2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › AT: INB—European Defense High
Hazen ’20 (Bradley Hazen, intern in the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, “NATO’s progress on burden sharing remains strong” ) //sethlee
When NATO leaders met in Wales in 2014, strengthening allied burden sharing and reversing a downward trend in national defense spending were high on the agenda. In response to Russia’s comprehensive military modernization efforts and territorial aggression against Ukraine, member states to increase their national defense spending to at least 2 percent of real gross domestic product (GDP) by no later than 2024.
European allies and Canada have now contributed five consecutive years of growth in defense investment, adding a cumulative total of in new spending since 2016. In 2019, all but three NATO allies increased their defense spending in real terms, with nine allies reaching or surpassing the 2 percent goal (up from seven in 2018).
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › AT: INB—European Defense High
Rolander ’22 (Niclas Rolander, Reporter, “Global Military Spending Tops $2 Trillion for First Time as Europe Boosts Defenses”, ) //sethlee
Global military expenditure has surpassed $2 trillion per year for the first time, and looks set to rise further as European countries beef up their armed forces in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
In 2021, countries spent a total of $2,113 billion on their militaries, up 0.7% in real terms from the year before, according to a report released Monday by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, or SIPRI.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › Perm Do the CP Definitions
Brown ’8 [Mary Ann Brown; May 14; Judge on the Court of Appeals of Iowa; Westlaw, “In re Est. of Guthrie,” 752 N.W.2d 452]
Brock and Kaitlyn look to the word “should” in the phrase “in the event any of my children should predecease me” and claim the district court improperly found the word looked to the future. They claim the word should be interpreted as the past tense of “shall” to imply a duty or obligation. See Black's Law Dictionary 1379 (6th ed.1990). Looking at the phrase as a whole, however, rather than at a single word, we determine the phrase is considering possible future events. See In re Estate of Grulke, 546 N.W.2d 626, 627 (Iowa Ct.App.1996) (noting we must ascertain a testator's intent from the entire will).
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › Perm Do the CP Definitions
Richman ’16 [James; August 17; Judge on the Second Circuit, California’s Court of Appeals; Westlaw, “Marin Assn. of Pub. Emps. v. Marin Cty. Employees' Ret. Assn.,” 2 Cal. App. 5th 674]
There is, of course, no bar to the Supreme Court adopting a Court of Appeal's reasoning as its own. Yet there is legitimate reason to question whether that was what the Supreme Court intended in 1983. First, as just shown, only the least authoritative of the three sources cited **385 actually supports the word “must,” while the two Supreme Court decisions employ “should.” Second, barely a month later, the Supreme Court—speaking though the same justice—filed another decision which used the “should” formulation from the 1955 Allen decision as quoted in Abbott.20 Third, the 1983 Allen decision involved retirees (and Flournoy the widow of a retiree), who historically receive a heightened degree of judicial protection. (See fn. 19, ante.) Fourth, and most significantly, the “must” formulation has never been reiterated by the Supreme Court, which has instead uniformly employed the “should” *699 language from the 1955 Allen decision. (Olson v. Cory, supra, 27 Cal.3d 532, 541, 178 Cal.Rptr. 568, 636 P.2d 532 [“Although an employee does not obtain any ‘absolute right to fixed or specific benefits ... there [are] strict limitation[s] on the conditions which may modify the pension system in effect during employment.’ [Citation.] Such modifications must be reasonable and any ‘ “changes in a pension plan which result in disadvantage to employees should be accompanied by comparable new advantages” ’ ”]; Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 492, 529–530, 286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d 1309 [quoting Olson]; City of Huntington Beach v. Board of Administration (1992) 4 Cal.4th 462, 472, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 514, 841 P.2d 1034 [“changes in a pension plan which result in disadvantage to employees should be accompanied by comparable new advantages,” citing Allen v. City of Long Beach, supra, 45 Cal.2d 128, 131, 287 P.2d 765].)
It thus appears unlikely that the Supreme Court's use of “must” in the 1983 Allen decision was intended to herald a fundamental doctrinal shift. “Should,” not “must,” remains the court's preferred expression. And “should” does not convey imperative obligation, no more compulsion than “ought.” (Lashley v. Koerber (1945) 26 Cal.2d 83, 90, 156 P.2d 441; see People v. Webb (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 401, 409, fn. 2, 230 Cal.Rptr. 755 [“the word ‘should’ is advisory only and not mandatory”].) In plain effect, “should” is “a recommendation, not ... a mandate.” (Cuevas v. Superior Court (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 406, 409, 130 Cal.Rptr. 238.)
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › AT: Blankenship
Blankenship – 1NC solvency advocate - 18 (Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami in Coral Gables, PhD political science at Columba, MPhil & MA political science at Columbia “Promises under Pressure: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in Asymmetric Alliances,” Columbia University PhD dissertation)
The credibility of a patron’s threat of abandonment is shaped by far more than just the level of reassurance it provides. As a result, the extent to which reassurance and burden-sharing are positively or negatively correlated depends in large part on whether the patron can couple its assurances with threats. When a patron’s threat to abandon allies is credible ex ante, it can afford to reassure its allies without worrying as much about free-riding. Indeed, the literature on coercion shows that reassurance is equally as important as threats in making for effective coercion, although it is much less studied (Davis, 2000; Sechser, 2007; Carnegie, 2015; Gerzhoy, 2015). The target of coercive bargaining needs to know that if it gives in, its partner will simply punish it anyway (Schelling, 1966). Thus, reassurance can actually be a positive tool that is used to increase burden-sharing, though only if it is backed up by threats. These threats do not necessarily need to be explicit, and indeed may be most effective if they are not. Allies are likely to consider how likely patron abandonment is, and thus their burden-sharing efforts will in no small part be a reaction to the patron’s latent threat of abandonment.
3.2.1 What is Exit? By exit, I refer to attempts by states in an alliance to loosen themselves from the partnership and reduce the benefits they provide to their partners. For allies, exit takes the form of efforts to reclaim their autonomy and pursue a foreign policy more independent of the patron, while for patrons exit takes the form of efforts to reduce the security it provides. Exiting the alliance is more credible to the extent that a state has attractive outside options for meeting their security and/or autonomy needs. Violation or abrogation of the alliance treaty are only the most extreme forms of exit; a party to an alliance need not expect that its partner will outright terminate the partnership. Rather, exit is a spectrum, and states may fear the consequences of the more moderate step of their partners “distancing” themselves from the alliance. Distancing is undesirable for two reasons. The first is that the perception of disunity may weaken deterrence by tempting adversaries to drive a wedge between the allies or by emboldening them to behave more aggressively (Weitsman, 2004; Crawford, 2011). Second, distancing raises questions about the amount of support that the partner will 35 furnish. Allies may fear that the patron will give only minimal support if they are attacked, while the patron may anticipate that more autonomous allies will be less likely to provide basing rights, less likely to support its foreign policy initiatives, and more likely to come to a separate understanding with adversaries (Lake, 2009). In early 2018, for example, steps toward détente between North and South Korea – including North Korea’s participation in the Winter Olympics and discussions of potential bilateral talks – worried many in the United States, who feared that such a rapprochement might undermine South Korea’s support for the United States’ preferred policy of putting military and economic pressure on the North.3 Two general forms of outside options are available to alliance partners: self-sufficiency and search. In the case of the former, states reduce their need for partners. Allies, for example, can attempt to increase their own military capabilities such that they no longer need protection. Patrons, for their part, can reduce their need for loyal allies by pursuing a more unilateral or isolationist foreign policy, and by striking a deal with adversaries. In terms of search, patrons and allies can seek alternative partners. While the types of outside options weaker allies can pursue – ranging from nuclearization, to neutrality, to finding other countries to rely on for support – are diverse, and in many cases will not be the precursor to actual alliance termination, their causes are fundamentally similar, and they share common features that will make them worrisome to the patron. First, all of the forms of exit I discuss reduce allies’ dependence on the patron. This, in turn, makes them less likely to cave into its pressure in the future, and gives them less incentive to be automatically loyal. As a result, a patron has good reason to discourage allies from pursuing any of these options. Second, allies will be most prone to consider all of these forms of exit when relying on the patron’s protection becomes less attractive – whether because the patron seems unreliable, because the severity of the threat environment makes trusting the patron risky, or because the barriers to exit decrease. I am ultimately agnostic as to which form of exit allies will be most likely to pursue in a given situation. Indeed, in many cases, allies can pursue multiple options in tandem, such as unilateral military arming coupled with efforts at rapprochement with adversaries. Nevertheless, I treat the threat of all forms of exit as a key driver of patron reassurance.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › Deficit—AI—Say No
Franke ’21 (Ulrike Esther Franke, Senior policy fellow at the European council on Foreign Relations, “ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI”, ) //sethlee
Both sides of the Atlantic are already motivated to cooperate with each other on AI. But, despite these shared interests, transatlantic cooperation on AI may not be straightforward. Four trends, in particular, could pose problems: transatlantic estrangement; European digital autonomy efforts; differing views on China; and, potentially, Brexit. The transatlantic alliance has had a bad four years. The Trump administration’s criticism of the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, the president’s threats to leave NATO, and his active criticism of the EU all made Europeans wonder whether they had lost their most important partner. Moreover, in light of the conflict over 5G, in the minds of many Europeans, technology in particular has become an area that creates conflict in the transatlantic relationship rather than fostering cooperation. Although transatlantic relations are likely to improve under Biden, substantial damage has been done, and it will take some time to mend these ties. But, even if relations improve, it is becoming increasingly obvious that US has a diminishing interest in Europe as a geopolitically important part of the world. This trend was already visible under Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama. It is, therefore, unsurprising that, on technology cooperation, both sides emphasise the importance of working with other actors as well as each other. The US National Security Commission on AI, for example, recommends that the US Departments of State and Defense “should negotiate formal AI cooperation agreements with Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam”. Its March 2020 report emphasises on several occasions the importance of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. Meanwhile, Europeans are pursuing the idea of an alliance for multilateralism. And, on technology and AI more specifically, they have also begun to reach out to other democratic allies. The most important aspect of transatlantic estrangement, however, is not the loss of trust between the US and Europe – which they will eventually reverse. Rather, during the four years of the Trump administration, and partly in response to isolationist tendencies in the US, Europeans have become much more comfortable talking about European strategic autonomy or sovereignty. Without encouraging the narrative that these efforts are directed against the US, or were primarily an answer to Trump, Europeans aim to empower Europe as an actor in its own right. In the technological realm, this led to the idea of European digital sovereignty, the aim of which is to build up European technological capabilities. Although European digital sovereignty is not specifically targeted at the US, it has led, among other things, to efforts such as the possible regulation of American technology companies and concerns over American firms acquiring European start-ups. European campaigners and some policymakers believe US tech giants such as Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon are forces to protect against. European thinking on technology partly developed in opposition to the US and US companies. Thus, European efforts to build up digital sovereignty may impede transatlantic cooperation. The EU’s effort to strengthen ethical AI, and to make ‘trustworthy AI’ a unique selling point for Europe, might also end up creating problems for transatlantic cooperation. Many EU policymakers believe that the EU’s insistence on ethical AI will eventually become a location advantage for Europe (much like data privacy): as more people become concerned about unethical AI and data security, they will prefer to use or buy AI ‘made in Europe’ rather than elsewhere. In this respect, two European aims are at odds with each other: on the one hand, Europeans want to ensure that AI is developed and used in an ethical way. Partnering with a powerful player such as the US on this matter should be an obvious way to help them achieve this goal. However, if the EU considers ethical AI not just a goal for humanity but a development that may also create commercial advantages for Europe, then transatlantic cooperation on this issue is counterproductive, as it would undermine Europe’s uniqueness. Finally, many Europeans have expressed scepticism about the extent to which Europe and the US are indeed aligned on ethical AI principles. For example, the Danish national AI strategy argues for a common ethical and human-centred basis for AI. It describes ethical AI as a particularly European approach: “Europe and Denmark should not copy the US or China. Both countries are investing heavily in artificial intelligence, but with little regard for responsibility, ethical principles and privacy.” Many Europeans feel that the US “has no idea how to regulate” cyberspace and continues to show little enthusiasm for doing so. The EU, however, likes to think of itself as a trailblazer when it comes to digital rights, such as the 2014 “right to be forgotten” or the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › Deficit—Conditions Fail
Munson 13 (Peter J. Munson is senior vice president for preventive services and global crisis management for a private sector corporation and a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer. “THE LIMITS OF SECURITY COOPERATION” 9/10/13 )
Planners should go to great lengths to ensure that SC is seen as a tool for a specific purpose, not a reward to condition behaviors. SC-as-a-conditioning-tool becomes bribery with diminishing returns. If policymakers want a quid pro quo, they need to admit as much and use much more precisely targeted incentives: paying a fee for access or head-of-the-line transit privileges for example. This becomes a much more predictable business transaction than trying to use SC funds, winks, and nudges to get one’s way. Finally, in the land of perverse incentives, SC is often seen as a means to drive defense business to U.S. contractors. This is true. By creating arms races and supplying prestige weapons, however useless, to unstable areas of the world, they are creating U.S. jobs. But wouldn’t taxpayer money and efforts be better spent if officials more precisely targeted domestic concerns with taxpayer funds rather than hoping that efforts trickle down predictably from collaboration with corpulent and unsavory foreign generals? In the land of perverse incentives, SC funding is one of the most egregious—and in the post-9/11 era, many officials see SC as a critical tool of strategic positioning. However, the premises of SC must be reconsidered before the U.S. military squanders more resources on white elephant projects.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › Deficit—Deterrence
Schnaufer 21, Tad A. Schnaufer II is a Ph.D. candidate in Security Studies at the School for Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida and is a captain in the Florida Army National Guard, “The US-NATO Relationship: The Cost of Maintaining Political Pressure on Allies,” January 15th 2021, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Conflict & Security, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2021/01/15/the-us-nato-relationship-the-cost-of-maintaining-political-pressure-on-allies/
These responses from European leaders show that startling allies into thinking the United States will abandon them has influenced allies to increase defense spending in line with the . However, in the long term, NATO policymaking should employ a balanced approach. If the United States brings its security guarantee of the alliance too much into question, Russia or other states may take action to test the United States’ resolve. During the Cold War, US leaders continually reaffirmed their commitment to allies, effectively deterring a Soviet invasion. Deterrence works best when allies clearly express their mutual obligations to all actors on the international stage.
The experience of the United Kingdom and Germany leading up to World War I provides an example of how the United Kingdom’s lack of a solid commitment to its allies allowed German leaders to think the British would stand aside in the war. details this situation in her book The Guns of August. The failure of King George V and the UK Foreign Secretary to give a definite guarantee of joining the war should Germany invade allowed the Kaiser to think that he could attack without a British intervention. If the British had made a direct declaration of support for its allies, German leadership might have decided against escalating the war. This case gives policymakers an idea of what could happen if the United States does not maintain a firm commitment to its NATO allies. US leaders must watch how far they allow the US commitment to NATO wane in competitors’ eyes or risk possible adventurism on the eastern flank of NATO.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › Deficit—Cohesion/Relations—Trump Proves
Benitez 19, Jorge Benitez is a senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, specializing in NATO, transatlantic relations, European politics, and U.S. national security, “U.S. NATO Policy in the Age of Trump: Controversy and Consistency,” Winter 2019, The Fletcher forum of world affairs, vol. 43
These statements echo some of Trump’s remarks about NATO. They demonstrate that American leaders are becoming more impatient with the persistent burden-sharing imbalance with European allies, marking a frequently overlooked yet nevertheless dangerous decline in the U.S. attitude toward the behavior of its allies. They are proof that Europe has underestimated the corrosive effect of its attitude toward fulfilling the NATO defense commitment. These comments demonstrate that the problem of burden-sharing is serious and will continue to jeopardize transatlantic relations after Trump, unless significant progress is made. Trump no doubt feels validated by these criticisms from previous presidents. But Trump also feels that previous presidents were unsuccessful because they did not make sufficient effort to pressure NATO allies to fulfill their defense commitments. As a result, Trump appears willing to take greater risks than any of his predecessors. Trump summed this up after his last NATO summit in 2018: Now, what has happened is, presidents over many years, from Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama, they came in, they said, “Okay, hey, do the best you can,” and they left. Nobody did anything about it. And it got to a point where the United States was paying for 90 percent of NATO. And that’s not fair. So it’s changed.13 To properly understand this widening gap between the United States and NATO allies, it is essential to recall the timely warning from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. In 2011, Gates spoke in very direct language to emphasize to Europe the gravity of the problem, stating, “I am the latest in a string of U.S. defense secretaries who have urged allies privately and publicly, often with exasperation, to meet agreed-upon NATO benchmarks for defense spending.”14 He then made one of the starkest warnings about the health of the Alliance, stating, “[I]f current trends in the decline of European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, future U.S. political leaders— those for whom the Cold War was not the formative experience that it was for me—may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost.”15 Gates did not advocate for such a change in U.S. NATO policy, but he feared that if allies did not make a significant change, future U.S. leaders would lose faith in the most powerful alliance in U.S. history. This warning may now seem prophetic with the rise of Trump, but even Gates must have been surprised at how quickly his warning proved true. TRUMP BREAKS FROM HISTORICAL PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT FOR NATO As we have seen, Trump is not the first president to complain that NATO allies are not contributing their fair share of defense spending to the Alliance. But Trump has done two things his predecessors avoided. First, he has publicly questioned the value of NATO to U.S. national security. Second, Trump has publicly questioned the validity of U.S. defense commitments to NATO allies. These two deviations from decades of bipartisan presidential support for NATO have weakened the cohesion of the transatlantic alliance and caused fears in allied capitals that under the Trump administration, the U.S. may not help defend them should they face a foreign attack. Trump’s views on NATO should be understood and examined in two phases: his statements about NATO as a candidate during the 2016 presidential campaign and his statements about NATO since he became president.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › Deficit—Cohesion/Relations—Abandonment Fears
Foucalt and Mérand 12, Martial Foucault is a professor of political science at Sciences Pro Paris and a researches of political economy and political behavior, Frédéric Mérand is a profession of political science and the Scientific Director of the Centre for International Studies at the University of Montreal and a researcher in international relations and global security, “The Challenge of Burden Sharing,” Spring 2012, International Journal, Vol. 67, No. 2,
Accusations of free-riding have marred transatlantic relations ever since the creation of the Atlantic alliance in 1949. Then as now, the rhetoric of burden-sharing has served as a useful rhetorical weapon to blame those who were seen as not contributing enough to the cause. Each time, however, Washington's call has fallen on deaf ears, at least in public. In private, European and Canadian officials highlight other contributions they think they are making to NATO operations, for example in the shape of development aid or considerable troop casualties in Afghanistan. They mention UN peacekeeping missions, such as in Lebanon, where the US is not involved. Cynics admit that they never really bought much into the military adventures into which the US threw them, and that the US itself did not seem to believe much in the Libya mission. The reality, French foreign minister Alain Juppe retorted to Gates, is that it is the Europeans who "think the Americans aren't doing enough."3 The evolution of the transatlantic debate suggests two things. First, burden-sharing is about more than NATO. One cannot just look at defence spending at a time when humanitarian aid, diplomatic mediation, and the fight against climate change can all be considered contributions of a sort to collective security.4 Disentangling what counts as a contribution to which public good is no easy thing. Second, burden-sharing is a contested political concept. Statesmen and diplomats do not speak the abstract language of public choice, with its "non-excludable" and "non-rival" goods. Rather, they talk about "being fair," "doing what you can," and "making a real contribution." In other words, they speak the normative language of justice rather than the utilitarian language of economics.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › Deficit—Cohesion/Relations—Abandonment Fears
Rapp-Hooper 20, Political Science PhD at Columbia University, Senior Research Scholar in Law at Yale Law School, Senior Fellow at Yale's Paul Tsai China Center, Senior Fellow at Yale's Paul Tsai China Center. (Mira, Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances, Harvard University Press, ProQuest Ebook Central)
If the benefits of coercion—especially the capricious sort in which Trump specializes—are small, the costs may be sizable. As we have seen, postwar American leaders saw value in asymmetric alliances in part because, by taking on the burden of defending others, they gained control over allies whose territory replaced the homeland as America’s front line. Washington spent more on defense than its allies, but got far more out of its alliances than any one of them did. If the United States continues to emphasize cost-sharing above all other strategic priorities, it will reduce its ability to assure and control allies, which may in turn weaken the defense and deterrence benefits those allies provide. America may pay less, but it will also get far less in return.
A loss of allied control may take the form of political distance, as allies look for other relationships to replace their faltering partner. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has already declared that Europe can no longer depend on the United States, and French President Emmanuel Macron has lamented that, amid US neglect and browbeating, NATO is “experiencing brain death.” South Korean President Moon Jae-In has prioritized his ongoing negotiations with Kim Jong Un, distancing himself from the United States. Both South Korea and Japan have improved their relations with China.16 Distance undermines policy coordination and can seriously diminish a guarantor’s political influence. It may even foster conditions in which allies to tilt toward rivals.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › Deficit—Cohesion/Relations—Abandonment Fears
Benitez 19, Jorge Benitez is a senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, specializing in NATO, transatlantic relations, European politics, and U.S. national security, “U.S. NATO Policy in the Age of Trump: Controversy and Consistency,” Winter 2019, The Fletcher forum of world affairs, vol. 43
Since its creation in response to Soviet aggression after World War II, the majority of the U.S. public has consistently held favorable views of NATO. But Trump’s repeated public criticism of NATO may be having an effect on popular support for the Alliance. Support for NATO by Republicans decreased from 52 percent in 2016 to 47 percent in 2017, during the first year of the Trump administration.81 Nevertheless, a strong majority of Americans polled have a favorable view of NATO. While Republican support for NATO may have gone down slightly, support for NATO by Democrats and Independents has increased significantly. As a result, overall public support for NATO has grown, from 53 percent in 2016 to 62 percent in 2017. 82 Still, Trump’s tough NATO policy is putting great strain on the Alliance. It will not convince the majority of U.S. allies to meet NATO’s 2-percent defense-spending pledge by 2024. Moreover, reducing U.S. commitments to NATO and cutting contributions to the Alliance will only make the problem worse and may make hostile powers more willing to test the Alliance by using force or engaging in a hybrid attack against a NATO member. Instead of focusing on threats, Trump’s NATO policy should propose feasible burden-sharing ideas that can be implemented quickly.83 But the key to a successful NATO policy from the Trump administration must be a more accurate perspective on the central role of NATO in U.S. national security. Trump needs to stop overestimating the harm from burden-sharing and underestimating the value of NATO to U.S. national interests. The security that NATO provides Europe, the North Atlantic, and the Mediterranean is worth much more to the United States than the 5 percent of the Department of Defense budget allocated to U.S. forces in Europe. It is critical that Trump appreciate the unique value that previous presidents saw in NATO. As George W. Bush described it,“These trans-Atlantic ties could not be severed by U-boats. They could not be cut by checkpoints and barbed wire. They were not ended by SS-20s and nuclear blackmail. And they certainly will not be broken by commercial quarrels and political debates.”84 NATO must not be evaluated simply as a transactional cost. It is a unique asset for the United States that protects American citizens, interests, and values. As Barack Obama explained,“Our nations are stronger and more prosperous when we stand together. In good times and in bad, our alliance has endured; in fact, it has thrived—because we share an unbreakable commitment to the freedom and security of our citizens. NATO is a force multiplier…. There is nothing else like it on Earth.”85 Notably, on July 6, 2017, Trump gave one of his most powerful foreign policy speeches in Warsaw. In the speech, he made two strong statements. “Americans know that a strong alliance of free, sovereign and independent nations is the best defense for our freedoms and for our interests. That is why my administration has demanded that all members of NATO finally meet their full and fair financial obligation,” he said.86 It is important that Trump recognize how his threats and demands are jeopardizing the significant value that NATO offers. If Trump leaves NATO or unintentionally breaks up the Alliance, the United States will not be able to replace it. Rather, the Trump administration should pursue alternative options to produce more responsible and fair behavior from NATO allies. As President, it is in Trump’s interest to strengthen NATO and find more positive and feasible policies to resolve the burden-sharing problem. NATO is the most powerful alliance in history and a key asset in U.S. national security. None of our competitors have anything like it. The loss of NATO would be a major victory for U.S. adversaries. As former Secretary of Defense Mattis has explained to the Senate Armed Services Committee, “history is clear: nations with strong allies thrive, and those without them wither.”87
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › Deficit—Cohesion/Relations—2AC
Blankenship 18, Brian Dylan Blankenship is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami and a researcher with a focus on international security and international cooperation, “Promises under Pressure: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in Asymmetric Alliances,” 2018, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Columbia University, p. 28-29
2.5.1 The Reassurance Dilemma. One might thus conclude that reassurance is suboptimal, and that patrons are best served by casting their protection into doubt. The reality is not so simple, however. Because the patron’s side of the bargain entails providing protection to its allies, if that protection comes into doubt then allies have less reason to honor their end of the bargain: namely, to remain loyal to the patron by siding with it against its adversaries, providing basing access, and supporting its other foreign policy priorities (Morrow, 1991; Lake, 2009). The patron thus faces a dilemma. It must choose between withholding reassurance to maximize burden-sharing, on the one hand, and providing reassurance to ensure that allies have incentives to remain loyal to it, on the other. Directly studying the relationship between reassurance and burden-sharing is difficult, however. The first two problems are methodological. Any relationship that exists between patron reassurance and allied burden-sharing may be spurious. For example, U.S. troop presence is likely to be correlated with threat, which may have an independent effect on allied military spending. Second, the relationship between reassurance and burden-sharing may be endogenous; patrons may withhold reassurance from allies which are under-contributing and then reward them with assurances of protection once they have increased their efforts. The third problem is theoretical – even if troops are present, allies may fear (and, indeed, the patron may threaten) that they will be withdrawn. It is difficult to know, for example, whether a large U.S. troop presence in a country indicates that the host is highly dependent on the United States, or whether it is instead the United States that is dependent upon the host. Indeed, while Lake (2007, 2009) and Machain and Morgan (2013) find that states which host U.S. troops have lower defense contributions, Allen, VanDusky-Allen, and Flynn (2016) show that NATO allies’ defense efforts are positively related to U.S. military presence. Moreover, Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger (1994) find that states with a large U.S. military presence – which they treat as a proxy for partners’ dependence on the United States – were more likely to contribute to the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › Deficit—Delay
Hoffman & Dinneen 18 [Frank G. Hoffman, board of advisors at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, serving the National Defense University as a Research Fellow; Molly Dinneen, Research Intern at the National Defense University, 7-6-2018, Foreign Policy Research Institute, ‘Examining NATO’s Progress: Common Goals, Shared Burdens’, /alundy]
In anticipation of the 2018 NATO Summit, analysts have commented on : command and control structure changes, new headquarters for maritime forces, and higher defense spending levels. European scholars and policy experts would like to see the Summit move past the issue of burden sharing. Certainly, there is much more than burden sharing to discuss. Yet, a lack of consensus about Russia and threats from terrorism have limited the progress the Alliance should have gained since Wales in 2014. Coercive tactics with tariffs and trade imbalances will only increase resistance and weaken consensus on a way ahead with regard to security arguments.
At the Summit, the attendees will be able to see a clear reversal of declining defense spending as several NATO members are expanding their defense budgets. Despite President Trump’s desires for rapid achievement of the 2% threshold, European disarmament occurred over a long period of time, and given economic realities in Europe, it will not be overcome in a matter of one or two years, as Frank Hoffman noted on this topic. However, as shown in Figure 2, European and Canadian defense expenditures are on a clear upward trend. Given U.S. persistence, and a bit of patience from U.S. leaders, these positive improvements should continue.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › Deficit—Credibility
Lagon & Moreland ’19 [Mark Lagon and Will Moreland; Chief Policy Officer at Friends of the Global Fight Against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, as well as Distinguished Senior Scholar in the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and associate fellow with the Brookings Institution's Project on International Order and Strategy; 2-14-2019; "Burden-Sharing Doesn’t Need to Be Burdensome"; National Interest; https://nationalinterest.org/feature/burden-sharing-doesn%E2%80%99t-need-be-burdensome-44572; Accessed 7-9-2022; AW]
The president’s critique is not unfounded. American power today differs from its heights in 1945, or even 1990. The United States will need help shouldering the maintenance of a liberal international order that has increased global security, prosperity and freedom these past seven decades. Nevertheless, the manner in which an American administration approaches the burden-sharing issue matters. Trump has pointedly called for NATO allies to pay more for defense and his team at the United Nations has circulated a potential policy to make foreign aid contingent on alignment with U.S. positions, so that aid dollars “only go to America’s friends.” Though increased action among allies and partners is necessary, to simply demand greater burden-sharing is insufficient. Policymakers confront two central questions if they are to promote effective burden-sharing: first, how to ensure other stakeholders do step forward, rather than leave a vacuum around an issue; and, second, how to protect and advance U.S. interests if burden-sharing cedes the initiative to others. Demands for increased activities from partners must be coupled with coordination and a measure of U.S. leadership for an effective burden-sharing campaign. A number of cases, therefore, reveal bases for eliciting burden-sharing of the quality and variety the United States should want—as well as the risks of forcing burden-sharing via disengagement. The notion of compelling other nations into taking actions—particularly by arousing skepticism around U.S. credibility—is a recipe for shortchanging American interests. Consideration of both UN peacekeeping operations and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria illustrate how effective burden-sharing requires continued U.S. commitments in order to spur burden-sharing over inaction. Furthermore, the success of the Global Fund, the worsening of some crises in the Middle East, such as in Yemen, and the mixed record of the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), similarly demonstrate that leadership creates the leverage necessary for Washington to advance U.S. interests when others do step up to act. Americans may legitimately want others to do more, but how that aim is pursued matters. Nowhere is this more evident than the debate over NATO. Even before the signing of the Washington Treaty, concerns around NATO burden-sharing arose. U.S. military planners worried that an American security guarantee would perpetually deter defense spending by the new European allies. This concern dogged the allies throughout the Cold War. Disagreements flared almost immediately in the Senate’s “great debate” over deploying troops to Europe without additional European support in the Korean War, a peripheral interest to many European leaders. Disagreements resurfaced in the 1960s as Western European economies recovered from their postwar devastation. The Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations repeatedly sought to navigate clashes between security interests in Europe and trade or balance of payments deficits. Compounded by the strains of Vietnam, both the security and economic arrangements boiled over in the Nixon administration with the resulting shifts of the Nixon Doctrine and the shocks to the Bretton Woods system. Though the transatlantic partners were in sync on détente and then counterbalancing in face of the Soviet Union in the 1970s and early 1980s, disagreements surrounding approaches to European security, particularly around the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, maintained a measure of tension between the Euro-Atlantic allies. The subsequent Soviet collapse transformed the global security environment; yet, it did not take long for a new generation of burden-sharing issues to emerge. The Clinton administration at first evidenced ambivalence on respective roles and responses on Balkans crises. Others, like then-French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine, derided the U.S. “hyperpower.” During this period even Paul Wolfowitz admitted a “need to believe that others are doing their share.” Frustrations persisted in the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations. Under both presidents, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates forewarned of a potential “two-tiered alliance” at the 2008 Munich Security Conference and the “the growing difficulty for the United States to sustain current support for NATO if the American taxpayer continues to carry most of the burden in the Alliance” in his 2011 farewell address at NATO. Jeffrey Goldberg further captured this sentiment in President Obama’s derision of “free-riders” in his revealing 2016 article “The Obama Doctrine” in The Atlantic. Surviving these crises, NATO’s story reminds that the organization has been and remains, like many of America’s global partnerships, inherently reformable—provided the United States engages with tangible and realistic ambitions. Without initial U.S. involvement, no effective collective defense organization would have developed in Europe sufficient to manage the Soviet threat. Without continued engagement that same organization would not have changed as needed, for instance, to be a stalwart partner in Afghanistan. NATO and the broader transatlantic partnership certainly require further shifts to manage today’s era of resurgent great power competition; however, this past precedent emphasizes the need for active U.S. leadership and reasonable agenda-setting. Pragmatic engagement will yield practical results. Peacekeeping by the United Nations offers an important example of what burden-sharing means and what elicits it. During the Cold War, UN peace operations were confined to interposing a deployment between formerly warring parties. The clash of the Cold War superpowers as veto-wielding United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members meant that was all the traffic would bear. In settings like Cyprus and Lebanon, long-standing deployments kept additional military duties off the U.S. plate through decades of the Cold War. The Cold War’s end ushered in more numerous and ambitious UNSC mandates—as the United States and Russia were more often willing to align on authorizing peace operations. In the 1990s, along with a couple of dramatic failures marred by murky mandates (in Bosnia and Rwanda, where excessive impartiality left atrocities to occur on peacekeepers’ watch), an array of peace operations took hold with a variety of governance and post-conflict goals beyond the traditional interpositional model.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › Deficit—Say No—vs 2% of GDP
Techau 15 [Jan Techau; director of Carnegie Europe, a part of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 9/2/15; THE POLITICS OF 2 PERCENT;
If 2 percent has become the gold standard for defense spending in the debate on NATO’s future, then how realistic is it that the goal will ever be reached? Pessimism prevails on this issue. “The guideline . . . if taken literally, would create an impossible situation for some allies,” writes Ian Anthony of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. A country like Germany would have to absorb €74 billion ($82 billion) of defense spending instead of its current €37 billion ($41 billion), something it would be unable (and unwilling) to do and that would in turn lead to “inefficiency and waste, rather than an increase in useful capability.”20 Germany is also the focus of another argument that aims at making 2 percent look unrealistic. The enormous increase in absolute defense spending in Germany, with its large economy, that would result from 2 percent could also lead to a degree of nervousness among some of the country’s allies. As Karl-Heinz Kamp of the German Federal Academy for Security Policy argues, “If Germany spent 2 percent of its huge GDP, it would produce a defense budget overshadowing those of France and the UK, arguably causing more concern than reassurance among its neighbors.”21 This is a weak argument, as it essentially questions the political reliability of a key NATO partner that is most under pressure to spend more The strength of the 2 percent metric is its triumph of simplicity over complexity. 12 | The Politics of 2 Percent: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe on defense. For the most part, it is a self-serving defensive argument against higher defense spending that has been used primarily by Germans themselves, not so much by other NATO allies. But the lack of capacity among member states to absorb significantly increased defense budgets is not the only factor that leads to doubt about hitting the 2 percent target. The biggest concern comes from the fact that many NATO countries agreed to the 2 percent pledge in Wales but have no real intention to make good on the promise. “The problem is not that most NATO allies will fail to reach the 2 percent bar. The trouble comes with those that don’t even try,” as Kamp puts it.22 Initial budget decisions made around or after the Wales summit and even public announcements by many member states seem to indicate that the political will to really reach 2 percent is indeed underdeveloped across NATO. Overriding economic concerns are also reasons for skepticism that the 2 percent pledge can be fulfilled. “As long as austerity remains the eurozone’s economic mantra, it is unlikely that European allies will meet the target,” one researcher argues.23 Under the prevailing economic circumstances, it is often claimed that a reversal of the downward trend in defense spending would already be a success, but that an increase to 2 percent would be too much to realistically expect. The Wales summit declaration itself makes 2 percent dependent on positive economic development, stipulating that allies “aim to increase defence expenditure in real terms as GDP grows.”24 This conditionality is meant to generate more defense spending from the moment economic recovery sets in. The volume of growth that would be needed to increase defense spending is not specified, nor is a time reference for growth given. Should spending be measured against absolute GDP growth on an annual basis, or should the growth rate be the metric? Or should GDP growth be measured against a fixed point in time—for instance, GDP before the financial crisis?
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › Deficit—Say No—vs 2% of GDP
Kivimaki, 19 [Timo Kivimaki, 2-13-2019, professor of International Relations and Director of Research at University of Bath, European Security, Volume 28, ‘Power, Contribution, and Dependence in NATO Burden Sharing’, /alundy]
The national GDP share of defence spending is often used as an easy, parsimonious, quantitative measure of contribution in some of the formative studies in the field and in most studies that aim at complete mathematical models of burden sharing in military alliances (Olson and Zeckhauser , Boyer , Oneal , Sandler and Hartley ). The use of national defence spending is justified by the fact that much of NATO’s operations and activities are funded by national defence spending, while only some funding is channelled through the NATO budget. Thus, the idea of measuring contribution to NATO by considering GDP shares of national military spending makes some sense, but it is neither an accurate, nor a necessarily useful, indicator of contributions (Zyla , Techau , Kunertova ).
US military spending in 2017 was at a level of 610 billion USD, thus representing not only a majority of NATO spending, but 35% of the military spending of the entire globe; 9.2 times that of Russia and 2.7 times that of China (These calculations are based on data by SIPRI ). Thus, if we use the GDP share of national military expenditure as an indicator, it seems clear that the US, with about a 45% share of the NATO GDP , (GDP data is calculated from “The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency” n.d.) has a too high a national expenditure, as it add up to more than 50% of the sum of national defence expenditures of all NATO countries.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › Deficit—Say No—AT: Pressure Solves
Becker 20, was Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the Institute for European Studies at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel during this research. He is currently the U.S. Liaison to the French Joint Staff, and an associate researcher at the Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire (IRSEM) and Sciences Po’s Center for International Studies (CERI). He completed his PhD at King’s College London in 2017, and he is a lieutenant colonel in the United States Army (Jordan and Robert Bell, “PREPARING FOR WAR IN THE FOG OF PEACE: THE TRANSATLANTIC CASE,” War on the Rocks, )
Yet there inevitably are areas of national strategy that a process alone cannot shape. We maintain that national strategic cultures, national political economies, and E.U. macroeconomic and fiscal policy decisively influence how countries allocate resources to defense – before NATO and E.U. planning processes take place. Specifically, the more Atlanticist (a preference for a transatlantic approach to European security, in which the United States’ role is central) a country’s national security strategy was, the more it contributed to shared operational priorities during NATO’s “out of area” period (from 2000 to 2012). As European states experience increased unemployment, they “slightly decrease top-line defense spending in response to unemployment, while shifting much more substantial amounts within defense budgets out of equipment and into personnel.” E.U. members respond similarly to supranational (E.U.) fiscal constraints agreed to by heads of state and government as part of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, and “monitored” (enforced) by the European Commission. Processes cannot address these tough choices, which amount to rival claims on strategic resources, but politico-strategic dialogue may. For example, when NATO allies agreed to a “pledge on defense investment” at their 2014 Wales Summit, their heads of state and government gave broad but clear guidance not only to defense ministries to “meet[] capability priorities,” but also to finance ministries to “reverse the trend of declining defense budgets.” Two years later, E.U. heads of state and government formally adopted the NATO goals of moving toward spending two percent of GDP on defense and 20 percent of defense spending on equipment modernization. Early indications are that these political agreements are having some effect on resource allocation, as Figure 3 shows. European allies’ defense spending increased by $87 billion from 2014 to 2018. That this would occur in spite of disagreements regarding threats, economic fragmentation within Europe and the broader transatlantic community, and fiscal austerity in the European Union, points to the importance of cultural factors like Atlanticism. However, as Figure 3 also shows, increases may be stalling – a transatlantic divide may harm burden-sharing and, perhaps paradoxically, weaken Europe as a strategic actor. Figure 3: Annual Real Change in Defense Spending, NATO Europe and Canada Source: NATO, Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2013-2019), 2020. NATO and European Union agreement on exigent defense investment guidelines, as well as the downstream effects on coordinated capability development, point toward other opportunities for the two organizations to cooperate strategically. This is especially true given the tight interconnection between the economic strength of the transatlantic community and its military strength. For example, NATO and the European Union could build on current cooperation proposals to include the grand strategic area of resource allocation, ensuring that NATO and E.U. defense spending goals are not in competition with E.U. fiscal rules for scarce resources. Italy’s 2015 defense White Paper, for example, suggests the possibility that some defense spending “could be excluded from the thresholds of the Stability and Growth Pact.” Trouble Behind, Trouble Ahead At some level, all states must prepare for war. Robert Osgood called alliances “latent war communities” – they are designed for that purpose. Indeed, Bear Braumoeller’s recent work extends Charles Tilly’s insight that “war made the state and the state made war” to international orders, which he argues prevent war among their members but are dangerous to non-members. Processes like those that NATO and the European Union have developed during the last eight decades of relative calm and prosperity are central to the transatlantic community’s ability to prepare for, and perhaps forestall, future wars. They are the best tools its members have to convert political will into capabilities that they believe will have strategic effects, like deterring adversaries or, if necessary, defending national territory and shared interests. Processes are, however, no substitute for grand strategic vision. Such vision animated the creation of both NATO and the European Union. There is now a strong case for a bolder vision of transatlantic cooperation in defense planning and grand strategy to keep the “fog of peace” from turning into the “fog of war.” What might such a vision look like? Some scholars have proposed to address the fog of peace by “rediscovering geography” to regionalize NATO defense planning, enabling allies to focus on capabilities that are most directly relevant to their own strategic priorities. Others have argued that it is time for Europe to seek – and achieve – true strategic autonomy, either by “Europeanizing” NATO (whereby the United States would reduce its footprint in the alliance and concentrate on its strategic challenges elsewhere), or by subsuming NATO into a broader European political-security framework. Even the possibility of extending France’s nuclear deterrent to its European allies has been raised, first by French scholars discussing “nuclear solidarity,” and then by President Emmanuel Macron, who invited European partners to “be associated with the exercises of French deterrence forces” in the interest of a “true strategic culture among Europeans.” Macron further clarified his intent in an interview with Wolfgang Ischinger at the 2020 Munich Security Conference, pointing to an “unprecedented dialogue” on nuclear deterrence among Europeans. Challenges abound. First, transatlantic discord creates challenges for European Atlanticists, making it more difficult to align national strategies, and may even incentivize countries to curb defense spending to appeal to domestic electorates that bristle at external pressure. Second, the combination of economic recession and fiscal austerity that plagued Europe during the 2008 crisis appears likely to return in a more virulent form, which is almost certain to dampen defense investment. Taking Europe’s “destiny in its own hands” is easier said than done. Years of low defense investment, the complicating effects of Brexit, the rise of populist politics across Europe, and uncertainties about Turkey, among other issues, cloud prospects for greater European defense autonomy. While retaining the transatlantic bond, in an era of great-power competition when conflict would almost certainly not be confined to one operational theater, it may be wise to encourage allies to “concentrate on those tasks for which they are most geographically suited.” For example, Baltic Sea states could focus on defending their territory from Russian aggression, while states along the Mediterranean could focus on combatting terrorism and building partner capacity – each without fear of being criticized for inadequately supporting allies. Doing so would help link operational and strategic planning to threat assessments, while also helping to blunt conflict among allies about defining the array of threats, risks, and challenges that characterize the emerging security environment. It would enable the transatlantic security community to incentivize and leverage the national defense planning efforts of its members. Specializing like this would enable institutional work to focus on harmonizing, which encourages burden-sharing, as opposed to dominating, which incentivizes free-riding. But such specialization demands trust, which is currently in short supply in the transatlantic community and beyond.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › Deficit—Say No—AT: Pressure Solves
Wohlforth 16 (William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, “The Right Choice for NATO,” This chapter will appear in: Sustainable Security: Rethinking American, National Security Strategy, edited by Jeremi Suri and Benjamin Valentino, )
A further, critical implication of this assessment of the strategic environment is rarely noted: it is entirely inconsistent with shock therapy’s assumption about the lack of serious threats to European security to say that calling the United States’ Article 5 commitment into question will cause European governments step up and create more military capacity via increased spending or cooperation. On the contrary, a relatively benign security setting is arguably more conducive to allowing (p.260) narrow national perspectives to trump EU-wide initiatives and to foster the continuation of minimalist defense efforts than the status quo of US leadership. America’s NATO allies make up nearly a fifth of global military spending. Britain is the fourth biggest military spender in the world, with France close behind (after another US ally, Japan) as sixth. Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Canada all rank among the world’s fifteen biggest spenders.41 Very secure states like Norway and Canada purchase sophisticated weaponry from the US military-industrial complex and order their soldiers into battle in America’s wars in far off lands. Why? A major reason is the alliance with the United States—it is the existence of the overseas hegemon and the perceived need to retain access to it and standing with it that drive much of this behavior.42
Options 1 and 2 are based on the assumption that the international system generates strong pressures for European states to do one or all of three very costly things: ramp up spending on defense; reform entrenched domestic defense practices and institutions; and set aside national prerogatives to generate genuine supranational military defense and decision making at the EU level. Take away Uncle Sam’s “welfare for the rich” and the logic of anarchy will somehow force this outcome. It cannot be ruled out that there is something special about Europe that would cause it to act in this collectively martial way without the US umbrella. But that expectation is inconsistent with most of what we know about international politics and with the lived experience of the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy and Common Foreign and Security Policy. Governments just don’t do extremely expensive and politically costly things without a major prod of some sort. The problem is that there is neither a compelling external security incentive nor a European hegemon to help solve the collective action problem. Germany may play this role in economics, but it is not going to do so in security.43 The likelihood that a US revocation of Article 5 would spur France and Britain to set aside national feeling and unite defense efforts—and that middle powers from Poland to Turkey would acquiesce—is exceedingly low. Indeed, the downward trend in European defense spending has continued despite the continuing decline in American military forces in Europe and despite increasingly loud calls for retrenchment.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › Deficit—Say No—Nationalism
Kluth 19 [Andreas Kluth is a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion, was previously editor in chief of Handelsblatt Global and a writer for the Economist, “A European Army? It’ll Never Happen,” Dec 2, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-12-02/a-european-army-will-never-happen-nato-remains-essential]
The complications that caused that stillbirth linger. The nations in what is now the European Union still care about their sovereignty, which is expressed above all in the decision to send young soldiers into harm’s way. They also have different interests. The French are busy in their former African colonies. The Poles and Balts feel most threatened by Russia. Germany, caring not a whit about all that, is merrily building itself a second gas pipeline to Russia, circumventing the eastern EU.
Member states also have dissonant historical traditions, which make integration into one command hierarchy almost impossible. Postcolonial France considers military action a legitimate tool of foreign policy, and its president has ample powers to direct its army. Germany, still atoning for World War II, disavows military interventionism. Unlike France, it has a “parliamentary army,” which must get explicit approval from the Bundestag to do anything. Would a French president patiently wait for the German legislature before deciding whether to shoot at little green men speaking Russian in an Estonian forest? Would 27 states cede that decision to Brussels?