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2022 Michigan Kritik
IMPACTS › ! – AT: World Getting Better

No link – we agree Empire is an improvement, but it still brings unique forms of violence that demand the alternative

Hardt/Negri ‘2K (Michael Hardt; professor of literature at Duke University. Antonio Negri; independent researcher and philosopher, previously a professor of political science at University of Padua. “Empire” pg 43-44 2000) // ELog

Saying that Empire is good in itself, however, does not mean that it is good for itself. Although Empire may have played a role in putting an end to colonialism and imperialism, it nonetheless constructs its own relationships of power based on exploitation that are in many respects more brutal than those it destroyed. The end of the dialectic of modernity has not resulted in the end of the dialectic of exploitation. Today nearly all of humanity is to some degree absorbed within or subordinated to the networks of capitalist exploitation. We see now an ever more extreme separation of a small minority that controls enormous wealth from multitudes that live in poverty at the limit of powerlessness. The geographical and racial lines of oppression and exploitation that were established during the era of colonialism and imperialism have in many respects not declined but instead increased exponentially. Despite recognizing all this, we insist on asserting that the construction of Empire is a step forward in order to do away with any nostalgia for the power structures that preceded it and refuse any political strategy that involves returning to that old arrangement, such as trying to resurrect the nation-state to protect against global capital. We claim that Empire is better in the same way that Marx insists that capitalism is better than the forms of society and modes of production that came before it. Marx’s view is grounded on a healthy and lucid disgust for the parochial and rigid hierarchies that preceded capitalist society as well as on a recognition that the potential for liberation is increased in the new situation. In the same way today we can see that Empire does away with the cruel regimes of modern power and also increases the potential for liberation.

2022 Michigan Kritik
IMPACTS › ! – AT: Hegemony Solves War

US hegemony facilitates a new age cold war – only a multilateral world order can stop the self-fulfilling narratives of the affirmative

KOTZ & YANG 22 (David M. Kotz - Professor Emeritus of Economics and Senior Research Fellow in the Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst. Qingmei Yang - PhD candidate at the School of Marxism, Tsinghua University.) (2022): On the New Cold War Promoted by the US Government Against China—Interview with Professor David M. Kotz, International Critical Thought, DOI: 10.1080/21598282.2022.2093052//vivi

I already mentioned some things that are relevant to this question. The global economy has benefited from the international exchange between China and the rest of the world. American working people have gotten access to high quality products at lower prices made in China. Initially this consisted of more low-tech products like clothing and toys, and more recently computers and cell phones. I’m doing this interview right now on a made-in-China Lenovo computer, which works very well. Also, as I already mentioned, many American capitalists have benefited. On the other hand, some American workers have lost jobs when production of the products of their workplace moved from the US to China. However, the right way to deal with that is not to promote hostility to a developing country, but to enact government policies that provide good jobs for people who lose their jobs through no fault of their own but because of being displaced by imports in the US. The government could follow such policies to ensure workers against being harmed by the way global capitalist competition operates. Capitalism always tends to put working people in conflict with each other and countries in conflict with each other. It’s one of its many problems. But a worse threat of a new cold war is it tends not only to worsen global economic performance and global economic advance, but it undermines global cooperation between the US and China that is very necessary to confront such challenges as climate change and pandemics. That is a very big cost. And even more serious is the danger of war. The US leadership doesn’t want war with China, but it could happen as a result of the US cold war policy due to miscalculation. Specialists who study the US-China military interactions argue that there is a dangerously high chance of an accidental armed conflict starting between the US and China. I’ve read that it is particularly dangerous because China has a significant advantage in conven- tional weaponry in the area around its borders, which are very far from US borders. And China has more ships, etc. So, if an armed conflict began, the US side might be faced with the choice between losing the conflict or initiating a nuclear strike. So, it would be a very dangerous situation. There is an organization in the US that formed about six months ago called the Committee for a SANE U.S.-China Policy. The name is modeled after a famous organization from the days of the nuclear arms race in the 1950s and 1960s called the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy that in the end was very influential in getting nuclear bomb testing halted and arms control agreements signed between the US and the Soviet Union. The Committee for a SANE U.S.-China Policy is run by progressive activists who are concerned about world peace. It focuses on demanding that the US change its policy toward China. It has been doing very good work in exposing the dangers of this new cold war. It has been warning that it may lead to a hot war and the US has to change its policies as soon as possible. QY: What could be done by both governments in order to avoid harmful consequences? DK: Let me start with the US side. In my view, the US government should turn away from promoting a new cold war. The US government should accept China and all other states as equal partners in the world, giving up the drive to dominate the world. The US government should adopt some of the practices China has followed such as industrial policy, big investments in science and technology, infrastructure investment, and even some state-owned enterprises, particularly in the financial sector. These would be very helpful for stabilizing the US economy and assuring that credit flows to productive pur- poses rather than speculation. But such policies should be undertaken not to target another country, not to defeat another country, not to keep the US dominant as is the case with the USICA I mentioned before, but to strengthen and improve the US econ- omy. Such an approach would benefit the American people and people in other countries who buy US products.

2022 Michigan Kritik
IMPACTS › ! – AT: Extinction Outweighs

The affs try-or-die mindset facilitates mass psychosis – their framing is over coded by mass psychosis, means that they can never prioritize ethical subjectivities – results in menticide

OLIVER 22 (Bert Olivier - Department of Philosophy, University of the Free State, research in Psychoanalysis, poststructuralism, ecological philosophy and the philosophy of technology, Literature, cinema, architecture and Aesthetics), 2022 "(PDF) PEER-REVIEWED ARTICLE Therapeutic reflections on the 'pandemic'," ResearchGate,

MASS PSYCHOSIS A concise and perspicacious account of the phenomenon of mass psychosis is encountered in a 20-minute video titled ‘MASS PSYCHOSIS — How an Entire Population Becomes MENTALLY ILL’, produced by After Skool and Academy of Ideas (2021; see also Neil Oliver, 2021). Confirming what was argued at the outset in this article about the parallel between the current state of affairs and the European ‘witch craze’ of the 16th and 17th centuries, the makers of this video actually note the same resemblance, also adding the other parallel, namely the rise of totalitarianism in the 20th century (think of the persecution of the Jews in Nazi Germany). They characterise ‘mass psychosis’ as an ‘epidemic of madness’ that emerges when a large percentage of a society somehow ‘loses touch with reality’ and develops a delusional outlook. They also note the moral and spiritual degeneration on the part of people who are drawn into the vortex of such a mass psychosis, which is accompanied by increasing unreasonableness, irresponsibility, emotional instability, and unreliability. Echoing the views of Le Bon and Freud on group behaviour (discussed earlier), it is pointed out that a psychotic group is likely to commit atrocities that individuals would normally refrain from. (This resonates with some of the video material circulating globally, not on mainstream media, but on social platforms like WhatsApp and Telegram, of unbelievable, quasi-psychotic—and morally speaking, unforgivable—behaviour of Australian police officers towards ‘unvaccinated’ people.) The video voiceover also discusses the psychogenesis of the collective craze in question, noting the ‘panic phase’ on the part of individuals that are scared by inexplicable events. This is a clear reference to the quick succession of events that followed the outbreak of a virus epidemic in Wuhan, China, towards the end of 2019. In the wake of this, the ‘novel coronavirus’ rapidly spread around the world, accompanied by what was fear-inspiring pronouncements by the World Health Organization (WHO) and other health organisations, as well as governments, which resulted in national lockdowns of different degrees of severity (Olivier, 2021). Understandably this gave rise to what quickly became endemic fear of contagion and panic in the face of a deadly pathogen. Moreover, in the development of mass psychosis, the video informs one, the initial panic typically makes way for a stage of ‘psychotic insight’, where fear-inducing experience is alleviated by the invention of an illogical, (quasi-)magical, and reassuring explanation of the (frightening) state of affairs. Under present ‘pandemic’ conditions this seems to apply to at least two things: the initial account of a natural, zoonotic origin of the virus, and the later, competing account of an accidental (but possibly deliberate), leak of a genetically engineered coronavirus, and secondly (more significantly), the present tendency, globally (on the part of PSYCHOTHERAPY AND POLITICS INTERNATIONAL 13 OLIVIER PEER-REVIEWED ARTICLE: THERAPEUTIC REFLECTIONS ON THE ‘PANDEMIC’ government representatives and the mainstream media), to play the ‘vaccinated’ off against the ‘unvaccinated’ with statements such as that we are witnessing ‘a pandemic of the unvaccinated’ (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC] Director Rochelle Walensky on NBC News, 2021). Someone who makes such statements ignores those virologists who point out that the ‘unvaccinated’ are not the ones who are causally responsible for the emerging so-called ‘variants’, but that these are attributable to the fact that the virus mutates in ‘vaccinated’ people, in response to the ‘vaccines’. As stated by well-known virologist Geert Vanden Bossche (2021), ‘Mass vaccination with imperfect vaccines is prone to promoting propagation of naturally selected, spike(S)-directed immune escape variants in the population, and ongoing campaigns are causing the population to place even more pressure on viral infectiousness.’ (para. 5). Nevertheless, to those who have fallen prey to the mass psychosis in question, putting the blame on the ‘unvaccinated’ seems like a stroke of genius that explains the fear-inducing situation. Addressing this situation by attempting to force the ‘unvaccinated’ to ‘take the shot’ seems to be a magical antidote to their own fears, but does not alleviate the mass psychosis; in fact, it exacerbates this condition In the video under consideration the concept of ‘menticide’—the killing of the mind—is introduced to explain how large numbers of people are subjected to control. In the discussion it becomes clear that menticide amounts to the systematic destruction of the human spirit and of free, uncensored thought. The prior stage of fearmongering and social division or isolation prepares the way for menticide. This enables the ruling elite to impose its own (delusional) ideology on society, which functions to exacerbate the mass psychosis in question in so far as it offers a (misleading) framework for understanding the dystopian events that are occurring. It comes as no surprise, therefore, to find that, where menticide happens, totalitarianism is easily established; in fact, menticide is a constituent of totalitarian rule, in so far as a society constructed on delusions lends itself to totalitarianism. The creators of the ‘Mass Psychosis’ video further discuss the highly relevant work of Joost Meerloo, who wrote The Rape of the Mind (2009). The pertinence of his work becomes apparent where they note that: ‘Confusion heightens the susceptibility of a descent into the delusions of totalitarianism’ (After Skool and Academy of Ideas, 2021, 11:53). Referring to the historical example of Adolf Hitler, Meerloo states that: There is another important weapon the totalitarians use in their campaign to frighten the world into submission. This is the weapon of psychological shock. Hitler kept his enemies in a state of constant confusion and diplomatic upheaval...Hitler was never logical, because he knew that that was what he was expected to be. Logic can be met with logic, while illogic cannot – it confuses those who think straight. The Big Lie and monotonously repeated nonsense have more emotional appeal in a cold war than logic and reason. While the enemy is still searching for a reasonable counter-argument to the first lie, the totalitarians can assault him with another. (2009, p. 70)

2022 Michigan Kritik
IMPACTS › ! – AT: AFF Outweighs

Aff’s arbitration and moderation of violence actually perpetuates the logic of violence, which is the root of the aff’s impacts

Weizman, 2011. (Eyal, professor of spatial and visual cultures at Goldsmiths University of London, founder of the collective Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency in Bethleham. The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza. Verso Publishers, Print copy, page 2-4)

Divine examination, evaluation, calculation and choice operate thus within a complex economy in which good and bad could be transferred and exchanged. Because in this economy all bad things necessarily appear at their minimum possible level, the world as lived is always necessarily the best of all possible worlds. 'If a lesser evil is relatively good,' Leibniz reasoned, 'so a lesser good is relatively evil ... to show that an architect could have done better is to find faults in his work. ' If this description of the economy of divine government is already reminiscent of the logic of contemporary wars, with its own scales of risk and proportionality used to evaluate the desired and undesired consequences of military acts, it is hardly surprising to find in it an early reflection on the concept of 'collateral damage'. Earlier Christian theology has indeed already described all bad things that take place as 'the collateral effects of the good'. In this immanent order of human and divine life, the destructive result of floods are nothing but the collateral effect of necessary rain. In both their theological and military contexts, as Giorgio Agamben observed, the collateral effects are structural rather than accidental. It is through the collateral - flood or blood - that a government -divine or human- can demonstrate, indeed exercise, its power. Unlike the calculations of a God, seen by the philosophers and the theologians of the eighteenth century as a perfect mathematician who could undertake instantaneous calculations and immediately arrive at a precise result, mere humans must of course guess, speculate and hedge their risks as they proceed towards the future as the blind leading the blind. It is for this reason that they ceaselessly seek to develop and perfect all sorts of technologies and techniques that might allow them to calculate the effects of violence and might harness its consequences. It is these techniques and technologies, apparatuses and spatial arrangements, that are at the heart of this book. Through them, Pangloss's Leibnizian scheme- or is it Leibniz's Panglossian scheme?-of the 'best of all possible worlds' re-emerges in the progressive tradition of liberalism. Here, in its secularized form, political rather than metaphysical, a similar structure of the argument sets up the sphere of morality as a set of calculations aimed to approximate the optimum proportion between common goods and necessary evils? But as the general outlook of liberalism shifted from Voltaire's and indeed Jeremy Bentham's later focus on the 'greater good' and the responsibility of government to increase happiness to the greatest number of people, to the liberal canards of 'just wars', and their increasingly sophisticated technologies for minimizing the number of 'necessary' corpses, the search for 'the best of all possible worlds' started giving ground to the present neo-Panglossian pessimism of the 'least of all possible evils'. This book engages with the problem of violence in its moderation and minimization, mostly with state violence that is managed according to a similar economy of calculations and justified as the least possible means. The fundamental point of this book is that the moderation of violence is part of the very logic of violence. Humanitarianism, human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL), when abused by state, supra-state and military action, have become the crucial means by which the economy of violence is calculated and managed. A dose reading of a series of case studies will show how, at present, spatial organizations and physical instruments, technical standards, procedures and systems of monitoring - the complex humanitarian assemblage that philosopher Adi Ophir called ‘moral technologies' - have become the means for exercising contemporary violence and for governing the displaced, the enemy and the unwanted. The condition of collusion of these technologies of humanitarianism, human rights and humanitarian law with military and political powers is referred to in this book as 'the humanitarian present'. Within this present condition, all political oppositions are replaced by the elasticity of degrees, negotiations, proportions and balances.

2022 Michigan Kritik
IMPACTS › ! – AT: AFF Outweighs

Lesser evil calculations allow for a continuing justification of unethical acts in the name of the greater good. Their approach to politics creates a constant state of exception which is counterproductive and justifies torture and necropolitics

Weizman, 2011. (Eyal, professor of spatial and visual cultures at Goldsmiths University of London, founder of the collective Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency in Bethleham. The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza. Verso Publishers, Print copy, page 6-10)

If, as a friend recently suggested, we ought to construct a monument to our present political culture as a homage to the principle of the 'lesser evil', it should be made in the form of the digits 6-6-5 built of concrete blocks, and installed like the Hollywood sign on hillsides or other high points overlooking city centres. This number, one less than the number of the beast -that of the devil and of total evil- might capture the essence of our humanitarian present obsessed -with the calculations and calibrations that seek to moderate, ever so slightly, the evils that it has largely caused itself. The principle of the lesser evil is often presented as a dilemma between two or more bad choices in situations where available options are, or seem to be, limited. The choice made justifies the pursuit of harmful actions that would be otherwise deemed unacceptable in the hope of averting even greater suffering. Sometimes the principle is presented as the optimal result of a general field of calculations that seeks to compare, measure and evaluate different bad consequences in relation to necessary acts, and then to minimize those consequences. Both aspects of the principle are understood as taking place within a dosed system in which those posing the dilemma, the options available for choice, the factors to be calculated and the very parameters of calculation are unchallenged. Each calculation is undertaken anew, as if the previous accumulation of events has not taken place, and the future implications are out of bounds. Those who seek to justify necessary evils as 'lesser' ones, especially when searching for a rationale to explain recent wars and military expeditions, like to appeal to the work of the fourth-century North African philosopher-theologian St Augustine. Augustine's rejection of the principle of Manichaeism- a world divided into equally powerful good and evil - meant that he no longer saw evil as the perfect mirror image of the good; rather, in platonic terms, as a measure of its absence. Since evil, unlike good, is not perfect and absolute, it is forever measured and calibrated on a differential scale of more and less, greater and lesser. Augustine taught that it is not permissible to practise lesser evils, because to do so violates the Pauline principle 'do no evil that good may come'. But- and here lies its appeal -lesser evils might be tolerated when they are deemed necessary and unavoidable, or when perpetrating an evil results in the reduction of the overall amount of evil in the world. One of the examples Augustine gives for such an economy of lesser and greater evils is a robbery on a crossroads. It is to this crossroads that other theologists, philosophers and political theorists will return, to this day, when discussing the dilemma. In Augustine's logic of pre-emption, it is better to kill the would-be assailant before he kills an innocent traveler. A millennium later and the armies of Western Christendom passed through this ethicotheological needle-eye-sized loophole on their way to the catalogue of pillage and destruction that constituted the crusades. More recently, Pope Benedict has appealed to the lesser evil principle in a decree permitting the use of condoms in places inflicted -with high rates of HIV. Similar to the latter logic of contraception, some in the Vatican thought that implicit support of the government of Silvio Berlusconi, albeit plagued by sin, ridicule and corruption, might after all be considered as the lesser evil in protecting Christian values. In cases such as these, the economy of the lesser ev-il is always cited as a justification for breaching rigid rules and entrenched dogma; indeed, it is often used by those in power as the primary justification for the very notion of 'exception'. In fact, Augustine's discourse of the lesser evil developed at a time when the church had started to participate in the political government of its subjects and had acquired considerable financial and military power. Through the ages, the Christian church increasingly saw its task as keeping human evil to its minimum level. It pastorally ruled over a vast and complex intrapersonal economy of merits and faults -of sin, vice and virtue- operating according to specific rules of circulation and transfer, with procedures, analyzes, calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of a specific interplay between conflicting goods and degrees of evil. In his lectures on the origins of governmentality, Michel Foucault argued that, on the basis of this 'economical theology', the modern, secular form of governmental power has itself taken on the form of an economy.10 Lesser Evildoers The theological origins of the lesser evil argument still cast a long shadow on the present. In fact the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts - from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the 'war on terror' and the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid- that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the term 'good'. Moreover, the very evocation of the 'good' seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. In relation to the 'war on terror', the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights scholar and leader of Canada's Liberal Party Michael lgnatieff. In his book The Lesser Evil, Ignatieff suggested that in 'balancing liberty against security' liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extrajuridical violence - which he saw as lesser evils - in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states. If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. 'Exceptions', Ignatieff states, 'do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort. '12 The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatic compromise, a 'tolerated sin' that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this model takes part in a necro-economy in which various types of destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greatest harm. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles: keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace. Niore recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed by lgnatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves. Lesser evil arguments are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture, to the use of (sometimes) non-lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even 'the intentional targeting of some civilians if it could save more innocent lives than they cost’. In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucy of the 'banality of evil' as the idiom to describe the most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization. Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an 'enlightened' manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatia-technological means of domination, and advertises them as 'humanitarian technology'. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation bringing together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even according to the terms of an economy of losses and gains, the concept of the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated - and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulatively.

2022 Michigan Kritik
IMPACTS › ! – Root Cause – Capitalism

We control the I/L to cap – capitalism is sustained through the creation of “bare-life”

OLIVER 22 – (Bert Olivier - Department of Philosophy, University of the Free State, research in Psychoanalysis, poststructuralism, ecological philosophy and the philosophy of technology, Literature, cinema, architecture and Aesthetics), 2022 "Beyond Agamben’s ‘Homo Sacer’ – the ‘pandemic’ as final reduction of humanity to ‘bare life", https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Bert-Olivier/publication/361054041_Beyond_Agamben's_'Homo_Sacer'_-the_'pandemic'_as_final_reduction_of_humanity_to_'bare_life'/links/6299eb3a55273755ebcf2bc9/Beyond-Agambens-Homo-Sacer-the-pandemic-as-final-reduction-of-humanity-to-bare-life.pdf//vivi

Engineered economic collapse The deliberate destruction of the world economy, with the purpose of ushering in a new, digital banking system, which is already underway (see, e.g. Owen 2021) – the ultimate goal of the people driving the ‘pandemic’ and everything associated with it – is a difficult topic to research, given the scarcity of direct evidence in a univocal manner. That is, one is faced with a set of conditions that is open to different interpretations. This projected new financial system, where all ‘programmable money’ – actually, ‘vouchers’ disguised as money – will be centrally controlled and used to control people, by disallowing the purchase of certain items and allowing the purchase of others (Wallace 2021), is a more difficult topic to write about compared to the lethal vaccines, given the abundantly available, incontrovertible evidence concerning the latter. Nevertheless, some such evidence, in the form of the assessments of the current situation by authorities in the fields of finance and economics, is available. A summary of their findings is encountered in the video-interview conducted by Maria Zeee (2022: 33 min. 22 secs) with Dr Reiner Fuellmich, the lawyer leading wide-ranging investigations into different aspects of the ‘pandemic’, where he remarks that, “…whatever we’re seeing, it is two things: deliberate destruction of our economies; deliberate destruction of our health”. As the rest of the video-interview sets out, these things are being engineered by the global elites known variously as the globalist cabal, the Davos clique or the billionaire elites, and in the process people are treated as ‘bare life’. Starting on 5 February 2022 Dr Fuellmich and his team commenced what they called GRAND JURY – The Court of Public Opinion (2022), where panels of authorities in relevant fields addressed ‘pandemic’-related topics at length, including PCR-tests, Injections, Eugenics and Financial Destruction, on different days. The latter topic was dealt with by, among others, Patrick Wood (editor and producer of Technocracy.News), who – having reconstructed the historical events leading up to and preparing for, the corona virus ‘pandemic’ – listed the following nine “Ways to destroy capitalism” (GRAND JURY 2022; 23 min. 18 sec), that is, the current hegemonic global economic system, to prepare for a fully digital economy: “Withdraw energy…; Withdraw resources…; Corrupt the supply chain…; Withdraw labour…; Withdraw financing, capital…; Limit consumption…; Limit

2022 Michigan Kritik
IMPACTS › ! – Subjectivity

Empire’s deterritorializing and biopolitical nature results in a collapse of autonomy replaced by a constant conditioning of imperial subjectivity

Hardt/Negri ‘2K (Michael Hardt; professor of literature at Duke University. Antonio Negri; independent researcher and philosopher, previously a professor of political science at University of Padua. “Empire” pg 195-198 2000) // ELog

The progressive lack of distinction between inside and outside has important implications for the social production of subjectivity. One of the central and most common theses of the institutional analyses proposed by modern social theory is that subjectivity is not pre-given and original but at least to some degree formed in the field of social forces. In this sense, modern social theory progressively emptied out any notion of a presocial subjectivity and instead grounded the production of subjectivity in the functioning of major social institutions, such as the prison, the family, the factory, and the school. Two aspects of this production process should be highlighted. First, subjectivity is a constant social process of generation. When the boss hails you on the shop floor, or the high school principal hails you in the school corridor, a subjectivity is formed. The material practices set out for the subject in the context of the institution (be they kneeling down to pray or changing hundreds of diapers) are the production processes of subjectivity. In a reflexive way, then, through its own actions, the subject is acted on, generated. Second, the institutions provide above all a discrete place (the home, the chapel, the classroom, the shop floor) where the production of subjectivity is enacted. The various institutions of modern society should be viewed as an archipelago of factories of subjectivity. In the course of a life, an individual passes linearly into and out of these various institutions (from the school to the barracks to the factory) and is formed by them. The relation between inside and outside is fundamental. Each institution has its own rules and logics of subjectivation: ‘‘School tells us, ‘You’re not at home anymore’; the army tells us, ‘You’re not in school anymore.’ ’’ 18 Nevertheless, within the walls of each institution the individual is at least partially shielded from the forces of the other institutions; in the convent one is normally safe from the apparatus of the family, at home one is normally out of reach of factory discipline. This clearly delimited place of the institutions is reflected in the regular and fixed form of the subjectivities produced. In the passage to imperial society, the first aspect of the modern condition is certainly still the case, that is, subjectivities are still produced in the social factory. In fact, the social institutions produce subjectivity in an ever more intense way. We might say that postmodernism is what you have when the modern theory of social constructivism is taken to its extreme and all subjectivity is recognized as artificial. How is this possible, however, when today, as nearly everyone says, the institutions in question are everywhere in crisis and continually breaking down? This general crisis does not necessarily mean that the institutions no longer produce subjectivity. What has changed, rather, is the second condition: that is, the place of the production of subjectivity is no longer defined in this same way. The crisis means, in other words, that today the enclosures that used to define the limited space of the institutions have broken down so that the logic that once functioned primarily within the institutional walls now spreads across the entire social terrain. Inside and outside are becoming indistinguishable. This omni-crisis of the institutions looks very different in different cases. For example, continually decreasing proportions of the U.S. population are involved in the nuclear family, while steadily increasing proportions are confined to prisons. Both institutions, however, the nuclear family and the prison, are equally in crisis, in the sense that the place of their effectivity is increasingly indeterminate. One should not think that the crisis of the nuclear family has brought a decline in the forces of patriarchy. On the contrary, discourses and practices of ‘‘family values’’ seem to be everywhere across the social field. The old feminist slogan ‘‘The personal is the political’’ has been reversed in such a way that the boundaries between public and private have fractured, unleashing circuits of control throughout the ‘‘intimate public sphere.’’ 19 In a similar way the crisis of the prison means that carceral logics and techniques have increasingly spread to other domains of society. The production of subjectivity in imperial society tends not to be limited to any specific places. One is always still in the family, always still in school, always still in prison, and so forth. In the general breakdown, then, the functioning of the institutions is both more intensive and more extensive. The institutions work even though they are breaking down—and perhaps they work all the better the more they break down. The indefiniteness of the place of the production corresponds to the indeterminacy of the form of the subjectivities produced. The imperial social institutions might be seen, then, in a fluid process of the generation and corruption of subjectivity. This passage is not isolated to the dominant countries and regions, but tends to be generalized to different degrees across the world. The apologia of colonial administration always celebrated its establishment of social and political institutions in the colonies, institutions that would constitute the backbone of a new civil society. Whereas in the process of modernization the most powerful countries export institutional forms to the subordinated ones, in the present process of postmodernization, what is exported is the general crisis of the institutions. The Empire’s institutional structure is like a software program that carries a virus along with it, so that it is continually modulating and corrupting the institutional forms around it. The imperial society of control is tendentially everywhere the order of the day.

2022 Michigan Kritik
IMPACTS › ! – Nuclear War

Petras 20 James Petras is a retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton, New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada who has published on political issues with particular focus on Latin America and the Middle East, imperialism, globalization, and leftist social movements US Imperialism: The Changing Dynamics of Global Power

Because the miliarial imperialized state prioritizes conflict and sanctions with Russia, Iran, and Syria it has failed to deepen and expand its economic ties with Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The political and economic conquest of East Europe and parts of the USSR has lost significance. The perpetual lost wars in the Middle East, North Africa and the Caucasus have weakened the imperial state’s capacity for empire building in Asia and Latin America.

The outflow of wealth and domestic cost of perpetual wars have eroded the electoral foundations of empire building. Only a fundamental change in composition of the imperial state and a re-orientation priorities toward economic expansion can alter the current decline empire. The danger that as the militarist-Zionist imperialist state pursues losing wars it may escalate and raise the ante and move toward a major confrontation: an empire amidst nuclear ashes!

2022 Michigan Kritik
IMPACTS › ! – Hegemony

As the US became the only global superpower at the turn of the 1990’s it began enforcing ITS global agenda and rule upon every global nation, dominating institutions in civil society, while isolating those that disagree, meaning that a large part of global affairs are controlled by the US

Diaconescu and Mazilu 21, Doctoral School of Sciences, University of Craiova, Field of Geography, Craiova, Romania “USA, Europe’s Geopolitical Moon: World Domination by the European population, Located on both sides of the North and South”

The US adopted a series of rules, models and restrictions, values and customs that were first implemented by Western European states, this step giving the impression of unanimous global will. Thus: Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel or South Africa further took over the new models to follow and from here the whole planet. In this way, the US dollar, the UN institution, the rules of the WHO, UNESCO, UNICEF, FAO and so on, the decisions of the courts and centers of justice and responsibility, human rights or the seas, with headquarters, were put in value in The Hague, San Francisco, Paris or Hamburg, the decision to increase GDP, centers, institutions, NGOs or all sorts of scales that said what is beautiful and ugly, trendy or disgusting, which occupies the first or last places, everything being evaluated by the USA or its dominated institutions. In the same way, the news was written, the public perception was shaped, and the instigation of hatred or praise of a leader or a country left the USA, while the economic restrictions adopted by the USA to the states it considered "bad" were followed by similar measures in the states of Western Europe and from here on in the other countries, leading to the isolation of the state that does not respect American values. The numerous state organizations culminating in a globalization at the global level, was also adopted from here, and the value of the forms listed on American exchanges or in the centers dominated by it, made everyone have a behavior, manifestation and trust after the dictation started by Americans, the USA becoming especially after 1990, the only world superpower. Just as a man who tries to impose his will and way of thinking, finds much more success if he holds the first position in an institution or the place of president in a country or a company, after him the first row of people, parties, specialists taking over the intention and further promoting it in a continuous branch to the base, so the US sat at the top of a pyramid created by it, in which Europe occupies the next step followed by the main US allies, held somewhat in this state and their attachment to Europe, from here descending in steps to less and less obedient states but also with low decision-making power. But the basis of this pyramid is made up of less perceptible states such as those in Africa, or those who tend to seek external alliances such as Latin America, those who want to cut off the top that submits them as the European Union does,, cultural model, army or euro, no longer wants submission to the US, but also the rapid rise of the Asian economy with the end of the population explosion here, makes the US no longer be placed as a pinnacle on the pyramid and will rather a peak in unstable and centrifugal circles trying to carve its own geopolitical path.

2022 Michigan Kritik
IMPACTS › ! – Commons

Empire’s biopolitical control produces subjects oriented towards production – that cascades into resource privatization, biodiversity loss, environmental destruction, and social inequality

Bazzul/Tolbert ’17 (Jesse Bazzul; professor of science and environmental education at University of Regina. Sara Tolbert; professor of science education University of Arizona. “Reassembling the Natural and Social Commons” ) // ELog

Creating and preserving a ‘common world for all’ is not so much a call, as it is a chorus. The need to continually make the commons grow exceeds the grossly uneven distribution of natural resources and wealth between the global elite and the impoverished majority.1 Witness the scientific designation of our current geological moment, the Anthropocene, a moment in Earth’s history so marked by the activity of one primate species that geologists have proposed an entirely new unit of geological time, where human destructiveness will remain biologically and geologically evident for tens of millions of years on planet Earth (Lewis and Maslin, 2015). The Anthropocene’s extinction rate is ‘100 to 1,000 times higher than normal background rates, and probably constitutes the beginning of the sixth mass extinction in Earth’s history’ (p.  172). In the last 40 years, Earth has lost half its wildlife diversity (Carrington, 2014). While we use the term Anthropocene for the sake of its increasingly widespread recognition, we want to highlight some of its limitations: 1. It renders less visible the populations of humans who have lived for thousands of years and maintained a more productive symbiotic relationship within their material/ecological communities and 2. It disguises the central role of patriarchy capitalism in the rapid (and recent) environmental destruction that distinguishes the Anthropocene from other epochs (see Moore, 2016). However, we argue that educational communities should be fixed on the predicament of rapid environmental destruction within the more recent history of the Anthropocene, along with the widening social inequality that is inseparable from it. Instead, current education reforms position schooling as an apparatus of social control and human capital (re)production. Resistance to these reforms involves preserving and producing a shared world in-common, for example through the free sharing of intellectual labor, protesting the inaccessibility of higher education (e.g. in Canada, Chile), high stakes testing opt-outs in the United States, massive demonstrations and strikes against neoliberal education reforms among teachers, youth, and families (e.g. in Detroit, Chicago, Mexico City), eco-justice educational movements that re-appropriate land for food access, and indigenous education movements that center collective priorities and communal politics (see Barronet and Ortega Brena, 2008). This chapter argues for educational practices that (re)engage the commons (Means, 2013; Mueller, 2008). We outline a theoretical context for the natural and social commons as pedagogical concepts, synthesizing the two in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) concept of assemblages in order to highlight political possibilities of the commons for critical education. In modernity, knowledge of the natural world has been shielded from proper political reckoning, and the importance of protecting and producing a shared commons obscured. As an ethico-political concept, we can view the commons as the natural and social worlds, or wealth, to which ‘we’ have shared, equal access. This definition is difficult to apply today, nor does it reflect the relational ethic of many indigenous communities in which humans are understood as part of, not separate from, the natural world (e.g. the Lakota mitakuye oyasin, or ‘all my relations’ and the Maori kaitiakanga or ‘guardianship, protection’ as in of/for the natural world). Though we often view parks, conservation areas, and nature reserves as common spaces, they are seldom accessible to all humans, nor to the biota that are ‘pushed out’ to make way for ornamental plants, animals, and other microscopic ‘critters’. To afford nature a ‘political imagination’, and politics the materiality it needs for enactment, ‘social’ and ‘natural’ distinctions must be blurred, while recognizing that traditional linguistic, scientific, and cultural constraints will resist such blurrings. According to philosopher Bruno Latour (2009) one reason for our current environmental mess and growing social inequality is because Eurocentric notions of politics and nature have historically been kept separate; the former confined to what ‘should be’ while the later ‘what is’. This fundamental schism has successfully functioned to keep politics out of the ‘study’ of nature, and ‘nature’ out of the practice of politics, moral philosophy, and ethics. From the onset of the Anthropocene, humans are themselves a geologic force. In a provocative way, educators must recognize allusions to ‘nature’, all that is non-human or non-artificial, as ideological. The ideological character of nature as static other can be seen not only by continued disregard for ecological realities, but also from the ‘voice of warning’ when scientific breakthroughs reposition our place within an unquestioned conceptualization of ‘nature’. Rejecting nature as unquestionable backdrop to which we must always ‘return’, is essential to asking big questions that link the ‘social and the natural’. For example, Slavoj Žižek (2011) stresses that considerations of capital cannot be divorced from questions of nature and puts it this way: ‘how are we going to think the link between the social history of Capital and the much larger geological changes of the conditions of life on Earth’?2 One important lesson of structuralism is precisely that the taken-for-granted should be refused. When Roland Barthes writes, ‘the “natural” is in short, the ultimate outrage’ (Barthes, 1977, p. 85), we should understand a fuller ontological meaning to natural—the outrage comes not just from rendering the historical and political as natural, but the ‘natural as natural’! If humans are inseparable from nature, then nature itself is always already ideological. This undoing of the modern culture–nature divide is a necessary part of what Hardt and Negri (2009) call altermodernity. That is, shedding the controlling aspects of modernity, colonialism and private property, and grasping modernity’s creative, immanent powers needed for creative labor and new political and educational practices that promote a multiplicity of differences and production of the commons (Hardt and Negri, 2000; Hardt & Negri, 2013). Combining the natural and social commons requires a creative refocus on virtual/actual ontological frameworks that allow their interplay. As Vine Deloria and Daniel Wildcat (2001) point out, Indigenous thought and practices have long fused the ‘natural’ and the political and promoted communal living between humans and non-humans. Modern ecology and indigenous models of politics and ethics have much in common: they are both about complex relationships between living organisms and their environments. Indigenous thought has, in my mind, one key advantage: it sees the ecosystem as the appropriate site for the study of politics and ethics. (Deloria and Wildcat, 2001, p. 139) If the commons serve as the grounds for education for emancipation, how do we envision its immanent potential in classrooms and movements for social and ecological justice? We argue here that assemblage theory, in short, the fusing of material and discursive parts in social analyses, adds a much needed ontological dimension to education research and critical pedagogy. Clayton Pierce (2015) cautions that the neoliberal restructuring of schools does not allow teachers and students to take the view that both humans and non-humans have agency, precisely because agency is geared toward (bio) capitalist ends through entrepreneurship and commodification. The prefix ‘bio’ describes our current political reality where forms of life, including educational life, have become the focus of modern governance and control. Pierce stresses the double meaning of ‘bio’ in biocapitalism. In one sense, a new form of modern governance, and capitalism, that reaches into every corner of human social life to reproduce the subjectivities and modes of living needed to reproduce the social order. However, ‘bio’ also means the harnessing of all powers of life—literally the commodification or mobilization of DNA, cells, genes, etc. for the purposes of capital. Education must not only produce and nurture a world-in-common, but also challenge the enclosure of the commons—that is, exploitation of what is common (forests, groundwater, and ideas) for private interests and the production of capital. Neoliberal, global capitalist enclosure of the commons is perhaps the key political battle for education for the twentyfirst century (see Means, 2014; Slater, 2014). Hendersen and Hursh (2014) outline the biopolitical nature of our current moment—resistance to neoliberal reforms will come from below through production of the commons. Part 1: The Commons as an Emancipatory Pedagogical Concept As stated above, privatization (or enclosure) of the commons is dangerous because it values biotic and abiotic entities as private commodities for certain individuals, not communities or the commons. The private commodification of water in California by Nestle™ is a good example of profit accumulation destroying the commons. Yet, resistance to privatization is growing. Urban populations are consistently creating the commons through shared struggles of collective existence, and the creation of ‘ecological space’ (Hardt and Negri, 2004). Indigenous peoples’ ecologically and community-oriented sense of place is highly threatening to the goals of capital because indigenous ways of being often do not rely on products from global capitalist commodity chains (Peña, 2014; Wildcat, 2009). However, the struggle to produce and preserve the commons is not just about commodities, but the (re)production of subjectivities needed to produce the commons (Hardt and Negri, 2009). Graham Slater (2014) encourages educators to move beyond an exclusively anthropocentric notion of the commons as shared human language, communication, and by extension, culture. Although this is an invaluable aspect of the common, it is limited insofar as it asserts the primacy of verbal communication in social production and centers an anthropocentric vision of communicative relationships in which meaningful and responsive relationships with nonhuman animals and environments are subordinated to intraspecies dialogue … This shortcoming is not a fatal flaw in Hardt and Negri’s conceptualization of the common, rather, it indicates the need to embrace this antagonism as the grounds for elaborating a more fully ecological theorization of the common. (p. 547) Slater emphasizes an antagonistic version of the commons, for example one that does not let settler colonists feel comfortable with a social commons that forgets destructive colonial realities. Indeed, the commons has a history—a social, colonial, ecological, geological, mythological, philosophical, and theological past. While there is some recognition that we share ecological habitats, with the rise of immaterial labor and its cultural, cognitive, artistic, intellectual and affective products that can be shared in common, our current notion of the commons needs to expand. The (bio)political potential of immaterial labor is that the ideas, signs, and affects required for (bio)capitalist growth, rely on interconnectivity and free sharing—paradoxically, what global (bio) capitalism needs to grow is anti-thetical to the rule of private property. A recent article in The Guardian on the ‘end of capitalism’ articulates this well: By building business models and share valuations based on the capture privatisation of all socially produced information, such firms are constructing a fragile corporate edifice at odds with the most basic need of humanity, which is to use ideas freely. (Mason, 2015) The old ‘logic of scarcity’ rule that is widely seen to drive economies and resource development also needs to be rethought. The logic of scarcity sees ‘natural resources’ as something to be consumed. However, according to Hardt and Negri (2009), a key aspect of the commons is that it puts the bios to work for the commons, involving not a logic of consumption but of growth. Resources of the commons, such as free education, are continually renewable. If we read a text, offer an interpretation, discern a new truth in science, this by no means limits anyone else in doing the same. On the contrary, interpretations and new science proliferate when people are encouraged to build off the exchange of ideas, affects and interpretations. This on its own should be a justification for offering free K–12 and higher education! The logic of consumption distorts our view of the commons. For example, we are not running out of fossil fuels, in fact, there are too many deposits, and they should be left in the ground. Education should promote a fundamental shift in the logic of production from utter consumption of the commons to the proliferation of the commons (p. 300). In Canada, Latin America, and New Zealand indigenous curricula and pedagogies that promote non-exploitative relationships and communal living are gaining ground thanks to community and indigenous activism. In Chiapas, Mexico, the Zapatista movement led to the establishment of autonomous education for indigenous Tzetsal youth in which children learn, alongside literacy and numeracy, skills for political resistance, collective democratic engagement, caring for land, gender equality and the revolutionary role of women, etc. (Barronet and Ortega Brena, 2008). In Canada, aboriginal communities have engaged in democratic politics through dissensus in the name of equality (Rancière and Corcoran, 2010; Bazzul, 2015). Indigenous political actions break down artificial dichotomies between natural and social commons. The Idle No More movement advocates a view of rivers, lakes, and non-humans, as part of the same commons and deserving of equal consideration—something unthinkable to a modern juridical mindset. Such activist movements are alter-futures (much like Hardt and Negri’s concept of altermodernity), a combination of democratic thinking and communal forms of life. Idle No More employed social media to (re)produce commons resources, understandings, and labor needed to fight for just futures. Educators whose aim is to produce a common livable world must challenge colonial discourses and ontologies, where land is viewed only as a ‘natural resource’ for human consumption rather than that which we are ecologically embedded within and part of (Barad, 2007; Watts, 2013). As we shall see in the next section assemblage thinking can help educators and students envision something new. Education for the commons recognizes that the long-term project is one of (re)production, something continually (re)made: The common is thus in a paradoxical position as being a ground or a presupposition that is also the result of the process. Our analysis, then, from this point on in our research should be aimed not at ‘being common’ but ‘making the common.’ (Hardt and Negri, p. 123) Emancipatory education and social struggles have their basis in the common, not simply as a ‘resource’, but ‘an inexhaustible source of innovation and creativity’ (Hardt and Negri, 2009, pp.  111–112). The commons consists of a multitude of singularities, subjectivities formed along the lines of sex/gender, race, culture, class, spirituality and beyond.3 Engagement with the commons is therefore an engagement with alterity, as the commons sets the stage for interactions with singularities and becoming. Encountering alterity begins a critique of what we have taken for granted as other or self, as well as processes of becoming autonomous that arise from the production of a shared commons (Hardt and Negri, 2009, p. 122; Slater and Griggs, 2015). A pedagogy of the commons employs (bio)political reason to intervene in the controlling forces of biopower that employ education as a way to maintain a White/Eurocentric/global capitalist/neocolonial vision of the world (Bazzul, 2014; Tolbert and Schindel Dimick, in press). Engaging biopolitically means (re)working forces of biopower from below toward different forms of eco-social relations—life in the service of the commons (Hardt and Negri, 2009, p. 125). Whereas the traditional notion poses the common as a natural world outside of society, the biopolitical conception of the common permeates equally all spheres of life …. We might call this an ‘ecology of the common—an ecology focused equally on nature and society, on humans and the non-human world in a dynamic of interdependence, care, and mutual transformation.’ (Hardt and Negri, 2009, p. 171) The struggle over subjectivity is integral to the commons, and therefore biopolitical in that forms of life (subjectivities) come together in cooperation to (re)produce the commons. The Metropolis is an extremely important site for (bio)political struggle and producing the commons today, as cities are ideal locations for interactions of the multitude and immaterial labor. Facing down neoliberal restructuring of public schooling through coalitions of teachers, students, and parents is also a form of building the commons. Such coalitions create spaces where common interests, knowledges, relationships, and forms of life grow. At the same time the commons are a creative entity always in danger of enclosure—sometimes for purported social or ecological good. Figure 4.1 diagrams some enclosures of the commons through the privatization of life (e.g. genetic, educational). Biopolitical struggle is inherent to all fields of education including science education, where the (re)production of biotechnological labor is often in conflict with science for the common good (Bazzul, 2012; Bencze and Carter, 2011; Pierce, 2013). If scientific knowledge is produced in-common and belongs to all, why should it be appropriated, enclosed by companies such as Novartis™ and Monsanto™, and not just along global capital lines, but along those of nationality, gender, and race (Shiva, 2000). Developing education for the commons, may involve developing more qualitative indicators of both growth (and corruption) of the commons, since it exceeds the use of metrics (Hardt and Negri, 2004). Education for the commons must move away from reproducing what Hardt and Negri (2009, p. 159) identify as corrupt forms of the common—systems of organization geared to the needs of certain individuals and not what is common to all. Some examples of this corruption are nepotistic practices, the chauvinist (nationalist) nation state and its blind adherence to mythic natural origins, the rule of private property, ethnocentrisms, racisms, heteronormativity, and the corporation—a parasite of the commons for the accumulation of (bio)capital. The following educational goals are relevant for fostering the biopolitical production of the commons: [figure omitted for formatting] Maximizing Free Accessibility of Knowledge—Education must facilitate access to knowledge and give all students the competencies and tools to access this knowledge. • Flattening Hierarchies—Education for the commons involves tearing down structural and pedagogical hierarchies (see Freire, 1972; hooks, 1994; Hardt, 2011). • Preservation of the ‘Natural’ Commons—Education must employ rationalities toward the service of life, ecology and relations between humans and non-humans. • Trouble the ‘Expert’—Educational communities must de-privilege the voices of experts who tell us we have no alternative (like the ‘TINA’ rhetoric of neoliberalism). • Inclusiveness—Radical inclusion should engage subjectivities at the precarious edges of politics as they have the greatest knowledge of, and ability to challenge, practices of biopower.

2022 Michigan Kritik
IMPACTS › ! – Bare Life – Root Cause – Patriarchy

Patriarchal violence is built on the dichotomy of zoe and bios – we control the root cause

EDKINS 00 (Jenny Edkins - political scientist, Professor of Politics at the University of Manchester) “Sovereign Power, Zones of Indistinction, and the Camp.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 25, no. 1, 2000, pp. 3–25. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644981. Accessed 14 Jul. 2022.//vivi

As feminist political theorists have long argued, from the Greeks onward the political has operated through the inclusion by exclusion of the female.lo Women are invisible in international politics, too.11 Crucial to both exclusions is the way the domestic is excluded from the po- litical and/or the international. There is disagreement on the im- plications. Jean Elshtain wants us to resist the extension of the po- litical to the domestic or family realm since she regards that realm as emblematic of values more conducive to the feminine. Cynthia Enloe argues that we should regard the personal as international. Indeed, Enloe stresses the impossibility of making the distinction. However, both agree on the importance to Western sovereign order of the dichotomies of female and male, the oikos and the polis, domestic politics and the international, inside and outside.12 Like the feminists, Agamben argues that the separation of zoe and bios is a practice of inclusion by exclusion that is constitutive of sovereignty in the modern Western sense from the beginning.l3 In other words, the exclusion of zoe from the polis is at the same time an inclusion. It is not just with the rise of the modern state, as Michel Foucault would have us believe, that zoe is included in state power. Foucault argues that at the beginning of the modern era, natural life comes to be included more and more in the mechanisms and calculations of state power. At this point, politics becomes biopolitics, and whereas for Aristotle man was a living an- imal with a capacity for political existence, modern man becomes “an animal whose politics calls his existence as a living being into question.”14 Modernity for Foucault is the point at which the species and the individual as a simple living body become what is at stake in a society’spolitical strategies. At one and the same time it becomes possible both to protect life and to organize a holo- caust. However, according to Agamben this picture needs to be corrected and Foucault’s analysis of power in modernity com- pleted. Sovereign power in the West is constituted from the start by the very inclusion by exclusion of natural life: sovereignty is the originary structure in which law refers to life. More than this inclusion by exclusion, sovereign power in the West is constituted by its ability to suspend itself in a state of ex- ception, or ban: “The originary relation of law to life is not appli- cation but abandonment.”15The paradox of sovereignty is that the sovereign is at the same time inside and outside the sovereign order: the sovereign can suspend the law. What defines the rule of law is the state of exception when law is suspended. The very space in which juridical order can have validity is created and de- fined through the sovereign exception. However, the exception that defines the structure of sovereignty is more complex than the inclusion of what is outside by means of an interdiction.16 It is not just a question of creating a distinction between inside and out- side: it is the tracing of a threshold between the two, a location where inside and outside enter into a zone of indistinction. It is this state of exception, or the zone of indistinction between inside and outside, that makes the modern juridical order of the West possible. The camp is exemplary as a location of a zone of indistinction. Although in general the camp is set up precisely as part of a state of emergency or martial law, under Nazi rule this becomes not so much a state of exception in the sense of an external and provi- sional state of danger as a means of establishing the Nazi state it- self. The camp is “the space opened up when the state of excep- tion begins to become the rule.”17 In the camp, the distinction between the rule of law and chaos disappears: decisions about life and death are entirely arbitrary, and everything is possible. A zone of indistinction appears between outside and inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit. What happened in the twentieth century in the West, and paradigmatically since the advent of the camp, was that the space of the state of exception transgressed its bound- aries and started to coincide with the normal order. The zone of indistinction expanded from a space of exclusion within the nor- mal order to take over that order entirely.

2022 Michigan Kritik
IMPACTS › ! – Bare Life

The affirmative is complicit in the politicization of “bare-life” – Western Modernity is too far entrenched within its own political existence --

AGAMBEN 98 9Agamben, Giorgio) “Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life”, Stanford, Calif. :Stanford University Press, 1998.//vivi

Yet the point at which these two faces of power converge remains strangely unclear in Foucault’s work, so much so that it has even been claimed that Foucault would have consistently refused to elaborate a unitary theory of power. If Foucault contests the traditional approach to the problem of power, which is exclusively based on juridical models (“What legitimates power?”) or on institutional models (“What is the State?”), and if he calls for a “liberation from the theoretical privilege of sovereignty” in order to construct an analytic of power that would, not take law as its model and code, then where, in the body of power, is the zone of indistinction (or, at least, the point of intersection) at which techniques of individualization and totalizing procedures converge? And, more generally, is there a unitary center in which the political “double bind” finds its raison d’être? That there is a subjective aspect in the genesis of power was already implicit in the concept of servitude volontaire in Etienne de La Boétie. But what is the point at which the voluntary servitude of individuals comes into contact with objective power? Can one be content, in such a delicate area, with psychological explanations such as the suggestive notion of a parallelism between external and internal neuroses? Confronted with phenomena such as the power of the society of the spectacle that is everywhere transforming the political realm today, is it legitimate or even possible to hold subjective technologies and political techniques apart? Although the existence of such a line of thinking seems to be logically implicit in Foucault’s work, it remains a blind spot to the eye of the researcher, or rather something like a vanishing point that the different perspectival lines of Foucault’s inquiry (and, more generally, of the entire Western reflection on power) converge toward without reaching. The present inquiry concerns precisely this hidden point of intersection between the juridico- institutional and the biopolitical models of power. What this work has had to record among its likely conclusions is precisely that the two analyses cannot be separated, and that the inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original – if concealed – nucleus of sovereign power. It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power. In this sense, biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception. Placing biological life at the center of its calculations, the modern State therefore does nothing other than bring to light the secret tie uniting power and bare life, thereby reaffirming the bond (derived from a tenacious correspondence between the modern and the archaic which one encounters in the most diverse spheres) berween modern power and the most immemorial of the arcana imperii. If this is true, it will be necessary to reconsider the sense of the Aristotelian definition of the polis as the opposition between life (zēn) and good life (eu zēn). The opposition is, in fact, at the same time an implication of the first in the second, of bare life in politically qualified life. What remains to be interrogated in the Aristotelian definition is not merely – as has been assumed until now – the sense, the modes, and the possible articulations of the “good life” as the telos of the political. We must instead ask why Western politics first constitutes itself through an exclusion (which is simultaneously an inclusion) of bare life. What is the relation between politics and life, if life presents itself as what is included by means of an exclusion? The structure of the exception delineated in the first part of this book appears from this perspective to be consubstantial with Western politics. In Foucault’s statement according to which man was, for Aristotle, a “living animal with the additional capacity for political existence,” it is therefore precisely the meaning of this “additional capacity” that must be understood as problematic. The peculiar phrase “born with regard to life, but existing essentially with regard to the good life” can be read not only as an implication of being born (ginomenē) in being (ousa) but also as an inclusive exclusion (an exceptio) of zoē in the polis, almost as if politics were the place in which life had to transform itself into good life and in which what had to be politicized were always already bare life. In Western politics, bare life has the peculiar privilege of being that whose exclusion founds the city of men. It is not by chance, then, that a passage of the Politics situates the proper place of the polis in the transition from voice to language. The link between bare life and politics is the same link that the metaphysical definition of man as “the living being who has language” seeks in the relation between phonē and logos: Among living beings, only man has language. The voice is the sign of pain and pleasure, and this is why it belongs to other living beings (since their nature has developed to the point of having the sensations of pain and pleasure and of signifying the two). But language is for manifesting the fitting and the unfitting and the just and the unjust. To have the sensation of the good and the bad and of the just and the unjust is what is proper to men as opposed to other living beings, and the community of these things makes dwelling and the city. (1253a, 10-18) The question “In what way does the living being have language?” corresponds exactly to the question “In what way does bare life dwell in the polis?” The living being has logos by taking away and conserving its own voice in it, even as it dwells in the polis by letting its own bare life be excluded, as an exception, within it. Politics therefore appears as the truly fundamental structure of Western metaphysics insofar as it occupies the threshold on which the relation between the living being and the logos is realized. In the “politicization” of bare life – the metaphysical task par excellence – the humanity of living man is decided. In assuming this task, modernity does nothing other than declare its own faithfulness to the essential structure of the metaphysical tradition. The fundamental categorial pair of Western politics is not that of friend/enemy but that of bare life/political existence, zoē/bios, exclusion/inclusion. There is politics because man is the living being who, in language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion. The protagonist of this book is bare life, that is, the life of homo sacer (sacred man), who may be killed and yet not sacrificed, and whose essential function in modern politics we intend to assert. An obscure figure of archaic Roman law, in which human life is included in the juridical order [ordinamento]1 solely in the form of its exclusion (that is, of its capacity to be killed), has thus offered the key by which not only the sacred tests of sovereignty but also the very codes of political power will unveil their mysteries. At the same time, however, this ancient meaning of the term sacer presents us with the enigma of a figure of the sacred that, before or beyond the religious, constitutes the first paradigm of the political realm of the West. The Foucauldian thesis will then have to be corrected or, at least, completed, in the sense that what characterizes modern politics is not so much the inclusion of zoē in the polis – which is, in itself, absolutely ancient – nor simply the fact that life as such becomes a principal object of the projections and calculations of State power. Instead the decisive fact is that, together with the process by which the exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare life – which is originally situated at the margins of the political order – gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoē, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction. At once excluding bare life from and capturing it within the political order, the state of exception actually constituted, in its very separateness, the hidden foundation on which the entire political system rested. When its borders begin to be blurred, the bare life that dwelt there frees itself in the city and becomes both subject and object of the conflicts of the political order, the one place for both the organization of State power and emancipation from it. Everything happens as if, along with the disciplinary process by which State power makes man as a living being into its own specific object, another process is set in motion that in large measure corresponds to the birth of modern democracy, in which man as a living being presents himself no longer as an object but as the subject of political power. These processes – which in many ways oppose and (at least apparently) bitterly conflict with each other – nevertheless converge insofar as both concern the bare life of the citizen, the new biopolitical body of humanity. If anything characterizes modern democracy as opposed to classical democracy, then, it is that modern democracy presents itself from the beginning as a vindication and liberation of zoē, and that it is constantly trying to transform its own bare life into a way of life and to find, so to speak, the bios of zoē. Hence, too, modern democracy’s specific aporia: it wants to put the freedom and happiness of men into play in the very place – “bare life” – that marked their subjection. Behind the long, strife-ridden process that leads to the recognition of rights and formal liberties stands once again the body of the sacred man with his double sovereign, his life that cannot be sacrificed yet may, nevertheless, be killed. To become conscious of this aporia is not to belittle the conquests and accomplishments of democracy. It is, rather, to try to understand once and for all why democracy, at the very moment in which it seemed to have finally triumphed over its adversaries and reached its greatest height, proved itself incapable of saving zoē, to whose happiness it had dedicated all its efforts, from unprecedented ruin. Modern democracy’s decadence and gradual convergence with totalitarian states in post-democratic spectacular societies (which begins to become evident with Alexis de Tocqueville and finds its final sanction in the analyses of Guy Debord) may well be rooted in this aporia, which marks the beginning of modern democracy and forces it into complicity with its most implacable enemy. Today politics knows no value (and, consequently, no nonvalue) other than life, and until the contradictions that this fact implies are dissolved, Nazism and fascism – which transformed the decision on bare life into the supreme political principle – will remain stubbornly with us. According to the testimony of Robert Antelme, in fact, what the camps taught those who lived there was precisely that “calling into question the quality of man provokes an almost biological assertion of belonging to the human race” (L’espèce humaine, p. II).

2022 Michigan Kritik
IMPACTS › ! – Algorithmic Governance

The impact is an all-encompassing algorithmic schema that reduces human life to units of calculability. Everyday interactions in a social arena are transformed into covert warfare waged against people.

Amoore 09 - Louise Amoore is Professor of Political Geography at Durham University and author of The Politics of Possibility: Risk and Security beyond Probability, also published by Duke University Press, (2009), Algorithmic War: Everyday Geographies of the War on Terror. Antipode, 41: 49-69.  eshaan

In August 2004, the US Department for Homeland Security (DHS) announced the testing of a new tracking technology at five US land border ports of entry. The trial—conducted by consultants Accenture and Deloitte in collaboration with Philips Semiconductors—embedded radio frequency identification (RFID) tags into paper I-94 customs and border protection forms.4 The RFID tags contain a “passive” chip and antenna, capable of transmitting a unique numeric identifier to a remote reader. By October 2006, though rejected for US passports, the same RFID technology became a US entry requirement for visa waiver programme passports. Later the same year, the UK’s Transport for London announced that its RFID-enabled Oyster travel payment card was to integrate with a Visa credit card, allowing the tracking and tracing of all small transactions, actions and movements on the London Underground system. How might we understand what is at work here? A virtually invisible technology, concealed within a paper document or “smart” card, is deployed with the precise purpose of rendering a person visible, identifiable and locatable. As architect Dana Cuff has noted, “there is an irony here”, it is “invisible, miniaturized sensors that are making formerly inaccessible realms visible” (2003:45). In part, of course, the apparent invisibility of the techniques for making visible is assured because of their already existing ubiquity in everyday commercial transactions. As the Vice President of Philips Semiconductors had testified to the US Congress Committee on Energy and Commerce in 2004, “consumers are already likely to encounter RF-enabled personal identification devices in their daily lives, such as secure access cards for building entry, speedy gasoline purchasing such as the Exxon Speedpass, vehicle anti-theft systems, and in transportation systems all over the world” (US House of Representatives 2004:3). What is taking place, then, is the redeployment of sensor technologies used in the commercial tracking of mobile things, objects, animals and vehicles into the domain of the tracking of mobile people. As a technology of location, tracking is central to the processes and practices of militarization. As performance artist and social theorist Jordan Crandall has argued, “militarization and movement intersect through the activity of tracking” (2005:19). The domains of geopolitics and geoeconomics cross over here (see Cowen and Smith, this issue) as the governing of the global economy draws into common assemblage with a state that is concerned to make visible the minutiae of daily life, to seek security in the transactions, journeys and movements that are the norm and those that are suspicious. Put simply, algorithmic war requires a target for its calculations, preferably a moving target. The practice of tracking, then, seeks to “detect, process and strategically codify a moving phenomenon in a competitive theatre”, whether this space is a “battlefield, the social arena, or the marketplace” (Crandall 2006:4). In this sense, tracking technologies enable the identification and location of moving targets. In the war on terror, the specific form has become what Samuel Weber calls a “target of opportunity”, a competitive “seizing” of “targets that were not foreseen or planned” (2005:4). The targets of opportunity in the war on terror, then, involve the depiction of mobile enemies: However different the war on terror was going to be from traditional wars, with their relatively well-defined enemies, it would still involve one of the basic mechanisms of traditional hunting and combat, in however modified and modernized a form: namely “targeting”. The enemy would have to be identified and localized, named and depicted, in order to be made into an accessible target ... None of this was, per se, entirely new. What was, however, was the mobility, indeterminate structure, and unpredictability of the spatio-temporal medium in which such targets had to be sited ... In theatres of conflict that had become highly mobile and changeable, “targets” and “opportunity” were linked as never before (Weber 2005:3–4, emphasis in original). Samuel Weber’s key point of discussion is the theatre of war, though his argument sheds significant light on the algorithmic wars on terror that I depict here. The identification, localization, naming and depiction of mobile targets is, in this war by other means, conducted in and through daily life, in advance of any possible future strike or intervention. The targeting of mobile bodies, things, objects or monies is becoming a matter of locating—positioning in the sights, if you like—so that the opportunities of a mobile global economy might be seized, while the capability to take out the target remains. “Freedom is nothing but the correlative of the deployment of apparatuses of security”, states Foucault, “the very possibility of movement, change of place, and processes of circulation of both people and things” (2007 [1977]:49). For this reason, the geography of algorithmic war is a spatiality of locatability in movement, with origins in the interplay between military logistics and the commercial logistics of tracking objects through a supply chain. As consultants Accenture, Deloitte, IBM and PricewaterhouseCoopers lead the drive for multiple networked public and private applications of technologies of location such as RFID, the commercial “targets of opportunity” that allowed the production of goods to become dispersed and diffuse are clearing space for more diffuse modes of sovereign power. The technologies that have made possible a global supply chain of export processing zones and offshore sites are simultaneously being embedded into border crossing cards, visas, passports and immigrant ID cards that include mobile people within governable space by means of their targeted exclusion. How has locatability emerged as a key means of tracking mobile targets? The emergence of knowledges of location, what Nigel Thrift has called “our conventions of address”, follows a tacit and often unacknowledged sense that we somehow know “what will show up where and what will show up next” (2004:176). In other words, a system of address has been central to our ability to spatially and temporally locate events, objects, people and so on. The history of addressability displays a significant playing back and forth of military logistical knowledges and commercial supply and transportation knowledges. Thus, for example, the origins of 1940s bar code technologies lie in the communication techniques of Morse code. Historical records of early bar code techniques describe a graduate student, Joseph Woodland, marking the dots and dashes of Morse code into the sand on a beach as he thought through a research problem of how to identify a product at a check-out. Extending the dots and dashes to two-dimensional wide and narrow lines in the sand, Woodland later successfully patented the first binary barcode system. As computing technologies began to enable the electronic reading and recognition of patterns, new relationships between the identifier (postal code, ZIP, barcode, personal identifiers such as date of birth) and the identified (people, places, parcels, vehicles) become possible. Consider, for example, IBM’s “punch cards” of the 1950s, patterns of punched holes in a card to be fed into the pattern recognition programmes of IBM machines.5 The “patterns of data on the IBM cards”, writes architect Reinhold Martin, “made visible what was invisible” (2003:158). The machine’s ability to “read” the cards extended beyond the mere processing of data and into the almost magical realm of animating a life unseen. In a 1955 publicity brochure, IBM reminded the American public of how their lives were locatable in the traces of actions and transactions left in the card and “read” by the machine: IBM first came into your life when your birth was recorded on a punched card. From then on many such cards have been compiled, giving a lifetime of history of your important decisions and actions. If you went to school, entered a hospital, bought a home, paid income tax, got married or purchased an automobile, the chances are that permanent records were made of these and other personal stories (cited in Martin 2003:159). What we begin to see with the intersection of systems of address with systems of recognition, or the marrying of addressability and readability, if you like, is a computer-enabled system of locatability. While even rudimentary systems of address involve recognizing identifying markings, whether these are numbers, features of the natural landscape, or codes, the computer reading of markings and the recognition of patterns makes possible novel forms of location. Here, the emphasis is on a more mobile and agile mode of address that does not “stop at the door” of delivery, but instead dwells inside, making visible, readable and locatable the traces of daily life. With the rise of what Jerry Kang and Dana Cuff call “computer addressability”, the fixed location of the address is loosened via “unique identification codes” (2005:94). Because the codes dwell inside a body or object in the physical environment, they do, at least in theory, make it locatable in movement. In this shift from addressability to locatability, the ability to track and trace mobility is achieved by animating the physical environment so that it is able to “respond directly to what it sees” (Kang and Cuff 2005:94). Thus, the “reader” of traces, markings or transactions, established via the early technologies of punch cards and barcodes, becomes ever more important to the system of location as “addresses move with human and non-human actants” (Thrift 2004:183). Rather as IBM’s early computers inferred people’s life histories from the patterns punched into the cards, and from the intervals between them, contemporary readers of location, as a group of researchers at Intel have put it: “infer people’s actions from their effect on the environment, especially on the objects with which they interact” (Smith et al 2005:39). The embedding of RFID tags into objects, as Smith and his colleagues have shown at Intel, can be understood as one means to achieve a novel and mobile form of targeting. The origins of contemporary RFID technology, perhaps unsurprisingly, also find some roots in military communications and logistics, with the earliest writings on the problem to be found in research by radio engineers seeking more efficient readability of signals (Stockman 1948). It should be clear, then, that we cannot say that contemporary security applications of RFID are simply drawing on commercial knowledges of location. The 1940s research was, in many ways, the precedent for contemporary RFID technologies that deploy miniature tags, emitting a radio signal with a unique numeric identifier that can be received by a reader up to 25 ft away (Borriello 2005). Composed of a silicon chip and coiled antenna, usually sandwiched inside a plastic tag, so called “passive” RFIDs use the power supply from the reader to send their signal and are, therefore, smaller and require closer proximity to the reader than “active” tags that carry their own power supply. For example, a passive RFID application such as a supermarket loyalty card that is read at the till is, in effect, inert until it is in range of the reader that activates it. Once in range of the reader, the RFID’s numeric identifier allows the reader to locate the tag and to associate data on past readings of transactions. For a supermarket shopper’s “loyalty card” this might include patterns of past purchases, coupons or vouchers for savings and such like. For a US–Mexico border crossing card holder, the passive tag signals an identifier that can be mapped across past patterns of travel, criminal convictions or terrorist watch lists. In this way, the RFID identifies the target for algorithmic calculation, at the border, at the supermarket checkout, at the entrance to the sports stadium, in the subway ticket hall. “Through RFID tags”, as Jerry Kang and Dana Cuff have it, address is specified “to a fine level of granularity, much finer than a zip code”, so that we “will likely authenticate our identity to multiple queries of ‘who are you’ made by the enacted environment” (2005:106). What are the implications of mobile forms of locatability for algorithmic war and, in particular, for the exercise of sovereign power? As RFID stands on the brink of replacing bar code and paper-based markers of location (I 94 forms, passports, train tickets, paper money at toll booths, tickets for sports events),6 how does the war on terror become enmeshed with the geographies of everyday life? To be clear here, the seizing of targets of opportunity by commercial players can in no sense be interpreted as transcending the nation-state or outsourcing state security decisions to the market. Rather, a logic of outsourcing and targeting that exceeds any specific public or private domain—that is, as Samuel Weber suggests, a “militarization of thinking”—works to sustain the “hyphen” in the imagination of nation-state differently (Sparke 2005:48). It does so, I will argue here, via a spatial and temporal deferral of security decision that follows the dispersed geography of the commercial supply chain. The state’s ability to track and trace people or objects in movement, across or beyond its borders, is increasingly bound up with commercial techniques for tracking and tracing objects through the supply chain. The paradox of security and mobility—the problematic of the moving target—is given the appearance of being fixed by technologies of locatability. As David Campbell writes, “were it possible to bring about the absence of movement”, that would represent “pure security”, yet it would be at that moment that “the state would wither away” (1992:12). The question is not one of how to arrest mobility, then, but how to govern mobility in such a way as to allow circulation and to sustain the impression of securability. Put simply, to secure the sovereign power of the state in a global economy of mobile things and people precisely by means of targeting bodies in movement. The contemporary decentred state shares much of its spatial character with the diffuse and dispersed capillaries of global capital. If William Connolly (2005:148) is correct and sovereignty is “migrating to a layered global assemblage”, then one aspect of this layering is the profusion of ambiguous locations of many kinds, where the distinctions between legality and illegality, work and violence, onshore and offshore are increasingly blurred. Just as the dispersal of a global supply chain into offshore sites and export processing zones permits the deferral of many kinds of commercial decision—at least in terms of Jacques Derrida’s sense of decision as responsibility (1999:25)—so the diffusion of state authority into ambiguous locations of many kinds appears to institute the deferral of decision on behalf of the state. In the marketplace that is the test laboratory for RFID applications, for example, the tagging at item level by Wal-Mart, M&S and Gillette has allowed these commercial players to seek efficient locations in distant places, and yet to sustain the ability to control with precision (Eckfeldt 2005). The very idea of an animated supply chain, making its own algorithmic calculations and judgements—from “smart refrigerators” to smart supermarket shelving and tracked shipments (Gunther and Spiekerman 2005)—incorporates ¨ the bodies and objects of production and consumption, from the growers, pickers and producers of raw materials, through manufacturing, supply and retail workers. In the most vulnerable offshore spaces of the global economy, where commercial firms seek only the most fleeting of finger holds in a specific territorial space, we begin to see how the commercial targeting of things and objects plays into and through the targeting of people. Thailand’s export processing zones—or “free zones”—for example, have become “e-free-zones”, using RFID to track the movement of imported materials, deliveries, exported goods and, significantly, the bodies of workers, as they traverse the boundaries of the zone. The fortified security fences associated with export processing zones, then, are augmented by equally carceral, but less obviously visible, lines that track and trace the movements of workers via “contactless” smart cards, and the mobility of objects via RF-enabled smart labels. Similarly, the extension of RFID into border crossing cards and immigration documents allows the feigned impression of an open world, while it institutes new lines and boundaries. There is a growing resonance, then, between apparently geo-economic systems of locatability (of course always also political) that target the bodies of workers and the movement of the objects with which they interact, and the algorithmic security practices of the state: It plays out in new systems of production that aim to narrow the intervals between conception, manufacturing, distribution and consumption—shrinking the delays between detecting an audience pattern and formatting a new enticement that can address it. It plays out in pre-emptive policing and warfare systems that aim to close the gap between sensing and shooting (Crandall 2006:13). As Jordan Crandall depicts the geographies of tracking and targeting, they play in and out of the plural spaces of our world. As the commercial tracking technologies enter the sphere of security—RFID passports, “smart” national ID cards, RF-enabled immigration and visa documents, the tagging of detained asylum seekers, employee “contactless” buildings access cards—they defer security decisions into algorithmic calculation. The participation of RFID in violent geographies is thus often obscured. When global consultants Accenture made their successful bid for the USVISIT “Smart Borders” contract, for example, they simulated the ability of RFID to target from a distance: Using a nearby facility belonging to Raytheon, a subcontractor on its team, the Accenture team constructed a mock border point kiosk at which the government team had an RFID tag attached to their passports. They also constructed a mock land border crossing where a scanner read the RFID passport tags of the government officials inside the car. Even though the car became momentarily airborne after hitting a speed bump—the scanner read the digital information contained on the RFID chips of all four government officials in the vehicle, displaying their pictures on an electronic billboard as they passed by (Accenture 2005:242, emphasis added). Accenture’s business partner Raytheon, the world’s largest manufacturer of so-called “smart weapons”, produces the cluster bombs widely reported to be responsible for the violent deaths of civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan. Here we see the targeting of markets and neighbourhoods by military hardware segueing into the targeting of people at border crossings and in the spaces of the airport. Indeed, it is Raytheon that, in November 2007, was awarded the £650 million UK e-borders contract as the leading contractor of the Trusted Borders consortium, with Accenture the IT systems subcontractor. Where RFID appears to render movement around the subways, highways and superstores of the global economy as a smooth and seamless experience, it does so by aligning the security practices of the state with the mobilities of the consumer. In this sense, our everyday geographies do spiral into and across the daily violences of the algorithmic targeting of “others” and the visceral military violence of bombing campaigns. It is important to recognise at this point that we can only gain a limited understanding of the technologies of algorithmic war by seeing them as explainable by the post-9/11 deepening of political economies of surveillance (Lyon 2003). The capacity of RFID to make us locatable is actually acutely ambivalent: we feel its potential to watch and to incarcerate just as we simultaneously feel it fulfil some of our desires and pleasures. As Matt Sparke has illustrated in his study of the biometric proximity cards used in the US–Canadian border NEXUS programme, the appeal is made to “the fast lane, where you want to be” (2006:167). Similarly, RFID is offered as a means of expediting mobility in the UK’s Heathrow airport “MiSense” programme, promising to “simplify your journey through the airport while maintaining security”.7 The MiSense programme, by incorporating smart sensors into the possession of the subject—“my sense”—invites an almost playful encounter with RFID sensors. This stitching together of playful leisurely RFID encounters with security practice asks the subject to voluntarily offer themselves up to tracking technologies in return for expedited movement. In some of the most playful forms of RFID use in the leisure industry— subcutaneous chips inserted into the arms of customers at a Glasgow nightclub so that they may pay for their drinks without the hindrance of cash or cards; RFID golf balls that communicate their location to a remote reader—we can see security dreams fulfilled. Night club patrons secure their pre-cleared identity and financial details beneath their skin, and golfers seek out a means of securely locating distant objects. Where RFID “pleasures and anxieties cohabit”, the targeted line of sight sorts and segregates finite degrees of visibility so that, for some, “the edges are smoothed” as they “blend seamlessly into the crowd” (Crandall 2006:12). For others, of course, the line of sight targets for heightened exposure to visibility—to stop and search, to continually verify identity, to have movement in public space checked and intercepted.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › L – Ukraine

NATO intervention in Ukraine is not liberation, but new management – the guise of democratic support is a myth used to obscure the expansion of Empire, but only a class uprising which denounces Russia and NATO alike has the capacity to free Ukraine

Maiello ’22 (Matias Maiello; sociologist at University of Buenos Aires and leading member of the Socialist Workers Party of Argentina. “Once Again on the Debates Regarding the War in Ukraine” 31 March 2022) // ELog

In this context, we have not one but two central problems that must be addressed from an independent political position: the one posed by the Russian invasion with respect to the self-determination and independence of a semicolonial country such as Ukraine; and the one posed by NATO’s interference as a continuation of its imperialist politics in Ukraine and Eastern Europe as a whole, which so far has been put into practice only through economic sanctions against Russia and the shipment of weapons, without directly involving its military forces in the war. The combination of both problems adds to the complexity of the war in Ukraine. For several decades now, especially since the First Gulf War (1990–91), we have seen wars of imperialist aggression prevail under U.S. hegemony — so much so that some people (one of the most popular being Tony Negri2) mistook this for the end of imperialism and its replacement by an empire whose military actions were directed by a global police power. In the first war against Iraq, under the guise of “protecting” Kuwait from an invasion, the United States enlisted the imperialist powers and many other countries behind its military action, including Russia. This also occurred with the coalition created to invade Afghanistan in 2001, which was supported by Russia and resulted in its rapprochement with NATO. The first cracks in the U.S.-led war bloc became evident in the Second Gulf War of 2003, which both France and Germany opposed. Russia aligned itself with their position, but made sure not to get in the way of the U.S. offensive. These are three clear examples, though certainly not the only ones, in which the struggle to defeat an imperialist attack and the victory of the oppressed country were the basis of any independent and anti-imperialist position. This meant supporting the military camp of the Afghan and Iraqi people, while rejecting any sort of political support for their reactionary governments. A similar analysis can be made in the case of the Malvinas War. This was an adventurist undertaking launched by the genocidal Argentine dictatorship to help overcome its internal crisis. However, it pitted a semicolonial country against the United Kingdom, an imperialist power supported by the United States and other great powers — despite the illusions that the United States would defend Argentina held by Leopold Galtieri, the president and leader of the military, and his henchmen. Argentina’s defeat reinforced the imperialist chains that bound the semicolonial country and determined the character of the transition up to the 1983 elections as the product of an agreement between the military junta and the country’s main political parties. It was also key to strengthening Margaret Thatcher’s position in her bid to defeat the British working class and launch the neoliberal offensive on a global scale. this type of position in an interview with Mateo Fossa, using the following example: In Brazil there now reigns a semifascist regime that every revolutionary can only view with hatred. Let us assume, however, that on the morrow England enters into a military conflict with Brazil. I ask you on whose side of the conflict will the working class be? I will answer for myself personally — in this case I will be on the side of “fascist” Brazil against “democratic” Great Britain. Why? Because in the conflict between them it will not be a question of democracy or fascism. If England should be victorious, she will put another fascist in Rio de Janeiro and will place double chains on Brazil. If Brazil on the contrary should be victorious, it will give a mighty impulse to the national and democratic consciousness of the country and will lead to the overthrow of the Vargas dictatorship. The defeat of England will at the same time deliver a blow to British imperialism and will give an impulse to the revolutionary movement of the British proletariat. Since then, imperialism’s politics have become more sophisticated. It no longer exchanges one fascist for another, but pushes for “democratic transitions” designed to protect imperialist interests by reinforcing the chains of national oppression. I return to this point below. During World War I, Lenin analyzed a very different scenario than the one discussed by Trotsky in terms of the relationship between an oppressed nation and an imperialist offensive, namely, the case of Polish independence. In that instance, the country’s independence was opportunistically supported by the czarist regime after Poland had been taken from it by Germany. , “How can we help liberate Poland from Germany!” Is it not our duty to help in this?” And he answered, Of course it is, but not by supporting the imperialist war of tsarist, or of bourgeois, or even of bourgeois republican Russia, but by supporting the revolutionary proletariat of Germany … All those who want to stand for the freedom of nations, for the right of nations to self-determination, not hypocritically … but sincerely, must be opposed to the war because of the oppression of Poland … Those who do not wish to be social-chauvinists in deeds must support only those elements in the Socialist Parties of all countries which are frankly, directly and immediately working for the proletarian revolution in their own countries. Lenin thus rejected the demagoguery over Poland’s independence expressed by czarism, which oppressed peoples like the Ukrainians, the Finns, and so on. An undeniably staunch defender of Polish self-determination, he was opposed to this slogan in the hands of the czarist regime. And in response to the question of how to help Poland liberate itself, he called for support for the German revolutionaries, while in Russia he called for the independence of all nations oppressed by czarism. It was undoubtedly a more complex question than the mere determination of where to shoot. Now, the conditions of the ongoing war in Ukraine do not fully coincide with those of either of these two “typical” cases and, in my opinion, to attempt to reduce it to them would be a mistake. It is not a war in which all of imperialism is on one side, with the oppressed nation on the other (as in the examples discussed above of the two Gulf Wars, which have some differences between them, as well as Afghanistan and the Malvinas War). On the one hand, there is Putin’s reactionary invasion, with Russia acting as a kind of “military imperialism” (although it does not qualify as an imperialist country in the precise sense of the term, given the low level of expansion of its monopolies and capital exports on a global scale; it essentially exports gas, oil, and commodities, etc.). On the other hand, we have the semicolonial nation of Ukraine, which is being used as a proxy by the biggest imperialist powers of the West in their confrontation with Russia. But it is also not an open interimperialist war, as in the Polish case analyzed by Lenin. So far, Western powers have been intervening essentially through economic sanctions and the supply of weapons, trying to avoid becoming fully involved. The effort to portray this confrontation as the product of an internal division of the Ukrainian people themselves, a third of whom have strong linguistic and cultural ties with Russia, is another aspect that must be added. Hence, an independent political position, in my opinion, should also seek a coherent combination of the elements discussed in the examples analyzed by Trotsky and Lenin. To oppose the Russian invasion from such a political position means not only “denouncing” NATO, but also including it as an active factor in the conflict itself against the self-determination of the Ukrainian people. And in this respect, as in Lenin’s analysis, it means calling for international mobilization, both in the “West” and in Russia, is crucial to supporting the struggle for Ukraine’s independence. The development of an anti-war movement that does not succumb to NATO militarism is essential. Having a consistent political position regarding the national question in Ukraine also means supporting the right to self-determination of Donetsk and Lugansk and of the Russian-speaking population. At the same time, it means fighting against the occupation of pro-Russian regions, whose population has the ability to undermine all of Putin’s demagoguery. No matter how many weapons are circulating, only the unity of the Ukrainian working people, overcoming the divisions promoted by the oligarchies on both sides of the rift, can defeat Putin’s invasion without trading one set of chains for another and continuing the pendular trajectory (between Russia and NATO) that has characterized the country’s politics during the past few decades. The Goals of an Independent Political Position Of course, the degree to which an independent political position is needed depends on the goals pursued by whoever establishes that position. For example, the United Secretariat concludes its declaration, “Only the international working class, fighting together with all oppressed and exploited people, for peace and against imperialism, capitalism and war, can create a better world.” From this point of view, its defense of the sanctions against Russia and the shipment of weapons in general could be more or less contradictory depending on what is meant by a “better world.” From a socialist and revolutionary internationalist perspective, things are clearly different. And this is also important in terms of the debate on the question of national self-determination and anti-imperialist struggle with those who, like the UIT, the LIT, and the LIS,3 aspire to a particular type of revolution called a “democratic revolution.” In relation to the perspective I have spelled out here, Mercedes Petit writes: This approach [of the PTS and the FT] is directly defeatist and, if applied, would simply and immediately favor Putin’s invasion. It is no coincidence that the FT-CI’s declaration refers to the 2011–16 struggle against Assad. At that time, they also adopted a nefarious position. As they themselves now point out, they claimed that there was “a reactionary war with no progressive camps” in Syria and rejected any military support for the massive mobilization and military struggle against Assad. They were thus complicit, along with the majority of the left worldwide, with dictator Assad and mass murderer Putin, by whom the mobilization was brutally crushed. Although it cannot be likened to the current war in Ukraine, there are some points of convergence with the Syrian conflict, if we consider the entire process from the “orange revolution” of 2004 to the Maidan uprising in 2014 and the subsequent confrontations. The origins of the war in Syria date back to the 2011 revolt, which was an expression of the people’s outrage against Bashar al-Assad’s Bonapartist regime and part of the Arab Spring. The government resorted to fierce repression and incited an interreligious confrontation. At first, the army was divided horizontally between sectors of the troops and the officers. However, this would soon turn into a vertical division in which the elements of self-defense of the “citizenry” and the “people” (though not a class-based self-defense) were relegated to a secondary position and regimented and subordinated to the structure of the Free Syrian Army. This army was sponsored from the outset by Turkey and later supported by U.S., British, and French imperialism, although with some distrust due to its links with the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi movement. The conflict passed through different phases, leading to a reactionary civil war. A progressive element of this war was the development of the . Their independence, however, subsequently became diluted in the context of military alliances with the United States and later with Assad against Turkish attacks. A significant part of the Left, inspired by the theory of democratic revolution, viewed the Syrian civil war as a revolutionary war, more or less overlooking the complexity of the process, which included imperialist interference and inter-religious divisions. In doing so, it adopted in its own way the positions of Nahuel Moreno,4 that to confront fascism and “counterrevolutionary regimes,” it is necessary to “make a revolution in the political regime: to destroy fascism to regain the freedoms of bourgeois democracy, even if in the arena of the political regimes of the bourgeoisie, the bourgeois state.” In the same way, they viewed the 2013–14 Maidan uprising as a “victorious democratic revolution.” In the at the time: “We are witnessing the triumph of a revolution similar to the revolutionary uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East that led to enormous revolutions overthrowing their oppressive governments. In Ukraine, a democratic revolution has also taken place, resulting in the fall of the reactionary and pro-Russian Yanukovych.” Although the uprising took place against the backdrop of the hardships faced by the Ukrainian people and their outrage against Yanukovych’s repressive and corrupt government, the IS characterization overlooked the actual development of the process itself. It disregarded the movement’s program (with its core demand that Ukraine join the imperialist European Union) and its leadership, consisting of a front ranging from pro-Western liberal opposition parties to the extreme Right, including neo-Nazi groups. In line with their shared views, one of the first measures this front enacted when it came to power was to repeal the law that protected non-Ukrainian minority languages. Izquierda Socialista thus took to the extreme the theory of “democratic revolution,” “it isn’t necessary for the working class and for a revolutionary Marxist party with mass influence to direct the process of democratic revolution to socialist revolution” given that, according to Moreno, every revolution (resulting from the catastrophic state of capitalism) is in itself “unconsciously socialist.” It is difficult to develop independent politics on the basis of such a theory. The fact is that since Moreno’s original formulation, inspired by the processes sparked by the mass uprisings in the 1970s known as the “transitions to democracy” (in Portugal, the Spanish State, and Greece, and then later spreading to the semicolonial world), none of these processes of so-called “regime revolutions” followed a trajectory like the one he predicted. On the contrary, they resulted in reconfigurations that allowed the bourgeoisie to regain its hegemony. Thus, under the banners of an idyllic bourgeois democracy, of the supposed defense of human rights and “freedom,” the neoliberal offensive spread across the globe. Today we see the remnants of those politics in the decline of U.S. hegemony. Evidence of this was the “orange revolution” in Ukraine and the course of the Maidan uprising in 2014 that led to the rise of the pro-Western oligarch Piotr Poroshenko. The outbreak of a reactionary civil war in Syria is another example. What has become increasingly clear in these processes is the profound connection between the realization of democratic demands and a consistent anti-imperialist struggle. From his first formulations of the theory of permanent revolution, Trotsky maintained that even in a country where the proletariat was a minority, as in Russia, its hegemony was a condition for the “,” which is necessarily linked to structural (and in many cases anti-capitalist) transformations. The developments of the last decades expanded the meaning of that thesis. Imperialist oppression increased spectacularly during the neoliberal offensive, rendering inconceivable any fundamental and lasting democratic conquests in semicolonies without their emancipation from imperialism. In Ukraine, amid the complexity of the war, this is also an essential question. The interests of the Ukrainian workers and poor are diametrically opposed to those of the different sectors of the local oligarchy linked to Putin and Western imperialism. In the fight against the Russian invasion, no true independence can be won under the influence of NATO, which is why this fight is inseparable from the most resolute anti-imperialist struggle. , the prospect of Ukraine’s independence is inextricably linked to the fight for workers’ power. This conclusion is undeniably relevant today, in the difficult conditions created by the Russian occupation, and is intertwined with the struggle for a socialist Ukraine run by its working class. When we discuss the need to adopt an independent political position, we do so from the perspective of these objectives.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › L – Transparency

In the era of contemporary geopolitics, war and peace have become indistinguishable. The 1AC is the rhetoric of the traveling preacher shouting extinction by escalation while ignoring the inherently paradoxical nature of conflict. Secrecy cannot be remedied by “information sharing” or “security cooperation” because secrecy is a precondition to justify war absent moral responsibility. The impact is a ‘forever war’ of negative peace characterized endless militarized warfare.

Fazendeiro 21, Bernardo Fazendeiro is a researcher at the Centre for Social Studies and an assistant professor in International Relations (IR) at the Faculdade de Economia of the University of Coimbra. (2021). Wartime Is Peacetime: Undeclared Armed Conflict in the Late Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Centuries. International Studies Review. 10.1093/isr/viab022 // eshaan

Secrecy, Escalation, and War Secrecy regularly plagues the conduct of war (Carson 2018). Combatants and politicians have always attempted to conceal their actions, often with a view to securing tactical victories. Carson (2018) takes the argument in an innovative direction, however; enemies cooperate “backstage” during war, not so much to gain an edge in battle as to contain the destructive capacity of modern wars. The Cold War, for example, “started hot.” Recently declassified documents disclose the direct involvement of nearly 30,000 Soviet military personnel in the Korean War (Carson 2018, 2). This would not have been a surprise to the public if most US intelligence services had publicized this information (which they held); they deemed it best not to publicize it, though.3 The question is: why? Carson (2018) develops a more general version of this question about the character of twentieth-century warfare—namely why covert operations were considered preferable and, relatedly, why enemies would cooperate in secret. To answer these questions, Carson (2018) claims that contemporary political authorities (more or less) agree that open, acknowledged combat could lead to unlimited war and, thus, to unlimited destruction. Secrecy and “non-acknowledgment” of “open secrets” therefore provide a means by which to keep armed conflict private, not least to restrict the potential for further escalation (Carson 2018, 44). To that effect, Carson draws from theater to explore how overt and covert playacting allows a suitable way to deny intervention. Put differently, “non-acknowledgment allows a widely exposed covert intervention to still remain an ‘open secret’” (Carson 2018, 31), thereby avoiding “domestic hawks” who may otherwise be in favor of escalating the conflict. Carson (2018) subsequently applies this theory to several twentieth-century conflicts, particularly great power intervention in the Spanish Civil War, Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. In doing so, he reveals how technological developments have encouraged covert operations. From aerial bombardment to submarines to drone warfare, great powers now hold numerous means by which to guarantee secrecy and deniability. That, in turn, has led to countermeasures. The invention of radar, for instance, meant states could determine more accurately who had intervened and whether they ought to disclose their involvement. As such, Carson (2018) offers us much food for thought on the changing nature of armed conflict, many of which now consist of covert, non-acknowledged intervention—or an explicit reluctance to declare war. The current international order, predicated on the values of peace and IHL, has also opened the way for secret wars. While Carson (2018) does not cover this topic in detail, some passing insights explain how secrecy contradicts the United Nations’ (UN) core principles: “my theory suggests that such institutions could undermine the ability of major powers to manipulate information to control escalatory pressures and communicate their interest in limited war” (Carson 2018, 310). Limited armed conflict, in other words, depends less on how institutions regulate conflict than on how actors deploy secrecy and non-acknowledgment to prevent escalation. This is a damning critique of the international order, for it challenges mainstream liberal assumptions (e.g., Bentham and Wilson) that conflict results from secrecy, and therefore that public discussion and mediation provide the antidote (Gittings 2012; Hathaway and Shapiro 2017). It also contradicts existing realist hypotheses on the need for transparency to contain the use of force (Van Evera 1999). Carson (2018) might have expanded on these myriad ramifications. Carson (2018) also does not fully consider how secret wars unsettle the relationship between formal wartimes and peacetimes, particularly when the former ends and the latter begins. If actors supposedly do not acknowledge and barely (if at all) admit to armed conflict, when and how does one determine “peace”? Relatedly, when do societies augment or curtail executive powers? Many competing audiences surround the political leaders to which Carson refers; yet, these leaders gather enough legal and political leeway to authorize covert military action in the absence of public discussion. It remains to be seen whether leaders facing greater constraints when deploying the military (including covert operations) would be capable of overcoming public scrutiny. All the same, the extent to which secrecy challenges the principles of the global order (i.e., peace and humanitarianism) says something about how international actors seek to evade moral responsibility. Carson (2018, 94–97) alludes briefly to this issue (i.e., that denial opens the way for the extensive use of war euphemisms). Hoffman and Weiss (2017) and Fazal (2018) develop that allusion in detail. Humanitarianism and War Hoffman and Weiss (2017) thoroughly survey the origins of humanitarianism and its relation to war and politics. In so doing, the authors explore the extent to which humanitarian norms have encroached upon—if not constituted—the international order, from armed conflict to adjudication to disaster relief. Compared to the humble, nineteenth-century beginnings of humanitarianism, which sought to abolish war or (at least) contain its effects, the tasks and aims of humanitarianism have expanded considerably. As Hoffman and Weiss (2017, 3) note, humanitarian principles “have not changed much, but what has changed is greater calls within the humanitarian sector to expand its work.” Hoffman and Weiss (2017) first detail how the destruction caused by war gradually led to the rise of humanitarianism in the nineteenth century. They subsequently show how IHL—and humanitarian action in particular—shifted in the aftermath of the Cold War, becoming ever more linked to the provision of security. This new breed of interventive humanitarianism, often labeled new humanitarianism, spawned a whole array of debates about the nature of peace, and the UN’s role in providing it. That shift also instilled a sense of urgency about addressing the weak nature of international criminal adjudication, leading to the Rome Statute and, thus, to the International Criminal Court. Finally, interventive humanitarianism prompted discussions on the principle of Responsibility to Protect, the legacy of which remains under intense debate (Bellamy 2008; Chandler 2010). All in all, the expansion of humanitarianism has affected war significantly, including the practice of declaring war. Much of IHL depends on the formal acknowledgment of armed conflict. Hence, for Fazal (2018), the prominence and sheer number of regulations pertaining to IHL have “created perverse incentives for states engaged in interstate war” (Fazal 2018, 5). Any international lawyer will be aware of these developments. More disconcerting, however, is how such regulations became the grounds on which to evade political and moral responsibility. State representatives were obliged to weigh the bureaucratic, strategic, liability, and reputational disadvantages that accompany strict adherence to IHL. Put differently, declaring war became too burdensome from a moral, political, and military point of view. As a result, leaders opted for secrecy or euphemism4: Fazal (2018) offers an especially pertinent illustration: the 1999 Kosovo War, a conflict officially deemed less of a war than a “humanitarian intervention” (Roberts 1999; Ignatieff 2000; Booth 2001; Wheeler 2002). Euphemisms aside, had the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) acknowledged that it was conducting a war in Kosovo, its pilots would have needed to comply with IHL or be liable for violating IHL. To comply would require flying at a much lower altitude than they did, conflicting with NATO’s strategic and tactical considerations (Fazal 2018, 153). Fazal (2018) also explains the more unintended consequences. On the grounds that openly acknowledged wars are fairly accurate “predictors of peace treaties,” the decrease in formal declarations of war also lowers the likelihood that actors sign such treaties (Fazal 2018, 158). Paradoxically though, combatants in civil wars, especially secessionists, tend to pay more attention to IHL. Because many of these combatants (unlike de jure states) lack international recognition, they have traditionally abided by IHL more often, in order to obtain that recognition (Fazal 2018). Regardless of whether responsibility lies with international law, IHL, or some combination of the two, the current international norms place a heavy legal and political burden on those who recognize wartime formally. Those who use force openly, or who otherwise acknowledge armed combat, consequently face major legal and political consequences. They may also create too many duties. As a result, leaders eschew formal declarations; Schadlow (2017) addresses how that loss of responsibility leads to less unity during war efforts, thereby contributing to strategic confusion. The Consequences of Euphemism and Secrecy: Operational Confusion Schadlow (2017) argues that war is, and has always been, about re-establishing order—that is, about reinstating a workable system of governance. She therefore rejects the claim that the military ought to engage only in combat. Military personnel and strategic planners (e.g., politicians) must consider not only the tactical considerations required for a successful military operation, but also the political measures necessary for obtaining peace. Most of the study focuses on circumstances specific to North American politics; even so, this more general relationship between politics, peace, and armed conflict likely travels to other regions as well. Schadlow (2017) does not fully explore how norms (e.g., IHL or international law) came to affect American military thinking; nevertheless, she does account for how euphemistic uses of the term “war” hinder the development of an effective long-term strategy. Doing so, or narrowly focusing on the military “fighting” dimension, leads to strategic confusion (e.g., reducing “wartime” to combat). Unity of purpose and command then slips away, with many tasks increasingly delegated to nonmilitary actors. In other words, the reductive categorization of armed conflict, prompted by euphemism, conflicts with Schadlow’s (2017) general understanding of war—not least because it compromises the war effort’s chain of authority and, thus, the unity of purpose on which that authority depends. In her words, “given the centrality of politics to war, the United States must realize that unity of command is essential to operational and strategic success in war” (Schadlow 2017, 274). The war effort in Afghanistan illustrates the point. It cannot simply be coined or reduced to “counterterrorism,” as the military also needed to pursue a lasting peace there. That requires a comprehensive strategy and an all-encompassing hierarchy of command with differing levels of responsibility for distinct tasks—a comprehensive approach (to peace) unattainable if one delegates tasks to distinct, nonunified authorities (e.g., various nongovernmental organizations, or allies). Schadlow (2017) consequently speaks disparagingly of the US military’s decision to assign noncombat operations to nongovernmental organizations in Afghanistan and Iraq, without fully integrating them into its own long-term strategy. Schadlow’s (2017) discussion of the lack of strategic planning and governance complements ongoing research about the global obsession with neutralizing terrorists (Whitaker 2007; Noxolo and Husymans 2009; Piazza and Walsh 2009; Fairweather 2015). It also reveals just how much political authorities, at least in the United States, have neglected the development of feasible, long-term governance models. That neglect results partly from domestic and international pressures, as Carson (2018) implies, but also from the trend toward not taking responsibility for a general (formal) war effort. As the trend toward a division of labor in armed conflict tasks accelerates, these tasks increasingly fall to a cacophony of actors—sundry technocrats, soldiers, mercenaries, allies, and international organizations—thereby diluting any one actor’s responsibility for the task and the overall unity of command. This division of labor contributes, in other words, to the ability of leaders to avoid responsibility for the activities formally contained together within the broader wartime context. Other (Complementary) Explanations George Orwell foretold the decrease in formal declarations of war and peace as World War II ended (Orwell 1968). In 1946, not long after the atomic explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Orwell presciently claimed that international politics would witness the rise of superstates that coexisted in a permanent state of fear. Powerful and capable of mass destruction, these superstates would no longer fight one another. That development alone would be positive; yet, the mutual mistrust that accompanied superstates’ rise would also generate significant fear, thereby precluding the possibility of peace. “[A] permanent state of ‘cold war’” would develop (Orwell 1968). Orwell’s dystopian masterpiece, 1984, provides further insight into his argument. In a (not so hypothetical) future, the wartime–peacetime distinction dissolved in the face of euphemism, manipulation, and plausible deniability; the so-called Ministry of Truth would face little compunction in claiming that “war is peace” in its party slogan (Orwell 1977, 26). The books reviewed in this essay clarify why wartime and peacetime have become Orwellian in nature—that is, roughly equivalent to one another. As legal constraints grew (Fazal 2018), politicians exercised greater caution to avoid the moral and legal responsibility attached to war. They also moved wartime from a formal (i.e., declared) to an informal (i.e., undeclared, or covert) setting for a similar reason (and to manage escalation; Carson 2018). As the reluctance to formally declare war intensified, the need to define a clear enemy and purpose for fighting weakened; that undermined strategic thinking, threatening the efficacy of the military hierarchy and its response to armed conflict (Schadlow 2017). To be fair, alternative explanations for the evaporation of a wartime–peacetime distinction exist as well. In one of the most prominent of these, technological developments facilitate quick reprisals among powerful states—reprisals short of mobilized warfare, but that also lack any semblance of peace. Schelling (2008), for instance, acknowledges that the capacity for mass destruction encouraged leaders to question the relevance of a direct military confrontation (i.e., a battle between forces) for their strategic policies. Warfare in the late twentieth century, especially in nuclear era, consequently became more about activities like concealed threats, diplomatic coercion, targeted assassinations, covert operations, economic sanctions, and terrorism, rather than military deployments. The development of drone warfare likely falls here too (Kennedy and Rengger 2012; Sauer and Schörnig 2012 Boyle 2013; Chamayou 2015; Sandvik and Lohne 2015). Each of these tools allows leaders an opportunity to respond rapidly and coercively (to varying degrees) to adversaries without a declaration of war—and therefore, an extensive military mobilization. That proves particularly convenient for liberal, democratic governments, whose politicians must circumvent public opinion while simultaneously showing a strong determination to punish enemies (Sauer and Schörnig 2012). Irrespective of contemporary developments, technology is a tool. It can restrict or amplify the means at a decision-maker’s disposal, but the decision-maker ultimately creates and implements policy. Moreover, current norms and ongoing global trends shape the policies that leaders develop. A look at these trends suggests two other alternative accounts: the growth of civil and police wars, respectively. That intrastate armed conflict (i.e., civil war) has increased as interstate armed conflicts (i.e., wars between states) have decreased offers one explanation for this trend. Intrastate conflicts frequently avoid a formal declaration of war, since sitting governments do not wish to legitimize those challenging it. Doing otherwise would not only grant the challenger political recognition, but also admit it as an authority to whom the laws of war (or IHL) apply (Armitage 2017). Governments therefore go to great lengths to brand the challenges as anything but a combatant (e.g., an outlaw, a criminal, or a terrorist). Although promising, this explanation remains partial at best. The refusal to declare war—including to recognize a substate challenger as a lawful combatant—does not merely happen in the context discussed here. It extends to the international sphere as well. Even NATO leaders (i.e., outside Yugoslavia) refused to declare war against the Yugoslav (or Serbian) government in 1999. Alternatively, then, perhaps the growth of “police wars” accounts for the disappearance of formal war declarations (Hardt and Negri 2004; Howard 2008; Jahn 2009; Holmqvist 2014; Neocleous 2014). Tying war activities and policing together exposes how ambiguity pervades the international liberal order. Peacetime police deployments often assist with state-building activities: extending sovereign authority within and patrolling the state’s territory, protecting the state from—if not punishing—those who disavow the rules, and so on (Neocleous 2014). To that end, integrating policing with war unsettles the distinctions between war and peace, between the military and the police, and between combatant and criminal. In effect, contemporary police wars mirror erstwhile colonial wars, and rightfully so. Although European statesmen had few qualms about formally declaring wars on their sovereign counterparts, they seldom issued such declarations in wars against colonial territories (Neocleous 2014; Bartelson 2018). Colonies, as “non-states,” did not receive the status of equal combatants; they were territorial holdings for the parent state to patrol and control, with the parent state even building the colony’s administration in line with European practices. As such, states maintained the international order with recourse to great power patrol—a traditional police function—remedied through state-building, and enforced by punishing those who reject its rules (Kaldor 1999, 2003; Mueller 2000; Howard 2008; Holmqvist 2013, 2014; Bartelson 2018). These police wars partially unsettle the basis on which the distinction between wartime and peacetime rests, for they apply concepts and means traditionally associated with peacetime to the armed conflict setting. Although the myriad wartime activities relate to one another, a division of labor now undermines what once constituted a united and comprehensive war effort (Schadlow 2017). It is therefore unsurprising that academic observers question the UN’s practical distinctions, insofar as UN actions in some contexts resemble war more than peacekeeping or peacebuilding (Fortna 2004; Peter 2015; Hunt 2017; Karlsrud 2017, 2018). In this respect, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) illustrates the point. It carries all the features of the modern police wars. It tasks external military forces with neutralizing terrorists (i.e., peace enforcement), deploys a robust international peacekeeping force to patrol swathes of territory and to protect civilians (i.e., policing), and mobilizes UN specialists to advise and support Mali’s governing authority (i.e., state-building). As a result, MINUSMA occupies neither the wartime nor peacetime space; it is instead a sophisticated policing and state-building operation premised on a division of labor: the military, the police, and political advisors. This division of labor reflects and reinforces how the international order has developed since 1945—especially the increased desire to avoid political responsibility for war. Euphemism and the rise of new terminology not only diffuse political and legal responsibility for war, but also exemplify how the system has disassembled wartime into its component parts. War increasingly ceased to be a comprehensive political and military task, being instead divided into several specialized tasks. Nevertheless, the range of creative terminology reflects not so much an attempt to deploy euphemism as the fact that armed conflict can no longer be reduced to war. But that raises a larger question: what is the threshold that separates lower levels of combat from war?5 In the absence of such criteria, wartime is peacetime. Concluding Remarks: Where to Go from Here? Further inquiry into the relationships discussed here might continue along two major fronts. The first addresses whether the diffusion of responsibility, and the rise of police wars, reflects the demise of the international order or enhances its robustness. With regard to the latter, for example, broad agreement about the rules to armed conflict exists, even as economic quarrels continue over which state benefits the most from the current order. The UN’s twelve peacekeeping operations across Africa, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean are only possible in light of agreement among United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members (ongoing as of December 2020). This need not downplay the sundry disagreements among UNSC members, as well as among the other rising powers across the globe; rather, it reveals a measure of convergence in expectations—namely, the acceptability of pursuing police wars, of punishing the order’s enemies, and of strengthening the state wherever it seems fragile. Hence, although assessments of the liberal order’s future most often rest on economic considerations (e.g., welfare and progress), one can also evaluate it according to the standard found in the UN’s Charter: whether the order has saved “future generations from the scourge of war.” From that angle, the absence of formal war declarations—along with widespread agreement on the need to punish, police, and build the state across global armed conflicts—indicates that the UN is largely fulfilling its role. The world may not be entirely peaceful, but it is not embroiled in major warring either. It is something in between: a policing world. Further research might inquire about whether this policing consensus will be sufficient to overcome future disputes over the distribution of power, wealth, and authority that will inevitably challenge the international order. A second line of inquiry looks elsewhere—to ascertain how the end of the wartime–peacetime distinction, coupled with the division of labor that now addresses armed conflicts worldwide, compromises the international order’s longevity. Neff (2005) aptly suggests that a legal order may sit on the brink of transformation once the understanding of war and peace ceases to inform practice. After all, when politicians cease to invoke the traditional wartime–peacetime distinction, or otherwise conceal it through euphemism, then a fundamental question comes to the fore: who is responsible for declaring war and peace? Managing international security lies under the UNSC’s purview, at least in the current order; yet, quarrels over the legitimacy of great power intervention—as seen in Kosovo (1999), Georgia (2008), Libya (2011), and Syria (2011)—make one wonder whether reviving the wartime–peacetime distinction would be the best means by which to deal with armed conflict. That revival may not only lead to clearer lines of authority, but also facilitate the attainment of peace. At least, this has been the position of some who consider traditional wartime—as an all-encompassing effort, involving combat and governance from the outset—to be more effective than the present-day alternative (e.g., see Luttwak 1999; Schadlow 2017). In the end, the international order’s trajectory is an old, if not foundational, question in international relations. The tradition of formally recognizing wartime—and, therefore, peacetime—provides yet another prism through which to investigate that topic. Further inquiry might indeed question whether the international order is moving toward the consolidation of the practice of global policing, punishment, and state-building, which ultimately threaten to dilute political and moral responsibility at the state level, or alternatively, toward the reinvigoration of the state’s role in determining when wartime exists. These are all questions for and of our time.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › L - Tech Development

Technological development leads to blind faith in tech which obliterates subjectivity and expands social control

JERUSALIMIEC 18 (Lucas Jerusalimiec - PhD Candidate in Political Theory and Comparative Politics at McGill University), 11-13-2018, "Technology, Hegemony, and Citizenship," https://curve.carleton.ca/f3bb23c1-4d5e-49cc-862d-d5cfabc24b83//vivi

1.7 Technology and Hegemony The philosophers of technology agree that while rigid technological thinking hides the possibility of citizenship, it encourages a vision of a totalizing state. This technological state, or condition, defines a world in which autonomous systematization no longer faces any friction or resistance. In this version of the eternal present technological progress is allowed to legislate for human affairs in addition to conditioning them. As Feenberg writes: Technology is power in modern societies, a greater power in many domains than the political system itself. . . . if this is true, technology should be considered as a new kind of legislation, not so very different from other public decisions . . . . The legislative authority of technology increases constantly as it becomes more and more pervasive. But if technology is so powerful, why don’t we apply the same democratic standards to it we apply to other political institutions? (1999, 131). Here Feenberg draws our attention to the danger that the philosophers of technology see in uncriticized hegemony. When citizens see politics as nothing more than a system of power relations, it becomes normal to equate systematizing technology and the political system. According to Feenberg, we should not think that technology’s autonomy frees it from the need to exist within society. As he puts it “[t]he technical always already incorporates the social in its structure” (1999, 210). Along with the other authors in the Heideggerian/Ellulian tradition, Feenberg is concerned with the damage that an unquestioning belief in technological autonomy will cause to political freedom. Verene explains the danger of the autonomous technological state in terms of myth. He claims that To redefine the state through the logic of mythical thought is to eliminate the possibility of moral judgment . . . . Politics becomes not a matter of ideas put into action but the purveyance of images and rites that relieve the self of individual responsibility and the state from any acts of rational justification. . . . Myth is always present in the background of social life, ready to appear as the manner of thought to grip the individual and unite the individual with the collective in times of political tension or crisis” (2016, 34). Verene explains that the technological state as a vision of public life excludes deliberation and political action. Even though, like Feenberg, he does not hold that citizens are constrained to accept this myth, he believes that it can exist as a substratum of civic consciousness. Verene is pointing to a myth that claims that society can survive without citizens. Simpson writes that when citizens choose to believe this myth, the technological state can actually become self-perpetuating and self-directing: “technology itself decides upon the best means, and, to the extent that we increasingly abdicate our power to make legitimate choices . . . . it becomes self-determinative without any decisive human intervention” (1995, 21). For the philosophers of technology, citizens may choose to believe in the full autonomy of the technological state because it seems to incarnate systematic progress. This attitude reflects a citizen belief that self-making is a feature the non-human rather than the human. Thinkers in the Heidegerrian/Ellulian tradition think that systematic and autonomous progress belong first to historical humanity, and that the technological state is merely one possible expression of this power of self-making. In Darby’s analysis of how technology combines both techne and logos he writes that Techne pertains to the universalizing and homogenizing of making (poesis). This re-presentation in the form of a thing (= object = a being that stands before us) is demarcated by clear boundaries (= completeness = wholeness). . . . Logos, in an archaic form, is a gathering together of experience that leads to perception, or, we might say, to knowledge (2004). Techne is homogenizing because the form in which a thing is made obscures our perception of its composite elements. In this interpretation, forms result from the human desire to have names for the parts of our experience. There are “objects” of experience because we have made objects that can be experienced as unities. For the philosophers of technology, technological progress reveals that the unity of experience is imposed within the human being before it is imposed on the world. Thus technological hegemony is really internal hegemony, because human beings can break and make the boundaries of their own natures by imposing unity on self-experience. When speaking about Hobbes’ technological attitude toward human nature, Darby writes that all boundaries originate with, and are shaped by, the self-made being: man. As the being who makes himself from an infinite array of possibilities, man makes his own purposes and shapes his own ends. In doing so, he becomes the spirit of modern science: technology (2016, 305). The modern belief in the power of information technology is representative of the view that human beings are self-making. Information technology is supposed to manipulate the disembodied data of experience in such a way that it can become raw material for the construction of a mind or person. In this context, to “in-form oneself” means to choose both the categories and the content of one’s own experience, and to shape the previously formless data into a personal identity. Human beings must begin as a non-persons so that they are not constrained by previous forms as they progressively bring themselves into appearance. For the philosophers of technology, the totally self-sufficient technological state presents an attractive but impartial vision of the reality of self-making. The technological state appears free to homogenize experience without the interference of social authority (Juenger 1949, 79, 99). This apparent freedom allows the modern citizen to believe in the possibility of progressive self-making, but the impersonal nature of the technological state obscures the roots of its autonomy within human existence. Technology can help lead us to adequate self-knowledge as the beings that are always becoming, but the reality of mortality causes us to retreat into the homogeneous present and away from our destinies in the past and the future (Simpson 1995, 24, Heidegger, Question 1977, 32). This is an ironic and anxious situation because there is no necessary relationship between the technology of becoming and the advent of a totally impersonal state. For Ellul, impersonal technological hegemony traps citizens into a kind of progress that is unfree and closed, rather than free and open: The rapid changing of these social relations gives an illusion of freedom. But it is not man who causes these changes. It is they, stemming from the progression of the system, that determine man, and it is their ‘pressing’ character that restrains his liberty. He is constantly more and more defined by his situation in the system (1980, 322). The hegemonic claim that technological progress will inevitably systematize human nature in a particular way destroys the possibility of deliberating about the reality or advisability of the technological state. Feenberg writes that “[I]n the technical sphere, it is commonly said, legitimacy is a function of efficiency rather than of the will of the people, or rather, efficiency is the will of the people” (1999, 131). For the philosophers of technology, the identification of politics and society with an impersonal system of causes and effects legitimizes the suppression of the particular ends and particular means of individual persons (Angus 1987, 111). Ellul puts the homogenizing effects of the technological system on human nature in terms of anxiety. He claims that the technological state produces a type incapable of reacting directly to . . . the forms of concrete things, incapable of functioning without anxiety in any domain, and even incapable of feeling alive unless authorized or commanded by a machine and with the aid of the extra-organic apparatus furnished by the machine deity (1980, 313-314). For the philosophers of technology, persons in the grip of this kind of technological thinking believe that their very existence depends on the technological state.11 Every aspect of experience is viewed as the product of impersonal mediation. Questioning the nature of things or persons becomes an insupportably anxious activity. What does this underlying anxiety tell the philosophers of technology about human nature? Heidegger writes that technology endangers our ability to see that the essence of nature is fundamentally becoming. He thinks, however, that along with this danger comes the possibility of human beings realizing that technology calls them to cooperate with it and reveal themselves as the ones who determine the direction of natural becoming: the coming to presence of technology cannot be led into the change of its destining without the cooperation of the coming to presence of man. . . . Man is indeed needed and used for the restorative surmounting of the essence of technology. . . . man’s essence must first open itself to the essence of technology. This opening is, in terms of that coming-to-pass which discloses, something quite different from the event of man’s affirming technology and its means and promoting them (Heidegger, Turning 1977, 39). For Heidegger, human beings can redirect technology away from the radical systematization of experience, but they cannot destroy technology. Technology and humanity are co-products of a world that is always changing the way it reveals itself. Technology is the means by which this change is expressed, and humanity is the means by which it is understood. Heidegger thinks that true self-knowledge will result from a successful integration of technology and human nature.12 This true self-knowledge will come into existence through a ‘turning’ that applies technological thinking to technology itself. Heidegger says that [i]n the coming to presence of the danger there conceals itself, therefore, the possibility of a turning in which the oblivion belonging to the coming to presence of Being will so turn itself that, with this turning, the truth of the coming to presence of Being will expressly turn in—turn homeward—into whatever is (Heidegger, Turning 1977, 41). Heidegger claims that Being has its home within human nature, or, that humanity is where Being can be known as Being. In this passage Heidegger shows that he is thinking of Being as an essentially empty category since oblivion is what the ‘turning’ reveals. The rescue Heidegger offers from the systematization of experience is another kind of homogenization. Rather than technology operating as an active force of historical progress toward stasis, technology is that by which humanity examines itself and finds literally nothing (Heidegger, Turning 1977, 44). Heidegger’s ‘coming to presence’ seems to come from and lead to a place without any tangibly existing things other than technological process. This ontological nowhere contains the possibility of creating a world, but this possibility exists because Being needs a way to reveal itself (Heidegger, Turning 1977, 43). In this interpretation of technological becoming, however, human individuals do not appear to have any ontological status as persons apart from their role as knowers of Being (Heidegger, Turning 1977, 42).

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › L – Neoliberalism

The convergence between the contemporary Nation-state and capitalist interests has put the interests of the common people on the backburner. Neoliberal innovations in the form of emerging technologies accelerate existential catastrophe.

Grech 19 - John Grech, , Mulit-Faculty Affiliations, Lecturer, Nation : State // Technology : Biology Global Relations in an Age of Emerging Algorithms and the Logic of Late Capitalism (Draft), Academia // eshaan

Evidence suggests seismic shifts may be taking place in the political as well as technological landscapes of the world today the likes of which have not been witnessed since the 17th and 18th centuries. Although it is foolish to try to predict the outcome of such changes, democratic societies founded on universal suffrage, human rights, and the rule of law definitely appear to be under threat (Levitsky & Ziblatt 2018; Rich 2017; MacLean 2017). In the shadow of these economic, political, and technological developments, the physical environment is itself becoming less hospitable to biological life and this trend looks likely to intensify as the present millenium progresses. In the context of global climate change, it is gradually becoming accepted that the very survival of humanity may actually be at stake although most writers, scientists and activists understandably choose to focus on the prospects of retrieving the situation before it is too late (Flannery 2010; Gibson, Rose & Fincher 2015; Kaku 2018; Akhavan 2017; Oreskes & Conway 2014).xxxvii Current debates concerning sapiens’ relationships with the natural world are many, however, and undercut many anthropocentric assumptions about the world that have consistently been pedalled by humans to justify our actions throughout history. What can definitely be agreed, at least for the moment, is that planet Earth is the only home humans – as well as every other life form that we know – have. It would be presumptuous to suggest that all life on Earth will cease as a result of human impact, but it is nevertheless reasonable to conclude that dramatic changes will significantly alter the planet’s capacity to maintain a sprawling human population of more than seven billion people as well as sustain the habitats of the vast majority of other living creatures. In the context of political and economic developments, the last century has seen the central role of the Nation-State appear to have been both reworked and eroded. For if at the end of the 19th century, the role of collectively representing individual as well as collective human interests had been assumed by the Nation-State, by the beginning of the 21st century, the interlocked relationship between State and Nation have become significantly weakened and the position of individuals and society as a whole no longer appear to be the primary focus. This is evident in war events and the rise of civilian targets as well as in the evolution of general economic, tax, social welfare, labour and corporate regulation. The instrumental power of the State now appears to privilege the interests of global capital and the large multinational corporations that articulate it rather than “the people’s”. In this emerging scenario, the needs and necessities of “the people”, as can be said also of the needs and necessities of the biosphere in general, are subsumed to the interests and logics of capital. This, however, is only the latest elaboration of the underlying philosophy enshrining “star” fixated economic liberalism (Das 2015:15) that Western culture has doggedly pursued throughout modernity. At national level, the “rugged individualism” of liberalism has realised enormous economic and technological development and innovation but it has come at the expense of ever greater concentrations of wealth and power, environmental and human exploitation. As well as entrenching systemic inequality, economic liberalism has maintain an outward appearance of a broad commitment to the betterment and freedom of humanity in general through the individual. Compounding this, the regulatory systems established for globalisation allows corporations to run up enormous debt in the pursuit of profit but then enables them to shed such debt onto society when the things go sour. The shedding of privately accumulated debt as collective responsibility during times of recession has become an unavoidable consequence of capitalism’s boom/bust cycles and is usually justified by statements that the consequences of allowing such large corporations to go bankrupt are worse than the cost of bailing them out. With privately oriented liberal economics adopted as social policy, communities bear the risks while profits are disbursed to corporate stakeholders, or as Veroufakis puts it, sharing the burden of venture capital at the same time as enabling “public investments” to prop up or become a part of ever growing corporate empires (Veroufakis 2017). The healthy profits private interests accumulate then encourages further risktaking ‘innovations’ and so the cycle continues until such innovations overstep the mark and stock exchange credibility disappears thus unleashing the next crash. Encouraging individual enterprise and greed is, according to Adam Smith and other liberal thinkers, the most efficient way to improve the economic well-being of the community. So large and very large corporations have become the beneficiaries of collective largesse as corporate welfare (though not general social security) has become more prevalent. In practice this means that average taxpayers help line the pockets of the already rich and powerful, bringing into higher relief the fact that many multinational corporations often pay no or negligible rates of tax on income. The global trend towards lower company tax contrasts with the rising tax burden ordinary individuals are being asked to bear in terms of health, education, and social welfare. This exacerbates the shift in tax regimes from income to consumption taxes which obscures how those earning on lower incomes end up paying higher proportions of their salaries on indirect consumption taxes because taxes on goods and services are charged at the same rate irrespective of how much one earns. Add to that the generous allowances and subventions National governments avail to corporations in contrast to the stringent tax enforcement regimes individuals are subjected to, and the imbalance between people and corporate’ tax burdens is even more apparent. Now lets concede that rich corporations and wealthy individuals are best positioned to take advantage of tax avoidance and minimisation accounting practices (West 2019xxxviii) and even the most partial commentator cannot avoid the honest conclusion that inequality is embedded in global regulation that promotes the growing gap between those who have and those who have not.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › L – NATO

NATO action is constructive of Empire – it relies on discourses of legitimated war which lays the universal values necessary for imperial biopolitical control

Kuus ‘7 (Merje Kuss; professor of geography at University of British Columbia. “’Love, Peace, and Nato’: Imperial-Subject Making in Central Europe” ) // ELog

NATO enlargement involves a two-fold legitimation. It rests firstly on making NATO everyday and unremarkable, and secondly on making it morally good. The effect is one of simultaneous banalization and glorification of NATO. The alliance is on the one hand made so common sense as to be boring—below political debate. It is on the other hand made existential and essential—above debate. The first side of this coin of legitimation—that of banalization—is a key feature of geopolitical discourses. These discourses rely not as much on formal arguments about science and strategy as on the notion of common sense (O’Tuathail and Agnew 1992:193). Their political success stems not from their deep meaning, but from their dailiness and banality. The militarization of political debate and everyday life is made possible in significant measure by domesticating military power as everyday (Cohn 1987; Lutz 2001). The military–industrial complex, or the military–industrial–media–entertainment network in Der Derian’s (2001) more precise terminology, is made to appear both virtual and virtuous, both clean and good. Its material infrastructure and material effects are thereby erased from political debate. This is clearly the case with NATO. Military terminology is all but absent from discussions of the world’s most powerful military alliance (Sidaway 2001:602). It has thus become acceptable and indeed common to speak of war— such as the one in Kosovo in 1999—as an “operation” concerned with “building civil society” (see also Feldman 2003; Sidaway 2003). Yet as Arendt (1964:288) famously pointed out over 40 years ago, banal is not synonymous with benign. Evil can arise not from sinister intent but from unthinking adherence to the taken-for-granted (see also Billig 1995; Gregory 2004). To speak of the banality of the military–industrial complex, then, is not to imply triviality, but to specify its mechanisms of operation and legitimation. It is to underscore the “set of silent ethical assertions that pre-organize explicit ethicopolitical discourses” (Shapiro 1997:16)—in this case the assertions that enable discussions of NATO to revolve around the notions of right, peace, culture, and values. As Enloe (2004:220) points out, most of the militarization of social life, a process in which social practices gain value and legitimacy by being associated with military force, occurs in peacetime. To understand the dynamics of this process, then, we need to look at the mundane rather than the spectacular, the civilian rather than the military. The second aspect of the legitimation of NATO—the constitution of military power as good—is a key part of what Hardt and Negri (2000:9) call the new inscription of authority. Today’s global power relations, they argue, are based not on force itself, but on the capacity to present force as being in the service of right and peace. These relations rely on an “ethico-political dynamic”, which envelops the entire space of what it considers civilization—a boundless, universal space (ibid.:11). This ethico-political dynamic lays the foundation for a renewed notion of just war: no longer an activity of defense or resistance, but one that is justified in itself, by the appeal to essential values and justice. This just war combines two elements: first, the legitimacy of the military apparatus insofar as it is ethically grounded, and second, the effectiveness of military action to achieve the desired order and peace. The Empire’s powers of intervention do not begin directly with its weapons of lethal force but rather with its moral instruments (Hardt and Negri 2000:35). They are based on the production of the normative space of imperial right. Intervention becomes juridically legitimate only when it is inserted into existing international consensuses. The first task of the Empire is “to enlarge the realm of the consensuses that support its own power” (ibid.:15).2 The military complex becomes a key part of the production of moral good (see also Flint and Falah 2004 for an in-depth discussion of the concept of just war). Hardt and Negri conceptualize this new notion of right as a substantively new phenomenon. In the earlier disciplinary society, they argue, social power was effected through administrative apparatuses that produce and regulate customs and habits. In today’s society of control, in contrast, mechanisms of command become ever more “democratic”, ever more immanent in the social field. The normalizing apparatuses of disciplinary power do not simply intensify. In addition, and in contrast to disciplinary society, social control today extends well outside the structured sites of social institutions through flexible and fluctuating networks (Hardt and Negri 2000:23). Power has become biopolitical in that it extends throughout the depths of the consciousnesses and bodies of the population. The new notion of right, then, is not simply imposed on localities and subjects from the outside. It is rather part and parcel of the very production of locality and subjectivity (Hardt and Negri 2000:30). According to Hardt and Negri (2004:13), security is a form of biopower in the sense that it is aimed not only at controlling a population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life.3 It is effective if it is an integral vital function of individuals. The movement from defense to security represents a shift from a reactive and conservative attitude to an active and constructive one (Agamben 2002). The normative space of imperial right is produced by a variety of bodies in the civil society, including the news media and especially non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Because these institutions are not run by governments, they are easily presented as acting on the basis of moral or ethical imperatives (ibid.:36). This dynamic is especially visible in the current “war on terror”, which popular legitimation centers on the concepts of identity and universal moral values (Dalby 2005). It is made possible by constructing military solutions as morally just (Flint and Falah 2004). Al Quaeda’s motives are identified as cultural and moral and so are the “western” or US responses.4 As such bundling up of security, culture, and moral values has moved to the centre stage of political legitimation since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, we need to closely investigate how the process works (Agamben 2002). Hardt and Negri overemphasize the novelty of imperial subjectmaking. They downplay the much longer processes of the construction of geographical and geopolitical knowledge, in which the notion of universal values has occupied a central position at least since the Age of Exploration (see Agnew 1998; Mignolo 1995). They also under-estimate the spatiality of power by conceptualizing imperial right as essentially a non-territorial universalizing process that encompasses the whole globe regardless of the current spatial configurations.5 Their argument’s utility for the present analysis stems from its focus on a key mechanism by which hegemonic power works today: not against but through the creative efforts of individuals. NATO enlargement exemplifies this mechanism. Whereas national security discourses still invoke the negative notion of threat, however “soft” and however indirect, NATO enlargement discourse invokes only positive categories—values, democracy, openness. NATO, like Empire, is a “machine for universal integration. It does not fortify its boundaries to push others away, but rather pulls them within its pacific order” (Hardt and Negri 2000:198). NATO is central to the institutional structure through which military intervention is organized and legitimized today, and it is continually bolstering its technical capabilities to operate globally. Its enlargement discourse is moralistic, affective, and adamantly non-territorial, as it emphasizes not territories but universal values. NATO enlargement can therefore illuminate in rich empirical detail how the production of imperial right and the militarization of social life work on a daily basis.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › L – Hegemony

Their concerns of great power competition overlook that hegemony is threatened not due to the actions of individual nations, but as an inevitable symptom of the emergence of Empire

Hardt/Negri ’19 (Michael Hardt; professor of literature at Duke University. Antonio Negri; independent researcher and philosopher, previously a professor of political science at University of Padua. “Empire, Twenty Years On” ) // ELog

The fact that the two spheres are increasingly out of joint, however, is only part of the story. We need to look more closely at the composition of each sphere, to gauge its powers and estimate its prospects. We begin by taking a step back to register how the structures of global order have changed in the last twenty years, with an eye to how potential avenues have opened there today for the multitudes that resist and challenge them. At the beginning of the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and as economic, political and cultural relations were extending in novel ways beyond the reach of national sovereign powers, the US President proclaimed the dawn of a new world order. At the time, most supporters and critics alike took for granted that the United States, having emerged ‘victorious’ from the Cold War as sole remaining superpower, would exert its unparalleled hard and soft power, shouldering ever-more responsibility while exercising increasingly unilateral control over global affairs. A decade later, as victorious US troops rolled into Baghdad, it appeared that the new world order announced by Bush Senior was being realized in concrete form by Bush Junior. American occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan promised to ‘remake the Middle East’ while creating pure neoliberal economies from the ashes of invasion. As neoconservatives flexed their muscles, critics denounced a new US imperialism. From today’s vantage point, it is obvious that unilateralist US power was already limited, and Washington’s imperialist ambitions were in vain. US imperialism had been undermined not by the enlightened virtue of its leaders or the republican righteousness of its national spirit but simply by the insufficiencies of its economic, political and military strength. The United States could topple the Taliban and Baathist regimes (and, indeed, wreak tragic destruction), but it could not achieve the stable hegemony required of a true imperialist power. Now, after decades of failure in Afghanistan and Iraq, waging the ‘war on terror’, few can muster much faith in the benefits of a US-led global system or its ability to create a stable order. Since Trump’s election there has been considerable hand-wringing by commentators about whether the liberal international order can survive. In truth, the Pax Americana, and the moment when the US could unilaterally anchor a global institutional order, passed long before Trump crashed onto the scene. This new situation pertains not only to the United States: no nation-state today is able to organize and command the global order unilaterally. Those who diagnose the waning of US global hegemony—Giovanni Arrighi was one of the first and most insightful—generally project another state as successor in that hegemonic role: just as the mantle of the global hegemon passed in the early 20th century from Britain to the US, they reason, so too today, as the star of the US wanes, that of another state must rise, with China the prime candidate. In contrast, liberal institutional commentators cling to the belief that, despite the international disorder sown by Trump, the star of the United States still shines over the world, and talk of the relative decline of its military, economic and political powers is exaggerated. It remains, for them, the only contender for global hegemon. There is some truth in these arguments; but the more important point is that the role of the US, as well as that of rising powers like China, must be understood not in terms of unipolar hegemony but instead as part of the intense jockeying among nation-states on the rungs of Empire’s mixed constitution. The fact that no nation-state is able to fill the hegemonic role in the emerging global order is not a diagnosis of chaos and disorder, but rather reveals the emergence of a new global power structure—and, indeed, a new form of sovereignty.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › L – Digital Economy

The 1AC’s sanctimonious insistence on benevolent cyber development to help the “lesser developed nations” is a Janus-faced promise that only brings these nations from the periphery to the front stage of the worldwide digital economy. Geopolitics has evolved from annihilation to assimilation where the non-western world is incorporated into the ever-expanding empire of IR.

Lobastova 20 - Svetlana Lobastova of The University of Economics Prague, Geopolitics of Cyberspace: Virtual Power and International Development, Journal of Liberal Arts and Humanities (JLAH) Issue: Vol. 1; No. 3 March2020 (pp. 97-108), eshaan

The international community is currently involved in a new digital information era. The worldwide digital economy is fundamentally relied on the diverse cryptographic processes, virtuality phenomenon gains on the popularity(Chang, 2017; North & North, 2016; Lau & Lee, 2015; Nardi, 2015; Bombari, 2015). International political, economic and socio-cultural structures exist in a virtual mode (Baylis, 2011) and are socially constructed (Wendt, 1999; Katzenstein, 1996). Development mechanisms of the international system are based on hybridity (Acharya, 2017). The dissemination of representational systems of social meanings and cultural valuesvia popular mass media resources may serve the form ofinternational cooperation (Constantinou, 2018).Advanced technological equipment that projects virtual reality spaces within global international environment is widely distributed. International markets, information infrastructures inter-unite individuals on the global international stage. Visual representations serve the means of shaping individuals` interestsin the global internationalcommunities with an emphasis on the type of technical equipment that is capable to produce virtual reality expanse in a certain area and region(Constantinou, 2018). Artificial worlds presented in simulated virtual realm also affect digital marketing strategies (Zanni& Rios, 2018; Lin &Rauschnabel, 2015) in a global social context andconsolidate representatives of the international cyber society into discrete interest groups. Popular online mass media platforms are persistently growing in prominence among youngpeople (Goodyear, Armour& Wood, 2018; Swist, et al., 2015). Such platforms become a feasible mediator among interest groups in the global international level(Leavey, 2013; Margetts, 2009). In this connection, it makes sense to argue, that global cyberspace and online virtual platforms serve theappropriate environment forinternational communication and cooperation. Such environment creates the appropriate platform for international cooperation and future developmentof the international system from a global perspective, as the distribution of consolidating social content may influence and shape actors` interests and integrate them and their strategies of behavior. By means of promoting consolidating social contentsadpted to thetechnological landscape incertain geographical areas may integrate individual actors on the international stage and diverse social groups. However, the promotion of certain type of virtuality content with emphasized commonalities of shared systems of meanings via global cyberspace adopted to the technical environment in a local area has not been considered the constituent part of the global internationaldevelopment according to the geopolitics of cyberspace strategyyet. The paper focuses the global virtual environment an appropriateinternational platform for geopolitics of cyberspace implementation via adopting the virtuality with its content and representation of intersubjectivity as the discrete form of internationally unitingsocial power and platform for global communication. To achieve the objective, the paper focuses on the concepts of cyberspace and cybercartography. This is followed by the proposition of transformed Wallerstein`s theory as the contemporary structure of the world-system. This is followed by consideration of a virtual poweras the means of geopolitics of cyberspace strategy, with a particular attention on developing gaming industry. 2. Cyberspace as global virtual environment The globally spread networking systems have influenced the essential processes of humanity existence on micro and macro levels. They synchronize basic human life processes across geographical boundaries, time zones and cultural prejudices. Social relations have already been hybridized into offline and online environments (Serrano-Puche, 2016). Global cyberspace integrates people all over the world into one common cyberspace community that is comprised of information infrastructures. Interest communities are internationally interconnected within online spaces and virtual platforms. The structure of contemporary international systemis constructed by social ideas (Baylis, 2011).The concept may be interpreted as digital libertarianism as important characteristic of postmodern society.Many individuals spend a significant part of their conscious day in virtual reality spaces. Naím (2005) argues that essential communicative transactions today proceed among individuals in the global networking virtual space, so that an individual is considered an actor on the international stage. The Actor-Network theory focuses the exploratory consideration of social relations and various interaction modalities in global networking world. The Actor-Network theory has become increasingly prominent within the international relations discipline and political sciences (Lezaun, 2017; Bencherki, 2017). In this connection, the global cyberspace serves a strategic platform for social integration and communication on the international stage. The definition of cyberspace initially refers to a multichannel widespread, interconnected digital technology system that creates a notional global environment in which communication over computer networks occurs. Subsequently, the virtual environment in which communication over computer networks is implemented can be understood as concept of cyberspace. Cyberspace can also be defined as avirtual environment in which communication over computer networks occurs. The cyberspace term also refers to a virtualized computer world and electronic medium (Kneale, 1999). Cyberspace is created by a global computer networking system and serves the facilitation of interaction and transaction processes.The term is currently used by technology strategists, industrial security representatives, in formal speeches and entrepreneurs to describe the domain of the global technology environment. The term cyberspace is related to the notion of cybernetics. The notion is traditionally understood as the science of the general laws of information change within complex systems. Wiener has defined cybernetics as the science of communication, based on human-computed interaction studies (Wiener, 1948). Cybernetic studies in this connection are associated with general laws of networking processes that occur within complex dynamic transformation systems of social nature (Wiener, 1948).A number of contemporary cyberpschycological studies are devoted to the exploration of computer-mediated communication (Parker, 2007; Huber, 2006; Muhlberger, et al., 2005; Galimberti&Belloni, 2003). Cybernetics and networking information infrastructures generate global virtual cyberspace that is considered theglobal virtual field of action. Currently, the international system is partially constructed and influenced by the spread of global virtual cyberspace. It makes sense to argue that in such type of a system data visualization and digital technological equipment remain the components of information infrastructure basis and enable the cyberspace existence. In this connection, these constituents of global communication can be considered the two main strategic resources for dissemination of internationally uniting virtual social contents on global level. The increasingly significant place in the international relations discourse currently take the debates on Geocybernetics (Phillips, 2016; Paras, 2007; Reyes, Taylor & Martinez, 2006).Cybersecurity is considered the top of international agenda (Kuranda, 2018). The geocybernetics term refers to scientific perspective of the general laws of information change within a global complex networking systems (Stangu,2010). Geocybernetics is a scientific discipline that focuses the exploratory regulation principles of global interconnected action systems on the basis of general mathematical laws and management regulations (Stangu, 2010).Physical geography of cyberspace or geo cyber cartography (Taylor &Caquard, 2006; Reyes & Martinez, 2005; Jiang &Ormeling, 2000) deals with technological equipment of all types. This aspect can be considered to serve an appropriate platform that can enable distribution of virtualityin a certain geographical region. Visualization of cyber cartography (Hecht, et al., 2011) and geographical hypermedia (Crampton, 2009) are considered the epistemology of science. Batty (1977) and Goodchild (1990) argue that virtual geography is a field of new media convergence. CentroGeo’s Scientific Project with its cybernetic character was developed to focus the Scientific Management Model (SMM) (Jeong, &Barabasi, 1999). The SMM as a scientific strategy that constitutes of four blocks: human networking, heterarchical groups, a method to approach knowledge production and the international level (Reyes & Paras, 1999). There was produced the three-dimensional hyperbolic visualization of Internet topologies (CAIDA). The model can be considered an innovative mode of knowledge production with a cybernetic character based on the science of geocybernetics. The main focus of the developed model is on communication and cognition processes of user`s interaction strategies within the global networking system in accordance with cybernetics (Reyes & Paras, 1999). There were also invented cartographic mode maps that display information infrastructures in their global scale, and infrastructures in certain geographic areas (the Helsinki metropolitan area, the west LondonM4 corridor, Silicon Valley). Via distributing virtual representations through the multichannel expanse of global cyberspace there should be payed a particular attention on its adoption to the technical equipment availability in a certain geographic region.There were already developed cyber cartography atlases of digital ethnography that display digital logistical infrastructure and material properties of communicational environment in a certain geographic area(Grubesic & Murray, 2005a; Grubesic & Murray, 2005b). Geographic maps are developed to indicate and produce the visual map-like interfaces into online virtual spaces (Grubesic & Murray, 2005a; Grubesic & Murray, 2005b).These aspects can be utilized to enable the effective international social interaction and communication and serve the basis for developing elaboration strategies for the international future cooperation and development. In addition, the globalized networking cyberspace does not have anarchical configuration. The international cyberspace may be represented as intersubjective virtual unit constructed with certain informational zones and information infrastructures that are interconnected among one another. The developed design of the virtual world map and global cyberspace as the significant part of contemporary world division may serve the global international platform for global communication and digital cooperation, international consolidation of discrete societies. Online platforms may be considered the sustainable basis for future international cooperation and development. 3 Transformed Wallerstein`s theory There had been held several debates on world-system structure theories based on division of the global system on center-periphery relation paradigms (Mathias, Buzan &Zürn, 2013). The fundamental perspectives of a world-system division on center-periphery relation paradigms in the traditional international relations theories were presented by Onuf (2017), Galtung (1971) and Wallerstein (1974). Wallerstein (2004) presented an inter-regional world-system theory which is based on categorization of nation states as power units. The division is based on the analysis of various economic areas division. He contributes three main world categories of core, semi-periphery and periphery, according to the nation state`s relative position within the world economy. According to Wallerstein (2004) core nations are represented with more complex state institutions that provide infrastructures with economic diversification, centralized governmental structure and specialize on information industry improvement. The distinctive feature of core nation states is their financial and military dominance in the international system. Wallerstein defines Canada, Australia, the United States, England, France, Netherlands as the category of core states. The peripheral nations are presented with Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. The distinctive feature of this category is defined as weakly functioning institutional systems, high level of social inequality and poor economic diversification. The category of Semi-peripheral nation states can be represented by nation states that cannot be classified neither as core, nor as periphery. Currently, the status of semi peripheral nation states have BRICS countries, Israel, and South Korea. Otherwise, there also should be took into consideration the availability of digital technologies, media technologies in a certain region. Information infrastructures that constructs the essential basis for global cyberspace existence as any kind of social structure also serves the catalyst for economic development in a certain region. Italso does make sense to argue that each geographic area is distinct with a special type of technical equipment, with each area having its unique technological landscape and potential for economic development in the future. Core can be considered as a geographic region with widely-spreaddeveloped technological equipment on its whole territory. The individuals dispose on such territory the latest digital technological units, have the access to the global international cyberspace and are actively involved into multiple international cooperation. Periphery should be understood as the geographical regions on the surface of the Earth that were not, or almost not, absorbed by globalization processes, individuals on these territories almost don`t dispose the technical equipment and have the lack of access to the global international community. Periphery regions are also distinct with the lack of access to the education. On the periphery territories there isa lack of access to electricity and energy. Individuals that are located on the periphery territories have small access to available mass-media resources and to the global networking cyberspace, so that they are enable to be involved into global international development processes and have difficulties with access to the educational online programs. While considering regions of periphery it’s important to take into account the lack of electricalaccessibility in those regions, which is considered a significant constituent for geopolitics of cyberspace future development. The absence of electricity enables the expanse of networking communications, the Internet within geographical area. This aspect also influences the type of technical equipment in the regional location. For instance, according toThe Harvard Forum I Research ICTdue to the lack of electrical power in African regions, 75% of mobile-phone users spend around 11%-27% of their household income on mobile communications (Ishkanian, 2011). Insurrectional movements in north Africa region and middle east raise up considerations on new communication technologies as sustainable development source in democratic world (Ishkanian, 2011). Each geographic area on the world map, where advanced technological equipment is spread enough to create the virtual cyberspace corresponds to the semi-periphery. Otherwise, the online activities of individuals located on the Semi-Periphery territories are not so extensive as on the core territories, so that the complete involvement into international online cooperation might be difficult. To the semi-periphery territories there may refer industrializing and developing world regions. Within these territories individuals dispose information technologies and technical equipment, although, the intense of their operations in online spaces and involvement to the global development and cooperation is not such intensive as on the territories of core. 4 Intersubjectivity intra cyberspace The basic social constructivism assumption stipulates and emphasizes the significance of intersubjectivity of social meanings. The notion stipulates a common system of social meanings that is shared among the members of a certain social group (Rogoff, 1990). The intersubjectivity, as a social constructivism concept, represented by the common system of social meanings and shared knowledge with a common social context and background (Prawat&Floden, 1994). Every system of common shared meanings is supported by a virtue of social interactions and communications among individuals also in a virtual space. As a result of social interactions and communications among the group members there occur thecommon understanding of basic principles of a discrete social reality space (Ernest, 1999). Intersubjectivity also serves the prism for new information interpretation in a particular society (Rogoff, 1990). The virtual environment faces the international relations constructivist Agent-Structure problem (Wendt, 1987), although it occurs in a cyber mode. In this connection, international virtual platforms may promote the similar systems of social meanings and consolidate the international community and discrete social groups around the world. The intersubjectivity promoted via virtual spacesis considered a vehicle for social interaction processes and information transmission among the group members in the international societies. So that, each community has the unique socio-cultural basis with promoted system of social values. The common intersubjectivity of social meaningspromoted via discrete online communities may consolidate andinterconnect discrete communities with one another via international global cyberspace.The reflection of intersubjectivities with an emphasis of their commonalities promoted via virtual environments may consolidate and incorporate people around the world. The unification on communication platforms in the global cyberspace and promotion of common systems of social meanings and intersubjectivity, in this connection, is considered to serve the internationally consolidating aspect and the appropriate platform for international cooperation and futuredevelopment. 5 Virtual power and cooperationvia global cyberspace Traditionally, the concept of social poweris associated with a corpus of modalities that function as a machinery for social classes` conviction (Purvis & Hunt, 1993). Social power can also be understood as the complex system of prevalent norms and social values that function as a mechanism of individuals` persuasion to a certain kind of social structure maintenance (Laclau& Chantal, 2001). Debord (1994) argues that a significant role incontemporary societies is played by promoted imagery representations. The significant attention can be payed to the roleof mass media resources in each geographic area as they serve a considerable part of social strategies (Altheide, 1984).Straubhaar (1991)determinates the concept of social power in the international relations as the interdependence relationship amongnation-state units, with each of them having its own political, economic, and cultural background and social basis. The social power concept takes its roots in Gramsci’s differentiating between concurrence as a mode of social power force in industrial societies (Gramsci, 1992). Gramsci argues that mass-media resources can influence the people`spolitical, economic preferences and their perception of discrete systems of cultural values(Lears, 1985).According to Gramsci, social strategies in a modern society maybe supported d by the means ofinformationspread(Lears, 1985). Foucault (1980) considers the Internet to be the appropriate platform for social strategiesrepresentation and support. Ifthe globalized international systemthat nowadays partially exists in a virtualized form.According to Gramscian perspective (1971), the social strategies in modern societies may be also influenced by means of promoted information. The global cyberspace can be considered the uniting international social platform for common spread of systems of social meanings and representations of intersubjectivity with focus on their commonalities.At this stagethe interpretative approach of virtual power concept may be pertinently introduced in its unique interpretation.The concept of virtual social power for individualsliein their ability to access the global cyberspace and particular type of promotedvirtuality that positively influences their perception of discrete systems of social meanings with their commonalities. Virtual power concept should be understood asconfiguredvirtuality promotion within the global virtual environmentof cyberspace with an emphasis on the popular type of technical equipment in a certain geographic region.Virtual powermay also promote and cultivate the common systems of social and cultural values via international cyberspace. Barry Buzan considers identity and culture as the social security component in terms of the international perspective (Buzan, 2008; Buzan, 1998; Buzan, 1991). Consequently, the discrete type of promoted virtuality should consider the security aspects of each discrete society, particularly, individuals` moral discourse, their ethic values, and behavioral strategies intra objective reality of a discrete space of a geographic area. Such social power modality might be supported by international actors in order to promote internationally consolidating ideas on the global level. Such modality of consolidating social power is supposed to serve the ultimate integrating international power distributed via available technological equipment in each region. The discrete laws for regional counterparts of cyberspaces should be taken into consideration and respected. The internationally uniting power can be transmitted within the global international cyberspace in accordance to already developed cyber cartography atlases in order to distribute the appropriate type of internationally consolidate ideas within each geographic region and area.Technical equipment and digital technologies are considered the strategically important source essential for promotion of social values and cultural ideas. In this regard, virtual power serves the appropriatestrategic mechanism to unite the international community via global cyberspace globally. The virtuality may be purposefully transmitted within the global international space via available technical equipment capable to produce virtual extent in a certain geographic area. In addition, the international system that partially nowadays exists in a cyberspace mode can serve the global platform for internationally uniting social strategies, global communication support and catalyst for international development. The virtual power can be considered a global communicationmediator between discrete nation states. This type of power is disseminated via available technological equipment in acertain region and geographic area. The appropriate type of available technical equipment within each discrete geographical territory matters and can be considered the important aspect while the geopolitics of cyberspace implementation and development. 6 Geopolitics of cyberspace as theglobally uniting strategy The international cyberspace withvirtual platformsunites the representatives of international community all over the world. The information infrastructuresenablepeoples` interactions on the global level. In this connection, it can be claimed that all the technical equipment that is able to produce intersubjective virtual online spaces can be considered the essential component for the successful geopolitics of cyberspace strategy implementation. Moreover, the number of personal computers that are able to support connection to the worldwide network of the Internet during 1994 increased to 3,217,000 of machines (InterNIC) (Nunes & College, 1995). The virtuality construction as the product may be distributed via technological equipment within a particulargeographic area with an emphasis on social commonalities. There was also an attempt to support the net politics is The Program on Liberation Technology at Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law 2009 (Diamond & Plattner, 2012).ICT development also supports the distribution of digital technologies (Bonn &Akkermans, 2015), and in this connection, may be considered the significant constituent for international development support. These aspects create the sustainable platform for the international development and future cooperation with accordance to the geopolitics of cyberspace. Geopolitics of cyberspace as the internationally uniting global strategy might be also associated with the phenomenon of virtual poverty and the immaterial labor. The concept refers to the availability of technical equipment and attributes of global wealth, such as the affordability of a personal computer and the broadband connection, which limits the admission to the upper percentiles of the population majority in the age of twenties and evenly subdivided by gender in countries of Europe, Japan, and the United States (Au 2007a, 2007b). Virtual poverty as the phenomenon can instigate ludocapitalism that reflects the interactive virtual games as actual power being the coherent apparatus with military and the market its two pillars (Burston, 2003; Dibbell, 2006). The immaterial labor invokes the information and communication diversity of procedures, being the cultural phenomenon or affective element of the commodity (Virno& Hardt, 1996; Dowling, Nunes, & Trott, 2007; Lazzarato, 1996; Virno& Hardt, 1996; Hardt &Negri, 2000). Otherwise, it should be taken into consideration that the role of a nation state is little to prevalently influence or digital libertarianism in global cyberspace. So that internationally uniting social strategies should be implemented in accordance to existing regulations on national level. The cybercartography landscape and cyberspace law acknowledgement are essential to serve the basis forimplementation of efficient strategies.