2022
Michigan
Negative
**AT: Case** › Turns › 1NC---Turn---Effectiveness
Noyes, 2019 - Major, US Army Reserve [Matthew MPP, Harvard Kennedy School 14-06-2019 “Autonomous Weapons: The Future Behind Us” https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1085435.pdf Acc 12/27/20 TA]
The normative and ethical considerations related to autonomous weapons are an area that needs further research. Existing literature on the ethics of autonomous weapons tends to describe them as a potential future capability not an existing capability, which may create a status quo bias in arguing against autonomous weapons. It also appears a substantial element in some moral arguments against autonomous weapons is a reaction to a challenge in what it means to be human. There seems to be a deeply held moral intuition that humans ought to have control over killing other humans. Autonomous weapons may be a key means for providing for that control, for example by targeting systems to disrupt command and control channels. If autonomous weapons are seen not as a means to kill humans, but as a means to target adversarial military systems that undermine control over who is killed, I suspect it fundamentally alters normative perspectives. It also suggests rather than seeking to ban autonomous weapons, to seek banning electronic warfare and other systems that erode control over the use of force.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**AT: Case** › Turns › 1NC---Turn---Effectiveness
Noyes, 2019 - Major, US Army Reserve [Matthew MPP, Harvard Kennedy School 14-06-2019 “Autonomous Weapons: The Future Behind Us” https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1085435.pdf Acc 12/27/20 TA]
Militaries have long used weapons with autonomous capabilities and are likely to increasingly use autonomous weapons as their effectiveness is demonstrated. Autonomous weapons predate remotely operated weapons in most domains. The air domain is instructive in this regard, as the invention of television in the 1930s disrupted prior work on more autonomous aircraft by allowing for the remote operation of aircraft out of sight from the pilot. Remotely operated systems are likely to continue to be generally preferred by militaries, but those systems will have increasingly autonomous capabilities, particularly in targeting enemy systems that disrupt their command and control links. This suggests rather than viewing “autonomous weapons” as a distinct class of systems, instead we should consider the autonomous capabilities of a weapon and how it is controlled by its user. Correctly considering autonomy in weapons begins with recognizing weapons are tools, and like all tools have a user. “Full autonomy,” in the sense of absolute independence, is not a desirable property of a tool. Rather, users will maintain some control over their tools to ensure they are accomplishing their desired purpose. Instead of trying to distinguish between what is autonomous and what is not, we should focus on the relationship between the user and the tool. To paraphrase David Mindell: “Where are the [users]? Who are they? What are they doing? When? Why does it matter?”152 Unencumbered with trying to distinguish between what is autonomous and non-autonomous allows analysis to instead focus on autonomy in executing particular functions. Recognizing militaries have long used autonomous weapons makes predicting their future use a matter of identifying the capabilities militaries have sought to achieve through autonomous weapons in the past, and how technology is changing what is possible. Considering this history, autonomous weapons have predominately been used to address at least one of four challenges: the mundane, the fast, the denied, and mass. Autonomous weapons aid militaries in addressing the mundane, or long duration, by providing greater persistence in observing and reacting to events over an extended period than is efficiently achieved with a manned system. In terms of both reaction speed and at high accelerations, autonomous weapons can operate at speeds exceeding what people are capable of. A particularly attractive feature of autonomous weapons is the ability to operate in denied environment, either due to environmental conditions or enemy action, that present unacceptable risk to manned systems or to the control channels for remotely operated systems. Finally, autonomous weapons provide increased mass, like most any military technology, by increasing the military power of a state relative to its available population for military service.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**AT: Case** › Turns › 2NC---Turn---Ethics Soldiers
Arkin, 2008 – the Mobile Robot Laboratory at Georgia Institute of Technology [Ronald “Technical Report GIT-GVU-07-11 Governing Lethal Behavior: Embedding Ethics in a Hybrid Deliberative/Reactive Robot Architecture” Acc 12/27/20 TA]
Along other lines [Sparrow 07], points out several clear challenges to the roboticist attempting to create a moral sense for a battlefield robot: • “Controversy about right and wrong is endemic to ethics”. o Response: While that is true, we have reasonable guidance by the agreed upon and negotiated Laws of War as well as the Rules of Engagement as a means to constrain behavior when compared to ungoverned solutions for autonomous robots. • “I suspect that any decision structure that a robot is capable of instantiating is still likely to leave open the possibility that robots will act unethically.” o Response: Agreed – It is the goal of this work to create systems that can perform better ethically than human soldiers do in the battlefield, albeit they will still be imperfect. This challenge seems achievable. Reaching perfection in almost anything in the real world, including human behavior, seems beyond our grasp.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**AT: Case** › Turns › 1NC---Turn---Ethics Soldiers
Arkin, 2008 – the Mobile Robot Laboratory at Georgia Institute of Technology [Ronald “Technical Report GIT-GVU-07-11 Governing Lethal Behavior: Embedding Ethics in a Hybrid Deliberative/Reactive Robot Architecture” Acc 12/27/20 TA]
It is not my belief that an unmanned system will be able to be perfectly ethical in the battlefield, but I am convinced that they can perform more ethically than human soldiers are capable of. Unfortunately the trends in human behavior in the battlefield regarding adhering to legal and ethical requirements are questionable at best. A recent report from the Surgeon General’s Office [Surgeon General 06] assessing the battlefield ethics of soldiers and marines deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom is disconcerting. The following findings are taken directly from that report: 1. Approximately 10% of Soldiers and Marines report mistreating noncombatants (damaged/destroyed Iraqi property when not necessary or hit/kicked a noncombatant when not necessary). Soldiers that have high levels of anger, experience high levels of combat or those who screened positive for a mental health problem were nearly twice as likely to mistreat non-combatants as those who had low levels of anger or combat or screened negative for a mental health problem. 2. Only 47% of Soldiers and 38% of Marines agreed that noncombatants should be treated with dignity and respect. 3. Well over a third of Soldiers and Marines reported torture should be allowed, whether to save the life of a fellow Soldier or Marine or to obtain important information about insurgents. 4. 17% of Soldiers and Marines agreed or strongly agreed that all noncombatants should be treated as insurgents. 5. Just under 10% of soldiers and marines reported that their unit modifies the ROE to accomplish the mission. 6. 45% of Soldiers and 60% of Marines did not agree that they would report a fellow soldier/marine if he had injured or killed an innocent noncombatant. 7. Only 43% of Soldiers and 30% of Marines agreed they would report a unit member for unnecessarily damaging or destroying private property. 8. Less than half of Soldiers and Marines would report a team member for an unethical behavior. 9. A third of Marines and over a quarter of Soldiers did not agree that their NCOs and Officers made it clear not to mistreat noncombatants. 10. Although they reported receiving ethical training, 28% of Soldiers and 31% of Marines reported facing ethical situations in which they did not know how to respond. 11. Soldiers and Marines are more likely to report engaging in the mistreatment of Iraqi noncombatants when they are angry, and are twice as likely to engage in unethical behavior in the battlefield than when they have low levels of anger. 12. Combat experience, particularly losing a team member, was related to an increase in ethical violations.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**AT: Case** › Turns › 1NC---Turn---Ethics Generic
Ibrahim 20 [Lara Miriam Ibrahim (Bachelor of Civil Law candidate at the University of Oxford. Incoming DPhil in Law candidate at Oriel College, University of Oxford), 9-10-2020, "Autonomous Weapons Systems: Perpetuating the Gender Bias in Armed Conflict?," IntLawGrrls, ] // st
Gender as a social construct and the binary of sex difference embedded within gender identity has been translated into many areas of international law and IHL is not exempt from this critique. It is a regime that predominantly prioritises men, relegating women to the status of victims and child-bearers. This discrimination and bias can be seen especially in the principle of distinction.¶ Masculinity in war is associated with a natural ‘protector’ dynamic; the combatants embodying the image of chivalric, just warriors as a direct result of patriarchal norms within society. Women are regularly placed in the same group as children when their experiences within war is considered. In turn, this analogises women with the perceived vulnerability and innocence that children bear in society. It is therefore expected from men’s gendered roles that their duty is to fight in wars to protect women and children. This hegemonic masculinity sustains the patriarchal military structure.¶ The reality is that many women do act as combatants in armed conflicts, defying the gendered narratives of war. However, their role as combatants is often over-looked by many participants. The generalisation of women as civilians also serves to ignore their unique experiences of war as victims of gender-based violence, perpetrated in armed conflict to ensure maintenance of the subordination of women.¶ The use of AWS may present an opportunity to rid the gender bias embedded within the principle of distinction; the phrase “robots do not rape” is one that has been used in arguments that propose the use of AWS. Their use presents an opportunity to eliminate gender-based violence as a way of upholding the patriarchal military structure. Rather than viewing women as innocent subordinates, AWS warfare could result in the emancipation of the traditional gender roles prescribed to men and women during wartime. The protector and protected dyad would cease to continue, as all genders would be protected during war by AWS.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**AT: Case** › Turns › 1NC---Turn---Deterrence
Baum 15 [Seth Baum, 7/27/15, “Breaking down the risk of nuclear deterrence failure”, Bulletin of the Nuclear Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2015/07/breaking-down-the-risk-of-nuclear-deterrence-failure/]
Which risk is larger? This is where the empirical details come in. Risk can be quantified as the probability of some harm times the severity of that harm if it were to occur. That means we are comparing four quantities: the probability of war with nuclear weapons, the probability without them, the severity of war with them, and the severity without them. The probability of any war is a very difficult number to pin down. The causes of war are complex and contingent on many case-specific factors, and the historical record is murky and limited. But at least one thing is clear: The probability of nuclear war is not zero. Nuclear deterrence can fail. It is a fallacy to presume that just because no nuclear war has occurred since the post-World War II advent of nuclear deterrence, therefore it will never happen. The historical record contains several near-misses in which nuclear war was narrowly avoided due in no small part to luck. When these points are raised in disarmament debates, there is no significant international divide. When pushed, everyone seems to agree that nuclear deterrence can fail. Like nuclear weapons, conventional weapons can also act as deterrents, discouraging states from going to war by presenting a counter-threat. So how does the probability of deterrence failure with nuclear weapons compare to the probability without them? This is a much harder question, and not one commonly considered in the debates. Several studies have attempted to answer it by looking at data on the history of war between states that do and do not have nuclear weapons. A 2009 study by Robert Rauchhaus found a lower probability of war between states that both have nuclear weapons but a higher probability when only one has them. However, a 2015 study by Mark Bell and Nicholas L. Miller finds no significant difference in the relative probabilities. These studies are helpful but inconclusive. Such an important policy decision should ideally rest on more robust research. (I would welcome any reader comments on these two studies or suggestions for additional ones.) The relative severity of nuclear and non-nuclear war is also complex and uncertain, but easier to compare. In principle, either war could result in few or many deaths depending on how it proceeded. In practice, there is reason to believe that nuclear war would be vastly more severe. Non-nuclear war could result in many millions of deaths, as in the two World Wars, but the unparalleled explosive force of nuclear weapons makes great harm much easier to cause and therefore more probable. By far the biggest difference between nuclear and non-nuclear war would be that the former would likely result in nuclear winter. Nuclear explosions send smoke up past the clouds, into the stratosphere, which causes global environmental problems for years. Crop failures could ensue in every country, no matter where the war occurred. The survival of human civilization could be at stake. Nuclear winter could astronomically dwarf the potential harm of a non-nuclear war, unless the latter involved some other weapon of global destruction, such as contagious biological weapons. (Those are already banned by treaty and not in active deployment). The relative severity of nuclear and non-nuclear war is likewise not a point of international disagreement. While awareness of nuclear winter remains low, all sides concur that the impacts of the former would be catastrophic, and the impacts of the latter not as bad. Taking nuclear winter into account, the ambiguity about the probabilities of whether war will occur becomes less important. That is, even if nuclear weapons significantly improve deterrence, nuclear disarmament still reduces the risk of war. Thus, while it is understandable that nucleararmed states would want to avoid disarmament in order to avoid war, the world will ultimately be safer without nuclear weapons. In other words, nuclear disarmament should proceed rapidly.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**AT: Case** › Turns › 1NC---Turn---Deterrence
Umbrello et. al 19 [Steven Umbrello, Phil Torres, and Angelo F. De Bellis. Umbrello works for the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies and the University of Turin. Torres is an employee at the Project for Future Human Flpurishing. De Bellis is a Professor at the Universiy of Edinburgh. 01/24/2019, “The future of war: could lethal autonomous weapons make conflict more ethical?”, Journal of AI & Society, doi:10.1007/s00146-019-00879-x]
To begin, one of the most compelling reasons for opposing nuclear non-proliferation efforts is that the destructive potential of nuclear weapons increases the threshold of use (Jürgen 2008; Wilson 2012). Thus, only in extreme circumstances would rational actors deem their use to be either morally or strategically acceptable. This strongly contrasts with the case of LAWs, whose cost would be small compared to the cost of paying military personnel. Consequently, states could maintain stockpiles of LAWs that are far larger than any standing army. The low cost of LAWs would also make them more expendable than human soldiers (Jacoby and Chang 2008; Singer 2009a, b; Jenks 2010), and they could strike the enemy with greater precision than human scolders can currently achieve (Thurnher 2012; Ekelhof and Struyk 2014). These four properties—low cost, military effectiveness, expendability, and precision—could drive proliferation while lowering the threshold for use and, therefore, undermine geopolitical security. Incidentally, similar claims could be made about anticipated future nanotech weaponry (see Whitman 2011). The attractiveness of LAWs is apparent in the US’s use of “unmanned aerial vehicles” (UAVs, also known as “drones”) in Iraq and Syria. These semi-autonomous systems offer a cheap, effective, and relatively precise means for conducting surveillance and targeting enemy combatants [despite unsatisfied infrastructural needs to sustain the drone program] (McLean 2014). As a result, the US drone program has grown and the frequency of drone use against terrorist organizations like the (now-defunct) Islamic State has steadily increased in the past decade (Higgins 2017). Yet the proliferation of LAWs discussed in this paper is different in important respects from the proliferation of current UAV devices. LAWs are theoretically capable of becoming moral actors capable of making life and death decisions without human intervention. The absence of a human operator suggests that LAWs will be even cheaper than current UAVs and, as such, more vulnerable to proliferation. But this might not be undesirable given that, for example, ethical LAWs will—almost by definition—not serve to glorify or extend war efforts beyond the initial scope. Furthermore, UAVs still require human intervention and, as we will soon discuss, the emotional volatility of humans could lead to overspending and high death tolls. More generally speaking, the growing use of UAVs in conflict situations is consistent with a broader trend toward high-precision weaponry and away from larger, more destructive weapons like those in the world’s nuclear arsenals (Wilson 2013). There are some reasons for welcoming this shift. For example, the use of high-precision weapons like LAWs to achieve a state’s military objectives could reduce the probability and proportion of indiscriminate harm, thus violating the LoW and “rules of engagement” (RoE) less than might otherwise have been possible. Even more, the “ease-of-use” of LAWs that are fully autonomous could enhance the “balance of terror” that prevents conflict from breaking out by providing a credible means for retaliation: “If you strike me first, I will unleash a swarm of LAWs that devastate your infrastructure, poison your streams, set fire to your farms, destroy your armies, and assassinate your leaders.” The precision and effectiveness of LAWs could also accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament, seeing as the conception of LAWS regards them as agents capable of conventional weapons use rather non-conventional weapons platforms. First, consider that research on the potential climatic consequences of a nuclear war resulted in the replacement of MAD (“mutuallyassured destruction”) with SAD (“self-assured destruction”). The reason is that an exchange of nuclear weapons—even a regional one [citation]—could initiate a “nuclear winter” that causes global agricultural failures, widespread starvation, the spread of infectious disease, and other catastrophic sequelae that cannot be contained within national borders (Mills et al. 2014; Xia et al. 2015). Consequently, a nuclear war would all but guarantee the self-annihilation of states involved. As Seth Baum (2015) notes, though, LAWs could provide a kind of “winter-safe deterrence” by providing states with a credible threat of retaliation without the global catastrophic risks of nuclear conflict. Thus, LAWs could render the world’s nuclear arsenals irrelevant and, in doing so, lower the overall risk of human annihilation. Distinguishing valid targets As mentioned above and discussed further below, the most significant obstacle to the development and acceptance of LAWs is their current inability to reliably distinguish between valid and invalid targets. This is a crucial shortcoming because, as previously alluded, the Geneva Conventions require that attacks must be exclusively directed at military rather than civilian entities (United Nations 1979). As Article 51(3) of Sect. 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention states, “civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities” (United Nations 1979). Complicating the situation further is an ambiguity about what exactly counts as a “civilian”—eg., some civilians engage in combative activities, some of which are not clearly overt, thus making it a matter of interpretation whether such individuals should fall within the “combatant” or “noncombatant” categories.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**AT: Case** › Turns › 1NC---Turn---Deterrence
Amatai Etzioni and Oren Etzioni, May-June 2017, “Pros and Cons of Autonomous Weapons”, Military Review, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June2017/Pros-and-Cons-of-Autonomous-Weapons-Systems/
Why to begin. However, one should note that human-out-of-the-loop arms are very effective in reinforcing a red line. Declaration by representatives of one nation that if another nation engages in a certain kind of hostile behavior, swift and severe retaliation will follow, are open to misinterpretation by the other side, even if backed up with deployment of troops or other military assets. Leaders, drawing on considerable historical experience, may bet that they be able to cross the red line and be spared because of one reason or another. Hence, arms without a human in the loop make for much more credible red lines. (This is a form of the “precommitment strategy” discussed by Thomas Schelling in Arms and Influence, in which one party limits its own options by obligating itself to retaliate, thus making its deterrence more credible.) We suggest that nations might be willing to forgo this advantage of fully autonomous arms in order to gain the assurance that once hostilities ceased, they could avoid becoming entangled in new rounds of fighting because some bombers were still running loose and attacking the other side, or because some bombers might malfunction and attack civilian centers. Finally, if a ban on fully autonomous weapons were agreed upon and means of verification were developed, one could aspire to move toward limiting weapons with a high but not full measure of autonomy.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**AT: Case** › Turns › 1NC---Turn---Casualties
Müller 16 (Vincent C., Professor of Philosophy at Eindhoven University of Technology, University Fellow at the University of Leeds, Turing Fellow at the Alan Turing Institute, President of the European Association for Cognitive Systems, PhD Phil with Cognitive Science, Linguistics, and History, and chair of the euRobotics topics group on 'ethical, legal and socio-economic issues’, (PDF), 2016 “Autonomous killer robots are probably good news," ResearchGate,
Are killer robots good for us? Assuming there is no particular ethical problem with humanitarian law or responsibil-ity, the remaining question is whether the consequences of LAWS are good overall, in the long run—do they reduce or increase human well-being? If utility is reduced by the existence and use of these weapons we should not allow them. There are two sub-ordinate questions here. Do LAWS increase or decrease the suffering and loss of war? Do LAWS make war more or less likely? 3.3.1. Reducing the human cost of war There are a number of points that suggest LAWS would reduce the human cost of war. • Robots reduce war crimes and crimes in war: they do not rape, do not get angry or afraid, they do not intentionally commit war crimes—unless pro-grammed to do so. They follow orders more closely. • “One of the great arguments for armed robots is they can fire second,” Jo-seph W. Dyer, cited in (Markoff 2010) • Drones are excellent data-collectors, so perpetrators of war crimes are more likely to be caught. This also makes war crimes less likely • Fewer deaths, injuries and traumas of combatants • Fewer deaths, injuries and traumas of non-combatants • Thus less damage to future generations 3.3.2. Making war worse There are a couple of points that suggest LAWS would make wars worse: • LAWS have limited judgment and common sense, which will lead to errors and to carrying out orders that violate the law of war. • Killing is made easier if the command can be passed on to an autonomous system, so proportionality is under threat. 3.3.3. Making war more likely There are some points that suggest LAWS would make wars more likely: Autonomous Killer Robots Are Probably Good News 12/16 • With LAWS, a war can be expected to result in less death and injury to the soldiers on the side that has them available (but only slightly, if compared to remote-controlled systems). • They make wars less bad, generally, and thus wars are more likely to be cho-sen as a means. • They make a particular military action easier to decide for a military com-mander (see Krishnan 2009). • Fewer losses of soldiers’ lives reduce the political hurdle for wars and esp. military action short of war. • Finally, they make it easier to maintain a ‘low level’ war for some time, espe-cially if it is an asymmetric war. 3.3.4. Utility, fairness and arms races The reasons why LAWS make a war more likely apply equally to remote-controlled weapons; in fact they apply to any weapon that acts at a distance. Such weapons have always resulted in relative safety for the first users: Goliath probably thought David’s sling unfair; the Lateran Council of 1139, Canon 29, banned use of the large cross-bow [ballista] and archery against fellow Christians. The criticism that LAWS lower the risk for attackers and thus make wars and other killings more likely is thus correct, but applies to any weapon that the one side has, but the other does not: In other words, it is the result of an on-going arms race. As soon as the other side has acquired the new weapon, the risk of war goes down again. This is not to say that I think LAWS are part of an unstoppable arms race. Some weapons systems have been banned (anti-personnel mines, chemical weapons) and with nuclear weapons the arms race is highly controlled. We can stop developing these weapons—the question is whether it is right to do so, given that they seem to save lives. Let us note that the reasons why LAWS make wars less bad do not apply to all weapons at a distance. This is so especially for weapons of mass destruction or weap-ons with poor accuracy—and thus with poor compliance to the humanitarian law requirements of distinction and proportionality. If killer robots become cheap and easy to obtain or make, then the consequences would certainly be bad – as in any case of a weapon becoming more widely available (see Müller 2015) – so we would do well to prevent this spread. 3.3.5. Utility Overall So, what is the overall utility count? As usual with utility in the long run, this is very hard to say but it seems quite clear that LAWS would do something to reduce the human cost of war. Some reduction is extremely valuable, given how serious the suf- Autonomous Killer Robots Are Probably Good News 13/16 fering of war is. Further, while LAWS do raise the probability of wars in the short run, there is no reason to think they will do so in the long run. The overall utility calcula-tion depends on the balance of how much less bad wars become and how much more likely they become. How bad the short run raise in probability will turn out depends mainly on which the first parties to acquire them are. Given current military spend-ing, we know who these are: USA, China, Russia. It also depends on how big the dif-ference to remote-controlled systems is, which currently looks minimal. If they do not substantially increase the probability of war, then killer robots are good news for hu-manity.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**AT: Case** › Turns › 1NC---Turn---Casualties
Hitchens 19 Theresa Hitchens (Hitchens was a senior research associate at the University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM). Before that, she spent six years in Geneva, Switzerland as director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)), 11-5-2019, "DoD Should Consider Truly Autonomous Weapons: Bipartisan AI Commission," Breaking Defense, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/11/bipartisan-ai-commission-dod-should-consider-truly-autonomous-weapons/
DoD Should Consider Truly Autonomous Weapons: Bipartisan AI Commission "The Commission is not glorifying the prospect of AI-enabled warfare, [but] adopting AI for defense and security purposes is an urgent national imperative." WASHINGTON: The US military should adopt artificial intelligence urgently without letting debates over ethics and human control “paralyze AI development,” a congressionally mandated panel says. “In light of the choices being made by our strategic competitors, the United States must also examine AI through a military lens, including concepts for AI-enabled autonomous operations.” (Emphasis ours). In what will likely be controversial on Capitol Hill, the interim report released yesterday by the the bipartisan National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence is full-throated in its defense of the pursuit of autonomous, AI-driven military systems as not only ethical but essential for future US military operations. Even in the military, some commanders have been publicly reluctant to trust AI — especially for anything related to nuclear weapons. [Read about the independent Defense Innovation Board’s call for ethical military AI] Notably, nowhere does commission use the phrase ‘human in the loop,’ the language currently favored by the Pentagon to assert that a human would always have ultimate control over any autonomous system.” That phrase, in turn, is an oversimplification of the current Department of Defense policy on autonomous systems, DoD Instruction 3000.9 — which also goes remarkably unmentioned, referenced in a single footnote to one of its 101 pages. “Ethics and strategic necessity are compatible with one another,” the report says. “Defense and national security agencies must develop and deploy AI in a responsible, trusted, and ethical manner…. Everyone desires safe, robust, and reliable AI systems free of unwanted bias, and recognizes today’s technical limitations. Everyone wants to establish thresholds for testing and deploying AI systems worthy of human trust and to ensure that humans remain responsible for the outcomes of their use. Some disagreements will remain, but the Commission is concerned that debate will paralyze AI development.” “Inaction on AI development raises as many ethical challenges as AI deployment,” the report continues. “There is an ethical imperative to accelerate the fielding of safe, reliable, and secure AI systems that can be demonstrated to protect the American people, minimize operational dangers to U.S. service members, and make warfare more discriminating, which could reduce civilian casualties.” “Adopting AI for defense and security purposes is an urgent national imperative,” is one of the seven consensus-agreed principles agreed to be the commissioners. “The Commission is not glorifying the prospect of AI-enabled warfare,” they write. “But new technology is almost always employed for the pursuit of power. In light of the choices being made by our strategic competitors, the United States must also examine AI through a military lens, including concepts for AI-enabled autonomous operations.” The concept of fully autonomous weapon systems is highly controversial, both in the US and among US allies. As we reported back in August, the International Campaign to Stop Killer Robots nearly doubled its membership over the past year, to 113 NGOs in 57 countries as well as The Vatican and Palestinian Authority. A total of 90 nations have called for negotiations towards some kind of ban. In addition, an August report by the Congressional Research Service found that there is a widespread consensus at the United Nations that “appropriate levels of human judgement must be maintained” over any lethal autonomous weapon even though there is not agreement on a ban. The commission’s seven guiding principles were agreed as a method for shaping the robust US debate about the linkage of AI to national defense and military systems, the report explains. Others include making global leadership a national security priority with a robust government investment strategy in order to maintain the US technological edge; investing in domestic STEM eduction and recruiting foreign talent; and maintaining free and open academic research. The commission stressed, however, that the 101-page report is not final and thus does not make “final recommendations, suggest major organizational changes, or propose specific investment priorities in rank order attached to dollar figures.” The final report is due to Congress in October 2020. NSSL 7 may 2020 ULA pic Recommended With billions at stake, lobbying heats up for future rights to Space Force launches “Key for us is allowing on-ramps, allowing for some smaller launches to have a chance,” a senior Space Force official told Breaking Defense, in order to avoid billion-dollar “Titan-era prices.” By THERESA HITCHENS The commission was established by the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act. Chaired by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt, who also chairs DoD’s Defense Innovation Board, it has 15 members including Bob Work, former DoD deputy secretary who serves as vice chairman. “The development of AI will shape the future of power,” the report states bluntly. “The nation with the most resilient and productive economic base will be best positioned to seize the mantle of world leadership. That base increasingly depends on the strength of the innovation economy, which in turn will depend on AI. AI will drive waves of advancement in commerce, transportation, health, education, financial markets, government, and national defense.” It identifies “five fundamental lines of effort that are necessary to preserve U.S. advantages: Invest in AI Research and Development (R&D); Apply AI to National Security Missions; Train and Recruit AI Talent; Protect and Build Upon U.S. Technology Advantages; and Marshal Global AI Cooperation.” The report explains that the commission’s work so far has focused on four major issues: foreign threats to our national security in the current AI era; how AI can improve the government’s ability to defend the country, cooperate with allies, and preserve a favorable balance of military power in the world; the relationship between AI and economic competitiveness as a component of national security, including the strength of our scientific research community and our larger workforce; and ethical considerations in fielding AI systems for national security purposes. Threats posed by AI misuse, the report says, include disinformation that undermine democratic systems; erosion of privacy and civil liberties; increasing cyber attacks; and increased potential for catastrophic accidents. It also posits the benefits of AI for homeland defense, the Intelligence Community (IC) and the military: For homeland defense, the report says, AI-enable tools can assist with border protections, cybersecurity, protection of critical infrastructure and natural disaster response. For the Intelligence Community, “AI algorithms can sift through vast amounts of data to find patterns, detect threats, and identify correlations. AI tools can make satellite imagery, communications signals, economic indicators, social media data, and other large sources of information more intelligible. AI-enabled analysis can provide faster and more precise situational awareness that supports higher quality decision-making.” On future battlefields, the military “could use AI-enabled machines, systems, and weapons to understand the battlespace more quickly; develop a common joint operating picture more rapidly; make relevant decisions faster; mount more complex multi-domain operations in contested environments; put fewer U.S. service members at risk; and protect innocent lives and reduce collateral damage.” Of course, if those applications, however appealing, require relinquishing or even reducing human control, the controversy will be intense.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**AT: Case** › Turns › 1NC---Turn---LAWS Better
De Carvalho, 18 [Juliana Santos de Carvalho is a research associate at the Public International Law and Policy Group, Spring Issue 2018, accessed on 6-21-2022, Amsterdam Law Review, “A Male Future? An Analysis on the Gendered Discourses Regarding Lethal Autonomous Weapons”, ]/ISEE
The current examination of the inter-relations between gendered discourses and robotic warfare is focused on their ability to mutually shape and influence each other. To comprehend such relation between gendered discourses and robotic warfare, there is a need to first understand some key-theoretical concepts from which feminist literature on war and militarism stems, namely the idea of hegemonic masculinity and its interplay with militarisation/militarism. To understand hegemonic masculinity, the concept of gender performativity is pivotal. Pursuant to the theoretical prepositions of philosopher and gender theorist Judith Butler, gender does not follow from sex or “nature”. Rather, it is performatively and socially produced, as well as enforced by „the regulatory practices of gender coherence‟. Masculine and feminine attributes are socially constructed within frames of masculine domination, which in turn operate through regulated processes of repetition that consolidate and perpetuate gender hierarchy. Within this context, “hegemonic masculinity” is a constructed and idealised notion of certain attributes socially linked to the male gender, which subordinates and marginalises all other practices that do not conform to such ideal. Scholar Frank J. Barrett explains that the current hegemonic ideal of masculinity in Western societies is that of the independent, risk-taking, aggressive, heterosexual and rational man. As a result, a hierarchy is created not only between women and men, but also between the men who are coherent with hegemonic masculinity ideals and those who are not. In this regard, current hegemonic masculinity language applied to the military can actually demean and criticise robotic warfare. As these novel military technologies require no physical strength, no courage to “be in the battlefield” and no risk for the individual soldier, it alleviates the “dirty work of war”, and therefore can be considered as coward and feminine. A very telling example of this is the case of the “Nintendo Medal”, as explained by professor in women and gender studies Lorraine Bayard de Volo. In this instance, Leon Panetta, U.S Secretary of Defence in 2013, had proposed the Distinguished Warfare Medal to laud robotic pilots for “extraordinary achievements”. However, the medal was met with a huge backlash from the overall military community, as they argued that medals of honour should not be endowed to coward “button-pushers”. This is particularly interesting when one analyses the role of “sacrifice” to the “formation of the soldier-citizen as an archetype of heroic masculinity”. As explained by gender studies scholar Bianca Baggiarini, military sacrifice publicises the death, injury and suffering of soldiers that put themselves in harm’s way for the „greater good of the national community and subsequently the life of the body politic‟. Soldier’s lives then become gendered, as their value is located in the public sphere – often seen as the „male‟ realm, in contrast to the private, family and domestic domain associated with feminine roles. This does not mean to say that such sacrificial effort is expected only from male-bodied soldiers: this is an overarching gendering of the commitment of soldiers – male and female – to take risks for the national good, which grounds itself in the masculinised domain of the public to validate such endeavour. Drone war, for its turn, can distance the military enterprise from “public sacrifice”, and potentially “emasculate” military heroism.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**AT: Case** › Advantage › 1NC---Advantage---LAWs inevitable
Scharre, 17 [Paul Scharre is the vice president and director of studies at the Center for a New American Security, 12-22-2017, accessed on 6-27-2022, IEEE Spectrum, "Why You Shouldn’t Fear “Slaughterbots”", https://spectrum.ieee.org/why-you-shouldnt-fear-slaughterbots]/ISEE
Killer drones in the hands of terrorists massacring innocents. Robotic weapons of mass destruction breeding chaos and fear. A video created by advocates of a ban on autonomous weapons would have you believe this dystopian future is right around the corner if we don't act now. The short video, called “Slaughterbots," was released last month coinciding with United Nations meetings on autonomous weapons. The UN meetings ended inconclusively, but the video is getting traction. It's gotten over 2 million views and has sparked dozens of news stories. As a piece of propaganda, it works great. As a substantive argument for a ban on autonomous weapons, the video fails miserably. Obviously, a world in which terrorists can unleash swarms of killer drones on innocent civilians would be terrible, but is the future the video depicts realistic? The movie's slick production quality helps to gloss over its leaps of logic. It immerses the viewer in a dystopian nightmare, but let's be clear: It's very much science fiction. The central premise of “Slaughterbots" is that in the future militaries will build autonomous microdrones with shaped charges that can fly up to someone's head and detonate an explosive, killing the person. In the film, these “slaughterbots" quickly fall into the hands of terrorists, resulting in mass killings worldwide. The lethal microdrones depicted in “Slaughterbots" use facial recognition to identify their targets, then fly up to them and detonate shaped explosives.Image: Slaughterbots/YouTube The basic concept is grounded in technical reality. In the real world, the Islamic State has used off-the-shelf quadcopters equipped with small explosives to attack Iraqi troops, killing or wounding dozens of Iraqi soldiers. Today's terrorist drones are largely remotely controlled, but hobbyist drones are becoming increasingly autonomous. The latest models can navigate to a fixed target on their own, avoid obstacles, and autonomously track and follow moving objects. A small drone equipped with facial recognition technology could potentially be used to autonomously search for and kill specific individuals, as “Slaughterbots" envisions. It took me just a few minutes of searching online to find the resources necessary to download and train a free neural network to do facial recognition. So while no one has yet cobbled the technology together in the way the video depicts, all of the components are real. I want to make something very clear: There is nothing we can do to keep that underlying technology out of the hands of would-be terrorists. This is upsetting, but it's very important to understand. Just like how terrorists can and do use cars to ram crowds of civilians, the underlying technology to turn hobbyist drones into crude autonomous weapons is already too ubiquitous to stop. This is a genuine problem, and the best response is to focus on defensive measures to counter drones along with surveillance to catch would-be terrorists ahead of time. The “Slaughterbots" video takes this problem and blows it out of proportion, however, suggesting that drones would be used by terrorists as robotic weapons of mass destruction, killing thousands of people at a time. Fortunately, this nightmare scenario is about as likely to happen as HAL 9000 locking you out of the pod bay doors. The technology shown in the video is plausible, but basically everything else is a bunch of malarkey. The video assumes the following: These assumptions range from questionable, at best, to completely fanciful. Of course, the video is fictional, and defense planners do often use fictionalized scenarios to help policymakers think through plausible events that may occur. As a defense analyst at a think tank and in my prior job as a strategic planner at the Pentagon, I used fictional scenarios to help inform choices about what technologies the United States military should invest in. To be useful, however, these scenarios need to at least be plausible. They need to be something that could happen. The scenario depicted in the “Slaughterbots" video fails to account for political and strategic realities about how governments use military technology. First, there is no evidence that governments are planning to mass-produce small drones to kill civilians in large numbers. In my forthcoming book, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War, I examine next-generation weapons being built in defense labs around the world. Russia, China, and the United States are all racing ahead on autonomy and artificial intelligence. But the types of weapons they are building are generally aimed at fighting other militaries. They are “counter-force" weapons, not “counter-value" weapons that would target civilians. Counter-force autonomous weapons raise their own sets of concerns, but they aren't designed for mass targeting of civilians, nor could they be easily repurposed to do so. Second, in the video, we're told the drones can defeat “any countermeasure." TV pundits scream, “We can't defend ourselves." This isn't fiction; it's farce. Every military technology has a countermeasure, and countermeasures against small drones aren't even hypothetical. The U.S. government is actively working on ways to shoot down, jam, fry, hack, ensnare, or otherwise defeat small drones. The microdrones in the video could be defeated by something as simple as chicken wire. The video shows heavier-payload drones blasting holes through walls so that other drones can get inside, but the solution is simply layered defenses. Military analysts look at the cost-exchange ratio between offense and defense, and in this case, the costs heavily favor static defenders. In a world where terrorists launch occasional small-scale attacks using DIY drones, people are unlikely to absorb the inconveniences of building robust defenses, just like people don't wear body armor to protect against the unlikely event of being caught in a mass shooting. But if an enemy country built hundreds of thousands of drones to wipe out a city, you bet there'd be a run on chicken wire. The video takes a plausible problem—terrorist attacks with drones—and scales it up without factoring in how others would respond. If lethal microdrones were built en masse, defenses and countermeasures would be a national priority, and in this case the countermeasures are simple. Any weapon that can be defeated by a net isn't a weapon of mass destruction. Third, the video assumes that militaries are incapable of preventing terrorists from getting access to military-grade weapons. But we don't give terrorists hand grenades, rocket launchers, or machine guns today. Terrorist attacks with drones are a concern precisely because they involve DIY explosives strapped to readily available technology. This is a genuine problem, but again the video scales this threat up in ways that are unrealistic. Even if militaries were to build lethal microdrones, terrorists are no more likely to get their hands on large numbers of them than other military technologies. Weapons do proliferate over time to nonstate actors in war zones, but just because antitank guided missiles are prevalent in Syria doesn't mean they're commonplace in New York. Terrorists use airplanes and trucks for attacks precisely because successfully smuggling military-grade weapons into a Western country isn't that easy. In “Slaughterbots," AI-powered microdrones are built en masse, and there seems to be no defenses and countermeasures to stop them.Image: Slaughterbots/YouTube Fourth, the video assumes terrorists can carry out coordinated attacks at a scale that is not plausible. In one scene, two men release a swarm of about 50 drones from the back of a van. This specific scene is fairly realistic; one of the challenges of autonomy is that a small group of people could launch a larger attack than might otherwise be possible. Something like a truck full of 50 drones is a reasonable possibility. Again, though, the video takes this scenario to the absurd. The video claims that 8,300 people are killed in simultaneous attacks. If the men in the van depict a typical attack, then this level of casualties would equate to over 160 coordinated attacks worldwide. Terrorist groups often launch coordinated attacks, but usually on the scale of single digit numbers of attacks. The video assumes not just superweapons but ones that are in the hands of supervillains. The movie uses hype and fear to skip past these crucial assumptions, and in doing so it undermines any rational debate about the risk of terrorists acquiring autonomous weapons. The video makes clear we're supposed to be afraid. But what are we supposed to be afraid of? A weapon that chooses its own targets (which the video is actually ambiguous about)? A weapon with no countermeasure? The fact that terrorists can get ahold of the weapon? The ability of autonomy to scale up attacks? If you want to drum up fears of “killer robots," the video is great. But as a substantive analysis of the issue, it falls apart under even the most casual scrutiny. The video doesn't put forward an argument. It's sensationalist fear-mongering. Of course, the whole purpose of the video is to scare the viewer into action. The video concludes with UC Berkeley professor Stuart Russell warning of the dangers of autonomous weapons and imploring the viewer to act now to stop this nightmare from becoming a reality. I have tremendous respect for Stuart Russell, both as an artificial intelligence researcher and as a contributor to the debate on autonomous weapons. I've hosted Russell at events at the Center for a New American Security, where I run a research program on artificial intelligence and global security. I have no doubt Russell's views are sincere. But in attempting to persuade the viewer, the video makes assumptions that are not supportable. Even worse, the proposed solution—a legally binding treatybanning autonomous weapons—won't solve the real problems humanity faces as autonomy advances in weapons. A ban won't stop terrorists from fashioning crude DIY robotic weapons. Nor would a ban on the kinds of weapons the video imagines do anything to address the risks that arise from counter-force autonomous weapons. (In fact, it's not even clear whether a ban would prohibit the weapons shown in the video, which are actually fairly discriminate.) By focusing on extreme and implausible scenarios, the video actually undermines progress on real concerns about autonomous weapons. Nations who are leading developers of robotic weapons are likely to dismiss the fears raised in “Slaughterbots" out of hand. The video plays into the hands of those who argue that these fears of autonomous weapons are overhyped and irrational. Autonomous weapons raise important questions about compliance with the laws of war, risk, and controllability, and the role of humans as moral agents in warfare. These are important issues that merit serious discussion. When Russell and others engage in spirited debate on these topics, I welcome the conversation. But that's not what “Slaughterbots" is. The video has succeeded in grabbing media attention, but its sensationalism undercuts the kind of serious intellectual discourse that is actually needed on autonomous weapons.
2022
Michigan
Negative
**AT: Case** › Advantage › 1NC---Advantage---Alt Causes
Michel 20 [Arthur Holland Michel (the co-director of the Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College and the author of Eyes in the Sky: The Secret Rise of Gorgon Stare and How It Will Watch Us All), 1-20-2020, "The Killer Algorithms Nobody’s Talking About," Foreign Policy, ] // st
Many such technologies are already in use. Many more are right around the corner. And because of our singular focus on headline-grabbing killer robots, they have largely gone ignored.¶ Militaries and spy services have long been developing and deploying software for autonomously finding “unknown unknowns”—potential targets who would have otherwise slipped by unnoticed in the torrent of data from their growing surveillance arsenals. One particularly spooky strand of research seeks to build algorithms that tip human analysts off to such targets by singling out cars driving suspiciously around a surveilled city.¶ Other lethality-enabling technologies can translate intercepted communications, synthesize intelligence reports, and predict an adversary’s next move—all of which are similarly crucial steps in the lead-up to a strike. Even many entry-level surveillance devices on the market today, such as targeting cameras, come with standard features for automated tracking and detection.¶ For its part, the U.S. Department of Defense, whose self-imposed rules for autonomous weapons specifically exempt nonlethal systems, is allowing algorithms dangerously close to the trigger. The Army wants to equip tanks with computer vision that identifies “objects of interest” (translation: potential targets) along with recommendation algorithms—kind of like Amazon’s—that advise weapons operators whether to destroy those objects with a cannon or a gun, or by calling in an airstrike. All of these technologies fall outside the scope of the international debate on killer robots. But their effects could be just as dangerous.¶ The widespread use of sophisticated autonomous aids in war would be fraught with unknown unknowns. An algorithm with the power to suggest whether a tank should use a small rocket or a fighter jet to take out an enemy could mark the difference between life and death for anybody who happens to be in the vicinity of the target. An algorithm with the power to suggest whether a tank should use a small rocket or a fighter jet to take out an enemy could mark the difference between life and death for anybody who happens to be in the vicinity of the target. But different systems could perform that same calculation with widely diverging results. Even the reliability of a single given algorithm could vary wildly depending on the quality of the data it ingests.¶ It is also difficult to know whether lethality-enabling artificial intelligence—prone as computers are to bias—would contravene or reinforce those human passions that all too often lead to erroneous or illegal killings. Nor is there any consensus as to how to ensure that a human finger on the trigger can be counted on as a reliable check against the fallibility of its algorithmic enablers.¶ As such, in the absence of standards on such matters, not to mention protocols for algorithmic accountability, there is no good way to assess whether a bad algorithmically enabled killing came down to poor data, human error, or a deliberate act of aggression against a protected group.¶ A well-intentioned military actor could be led astray by a deviant algorithm and not know it; but just as easily, an actor with darker motives might use algorithms as a convenient veil for an intentionally insidious decisions.¶ Automation’s vast potential to make humans more efficient extends to the very human act of committing war crimes.¶ If one system offers up a faulty conclusion, it could be easy to catch the mistake before it does any harm. But these algorithms won’t act alone. A few months ago, the U.S. Navy tested a network of three AI systems, mounted on a satellite and two different airplanes, that collaboratively found an enemy ship and decided which vessel in the Navy’s fleet was best placed to destroy it, as well as what missile it should use. The one human involved in this kill chain was a commanding officer on the chosen destroyer, whose only job was to give the order to fire.¶ Eventually, the lead-up to a strike may involve dozens or hundreds of separate algorithms, each with a different job, passing findings not just to human overseers but also from machine to machine. Mistakes could accrue; human judgment and machine estimations would be impossible to parse from one another; and the results could be wildly unpredictable.¶ These questions are even more troubling when you consider how central such technologies will become to all future military operations. As the technology proliferates, even morally upstanding militaries may have to rely on autonomous assistance, in spite of its many risks, just to keep ahead of their less scrupulous AI-enabled adversaries.¶ Once an AI system can navigate complicated circumstances more intelligently than any team of soldiers, the human will have no choice but to take its advice on trust¶ And once an AI system can navigate complicated circumstances more intelligently than any team of soldiers, the human will have no choice but to take its advice on trust—or, as one thoughtful participant at a recent U.S. Army symposium put it, targeting will become a matter of simply pressing the “I-believe button.” In such a context, assurances from top brass that their machines will never make the ultimate lethal decision seem a little beside the point.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: T › Coop
Scalia ’12 [Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner; 2012; Justice on the Supreme Court of the United States; American lawyer, lexicographer, and teacher; Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, “General-Terms Canon,” Ch. 9]
General terms are to be given their general meaning (generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda).
Without some indication to the contrary, general words (like all words, general or not) are to be accorded their full and fair scope. They are not to be arbitrarily limited. This is the general-terms canon, which is based on the reality that it is possible and useful to formulate categories (e.g., “dangerous weapons”) without knowing all the items that may fit—or may later, once invented, come to fit—within those categories.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: T › Coop
RWCS ’20 [Real World Cyber Security; April 14; cyber analyst with deep expertise and extensive experience in embedded systems product development and product development security, including hardware security, secure boot, software and firmware security, network and protocol security, operating systems hardening, user interaction and user experience security, industrial design security, data protection and data privacy, cryptographic security, secure software development practices, security test and evaluation, government product security certifications and validation, intellectual property protection, import/export compliance, product liability, supply chain integrity, security in mergers and acquisitions, and corporate security governance; RWCS, “Defining Cybersecurity,” ]
If You Can’t Properly Define Cybersecurity, How Can You Know What It Is?
It’s clear that the cybersecurity industry hasn’t been able to agree upon what cybersecurity is and isn’t. Even NIST, who is responsible for the definition of technical terms used by the U.S. Federal Government, has four different definitions of cybersecurity! At a minimum, there are dozens of different definitions of cybersecurity currently in use. Nearly all are incomplete in scope, some are horridly wrong, and nearly all fail to differentiate between cybersecurity and its information security cousin.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: T › AT---T-Bowne
Bowne ’18 [Andrew; 2018; Major and Judge Advocate in the United States Air Force, Contract and Fiscal Law Professor, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army; Military Law Review, “Defending the New Fulda Gap: Deterring Russian Aggression Against the Baltic States Through Fiscal Legislation, 226 Mil. L. Rev. 147, lexis]
The lack of clarity for EDI authorities notwithstanding, efforts to build defense capacity in the Baltic States were bolstered by the overhaul of the security cooperation regime in the FY17 NDAA. In an attempt to simplify the quagmire that security cooperation authorities had become over the past fifteen years, Congress streamlined the dozens of various temporary and permanent sources of authority and codified them under one chapter in Title 10 of the U.S. Code. 125 Congress noted the increasingly more important role security cooperation plays in DoD operations, 126 and the below discussion of how EUCOM can leverage these new authorities to augment EDI demonstrates the potential utility such activities can have within NATO's deterrence strategy.
3. Defense Security Cooperation and the Baltic States
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: T › AT---T-Bowne
Fraser ’15 [Douglas; October 21; General (Retired), LLC, Former Commander of United States Southern Command; Statement of General Douglas M. Fraser before the House Armed Service Committee on Security Cooperation, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=789068]
Close Relationship Between Security Cooperation and Security Assistance Mr. Chairman, while this hearing is focused on security cooperation, from my experience, I think it is important to acknowledge the close relationship between Department of Defense security cooperation programs and Department of State security assistance programs. During my time in U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Southern Command, both commands worked closely with the Department of State and the respective U.S. Embassies to coordinate security cooperation and security assistance programs. Training and exercise programs conducted through security cooperation meshed closely with the education and equipping programs conducted through security assistance programs. In fact, in many cases, more funding assistance to a country was provided through Department of State programs to enhance the capability of a nation’s armed forces, like Foreign Military Financing, than came from Department of Defense programs.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: T › Cyber security
David M. J. Lazer, et al 2018, * “The Science of Fake News,” Science 09 Mar 2018: Vol. 359, Issue 6380, pp. 1094-1096.
In this edition of the IT Security Series, we discuss why misinformation and disinformation are emerging as cyber security threats, share approaches to help us become more critical news consumers, and provide fact-checking tools to determine when news content, images, and videos have been manipulated to deceive viewers. * David M. J. Lazer, et al., “The Science of Fake News,” Science 09 Mar 2018: Vol. 359, Issue 6380, pp. 1094-1096. WHY ARE FAKE NEWS, MISINFORMATION, AND DISINFORMATION CYBER SECURITY THREATS? Fake news, misinformation, and disinformation have been a problem for some time; however, factors such as the continual increase in the frequency and sophistication of cyberattacks, election interference, and crises such as the COVID-19 “infodemic,” have made them a significant challenge for businesses, government agencies, financial markets, and the media.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: T › T The = All of Nato › AT: Kotila
Supreme Court of Kentucky 6. “Matheney v. Commonwealth”; 2002-SC-0920-MR; March 23, 2006; Lexis //BY
In , this Court held that the version of then in effect required possession of all the chemicals or equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine. Essentially, this Court found that the statute's use of the word [**5] "the" meant that a person could be convicted under of the statute only for possession of all the chemicals or equipment (as opposed to "any" or "some" of the chemicals or equipment) for the manufacture of methamphetamine. The Kotila majority based this conclusion on grammatical construction and subsequent statutory enactments by the General Assembly. While attempting to discern the General Assembly's intent by analyzing subsequent legislation, the majority opinion conceded that the precise intent of the General Assembly was ambiguous.
The majority also rejected the applicability of criminal attempt under unless all the chemicals or equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine were present. Justice Keller concurred in the Court's opinion relating to . However, he believed [*603] that applied to "defendants who intend to manufacture methamphetamine and who undertake 'substantial steps' towards manufacturing methamphetamine by knowingly accumulating materials necessary to do so, but who are apprehended before they can complete the Manufacturing Methamphetamine offense by knowingly possessing all of the chemicals or all of the equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine." (Keller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: T › T The = All of Nato › The
Supreme Court of Michigan 21. “Ricks v. State”; July 8, 2021; Lexis //BY
In its review of the threshold-eligibility requirements in MCL 691.1755(1), the Court of Appeals aptly recognized that the Legislature repeatedly used the word [**440] "the" in front of "crimes," "charges," and "judgment of conviction" in MCL 691.1755(1)(a) to (c) in setting forth when a plaintiff is eligible for compensation under the WICA. On the other hand, the Legislature uses the word "another" before "criminal offense" in MCL 691.1755(1)(b) and [***27] "conviction" in MCL 691.1755(4)—other subsections of MCL 691.1755 that explain when a plaintiff is not eligible for compensation. We have previously defined "the" as a "definite article . . . (used, especially before a noun, with a specifying or particularizing effect, as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of the indefinite article a or an)."20Link to the text of the note As an adjective, "another" is defined as "different or distinct from the one first considered"; "some other"; or "being one more in addition to one or more of the same kind."21Link to the text of the note Accordingly, the Legislature's use of "the" before "crimes," "charges," and "judgment of conviction" throughout MCL 691.1755(1)(a) to (c) means those provisions refer to the specific crimes and charges leading to a plaintiff's wrongful conviction and imprisonment that gave rise to a WICA claim. The Legislature's use of "another" before "criminal offense" in MCL 691.1755(1)(b) and "conviction" in MCL 691.1755(4) [*413] means those provisions refer to some other offense or conviction that is different or distinct from the wrongful conviction and imprisonment, and which therefore does not warrant compensation under the WICA. Thus, MCL 691.1755 reflects the overall structure of the WICA in only providing compensation for the specific crimes, charges, or convictions [***28] that the plaintiff was wrongfully convicted of and imprisoned for, and which ultimately form the basis of the WICA claim—not "another" crime, charge, or conviction.