-deployed users is often sent via satellite to a teleport ground station, where it is relayed through another satellite or terrestrial networks to users around the world. To reduce the dependence on ground stations, some military space systems use inter-satellite links to transmit data directly between satellites without passing through an intermediary ground station.

Ground stations are vulnerable to kinetic physical attack by several means. Guided missiles and rockets can be used to attack ground stations from range, while rocket-propelled grenades and small arms fire can be used to disable ground station antennas at close range. Ground stations can also be disrupted by attacking the electrical power grid, water lines, and the high-capacity communications lines that support them. While attacks against ground stations could have large implications, the effects would not be permanent. Unlike satellites, which require years to build and often cannot be repaired once they are launched, ground stations can be repaired in a matter of days or weeks, depending on the level of damage incurred.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Solvency › 2NC – Say No – Germany

Germany will say no–they want to cooperate with China over cybersecurity to improve their economy, but the plan puts them on the backburner

Wendy Wu 15, writer for South China Morning Post , 11/9/2015, “Handshake to end the hacking: China and Germany pledge for peace in cyberspace by 2016”, South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1877288/china-and-germany-aim-reach-commercial-cyberspying-deal

China and Germany aim to wrap up a deal over commercial cyberespionage as early as next year, according to German ambassador to China Michael Clauss.

The two countries had agreed to start negotiating an agreement to abstain from such activity when Chancellor Angela Merkel visited China at the end of last month, Clauss said.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Solvency › 2NC – Say No – Canada

Canada will say no–they’re working closely with China over cybersecurity, but the plan puts them on the backburner

Dan Bousfield 17, researcher at the university of western Ontario, 8/2017, “Revisiting Cyber-Diplomacy: Canada-China Relations Online”, ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319142200_Revisiting_Cyber-Diplomacy_Canada-China_Relations_Online

New avenues of Cyber-Diplomacy between Canada and China emerged during US House Intelligence Committee hearings over the Chinese manufacturers Huawei and ZTE Inc. (U.S. Panel, 2012). American concerns about close links between these companies and the Chinese government have led to bans on their products in the American national broadband network (China’s Huawei, 2012). The US government drew upon national security concerns to politicize the Chinese regulation of network effects, forcing Huawei to abandon its expansion into the American market and to look instead toward Europe (Pfanner, 2012). Protectionism through national security is not new, and cyber threats can be used to undermine the liberal commitments to trade (seen most recently in the tensions following the US election). However, as a middle power in the postwar era, Canada has long been able to leverage its autonomy to facilitate greater coordination and cooperation between states. In the past this was linked to the cultivation of a strong Pearsonian peacekeeping mythos. However, increasingly, Canada has characterized its geopolitical image in terms of commerce and finance (Bousfield, 2013). The Cyber-Diplomacy of Canada’s support for the Chinese ICT industry presents new avenues for expanded engagement. In particular, despite Canadian involvement in North American security arrangements, the Canadian government has been much more willing to work with Chinese ICT firms to foster the image of being a ‘Silicon Valley North’ and it has worked closely with Chinese ICT providers. In addition, Huawei recently sponsored a report from the Economist Intelligence Unit on the extent to which countries were ICT globalized, ranking Canada in the top 10 (The ICT Globalisation Index, 2014). It is important to note that the report highlighted how cyber-security was not a primary concern in the relationship between developing and developed countries, and that ICT globalization also required support for ICT R&D, for which Canada was ranked first (The ICT Globalisation Index, 2014). Thus, there are opportunities for network efforts to facilitate ICT globalization despite geopolitical security concerns, and ways for middle-power countries such as Canada to mobilize their ICT strengths.

The impact of network effects and ICT development in Canada establish a foundation for parallels with China while establishing the importance of the academy in facilitating non-state 1054 D. Bousfield diplomacies. This stems from what Marshall Beier has characterized as the struggles of Canadian autonomy—namely, the tension between adopting independent policy positions while also being overshadowed and influenced by closeness to the American hegemon (Beier, 2005). Specifically, Canada’s longstanding cooperation in the ‘Five Eyes Intelligence Community’ and the 1946 UK/USA intelligence agreement has meant that Communications Security Establishment Canada has remained heavily classified and thus largely unable to engage in public debates about cyber issues (Cox, 2012). As Barry and Bratt have described, Canada’s security strategies are a ‘defense against help’, that is, doing enough to prevent the United States from acting unilaterally on Canada’s behalf (Barry & Bratt, 2008). This situation also explains Canada’s limited funding to securitize cyberspace, its delay in formulating a cyberpolicy framework, and its relative lack of transparency about its cyber policy options (Levin, Goodrick, & Ilkina, 2013; Van der Meulen, 2013). Secrecy, combined with Canada’s desire to preserve market autonomy in the face of American ICT network effects, has produced an oligopolistic ISP market with close ties to government interests. Because the government’s goals have been determined by the national interest in responding to global market forces, discussions in Canada about user actions and social preferences have fallen to non-state forums.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Solvency › 2NC – Say No – Europe

The EU will say no–they can’t afford to put China on the backburner

Federica Russo 20, researcher at the university of Amsterdam, 7/15/2020, “Assessing the EU-China relationship in Cyberspace”, EIAS, https://eias.org/publications/op-ed/assessing-the-eu-china-relationship-in-cyberspace/

The global system which is to emerge in the post-pandemic era – ever more connected and digitalised – will lead to the need of reinforced cyber security mechanisms and diplomacy. For example, the Internet of Things (IoT) will significantly expand the frontiers of cyberspace, connecting sensors and actuators within a cyber-physical ecosystem, reaching 100 billion of objects networked by 2025. According to data reported by the independent cybersecurity company McAfee, cybercrimes related to criminals gaining illicit access to personal network costed the world USD 600 billion in 2017, which is up to 0.8% of the global gross domestic product (GDP). However, with the advent of IoT, the economic impact is destined to be even greater because of the extraordinary flow of data which brings challenges in boosting cyberattack capabilities and increasing the scale of the disruption across several sectors with a potential domino effect.

Besides the above-mentioned obstacles, internal coordination can no longer be dissociated from international cooperation and key players such as China and the EU will have to navigate this complex reality and act accordingly. The EU should deepen its ties with China in the framework of a pragmatic cyber partnership to strengthen the dialogue, build mutual trust, improve the sharing of key information to mitigate threats, prompt action in response, enhance law enforcement and shared understanding of domestic cyber policies, as well as identify lessons to learn from. For example, the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has been object of research in China following the aim of improving the country’s Cyber Security Law on data protection.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Solvency › 2NC – Say No – Turkey

Turkey will say no–they’ve been undermining NATO’s cybersecurity with troll groups, the last thing they’ll want to do is strengthen it

Nordic Monitor 19, The Nordic Research Monitoring Network (Nordic Monitor) is a non-profit organization that aims to raise awareness of radical and violent extremist trends in Europe and beyond, with a specific focus on patterns that disrupt peace and harmony among community groups, with an emphasis on Turkey, 9/30/2019, “Turkey undermines NATO cyber-army initiative”, https://nordicmonitor.com/2019/09/turkey-undermines-nato-cyber-army-initiative/

As NATO has been working on a counter strategy to neutralize the non-conventional cyber threat that originates from Russia, Iran, China and others, NATO member Turkey has secretly been running a project to undermine the alliance structure from within.

The social media and Internet campaigns run by associates of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan harbor anti-NATO and anti-Western sentiments and portray NATO and allies as enemies that are bent on harming Turkey. The most vicious group among various entities that were coordinated by Erdoğan and his office is identified as the Pelican group.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Solvency › 1NC – Say No – General

NATO will say no–unease over different policies and internal disagreements

Benjamin Silverstein 20, research analyst for the Space Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 8/3/2020, “NATO’S RETURN TO SPACE”, War On The Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/natos-return-to-space/

The new NATO policy arrives at an unsettled time in space competition, as internationally accepted behavioral norms regarding the use of non-nuclear force in space have not crystalized. Progress in multinational organizations like the Conference on Disarmament has been stymied by profound disagreements, and there is no indication that non-binding measures developed outside multilateral forums would enhance security in space. Absent concrete norms or legal regulations on the use of force in space, some NATO members are pursuing active defenses to protect satellites, and others have demonstrated exoatmospheric capabilities that brew unease about the potential for overt conflict in space. NATO’s adversaries are also seeking advanced counterspace capabilities. For instance, Russia has conducted on-orbit maneuvers that some perceive as hostile, and in April conducted a missile test with anti-satellite applications, which the United States condemned.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Solvency › 2NC – Kinetic – Iran

Alt causes – Iran’s ballistic missiles are modifications away from ASATs – makes satellite strikes inevitable

Caleb Larson 22 — (Caleb Larson; multimedia journalist and defense writer with the National Interest Published: 1-29-2022; "Does Iran Have Anti-Satellite Missiles?"; National Interest; Accessed: 6-30-2022; https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/does-iran-have-anti-satellite-missiles-199900)//Pen-SY

Here's What You Need to Remember: Iran’s capabilities in space are most effective in denying the space sphere to adversaries, rather than actually controlling it themselves. In 2011, Iran was able to capture an American drone by jamming the drone’s GPS signal and spoofing another GPS signal. After the targeted killing of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, Iran flexed a bit of its ballistic missile muscle in retaliation, striking several bases in Iraq that housed U.S. troops. Striking a target just across a national border is relatively easy. What is much harder, however, is striking an adversary’s satellites. Could Iran do it? Bombs Away A report from CSIS stated that Iran’s “missile forces [are] a potent tool for Iranian power projection and a credible threat to U.S. and partner military forces in the region.” While referencing Iran’s conventional ballistic missile capabilities, the report fails to mention that Iran’s missile arsenal is fully adequate for reaching satellites of varying orbits. Converting a missile from ground attack to space attack is not necessarily difficult. And space is a ripe target. Satellites are virtually defenseless from strikes by kill vehicles. The United States, and virtually the entire world is dependent on satellites for peaceful reasons like communications, for navigating by GPS—and for violent reasons, like guiding precision-guided munition, or snapping photos from nuclear test sites. One expert on the danger posed by anti-satellite capabilities wrote, “the military applications of ASAT missiles appear fairly obvious. China would seek to use the ASAT missiles to knock out U.S. satellites in order to degrade its C5ISR [Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance] capabilities, rendering distributed U.S. military and allied assets unable to communicate or share information.” If enough satellites were knocked out in a conflict scenario, troops would have to dust of the ole map and compass. Still, striking a satellite is no walk in the park—and more complicated that just launching a missile into space. Satellites are small, and some travel along their orbits quite fast. Striking satellites has been compared to hitting a bullet with another bullet. No Mental Limitations Challenges aside, could Iran knock out the United State’s satellites? A Defense Intelligence Agency report acknowledged Iran’s desire to shape the space battlefield. "Iran recognizes the strategic value of space and counterspace capabilities and will attempt to deny an adversary use of space during a conflict.” Iran does also have some capabilities, due to the aforementioned ballistic missile arsenal it maintains: “Because of the inherent overlap in technology between ICBMs and SLVs, Iran’s development of larger, more capable SLV boosters remains a concern for a future ICBM capability. Also, these advancements could be applied to developing a basic ground-based ASAT missile, should Iran choose to do so in the future.” Desire aside, Iran has some practical limitations to deal with: “Tehran states it has developed sophisticated capabilities, including SLVs and communications and remote sensing satellites, but its SLVs are only able to launch microsatellites into LEO [Low Earth Orbit} and have proven unreliable.”

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Solvency › 2NC – Kinetic Inevitable

Litany of kinetic weapons with natural phenomenon make continuous disruption inevitable

Adam Ali.Zare Hudaib 16; Network & Cyber Security Expert / Penetration Tester / Ethical Hackers Trainer / Ethical Hacker / IT Security Trainer., Published: 2016; "Satellite Network Hacking & Security Analysis"; Adam Ali.Zare HudaibInternational Journal of Computer Science and Security (IJCSS), Volume (10); Accessed: 6-22-2022; https://www.academia.edu/24899095/Satellite_Network_Hacking_and_Security_Analysis)//Pen-SY

2.4 Satellite Network Vulnerabilities Satellites’ transmissions are subject to lengthy delays, low bandwidth, and high bit-error rates that adversely impact real-time, interactive applications such as videoconferences and lead to data corruption, performance degradation, and cyber incursions. Atmospheric and interstellar noise; cosmic radiation; interference from electronic devices; and precipitation and rain absorption in the spectral frequencies employed by satellites impede network performance and information throughput and negatively affect provision of quality of service (QoS) guarantees [22]. Satellite network applications and services are also adversely impacted by geophysical events. In 1998, for example, tremendous explosions on the sun disrupted operations onboard PanAmSat’s Galaxy IV Satellite. As a consequence of these solar flares, digital paging services, bank transactions, and cable television programs across the U.S. were disabled [22]. According to the U.S. GAO (2002), satellite network functions can be compromised by groundbased antisatellite weapons, high-altitude nuclear explosions, stealth micro satellites, space mines, space-to-space missiles, and directed energy space weapons. For instance, as a consequence of intentional jamming resulting from cyber attacks on a Telestar-12 commercial satellite in 2003, U.S. governmentsupported broadcasts promoting regime changes in Iran were blocked by the Iranian Ministry of Post, Telegraph, and Telephone [22]. Satellite-based telephony services in Tehran were also disabled.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Solvency › 1NC – Kinetic Alt Cause

Kinetic attacks more likely in space

Martin BLAŠŤÁK 22; Graduated in Bachelor's degree in International Relations and Diplomacy from the University of Derby. Currently a master's degree in Security Studies at Charles University., Published: 2/15/2022; "The Current Rise of Anti-Satellite Weaponry"; Security Outlines - česko-slovenský portál o bezpečnosti; Accessed: 6-26-2022; https://www.securityoutlines.cz/the-current-rise-of-anti-satellite-weaponry/)//Pen-SY

Though we might still believe that outer space is somewhat out of our reach, the fact is that we are dependent on space technologies in many ways. Their expensive and vulnerable nature makes them a perfect target for those who want to severely disrupt opponents’ communication, coordination, or intelligence activities. As such, several nations are currently equipped with or at least developing means of satellite disposal that range from ballistic missiles to communication jammers. The United States, China, Russia, India, and even Japan and France are looking forward to enhancing their counterspace arsenal to protect their ever more important space assets. Even though the development of ASAT weapons is still in the process, the number of nations capable of in-space operations has increased since the Cold War. The current geopolitical tension provides a catalyst for further incentives for the development of new weapons. Types of ASAT weapons When we talk about anti-satellite weaponry, what usually comes to mind are kinetic physical weapons. The technology behind kinetic weapons is accessible to a greater number of states (as it is based on ballistic weapons already in use) and their use has rather horrifying results, as illustrated clearly by the aftermath of the Fengyun-1C case, which was easily attributed to the Chinese and harmed the environment disastrously for the next few decades or even centuries [1]. In addition to direct ascent missiles, kinetic weapons can also take the form of a co-orbital device – a satellite equipped with a payload (usually explosive) sent to an intercepting orbit with another satellite [2]. The US, China, and India all have some degree of developed, tested, and somewhat operational ASAT kinetic capabilities. For example, the Indian missile test of 2019 (Mission Shakti) or the Chinese 2007 test (Fengyun-1C), which managed to destroy targeted satellites successfully. The US did not declare any official direct-ascent weapons, but it is agreed that their anti-ballistic missile interceptors could be used against enemy satellites. Furthermore, the US would be able to quickly develop dedicated ASAT systems [3].

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Solvency › 2NC – Cyber Norms Fail

Attribution’s impossible---means the plan’s norm can’t be enforced

Kenneth Lieberthal 12, director of the John L. Thornton China Center and senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at Brookings; and Peter W. Singer, director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings, February 2012, “Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations,” https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0223_cybersecurity_china_us_lieberthal_singer_pdf_english.pdf

Beyond just the issue of terminology, however, there are also other dimensions in the cyber arena that are especially consequential to U.S.-China relations and must inform any process aimed at engagement. Put simply, in this dynamic arena, it is necessary to be realistic about what types of activities can potentially be brought under control through agreed-upon actions and what things are effectively beyond the capacity of institutions to control. It is important to appreciate why this is so and, in that context, to focus on those areas that are still potentially subject to meaningful controls. Perhaps the most difficult is the problem of attribution.41

The ability to capture the operations of another computer and use it to launch activities that its owner does not intend and might even be unaware of (described inside the field as to “pwn,” a computer hacker term meaning to “own”) is very well developed and widely used. This often takes the form of creating botnets that link unrelated computers and enable the controller to leverage their combined computing and communications capabilities for a particular purpose. The resulting network of secretly linked devices can easily grow to extraordinary dimensions. For example, three not terribly sophisticated Spaniards allegedly created a global botnet that included over twelve million computers.42 In other cases, a controller may seek to capture and leverage only one or a small number of computers. In this case, the major purpose is more likely to be to conceal the controller’s identity.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Solvency › 1NC – Cyber Norms Fail

Cyber governance fails to stop risks to satellites---tech changes too fast and offensive capabilities are too diffused

David Livingstone 16, associate fellow at Chatham House, was policy lead on Military Aid to the Civil Powers at the UK Ministry of Defence between 1994 and 1999; and Patricia M. Lewis is the research director of the International Security Department at Chatham House, September 2016, “Space, the Final Frontier for Cybersecurity?”

• Cyberattacks on satellites can include jamming, spoofing and hacking attacks on communication networks; targeting control systems or mission packages; and attacks on the ground infrastructure such as satellite control centres. Possible cyberthreats against space-based systems include state-to-state and military actions; well-resourced organized criminal elements seeking financial gain; terrorist groups wishing to promote their causes, even up to the catastrophic level of cascading satellite collisions; and individual hackers who want to fanfare their skills.

• Space is changing from a selective preserve of wealthy states or well-resourced academia, into one in which market forces dominate. Current technologies bring space capability into the reach of states, international organizations, corporations and individuals that a decade ago had no realistic ambition in this regard; and capabilities possessed a few years ago only by government security agencies are now in the commercial domain.