2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—Russia—Solves Baltics
Blachford 20, a Lecturer of International Relations at the Baltic Defence College, Estonia, (Kevin, February 7th, 2020, “Can NATO and The EU Really Defend the Baltic States Against Russia?”, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/can-nato-and-eu-really-defend-baltic-states-against-russia-121711)
Primarily, the challenge facing NATO is dealing with the possibility of Russia using the Baltics as a way to test the credibility of the NATO alliance. The Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia currently rely on NATO’s enhanced forward presence and air policing missions to deter Russian aggression. But this provides only short term reassurance to the region and overlooks the lessons of the Cold War in which West Germany played a vital role in the credibility of NATO’s deterrence posture. The reluctance of Germany to think seriously about the military security of Europe is, therefore, becoming a hindrance to NATO’s deterrence capabilities. Germany has repeatedly emphasized its aversion to militarism in recent years and its military has faced numerous bouts of austerity. But this reluctance to be seen as a military power overlooks the role of the West German Bundeswehr which acted as the first line of NATO’s defense in the Cold War.
The history of the Cold War provides clues to how deterrence could be increased in the Baltic region today. The defense and deterrence capability of West Germany revolved not just around the nuclear deterrent, but on the ability of the United States and its allies to deploy forces quickly. This related to the logistic capabilities to move forces quickly to the border with East Germany. An important part of NATO strategy therefore relied on the West German autobahns as a way to move both goods and people. Today, the Baltic region lacks any meaningful infrastructure in which reinforcements could be moved quickly to the region. Train lines are outdated and travel between the Baltics to Poland or further to Germany is painstakingly slow. The Baltic states also do not have any significant capabilities to host allied forces in large scale numbers, particularly as access to the area in a conflict scenario would be limited due to Russian air superiority and anti-access, area-denial capabilities. The large placement of U.S. forces in this sensitive area would no doubt invite reprisals and escalation from Russia. But showing the capabilities to quickly respond to a crisis by having the capacity to move resources to the region would enhance NATO’s deterrence in the long term. NATO should therefore consider developing its forces in Germany and even Poland, but with the added caveat of being able to move these forces quickly to where they are needed in the Baltics.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—Russia—Europe Key
Shalal-Esa 14 [Andrea Shalal-Esa; Correspondent at Reuters; 1/9/14; Europe must step up on NATO defense burden -Norway defense chief; ]
WASHINGTON, Jan 9 (Reuters) - European countries must shoulder more of the political and economic responsiblity for NATO’s common defense to ensure the continued relevance of the alliance in coming years, Norwegian Defense Minister Ine Eriksen Soreide said on Thursday. Soreide, who met with an number of U.S. lawmakers this week and is due to meet with U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel on Friday, said the United States could not be expected to continue paying for over 70 percent of NATO’s defense needs. “European allies need to step up to the plate, take a bigger part of the political and economic burdens,” Soreide told Reuters in an interview after a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank. “We need to do our part. We need to be more than a net importer of security. We need to export security,” she said. In her speech, Soreide said her meetings with U.S. lawmakers revealed that both Democrats and Republicans in Congress were increasingly questioning the value of continued U.S. investments and engagement in Europe. Soreide said European fears of being abandoned by Washington had been fanned by U.S. plans to focus more on the Asian-Pacific region, but those concerns were likely overblown. Still, some changes were clearly needed, she said, calling for greater investment in Europe’s own security, increased planning for future crises, and development of high-end capabilities that could be easily deployed if needed. “Norway believes that global stability depends on the ability of Europe and the U.S. to work together, and that this will become even more important in the future,” Soreide told the think tank, citing threats from terrorists, emerging state powers and the re-emergence of old powers such as Russia. She called for increased NATO exercises and training, greater engagement in areas outside allied terrorities, and said European allies should be more willing to address U.S. security concerns outside Europe. The participation of Norway and Denmark in efforts to destroy Syrian chemical weapons was a good example of “trans-Atlantic burden-sharing in practice,” Soreide said.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—Russia—Europe Key
Le Gleut 19 [Ronan LE GLEUT; senator for French people living outside France; 7/3/19; European Defence: The Challenge of Strategic Autonomy;
Since 1945, Europe has been in a situation that has never occurred since the fall of the Roman Empire: it has largely lost its responsibility for defending itself. Several countries in Eastern Europe underwent Soviet domination from 1945 to the 1980s, which for half a century deprived them of the possibility of determining their own defence policy. In Western Europe, in the context of the Cold War, the European countries by and large placed themselves under US protection, in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) created by the Washington Treaty of 4 April 1949. Only two countries have chosen to maintain an autonomous capacity to defend their vital interests by rapidly acquiring nuclear arms: the United Kingdom (which has had nuclear weapons since 1952) and France (which has had them since 1960). Even today, the United States accounts for about two-thirds of NATO efforts. The situation now, however, is that faced with the growing challenge of China's hyper-power status, the United States has made clear to its European allies that it no longer intends to play such a substantial role in the defence of Europe. That is what the United States means by its regularly repeated demand for “burden-sharing.” By the time of the 2006 Riga Summit, the allies had agreed to raise their national spending to a minimum of 2% of GDP. It was in this context, that this prospect was confirmed at the 2014 NATO Summit held at Newport, by a specific commitment that the allies would make that figure the goal to be reached in 10 years.29(*) A second goal was that at least 20% of these defence budgets would be allocated to equipment purchases. In fact, the end of the Cold War led the European States to believe that they would be able to “collect the dividends of peace” by continuously reducing their defence efforts. The significant element of this new context is that two developments not directly related to one another have met and converged: - On the one hand, the United States has found itself facing challenges on a global level of a kind not seen since the Second World War, and has felt the burden of its commitment to European defence more acutely; - On the other hand, the European States have become increasingly aware of the threats they face, especially in the wake of Russia's annexation of Crimea. This was a symbolic shock, because it dramatically manifested Russia's will and ability to challenge internationally recognised borders, including those that it had itself recognised until then. Source: NATO The graph above shows the increase in the share of defence spending in GDP for most European countries between 2014 and 2019. Expenditures have increased for the fourth year in a row. However, for the time being, the majority of European NATO members still fall short of the 2% of GDP criterion.30(*) This is particularly the case in Germany, at 1.36%; Italy, at 1.22% and Spain, which is at 0.92% of GDP. Here, American and European perspectives diverge. It is quite clear that for the United States there is no common measure between these two challenges. For the United States, China is a universal competitor, contesting American supremacy in all domains: first of all in the economic domain, then in the financial domain, and in the cultural, diplomatic and strategic domains as well. In this competition, the military dimension does not dominate, although it is present. Russia has the opposite profile: it is a country with a weak economy, and a GDP between those of Spain and Italy - even though it is the largest country in the world and endowed with considerable natural resources. In addition to this, the Russian population is undergoing a net decline. Though Russia's interventionist and sometimes provocative policies pose a clear and immediate threat to European countries, and are of course more urgent for those closest to it, it does not pose a threat to US pre-eminence worldwide. These are the issues at stake in the organisation of the system for arms control in Europe, a matter that is of key importance for Europeans. In this light, the scheduled expiration of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty next August is extremely concerning. Significantly, the issue is the subject of very broad consensus in Europe. This, then, is the deep root of the awakening of the European spirit of defence: our fundamental security and defence interests have diverged from those of the United States. But this divergence, of course, does not mean opposition. Extremely strong ties unite the countries of Europe to the United States. These ties are multiple, and range across all the economic and social fields, but in general they may be considered as being of two fundamental types: - First there are blood ties, forged in common military engagements against common enemies. While these ties are particularly old in the case of France, it can be said that they include all European nations, in respect of the liberation of Western Europe in 1944-1945. As we have lately been commemorating the 75th anniversary of the Normandy landings, your rapporteurs here wish to take a moment to salute the memory of the thousands of American soldiers who gave their lives during the campaign in France. Their sacrifice cannot and will not ever be forgotten, and has forged an eternal bond between our two peoples. - Then there are ties of a political nature. The United States is a democratic regime, based, in the same philosophical and ideological tradition as the European countries, on the belief that every individual has inalienable rights, and that the rights and duties of all members of society are defined and protected by the rule of law. This is an abiding, fundamental difference between the United States and other powers like China or Russia. The use of the term “burden-sharing” in regard to European defence would thus seem appropriate. In substance, then, it is difficult to see what could lastingly justify Europe's continued under-sizing of its defence efforts.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—Russia—Europe Key
Gopalan 18, a professor of law and pro vice chancellor for academic innovation at Deakin University in Melbourne, Australia. He previously was co-chairman or vice chairman of American Bar Association committees on aerospace/defense and international transactions, a member of the ABA’s immigration commission, and dean of three law schools in Ireland and Australia. He has taught law in four countries and served as a visiting scholar at universities in France and Germany. (Sandeep, July 11th, 2018, “A new security alliance might be better than NATO free-riders”, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/395875-a-new-security-alliance-might-be-better-than-nato-free-riders)
The provision with bite is article 5 — that is, members agree “that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all,” and in response, NATO will assist by taking “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.” Yet, even this provision is not that strong. It doesn’t commit members to take military action in all cases of armed attack against a member. For example, Germany is not obligated to attack Russia if the latter invades Estonia. Collective self-defense is subject to pragmatic considerations of expediency and self-interest.
In other words, while NATO might provide limited deterrence against Russian adventurism, this is largely predicated on adversely impacting U.S. self-interest. Put differently, Russia is not so naïve as to be deterred by the prospect of a military response from Europeans when U.S. interests are not affected. Russia knows that the Germans and French are unlikely to sacrifice their troops or commercial interests and go to war if Russia acts aggressively against, say, Poland. Therefore, if deterrence is the goal, America must decide what price it is willing to pay to save Poland — and who should foot that bill.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—Russia—Burden Sharing Deters Russia
Sands, 18 [Carla Sands, US ambassador to Denmark, 6-13-2018 accessed and translation from U.S. Mission Denmark, published Berlingske, ‘In NATO, too, It is a matter of Giving before one can enjoy /alundy]
At the NATO summit in July in Brussels, heads of state and government will convene to evaluate our current defense capabilities. One topic that will be high on the agenda is a discussion of burden sharing. It is an undeniable fact that many NATO allies are struggling to overcome years of declining defense budgets. As a result of this prolonged underinvestment, several countries who boast cutting edge technolgies in other fields are risking their security and short-changing their soldiers, sailors, and airmen by leaving them to work with aging and worn out military hardware.
In our dangerous world, we need all NATO members to invest so that our defense provides a robust and meaningful deterrent. As every Danish taxpayer knows, the system only works if everyone is willing to pay their fair share of the bill – “man skal yde før man kan nyde.” (you have to make an effort because you can enjoy the benefits)
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—China—China War !
Kulacki 16, the China Project Manager in the UCS Global Security Program, (Gregory, May 2016, “The Risk of Nuclear War with China: A Troubling Lack of Urgency”, https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/05/Nuclear-War-with-China.pdf)
No Technical Exit As long as both sides remain committed to pursuing technical solutions to their unique strategic problems, they are condemned to continue competing indefinitely. But stalemate is not a stable outcome; rather, it is a perpetual high-wire act. Twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year, the governments of the United States and China are a few poor decisions away from starting a war that could escalate rapidly and end in a nuclear exchange. Lack of mutual trust and a growing sense that their differences may be irreconcilable incline both governments to continue looking for military solutions—for new means of coercion that help them feel more secure. Establishing the trust needed to have confidence in diplomatic resolutions to the dis-agreements, animosities, and suspicions that have troubled leaders of the United States and the PRC for almost 70 years is extremely difficult when both governments take every new effort to up the technological ante as an act of bad faith. The bilateral dialogues on strategic stability aim to manage the military competition, but they do not seek to end it. Although the two governments work very hard at avoiding conflict, they have yet to find a way out of what Graham Allison called their “Thucydides trap”—the risk of conflict between a rising power and an established power invested in the status quo (Allison 2015). Allison’s warning not to minimize the risks of war is sage advice, even if he does not say how the United States and China can escape the trap he describes. PRC leaders believe it is possible to prosecute a major war without risking a U.S. nuclear attack. The leaders of the United States believe stopping the PRC from prosecuting such a war may depend, in certain contingencies, on a credible threat to use nu-clear weapons—a threat U.S. leaders state they are prepared to execute. These mismatched perceptions increase both the possibility of war and the likelihood it will result in the use of nuclear weapons. Well-informed U.S. officials tend to dismiss the possibility that the United States and the PRC could wander into a nuclear war. For example, Admiral Dennis Blair, a former Director of National Intelligence whose final military post was Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, assured a large gathering of U.S. arms-control experts that “the chances of a nuclear exchange between the United States and China are somewhere between nil and zero.” J. Stapleton Roy, a former U.S. ambassador to the PRC, wholeheartedly agreed (Swaine, Blair, and Roy 2015). Similarly, PRC military strategists and arms control experts believe that the risk of nuclear war with the United States is not an urgent concern even if that risk may not be zero (Cunningham and Fravel 2015). This lack of urgency is troubling. For example, the United States reportedly told the PRC it would risk military escalation to prevent or stop a proposed PRC island reclamation project in the Scarborough Shoal (Cooper and Douglas 2016). The PRC reportedly responded by committing to move ahead with the project later in 2016 (Chan 2016). This particular contest of wills is part of a steadily increasing number of unresolved diplomatic spats that have escalated to the level of overt military posturing reminiscent of U.S.-Soviet jousting during the Cold War. The United States and the PRC are decades-old enemies, preparing for war and armed with nuclear weapons. Good faith efforts by the leaders of both nations have failed to stop accelerating preparations for war, including new investments in their nuclear forces. Miscommunication, misunderstanding, or poor judgment could spark a conflict that both governments may find difficult to stop. War between the United States and the People’s Republic of China is not inevitable, but failing to acknowledge the risks is certain to make it more likely. Both governments should confront these risks with a greater sense of purpose. Only then will they devote the same measure of creativity, effort, and resources to the diplomacy of reducing those risks as they now spend preparing for war.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—China—Burden Sharing Solves
Monie, 21 [Connor Monie, PhD student in political science at the Schar School of Policy and Government, 4-14-2021, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, ‘Perennial Friction: NATO and Burden Sharing Concerns’, /alundy]
President Biden comes into office with a similar gripe against wealthy European allies. Defense spending has increased in recent years, yet many European governments remain unwilling to allocate the amount of resource sought by their American counterpart. Geopolitical trends will only serve to intensify US entreaties for greater equality in defense burdens: the focus on Beijing as Washington’s primary adversary will continue to put budgetary pressures on US military commitments in Europe. President Biden will be forced to walk a tightrope between his stated goal of revitalizing the transatlantic community and the tradeoffs associated with a focus on the Indo-Pacific.
President Biden and his team face the same perennial problem vis-à-vis NATO that their predecessors faced: stronger allies tend to absorb disproportionate costs in providing security for all members and chafe at that imbalance. argue that free-riding is less harmful than it is often described to be and that the rhetoric often distorts reality. contend that standard metrics of burden sharing measure the wrong things, resulting in biased estimates of national defense contributions. Still others posit that smaller allies rationally pay a smaller share of alliance costs, whether because or because they are . Whatever the case may be, the US interest in inducing Europeans to spend more on defense — and their disinclination to do so — will persevere throughout President Biden’s time in office.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—China—Burden Sharing Solves
Felde ’22 (Rainer Meyer zum Felde, Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University, 6/12/22, “Russia-China Relations”, 261-262, ) //sethlee
Europeans need to accept transatlantic burden shifting in order to “keep the Americans in”. While significantly fewer US forces and capabilities will be available for fighting and winning a regional war in Europe, some European NATO allies, including Germany as a key member, have long hesitated to fully implement their current commitments and were not even considering further upgrades in response to the deteriorating geopolitical situation (Meyer zum Felde, 2020b). US representatives have been clear in recent years that the US military is no longer able to fight and win two major wars simultaneously in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, and that the primary US focus is shifting toward China (Russia is perceived as the near-term, but China as the long-term and more difficult, bigger challenge; see Colby, 2021b). It follows that Europeans need to take on much more of the burden of deterring and defending NATO member states in Europe against Russia. Against this background, the NATO capstone documents for NATO defense planning agreed at Wales, Warsaw and Brussels have all been designed toward a fairer transatlantic burden-sharing and more European forces, capabilities and contributions. However, in terms of implementation, European member states—first and foremost Germany—have taken a steady but rather slow approach in their turnarounds and implementation efforts. What remains required in Europe vis-à-vis Russia is significant US military presence and power, particularly in critical capability areas—extended nuclear deterrence, critical enablers and force multipliers, air power, naval power, cyber. In return, Europeans need to accept the US request for burden shifting and take more responsibility for filling the gaps in NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. This applies particularly to Germany, despite its obvious unwillingness to keep its pledges and again play its role as the conventional backbone for collective defense in Europe. Whether or not Europe will be able to maintain its security depends first and foremost on the USA, and next on Germany. Both need to take their responsibilities seriously, and consequently accept that in military burden sharing and shifting, they have to take their fair share according to their political and economic weight. Above all, it is essential for Europe’s security that both give the Russian leadership no reason to change its risk calculus.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—China—Burden Sharing Solves
Larsen ’21 (Henrik Larsen, Ph.D and senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, “NATO Shouldn’t Try to Do Too Much on China” ) //sethlee
Second, NATO should clarify the meaning of “resilience” by linking it as closely as possible to collective defense and national security. China is not a territorial threat to NATO, but its acquisition of transportation hubs in Europe and future capacity to neutralize space-based navigation systems (like GPS) present vulnerabilities to NATO force mobility in a crisis situation. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that Chinese 5G networks threaten continued NATO intelligence sharing.
Conversely, NATO is not always the right actor to prevent the intrusion of illiberal powers into the domestic politics of its allies. Increased levels of espionage from call for increased cooperation across the NATO intelligence services. But NATO does not seem to have a natural role in, for example, bolstering police cooperation to fight other types of criminal activity, such as weaponized corruption, illicit party financing, and outsourcing of influence operations, as earlier by President Joseph Biden to face both Russia and China.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—China—Burden Sharing Solves
Mohan ’21 (Raja Mohan, a senior fellow at the Asia Society Public Institute, “A New Pivot to Asia”, ) //sethlee
On globalization, the United States cannot continue to let China play fast and loose with the ideas of economic internationalism and national sovereignty. Beijing clothes its ambition for regional economic dominance in the rhetoric of globalization but at the same time champions state sovereignty when it’s convenient. Rather than frame its policies as a choice between the ideologies of “America First” and “globalism,” Washington needs to articulate the case for a new mix of sovereignty and internationalism. That is the only basis for designing a new set of rules for international economic cooperation that can win lasting domestic political support. After all, the difficult decisions on the equitable domestic distribution of economic globalization’s costs and benefits are intensely political—and must necessarily be made and owned by national governments.
Although burden sharing has long been part of U.S. foreign-policy rhetoric, it has always ceded ground to the presumed imperatives of U.S. leadership. Trump’s clumsy efforts to force the issue of burden sharing on U.S. allies has only made matters worse. But looking from the outside in, it is unrealistic for allies to expect that the American taxpayer and U.S. military will forever bear the burden of securing Europe and Asia. The last few years have seen both regions recognize this problem, but there will be a strong temptation to backslide, with allies betting that Biden will take them back to the happy, free-riding days of old. For the United States, too, it is important to recognize that its leadership is creating a moral hazard among its allies who refuse to take responsibility for their own security, expect the United States to do the heavy lifting, get complacent about threats, and criticize Washington for confronting these threats. Regional responsibility and burden sharing are critical for making the alliances survive the new challenges.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—China—Asia Pivot Now
Sun 6/23 (Yun Sun, Senior Fellow of the East Asia Program at the Stimson Center on U.S-China relations, 7/4/22, “After Biden's pivot to Asia, China feels the chill”, ) //sethlee
The Biden administration, hoping to counter China’s growing influence in Asia, has initiated several high-level engagements with Asia in recent months, ranging from summits to a presidential visit to the region. Despite lukewarm reception at home, it’s now clear that Washington’s Asia pivot caused much anxiety in China.
The administration's outreach started with Southeast Asia — the U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit in Washington in mid-May followed by President JOE BIDEN’s high-profile visit to South Korea and Japan on May 19-24. In Japan, Biden attended a summit with leaders of Japan, Australia and India (the Quad) and launched the long-expected.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—Turns Peace Ops
Lagon & Moreland, 19 [Mark P. Lagon, American political scientist and practitioner expertise in human rights, global health, human trafficking, and global institutions and governance, Will Moreland, former project manager and associate fellow with Foreign Policy at Brookings, focus on the future of U.S. alliances and multilateralism in a more geopolitically competitive world, 2-14-2019, The National Interest, ‘Burden-Sharing Doesn’t Need to Be Burdensome’, /alundy]
Peacekeeping by the United Nations offers an important example of what burden-sharing means and what elicits it. During the Cold War, UN peace operations were confined to interposing a deployment between formerly warring parties. The clash of the Cold War superpowers as veto-wielding United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members meant that was all the traffic would bear. In settings like Cyprus and Lebanon, long-standing deployments kept additional military duties off the U.S. plate through decades of the Cold War. The Cold War’s end ushered in more numerous and ambitious UNSC mandates—as the United States and Russia were more often willing to align on authorizing peace operations. In the 1990s, along with a couple of dramatic failures marred by murky mandates (in Bosnia and Rwanda, where excessive impartiality left atrocities to occur on peacekeepers’ watch), an array of peace operations took hold with a variety of governance and post-conflict goals beyond the traditional interpositional model.
Before even addressing questions of who pays what and who contributes how many troops, peace operations are by nature an exercise in burden-sharing benefiting the United States. With collective defense, expeditionary and stabilization deployments globally, the U.S. military footprint is immense. Whether midwifing a new nation in East Timor or containing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN peace operations provide for other functions to be outsourced with quite limited U.S. roles. A February 2018 Government Accountability Office study found that a hypothetical U.S. peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic of the same size and duration as the UN’s Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) operation would cost the United States some eight times more than its share for MINUSCA. And this good bargain affords the United States a major voice as a member of UNSC’s permanent five (P-5) on what missions will and will not be approved to boot.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—Turns Hybrid War
Melissa Dalton 20, directs the Cooperative Defense Project and is deputy director and a senior fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C; Hijab Shah, associate fellow with the International Security Program at CSIS, May 2020, “Partners, not Proxies: Capacity Building in Hybrid Warfare
Partners will be vital to the allies’ ability to compete effectively in hybrid warfare environments. Pursuing partnerships through a principled approach provides the allies with an asymmetric advantage in contrast to rivals that resort to autocratic, deceptive, and extra-legal tactics. Allies’ laws, principles, and values are strategic advantages in hybrid warfare. Investing in partners rather than casting them as proxies will increase allied strategic action and operational effectiveness. The allies should select, design, and pursue security partnerships based on the following guidelines:
Be the Partner of Choice: The allies should be the partners of choice. They should be reliable, committing up front to common outcomes and objectives defined with the partner, with clear communication as to expectations, red lines, duration of the partnership, and steps that will be taken if the partner makes choices that depart from a principled approach (e.g., undermining legitimate civilian authorities, human rights violations, or extra-legal actions). They should provide quality training, advising, and equipment to enable interoperability with the allies and other partners and sustainment to provide actual military capability. They should be transparent with the partner, civilian authorities, and public about the purpose of and expectations for the partnership. • Select Partners to Increase “Portfolio Strength”: The allies are fortunate to have a strong network of partners. In seeking new or strengthened partnerships in hybrid warfare environments, the allies should be more selective of partners, seeking fewer, higher-quality partners to fortify collective strengths important for competition in hybrid warfare environments, such as good governance and transparency. Partners should be selected for these attributes and incentivized to make choices that reinforce them. Recognizing that some partnerships will be transactional, the allies should calculate risk thresholds and diminishing returns at the outset and be upfront with the partner to avoid unmet expectations that may do more damage to allied and partner interests than the value of the transactional relationship. If a high-quality partner cannot be found, then allies should determine whether to intervene militarily at all.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—Turns Cyber
DOD 11 (DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE July 2011 )
As international cyberspace cooperation continues to develop, DoD will advance its close cyberspace cooperation with its allies to defend U.S. and allied interests in cyberspace. DoD will work closely with its allies and international partners to develop shared warning capabilities, engage in capacity building, and conduct joint training activities. Engagement will create opportunities to initiate dialogues for sharing best practices in areas such as forensics, capability development, exercise participation, and public-private partnerships. Further, the development of burden sharing arrangements can play to each nation’s core strengths and capabilities; this will bolster areas where partners are less proficient, increase capacity, and strengthen collective cybersecurity.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—Turns Cyber
Nietsche, Townsend, and Kendall-Taylor 20 (Carisa Nietsche, Associate Fellow, Transatlantic Security Program; Jim Townsend, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Transatlantic Security Program; Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Senior Fellow and Director, Transatlantic Security Program; “Enlisting NATO to Address the China Challenge” 10/5/20 Center for New American Security )
To address these challenges, the Department of Defense should work with NATO partners to pursue a strategy that tackles the risks China poses to the NATO alliance. DoD should work more effectively through NATO on the shared China challenge. Encourage burden sharing, but rethink what counts toward the 2 percent. In order to free up U.S. military resources for the Indo-Pacific and potentially help offset the impending U.S. defense budget decline, the United States should continue to press the issue of burden sharing with allies. In doing so, however, the United States and its allies should together revisit what defense expenditures can be applied to the 2 percent target upon which the NATO allies agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit. The threat landscape in Europe is evolving. To prepare for this, NATO can use defense spending targets to encourage allies to take steps, including investing in secure 5G networks, cybersecurity, infrastructure and other areas that improve military mobility in Europe. These measures will help NATO adapt to meet the China challenge and other evolving threats in Europe’s security landscape.20
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—Turns AI Interoperability
Dufour, 18 [Martin Dufour, Colonel in the Canadian Army, currently working with NATO, 12-10-2018, NATO Defense College, /alundy]
NATO has arguably been the most successful alliance of its kind, and much of this success can be attributed to its cohesion in the face of various threats. At the heart of this cohesion lie two important notions: burden sharing between members; and interoperability. The Alliance’s cohesion however has increasingly come under pressure over the last two decades, and there are growing challenges with the level of interoperability between member countries. While numerous technical and political factors influence interoperability, the emergence of disruptive technologies such as genetic engineering, nanotechnology, additive manufacturing and robotics, are likely to make this challenge more acute in the next two decades. Of the many technologies rapidly emerging, none is likely to have as significant an impact as that of artificial intelligence, which combines with other technologies and multiply their effect by allowing the development of advanced autonomous systems. And while the latter holds the promise of developing new classes of weapons with great military potential, its asymmetrical adoption among the various NATO allies could also lead to significant interoperability problems.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—Turns Emerging Tech
Dufour, 18 [Martin Dufour, Colonel in the Canadian Army, currently working with NATO, 12-10-2018, NATO Defense College, /alundy]
Historically NATO has had the tendency to focus on procedural and technical interoperability between systems. To do so, it has employed a standards-based approach and developed hundreds of Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) which provide member states agreed-upon processes, procedures and platform compliance specifications rather than stipulating what to build and how. While this approach has allowed member states to equip themselves but still successfully train and operate together for decades, the last 25 years has witnessed a growing rift in the military capabilities of different nations. Rapid technological evolution and the increasing cost and complexity of contemporary military systems have made it progressively more difficult for several countries to keep pace with the systems of the bigger allies. For instance, some countries have invested heavily in advanced systems allowing them to collect and process intelligence, designate targets and strike them at will with standoff, precision-guided weapons, day and night in any weather conditions. The level of investment necessary to acquire such capabilities, as well as various politico-strategic concerns such as the protection of a country’s military-industrial base and resultant unwillingness to sell or transfer advanced technologies, have prevented other allies from remaining current with some of these innovations. These allies therefore lack the ability to gainfully partake in certain military operations and equally share the burden with other members of the Alliance.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—Turns Emerging Tech
Keil 21 (Steven, Senior Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States, “Chapter 10: NATO Burden Sharing in a New Geopolitical Era” in NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond edited by Jason Blessing, Katherine Kjellström Elgin, Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters, published by Foreign Policy Institute/Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs, Johns Hopkins University, 2021 ISBN: 978-0-9997406-0-6)
Beyond these more traditional issues, NATO members must also consider how to jointly address challenges in disruptive new domains. Advances in big data, artificial intelligence, hypersonic systems, and quantum technologies are reshaping how NATO Allies think about deterrence and conflict, while simultaneously increasing the scope and speed of threats. Concerns around issues like disinformation, infrastructure vulnerabilities, and espionage are being heightened. Specifically, the use of cyber technologies can adversely impact critical infrastructure vital for collective defense (see Blessing’s chapter in this volume). In response, leaders endorsed a Cyber Defense Policy at the 2021 Brussels Summit which affirmed the domain’s impact on NATO’s core tasks and its implications for Article 5 commitments.7 Advancement in these new technologies, alongside growing challenges emanating from traditionally non-kinetic or non-military domains like space, will complicate and potentially undermine NATO’s territorial defense commitments. The increased militarization of space could create uncertainties around strategic deterrence, while also threatening various communication technologies vital to territorial defense (see Johnson’s chapter in this volume). NATO’s new military strategy highlights significant risks around many of these technologies and domains, characterizing a “strategic competition for advantage.”8 Assertive developments in Russian foreign policy (e.g., Ukraine and Georgia), alongside its military modernization efforts, will require NATO to assess how its competitive edge maintains deterrence and bolsters collective defense (see the chapter by Simakovsky and Williams in this volume). Russia’s investment in more expensive technologies like hypersonic systems and efforts to infuse conventional capabilities with hybrid tactics is one facet of this assertive behavior. China’s military modernization efforts and increased engagement in Europe’s neighborhood could also create significant challenges for NATO’s core tasks of crisis management and cooperative security (see the chapter by Bērziņa-Čerenkova). The new security environment poses difficult questions for NATO resilience across core tasks and domains. Consequently, resilience will increasingly be featured as a priority in Alliance thinking.9 As such, an unclassified read-ahead document for a conference on NATO’s Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC) argued that to project power, NATO must integrate a multi-domain defense. This means “the Alliance Military Instrument of Power will need to possess a spectrum of non-lethal, non-kinetic to lethal kinetic all-domain options to shape the battlespace to NATO’s strengths.”10 The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated key resiliency gaps disrupting NATO’s training mission in Iraq, while wreaking havoc on military exercises and readiness. Looking toward the future, other environmental issues like climate change—alongside disruptive technological developments—will transform the security environment. Efforts to increase resilience across all domains will be critical. This should include a focus on layered resilience as outlined by the NWCC that spans military, military-civilian, and civilian spheres.11 Consequently, NATO member efforts that increase national and broader institutional resilience should be considered important contributions to the Alliance’s security. Burden Sharing for a New Strategic Environment Shifts in the strategic environment and emerging challenges put pressure on NATO’s capacity to service its core tasks and mission. How Allies share the burden in the face of these challenges will be central to NATO’s ability to adapt. The toxicity of defense spending debates over the past few years have demonstrated certain deficiencies in the current debate, often putting Alliance disunity on full display and undermining political will within the alliance. Central to these tensions is the frequently discussed spending metric of 2 percent of GDP on defense, which also includes a 20 percent allocation of these funds on major equipment and research and development. Given its pivotal role in Alliance burden sharing discussions its worth unpacking how successful this target has been and whether it needs to be reassessed as the NATO 2030 process and Strategic Review moves forward.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—Turns Alliances
Jermalavičius and Lawrence 11 (Tomas Jermalavičius and Anthony Lawrence, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY, “From the Cold War and Hot Peace to the Long War and Beyond: What Are Our Armed Forces (Good) For?” 2011 )
Prompted by the crisis, we often talk about spending on new capabilities such as cyber, but this cannot become a substitute for investing in real capabilities (cyber would have been of little use in Libya or against the Taliban) and doing it in a collective, coordinated manner. New approaches are needed to obtain those capabilities, especially doing away with many duplicate programmes in Europe. In the United States, despite the inherent waste of a large defence organisation, the military manage to derive a greater value from their investments than the Europeans. If Europeans continue in their current approach of just shrinking their “total war” force instead of reconfiguring it properly for the age of “limited wars”, the Americans will simply turn away and leave. Their executive branch and the military realise very well that even the United States cannot achieve everything alone and must cooperate with its allies and partners in Europe, but this may not arrest the growing sentiment of giving up on Europe felt in the legislative branch. On the other hand, some of the fault for the capability gaps and the steep decline in conventional heavy capabilities in Europe rests with the United States: many Europeans wanted to shine in the “coalitions of the willing” led by the Americans and therefore developed capabilities which bought influence instead of producing military effectiveness.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—L—SC = Freeriding
HUSERAȘ 21 [Alin HUSERAȘ*; 2021; “STUDY ON THE EVOLUTION OF DEFENSE EXPENSES IN NATO MEMBER STATES FOR THE PERIOD 2010-2020. "FREE RIDER" BEHAVIOR AMONG ALLIES”; ]
Regarding the variable share of defense expenditure in GDP, it is observed that when the defense expenditure of states is related to the variable GDP, a new set of data is obtained. This new series practically reflects the specific weight of defense spending in the GDP of each state, in order to maintain the functioning of the armies and implicitly to benefit from defense. From the econometric study of the influence of the independent variable the share of defense expenditure in GDP on the dependent variable defense expenditure, estimated by the PLS method, it was observed that between the two variables there is a linear and positive dependence. The variable share of defense spending in GDP reflects the concept and approach (policy / strategy / doctrine) to the public good of defense, the alliance partners, found by the two sides of the Atlantic. This aspect can be easily appreciated by analyzing the evolution of the data series of the analyzed expenses, as well as by following the policies of international military intervention. The way in which countries determine the share of defense spending in GDP may reflect "free-rider" behavior, in which each country tries to rely on the defense spending of the other members of the Alliance. Consequently, there is an effect of replacing the country's defense spending with that of the entire Alliance. This is especially evident in the case of military spending by European countries compared to the military spending of North American countries, and especially the United States.