2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: Entrapment DA › No Escalation—Diplomacy
Narang and Mehta 19 [Neil Narang, Department of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara, Rupal N. Mehta, Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, "The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended Deterrence: Moral Hazard in a Nuclear Client State", 2019, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022002717729025?casa_token=fjphBVEC1bcAAAAA:s1NRigLIcYYxZXkDz9eLxekB42NjmCbbcbFMw_HyiWfIAQl2rkicA4CWZa6pN7ACXfmR6slngz2Jlg]
In this article, we explore the relationship between nuclear umbrellas, militarized conflict, and crisis bargaining. Drawing on existing bargaining theories of war, we argue that, because war is costly, both parties in a crisis have an incentive to avoid fighting. This implies that—in equilibrium—the impact of a nuclear umbrella on the risk of war between a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella and a potential target should generally be zero, assuming information is complete, commitments are credible, and the stakes are divisible. However, this does not mean that such commitments are benign, or that they pose no risk to potential targets and nuclear patrons. Instead, we argue that a client state’s expectation that its power will be augmented in the event of war (by that of its nuclear patron) will make it more likely to expand the scope of its demands and seek to revise the status quo. Because war is generally ex post inefficient, leaders of target states are likely to offer concessions in the amount that reflects the changed balance of power, rather than fight a costly war. Thus, we argue that the risk of moral hazard from nuclear umbrellas should be observable in the bargaining outcomes short of war, if not in the observable patterns of militarized conflict.
We begin by investigating whether nuclear umbrellas generate a risk of moral hazard by increasing the risk of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). We find evidence that protection under a nuclear umbrella slightly increases the risk that a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella will initiate an MID compared to a state that lacks this protection. However, we find that this overall effect is driven entirely by one-sided use of force initiated by the client state protected under a nuclear umbrella that never escalates to the reciprocal use of force by the target state. At the same time that targets appear to avoid the reciprocal use of force, we find strong evidence that a client state’s protection under a nuclear umbrella is positively associated with the likelihood that a crisis will include a peaceful settlement attempt and an increased likelihood that a target will offer policy concessions to the client state. Together, the results along both dimensions—conflict and bargaining outcomes—are consistent with the observable implications of the theory.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: Entrapment DA › No Escalation—Moral Hazard
Benson 14, Associate Professor of Political Science and Asian Studies at Vanderbilt University (Brett, “Inducing Deterrence through Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58.2)
Do military alliances cause allies to act so aggressively that their behavior undermines the security goal of the alliance? If so, then leaders may be cautious about joining an alliance, doing so only if they can select safe alliance partners or design the terms of the treaty in a way that captures the deterrence benefits while managing the dangers of overaggression. We show that while alliance commitments may cause alliance partners to behave aggressively, under some conditions the added aggressiveness actually enhances deterrence. From this perspective, the effectiveness of an alliance is related both to the structure and to the content of the treaty.
This view stands in contrast to the standard explanation that the content of an alliance agreement is designed to balance the benefit of deterring an enemy against the risk of emboldening an ally (Fearon 1997; Snyder 1997; Yuen 2009). Our approach builds on existing models of alliance formation (Morrow 1994; Smith 1995) but adds intra-alliance contracting over the benefits from successful deterrence. Specifically, avoiding a conflict that they otherwise might expect creates a surplus equal to the foregone cost of war, which may be divided among alliance partners.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: Entrapment DA › No Norway Entrapment
Andreas Østhagen 18, Senior Fellow at The Arctic Institute, Senior Research Fellow at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of British Columbia, “How Norway and Russia avoid Conflict over Svalbard,” The Arctic Institute, 06-19-2018, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/norway-russia-avoid-conflict-svalbard/
In 1977, Norway established a maritime Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ) around the Arctic Archipelago of Svalbard. Norway avoided claiming an outright Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) fearing it would be challenged due to stipulations (or lack thereof) concerning extended maritime zones in the Svalbard Treaty from 1920.1) A dispute with Russia over the status of the Zone arose, although the two countries quickly agreed to disagree as long as Russian fishermen would have access to fisheries in the Zone.
In the late 1990s, Norwegian fisheries enforcement in the FPZ became stricter, in tandem with declining fish stocks and fear of considerable illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the Barents Sea. This led the Norwegian Coast Guard to attempt to arrest Russian fishing vessels on several occasions, resulting in reactions from Russian fishermen, as well as officials in Murmansk and Moscow.2) In 1998, 2001, 2005, and 2011 specifically, incidents had the potential to escalate beyond a fisheries issue.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: Entrapment DA › No Norway Entrapment
Wrenn Yennie Lindgren & Nina Græger 17, Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Associate Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at Stockholm University, M.A. in International Policy Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies; Research Professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Head of the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen, “The Challenges and Dynamics of Alliance Policies: Norway, NATO and the High North,” in “Global Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century,” pp. 91-113, June 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.22459/GA.06.2017.07
Whereas the end of the Cold War implied that ‘for most other states than Russia the region has remained either marginal or peripheral’, the importance of the High North was revitalised in Norway with the Norwegian High North strategy from 2005 onwards.73 The significant Russian military build-up on the Kola Peninsula from the mid-2000s also raised concerns about security among Norwegian politicians, diplomats and militaries. In particular, the Russian reopening of old military bases, the increased level of military exercises and, not least, the increase in overflights of Russian bombers and strategic bombers off the coast of Norway sparked a new round of ‘New Cold War’ rhetoric and media headlines.
Certainly, a more aggressive Russian foreign policy towards Eastern Europe and Ukraine in 2014 in particular has also put the High North, where Russia has ‘geo-political and military-strategic interests’, back at the top of the Norwegian security and defence policy agenda.74 For instance, the main focus of the expert commission was the security challenges that Russia represents in the region, which they describe as ‘an arena for geopolitical struggle’.75 The forward-leaning Russian foreign policy has also gained a lot of attention in Nordic academic environments.76 Even after the Ukraine crisis, however, Russia has not been considered as a direct threat to Norway, at least not at present.77 As formulated by the head of Norwegian military intelligence, ‘Russia has not suddenly become a military threat—not in the short term. But, in the long term the picture is more uncertain’.78 Hence the focus on strengthening the military presence in northern Norway in subsequent defence plans and reports.79 Rather than seeing any impending security threats in the region, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affair’s Arctic slogan, ‘high north, low tension’, emphasises the safety aspect of Arctic activity.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: Entrapment DA › No Norway Entrapment
Koivurova 16, is Research Professor and Director of the Arctic Centre at the University of Lapland. (Tim, 11-18-2016, “Analysis: The Arctic conflict - truth, fantasy or a little bit of both?” High North News, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/analysis-arctic-conflict-truth-fantasy-or-little-bit-both)
What do we mean by a conflict? Since Arctic countries have so much practical cooperation, it is important to ask what sort of conflicts could occur in the region. If we are claiming that the general deterioration of relations between Russia and the West is about to lead to some sort of a conflict, it is important to stop and think what kind of a conflict we are talking about. If a conflict means, for example, an unresolved dispute over where a maritime border should lie, this does not shock many experts. Arctic states have disputed over their maritime borders bilaterally and sometimes even at the International Court of Justice, but such disputes have been settled sooner or later. It took more than 40 years for Russia and Norway to resolve a border dispute in the Barents Sea, but even this was settled in 2010. Furthermore, the dispute did not prevent cooperation between the countries. Norway, a NATO member, and the Soviet Union used to jointly manage fish stocks in the disputed region. In fact, most of the Arctic maritime disputes occur between close allies, like the United States and Canada. Or, does a conflict refer to a single event, which causes diplomatic slanging match? If, for example, the Coast Guard of the US or Norway seizes a Russian fishing vessel or a person subject to sanctions travels to Svalbard, can this be defined as a conflict? It is very rare that single events escalate into worse conflicts than a mild war of words, which is quickly lost in the mists of time. A case in point is when a Russian fishing vessel Elektron escaped in 2005 from the Norwegian Coast Guard to the Russian territorial waters, after having been arrested for illegal fishing. While the case lingered for some time, it did not affect general long-term Russian-Norwegian relations in the Arctic. What would it mean, then, if the geopolitical tension expanded to the Arctic region? In general, if Russian tensions grow with NATO, it is important to keep in mind that the Arctic plays a crucial role in Russia’s global military strategy: its Northern Fleet requires access to the Atlantic. We could also claim that since Russia has now increased its military presence in its Arctic regions, we have a security dilemma at hand: Could armament in Russian Arctic also lead to increased military investment from the part of its neighbors, and such investments reinforce each other in a vicious circle? Although the Arctic states have sometimes declared they will boost their investments in measures guaranteeing Arctic security, this has not actually occurred. The United States has so far been unable to even purchase one new icebreaker for its Arctic areas. Overall, it is important to ask for what purpose Russia is militarily equipping its Arctic areas. Due to the difficult circumstances in the region, militaries are needed in many tasks in the Arctic, ranging from rescue tasks to safeguarding shipping in the Northern Sea Route. It is also important to monitor whether Russia implements all the planned military investments in its Arctic areas. They are expensive measures in a country whose economy is not doing well. It is also important to consider for what strategic purposes could Russian military act in the Arctic. Russia has demonstrated to have the ability and will to use also military power to achieve its aims in foreign policy. This has been visible for a long time, since Russia’s Georgia operation in 2008, and it has accelerated in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea, war in Eastern Ukraine and military support for the Syrian government. This consideration leads to two questions: "Could Russia gain anything by military occupation in the Arctic and what would it even mean in the Arctic?", and: "What is the difference between Ukraine, Georgia and the Arctic?" To the first question: Could it be possible for Russia to also use military power in forcibly claim the Lomonosov Ridge, if Denmark-Greenland and perhaps Canada, too, want it? We could also ask, what would Russia celebrate as a foreign policy win, if it did conquer the Lomonosov Ridge? It is very likely that Russia receives a large part of the Lomonosov Ridge and its hypothetical hydrocarbon resources just by complying with the UNCLOS rules. Furthermore, most likely they have nothing economically exploitable and even if something was found, it would take decades for Russia to even dream of drilling oil in these areas. As regards the second question on differences between Russian actions in the Arctic and Eastern Europe, Russia has used military power against two states, which both were part of the former Soviet Union and which are not NATO members. It is a different matter to carry out attack in the Arctic Ocean against NATO member states, which are covered by alliance security guarantee. But could Putin’s regime, then, attack the non-NATO members, Finland and Sweden? Although these countries are EU member states and thus enjoy a softer form of security guarantee, the famous fifth article of the North Atlantic Treaty would not push the alliance to defend Finland and Sweden. It is important to ask these types of questions, since they allow us to reflect what Putin’s Russia is prepared to pursue with military means in actual terms. There are no signs of Russia’s military strategy being completely unpredictable. Russia has enabled the de facto separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia and annexed Crimea. All the regions have had a Russian majority, even though they were part of Georgia and Ukraine. To be sure, safeguarding the Crimean naval base and access to the Black Sea contributed to the decision to annex Crimea. Considering Putin’s military strategy so far, it is difficult to draw any parallels between the Georgian regions and the Crimean Peninsula on one hand and Finland and Sweden on the other. The Arctic region lacks similar reasons for any military confrontation. If the general tension in the relations , however, leads to military actions between Russia and Western powers elsewhere, however, these confrontations are very likely to expand to the Arctic region. This is for the present, though, an unlikely course of events. A more crucial question is this: When do the relations between the US and Russia freeze to a point where it starts to affect Arctic cooperation, which has so far been largely shielded from tensions from outside the region? The recent signs are not promising: The plutonium agreement was suspended by Russia, the United States and Russia are again on opposite sides in Syria, and the situation in Eastern Ukraine continues to be difficult. The situation is constantly changing, and we cannot exclude the possibility that we reach a point where the deterioration of the relations also leads to difficulties in the Arctic cooperation. Did we receive answers to these questions from the election of Donald Trump as the next US President? On one hand, it seems, Trump and Putin seem to pull in the same direction, perhaps leading to less confrontational relations and better Arctic co-operation. However, it is the unpredictability of Donald Trump that makes it very difficult to say anything clear on what his foreign policy agenda will eventually look like. Moreover, the Arctic Council may not be the forum where Trump would like to pursue his policies, given that the climate change is at the core of what the Arctic Council does – a phenomenon that does not seem to exist for the president-elect.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: Entrapment DA › No Norway Entrapment
Frank Bakke-Jensen, 1-11-2021,(writing when he was the Norwegian minister of defense; "Norway’s defense minister: We must ensure strategic stability in the High North," Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2021/01/11/norways-defense-minister-we-must-ensure-strategic-stability-in-the-high-north//EZAY
The United States and Norway have a strong and longstanding bilateral relationship based on mutual interests and common values. The trans-Atlantic link remains the cornerstone of Norwegian security, and our two countries cooperate closely on almost every aspect of military operations. Looking ahead, the two key dimensions for Norwegian security policy are the Arctic and Russia.
Strategic environment in the High North
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: Entrapment DA › No Turkey Entrapment
Michael Moran 16, Visiting Media Fellow and author of The Reckoning: Debt, Democracy and the Future of American Power, “Turkey’s Article 5 Argument Finds No Takers,” Carnegie Corporation of New York, 2-24-2016, https://www.carnegie.org/news/articles/turkeys-article-5-argument-finds-no-takers/
The ferocity of the fighting between Syria’s government forces and various proxies vying for control of territory and resources has Turkey on edge and has already led to several deadly clashes involving the only NATO member state bordering the civil war.
With Turkey, Russia, Iran, Iraq, and Gulf states pursuing their own, often conflicting aims in Syria, all against the backdrop of a U.S.-led air and commando campaign against the Islamic State (IS), there is renewed concern at NATO’s headquarters in Brussels that Turkey could see the next flare-up as grounds for citing Article 5: in effect, demanding that its NATO allies deploy forces and come to its collective defense.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: Entrapment DA › No Turkey Entrapment
İbrahim KARATAŞ 20 (10/20/2020, “Analyzing the Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty as an Assurance of Turkey’s Security”, Middle Eastern Studies, 13-2 (2021):155-176//) EZAY
Article 5 of the NATO agreement that orders collective defense for a member that has incurred an armed attack has always been a matter of debate in Turkey. Turks are suspicious of it if it involves Turkey in a likely war or conflict. This study analyzed whether Turkey and other members can rely on NATO’s assurance of security stemming from Article 5. After examining certain events and surveys measuring public opinion of member states about NATO, it has been concluded that it is not clear that other members will defend Turkey or any other member since the article was invoked only once in the history of NATO to protect the US against relatively small states and a terrorist group. However, regarding Turkey’s position, the claim that NATO will not protect Turkey cannot be proven since Turkey did not face an existential threat after becoming a NATO member. In addition, deterring the Soviet Union from attacking Turkey by making it a NATO member can be regarded as a benefit of Article 5 without invoking it. On the other hand, Turkey’s own preferences and compelling reasons in foreign policy made it to be in contention with its NATO allies. However, when NATO members’ attitudes are examined, it can be concluded that they could still have proposed better solutions for Turkey. In addition to the above, as per public opinion surveys, NATO members hint that they may not sacrifice themselves for others unless (1) they are at War, (2) the enemy attacks all, (3) all attack the enemy, and (4) the US leads. According to surveys, this thesis is valid for Turkey since it favors NATO least and does not seem to join a collective defense of its allies. Yet, NATO’s and some members’ failure or reluctance to address Turkey’s security problems has a significant impact on Turkish people’s views. Surveys also show that NATO members are not as much in allegiance to the organization as they were in the past, probably due to the non-existence of an imminent threat.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: Entrapment DA › No NATO Entrapment—AT: Article V
Joshua Alley 2020[Postdoctoral Research Associate (Politics) UVirginia Ph.D. Political Science (Department of Political Science) Texas AM B.A. International Affairs/Political Science Gettysburg college) Alliance Participation and Military Spending. Doctoral dissertation, Texas A&M University. Available electronically from .] pg.76-78//EZAY
I focus this brief case study on NATO treaty design for two reasons. First, information from NATO applies to multiple alliances, as other US treaties have similar designs. Most US alliances have conditional promises of military support and understanding why is important. Second, NATO is also the most important alliance in international politics, so understanding how the treaty formed is worthwhile. After the end of World War II, the US sought a way to protect Europe from the USSR. Despite acute security concerns, fear of entrapment in unwanted conflicts led to limits on military support. First, as Poast (2019a) details, NATO members disagreed over how to define the North Atlantic area, which was a key condition on military support. The US and other states argued about whether France’s Algerian colony and Italy should be protected by the alliance. Second, active military support from NATO members depends on domestic political processes.18 Isolationists in the US Senate feared that an alliance would force America to intervene automatically if partners were attacked, bypassing the power of Congress to declare war and engaging the US in unwanted conflicts (Acheson, 1969, pg. 280-1). Therefore Article V of the NATO treaty states that if one member is attacked the others “will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary (emphasis mine).” Military support was and is not guaranteed. Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated as much in a March 1949 press release defending NATO to the US public, where he said that Article V “does not mean that the United States would automatically be at war if one of the nations covered by the Pact is subject to armed attack” (Acheson, 1949). This claim and the emphases of the press release shows that promises of military support were highly salient to the US public. Military support from Article V did not assuage European fears that if the Soviets invaded, the United States would not fight. To increase the credibility of NATO, the United States took other measures. A 1951 presentation by Dean Acheson to Dwight Eisenhower argued European allies “fear the inconstancy of United States purpose in Europe. ... These European fears and apprehensions can only be overcome if we move forward with determination and if we make the necessary full and active contribution in terms of both military forces and economic aid” (Acheson, 1951, pg. 3). The first part of reassurance was the creation of the Atlantic Council, which is an international organization and the main source of depth in the NATO treaty itself. The United States used the Atlantic Council to coordinate collective defense and increase the perceived reliability of the alliance. By investing in the Atlantic Council and related joint military planning, the US addressed European fears of abandonment. For example, US officials thought that the British Foreign Minister viewed US provision of a supreme commander in Europe as “a stimulus to European action” in NATO (Acheson, 1950). Many Senators also opposed military aid to Europe (Acheson, 1969, pg 285), which limited efforts to add further treaty depth. These legislative constraints on the executive branch reduced the formal depth of NATO relative to what many ambassadors preferred (Acheson, 1969, pg 277). Bilateral agreements on troop deployments then became another instrument of reassurance. In 1950 the Germans formally requested clarification on whether an attack on US forces in Germany would be treated as an armed attack on the US- which the US said it would (Acheson, 1969, pg. 395). These bilateral arrangements and basing rights are not covered in the NATO treaty, but they added substantial depth.19 NATO negotiations reveal the tendency of democracies to use treaty depth to reassure their allies, rather than unconditional military support. Fear of foreign entanglement led the United States to offer conditional military support, but did not inhibit deep military cooperation, which helped reassure European allies. Limits on the promises of military support were an important public justification for the NATO treaty, while the Atlantic Council was less discussed. Still, the power of treaty ratification in the Senate limited formal NATO depth to the Atlantic Council. The Atlantic Council and associated bureaucratic machinery are the formal core of substantial defense cooperation. Altogether though Article V is limited, the US used treaty depth to increase the credibility of NATO.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: Entrapment DA › No NATO Entrapment—AT: Article V
– Quantitative analysis of every single alliance invocation
Berkemeier, M., & Fuhrmann, M. (2018). [Ph.D. Political Science, Texas A&M University M.A. Non-Proliferation & International Security B.A. Political Science, University of Chicago, 2012 “Reassessing the fulfillment of alliance commitments in war.” Research & Politics, 5(2), 205316801877969. doi:10.1177/2053168018779697]//EZAY
Table 1 lists the opportunities to fulfill alliance commitments from 1945 to 2003. This information offers some possible explanations for the sharp decrease in promise fulfillment after World War II. One thing that stands out is that offense pacts and neutrality agreements, which are honored at higher rates than defense pacts and nonaggression pacts, are less common in the modern era. Only 20% of alliance performance opportunities from 1945 to 2003 included offensive or neutrality-based commitments, compared with more than 70% from 1816 to 1944. Changes in the types of alliance commitments that are invoked in war over time might partially account for the puzzling trend that we identify. Yet we still see sizable variation in compliance within the same commitment type in the two eras. Defense pacts, for instance, were honored 61.02% of the time from 1816 to 1944 and only 13.95% of the time post-World War II. What else, then, could explain the changing patterns over time?
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: Entrapment DA › No NATO Entrapment—AT: Article V
Constantine Atlamazoglou, 9-23-2021, (master's degree in security studies and European affairs from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. "NATO is still living with the consequences of a historic decision it made hours after 9/11," Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/nato-still-living-with-consequences-article-5-invocation-after-911-2021-9)//EZAY
The day after the September 11 attacks, most NATO countries called for the invocation of Article 5. This did not immediately happen since the origin of the attacks had yet to be determined to the satisfaction of some members.
It took until October 2, 2001 — when then-NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson announced that the attacks had indeed been directed from abroad — for Article 5 to be invoked.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: Entrapment DA › No NATO Entrapment
Ariel Shapiro 17, Master of Arts Candidate at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, Worked at Parliament and as a Policy Analyst at the Federal Government, and Holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science from McGill University, “NATO If Necessary, But Not Necessarily NATO: Critically Evaluating Canada’s Membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, October 2017, https://www.cgai.ca/nato_if_necessary_but_not_necessarily_nato
A final risk of continued NATO membership that Canada must consider is the possibility of being dragged into conflict. While the ADM (Policy) at DND claims that NATO increases global stability by preventing the formation of smaller alliance blocs, this logic must be re-evaluated in the post-Cold War era. We can turn to the international relations theory of alliances in multipolarity, as explained by Kenneth Waltz (and later, Jack Snyder and Thomas Christensen). One of the biggest dangers of a military alliance is “chain-ganging”50: that one ally will recklessly drag the others into war, as was the case between Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1914. It is true that the NATO alliance has a mechanism to stop this: Article 5 can only be invoked by consensus, which prevents the shooting down of a Turkish jet by Russia from immediately turning into global war. However, alliance theory argues that it isn’t about automatic triggers, but survival interests. As Waltz explained, in 1914, “If France marched, Russia had to follow; a German victory over France would be a defeat for Russia.”51 Similarly, if Russia today conventionally invaded a Baltic state and NATO ally, it is difficult to imagine that the alliance would not respond: not for the first time in its history, Canada would be dragged into a faraway, conventional European war. However, Canada can support countries around the world and advocate for their continued survival and independence without being bound to defend them. Canada’s relationship with Israel is a good example. Canada has supported this precariously situated democratic country since its creation in 1948, has engaged in numerous high-level visits and economic agreements with this state, and has frequently (especially since 2006) taken a stand against condemnation of Israel at the United Nations at significant cost to its own reputation. However, there is no defence agreement: should war erupt again between Israel and its neighbours, Canada would not come to Israel’s aid by sending soldiers. A different example is Canada’s relationship with Kuwait. While there is no long-standing mutual relationship of defence and support between the two, it was in the interest of global security to stop Saddam Hussein’s invasion of that country in 1990/1991. Canada answered the call then, but was not bound to support a future mission against Iraq in 2003.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: Entrapment DA › No NATO Entrapment
Cohen and Monie 19 [Jordan Cohen is a Political science Ph.D. student at George Mason University and Connor Monie is a Master's candidate in international security at George Mason University. "The True Value of a NATO Membership" The National Interest, 25 November 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/true-value-nato-membership-99817.]
The second part of the counterargument deals with entanglement and entrapment. The idea that U.S. presence in an alliance with an extensive security commitment and an ever-increasing number of European countries and can entangle it in a conflict with Russia is persistent and not entirely incorrect.
On one hand, the academic literature suggests entrapment is far less common than perceived. Separate research by Tongfi Kim, Michael Beckley, and Alexander Lanoszka all finds that entrapment is an unlikely scenario in international politics. In fact, the work by Beckley finds that the United States has been able to avoid entanglement by using a large alliance portfolio to balance counteracting commitments.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: Entrapment DA › No NATO Entrapment
Michael Kofman 16, Analyst at CNA Corporation and Fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, Former Program Manager at National Defense University, “Fixing NATO Deterrence In The East Or: How I Learned To Stop Worrying And Love Nato’s Crushing Defeat By Russia”, War on the Rocks, 5/12/2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-nato-deterrence-in-the-east-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/
NATO’s best answer to compellence is strategic flexibility and ambiguity of response. While Article V dictates the defense of a member, it doesn’t stipulate what that defense must be, how it should take shape, or where it will be applied. With U.S. forces in place, NATO members can be assured that Article V will be triggered, but what happens next should be left a question mark. The more NATO emphasizes the Russian threat and argues for fixed forces in place, the less capably it can defend a challenge to its credibility as an alliance. Anyone can count the order of battle and the balance of forces. By introducing ambiguity in its potential response once Article V has been declared, NATO reduces the chance it can easily be manipulated into a credibility test. The objective should be shrouding a Baltic high-end fight in incalculable risk for Russia while maintaining uncertainty and strategic flexibility with air and naval assets.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: Entrapment DA › Entrapment False—AT: Cred Theory
Iain D. Henry 20, (Lecturer at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Spring 2020, “What Allies Want: Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence,” International Security, Vol. 44, No. 4)//EZAY
The events of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis illustrate the need to delineate between innate loyalty and observed reliability. Reliability is a broader and more useful concept that subsumes the idea of loyalty and reduces its unwarranted prominence. U.S. conduct was not judged against an objective standard of loyalty: allies desiring a confrontational posture, such as South Korea and the Philippines, invoked Quemoy and Matsu as symbols that required defending, and encouraged U.S. loyalty to the ROC. Most allies, however, were more concerned about the possibility of war, and so discouraged a U.S. defense of strategically unimportant territory. These allies did not mind that this would involve U.S. disloyalty to the ROC, but instead cared about whether Washington's policy goals were convergent with their own.
In this case study, several allies cooperated to restrain the United States and mitigate the risk of entrapment, while weaker allies fearing abandonment had little option but to complain about U.S. timidity. In other circumstances, however, allies fearing abandonment could respond differently. For example, in May 1950 Japan dispatched a secret delegation to Washington. Citing the concern prompted by the 1949 withdrawal of United States forces from the Korean Peninsula, and vacillating U.S. policy toward Nationalist China, Japan expressed its desire for U.S. forces to stay in Japan, even once the postwar occupation ended. Similar fears of abandonment were sparked in the 1970s, when President Jimmy Carter planned troop reductions in South Korea. In response, Tokyo initiated a new period of military and economic cooperation with Seoul. As Victor Cha writes, “The most single decisive factor in this upswing in security contacts was anxiety over the Carter plan.”
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: Entrapment DA › Entrapment False—AT: Reputational risk theory
Alexander Lanoszka 17 — (Alexander Lanoszka; Assistant Professor at the University of Waterloo, Published: 12-18-2017; "Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War"; Taylor & Francis; Accessed: 7-4-2022; https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2017.1392102)//Pen-SY
Scholars are divided about whether fighting for reputation is a rational motive for states and thus whether it creates perverse incentives for allies. Some claim that states calculate the credibility of an ally or an adversary on the basis of its willingness and ability to fulfill a threat or promise. Credibility thus does not depend on having a record of keeping pledges (Press, 2005). Accordingly, states cannot develop reputations for reliability among their own allies (Mercer, 1996; Tang, 2005). Fighting for reputation is irrational. However, some dispute the proposition that actions do not matter for building credibility since actions provide information as to the interests and resolve of a state. Moreover, a record of standing up to adversaries could generate credibility, which in turn helps develop a bargaining advantage (Weisiger & Yarhi-Milo, 2015). Whichever is the case, recent scholarship has cast doubt as to whether reputational concerns worsen entrapment risks. The Vietnam War is an oft-cited example of the entrapment of strong states by friendly states, but the evidence shows that American allies wished to restrain the United States because they feared that questionable wars of choice would divert resources away from them (Beckley, 2015, pp. 33–38, pp. 46–47). Another weakness of the reputational explanation for entrapment is its deceptively simple counterfactual. Simply stated, the counterfactual is that the defender does not care about its reputation. Yet the implications of this counterfactual are unclear. For example, does the defender not help the ally at all? And if it does assist the ally, is it doing so only because of reputational concerns? By offering an alliance commitment in the first place, the defender reveals that it has some common security interests with that ally (Walt, 1987; Yarhi-Milo, Lanoszka, & Cooper, 2016). A defender unconcerned with its reputation might still help that ally for various national security reasons, as its decision-makers understand them. Alternatively, a defender might even enhance its reputation by not assisting the ally in a militarized conflict that the very ally instigated. The defender could decide that following the reckless ally into an undesirable war will undermine its ability to protect other, less problematic allies. The defender could even limit the damage to its reputation by deflecting blame onto a misbehaving ally. These observations suggest that the ally might not necessarily want to wager that the defender would fight on its behalf simply because of reputational concerns. And so an ally that is willing to make this wager is the sort of state that might already be pre-disposed to risk-acceptant behavior. If war does break out because the ally made that gamble, then the war should not be attributed to the alliance per se but rather to the ally and its innate risk propensity.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: Entrapment DA › Entrapment False
Alexander Lanoszka (2017). Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and in the Balsillie School of International Affairs at the University of Waterloo, BA (Windsor), PhD (Princeton);” Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War.“ Contemporary Security Policy, 39(2), 234–257. doi:10.1080/13523260.2017.1392102) //P.19 EZAY
The main problem concerns counterfactuals. The factors that allegedly generate entrapment risks can be so wide-ranging that imagining a world in which they operate differently would require changing other variables, which in turn can make war more or less likely. Alternatively, they might not exclude other factors that could lead to the same violent outcome. After all, conflict drives both alliance formation and the likelihood of war. States join alliances because they assess that the possibility of war is non-trivial. Similarly, a defender might be receptive to the overtures of an ally precisely because it has a pre-existing desire to see conflict with the adversary of that ally. In social scientific parlance, endogeneity problems are pervasive when trying to understand whether entrapment has occurred or is at risk of occurring. The case of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War is instructive by revealing these ambiguities. Many NATO members—especially those in Western Europe—were lukewarm towards Georgia’s bid to become a treaty ally, arguably because they recognized that Georgia posed certain entrapment risks. The United States was the most supportive of Georgia, but it might have overstated its support to Georgia in order to gain a bargaining chip with Russia. It might have even done so because Western European countries were so hesitant, thereby ignoring Saakashvili’s non-democratic tendencies. But by this very token, the United States limited its response to the outbreak of hostilities between Georgia and Russia in August 2008. The Georgian case suggests that states do not forge alliances mindlessly nor do they follow their allies off the cliff thoughtlessly. One cannot by definition want to be entrapped. The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 illustrates the need to disentangle the factors that push states to fight wars and to seek alliances while carefully investigating the mechanisms through which alliances fuel wars. As noted, some baseline probability of war had already existed between the two former Soviet republics when Saakashvili became President. Their conflict centered on an unresolved dispute regarding the political status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Neither could commit to a durable settlement. Moreover, territorial concessions and submission to salami tactics could have signaled Georgian weakness, thereby encouraging new or more assertive territorial demands. Georgian leaders might have also faced domestic incentives to stand firm towards Russia—incentives that would have existed independent of NATO. To the extent that alliance politics mattered from Georgia’s perspective, Saakashvili might have cherry-picked information that confirmed his beliefs regarding Western support. Nevertheless, these factors are idiosyncratic because they stem directly from his personality. In a counterfactual world where NATO was not a factor, he could have had these and other cognitive biases that would have elevated the likelihood of war. By undertaking this sort of counterfactual analysis, scholars thus must take care to isolate the effect of an alliance commitment—to the degree that it exists—from the underlying propensity of war. Georgia bears a methodological and analytical lesson for thinking about entrapment: Just because NATO was an issue for Georgian security in 2008 does not mean the alliance was causally responsible for the war. Future research on alliances and war must not only identify correlations between alliances and conflict, but also sort out various causal mechanisms that connect different causal factors with war. Carefully disentangling the factors that could lead to entrapment matters not only for theory and methodology but also for policy. If entrapment concerns are real, then defense planners must have a clear idea as to where they come from. Some entrapment risks can be attenuated with active policy measures. Conditioning a political or military commitment when dealing with a risk-acceptant ally is one example. But doing so might not matter if we have reason to think that systemic forces make that ally more aggressive. Strong commitments could even make seemingly jumpy allies more secure. And so, armed with a better understanding of what drives entrapment risks, defense planners would be more confident in modulating political and military commitments appropriately. As such, critics of NATO expansion and American foreign policy may be overstating their case. NATO might bear some indirect responsibility for the Russo-Georgian War, but its culpability lessens when we consider the other factors that increased the likelihood of war: misperceptions, overconfidence, and the commitment problems underlying the territorial disputes themselves. If anything, the key policy challenge is for NATO to determine whether prospective partners like Saakashvili have psychological traits or cognitive biases that would make them unjustifiably optimistic about the level of support that they would receive.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: Entrapment DA › Turn—Relations Solve Entrapment
Anika Binnendijk 19 — (Anika Binnendijk; senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Published: 2019; "An Attack Against Them All? Drivers of Decisions to Contribute to NATO Collective Defense"; RAND Corporation; Accessed: 7-9-2022; https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1080712.pdf)//Pen-SY
Concerns about a mismatch of goals could be overcome if coalition participants are more confident in their ability to influence the coalition’s actions. Potential participants could have concerns about restraining any ally, but in a Baltic scenario, these concerns are likely to be most acute with respect to the most powerful and leading members of the coalition and the Baltic states. Typically, weaker states are thought to have less leverage in the alliance and, therefore, greater concerns about entrapment by a stronger ally like the United States.78 However, weaker allies do have some ways to restrain more-powerful allies. First, longstanding diplomatic and military relationships among NATO members mean that states might have insight into their allies’ decision making processes and the contacts needed to influence those processes.79 Second, allies also have some sources of leverage over a coalition leader, including the ability to withdraw participation or place limits on access to military bases or airspace.80 Such actions could restrain a coalition leader’s behavior by affecting its ability to carry out operations, raising the costs of a military action, or undermining the domestic or international legitimacy of the operation. To the extent that a coalition leader values the support of its allies in the longer term, threats of exit from the coalition or NATO itself could affect a coalition leader’s decisionmaking.81 There is evidence that NATO allies used NATO decisionmaking structures to restrain U.S. actions during the air war over Kosovo. Wesley Clark, who was NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, complained about the influence of NATO members on military decisions, including campaign phasing and individual targeting.82 In a now-famous incident at the Pristina airport, the British commander of NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps was able to leverage his chain of command in London to thwart Clark’s plan to block the airport runway with helicopters—a move that the British commander believed could have triggered a security incident between NATO and Russia.83 Ultimately, concerns about constraints posed by NATO structures in Kosovo contributed to the U.S. decision to form a coalition of the willing for initial operations in Afghanistan in 2001.84 NATO members that do not participate could still face direct Russian retaliation or other consequences. Given that possibility, members who do not entirely support the aims of the operation might still participate in order to seek greater influence over operational decisions than they would have if they were on the outside.85 This logic appears to have influenced France’s decision to join NATO’s air war over Kosovo. French Secretary General for Defense and National Security Louis Gautier argued that French participation in the operation meant that France was “able in Kosovo to impose itself in the decisionmaking process and affect strategy.”86
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › Links to Politics
Eyal 22 (Jonathan Eyal is associate director at the Royal United Services Institute in London, “Yes, Nato has a new vitality. But its united front could collapse when it has to deal with Russia” 7/3/22 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jul/03/yes-nato-has-a-new-vitality-but-its-united-front-could-collapse-when-it-has-to-deal-with-russia)
Nato calculates that its members have promised to spend £172.6bn in additional defence expenditure on top of existing defence budgets, with Germany accounting for perhaps half this amount. But the question is how this will be spent and over what period. The easiest way to improve European capabilities would be to use this cash to buy US equipment off the shelf: this offers substantial economies of scale and time. Yet such an approach will go against European aspirations to boost their defence industries; French diplomats are warning that the Ukraine war must not end up as a bonanza for US arms manufacturers. Chances are high that Nato’s eternal “burden-sharing” debate will continue, even if more cash is available. Across the Atlantic, Donald Trump and his disciples are poised to argue – as “The Donald” did when he was in the White House – that Nato is a scam to fleece American taxpayers. Even if he does not stage a comeback, the idea that the US is spending far more than it should to defend fat, wealthy Europeans is likely to feature prominently when a new Congress is elected this November. The sheer audacity of the Russian aggression has allowed the Biden administration to get the cash it needed from Congress. Still, it is taken for granted in Washington that the $40bn package recently approved by Congress for security assistance to Ukraine is unlikely to be repeated. And a future Nato burden-sharing debate is bound to get more acrimonious when it is joined with a parallel discussion about paying for Ukraine’s postwar economic reconstruction, a project estimated at an eye-watering $500bn.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › Links to Entrapment
Lanoszka ’17 [Alexander Lanoszka; Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Waterloo; 12-18-2017; "Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War"; Taylor & Francis; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13523260.2017.1392102; Accessed 7-11-2022; AW]
Entrapment could also result from transnational ideological factors. Driscoll and Maliniak (2016) suggest that defenders like the United States get ensnared in conflicts “where their national interests are not implicated” for reasons of “issue slippage” (p. 593). This issue slippage occurs when the alliance takes on additional purposes, losing sight even of its original purpose. In the case of NATO, issue slippage ensued when the Soviet military threat no longer existed and the alliance became instead a political community based on liberal democratic values. Accordingly, an actual or potential ally can “position itself in the imagination of liberal idealists in the West” to maximize external support (Driscoll & Maliniak, 2016, p. 594). Similarly, Cooley and Nexon (2016, pp. 77–82) argue that foreign elites can forge bonds of trust and friendship with American officials and politicians, thereby eliciting more cooperation than what was strategically warranted. The common mechanism underlying these arguments is that the ally exploits some transnational connection via elite networks. This connection often has an ideological character since foreign elites play to the ideological prejudices of the defender by professionalizing the national bureaucracy, highlighting religious and political affinities with the West, contracting with lobbying firms in the defender’s capital city, and developing embassy connections (Cooley & Nexon, 2016, pp. 88–94; Driscoll & Maliniak, 2016, p. 601). Sometimes they might instead play on ethnic ties if those ties exist. The net effect is to make foreign policy-making in NATO capitals more amenable to a state’s particular interests. The mechanism resembles what Schimmelfennig (2003) calls rhetorical action, which refers to the “strategic use and exchange of arguments to persuade other actors to act according to one’s preferences” (p. 5). By appealing to the ideological sensibilities of the defender’s elites, the ally can co-opt that defender, thereby increasing the probability that the defender would assist the ally even if doing so is detrimental to its strategic interests.