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2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › Terrorism DA › 2NC---DA---Terror---UQ

US tech superiority is key to keeping terrorism low

Kfir 20 [Isaac Kfir (Director of the National Security Program and Counterterrorism Policy Centre at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute), 8-21-20, "Counterterrorism and Terrorist Innovation," GNET, ] // st

Historically, counterterrorism has largely been reactive, adopting policies and measures to respond to what violent extremists do. The purpose of this blog is to argue that as violent extremists innovate, so should counterterrorism because as Professor Leonard Weinberg , “Innovative terrorist groups seem to be exceptionally dangerous. Their innovations are often emulated by other groups – even ones with other aims and in other parts of the world.” Writing in the late 1980s, Professor Martha Crenshaw terrorist innovation to survival as she emphasises that state actors adapt to the violence. Included in her assessment is the observation that innovation is not something that all violent extremists do or can do, which is why some may disappear. Crenshaw was writing in the pre-social media and fourth technological revolution, which has affected the process of innovation as nowadays information can and is shared much faster. Nevertheless, the core of her argument remains as valid today as when it was first touted. In her work on terrorism and innovation Professor Crenshaw three types of terrorist innovation: strategic, organisational and tactical. She conceded that it may be difficult to identify the difference between strategic and tactical innovation or distinguish the source of the innovation according to type, which could become obvious over time. In the context of terrorism, occurs when the group veers from one strategy to another, which may lead the group to adopt new ideas, tactics or tools. The revised strategy need not impact the ideology of the group, which often stays the same. The group recognises that its current strategy is not getting it closer to the end-goal, which is why it needs to innovate. Both al-Qaeda and Islamic State provide good examples of groups that engaged in strategic innovation as a way to survive and continue. The former increasingly adopted a , model. This was a strategic shift, as core al-Qaeda moved away from the direct commission of terrorist attacks to operating as an marrying the local with the global (). To achieve this, core al-Qaeda has to adapt its organisation and tactics to fit with its franchising model, including focusing more on the non-Western states, as seen for example in Zawahiri’s 11 September 2019 , which focused more on those living in Arab-majority countries, calling on the faithful to attack American targets in their country. The Islamic State is a good example of strategic innovation, as it applied advertising techniques to encourage young people to migrate to the so-called caliphate or commit acts of violence. Technological changes proved essential to these strategic innovations. Organisational innovation to changes within the organisational space specifically to changes in the group’s structure and institutions. Organisational innovation is very much impacted by the environment, specifically effective anti- and counter-terrorism measures such as decapitation, as groups lose key strategic and tactical leaders that are not easily replaceable. Al-Qaeda’s founders recognised the need to form a which is why they structured along traditional lines as a top-down, hierarchical organisation with clear strategic goals that are determined by the emir, whilst also permitting an element of decentralisation, giving the locals some operational independence. An important factor in ensuring al-Qaeda’s durability is its , which is dependent on secure communication, which in turn has allowed Zawahiri to the group’s Shura Majilis. Tactical innovation to changes in methods, targeting or operations used by a terrorist group. The innovation generally manifests itself through the acquisition of new weapons or new targets or the recognition that a tactic no longer works, which is why there is a need to adapt. of the Provisional Irish Republican Army highlights how the group adapted its use of improvised explosive devices. The change also altered perception about the group which before the change in tactic was described as ‘clumsy’, ‘disorganised,’ ‘unimaginative’ to one that commentators described as professional. Another example is the usage of drones, which states initially held a monopoly over, but over time non-state actors sought to acquire this tool ( Israel had used drones in the 1980s in Lebanon, but by 1993 Aum Shinrikyo sought to acquire this tool. Ten years later, Hezbollah used a surveillance drone and by the mid-2010s, Islamic State had used a quadcopter with an explosive payload). This type of innovation is generally linked to a change within the strategic thinking, although tactical innovation is not necessarily reliant on strategic innovation. It is in the tactical sector that there has been a fair amount of innovation especially as the technological revolution has made communication and therefore the sharing of ideas and information easier and faster. Research has highlighted how effective Islamic State has been in adapting, i.e. innovating, its communication strategy as states and companies develop a mechanism to hinder the group’s message. For example, when Twitter began removing the Islamic State official media account, al-I‘tisam, Islamic State’s main distribution unit adapted, using variations on its name when creating new Twitter handles to come back to the platform. As Twitter became better at shutting down the al-I‘tisam account, Islamic State created a new methodology for distribution, referred by some as the “centralised decentralisation”, allowing it to create official and unofficial dissemination accounts (some were linked to the group and others were managed by others who may not have had direct or even indirect links to Islamic State but supported the group’s agenda). Through this system, Islamic State was able to continue to disseminate propaganda material because when one account was taken down, others remained operational, tweeting whenever the new account of the one taken down was back online using an alternative handle. Another innovative way Islamic State has sought to promote its message and to recruit is through . Islamic State was not the first to use this medium, Hezbollah for example released a video game, Special Force, in 2003, in which the player fights against Israel. The game includes real battle fought between Hezbollah and Israel in Lebanon and the game itself is structured to include a that the designers constructed, aimed at generating a new moral reality as much as the construction of heroes and villains. Notably, recognising that creating games from scratch is challenging, they are opting to undertake , whether as a bottom-up or a top-down process. Conclusion Innovation, whether strategic, tactical, or organisational is a complex and yet a crucial process, as without it, violent extremists become susceptible to extermination or irrelevancy, as states adapt. When it comes to innovation, violent extremists are limited by their ideology, availability of resources, and a willingness to change. Currently, many Salafi-jihadi groups are engaged in strategic reassessment as they consider how to proceed with their campaign. This may explain the lull in terrorist attacks (especially against western targets). Nevertheless, these individuals are imaginative, technically savvy, and determined and they bank on the fact that many policymakers suffer from what is best described as a ‘failure of imagination’. Moreover, as Adam Dolnik had shown in his important on terrorist and innovation, groups whose ideology centres on inflicting mass casualties and who want to undertake spectacular events tend to be more innovative. This is very true for most if not all Salafi-jihadi and extreme violent right-wing actors.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › Terrorism DA › 1NC---DA---Nuke Terror

Results in nuclear terrorism and extinction

Hayes, PhD, 18

(Peter, Energy+Recpurces@Berkeley, ProfIR@RMIT, 1-18, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/non-state-terrorism-and-inadvertent-nuclear-war/)

Nuclear terrorism post-cold war: trigger for inadvertent nuclear war? The possible catalytic effect of nuclear terrorism on the risk of state-based nuclear war is not a simple linkage. The multiple types and scales of nuclear terrorism may affect state-nuclear use decisions along multiple pathways that lead to inadvertent nuclear war. These include: Early warning systems fail or are “tripped” in ways that lead to launch-on-warning Accidental nuclear detonation, including sub-critical explosions. Strategic miscalculation in crisis, show of force Decision-making failure (such as irrational, misperception, bias, degraded, group, and time-compressed decision-making) Allied or enemy choices (to seek revenge, to exploit nuclear risk, to act out of desperation) Organizational cybernetics whereby a nuclear command-control-and communications (NC3) system generates error, including the interplay of national NC3 systems in what may be termed the meta-NC3 system. Synchronous and coincident combinations of above.[4] Exactly how, where, and when nuclear terrorism may “ambush” nuclear armed states already heading for or on such a path to inadvertent nuclear war depends on who is targeting whom at a given time, either immediately due to high tension, or generally due to a structural conflict between states. Nuclear armed states today form a complex set of global threat relationships that are not distributed uniformly across the face of Earth. Rather, based on sheer firepower and reach, the nine nuclear weapons states form a global hierarchy with at least four tiers, viz: Tier 1: United States, clear technological supremacy and qualitative edge. Tier 2: Russia, China, global nuclear powers and peers with the United States due to the unique destructive power of even relatively small nuclear arsenals, combined with global reach of missile and bomber delivery systems, thereby constituting a two-tiered global “nuclear triangle” with the United States. Tier 3: France, UK, NATO nuclear sharing and delivery NATO members (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey) and the NATO and Pacific nuclear umbrella states (Japan, South Korea, Australia) that depend on American nuclear extended deterrence and directly and indirectly support US and US-allied nuclear operations even though they do not host nor deliver nuclear weapons themselves. Tier 4: India, Pakistan, Israel, DPRK. The first two tiers constitute the global nuclear threat triangle that exists between the United States, Russia, and China, forming a global nuclear “truel.” Each of these states targets the others; each represents an existential threat to the other; and each has a long history of mutual nuclear threat that is now a core element of their strategic identity. Tier three consists of states with their own nuclear force but integrated with that of the United States (even France!) that expand the zone of mutual nuclear threat over much of the northern and even parts of the southern hemisphere; and states that host American nuclear command, control, communications, and intelligence systems that support US nuclear operations and to whom nuclear deterrence is “extended” (if, for example, Australia’s claim to having an American nuclear umbrella is believed). The fourth tier is composed of smaller nuclear forces with a primarily regional reach and focus. Between most of these nuclear armed states and across the tiers, there are few shared “rules of the road.” The more of these states that are engaged in a specific conflict and location, the more unpredictable and unstable this global nuclear threat system becomes, with the potential for cascading and concatenating effects. Indeed, as the number of nuclear states projecting nuclear threat against each other increases, the notion of strategic stability may lose all meaning. The emergence of a fifth tier—of non-state actors with the capacity to project nuclear threat against nuclear-armed and nuclear umbrella states (although not only these states)—is a critically important possible catalytic actor in the new conditions of nuclear threat complexity that already exist today. Such a layer represents an “edge of chaos” where the attempts by nuclear armed states to exert absolute “vertical” control over the use of nuclear weapons confront the potential of non-state entities and even individuals (insiders) to engage in “horizontal” nuclear terrorism, presenting radically different control imperatives to the standard paradigm of organizational procedures, technical measures, and safeguards of various kinds. This tier is like the waves and tides on a beach that quickly surrounds and then causes sand castles to collapse. In 2010, Robert Ayson reviewed the potential linkages between inter-state nuclear war and non-state terrorism. He concluded: “…[T]hese two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them.”[5] How this linkage might unfold is the subject of the next sections of this essay. Are non-state actors motivated and able to attempt nuclear terrorism? A diverse set of non-state actors have engaged in terrorist activities—for which there is no simple or consensual definition. In 2011, there were more than 6,900 known extremist, terrorist and other organizations associated with guerrilla warfare, political violence, protest, organized crime and cyber-crime. Of these, about 120 terrorist and extremist groups had been blacklisted by the United Nations, the European Union and six major countries.[6] Some have argued that the technical, organizational, and funding demanded for a successful nuclear attack, especially involving nuclear weapons, exceeds the capacity of most of the non-state actors with terrorist proclivities. Unfortunately, this assertion is not true, especially at lower levels of impact as shown in Figure 1; but even at the highest levels of obtaining authentic nuclear weapons capabilities, a small number of non-state actors already exhibit the motivation and possible capacity to become nuclear-armed. Ellingsen suggests a useful distinction that nuclear terrorists may be impelled by two divergent motivations, as shown in Figure 2, creating “opportunistic” and “patient” profiles.[7] The requirements for an opportunist non-state nuclear terrorist tend towards immediate use and the search for short-term payoffs with only tactical levels of commitment; whereas the patient non-state nuclear terrorist is able and willing to sustain a long-term acquisition effort to deal a strategic blow to an adversary in a manner that could be achieved only with nuclear weapons. In turn, many factors will drive how a potential nuclear terrorist non-state organization that obtains nuclear weapons or materials may seek to employ them, especially in its nuclear command-and-control orientations. Blair and Ackerman suggest that the goals, conditions, and capacity limitations that shape a possible nuclear terrorist’s posture lead logically to three types of nuclear terrorist nuclear command-and-control postures, viz: pre-determined (in which the leadership sends a fire order to a nuclear-armed subordinate and no change is entertained and no capacity to effect change is established in the field, that is, the order is fire-and-forget); assertive (in which only the central command can issue a nuclear fire order, central control is maintained at all times, with resulting demanding communications systems to support such control); and delegative (in which lower level commanders control nuclear weapons and have pre-delegated authority to use them in defined circumstances, for example, evidence of nuclear explosions combined with loss-of-connectivity with their central command).[8] An example of such delegative control system was the November 26, 2008 attack on Mumbai that used social media reporting to enable the attacking terrorists to respond to distant controller direction and to adapt to counter-terrorist attacks—a connectivity tactic that the authorities were too slow to shut down before mayhem was achieved.[9] Logically, one might expect nuclear terrorists oriented toward short-term, tactical goals to employ pre-determined nuclear command-and-control strategies in the hope that the speed of attack and minimum field communications avoids discovery and interdiction before the attack is complete; whereas nuclear terrorists oriented toward long-term, strategic goals might employ more pre-delegative command-and-control systems that would support a bargaining use and therefore a field capacity to deploy nuclear weapons or materials that can calibrate actual attack based on communications with the central leadership with the risk of interdiction through surveillance and counter-attack. These differing strategic motivations, timelines, and strategies in many respects invert those of nuclear weapons states that rely on large organizations, procedures, and technical controls, to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used without legitimate authorization; and if they are used, to minimize needless civilian casualties (at least some nuclear armed states aspire to this outcome). The repertoire of state-based practices that presents other states with credible nuclear threat and reassures them that nuclear weapons are secure and controlled is likely to be completely mismatched with the strengths and strategies of non-state nuclear terrorists that may seek to maximize civilian terror, are not always concerned about their own survival or even that of their families and communities-of-origin, and may be willing to take extraordinary risk combined with creativity to exploit the opportunities for attack presented by nuclear weapons, umbrella, and non-nuclear states, or their private adversaries. For non-state actors to succeed at complex engineering project such as acquiring a nuclear weapons or nuclear threat capacity demands substantial effort. Gary Ackerman specifies that to have a chance of succeeding, non-state actors with nuclear weapons aspirations must be able to demonstrate that they control substantial resources, have a safe haven in which to conduct research and development, have their own or procured expertise, are able to learn from failing and have the stamina and strategic commitment to do so, and manifest long-term planning and ability to make rational choices on decadal timelines. He identified five such violent non-state actors who already conducted such engineering projects (see Figure 3), and also noted the important facilitating condition of a global network of expertize and hardware. Thus, although the skill, financial, and materiel requirements of a non-state nuclear weapons project present a high bar, they are certainly reachable. Along similar lines, James Forest examined the extent to which non-state actors can pose a threat of nuclear terrorism.[10] He notes that such entities face practical constraints, including expense, the obstacles to stealing many essential elements for nuclear weapons, the risk of discovery, and the difficulties of constructing and concealing such weapons. He also recognizes the strategic constraints that work against obtaining nuclear weapons, including a cost-benefit analysis, possible de-legitimation that might follow from perceived genocidal intent or use, and the primacy of political-ideological objectives over long-term projects that might lead to the group’s elimination, the availability of cheaper and more effective alternatives that would be foregone by pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the risk of failure and/or discovery before successful acquisition and use occurs. In the past, almost all—but not all—non-state terrorist groups appeared to be restrained by a combination of high practical and strategic constraints, plus their own cost-benefit analysis of the opportunity costs of pursuing nuclear weapons. However, should some or all of these constraints diminish, a rapid non-state nuclear proliferation is possible. Although only a few non-state actors such as Al Qaeda and Islamic State have exhibited such underlying stamina and organizational capacities and actually attempted to obtain nuclear weapons-related skills, hardware, and materials, the past is not prologue. An incredibly diverse set of variously motivated terrorist groups exist already, including politico-ideological, apocalyptic-millenarian, politico-religious, nationalist-separatist, ecological, and political-insurgency entities, some of which converge with criminal-military and criminal-scientist (profit based) networks; but also pyscho-pathological mass killing cults, lone wolves, and ephemeral copy-cat non-state actors. The social, economic, and deculturating conditions that generate such entities are likely to persist and even expand. In particular, rapidly growing coastal mega-cities as part of rapid global urbanization offer such actors the ability to sustain themselves as “flow gatekeepers,” possibly in alliance with global criminal networks, thereby supplanting the highland origins of many of today’s non-state violent actors with global reach.[11] Other contributing factors contributing to the supply of possible non-state actors seeking nuclear weapons include new entries such as city states in search of new security strategies, megacities creating their own transnationally active security forces, non-states with partial or complete territorial control such as Taiwan and various micro-states, failing states, provinces in dissociating, failing states that fall victim to internal chaos and the displacement effects of untrammeled globalization, and altogether failed states resulting in ungoverned spaces. To this must be added domestic terrorist entities in the advanced industrial states as they hollow out their economies due to economic globalization and restructuring, adjust to cross-border migration, and adapt to cultural and political dislocation. In short, the prognosis is for the fifth tier of non-state actors to beset the other four tiers with intense turbulence just as waves on a beach swirl around sandcastles, washing away their foundations, causing grains of sand to cascade, and eventually collapsing the whole structure. Observed non-state nuclear threats and attacks In light of the constraints faced by non-state terrorist actors in past decades, it is not surprising that the constellation of actual nuclear terrorist attacks and threats has been relatively limited during and since the end of the Cold War. As Martha Crenshaw noted in a comment on the draft of this paper: We still don’t know why terrorists (in the sense of non-state actors) have not moved into the CBRN [chemical,biological, radiological or nuclear ] domain. (Many people think biosecurity is more critical, for that matter.) Such a move would be extremely risky for the terrorist actor, even if the group possessed both capability (resources, secure space, time, patience) and motivation (willingness to expend the effort, considering opportunity costs). So far it appears that “conventional” terrorism serves their purposes well enough. Most of what we have seen is rhetoric, with some scattered and not always energetic initiatives.[12] Nonetheless, those that have occurred demonstrate unambiguously that such threats and attacks are not merely hypothetical, in spite of the limiting conditions outlined above. One survey documented eighty actual, planned attacks on nuclear facilities containing nuclear materials between 1961-2016[13] as follows: 80 attacks in 3 waves (1970s armed assaults, 1990s thefts, post-2010, breaches) High threat attacks: 32/80 attacks posed substantial, verified threat of which 44 percent involved insiders. All types of targets were found in the data set—on reactors, other nuclear facilities, military bases leading Gary Ackerman and to conclude: “Overall, empirical evidence suggests that there are sufficient cases in each of the listed categories that no type of threat can be ignored.”[14] No region was immune; no year was without such a threat or attack. Thus, there is a likely to be a coincidence of future non-state threats and attacks with inter-state nuclear-prone conflicts, as in the past, and possibly more so given the current trend in and the generative conditions for global terrorist activity that will likely pertain in the coming decades. Of these attacks, about a quarter each were ethno-nationalist, secular utopian, or unknown in motivation; and the remaining quarter were a motley mix of religious (11 percent), “other” (5 percent), personal-idiosyncratic (4 percent), single issue (2 percent) and state sponsored (1 percent) in motivation. The conclusion is unavoidable that there a non-state nuclear terrorist attack in the Northeast Asia region is possible. The following sections outline the possible situations in which nuclear terrorist attacks might be implicated as a trigger to interstate conflict, and even nuclear war. Particular attention is paid to the how nuclear command, control and communications systems may play an independent and unanticipated role in leading to inadvertent nuclear war, separate to the contributors to inadvertency normally included such as degradation of decision-making due to time and other pressures; accident; “wetware” (human failures), software or hardware failures; and misinterpretation of intended or unintended signals from an adversary. Regional pathways to interstate nuclear war At least five distinct nuclear-prone axes of conflict are evident in Northeast Asia. These are: US-DPRK conflict (including with United States, US allies Japan, South Korea and Australia; and all other UNC command allies. Many permutations possible ranging from non-violent collapse to implosion and civil war, inter-Korean war, slow humanitarian crisis. Of these implosion-civil war in the DPRK may be the most dangerous, followed closely by an altercation at the Joint Security Area at Panmunjon where US, ROK, and DPRK soldiers interact constantly. China-Taiwan conflict, whereby China may use nuclear weapons to overcome US forces operating in the West Pacific, either at sea, or based on US (Guam, Alaska) or US allied territory in the ROK, Japan, the Philippines, or Australia); or US uses nuclear weapons in response to Chinese attack on Taiwan. China-Japan conflict escalates via attacks on early warning systems, for example, underwater hydrophone systems (Ayson-Ball, 2011). China-Russia conflict, possibly in context of loss-of-control of Chinese nuclear forces in a regional conflict involving Taiwan or North Korea. Russia-US conflict, involving horizontal escalation from a head-on collision with Russian nuclear forces in Europe or the Middle East; or somehow starts at sea (mostly likely seems ASW) or over North Korea (some have cited risk of US missile defenses against North Korean attack as risking Russian immediate response). Combinations of or simultaneous eruption of the above conflicts that culminate in nuclear war are also possible. Other unanticipated nuclear-prone conflict axes (such as Russia-Japan) could also emerge with little warning. Precursors of such nuclear-laden conflicts in this region also exist that could lead states to the brink of nuclear war and demonstrate that nuclear war is all too possible between states in this region. Examples include the August 1958 Quemoy-Matsu crisis, in which the United States deployed nuclear weapons to Taiwan, and the US Air Force has only a nuclear defense strategy in place to defend Taiwan should China have escalated its shelling campaign to an actual attack; the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when a US nuclear armed missile was nearly fired from Okinawa due to a false fire order; the March 1969 Chinese-Soviet military clash and resulting consideration of nuclear attacks by both sides; and the August 1976 poplar tree crisis at Panmunjon in Korea, when the United States moved nuclear weapons back to the DMZ and the White House issued pre-delegated orders to the US commander in Korea to attack North Korea if the tree cutting task force was attacked by North Korean forces. Loss-of-control of Nuclear Weapons As is well known, nuclear armed states must routinely—and in the midst of a crisis—ensure that their nuclear weapons are never used without legitimate authority, but also ensure at the same time that they are always available for immediate use with legitimate authority. This “always-never” paradox is managed in part by a set of negative and positive controls, reliant upon procedural and technical measures, to maintain legitimate state-based command-and-control (see Figure Four). In this framework, Jerry Conley has produced a taxonomy of nuclear command-and-control structures that embody varying notional national “command-and-control” orientations (also referred to as stability points or biases). Each nuclear armed state exhibits a distinct preference for technical and procedural measures to achieve negative and positive control of nuclear weapons. The way that a state constructs its control system varies depending on its size, wealth, technology, leadership, and strategic orientation, lending each state a unique use propensity affected by the information processing and transmission functions of the nuclear command-and-control system, that in part determines the use or non-use decisions made by the leaders of nuclear armed states. The resulting ideal nuclear command-and-control state structures are shown in Table 1. In Northeast Asia, a four-way nuclear threat system exists that has a three world-class nuclear armed states, the United States, Russia and China, interacting with a fourth tier, barely nuclear armed state, the DPRK. In this quadrilateral nuclear standoff, the DPRK’s simple NC3 system likely is an amalgam of a poorly resourced, militarized, and personalized leadership—which may lead it to oscillate between procedural and technical measures as the basis of control, with a primary emphasis on positive use control, not negative control to avoid unauthorized use. China’s large, centralized NC3 system co-mingles nuclear and conventional communications between national commanders and deployed nuclear forces and may emphasize negative more than positive use controls to ensure Party control. Russia’s highly centralized, complex NC3 system relies on legacy technology and limited economic base for modernization. It too may be more oriented towards negative controls in peacetime, but have the capacity to spring almost instantly to primary reliance on positive controls in times of crisis or tension. The US NC3 system is large, complex and based on wealth and technological prowess. It is under civilian, not military control, at least in principle and in peacetime, and is redundant, diverse, and relatively resilient. Non-state nuclear attack as trigger of inter-state nuclear war in Northeast Asia The critical issue is how a nuclear terrorist attack may “catalyze” inter-state nuclear war, especially the NC3 systems that inform and partly determine how leaders respond to nuclear threat. Current conditions in Northeast Asia suggest that multiple precursory conditions for nuclear terrorism already exist or exist in nascent form. In Japan, for example, low-level, individual, terroristic violence with nuclear materials, against nuclear facilities, is real. In all countries of the region, the risk of diversion of nuclear material is real, although the risk is likely higher due to volume and laxity of security in some countries of the region than in others. In all countries, the risk of an insider “sleeper” threat is real in security and nuclear agencies, and such insiders already operated in actual terrorist organizations. Insider corruption is also observable in nuclear fuel cycle agencies in all countries of the region. The threat of extortion to induce insider cooperation is also real in all countries. The possibility of a cult attempting to build and buy nuclear weapons is real and has already occurred in the region.[15] Cyber-terrorism against nuclear reactors is real and such attacks have already taken place in South Korea (although it remains difficult to attribute the source of the attacks with certainty). The stand-off ballistic and drone threat to nuclear weapons and fuel cycle facilities is real in the region, including from non-state actors, some of whom have already adopted and used such technology almost instantly from when it becomes accessible (for example, drones).[16] Two other broad risk factors are also present in the region. The social and political conditions for extreme ethnic and xenophobic nationalism are emerging in China, Korea, Japan, and Russia. Although there has been no risk of attack on or loss of control over nuclear weapons since their removal from Japan in 1972 and from South Korea in 1991, this risk continues to exist in North Korea, China, and Russia, and to the extent that they are deployed on aircraft and ships of these and other nuclear weapons states (including submarines) deployed in the region’s high seas, also outside their territorial borders. The most conducive circumstance for catalysis to occur due to a nuclear terrorist attack might involve the following nexi of timing and conditions: Low-level, tactical, or random individual terrorist attacks for whatever reasons, even assassination of national leaders, up to and including dirty radiological bomb attacks, that overlap with inter-state crisis dynamics in ways that affect state decisions to threaten with or to use nuclear weapons. This might be undertaken by an opportunist nuclear terrorist entity in search of rapid and high political impact. Attacks on major national or international events in each country to maximize terror and to de-legitimate national leaders and whole governments. In Japan, for example, more than ten heads of state and senior ministerial international meetings are held each year. For the strategic nuclear terrorist, patiently acquiring higher level nuclear threat capabilities for such attacks and then staging them to maximum effect could accrue strategic gains. Attacks or threatened attacks, including deception and disguised attacks, will have maximum leverage when nuclear-armed states are near or on the brink of war or during a national crisis (such as Fukushima), when intelligence agencies, national leaders, facility operators, surveillance and policing agencies, and first responders are already maximally committed and over-extended. At this point, we note an important caveat to the original concept of catalytic nuclear war as it might pertain to nuclear terrorist threats or attacks. Although an attack might be disguised so that it is attributed to a nuclear-armed state, or a ruse might be undertaken to threaten such attacks by deception, in reality a catalytic strike by a nuclear weapons state in conditions of mutual vulnerability to nuclear retaliation for such a strike from other nuclear armed states would be highly irrational. Accordingly, the effect of nuclear terrorism involving a nuclear detonation or major radiological release may not of itself be catalytic of nuclear war—at least not intentionally–because it will not lead directly to the destruction of a targeted nuclear-armed state. Rather, it may be catalytic of non-nuclear war between states, especially if the non-state actor turns out to be aligned with or sponsored by a state (in many Japanese minds, the natural candidate for the perpetrator of such an attack is the pro-North Korean General Association of Korean Residents, often called Chosen Soren, which represents many of the otherwise stateless Koreans who were born and live in Japan) and a further sequence of coincident events is necessary to drive escalation to the point of nuclear first use by a state. Also, the catalyst—the non-state actor–is almost assured of discovery and destruction either during the attack itself (if it takes the form of a nuclear suicide attack then self-immolation is assured) or as a result of a search-and-destroy campaign from the targeted state (unless the targeted government is annihilated by the initial terrorist nuclear attack). It follows that the effects of a non-state nuclear attack may be characterized better as a trigger effect, bringing about a cascade of nuclear use decisions within NC3 systems that shift each state increasingly away from nuclear non-use and increasingly towards nuclear use by releasing negative controls and enhancing positive controls in multiple action-reaction escalation spirals (depending on how many nuclear armed states are party to an inter-state conflict that is already underway at the time of the non-state nuclear attack); and/or by inducing concatenating nuclear attacks across geographically proximate nuclear weapons forces of states already caught in the crossfire of nuclear threat or attacks of their own making before a nuclear terrorist attack.[17] An example of a cascading effect would be a non-state attack on a key node of linked early warning systems that is unique to and critical for strategic nuclear forces to be employable, or the effect of multiple, coincident and erroneous sensor alerts of incoming attacks (as occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis with radar in Florida monitoring Soviet missiles in Cuba that mistakenly fused an erroneous reading of a missile trajectory with a real observation of a Soviet satellite that happened to be passing overhead). An example of a concatenating effect would an attack that leads a nuclear weapons state to target two other states forces because it cannot determine whose forces attacked its own. This circumstance might arise if key anti-submarine forces or an aircraft carrier battle group were attacked and it was impossible to determine in a given waterway or area of ocean whose submarines were present or responsible for the attack, leading the attacked state to destroy all the submarines presenting on-going threat to its strategic forces. As we noted above, a terrorist nuclear shock may take various forms and appear in different places. Ever since an extortion attempt in Boston in 1974 based on the threat of nuclear detonation, the threat of an improvised nuclear device has been credible. For such a threat to be credible, a non-state terrorist entity must release a plausible precursor such as nuclear material or warhead design information, or stage an actual demonstration attack that makes it plausible that the attacker controls a significant quantity of fissile material (most likely plutonium, or simply radioactive materials suitable for a radiological device that might be used to draw in first responders and then detonate a warhead to maximize damage and terror). Such an attack might be combined with a separate attack on critical infrastructure such as a cyberattack. The attacker might retain sufficient material for bargaining and insurance should the initial attack fail. Given the need to adapt to circumstances, such an attacker is likely to be patient and strategic, in the terms defined earlier, and to have extensive organizational and communication capacities; and to be able to operate at multiple targeted sites, possibly in multiple countries. Given its patience and stamina, such an attacker would select a highly symbolic target such as a high level meeting. Such a case would present the targeted state with an exquisite dilemma: bargaining and negotiation with the non-state actor threatening such an attack may be justified given the explicit and plausible nature of the threat, which may be politically impossible while making counter-terrorism operations very risky and only possible with extreme caution. And, such an attacker might well issue a false statement about state-sponsorship to invoke third parties in ways that vastly complicate the response to the threat. If the attacker is less capable and driven for immediate political or other returns, then it may be satisfied with highly delegated delivery with no recall option, and no use of communications to minimize the risk of discovery or interdiction. Such an attacker is also less likely to wait for the circumstances in which inter-state nuclear war is more likely due to inter-state tension; and also less likely to seek third party effects beyond the damage to the immediate target and resulting terror. Should surveillance indicate that an improvised nuclear device is in motion, then an all-out search to interdict the attackers and to retrieve the device or materials would likely ensue. In these two instances of credible threat of non-state nuclear attack, the insider versus outsider perpetrator factor will affect significantly how the attack affects possible inter-state conflicts. In Kobe’s terms, if the perpetrator is confirmed to be an outsider, then a country-of-origin suspicion matrix may cast suspicion onto another state as possible sponsor. For an attack threatened in China, the linkage might be back to Russia, the United States, or North Korea. For an attack threatened in Russia, the linkage might be back to the United States, China, or North Korea. For an attack threatened in North Korea, the linkage might be back to the United States, China, or Russia. And for an attack threatened in one of the umbrella states in the region, South Korea and Japan, such an attack might be linked to each other, as well as to China, North Korea, or Russia. In each case, the shadow of suspicion and possible accusations could tilt decision-making processes in one or more of these states and ways that could worsen pre-existing views about the nuclear use propensity of an opposing nuclear armed state. Should an actual nuclear attack occur, the situation is even more complex and problematic. Such an attack might be purely accidental, due to hardware, software, or human error while nuclear materials or weapons are in transit. In principle, this limits the site of such an event to the nuclear weapons states or their ships and aircraft as neither South Korea nor Japan host nuclear weapons today. If an insider is involved, then the perpetrator may be identified quickly, and whether there is a linkage with another state may become evident (depending on nuclear forensics as well as insight obtained from surviving attackers). If an outsider is the perpetrator, then the suspicion matrix will come into play again, with possibly severe effects on inter-state tension due to accusation, suspicion, and fear of follow-on attacks. During the attack, especially if it is a hostage-taking type of attack, the identity of the perpetrator may be unknown or ambiguous, and maintaining this ambiguity or even opacity as to the attacker may be deliberate—as was the case with the 2008 Mumbai attack in which the controller tried to ensure that all the attackers were killed in the course of the twelve separate but coordinated attacks across the city over four days. Although much progress has been made in establishing local nuclear forensics capability in Japan,[18] China, and South Korea, there is no certainty that it is sufficiently developed to identify the perpetrator of an act of nuclear terrorism, especially if there is a state sponsor and deception involved. Conclusion We now move to our conclusion. Nuclear-armed states can place themselves on the edge of nuclear war by a combination of threatening force deployments and threat rhetoric. Statements by US and North Korea’s leaders and supporting amplification by state and private media to present just such a lethal combination. Many observers have observed that the risk of war and nuclear war, in Korea and globally, have increased in the last few years—although no-one can say with authority by how much and exactly for what reasons. However, states are restrained in their actual decisions to escalate to conflict and/or nuclear war by conventional deterrence, vital national interests, and other institutional and political restraints, both domestic and international. It is not easy, in the real world, or even in fiction, to start nuclear wars.[19] Rhetorical threats are standard fare in realist and constructivist accounts of inter-state nuclear deterrence, compellence, and reassurance, and are not cause for alarm per se. States will manage the risk in each of the threat relationships with other nuclear armed states to stay back from the brink, let alone go over it, as they have in the past. This argument was powerful and to many, persuasive during the Cold War although it does not deny the hair-raising risks taken by nuclear armed states during this period. Today, the multi-polarity of nine nuclear weapons states interacting in a four-tiered nuclear threat system means that the practice of sustaining nuclear threat and preparing for nuclear war is no longer merely complicated, but is now enormously complex in ways that may exceed the capacity of some and perhaps all states to manage, even without the emergence of a fifth tier of non-state actors to add further unpredictability to how this system works in practice. The possibility that non-state actors may attack without advance warning as to the time, place, and angle of attack presents another layer of uncertainty to this complexity as to how inter-state nuclear war may break out. That is, non-state actors with nuclear weapons or threat goals and capacities do not seek the same goals, will not use the same control systems, and will use radically different organizational procedures and systems to deliver on their threats compared with nuclear armed states. If used tactically for immediate terrorist effect, a non-state nuclear terrorist could violently attack nuclear facilities, exploiting any number of vulnerabilities in fuel cycle facility security, or use actual nuclear materials and even warheads against military or civilian targets. If a persistent, strategically oriented nuclear terrorist succeed in gaining credible nuclear threat capacities, it might take hostage one or more states or cities. If such an event coincides with already high levels of tension and even military collisions between the non-nuclear forces of nuclear armed states, then a non-state nuclear terrorist attack could impel a nuclear armed state to escalate its threat or even military actions against other states, in the belief that this targeted state may have sponsored the non-state attack, or was simply the source of the attack, whatever the declared identity of the attacking non-state entity. This outcome could trigger these states to go onto one or more of the pathways to inadvertent nuclear war, especially if the terrorist attack was on a high value and high risk nuclear facility or involved the seizure and/or use of fissile material. Some experts dismiss this possibility as so remote as to be not worth worrying about. Yet the history of nuclear terrorism globally and in the Northeast Asian region suggests otherwise. Using the sand castle metaphor, once built on the high tide line, sand castles may withstand the wind but eventually succumb to the tide once it reaches the castle—at least once, usually twice a day. Also, theories of organizational and technological failure point to the coincidence of multiple, relatively insignificant driving events that interact or accumulate in ways that lead the “metasystem” to fail, even if each individual component of a system works perfectly. Thus, the potential catalytic effect of a nuclear terrorist incident is not that it would of itself lead to a sudden inter-state nuclear war; but that at a time of crisis when alert levels are already high, when control systems on nuclear forces have already shifted from primary emphasis on negative to positive control, when decision making is already stressed, when the potential for miscalculation is already high due to shows of force indicating that first-use is nigh, when rhetorical threats promising annihilation on the one hand, or collapse of morale and weakness on the other invite counter-vailing threats by nuclear adversaries or their allies to gain the upper hand in the “contest of resolve,” and when organizational cybernetics may be in play such that purposeful actions are implemented differently than intended, then a terrorist nuclear attack may shift a coincident combination of some or all of these factors to a threshold level where they collectively lead to a first-use decision by one or more nuclear-armed states. If the terrorist attack is timed or happens to coincide with high levels of inter-state tension involving nuclear-armed states, then some or all of these tendencies will likely be in play anyway—precisely the concern of those who posit pathways to inadvertent nuclear war as outlined in section 2 above.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › Terrorism DA › 1NC---DA---Nuke Terror

US LAWs are counter-terrorism. Without them, LAWs are proliferated to terrorist organizations

Yoo and Rabkin 17 [John Yoo (A professor of Law at UC Berkeley) and Jeremy Rabkin {A professor of Law at George Mason University), 9-1-2017, "‘Killer Robots’ Can Make War Less Awful," American Enterprise Institute - AEI, ] // st

Robots won’t bring perfection to the use of force, but they can reduce mistakes, increase precision and lower overall destruction compared with their human counterparts. Some worry that autonomous weapons might prompt leaders to turn more readily to conflict. But decisions about war and peace have much more to do with political leaders and their choices than with the technology available to them. Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama had roughly the same military at their disposal, but they used it very differently. The greater risk today isn’t that the U.S. will intervene impulsively but that it won’t intervene at all, allowing serious challenges to intensify. Robotic weapons can ease the dilemma. In World War II, the Allies leveled cities, at enormous human cost, to destroy Axis transportation and manufacturing facilities. Drones today can strike an arms factory, pick off terrorists or destroy nuclear-weapons sites while leaving neighboring structures and civilians untouched. Robotic weapons can reduce the costs that discourage the U.S. and its allies from intervening in humanitarian disasters or civil wars. Even if we shared the apocalyptic worries of Mr. Musk and his allies, it isn’t at all clear that arms control could begin to deal with the problem. Arms control has mostly failed to prevent weapons innovation, from the crossbow to the nuclear bomb. Nations have had more success in imposing rules of warfare, especially to protect civilians, than in restricting specific weapons. Robotics and AI will be even harder to control. Countries already hide their nuclear-weapons programs behind claims of scientific research or energy production. The technology involved in autonomous weapons is a classic instance of “dual use,” with obvious peaceful applications. The same technology that can produce a self-driving car can also drive an autonomous tank. A drone can just as easily deliver a bomb as a box from Amazon . A ban on military development would be almost impossible to verify. Such limits would also be a serious handicap for the U.S. The new technology is most likely to benefit countries with the technical dynamism and the innovative drive to deploy them broadly. Restraining their development seems likely to cancel an American advantage over our authoritarian rivals and terrorist enemies. Tech executives may worry that consumers will come to associate their products with war. But responsible governments buy weapons and wage wars for good reasons, such as self-defense, coming to the assistance of allies, pursuing terrorists and alleviating humanitarian disasters. If force is misused, we should blame our elected leaders, not the weapons.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › Terrorism DA › 1NC---DA---Nuke Terror

Terrorism decreasing now

Gavin 22 [Jerome Gavin (Masters student of International Security at the University of Sydney specializing in Peace and Conflict Studies), 2022, "Trends in Terrorism 2022," Vision of Humanity (Subset of the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), by staff in our global offices in Sydney, New York, The Hague, Harare and Mexico. Alongside maps and global indices, we present fresh perspectives on current affairs reflecting our editorial philosophy), ] // st

According to the latest Global Peace Index, peace in the world has deteriorated for the third year running. Peace has deteriorated for the eleventh time in the last 14 years. This has occurred, in-part, because the fallout from COVID-19 and the escalating security crisis in Ukraine. Despite this decline in peacefulness, one area that has recorded a significant improvement, is terrorism. Of all the indicators of global peace, terrorism impact recorded the third largest improvement. 86 countries recorded an improvement, while 18 countries recorded deteriorations. This represents a long-term trend in which the total deaths from terrorism have been falling steadily since 2015. There are several multifaceted reasons why these changes have occurred, and the result is that terrorism is globally at its lowest level in the history of the GPI. This change is represented by several notable global and regional trends. Geographical Trends The epicentre of terrorism has shifted out of the Middle East and North Africa, and into South Asia, with countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan recording poor scores in the terrorism impact indicator. The impact of terrorism has increased in the sub-Saharan African region, especially in the Sahel where armed conflict has become a key driver of terrorist activity. Terrorism in the Sahel has risen sharply over the last five years and attacks have become more frequent and more deadly. IS and its affiliates have shifted their focus away from the Middle East as the Syrian conflict has subsided and this has been a key driver in the increase in terrorism in the Sahel. Terrorism in the Sahel accounted for 35% of the total of terrorism deaths globally in 2021, an enormous increase from only 1% in 2007. Ideological Trends IEP’s definition of terrorism suggests that: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal. IEP groups terrorist organisations and ideologies into three broad categories: political, nationalist/separatist, and religiously motivated terrorism. While all acts of terrorism are inherently political, the major point of difference between the types of terrorism is the goal. For example, far-right terrorism is classified as a form of political terrorism, whereas when the goal or motivation is explicitly religious, the act is defined as religious terror. Difficulty arises when attempting to delineate between the types of terrorism, as there is a great deal of intersectionality between these categories. However, most terrorist groups have a primary purpose and self-understanding that fits into at least one of these three groups. Over the past decade, religious terrorism has been the deadliest form of terrorism. Islamist groups or lone actors have been responsible for 528 deaths in the West since 2007, representing 60% of deaths. This reached a peak of 457 deaths in the two years between 2015 and 2017. 2021 recorded the lowest number of attacks and deaths attributed to religious terrorism since 2013.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › Terrorism DA › 1NC---DA---Terror--Generic

Terrorists acquiring LAWs seems fictional in the squo because government LAWs are serving as modes of deterrence. But the plan ensures terrorists are the only actors who can use LAWS.

Scharre 17 [Paul Scharre (The vice president and director of studies at the Center for a New American Security. From 2009-2012, Scharre led the Defense Department's working group that resulted in the DoD policy directive on autonomy in weapons) , 12-22-17, "Why You Shouldn’t Fear “Slaughterbots”," IEEE Spectrum, ] // st

Killer drones in the hands of terrorists massacring innocents. Robotic weapons of mass destruction breeding chaos and fear. A video created by advocates of a ban on autonomous weapons would have you believe this dystopian future is right around the corner if we don't act now. The short video, called “Slaughterbots," was released last month coinciding with United Nations meetings on autonomous weapons. The UN meetings ended inconclusively, but the video is getting traction. It's gotten over 2 million views and has sparked dozens of news stories. As a piece of propaganda, it works great. As a substantive argument for a ban on autonomous weapons, the video fails miserably. Obviously, a world in which terrorists can unleash swarms of killer drones on innocent civilians would be terrible, but is the future the video depicts realistic? The movie's slick production quality helps to gloss over its leaps of logic. It immerses the viewer in a dystopian nightmare, but let's be clear: It's very much science fiction. The central premise of “Slaughterbots" is that in the future militaries will build autonomous microdrones with shaped charges that can fly up to someone's head and detonate an explosive, killing the person. In the film, these “slaughterbots" quickly fall into the hands of terrorists, resulting in mass killings worldwide. The basic concept is grounded in technical reality. In the real world, the Islamic State has used off-the-shelf quadcopters equipped with small explosives to attack Iraqi troops, killing or wounding dozens of Iraqi soldiers. Today's terrorist drones are largely remotely controlled, but hobbyist drones are becoming increasingly autonomous. The latest models can navigate to a fixed target on their own, avoid obstacles, and autonomously track and follow moving objects. A small drone equipped with facial recognition technology could potentially be used to autonomously search for and kill specific individuals, as “Slaughterbots" envisions. It took me just a few minutes of searching online to find the resources necessary to download and train a free neural network to do facial recognition. So while no one has yet cobbled the technology together in the way the video depicts, all of the components are real. I want to make something very clear: There is nothing we can do to keep that underlying technology out of the hands of would-be terrorists. This is upsetting, but it's very important to understand. Just like how terrorists can and do use cars to ram crowds of civilians, the underlying technology to turn hobbyist drones into crude autonomous weapons is already too ubiquitous to stop. This is a genuine problem, and the best response is to focus on defensive measures to counter drones along with surveillance to catch would-be terrorists ahead of time. “There is nothing we can do to keep that underlying technology out of the hands of would-be terrorists. Just like how terrorists can and do use cars to ram crowds of civilians, the underlying technology to turn hobbyist drones into crude autonomous weapons is already too ubiquitous to stop." The “Slaughterbots" video takes this problem and blows it out of proportion, however, suggesting that drones would be used by terrorists as robotic weapons of mass destruction, killing thousands of people at a time. Fortunately, this nightmare scenario is about as likely to happen as HAL 9000 locking you out of the pod bay doors. The technology shown in the video is plausible, but basically everything else is a bunch of malarkey. The video assumes the following: Governments will mass-produce lethal microdrones to use them as weapons of mass destruction; There are no effective defenses against lethal microdrones; Governments are incapable of keeping military-grade weapons out of the hands of terrorists; Terrorists are capable of launching large-scale coordinated attacks. These assumptions range from questionable, at best, to completely fanciful. Of course, the video is fictional, and defense planners do often use fictionalized scenarios to help policymakers think through plausible events that may occur. As a defense analyst at a think tank and in my prior job as a strategic planner at the Pentagon, I used fictional scenarios to help inform choices about what technologies the United States military should invest in. To be useful, however, these scenarios need to at least be plausible. They need to be something that could happen. The scenario depicted in the “Slaughterbots" video fails to account for political and strategic realities about how governments use military technology. First, there is no evidence that governments are planning to mass-produce small drones to kill civilians in large numbers. In my forthcoming book, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War, I examine next-generation weapons being built in defense labs around the world. Russia, China, and the United States are all racing ahead on autonomy and artificial intelligence. But the types of weapons they are building are generally aimed at fighting other militaries. They are “counter-force" weapons, not “counter-value" weapons that would target civilians. Counter-force autonomous weapons raise their own sets of concerns, but they aren't designed for mass targeting of civilians, nor could they be easily repurposed to do so. Second, in the video, we're told the drones can defeat “any countermeasure." TV pundits scream, “We can't defend ourselves." This isn't fiction; it's farce. Every military technology has a countermeasure, and countermeasures against small drones aren't even hypothetical. The U.S. government is actively working on ways to shoot down, jam, fry, hack, ensnare, or otherwise defeat small drones. The microdrones in the video could be defeated by something as simple as chicken wire. The video shows heavier-payload drones blasting holes through walls so that other drones can get inside, but the solution is simply layered defenses. Military analysts look at the cost-exchange ratio between offense and defense, and in this case, the costs heavily favor static defenders. In a world where terrorists launch occasional small-scale attacks using DIY drones, people are unlikely to absorb the inconveniences of building robust defenses, just like people don't wear body armor to protect against the unlikely event of being caught in a mass shooting. But if an enemy country built hundreds of thousands of drones to wipe out a city, you bet there'd be a run on chicken wire. The video takes a plausible problem—terrorist attacks with drones—and scales it up without factoring in how others would respond. If lethal microdrones were built en masse, defenses and countermeasures would be a national priority, and in this case the countermeasures are simple. Any weapon that can be defeated by a net isn't a weapon of mass destruction.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Disadvantages** › Terrorism DA › 1NC---DA---Terror--Generic

Terrorism decreasing now

Gavin 22 [Jerome Gavin (Masters student of International Security at the University of Sydney specializing in Peace and Conflict Studies), 2022, "Trends in Terrorism 2022," Vision of Humanity (Subset of the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), by staff in our global offices in Sydney, New York, The Hague, Harare and Mexico. Alongside maps and global indices, we present fresh perspectives on current affairs reflecting our editorial philosophy), ] // st

According to the latest Global Peace Index, peace in the world has deteriorated for the third year running. Peace has deteriorated for the eleventh time in the last 14 years. This has occurred, in-part, because the fallout from COVID-19 and the escalating security crisis in Ukraine. Despite this decline in peacefulness, one area that has recorded a significant improvement, is terrorism. Of all the indicators of global peace, terrorism impact recorded the third largest improvement. 86 countries recorded an improvement, while 18 countries recorded deteriorations. This represents a long-term trend in which the total deaths from terrorism have been falling steadily since 2015. There are several multifaceted reasons why these changes have occurred, and the result is that terrorism is globally at its lowest level in the history of the GPI. This change is represented by several notable global and regional trends. Geographical Trends The epicentre of terrorism has shifted out of the Middle East and North Africa, and into South Asia, with countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan recording poor scores in the terrorism impact indicator. The impact of terrorism has increased in the sub-Saharan African region, especially in the Sahel where armed conflict has become a key driver of terrorist activity. Terrorism in the Sahel has risen sharply over the last five years and attacks have become more frequent and more deadly. IS and its affiliates have shifted their focus away from the Middle East as the Syrian conflict has subsided and this has been a key driver in the increase in terrorism in the Sahel. Terrorism in the Sahel accounted for 35% of the total of terrorism deaths globally in 2021, an enormous increase from only 1% in 2007. Ideological Trends IEP’s definition of terrorism suggests that: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal. IEP groups terrorist organisations and ideologies into three broad categories: political, nationalist/separatist, and religiously motivated terrorism. While all acts of terrorism are inherently political, the major point of difference between the types of terrorism is the goal. For example, far-right terrorism is classified as a form of political terrorism, whereas when the goal or motivation is explicitly religious, the act is defined as religious terror. Difficulty arises when attempting to delineate between the types of terrorism, as there is a great deal of intersectionality between these categories. However, most terrorist groups have a primary purpose and self-understanding that fits into at least one of these three groups. Over the past decade, religious terrorism has been the deadliest form of terrorism. Islamist groups or lone actors have been responsible for 528 deaths in the West since 2007, representing 60% of deaths. This reached a peak of 457 deaths in the two years between 2015 and 2017. 2021 recorded the lowest number of attacks and deaths attributed to religious terrorism since 2013.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Counterplans** › UN CP › 2NC---CP---UN---Solvency---Generic

Jurisdiction is with the UN---conventional weapons convention is normal means for a ban.

Dawes, 21 [James Dawes is a Professor of English at Macalester College, 12-20-2021, accessed on 6-24-2022, The Conversation, "UN fails to agree on 'killer robot' ban as nations pour billions into autonomous weapons research", https://theconversation.com/un-fails-to-agree-on-killer-robot-ban-as-nations-pour-billions-into-autonomous-weapons-research-173616]/ISEE

Autonomous weapon systems – commonly known as killer robots – may have killed human beings for the first time ever last year, according to a recent United Nations Security Council report on the Libyan civil war. History could well identify this as the starting point of the next major arms race, one that has the potential to be humanity’s final one. The United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons debated the question of banning autonomous weapons at its once-every-five-years review meeting in Geneva Dec. 13-17, 2021, but didn’t reach consensus on a ban. Established in 1983, the convention has been updated regularly to restrict some of the world’s cruelest conventional weapons, including land mines, booby traps and incendiary weapons. Autonomous weapon systems are robots with lethal weapons that can operate independently, selecting and attacking targets without a human weighing in on those decisions. Militaries around the world are investing heavily in autonomous weapons research and development. The U.S. alone budgeted US$18 billion for autonomous weapons between 2016 and 2020. Meanwhile, human rights and humanitarian organizations are racing to establish regulations and prohibitions on such weapons development. Without such checks, foreign policy experts warn that disruptive autonomous weapons technologies will dangerously destabilize current nuclear strategies, both because they could radically change perceptions of strategic dominance, increasing the risk of preemptive attacks, and because they could be combined with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons themselves. As a specialist in human rights with a focus on the weaponization of artificial intelligence, I find that autonomous weapons make the unsteady balances and fragmented safeguards of the nuclear world – for example, the U.S. president’s minimally constrained authority to launch a strike – more unsteady and more fragmented. Given the pace of research and development in autonomous weapons, the U.N. meeting might have been the last chance to head off an arms race.

UN action solves for the case – it establishes global norms, provides flexibility, and serves as a clearinghouse for information even without a formal treaty.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Counterplans** › UN CP › 2NC---CP---UN---NB---Treaties

UN regulation via arms control treaties (akin to Ottawa) is key prevent outsourcing to countries not included in the ban

Zachary Kallenborn 21, is an author and analyst who specializes in WMD terrorism, unmanned systems, drone swarms, and homeland security., “Applying arms-control frameworks to autonomous weapons”, Brookings.Edu 10-5-2021, )/maze

The global community must now resolve the tension of fear between arms-control and military advocates. That means serious debate on which types of autonomous weapon offer the most military value and which present the most risk to civilians and noncombatants. Weapons with high risk to civilians and low military value should form the basis of conversations around risk reduction.

Existing arms control treaties offer models to address these complexities. The Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines narrowly focuses on anti-personnel landmines, excluding anti-vehicle landmines that require high pressure to detonate. An autonomous weapon treaty might focus on anti-personnel weapons using machine learning, given the challenges of distinguishing farmers from soldiers. A more precise treaty may allow military powers to separate weapons they fear giving up from the weapons arms control advocates fear proliferating. This may make getting an okay from those powers easier.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Counterplans** › UN CP › 1NC---CP---UN

Shifts in power causes Russia-China War—that outweighs

Lowry 22 – Rich Lowry is editor of National Review and a contributing editor with Politico Magazine. ("The Isolationists Are Wrong: The Pax Americana Is Worth Defending," 2-24-2022, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/02/24/isolationists-are-wrong-pax-americana-worth-defending-00011448, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC

Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine doesn’t just herald a new era in European security, it underlines a growing threat to the American-led international order.

Pax Americana, the post-World War II system that has created the conditions for peace and prosperity in Europe and elsewhere, is entering a great period of testing, with the revanchist powers of Russia and China seeking to overturn it.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Counterplans** › UN CP › 1NC---CP---UN

Regulate solves comparatively better – accesses the benefits of LAWS AND maintains balance of power

John Williams 21, is Professor of International Relations in the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University, UK. His research addresses ethical, regulatory, and security issues associated with new and emerging military technologies, “Effective, Deployable, Accountable: Pick Two’: Regulating Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems”, E-International Relations, 8-12-2021, https://www.e-ir.info/2021/08/12/effective-deployable-accountable-pick-two-regulating-lethal-autonomous-weapons-system/)/maze

Secondly, I assume efforts to ban the development and deployment of LAWS will fail. Despite a large coalition of NGOs, academics, policymakers, scientists, and others (e.g. , , ) LAWS development is more likely than not. Amandeep Singh Gill (, 175), former Indian Ambassador to the UN Conference on Disarmament and former Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS at the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), stresses how:

The economic, political and security drivers for mainstreaming this suite of technologies [AI] into security functions are simply too powerful to be rolled back. There will be plenty of persuasive national security applications – minimizing casualties and collateral damage …, defeating terrorist threats, saving on defense spending, and protecting soldiers and their bases – to provide counterarguments against concerns about runaway robots or accidental wars caused by machine error.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Counterplans** › UN CP › 1NC---CP---UN

The UN is best to create a global norm for human control because it builds on its principles from the CCW. UN Leadership would restore the credibility of global governance

Bolton, 2021 - professor of political science at Pace University [Matthew with Matilda Byrne, Ryan Gariepy, Emilia Javorsky, Volker Lehmann, and Laura Nolan, January “Addressing The Threat Of Autonomous Weapons Maintaining Meaningful Human Control” http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/17215.pdf Acc 5/27/22 TA]

The 2019 Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) adopted 11 »Guiding Principles affirmed by the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE ) on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems.« (see Box 1). Some 40 UN Member States belonging to the »Alliance for Multilateralism« are now championing these 11 Guiding Principles and calling on States to contribute actively to the clarification and development of a normative and operational framework.2 The civil society-led Campaign to Stop Killer Robots is working for a preemptive ban on the development, production, and use of fully autonomous weapons. Similarly, UN Secretary- General António Guterres as well as his High Representative for Disarmament, Izumi Nakamitsu, have called for LAWS to be banned by international law.3 A growing number of Member States have also called for a prohibition of LAWS. At a minimum, there seems to be broad agreement that it is necessary that States have an obligation to maintain meaningful human control over the lethal use of force. Member States, with the support and active participation of the United Nations and other international organizations, civil society and the private sector, quickly need to reach common understandings on how to ensure human beings retain control over the use of force. Improving communication between policymakers and scientific and technical experts is crucial given the dual-use nature of artificial intelligence. Indeed, a prohibition on weapons outside of human control would not be counterproductive to technological development. Rather, there is a need to fully harness technological progress while maintaining and advancing international law that safeguards humanitarian protections, human rights and international peace and security. Therefore, in September and October 2020, the Friedrich- Ebert-Stiftung New York Office (FESN Y) launched the »New Alliances for Meaningful Human Control« project aimed at building on the 11 Guiding Principles on LAWS and moving them to the next level, towards international legal instruments that regulate high-tech weapons and prohibit LAWS. Linked to the UN 75 Global Governance Forum,4 FESN Y convened three discussions with representatives of governments, the United Nations, academia, civil society and the private sector to discuss the moral, ethical, legal and humanitarian challenges posed by LAWS (see Annex I for list of participants). Participants, speaking under Chatham House Rule, offered many diverse viewpoints, representing different perspectives on LAWS and pathways to addressing the risk they pose. 5 This paper is rooted in the discussions facilitated by FESN Y. While it summarizes the agreements between the co-authors, who participated, it does not purport to represent the views of all members of the discussions. For instance, participants disagreed on the precise meaning, scope and value of the 11 Guiding Principles. However, a significant majority agreed that good faith interpretation of the 11 Guiding Principles – particularly paragraphs b), c) and d) (see Box 1) – required progress toward negotiation of a legally-binding multilateral instrument mandating a positive obligation to maintain meaningful human control over the use of force, at the level of individual attacks. Given the contested international political environment, progress toward negotiating a legally-binding instrument would also demonstrate the potential for effective global governance, as currently spearheaded by the Alliance for Multilateralism. Towards this end, the subsequent paper argues that a potential venue for negotiating such a mandate could be within the CC W, in the form of a new protocol on meaningful human control. While positive obligations would be the most suitable starting point, a new protocol should also entail principles about technologies not to be developed and deployed. In what follows, two main issues will be addressed to help States as they move toward negotiations on a treaty to ensure meaningful human control: First, meaningful positive obligations, and second, legally-binding control.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Counterplans** › Regulations CP › 2NC---CP---Regulations---Policy---NB

West and Karsten ‘19

(Darrell, Vice President and Director - Governance Studies Senior Fellow - Center for Technology Innovation, Jack, Senior Research Analyst, Center for Technology Innovation - The Brookings Institution “It’s time to start thinking about governance of autonomous weapons,” pg online @ //40)

From machine learning intelligence insights to autonomous drones, AI has the potential to significantly improve the goals and tasks of U.S. military operations at almost all levels. The U.S. military is focused on more than just operational gains though—it is keeping pace with growing state investment in AI from major powers such as China and Russia. This shifting landscape reveals a pressing need to develop appropriate governance structures that enhance the benefits and manage the risks of military uses of AI.

CHINESE AND RUSSIAN INVESTMENT IN AI

2022 Michigan Negative
**Counterplans** › Regulations CP › 2NC---CP---Regulations---Policy---Spillup

Sullivan ‘19

(Taylor Sullivan, intern for the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Laying Down the LAWS: Strategizing Autonomous Weapons Governance,” pg online @ //pa-ef)

If agreeing upon a working definition of LAWS proves too challenging, proponents of restrictions on the weapons could switch to a piecemeal rather than comprehensive approach. That is, they could establish specific instruments for specific uses of pertinent technologies, through the CCW or other processes (such as restricting interactions between autonomous technologies and, say, nuclear weapons). Once the conversation is narrowed, either through establishing a working definition or laying the groundwork for a piecemeal approach, states and other actors seeking to restrict LAWS could begin to make real progress in governing autonomous weapons.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Counterplans** › Regulations CP › 2NC---CP---Regulations---Policy---Spillup

Lewis ‘15

(John, JD from Yale, the San Francisco Affirmative Litigation Project, and the International Refugee Assistance Project, Senior Counsel at Democracy Forward. John has filed multiple cases under the Administrative Procedure Act, other federal statutes, and the U.S. Constitution. In particular, John has represented or co-counseled with governments and non-profit organizations in cases involving immigration, civil rights, health care, education, veterans’ affairs, and other issues., frmr executive editor on the Yale Law Journal and a member of the Supreme Court Clinic, “The Case for Regulating Fully Autonomous Weapons,” pg online @ //40)

In response to this claim, opponents of regulation make a slippery-slope argument, stressing that once nations invest in FAW technology, it will be difficult to encourage compliance with even modest regulations.52 Alternatively, there is some evidence from the case of landmines that an absolute prohibition can establish a norm against a weapons system that buttresses other, more modest regulatory schemes.53 This may be true, but if FAWs turn out to revolutionize warfare, then states may continue to develop them regardless. Furthermore, the causality may work the other way—”soft law” norms, like nation-specific codes of conduct, can often ripen into “hard law” treaties.54 If a ban turns out to be necessary, then it may be easier to build on an existing set of regulations and norms rather than to create one from scratch. For these reasons, it is important to consider the components of an effective regulatory scheme.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Counterplans** › Regulations CP › 2NC---CP---Regulations---Policy---AT: Cheating

Anderson and Waxman ‘13

(professor at Washington College of Law, American University; a visiting fellow of the Hoover Institution; and a non-resident senior fellow of the Brookings Institution. He writes on international law, the laws of war, weapons and technology, and national security, law professor at Columbia Law School, where he co-chairs the Program on Law and National Security. He is also co-chair of the Cybersecurity Center at Columbia University’s Data Science Institute, as well as Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. He previously served in senior policy positions at the State Department, Defense Department, and National Security Council, “Killer Robots and the Laws of War in Monday's Wall Street Journal,” pg online @ //40)

We began writing in this area before the ban campaign was launched, initially urging the Department of Defense to be more transparent about the standards of legal review being applied to weapon systems as they became increasingly automated and might ultimately raise questions about who or what was actually in control of firing decisions. After the ban campaign was launched, we pivoted to include arguments as to why an international ban was deeply mistaken. Our arguments are for careful, granular reviews and regulation of weapon technologies incorporating increasingly automated or even autonomous capabilities. Nothing in our positions says that these machines should be anything other than carefully regulated. But we also think that there is a moral obligation to seek to try and develop new technologies that might increase the precision of weapons and reduce harms on the battlefield; sweeping, preemptive bans, not just on "use" but "development" will not be effective and they might well impede emergence over time of new technologies that make war less harmful. So we're delighted to announce "Killer Robots and the Laws of War." Here is a short excerpt:

[A] ban is unlikely to work, especially in constraining states or actors most inclined to abuse these weapons. Those actors will not respect such an agreement, and the technological elements of highly automated weapons will proliferate. Moreover, because the automation of weapons will happen gradually, it would be nearly impossible to design or enforce such a ban. Because the same system might be operable with or without effective human control or oversight, the line between legal weapons and illegal autonomous ones will not be clear-cut.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Counterplans** › Regulations CP › 2NC---CP---Regulations---Policy---AT: Cheating

Bento ‘15

(Lucas Bento is a lawyer in New York specializing in international dispute resolution, President of the Brazilian American Lawyers Association, a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, and a Visiting Scholar at Columbia Law School., Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, in recognition of his contributions to the Legal Profession in both the UK and the U.S. He is a Solicitor Advocate with rights of audience in the higher courts (civil and criminal) of England & Wales. Mr. Bento has taught courses on International Arbitration and Dispute Resolution at New York University and Transnational Dispute Resolution at INSPER in São Paulo, Brazil. He has also spoken on international legal issues at the United Nations, pg online @ //40)

Technology can be both disruptive and transformative. It can disrupt the status quo and it can also transform the way we see how things can be done.

States around the world have showed great interest in developing autonomous robots for military purposes. These robots, also called “killer robots” in some circles, would be able to select and engage targets without human intervention. The implication of ceding human control for machine discretion has led some organizations to call for an outright ban of the technology. In a 2012 report entitled ‘Losing Humanity,’ Human Rights Watch recommended the ratification of an international treaty prohibiting the “development, production, and use” of robotic weapons because they would be incapable of discriminating between combatants and civilians on the battleground. Other coalitions, such as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, have formed around similar policy goals.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Counterplans** › Regulations CP › 2NC---CP---Regulations---Policy---AT: PDCP

California Second District Court of Appeals 12

(COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALTERNATIVE MEDICINAL CANNABIS COLLECTIVE et al., Defendants and Appellants, No. B233419) BW

We must give the words of the statute their usual and ordinary meaning; accord significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence; and construe the words in context, bearing in mind the statutory purpose, and attempting to harmonize statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject matter to the extent possible. (McCarther, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 110.) We disagree with County that in using the phrases “further restrict the location or establishment” and “regulate the location or establishment” in section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g), the Legislature intended to authorize local governments to ban all medical marijuana dispensaries that are otherwise “authorized by law to possess, cultivate, or distribute medical marijuana” (§ 11362.768, subd. (e) [stating scope of section's application] ); the Legislature did not use the words “ban” or “prohibit.” Yet County cites dictionary definitions of “regulate” (to govern or direct according to rule or law); “regulation” (controlling by rule or restriction; a rule or order that has legal force); “restriction” (a limitation or qualification, including on the use of property); “establishment” (the act of establishing or state or condition of being established); “ban” (to prohibit); and “prohibit” (to forbid by law; to prevent or hinder) to attempt to support its interpretation. County then concludes that “the ordinary meaning of the terms, ‘restriction,’ ‘regulate,’ and ‘regulation’ are consistent with a ban or prohibition against the opening or starting up or continued operation of [a medical marijuana dispensary] storefront business.” We disagree. The ordinary meanings of “restrict” and “regulate” suggest a degree of control or restriction falling short of “banning,” “prohibiting,” “forbidding,” or “preventing.” Had the Legislature intended to include an outright ban or prohibition among the local regulatory powers authorized in section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g), it would have said so. Attributing the usual and ordinary meanings to the words used in section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g), construing the words in context, attempting to harmonize subdivisions (f) and (g) with section 11362.775 and with the purpose of California's medical marijuana statutory program, and bearing in mind the intent of the electorate and the Legislature in enacting the CUA and the MMP, we conclude that the phrases “further restrict the location or establishment” and “regulate the location or establishment” in section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g) do not authorize a per se ban at the local level. The Legislature decided in section 11362.775 to insulate medical marijuana collectives and cooperatives from nuisance prosecution “solely on the basis” that they engage in a dispensary function. To interpret the phrases “further restrict the location or establishment” and “regulate the location or establishment” to mean that local governments may impose a blanket nuisance prohibition against dispensaries would frustrate both the Legislature's intent to “[e]nhance the access of patients and caregivers to medical marijuana through collective, cooperative cultivation projects” and “[p]romote uniform and consistent application of the [CUA] among the counties within the state” and the electorate's intent to “ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes” and “encourage the federal and state governments to implement a plan to provide for the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in medical need of marijuana.”

2022 Michigan Negative
**Counterplans** › Regulations CP › 1NC---CP---Regulations---Policy

And, it turns the case --- Spread of authoritarianism LAWS risks digital militarization---extinction.

Orts ’18 [Eric; June 27; Guardsmark Professor in the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania; LinkedIn Pulse, “Foreign Affairs: Six Future Scenarios (and a Seventh),” https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/foreign-affairs-six-future-scenarios-seventh-eric-orts]

7. Fascist Nationalism. There is another possible future that the Foreign Affairs scenarios do not contemplate, and it’s a dark world in which Trump, Putin, Xi, Erdogan, and others construct regimes that are authoritarian and nationalist. Fascism is possible in the United States and elsewhere if big business can be seduced by promises of riches in return for the institutional keys to democracy. Perhaps Foreign Affairs editors are right to leave this dark world out, for it would be very dark: nationalist wars with risks of escalation into global nuclear conflict, further digital militarization (even Terminator-style scenarios of smart military robots), and unchecked climate disasters.

The global challenges are quite large – and the six pieces do an outstanding job of presenting them. One must remain optimistic and engaged, hopeful that we can overcome the serious dangers of tribalism, nationalism, and new fascism. These "isms” of our time stand in the way of solving some of our biggest global problems, such as the risks of thermonuclear war and global climate catastrophe.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Counterplans** › Regulations CP › 1NC---CP---Regulations---Policy

Imbrie et al ‘20

(Andrew Imbrie, Ph.D. in international relations from Georgetown, Senior Fellow at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology. He previously worked as a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and as a senior advisor to Visiting Distinguished Statesman Secretary John F. Kerry. Prior to Carnegie, he served as a member of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, where he was a speechwriter to Secretary Kerry. Before moving to the Department of State, he served as a professional staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He teaches foreign policy speechwriting and rhetoric to graduate and undergraduate students at Georgetown University. He received his M.A. from the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Ryan Fedasiuk Catherine Aiken Tarun Chhabra Husanjot Chaha, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, “How The United States And Its Allies Can Deliver A Democratic Way Of Ai,” pg online @ //40)

Initiative 9: Shape global norms and standards for AI. The United States has a vested interest in setting the rules of the road for artificial intelligence. Western countries have already taken the lead in developing principles governing the application of artificial intelligence. China has produced its 32 Center for Security and Emerging Technology own set of principles and engages actively in international bodies, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), to establish standards for mobile network technologies and the future governance of AI. By assuming leadership in AI, the United States and its allies face risks and opportunities. The risks are twofold. On the one hand, standard setting could become a casualty of geopolitical competition as leading countries precipitate a race to the bottom. On the other hand, China already asserts its principles and standards through a variety of multilateral fora. The opportunity is that the United States and its allies can act now to set global standards for AI reflecting and supporting human rights and liberal democratic values, while addressing critical questions surrounding the rollout of 5G, facial recognition for surveillance, automated cyber exploitation and defense, and autonomous weapons systems. A Japanese official responding to the CSET survey noted that the United States and its allies should adopt a citizen-centric AI strategy. Such citizen-centric strategies would seek to develop and deploy AI for the benefit of democratic societies, including strengthened data privacy standards and respect for civil liberties; economic empowerment of citizens within rules-based market economies; greater access to education, precision medicine, energy efficiency, and more inclusive social service provision. The United States should lead a multilateral effort with allies and partners to set international rules of conduct for AI. This effort should build on and extend the OECD Principles on AI and the International Organization for Standardization working group initiatives on standards for data and AI safety and security. The United States and its allies could establish a standing platform to coordinate policies on standard-setting in multilateral fora. This is likely an area for productive dialogue, as partners are eager to coordinate policies and share best practices around norms and standards. In fact, all surveyed officials were extremely or very interested in this avenue for international collaboration. Longer term, the United States and its allies should explore the conditions for a common AI market, including standards for testing, verification, and validation of AI technologies, as well as common practices for certifying companies that support liberal democratic values and privacy.87 This common market would create incentives for other countries to abide by these principles in the development and deployment of safe and reliable AI. As one EU representative observed, if the West could offer a viable way of doing AI that respects privacy and fundamental rights, developing (and democratic) countries would be more inclined to follow the Western model.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Counterplans** › Regulations CP › 1NC---CP---Regulations---Policy

Lewis ‘15

(John, JD from Yale, the San Francisco Affirmative Litigation Project, and the International Refugee Assistance Project, Senior Counsel at Democracy Forward. John has filed multiple cases under the Administrative Procedure Act, other federal statutes, and the U.S. Constitution. In particular, John has represented or co-counseled with governments and non-profit organizations in cases involving immigration, civil rights, health care, education, veterans’ affairs, and other issues., frmr executive editor on the Yale Law Journal and a member of the Supreme Court Clinic, “The Case for Regulating Fully Autonomous Weapons,” pg online @ //40)

Opponents of FAWs invoke each of these critiques to argue in favor of an absolute, preemptive ban on FAWs.24 In their view, once nations have developed FAW technology, it will be difficult to get them to stop.25 The time to act is now, before the military utility of FAWs has been demonstrated and before other countries develop FAW technology in response. These arguments resonate with apocalyptic images, replete in pop culture, of killer robots run amok—think Terminator.26 Yet they also exaggerate the danger posed by FAWs and underappreciate regulation’s potential to respond to the threats that FAWs do pose.

II. THE ARGUMENT FOR REGULATION, RATHER THAN PROHIBITION