2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Assurance › 2nc – assurance link
Stoltenberg 18 – Jens Stoltenberg, NATO secretary general and the former prime minister of Norway. [How NATO Defends Against the Dark Side of the Web, 9-6-18, https://www.wired.com/story/how-nato-defends-against-the-dark-side-of-the-web/]
If cyberattacks were physical attacks, using bombs or missiles instead of computer code, they could be considered an act of war. But instead, some are using software to wage soft-war with very real, and potentially deadly, consequences.
For almost 70 years, NATO has been the bedrock of transatlantic security, whether on land, at sea, or in the air. The same is now true in cyberspace. A cyberattack can now trigger Article 5 of NATO'S founding treaty, which states that an attack on one Ally is an attack on all Allies.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Assurance › 2nc – assurance link
Kofman ’16 [Michael; 2016; Analyst at CNA Corporation and Fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute; War on the Rocks, “Fixing NATO Deterrence In The East Or: How I Learned To Stop Worrying And Love NATO’s Crushing Defeat By Russia,” https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-nato-deterrence-in-the-east-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/]
NATO’s best answer to compellence is strategic flexibility and ambiguity of response. While Article V dictates the defense of a member, it doesn’t stipulate what that defense must be, how it should take shape, or where it will be applied. With U.S. forces in place, NATO members can be assured that Article V will be triggered, but what happens next should be left a question mark. The more NATO emphasizes the Russian threat and argues for fixed forces in place, the less capably it can defend a challenge to its credibility as an alliance. Anyone can count the order of battle and the balance of forces. By introducing ambiguity in its potential response once Article V has been declared, NATO reduces the chance it can easily be manipulated into a credibility test. The objective should be shrouding a Baltic high-end fight in incalculable risk for Russia while maintaining uncertainty and strategic flexibility with air and naval assets.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Assurance › 2nc – assurance link
Tucker 19 – Patrick Tucker is technology editor for Defense One. [NATO Getting More Aggressive on Offensive Cyber, 5-24-2019, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/05/nato-getting-more-aggressive-offensive-cyber/157270/]
In the latest signal NATO is adopting a tougher posture against cyber and electronic attacks, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg this week said that the defensive alliance will not remain purely defensive.
Stoltenberg told attendees at the Cyber Defence Pledge conference in London, “We are not limited to respond in cyberspace when we are attacked in cyberspace.”
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Assurance › 2nc – assurance ov
Gallagher and Duek ’19 [Mike and Colin; January 2019; Representative for Wisconsin’s Eighth District in the U.S. House of Representatives; Professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University, Kirkpatrick Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute; National Review, “The Conservative Case for NATO,” ]
The conservative case for NATO is not that it strengthens liberal world order. Rather, the conservative case for NATO is that it bolsters American national interests. In an age of great-power competition, as identified by the Trump administration, America’s Western alliance provides the U.S. with some dramatic comparative advantages. The United States, Canada, and their European allies have a number of common interests and common challenges with regard to Beijing, Moscow, terrorism, cyberattacks, migration, nuclear weapons, and military readiness. NATO is the one formal alliance that allows for cooperation on these matters. It is also the only alliance that embodies America’s civilizational ties with Europe — a point forcefully made by President Trump when he visited Poland in 2017. Properly understood, NATO helps keeps America’s strategic competitors at bay, pushing back on Russian and Chinese influence. In all of these ways, the U.S. alliance system in Europe is a bit like oxygen. You may take it for granted, but you’ll miss it when it’s gone.
Now consider the alternative. American withdrawal from NATO would be a grave error. Not only would it surrender the above advantages and undo existing progress in Europe. It would also have negative long-term implications globally pertaining to America’s foremost long-term strategic challenge: namely, the People’s Republic of China. As Beijing extends its influence worldwide, U.S. disengagement from NATO would send the signal that the United States is an unreliable friend. America’s allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific would have to rethink the integrated security architecture we have painstakingly built since Eisenhower’s day. This is not to mention the obvious and immediate tactical and operational military advantages that would accrue to Russia in Europe, shifting the balance of power against the United States.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Assurance › 2nc – assurance ov
Jones 15 – Ken M. Jones, Naval Postgraduate School, Master’s Thesis. [Cyber war: the next frontier for NATO, Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/45201]
Finally, NATO needs to maintain ambiguity on what justifies an Article 5 response. As mentioned previously, ambiguity has served NATO well. A set threshold for when NATO will invoke an Article 5 response to a cyber-attack on a member country is not necessary. This ambiguity has historically served the alliance well, as demonstrated by the 9/11 attacks. If the alliance had said weapons were only include guns, bullets, tanks, and bombs, it would have set a threshold precluding a NATO response to attacks that turned four planes into improvised missiles. The larger issue of ambiguity is that there is no set definition of what constitutes an armed attack and what circumstances dictate a collective response, as per Article 5. Remaining ambiguous on the severity threshold of a cyber-attack allows the alliance to act in cases of future cyber-attacks that cause severe damage, but also allow NATO to refrain from over-reacting, even if an event is a cyber, or kinetic, attack as per a definition. It would be a mistake to set a threshold for attacks that cannot currently be anticipated.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Assurance › 2nc – prolif impact
McKenzie ’20 [Reuben; 2016; Independent Journalist Based in New Zealand; Defense One, “America’s Allies Are Becoming a Nuclear-Proliferation Threat,” https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2020/03/americas-allies-are-becoming-nuclear-proliferation-threat/164057/]
The consequences of proliferation among allies are dire. Miller explained that “the more countries with nuclear weapons, the more likely that a weapon gets used. That could be a deliberate attack, accident or nuclear terrorism.” Crucially, “the U.S. has adopted a strong stance against proliferation [because] we’re very worried about cascades or tipping points. If one [ally] gets nuclear weapons, it gives others incentives to do the same”.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Assurance › 2nc – prolif impact
Steff ’16 [Reuben; 2016; Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Global Security at the University of Waikato; Strategic Thinking, “Strategic Thinking, Deterrence and the US Ballistic Missile Defense Project: From Truman to Obama,” p. 139-140]
Commentators like Samuel Huntington and Zbiegniew Brezinski asserted that a world without US primacy would be a world of violence and disorder, less democracy and economic growth; American primacy facilitates global peace.1 Thus BMD was cast as inherently defensive; it enables the US to protect the global commons and international economic system that benefits all nations as the US assumes the role of a global-ordering superpower.2 Bush administration officials supported this position, in line with Hegemonic Stability Theory, holding that BMD could restore the freedom of action that would be lost in the second nuclear age, by allowing America to retain the capability to project power.3 There is some support for the nuclear age thesis. Firstly, nine states have nuclear weapons and apparently 49 countries have the know how to construct them.4 Secondly, to reduce greenhouse gases, many states may soon judge it prudent to construct nuclear power plants. Thirdly, states like Japan, Germany and South Korea have latent nuclear weapons potential and could apparently militarize their program in the space of a few months; Myanmar was suspected of having a covert program; Russia helped Iran build its Bushehr power plant and many states around the Persian Gulf are considering developing civilian programs. Syria also had a covert nuclear program until an Israeli strike in 2007.5 Finally, the IAEA is tasked with the contradictory mission of promoting the spread of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and inhibiting its diversion to military purposes. These goals are not mutually exclusive as the former provides a path towards weaponization.6
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Assurance › 2nc – prolif impact
Cirincione ’20 [Joe; March 20; Former Vice President for National Security at the Center for American Progress; Responsible Statecraft, “Why Letting Our Allies Get Nuclear Weapons Is A Bad Idea,” https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2020/05/20/why-letting-our-allies-get-nuclear-weapons-is-a-bad-idea/]
There is nothing automatic about the nuclear domino theory, and it has been successfully countered in some regions, but the theory is generally correct. The Soviet Union got the bomb because, as Stalin told his scientists after Hiroshima, “The balance has been broken. Build the bomb. It will remove the great danger from us.” Britain and France got the bomb because the Soviets (and the U.S.) had it. China did the same, then India got the bomb because China did; Pakistan because India did.
Nuclear competition in Asia would not end if South Korea decided to build a nuclear arsenal. Others in the region would likely follow suit. Japan, Taiwan, perhaps Vietnam. Similarly, a Saudi bomb would likely beget an Iranian bomb, a Turkish bomb and even an Egyptian bomb. Far from making the region — and the United States — safer, these arms races would blanket the globe with nuclear tripwires, each primed to unleash unprecedented destruction at the slightest twitch.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Assurance › 1nc – assurance module
Tanter ’17 [Richard; April 1; Senior Research Associate at the Nautilus Institute, Honorary Professor in the School of Political and Social Sciences at the University of Melbourne; The Asia-Pacific Journal, “Donald Trump’s Japanese and South Korean Nuclear Threat to China: A tipping point in East Asia?” Vol. 15, No. 2, Issue 7, ]
But in the longer run, apart from the direct risks of such an event for the U.S. itself, its East Asian alliance network, now in its seventh decade, founded on Japanese and Korean acceptance of U.S. nuclear primacy and a U.S. nuclear umbrella, would change dramatically, bringing with it, for better or worse, the end of U.S. hegemony in East and Southeast Asia (http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-rep orts/playing-the-japan-nuclear-card-did-the-ussecretary-of-state-reverse-five-decades-of-usnon-proliferation-policy/). Whether occurring on a Gaullist or British model, the foundations of Korean and Japanese relations with the United States would be irrevocably altered. Even leaving aside the obvious questions about the DPRK, in the event of a nuclearized Japan and South Korea, clearly the mathematical risks of nuclear war initiated in East Asia would be very much greater than even the current risks of India-Pakistan nuclear conflict. Regional nuclear security planning would be woven with multiple valences of possible perceived nuclear threats. The calculus of China-U.S. nuclear relations immediately becomes much more complex, with China facing two new potential threats, nominally at least coordinating with the U.S., in addition to the older concerns about India and Russia. For the United States, a nuclear-armed, fully ‘normalized’ Japan would never be the undoubted loyal lapdog of by then likely postUnited Kingdom Little England. And the calculations of a nuclear-armed South Korea and Japan about each other would start and finish in historically-conditioned suspicion.
At a global level, the U.S. opening the door to Japanese and Korean nuclear weapons could not fail to encourage a cascade of regional races to nuclear weapons, not only in the Western Pacific but in the Middle East, in Latin America, and quite possibly in Africa. The risks of regional nuclear war, with all its now thoroughly documented (http://www.psr.org/assets/pdfs/two-billion-at-ri sk.pdf) catastrophic environmental and climate consequences (http://www.readcube.com/articles/10.1002/201 3EF000205), would be both manifold and far higher than at present.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Assurance › 1nc – assurance module
Keifer, 11—Project Manager, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (Michael, “Assuring South Korea and Japan as the Role and Number of U.S. Nuclear Weapons are Reduced,” , dml)
For both the ROK and Japan, economic and cultural ties with the United States are strong and well established. The United States and its two key allies in the region share common values and cultural ties that are well ingrained. However, assuming the Chinese economy continues to expand, U.S. leaders may have to find innovative ways to ensure that this dimension of the relationship with Northeast Asian allies remains strong. Allies typically find common economic interests to be a tangible expression of a healthy bilateral relationship and, therefore, reassuring.
Allies in Northeast Asia are sure to watch closely any new developments in the NATO alliance and draw comparisons and contrasts. Therefore, as U.S. officials implement the new Strategic Concept in NATO and its implications for extended deterrence, it will be important to bear in mind how statements and actions will be perceived in Seoul and Tokyo.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Assurance › 1nc – assurance module
Baldor '18 [Lolita; 10/3/18; Associated Press reporter, citing Katie Wheelbarger, the principal deputy assistant defense secretary for international security affairs; "US to offer cyberwar capabilities to NATO allies," ]
Acting to counter Russia’s aggressive use of cyberattacks across Europe and around the world, the U.S. is expected to announce that, if asked, it will use its formidable cyberwarfare capabilities on NATO’s behalf, according to a senior U.S. official.
The announcement is expected in the coming days as U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis attends a meeting of NATO defense ministers on Wednesday and Thursday.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Strategic Ambiguity Good › 2nc – cyber probes impact
Brands ’18 [Dr. Hal; 2018; Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Charles Edel, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and is the author of Nation Builder: John Quincy Adams and the Grand Strategy of the Republic, The Disharmony of the Spheres, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/hal-brands/the-disharmony-of-the-spheres]
To see this, just work backward from the present. During the Cold War, a bipolar balance did help avert actual war between Moscow and Washington. But even in Europe—where the spheres of influence were best defined—there were continual tensions and crises as Moscow tested the Western bloc. And outside Europe, violence and proxy wars were common as the superpowers competed to extend their reach into the Third World. In the 1930s, the emergence of German and Japanese spheres of influence led to the most catastrophic war in global history. The empires of the 19th century—spheres of influence in their own right—continually jostled one another, leading to wars and near-wars over the course of decades; the Peace of Amiens between England and Napoleonic France lasted a mere 14 months. And looking back to the ancient world, there were not one, but three Punic Wars fought between Rome and Carthage as two expanding empires came into conflict. A world defined by spheres of influence is often a world characterized by tensions, wars, and competition.
The reasons for this are simple. As the political scientist William Wohlforth observed, unipolar systems—such as the U.S.-dominated post–Cold War order—are anchored by a hegemonic power that can act decisively to maintain the peace. In a unipolar system, Wohlforth writes, there are few incentives for revisionist powers to incur the “focused enmity” of the leading state. Truly multipolar systems, by contrast, have often been volatile. When the major powers are more evenly matched, there is a greater temptation to aggression by those who seek to change the existing order of things. And seek to change things they undoubtedly will.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Strategic Ambiguity Good › 2nc – cyber probes impact
Takacs ’17 [David; 2017; Associate Fellow at Slovak Security Policy Institute. "Ukraine‘s deterrence failure: Lessons for the Baltic States." DOI 10.1515/jobs-2017-0001]
Russia and its revisionist behaviour present the Baltic States with a multitude of threats, making deterrence a top priority in the Baltic Region. Not only does Moscow wish to extend its sphere of influence to include what it describes as ‘near abroad’, it must carefully protect its own model of ‘sovereign democracy’ at home. Prior to Russian involvement, Ukraine was getting close to signing an association agreement with the European Union (EU) and it was feared that ‘democratic change in brotherly Ukraine could spread to Russia’. Transforming Ukraine to a western democracy was seen as a threat to the Russian regime and was thus stymied at its source (Snegovaya, 2014). However, the Baltic States have already been fully integrated into NATO and the (EU) and have been stable democracies for over two decades now. So what is the nature of the threat that Russia presents to the Baltic States?
Putin is using hybrid tactics as a means of achieving his objectives of a politically restructured Europe. These include massive pro-Russian propaganda and misinformation campaigns, using economic levers, intimidation, or the employment of cyber warfare elements. In Ukraine in 2014, Russia has once again demonstrated its resolve to use both military and non-military means to create and fuel conflicts in pursuit of its wider geopolitical interests. The Kremlin is busily trying to regain its sphere of influence over nations that were formerly part of the Soviet Union, and the Baltic States’ governments are continuously being reminded to stay alert. In addition, NATO frontier allies face much more significant threats due to their proximity to the potential aggressor (Grygiel and Mitchell, 2016, p. 166). Thus, what NATO needs most to deter Russia is ‘to demonstrate robust political solidarity’ within the alliance (NATO Parliamentary Assembly Report, 2015, pp. 4-6). There has been a significant increase in Russian probing activities to gauge NATO’s commitment to the Baltic States over the past two years. Grygiel and Mitchell (2016, p. 43) define Russian probing as a ‘lowmintensity and low-risk test aimed at gauging the opposing state´s power and will to maintain security and influence over a region’. In case of the Baltic States, probing is aimed at the US and the strongest European countries, their power and their will to back up their most exposed allies. As mentioned by Grygiel and Mitchell (2016, p. 122), ‘there is a strong correlation between the existence of alliances in a given region and the effectiveness of deterrence against a threatening power’. Building on the allies’ fear of abandonment and US fear of entrapment in local conflicts, Russia is aiming to hinder their relationships which could ultimately provide Moscow with more room for probing and manoeuvring in the Baltic Region.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Strategic Ambiguity Good › 2nc – link
Mowchan 12 – Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army and an instructor at Center for Strategic Leadership (John, “On the Razor’s Edge: Establishing Indistinct Thresholds for Military Power in Cyberspace” United States Army War College, 4-23-12, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA568852.pdf) //nt-sg
Ambiguous Thresholds. Ambiguous thresholds offer several advantages for employing military power following a hostile cyber-attack against government networks.
First, not establishing red lines allows government leaders the flexibility to tailor response options based on the hostile act, the perpetrator (state or non-state), its effects in the physical and digital world, and how they relate to the current state of affairs in the international system. As such, the employment of military power against a state-based threat would be much different than one against a non-state actor that conducted the same type of attack thus validating the necessity for ambiguous thresholds. For example, in 2009 individuals in China and Russia penetrated computer networks that operate parts of the U.S. electrical power grid. These individuals reportedly inserted malware that could destroy infrastructure components. Although the identities of the perpetrators or their associations with the Russian and Chinese governments were not disclosed, it validates the point that response options must be tailored since a response against hackers or hacktivists would be different from a response against the Chinese or Russian governments.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Strategic Ambiguity Good › 2nc – link
Dr. Jamie Shea 18 - Senior Fellow for Peace, Security and Defence at Friends of Europe and former Deputy Assistant Secretary General for emerging security challenges at NATO. (“Cyberspace as a Domain of Operations What Is NATO’s Vision and Strategy?” MCU Journal vol. 9, no. 2, Fall 2018, ) PJW
To reach these objectives, the alliance needs to become more involved in resilience, mapping its vulnerabilities, and exercising comprehensive business continuity plans. The counterhybrid support teams that the recent NATO summit decided to establish, together with the advisory support teams and lists of trusted suppliers managed by NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning Committee, can help allies ensure and demonstrate the resilience of their critical infrastructures.21 Memoranda of understanding also have been concluded between the NATO staff and 24 of its allies. They provide for points of contact and the sending of cyber rapid reaction teams and enhanced technical measures provided by the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) Technical Centre to stricken allies upon request. These services help allies deal with specific incidents and collectively harness the diversity of the alliance when it comes to recovery options. This comes together with persistent cyberspace defense, which is not just the theoretical capacity to defend but the actual willingness to respond to all the many and regular cyber attacks below the Article 5 threshold. If NATO is only willing to act once this red line has been clearly crossed, and if it then has only heavy military forces with which to respond, it risks miscalculation by an aggressor regarding NATO’s resolve and unity. NATO may end up deterring itself more than the aggressor through fear of escalation and of an outright kinetic conflict. Here, strategic communications have a role to play in demonstrating that NATO is able to wield equivalent force in cyberspace as in the other domains. Increasing the visibility of cyber defense and highlighting the way in which cyber is being integrated into large-scale military exercises, such as the Trident Juncture or Trident Javelin series, conveys a message of capability and resolve. These efforts will not only dissuade would-be aggressors from attempting to intimidate any individual ally but also increase public confidence that NATO is addressing the evolving cyber threat. Some recent opinion pieces in the U.S. media, in particular calling for a “Cyber NATO,” have shown a lack of awareness of just how much effort NATO is actually making in this area.22 In fact, the alliance is already on its third Cyber Defence Policy and associated Cyber Action Plan since 2002.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Strategic Ambiguity Good › 2nc – ambiguity good
Canbolat & Sezgin 16 – Mustafa Canbolat and Emrah Sezgin, Master’s Thesis. [Is NATO ready for a cyberwar? Naval Postgraduate School, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/51662
Due to the difficulty of attributing a cyber-attack, NATO appears to have a pragmatic cyber security posture that handles each attack on a case-by-case basis (Burton, 2015). However, NATO officially stated that “NATO will consider (and potentially implement) a collective Article 5 response to cyber-attacks against NATO members, just as it did in response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11” (Burton, 2015, p. 308). Nevertheless, the threshold for the cyber-attacks that could invoke Article 5 is not certain. The head of NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges division, Jamie Shea stated that “[w]e are keeping that ambiguous so a potential aggressor does not get the idea they can carry out cyber-attacks up to a certain level with impunity” (Ashford, 2014, para. 8). Even though setting a specific and certain threshold would make it easier for NATO to determine when to invoke Article 5 against a cyber-attack, keeping it ambiguous gives an advantageous flexibility to the alliance regardless of the attack or adversary (Jones, 2015).
Article 5 was purposely left vague to give NATO more flexibility to assess a threat and determine a response. Therefore, it is also uncertain what kind of a response NATO would give against a cyber-attack. Would it be a cyber or a kinetic operation against the adversary if Article 5 were triggered? The answer to this question is deliberately left ambiguous, reinforcing NATO’s position that it will evaluate cyber-attacks on case-by-case basis.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Strategic Ambiguity Good › 2nc – ambiguity good
Taddeo 17 - Associate Professor and Senior Research Fellow at Oxford and the Programme Director of the DPhil in Information, Communication and the Social Sciences at the Oxford Internet Institute (Mariarosaria, “Deterrence by Norms to Stop Interstate Cyber Attacks, “ Minds and Machines, September 17, ) //nt-sg
In this scenario, state actors make policy decisions to protect their abilities to launch cyber attacks. ‘Strategic ambiguity’ is one of such decisions. According to this policy, states decide neither to define and nor inform the international community about their red lines—thresholds that once crossed would trigger state response—for non-kinetic cyber attacks (Taddeo 2011). Strategic ambiguity has often been presented as a way to confuse the opponents about the consequences of their cyber attacks. As the US National Intelligence Officer for Cyber Issues officer put it:
Currently most countries, including ours, don’t want to be incredibly specific about the red lines for two reasons: You don’t want to invite people to do anything they want below that red line thinking they’ll be able to do it with impunity, and secondly, you don’t want to back yourself into a strategic corner where you have to respond if they do something above that red line or else lose credibility in a geopolitical sense.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Strategic Ambiguity Good › 2nc – ambiguity good
Jones '15 [Ken; March 2015; MS in Cyber Systems and Operations from the Naval Postgraduate School; "Cyber War: The Next Frontier for NATO," https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45201/15Mar_Jones_Ken.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y]
To answer this question, it is important to look at the first (and only) time NATO invoked an Article 5 response; namely, following the 9/11 attacks on the United States. When the partners of the alliance first wrote the Washington Treaty, it was initially to deter the Russians from expanding and to deter nuclear warfare at the onset of the Cold War. Article 5 is purposefully vague to give NATO considerable room to maneuver. Before the 9/11 attacks led by Al Qaida, it would have been nearly impossible for anyone, anywhere, including the framers of the Washington Treaty, to imagine such an attack. Likewise, at the 2014 summit in Wales, NATO announced that it would and could invoke an Article 5 response to a cyber-attack, and that the ambiguity would stand.158 NATO’s Ambassador Sorin Ducaru, NATO’s assistant secretary general for “emerging security challenges,” made the following remarks:
[T]here’s no predetermined threshold…there was a conscious decision by the allies in this policy that there is benefit in keeping flexibility and ambiguity…article 5 was by design something that should be invoked politically by [member] nations in a specific context, on a case by case basis…article 5 was never designed to be triggered by a certain threshold. The only time it was invoked was after 9/11, which was a scenario that had never been contemplated by the founding partners.159 In this same vein, Christopher Painter, the U.S.’ State Department cyber coordinator said:
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Strategic Ambiguity Good › 2nc – ambiguity good
Takahashi '19 [Sugio; 1/9/19; Chief of Policy Simulation at the National Institute of Defense Studies, MA in Political Science from Waseda University; "Development of gray-zone deterrence: concept building and lessons from Japan’s experience," The Pacific Review, Vol. 31, Issue 6, p. 787-810]
Third aspect of gray zone deterrence is that deterring states should never close the window for escalation. The main reason why the challengers use gray zone threats to change the status quo is that, first, they are discontent with the status quo and, second, they recognize their inferiority in conventional military challenge (Mazzar, 2015). The challenger may choose gray zone creeping expansion, rather than conventional military challenge, because the cost of conventional military challenge would easily exceed potential gain. Therefore, they may refrain from launching the challenge in the first place if they realize that their expansion has plausible risk of escalating to military conflict. The tripwire definitely has an effect that the challenger estimates higher possibility for escalation. If deterring states absolutely refrain from escalating countermeasures, the challenger side can continue gray zone creeping expansion eternally without taking any risk accompanied with escalation. In order to stop them, the deterring side needs to develop robust posture to win the possible war in the case of escalation, and make the challengers recognize the possibility of unfavorable military conflict. The critical role of military force, which cannot be substituted by other toolkit of statecraft, exists in this aspect of gray zone deterrence. And in this context, war-fighting capabilities still have an irreplaceable role to play.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Strategic Ambiguity Good › 2nc – ambiguity good
Canbolat and Sezgin '16 [Mustafa and Emrah; December 2016; PhD in Management Science from McMaster University, Associate Professor of Operations Management and Business Analytics at the State University of New York; MBA as an International Military Officer from the Naval Postgraduate School, Senior Program Manager at Amazon; "Is NATO Ready for a Cyberwar?" https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=810939]
One of the most discussed issues in the international arena after the 9/11 attacks was the Digital Disaster scenario that could be experienced in a member country (Bicakci, 2014). Many countries have incorporated cyber security strategies in their national security strategies in order to address cyber-attacks that could threaten the state. The role of NATO in the case of a serious cyberattack against a member country has been a conundrum.
Due to the difficulty of attributing a cyber-attack, NATO appears to have a pragmatic cyber security posture that handles each attack on a case-by-case basis (Burton, 2015). However, NATO officially stated that “NATO will consider (and potentially implement) a collective Article 5 response to cyber-attacks against NATO members, just as it did in response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11” (Burton, 2015, p. 308). Nevertheless, the threshold for the cyber-attacks that could invoke Article 5 is not certain. The head of NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges division, Jamie Shea stated that “[w]e are keeping that ambiguous so a potential aggressor does not get the idea they can carry out cyber-attacks up to a certain level with impunity” (Ashford, 2014, para. 8). Even though setting a specific and certain threshold would make it easier for NATO to determine when to invoke Article 5 against a cyber-attack, keeping it ambiguous gives an advantageous flexibility to the alliance regardless of the attack or adversary (Jones, 2015).