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2022 Michigan Counterplan
OSCE CP › INB – OSCE › 2NC – INB – Link – Ext

Even if OSCE is slightly dysfunctional it is still necessary AND security cooperation can restore it

Sammut 20 [Dennis Sammut, 08-06-2020, “The OSCE is Dysfunctional – But Necessary,” Security and Human Rights, https://www.shrmonitor.org/the-osce-is-dysfunctional-but-necessary/]\\pairie

The ongoing crisis raises serious questions about the organization’s fundamental goals — as well as about the very future of the OSCE itself.

Roots of dysfunction

2022 Michigan Counterplan
OSCE CP › Solvency › 2NC – Solvency – AI – AT: Stanley Lockman

They end up concluding that NATO isn’t key

Stanley Lockman & Edward 21 [Zoe Stanley-Lockman & Edward Hunter Christie 21, Innovation Officer in the Emerging Security Challenges Division in NATO’s International Staff, and focuses particularly on Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy. owner and founder of AI Policy Consulting and served as lead consultant to NATO in the preparation of NATO’s AI Strategy. He was formerly Deputy Head of Innovation in NATO’s International Staff and the author of NATO’s Artificial Intelligence White Paper. "An Artificial Intelligence Strategy for NATO" October 25. //pipk] pairie

Importantly, we do not argue NATO is the only—or even the most important—actor shaping AI governance in international security. Other contributors in this Handbook impressively detail efforts at both state and regional levels. Our aim has been to convince sceptics that NATO has a role that is not replicated by other stakeholders in the international security environment. NATO has particular influence, procedures, and the competency to institute certain governance mechanisms—namely standardization and policy planning—that it can build on without needing to expend time building new institutions from scratch. Beyond just a role, NATO is incentivized to emerge as a steward of AI governance and use these mechanisms for future operations, should the Alliance wish to maintain its unique position as a leader encouraging policy alignment, defense planning, and military standardization.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
OSCE CP › Solvency › 2NC – Solvency – Cyber Agreement

The OSCE solves better cyberpolicies than the AFF – it creates the ability to come to consensus even if they fight or disagree

– AT: OCOs AFF that’s like NATO CBMs building is key to solving diverging cyberpolicies

Ponta 21 [Adina Ponta, December 2021, <<Adina is Faculty of Law @ Babes Bolyai University>>, “Legal instability in cyberspace and OSCE’s mitigation role,” Juridical Tribune Journal, Volume 11, Issue 3]

4.2 OSCE work and pressing cyberthreats

2022 Michigan Counterplan
OSCE CP › Solvency › 2NC – Solvency – Cyber Agreement

It solves diverging policy in cyberspace the best – it allows states to find common ground

Ponta 21 [Adina Ponta, December 2021, <<Adina is Faculty of Law @ Babes Bolyai University>>, “Legal instability in cyberspace and OSCE’s mitigation role,” Juridical Tribune Journal, Volume 11, Issue 3]

Although the OSCE process cannot force States to implement their recommendations, it can employ preventive and quiet diplomacy, as well as results orientated dialogue to find common grounds on emerging security challenges.52 As GGE processes share almost overlapping mandates with the OEWG, the OSCE can be among the most promising venues for multilateral cybersecurity cooperation. In this regard, the OSCE’s ability to bring the United States and Russia to the conversation table is crucial, and with EU support, it should strive at engaging Chinese representatives as well. The People’s Republic of China, which takes a similar view to Russia, also participated in the GGEs, but is not an OSCE member. The preliminary conversations should focus on national interpretations and application of fundamental international law principles. To ensure a candid exchange of views, initial conversations should be held under Chatham House Rule and avoid public scrutiny.

Fifth, as the coordinating fora for CBMs, the OSCE, has accumulated political capital of addressing States’ reluctance regarding information-sharing and inherent challenges that create multi-stakeholder cooperation problems. During the previous rounds, the OSCE gained an overview on which objectives can reasonably be achieved multilaterally, and which ones are more suited for bilateral cooperation mechanisms.53 Deriving lessons learned from past processes enables better approaches to national interests, concerns, and operational practices. 54

2022 Michigan Counterplan
OSCE CP › Solvency › 2NC – Solvency – Cyber – AT: Non Binding

It solves – even if it is non-binding – they can still generate effective norms in cybersecurity

Ponta 21 [Adina Ponta, December 2021, <<Adina is Faculty of Law @ Babes Bolyai University>>, “Legal instability in cyberspace and OSCE’s mitigation role,” Juridical Tribune Journal, Volume 11, Issue 3]

4. The process of consolidating existing norms under the OSCE umbrella

4.1 The old and new role of the OSCE

2022 Michigan Counterplan
OSCE CP › Perm › 2NC – AT: Perm Intrinsic – Russia

Adding Russia to NATO fails – psychological incompatibility, diverging interest and their nuclear arsenals make it impossible

Something about perm do the AFF + add Russia to NATO – some intrinsic perm

Daydov 2000 [Prof. Yuriy Davydov, 2000, <<NATO Research Fellow>> , “Should Russia Join NATO (Final Report)”,

Russia in NATO: «...contra». However, possible membership of Russia in NATO entails not only the benefits mentioned above but also a number of unavoidable problems that could have influence on the decision making process Moscow's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation included. It could not have been any other way, keeping in mind decades of "cold" war and the recent tensions between the two sides on the issue of NATO expansion and the conflict in Kosovo. These problems may be common for both Russia and NATO but they also may be regarded individually as having importance to Moscow or Brussels. The following may be counted as problems common for both Russia and NATO: · psychological compatibility. Even with an expediency of the alliance in mind, it will be hard for both sides to make a 100 percent turn after decades of being enemies, after viewing each other mainly as targets through the slit of a sight and the relationship – as a zero sum game. The matter is not only with the countries' leaders but also the general public mood that can be easily used by the «hawks» (such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Senator Helms and 32 others). The West will probably go through an easier adaptation process since it already has such experience (Germany, Spain, former socialistic states). With its tendency to view the world in black and white colours only, Russia will have more difficulties overcoming the physiological barriers. · transparency, first of all in the issues of military (nuclear) and mobilisation planning, intelligence information, especially received through agents or electronic means of interception. Of course, the confidence measures practised in Europe since the times of the first detente in the 70's have somewhat weakened the obsession of military people for secrecy. However, the spy obsession still common for both sides. This question is extremely delicate; usually it is not discussed openly and honestly which may lead to additional tensions and suspicions in the process of Russia and NATO cooperation. It is enough to say that the presence of NATO officers in the headquarters of the General Staff poses great problems for Russian officers. It is also correct to say that many Western generals will find it difficult to adjust themselves to participation of Russian military men in the meeting of NATO nuclear planning committee. The probable Russia’s membership in NATO is more likely to cause a series of difficult questions for its politicians and militaries. However, they are quite predictable. So, there is time to think about ways of avoiding them or lessening their probable negative impact on the relations between Russia and NATO under new circumstances. Despite their difficulties, these problems are solvable. But because these are Russia’s problems, the responsibility for their solving is mainly on its side. The following are the problems caused by the country's probable membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. · First of all, it is important to understand that the Russian political elite is not ready for such a radical step. It is so used to exploiting the image of an external enemy (that was usually presented as NATO) for its domestic needs that losing such a possibility will cause a confusion in the ranks of political and military establishment. Joining NATO will mean that everything said about it before (and equally, about Russia itself) is exactly the other way round. That is why Moscow makes a lot of reservations even if cooperation with NATO is very limited. The main idea here is to make the public believe that Moscow cooperates with NATO only because the alliance constantly makes fundamental concessions. However, the details of such ‘concessions’, for example during the eastward NATO expansion, the Dayton Agreements or the military actions in Yugoslavia, are usually not revealed to the public. In the 33 end the Russian political elite will have to decide on what NATO means and can mean for Russia? Is it an ally? A partner? Or an enemy who skilfully covers its true intentions? There are reasons to believe that the Russian establishment does not have answers to these questions even for itself.. · Russia will have to determine the form of joining NATO: will it become member of the political or the military organisation as well? Those who think that under current conditions Russia simply does not have any choice and thus is faced to join NATO believe that membership in the political organisation is the lesser of the two evils. Those who think that joining NATO would benefit Russia rather than harm it are certain that the country should join the military organisations as well. Thinking rationally, Moscow will (under any circumstances) go for the first option and only then, having gained certain experience, decide on the second one. · Russia will have to make a decision on its nuclear arsenal. No doubt, it will remain under national jurisdiction just as it is in the case of all NATO members who posses it. But Russia will have to answer the question whether this kind of arms will constitute a nuclear shield for the collective defence of NATO or rather be used for collective security of the post Soviet space only? Will the NATO Nuclear planning committee determine its probable use in some way (what way)? To what extent does the nuclear cooperation between Russia and NATO fit the nuclear policy of the latter? Is the cooperation of all four nuclear possessing members possible in the framework of the alliance? · The unpredictable response of the CIS countries to Russian membership in NATO may also raise a very important questions for Moscow. Involved in ethnical and territorial conflicts, all these countries, especially in Central Asia, have problems interpreting democracy. These states could deliberately draw Russia into the processes of conflict resolution in the area. In the case of Moscow’s membership in NATO, Russia would have to deal with those issues not as a neighbouring state but rather as a member of the alliance. However, other NATO allies would not be too happy about that: through Russia they could also become involved (military) in conflicts. In this situation, it is unclear how the system of collective defence will function: will Moscow remain its participant or not? Finally, a paradoxical situation can occur in the triangle NATO-Russia-Belarus. Will Minsk be automatically seen as member of the alliance keeping in mind that the two neighbouring 34 countries form something like a union state? It is very probable that the reaction of some post Soviet states who regard NATO with suspicion may be similar to the reaction of Russia as the ex-WTO allies were joining NATO and as the Baltic states are being considered for membership. · Used to gaining benefits from the contradictions between Russia and the West in the recent years, China will be not too excited about Russian membership in NATO. Peking usually frightened Moscow with closer relationship with the West, and the West – with probable coming together with Moscow. In this manner, China hoped to gain certain benefits on both directions. China will lose this possibility as soon as Moscow joins NATO. However, it can do nothing to oppose their united efforts. Besides, after Russia joins NATO, the enlarged alliance comes closely to the Chinese borders. For Peking, this would bring a change in the whole geopolitical configuration in a region where its influence has not been questioned before. The reaction of PRC on the rapprochement between Russia and NATO and the participation of Moscow in the alliance’s structures will probably be similar to that of Russia during the NATO eastward expansion. On the other hand, the reaction of Japan may be more favourable since a compromise between Russia and the West may be viewed as a precursor of a compromise between Moscow and Tokyo on the issue of the Kuril Islands. · Joining NATO may have positive effects on both the process of democratisation of military forces and the society as a whole as well as on emerging of the civil structures in Russia. However, under conditions of not finally asserted democratic values, it is important to understand that those who have not yet accepted these values or even deny them may accuse NATO and the Russian political leaders of imposing the alien values upon the society and the country. This mainly applies to the Russian generals who have lately build up their influence on the country's political leaders. As a result, an ideological confrontation and even a significant split in the Russian society on that issue may be expected. In turn, the possible membership of Russia in NATO may cause certain difficulties and problems for the West and the members of the alliance. There are those in the West who believe that these problems may be insoluble for the alliance. To which extent are these assumptions well grounded? And what are the most obvious problems nowadays? · The main concern of the West comes from the contention that Russian presence in the alliance may simply destroy it. Chaos and lack of stability in the country, corruption among 35 political elite, including military one as well, the penetration of criminal elements into business – all these distinguishing feature of contemporary Russia could spread to other members of the alliance. As a result, instead of positively influencing Russia, NATO will be negatively influenced by the new member. That is more than probable if Russia turns more clearly towards an authoritarian rule. Of course, by the time Moscow enters the alliance it will have to meet the majority of the problems; otherwise it will not be accepted by NATO. However, Russia is a transforming country; its internal as well as external structures are not yet stable. These structures are in a state of flux; they are renewed in some areas while go back to the old model (today Russia counts 89 subjects of Federation, tomorrow there may be seven left; Today Moscow has good relations with Byelarus, tomorrow they may be changed for the worst; Russia’s nearest environment is too hostile to be predictable) So, Russia may be a powerful generator of instability inside the alliance. That is why NATO members will always be afraid of having to deal with inner peacekeeping rather than with outer one. · The post Soviet space by itself is an enormous conflict area; and Russia has to a certain degree taken the responsibility for settling the ethnical and political conflicts in the region. There is a concern that having joined NATO, Russia would try handing this burden over to other alliance members. However, they are not interested to overburden themselves with different problems in Georgia and Abhasia, Tadjikistan, Azerbaijan, Nagorny Kharabach and Armenia. Chechnya alone poses enough difficulties to the West. Quite possibly, NATO will not be willing to handle territorial problems that exist between Russia and Japan, Russia and Finland, or the problems of illegal migration form China to Siberia and the Far East. · All that mentioned above brings up the following question: to what extent is Article 5 of the Washington Treaty applicable to Russia? For example, to what degree is it applicable in the case of the Chechen invasion into Dagestan in the fall of 1999? Some Western experts believe that if Russia joins the alliance, there will be a need for certain qualifications that would exclude automatic application of Article 5 to Russia and require additional consultations. However, this would change NATO status from an organisation of collective defence to an organisation of collective security. To what extent do other members agree with that? Another question – in that case, is there any sense for Russia to join NATO? If NATO does not want to take over responsibility for Russia, what sense does it make for Russia to take the responsibility for other alliance members in terms of their security?

2022 Michigan Counterplan
OSCE CP › Perm › 2NC – AT: Perm Do the CP – Members

International organization are autonomous actors and distinct from their member state

Hirschmann 21 [Gisela Hirschmann, November 2021, “Article Navigation International organizations' responses to member state contestation: from inertia to resilience,” <<Hirschmann is the Assistant Professor of IR @ Leiden University>>, International Affairs, Volume 97, Issue 6]

The responses of IO bureaucracies to member state contestation The existence of IOs relies on contributions of money and personnel, a functioning membership body and policies implemented by member states.10 States use numerous ways not only to influence IOs according to their interests, but also to contest IOs’ authority or individual policies.11 While membership withdrawals and budget cuts are nothing new in the history of IOs, these acts can pose a significant threat to the existence of IOs, especially if driven by nationalist and populist attitudes.12 This article is based on the assumption that IOs are autonomous actors and therefore have an inherent interest in maintaining their positions in the current multilateral order.13 In response to member state contestation, some IOs opt for a conciliatory tone in their communicative responses, whereas others are more assertive.14 This article builds on previous studies by focusing on the role of bureaucracies in shaping IO responses to contestation by member states. Drawing on the insights of organization theory, I propose three types of bureaucratic responses: inertia, adaptation and resilience-building. Inertia. We should not expect IOs always to respond with action to member state contestation. On the contrary, there might not be any immediate response to the challenges. Not responding can be a strategic decision; but it can also mean that an IO is simply ignoring the challenge and sticking to institutional routines.15 Inertia can therefore be a result of either a strategic decision or an organization’s ‘blind spots’.16 Following McConnell and ’t Hart, I define inertia as ‘an instance and/or pattern of non-intervention’ by an IO in response to member state contestation.17 How can inertia be observed at the bureaucratic level? Research has shown that IOs communicate strategically.18 Avoiding ‘unfavorable headlines’ through overt judicial activism has been identified as a ‘survival strategy’ used in particular by international courts and human rights institutions facing a populist backlash.19 Hunkering down allows the IO bureaucracy to keep a low profile and to continue its work without changes. Empirically, hunkering down can be observed, for example, in an IO bureaucracy’s refusal to issue public statements or press declarations on a contested issue, or regarding its relationship with the challenging member state, indicating an overall decrease in public visibility. Adaptation. This response type is based on the theoretical assumptions of the principal–agent approach, according to which IOs, as the agents of their member states, make efforts to satisfy the principals’ demands.20 Thus the IO changes its policy to maintain the support of the challenging member state(s). Some decades ago, the threat of significant budget cuts by the US government under President Reagan led to adaptation in policy- and decision-making in, for example, the World Bank.21 Further indicators of adaptation are policy reforms that grant the challenging state greater influence. Adaptation aims at accommodating the contesting state to the point where this state refrains from further contestation. IO bureaucracies actively shape adaptation through framing and negotiation. To demonstrate to the challenging member state its willingness to adapt, an IO may rename a contested policy (e.g. adopting ‘maternal health’ instead of ‘reproductive health’) or stop the implementation of contested programmes (e.g. projects addressing climate change in response to the Trump administration’s budget cuts). Moreover, we know from previous research that IO bureaucracies influence institution-building and shape the agenda of international negotiations.22 We can thus expect these bureaucracies to actively negotiate aspects of policies and budgets with individual member state governments, especially if their resources are based primarily on voluntary contributions.23

2022 Michigan Counterplan
OSCE CP › Perm › 2NC – AT: Perm Do the CP

They are different – working with the member state isn’t the same as working with NATO

Dowd 22 [Alan W. Dowd, 04-18-2022, “Looking ahead to Fortress Ukraine, American Legion,

Given Russia’s actions, it’s difficult (though not impossible) to see how such a force could be administered by the U.N. Security Council. And given sensitivities on both sides of the NATO-Russia divide, it’s unlikely that NATO could replicate in Ukraine its role leading the Implementation Force (IFOR), the Multinational Stabilization Force (SFOR) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in the former Yugoslavia. An alternative model is the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) peacekeeping mission, which has been deployed in the Sinai since 1981. The MFO is funded by a group of donor nations and manned and supplied by a group of troop-contributing nations. In a similar way, Ukraine could invite trusted partners to contribute personnel, material and funding to this effort. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – with a track record of border-management and a membership enfolding the entire Euro-Atlantic region – could play a coordinative role. Owing to their unique capabilities, certain NATO members (though not NATO itself) would be needed to provide enabling support.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
OSCE CP › Perm › 2NC – AT: Perm Do the CP

They are distinct European security organizations

Dean 99 [Jonathan Dean, 1999, “OSCE and NATO: Complementary or Competitive Security Providers for Europe,” OSCE Yearbook 1999, https://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/99/Dean.pdf]\\pairie

When they are viewed in ideal terms, NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and OSCE (the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) each represent half of a comprehensive European security organization. NATO, with nineteen members in March 1999, organizes armed forces to deter aggression and to undertake peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in Europe. The OSCE, with a more comprehensive membership of 55 states, has come to specialize in conflict prevention and in post-conflict peace-building - elections, police, and civil administration. Today, both organizations are deeply involved in the struggle over Kosovo. It is fairly evident, whatever the outcome of the dispute over Kosovo and over the treatment of the Kosovars, that both organizations will continue into the future. But NATO, which is conducting a military action against Serbia, risks much more with its Kosovo involvement than the OSCE, which thus far has a subordinate role. If NATO can cope with the Kosovar refugees, bring them back to Kosovo into relatively tolerable material conditions, reach an understanding with Serbia to allow Kosovo far-reaching autonomy within Serbia and can provide an effective peacekeeping contingent to assure implementation of this agreement, its prestige as it enters the next century will be high; OSCE's repute is likely to be carried along with that of NATO. If NATO fails in significant respects on Kosovo, the damage to European and Transatlantic unity will be great and the ensuing debate over NATO's proper role and that of the OSCE is likely to continue for years. In this situation, the general feasibility of multilateral military actions in support of human rights will also be placed in question. Even if the Kosovo crisis ultimately subsides, whether favourably or not, these two halves of an ideal European security organization, NATO and OSCE, are not likely to come together anytime soon to form a single, comprehensive institution. As already indicated, the current state of productive coexistence has not always characterized relations between the two organizations. During the Cold War years, the main role of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, as the OSCE was called prior to 1995, was to promote discussion and negotiation between East and West. This role was 1 The manuscript was completed in April 1999. 429 In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 1999, Baden-Baden 2000, pp. 429-434. questioned by some in the West, but ultimately supported as a vehicle for promoting Western political views in Warsaw Pact states. At that point, CSCE was considered a potentially useful but not essential complement to NATO, which was charged with the main responsibility for defending Europe.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
OSCE CP › Perm › 2NC – AT: Perm Do the CP

That’s distinct NATO is a security alliance with countries only from North America and Europe

US Mission To The North Atlantic Treaty Organization [US Mission To The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “About NATO”,

Formed in 1949 with the signing of the Washington Treaty, NATO is a security alliance of 30 countries from North America and Europe. NATO’s fundamental goal is to safeguard the Allies’ freedom and security by political and military means. NATO remains the principal security instrument of the transatlantic community and expression of its common democratic values. It is the practical means through which the security of North America and Europe are permanently tied together. NATO enlargement has furthered the U.S. goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
OSCE CP › Perm › 2NC – AT: Perm Do the CP

OSCE is a forum for political dialogue – that includes states from Asia

OSCE [OSCE, “Who we are”, OSCE, https://www.osce.org/who-we-are]\\pairie

With 57 participating States in North America, Europe and Asia, the OSCE – the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – is the world’s largest regional security organization. The OSCE works for stability, peace and democracy for more than a billion people, through political dialogue about shared values and through practical work that aims to make a lasting difference.

The OSCE is a forum for political dialogue on a wide range of security issues and a platform for joint action to improve the lives of individuals and communities. The organization uses a comprehensive approach to security that encompasses the politico-military, economic and environmental, and human dimensions. Through this approach, and with its inclusive membership, the OSCE helps bridge differences and build trust between states by co-operating on conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
OSCE CP › Perm › 2NC – AT: Perm Do Both

Perm fails – it only focuses the emphasis on NATO

Levinger 18 [Matthew Levinger, 03-2018, “Forging Consensus for Atrocity Prevention: Assessing the Record for the OSCE,” <<Matthew is a Research Professor of International Affairs & Director of the National Security Studies Program @ the George Washington University>>, Genocide Studies and Prevention An International Journal, Volume 11, Issue 3 Global Approaches to Atrocity Prevention: Theory, Practice and the State of the Field, Article 9]\\pairie

A greater challenge to the OSCE collaborative problem-solving efforts has been the rising tension between Russia and the West. During the early 1990s, Yeltsin and other Russian leaders embraced the organization as the potential centerpiece for a future collaborative European security architecture. In subsequent years, however, the Western participating States placed increasing emphasis on expanding NATO and the EU, to the detriment of the OSCE. The expansion of NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999, and an additional seven states including the Baltic republics in 2004, drove home the view among Russian leaders that the OSCE was “erecting a wall within itself, artificially dividing its members into the NATO and EU members, and the rest.” Under these new conditions, declared Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, “NATO deals with security issues, the EU with economic issues, while the OSCE will only monitor the adoption of these organizations’ values by countries that have remained outside the EU and NATO.”35

2022 Michigan Counterplan
OSCE CP › OFF › 1NC – OSCE CP

OSCE effectiveness is key to preventing escalating tensions that go existential – Moldova, Georgia and Central Asia

Vartanyan & Lanz 22 [Olesya Vartanyan & David Lanz, 03-21-2022, “Preserving the OSCE at a time of war,” <<Olesya is Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst>>, <<David is the Representative for Dialogue Promotion>>, OCHA Services,

But for all the challenges it faces, the OSCE remains an essential forum. It is one of the only remaining multilateral spaces outside the UN for dialogue between Russia and the West; in the words of an OSCE official, the organisation has been “sort of an airbag that opens any time we face echoes of tensions” between Russia and the West. The OSCE is one of the few international organisations with the potential to play an important role in implementing any ceasefire arrangement that the conflict parties might reach in Ukraine, where prior to the war’s current phase it led a sizeable monitoring mission. It also helps manage the risk of escalation in conflicts from Moldova to Georgia to Central Asia.

Governments should do all they can to prevent the OSCE’s incapacitation. Russia must refrain from holding the OSCE hostage and letting core operations collapse. Western states, in turn, should resist pushing for Russia’s suspension from the OSCE. Suspension would likely lead Russia to withdraw, as it did on 15 March from the Council of Europe.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
OSCE CP › OFF › 1NC – OSCE CP

Counterplan revitalizes OSCE effectiveness by refocusing the organizations and legitimizing its approach

Levinger 18 [Matthew Levinger, 03-2018, “Forging Consensus for Atrocity Prevention: Assessing the Record for the OSCE,” <<Matthew is a Research Professor of International Affairs & Director of the National Security Studies Program @ the George Washington University>>, Genocide Studies and Prevention An International Journal, Volume 11, Issue 3 Global Approaches to Atrocity Prevention: Theory, Practice and the State of the Field, Article 9]\\pairie

The Path Forward: Building Cooperative Capacity for Atrocity Prevention In an October 2016 interview, OSCE General Secretary Lamberto Zannier observed that “the OSCE as a security organization is facing a very complicated environment,” because of the “return of geopolitics” involving “divisions in Europe that we haven’t seen in a long time,” aggravated by global challenges including terrorism along with migration stemming from violent conflicts and the effects of climate change. Zannier observed: As the OSCE was built in a divided environment to bridge the gulf between opposing sides, today the convergence of all these problems is eroding the effectiveness of the tools that were created at that time. So we are facing a situation where we may have more division, and the tools that we developed to address the problems coming with the divisions are not functioning… as well as they were. So engagement, creating a space of dialogue in spite of the differences and the bitter debates… remains the key task for all of us.42 In the bitter aftermath of the 2016 presidential election in the United States, where the Russian intelligence services allegedly sought to undermine the campaign of Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton in order to tip the result to Republican candidate Donald Trump, such constructive dialogue has become more challenging than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Having long complained of Western meddling in Russia’s “near abroad” through democracy promotion initiatives and support for the “Color Revolutions,” the Putin regime has effectively turned the tables on its Western counterparts. Russia is alleged to have “cultivated an opaque web of economic and political patronage” throughout much of Central and Eastern Europe,43 as well as to have forged connections with right-wing parties in Western Europe including the UKIP in Britain and the National Front in France.44 The heated accusations of ill will on both sides have further narrowed the already constricted avenues for cooperation between the OSCE’s Eastern and Western participating States. As one scholar has written, the OSCE is “par excellence, a ‘soft security’ institution with extremely few material resources at its disposal.” Unlike other regional organizations such as the EU and NATO, the OSCE cannot exercise coercive power by imposing economic sanctions or threatening the use of military force. Nor, in the current geopolitical environment, can it credibly offer material rewards such as the prospect of EU membership, which served as a powerful incentive for cooperation by the Baltic governments in the 1990s. The effectiveness of the OSCE depends on its ability to “use its moral authority as a principled organization and its limited amount of cultural capital (e.g. technical expertise) to exercise symbolic power.”45 In the current polarized international security environment in Eurasia, it is increasingly difficult for the OSCE to assert universally recognized moral authority. During the 1970s and 1980s, the CSCE took shape as a dialogue process between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in a period of high international tension and distrust, which eased temporarily during the decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall. To some degree, the rising frictions between the Russian Federation and its Western counterparts have returned Europe full circle to the geopolitical atmosphere that surrounded the CSCE’s founding. Even in an inhospitable geopolitical context, the OSCE can make several valuable contributions to protecting civilians threatened by violent conflict in Eurasia: conflict prevention, crisis management, cooperative problem-solving, and the promotion of norms favoring peaceful coexistence of diverse ethnic and national groups. The remainder of this essay will address each of these aspects of the OSCE’s work in turn. Conflict Prevention. During the recent period of rising tensions between the Eastern and Western factions of the OSCE, a number of efforts have been made to bridge this geopolitical divide and develop more constructive strategies for mitigating threats of violent conflict. In 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and French President Nicolas Sarkozy called for a new European security dialogue to discuss post-Cold War security arrangements.46 In 2009, the Greek Chairmanship of the OSCE launched a series of dialogues known as the “Corfu Process,” which sought “to strengthen the Organization’s responsiveness to conflict in all its phases,” including “early warning, early action, dialogue facilitation and mediation support, and postconflict rehabilitation.”47 These dialogues culminated in 2011, under the OSCE’s Lithuanian Chairmanship, in Ministerial Decision No. 3/11 on Elements of the Conflict Cycle, which affirmed “the Organization’s commitment to revisiting its approaches to conflict prevention and conflict resolution for the twenty-first century.”48 Among other things, Ministerial Decision No. 3/11 called for the establishment of a systematic conflict early warning system and a more robust mediationsupport capacity. Unfortunately, there has been limited practical follow-through on many of its recommendations.49 Crisis Management. Some of the most intractable conflicts in the OSCE region—e.g. those in Ukraine, the South Caucasus, Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh—are located in areas on the periphery of the Russian Federation where Russia has a strong vested interest in the outcome. Given the OSCE’s lack of material instruments of leverage, the organization is unlikely to be able to successfully mediate such conflicts that have become locked into a “security competition” frame. Nonetheless, it can help contain violence by focusing international attention on events in the conflict zones, monitoring developments, and providing early warning of potential escalation. The presence of an OSCE field mission or visits by the HCNM may also provide channels of communication between leaders of rival groups, which may help keep a lid on violence even in the absence of a formal settlement. In Ukraine, for example, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) has tracked the living conditions of the 1.8 million IDPs from Crimea and Eastern Ukraine since 2014, offering recommendations for how the government of Ukraine and international donors can meet the needs of IDPs and enhance relations between IDPs and host communities.50 The SMM issues daily spot reports on security conditions in Eastern Ukraine, monitoring compliance with the Minsk ceasefire agreements, and “engages with authorities at all levels, as well as civil society, ethnic and religious groups and local communities to facilitate dialogue on the ground.”51 Astrid Thors, who served as High Commissioner on National Minorities from 2013 through 2016, also engaged in efforts to “facilitate a dialogue between national minorities and the Ukrainian authorities on issues of common concern.” For example, she co-hosted a 2016 roundtable in Kyiv on “Strengthening the Institutional Framework Related to Inter-ethnic Relations in Ukraine in the Context of Decentralization.” Asserting that “improved policies in the field of inter-ethnic relations would help to consolidate Ukrainian society and would increase stability in the country as a whole,” the HCNM has worked to provide a platform for Russian and other minority communities in Ukraine to express concerns about the protection of their language and cultural identities.52 In less geopolitically sensitive regions, such as Central Asia and the Balkan states, the OSCE may have greater potential for robust conflict prevention and crisis response—but its record in achieving this potential has been uneven. For example, in May and June 2010, HCNM Knut Vollebaek issued urgent warnings to the OSCE Permanent Council on the risk of interethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan, asserting that the situation represented “one of the OSCE’s biggest challenges since the 2008 war in the Caucasus.”53 When violence between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks erupted in southern Kyrgyzstan that June, however, the OSCE Permanent Council displayed no appetite for a robust response. In the words of one commentator, “The lack of collective will by the participating States and the Kyrgyz interim government’s inability to take substantial steps in managing the conflict in Kyrgyzstan significantly curbed the OSCE’s room for maneuver.”54 Cooperative Problem-Solving. Even in geopolitically contested settings where a comprehensive settlement remains elusive, the OSCE may be able to promote incremental progress toward peaceful coexistence of rival groups. For example, in Georgia, where the OSCE field mission was closed down on Russia’s insistence in 2008, the HCNM has “encouraged the effective implementation of the State Strategy for Civic Equality and Integration for 2015-2020 and Its Action Plan,” and has “continued to support a project to facilitate interaction between the political parties in the country and national minority representatives, including by bringing them together to discuss topical issues on televised talk shows.”55 In Moldova, High Commissioner Thors worked with the parliament to establish a “joint working group with members of parliament and the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia” to improve “the functioning of the Gagauz autonomy,” and she has worked with the OSCE Mission to Moldova to address cultural and linguistic issues surrounding the status of Transdniestria.56 Thors also remained engaged in addressing issues related to citizenship rights, political representation of ethnic minorities, and protection of minority languages in a wide range of other countries including Kyrgyzstan, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Hezegovina, Macedonia, Hungary, and Slovakia.57 Norm Promotion. Over the past twenty years, the OSCE has issued a number of statements of principles regarding the protection of minority rights, including the Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities (1996), the Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations (2008), and the Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies (2012).58 In documents such as the Charter for European Security, adopted at the Istanbul summit of 1999, it has also reaffirmed its commitment to “preventing the outbreak of violent conflicts wherever possible” and “to settle conflicts and to rehabilitate societies ravaged by war and destruction.”59 Beyond affirming these principles related to human security, the OSCE has sought to memorialize its operational approach to conflict prevention in documents including “The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Co-operative Security” (2009) and the Ministerial Decision No. 3/11 on Elements of the Conflict Cycle (2011).60 Scholars disagree about the efficacy of the OSCE’s efforts to transform norms governing relations among diverse ethnic groups in Eurasia. Some observers, such as Wolfgang Zellner, have argued that the HCNM has been relatively successful in “de-securitizing” relationships between states and minority groups by “introducing international minority rights standards as the frame of reference for majority, minority and kin-States.” The HCNM, Zellner asserts, has facilitated “substantive short-term solutions with a view towards sustainable long-term solutions under local ownership.”61 Others have taken a more skeptical view: David Galbreath and Joanne McEvoy contend that “the HCNM’s role in societal security often appears to maintain the status quo ‘state vs. minority’ logic of the European minority rights regime,” and that the OSCE as a whole has been unable to transform the “zero-sum context” of interethnic relations in Eurasia.62 Despite the sometimes disappointing results of its conflict prevention and crisis management initiatives, the OSCE remains a vital component of the Eurasian security architecture, both because of its inclusive membership structure and because of its core mission to advance “common and comprehensive security” through a consensus-based approach. Yet, for the organization to play a robust role in addressing the urgent security challenges in contemporary Eurasia, it is essential that its participating States share a genuine consensus about the importance of protecting civilians threatened by violent conflict. One stumbling block to productive cooperation between the Eastern and Western participating States of the OSCE has been mutual suspicion over the other side’s motives. In Zellner’s words, “what the U.S. regards as democratization, Russia takes as destabilization.”63 As Alistair Miskimmon and Ben O’Loughlin have observed, a profound misalignment has emerged between Russian and Western narratives about the post-Cold War order. Rather than being recognized as “co-constitutor of this emerging system,” since the early 1990s “Russia has complained of being excluded from the major decisions affecting it.” Consequently, Russia “feels mis-recognized,” driving a “cycle of miscommunication, generating frustration on all sides and restricting the scope for cooperation.”64 During the 1970s and 1980s, the CSCE explicitly avoided establishing a democratization agenda, which the Western participating States recognized as a bridge too far for their Soviet counterparts. Instead, participants in the Helsinki dialogue process focused on promotion of human rights and other aspects of the “human dimension” of security, in an effort to build mutual trust and lay a foundation for a broader range of security cooperation activities. In the current period of retrenchment in relations between NATO and the Russian Federation, it is essential for the OSCE to seek areas of common ground that can serve as a focal point for constructive engagement. A narrowing and deepening of the OSCE’s mission, refocusing on the objectives of promoting human security in regions afflicted by conflict, might help rebuild the normative consensus between Eastern and Western participating States and increase the OSCE’s operational effectiveness.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
OSCE CP › OFF › 1NC – OSCE CP

OSCE solves – they can regulate new emerging technologies

Liechtenstein 19 [Stephanie Liechtenstein, 03-25-2019, “Regulating new military technologies,” Security and Human Rights Monitor,

New technologies have reached the military realm and their possible impact is beginning to cause a headache for governments and military experts alike. Discussions are currently focused on four areas: lethal autonomous weapons, or so-called ‘killer robots’, biotechnologies, cyber weapons, and new missile technology.

For most of these technologies, there are no international rules in place.

2022 Michigan Evidence
net benefit › at: avoids politics

The counterplan threatens NATO allies. That links to politics.

Tamkin 18 [Emily Tamkin is a Reporter covering foreign affairs, "More than 8 in 10 Americans support NATO, study finds", Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/04/03/more-than-americans-support-nato-study-finds/] GBS-HW

NATO is a popular punching bag for President Trump. Days before coming into office, he called it “obsolete.” As president, he’s railed against European spending on defense and noted time and again that many NATO allies don’t meet the target of 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense. Other U.S. politicians — in Congress, for example — have rushed to make sure NATO allies know that the United States remains committed to the alliance. But as NATO approaches its 70th birthday Thursday, it’s worth asking — are Americans still behind NATO or have they been swayed by Trump’s arguments?

According to a new study by the Program for Public Consultation of the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland and released by the nonpartisan organization Voice of the People, the American people remain committed to NATO, too.

2022 Michigan Evidence
net benefit › us fails

Failure to shore up democracy at home makes global democracy promotion impossible

Elisa Massimino, contributor to Washington Post, 2021

“America’s hypocrisy on democracy and human rights has a cost,” Washington Post, , (accessed 6-2-2022)

American diplomats have long understood that hypocrisy has a cost, especially for a nation that seeks to champion the ideals of democracy and human rights as the cornerstone of global peace and security. As E.J. Dionne Jr. rightly pointed out in his June 10 Thursday Opinion column, “Our national security now depends on civil rights,” failing to shore up our democratic institutions and uphold human rights at home deepens the United States’ credibility deficit and weakens its effectiveness as a champion of these values abroad. And that has serious national security implications, because we know — from hard data and grim experience — that Americans are safer when democracies set the rules of a global order. But though it’s true that our adversaries will use this hypocrisy to discredit the United States in the global struggle of ideas, there’s a deeper and more direct security threat posed by our failure to live up to those ideals at home. Societal divisions that result from systemic racism and other human rights violations left to fester, combined with weak institutions seemingly incapable of addressing these challenges, make us not just a weaker champion but also a weaker nation, increasingly vulnerable to attacks of all kinds from those with a different vision of the world.

2022 Michigan Evidence
net benefit › us fails

Global atrocities committed by the US undermine its ability to promote human rights

Anna Rosario Malindog-Uy, Professor of Political Science, International Relations, Development Studies, European Studies, SEA and China Studies, April 17, 2022

“Human Rights: US’ Double Standards, Hypocrisy,” ASEAN Post, , (accessed 6-2-2022)

Externally, the war waged by America in countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria alone have already caused more than 20 million people to become either refugees or migrants. During the US withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan, a US drone killed 10 members of an Afghan family, including seven children, among which the youngest was only two years old. Also, to date, the US still holds 39 detainees at the Guantanamo high-security prison. Hence, given all these, it is imperative to ask if the US, a title-holder in pointing fingers at the human rights shortcomings of other countries, will take responsibility and address its dismal human rights record within its borders and beyond? Conclusion Indeed, “righteous indignation should be reserved for the truly righteous.” But America is far from being righteous given its blatant dismal human rights record within its borders and beyond. America lecturing the world on human rights is a farce, for it doesn’t have the moral ascendancy and integrity given its gloomy human rights record. Instead of schooling other countries on their human rights shortcomings, the US probably needs some self-introspection and should first address its human rights situation.

2022 Michigan Evidence
net benefit › us fails

Domestic human rights violations prevent effective US pressure

Tanya Elahi, JD, assessment analyst at the Independent Office for Police Conduct, 2020

“Hypocrisy And Human Rights Abuses In The Land Of The Free,” Human Rights Pulse, , (accessed 6-2-2022)

The US has faced accusations of voter suppression by introducing policies such as requiring citizens to show ID and prohibiting early votes, both of which disproportionately affect Black Americans and disabled people. The report highlights that people of colour and specifically Black Americans are “particularly vulnerable to abuses of every single right measured”. This highlights a worrying disregard for human rights which appears to affect vulnerable minority groups at a higher level. THE HYPOCRISY OF THE US America has taken a leading role in condemning human rights abuses worldwide. In December 2019, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo condemned Iran for violating human rights, including “the violent crackdown on protestors in November 2019”. This US subsequently placed sanctions on Iran. The current protests taking place in the US demonstrate the country’s outright hypocrisy. The death of George Floyd at the hands of US police officers has triggered worldwide protests against police brutality. American protestors have largely been met with further violence from the police. What began as a series of peaceful protests quickly became widespread chaos, with police cars driving into protestors, elderly men being pushed to the ground and seriously injured, and assaults on innocent reporters. Pompeo has also criticised Tehran for using violence against anti-government protestors. He stated that “we pray for a day when … all peoples can speak and assemble freely without fear of their own governments.” Whilst this violation of human rights should certainly be condemned, it is difficult to see how any country could learn lessons from the US, where the state is encouraging the use of violence against its own citizens during protests. For instance, Trump tweeted a controversial warning to protestors, stating that “when the looting starts, the shooting starts”. This statement was flagged by Twitter as violating their guidelines by “glorifying violence”. These protests are a clear example of the US committing the same violations it condemns overseas. THE EFFECTS OF HYPOCRITICAL POLICY The hypocrisy demonstrated by the US has a huge impact on the enforcement of international human rights. The US has a reputation for boasting about its citizens’ freedoms and claims to set an example for the rest of the world. US violations, however, of its own citizens freedoms have allowed countries such as China and Russia to undermine American efforts to condemn human rights abuses. America’s recent violations are likely to prohibit any effective intervention when encouraging other countries to respect human rights.

2022 Michigan Evidence
net benefit › us fails

US human rights pressure fails because of hypocrisy

Anna Rosario Malindog-Uy, Professor of Political Science, International Relations, Development Studies, European Studies, SEA and China Studies, April 17, 2022

“Human Rights: US’ Double Standards, Hypocrisy,” ASEAN Post, , (accessed 6-2-2022)

Unimaginably, the US is like a loose cannon with its double standards and hypocrisy in lecturing and pillorying other countries’ human rights shortcomings as if it has the moral and ethical superiority on this matter. It is as if the US is the world’s human rights judge and role model. Truth be told, the US hardly befits a nation that is a role model of human rights to be emulated by other countries. Relative to its size and power, the US, at the moment, is one, if not the most brazen and impertinent guilty party or delinquent in the international human rights community. Nevertheless, it is unashamed to castigate other countries across the world for their human rights deficiencies as if it has the moral ascendancy and credibility to do so, given that the US does not practice what it preaches more often than not. To note, the US is the only major world power that has failed to fully ratify or adhere to any of the significant human rights instruments introduced by the United Nations (UN) or other human rights bodies.