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2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Case › 2AC---AT: Will to Technology Good

No I/L – Lucas Critique, Info Relevancies, and Data Gathering

Fernández-Villaverde 21 (Jesús Fernández-Villaverde - Professor of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania, “Artificial Intelligence Can’t Solve the Knowledge Problem”, Public Discourse, 29 July 2021, , MG)

Unfortunately, in many areas of public policy, we do not have access to such a wealth of data and, most likely, we never will. Take the example of setting monetary policy, i.e., the regulation of how much money to supply, typically conducted by national central banks, such as the Federal Reserve in the U.S.

Monetary policy is a relatively straightforward topic with fewer moving parts than other kinds of economic policy. Could machine learning ever replace the Federal Market Open Committee (FOMC, the main policy instrument of the Federal Reserve System)? I am skeptical. For one thing, the FOMC usually has a limited amount of data. In the United States, we only have reliable data for output, consumption, and investment after World War II and, even then, only at a quarterly level. If we count them, from 1947:Q1 (the first “good” observation in terms of the accuracy of our measurement) until 2021:Q2 (the last observation as I write this), we have 298 data points. This is far fewer than acceptable for machine learning techniques.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Case › 2AC---AT: Will to Technology Good

AI can’t solve anything – Undeveloped Data and Attacks

Polonski 18 (Vyacheslav Polonski – Researcher at the University of Oxford, “Why A.I. can’t solve everything”, BigThink, 29 March 2018, , MG)

AI systems need a lot of data to function, but the public sector typically does not have the appropriate  to support advanced machine learning. Most of the data remains stored in offline archives. The few digitized sources of data that exist tend to be buried in bureaucracy. More often than not, data is spread across different government departments that each require special permissions to be accessed. Above all, the public sector typically lacks the human talent with the right technological capabilities to fully reap the .

For these reasons, the sensationalism over AI has attracted many critics. Stuart Russell, a professor of computer science at Berkeley, has long advocated a more realistic approach that focuses on  instead of the hypothetical takeover by super-intelligent robots. Similarly, MIT’s professor of robotics,  that “almost all innovations in robotics and AI take far, far, longer to be really widely deployed than people in the field and outside the field imagine”.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Case › 2AC---AT: Will to Technology Good

AI Fails – Moravec’s Paradox

Dickson 21 (Ben Dickson – Software Engineer and Foundation of TechTalks Founder, “Why AI can’t solve unknown problems”, TechTalks, 29 March 2021, , MG)

But symbolic AI can only solve problems for which we can provide well-formed, step-by-step solutions. The problem is that most tasks humans and animals perform can’t be represented in clear-cut rules.

“The intellectual tasks, such as chess playing, chemical structure analysis, and calculus are relatively easy to perform with a computer. Much harder are the kinds of activities that even a one-year-old human or a rat could do,” Roitblat writes in Algorithms Are Not Enough.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Case › Impact – Will to Technology

The will to technology is a doubled expression of hubris – it ends the human species and the cycle of life and death

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 29-31, October 2021, MG)

On the surface, the rhetoric of this latest American revival movement is delivered in the deliberately arid form of technocratic ambition – an “Internet of Things,” the “quantified self,” “A Data-Driven Life” – but scratch the surface of the covering rhetoric and what springs to mind are all those unmistakable signs of the spirit of rapture. Everything is there: a theology of technology driven by an overwhelming conviction that the vicissitudes of embodied experience are subordinate to digital transcendence; the will to extend life either by uploading the human mind into its AI machinic successors or by passionate faith in the bornagain body of artificial DNA; the doctrine of data as a state of (codedriven) grace; and conversionary enthusiasm for the fully quantified life. While many different perspectives gather under the revival tent of technological rapture, one common thing remains: an abiding faith that technological society is quickly delivering us to a future inaugurated by a singularity event, that epochal time in which intelligent machines take command with promises of a mind merger with a data world that is fluid, mobile, relational, and indeterminate. Though sceptics standing outside the circle of technological rapture might be tempted to reduce its enthusiasm for data delirium to the larger figurations of the form of (technological) subjectivity necessary for the functioning of digital capitalism, that reduction would surely overlook the fact that the contemporary will to technology is itself driven by a more radical eschatological promise, namely that the will to data has about it the tangible scent of finally achieving what the project of science has always promised but never delivered – human relief from death, disease, and bodily decay. While Francis Bacon’s emblematic treatise Novum Organum may have been the first to so confidently link the project of science and the heretofore quixotic quest for immortality, it was left to a contemporary techno-utopian visionary, Raymond Kurzweil (The Singularity Is Near), to transform Bacon’s ontological ambition for science into a practical strategy for better – that is, extended – computational living.2 In Kurzweil’s promised land of blended reality, the sky is the limit, with traditional boundaries dissolving between nature and human nature, the material and the virtual, and the enduring vulnerability of the human body with its defining limits of illness and death finally transcended. Powered by advances in nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, and gene editing, the world as we have always known it will be in sudden eclipse, and all this change will take place under the rising sun of a technological ornucopia. As Kurzweil argues, “through the use of nanotechnology, we will be able to manufacture almost any physical product upon demand, world hunger and poverty will be solved, and pollution will vanish. Human existence will undergo a quantum leap in evolution. We will be able to live as long as we choose. The coming into being of such a world is, in essence, the Singularity.”3

At first glance, this vision is only the most recent expression of the Greek concept of hubris, the cautionary tale concerning the ineluctable balance between excessive pride of purpose and mythic punishment meted out by always observant gods. Adding complexity to this reinvocation of hubris as often-fatal overconfidence, that vision of singularity is, in actuality, a doubled expression of hubris. First, there is the sense of technological overconfidence involved in breaking beyond the traditional boundaries of the specifically human in order to speak of the new epoch of “man and machine,” that is, fully digitally interpolated subjects in which the specifically human merges with the extended nervous system of the cybernetic. Here, the merely human is replaced by the technologically enabled post-human as the fundamental precondition for the singularity. With the sovereign expression of technological post-humanism, the stage is set for the futurist release of all the pent-up excess of expressions of scientific determinism and technological fundamentalism that have been gathering momentum for some five centuries  – transcending bodily limits, eradicating illness, ending poverty and hunger, and vanishing pollution. In its basics, this version of technological futurism, with its doubled sense of hubris and complicated alliance of recoded bodies, nanotechnology, genetic determinism, and artificial intelligence, is a creation myth – “the coming into being of such a world is, in essence, the Singularity.” With techno-futurism, we are literally present at a digital rewriting of the Book of Genesis with all that is implied in terms of (re)creating the body for smoother, and perhaps safer, passage through the often-turbulent event horizon surrounding the black hole of the singularity towards which (technological) society is plunging. While the DIY body may have the “Internet of Things” as its necessary digital infrastructure and the “quantified self” as its ideal expression, what drives it forward, animating its design and inspiring its constant creativity, is, in the end as in the beginning, the spectre of the coming singularity as its core creation myth. Curiously, in the same way that Heidegger once noted that the question of technology can never ever be understood technologically – that we must travel furthest from the dwelling place of technology to discover its essence4  – the concept of singularity, while evocative of the language of science and powered by digital devices, is something profoundly theological in its inception.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Case › Impact – Bad Conscience

Externalizing consciousness into technological thought culminates in Bad Conscience – a psychological parasite that feeds on the galaxy itself

Kroker 4 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, “THE WILL TO TECHNOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF NIHILISM: HEIDEGGER, NIETZSCHE, AND MARX”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 94-96, March 2004, MG)

One hundred years after Nietzsche’s prophecy, it might be said that the morality which began with the ‘instinct for freedom’ turning against itself in the form of bad conscience now effects a second ‘sundering.’ Not the separation of the human species from its animal past, but the separation of the will to technology from the human species. Not the heaviness of gravity as humanity crawls out of the primordial mass of the ocean, but the lightness of digital culture as technical beings – halfflesh/half-node – slip into the skin of electronic culture. Not the ‘reduction to consciousness – the weakest organ’ – but post-humans driven onwards by the externalization of consciousness in the form of networked intelligence and sim/entertainment and cloner brains. Not the ‘internalization of man’ as drives are forced to project themselves inward, but the exteriorization of the drive to planetary technicity as we come to live inside the noosphere of the electronic soul – ‘the entire external world, originally as [digitally] thin as if it were stretched between two membranes, expanded and extended itself, acquired depth, breadth, height, speed, connectivity, and extensiveness, in the same measure as outward discharge was encouraged.’ Not ‘homesickness for the wild,’ but the abandonment of human flesh in favour of a deep longing for the fulfilment of its telic destiny. Not the interface of the human sensorium with the digital nerve, but the projection outwards of bad conscience itself.

Abandoning its nesting place in human consciousness, the bad conscience goes electronic. Digital flesh – this ‘adventure, torture chamber, wilderness, homesickness’ – can no longer project its drives inward, can no longer feed on the ressentiment of human flesh, can no longer chew on the chestnuts of human resentment, can no longer parasite itself on the alibi of man as a ‘chained animal.’ The ‘end of man’ also means the ‘end of ressentiment’ as the energizing force of history; the end of the myth of bad conscience indicates the end of the psychology of repressed internalized drives. Man has been overcome; internalized drives no longer find a responsive sound in the gathering silence of the disappearance of the social; the animal/human rubbing itself raw on the bars of oppressive customs and punctilious behaviour has been liberated by being abandoned as biogenetic road kill.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Case › Emancipatory Joy Method

Thus, we endorse a politics of emancipatory joy – that’s the only way to end the colonization of colour

McDonald 14 (Dakin McDonald - Graduate Student in Cultural Studies and Critical Theory in the Department of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, “The Sight of Global Politics: Aesthetics after the Arab Spring (2011)”, Platform Journal of Media and Communication, 29 October 2014, , MG)

The attempts by millions of people across the Middle East and the Maghreb to overthrow the illegitimate authorities that suffocate their collective dreams can be productively, if only ever partially, understood as a collective ontopolitical desire to experience a different way of being human together. Not surprisingly, this desire for existential freedom has been met with the full force of the international security apparatus, namely the authorisation of a humanitarian war—a war that kills human beings in their defence—that is waged in Libya’s skies, upon Libyan bodies, across every screen, in all of our minds. I am not suggesting that this relationship is intentional, only that it is somewhat causal: predictable, expected, almost scripted because political outburst perversely necessitates containment according to the fatal logic of this apparatus. After all, the flowing spectacle of people demanding different lives was staunched, in the perception of those who have experienced the Arab Spring as a media event, by the redirection of cameras away from the coursing streets and towards the irresistible carnage accompanying the deployment of a humanitarian intervention that functions, ever ironically, via “strike sorties” and “humanitarian assistance movements.”2 The Arab Spring emerges, then, as a revelatory moment when the aesthetic mechanics of contemporary global governance are revealed.

Such a glimpse has been enabled by those bodies—to whom we owe not only debt but gratitude—which are actively transforming the possibilities of collective life by demanding to be seen and attempting to be heard.3 To begin to think with the Arab Spring invites one to repose Jacques Ranciere’s originally unrelated question, “what did the demonstration demonstrate, exactly?” (2009, p. 34) and ask, firstly, how did these demonstrations demonstrate? From Mohamed Bouazizi’s burning flesh to the living streets of Tunis, Cairo, Manama, and Homs, millions of people abandoned the (in)security of everyday routine and their apolitical “private” lives to reassert “public” spaces and voice their unquenched desire for political change. The willingness of those who had previously been unwilling to make their voices heard and to display their bodies publicly through acts of opposition impregnated the uprisings in the sense that Alexander Potts defines as the “unfolding of an event rather than its completion” (2009, p. 61).

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Top Level › 1AC---Other Card Possibilities

Welcome to the age of the bored eye, the eye that’s possessed with impossible dreams for a technical future and will never be satisfied – with this, we have become images to the world around us

Kroker 4 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, “THE WILL TO TECHNOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF NIHILISM: HEIDEGGER, NIETZSCHE, AND MARX”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 166-168, March 2004, MG)

The digital age unleashes deeply paradoxical tendencies in the unfolding history of the image, moving simultaneously between the violent repression of the material memory of the photographic image and its recombinant recreation in the culture of the digitized imaginaire. Out of the ashes of photography under the sign of analogue suddenly appears the phoenix of the digitized image-machine. A doubled story of repression and creation?

Or something else?

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Top Level › 1AC---Other Card Possibilities

To tell the story of the new age we must first look back to how we arrived at our current division of virtual and surplus flesh – as Kroker explains…

Kroker and Kroker 96 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Hacking the Future: Stories for the Flesh Eating 90s”, New Worlds Perspectives Montreal, Pages 34-36, 1996, MG s/o PFox)

It’s a hot day in July ‘95 and I’m tuned into cyber-business, reading a feverish newspaper report of “Glee at Microsoft as the master version of Windows 95 is finally shipped.” The mood in Redmond, Washington,is ecstatic, like a last day of cyber-school party, as the coder fraternity gets together for a victory bash: drinking Dom- Perignon, diving into the fountain,1 spraying whipped cream, maybe a game or two of pin the tail on Bill Gates’ donkey, and, who knows, even spin the bottle. Thinking I haven’t noticed it reading over my shoulder, my PC slinks away into the next room and suddenly starts to cough with the rasping sound of a summer algorithmic cold. I can already hear it whining for a Win 95 upgrade.

My micro-joy is abruptly terminated by TV scenes from Srebrenica. It seems that when the UN declared Srebrenica, ‘Tuzla and Gorazde as “safe areas,” it forgot to tell the Bosnian Muslims that it meant safe only for the UN. For the Muslims, the so-called safe areas are actually temporary holding depots, hospices where the UN collects refugees from ethnically cleansed areas in order to hand them over en masse to the Bosnian Serbs on demand. When the Government of Bosnia Herzegovina does a bit of truth-telling, declaring the UN soldiers to be on a wilderness camping trip, diplomats and officers throw their hands in the air, deploring the lack of “political will” and calling for just one more meeting. Sunday afternoon ‘barbeques in the West are spliced with TV images from the all too real theme park of suffering in Bosnia: hungry, children, suicided women, raped. girls, and lynched and stoned and knifed men and boys. 6

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Top Level › 1AC---Digital Cyclops

Traditional understandings of plan-focused debate adhere to neoliberal productivity models that reinforce our psychological need for ressentiment-laden fantasy, causing amoral apathy in its attempt to cling to security---actively reinterpreting argumentative norms foments revolutionary transformations

Schnurer 4 [Maxwell Schnurer, professor of communication at Humbolt State University, “Gaming as Control: Will to Power, the Prison of Debate and Game Called Potlach,” Contemporary Argumentation & Debate; Sep 2003, Vol. 24, online]

Gaming encourages such argument innovation not for the world community but for the debate community, teaching students to passionately plead for change to an empty room. How can a theory understand the desire of debaters to crack open the debate methods and introduce something “outside” of debate as Snider points to in his most recent gaming essay? The answer is that it can’t. Debate as a model can only create more debate, and so long as our goal for debate is more debate, then we will never emerge to challenge larger forces of control. Worse than being satisfied with shouting at walls, approaching debate from the perspective of games encourages a god-complex that teaches debaters that saying something poignant in a debate round translates into something larger in the world. Christopher Douglas, a professor of English at Furman University, explores how games teach us to adore the replay: “This is the experience structured into the gaming process—the multiple tries at the same space-time moment. Like Superman after Lois Lane dies, we can in a sense turn back the clock and replay the challenge, to a better end” (2002, p. 7). What kind of academic activity encourages students to fantasize about making change without considering for the slightest bit how to bring that change about? Douglas positions this impulse alongside the Sisyphean burden of trying to make the world into a structured, controlled, sterile environment. Sisyphus and the reset button on a videogame console share a common ancestor with the debate model that has thirty debate teams advocating different policies in separate rooms at exactly the same time. All of these examples showcase humans desperately attempting to construct meaning out of a confusing world, where the human will to power forces the world to fit a structure. Douglas reminds us that games help to structure an oft-confusing world, imbuing the person imagining with god-like powers (McGuire, 1980; Nietzsche 1966): Games therefore do not threaten film’s status so much as they threaten religion, because they perform the same existentially soothing task as religion. They proffer a world of meaning, in which we not only have a task to perform, but a world that is made with us in mind. And indeed, the game world is made with us, or at least our avatar in mind. (Douglas, 2002, p. 9). Gaming draws forth a natural impulse of humans – to make the world in our image. But debate and videogames contain the same fantastic lure that encourages people to pore their energies into debate. Fiat and utopian flights of fancy are both seductions of our will to power, encouraging us to commit to becoming better debaters. This process of self-important distraction has its model in the theories of the hyper-real posited by Jean Baudrillard. He argues that modern economies are geared to sell humans mass produced products, but whose advertising attempts to convince people that they have an authentic experience with the product. Economic structures make products that are more-than real – hyperreal in order to sell their products. The hyperreal creates games and fantasylands that are far richer and pleasurable than real life. One example of the hyperreal is Epcott center at Disneyland, which reduces foreign cultures to their most base natures – ensuring that everything is uniform, bland, and suitably “ethnic.” While one never need worry about eating food that is “too strange” in the Epcott lands, other negatives emerge in the world of the hyperreal. Humans who desire order and structure to our worlds often come to prefer the hyperreal to the real. The hyperreal has a world with all of the attractions of our own, but with none of the depressing realities of our own world. The hyperreal doesn’t have credit card bills or racism. The hyperreal is filled with beautiful people (who all want to have sex with you). The hyperreal is a hot seduction pulling our vision and hearing away form our own lives. Describing Snider’s gaming as a dangerous distraction that pulls us away from our communities and our lives is a bit simplistic. Rather, gaming greases the wheels for powers of control to remain in control. Douglas articulates some of the specific ways games solidify structures of power. In board games or computer games, however, players actually do start out in relative equality (although there are some chance elements as well, depending on the game), whereas in real life, so many characteristic of one’s life are already determined before birth, including social and economic standing, political freedom, skin color, gender, etc. What games accomplish is the instilling of the ideology of equality, which postulates that we are born equal and that differences emerge later on; the primary different to be explained away in this way is that of economic disparity, and games help explain that difference as the result of, in America, hard work and effort vs. laziness. Thus gaming helps inculcate the ideology that covers over the fact that, with the exception of the information technology bubble, most of those who are wealthy in the United States were born that way. Beyond this narrow ideological function, the game helps create subjects that accept the inevitability of rules as things that are given and must be “played” within—or else there is no game. This process is not total or ever complete, as the current gaming discourse complaining about the rules shows; here, player critique a games rules in view of a conventionalized notion of how “reality” works, or, less often, how a game’s playability is compromised by rules that are too “realistic (Douglas, 2002, p. 24). Viewing debate as a game may have the opposite effect that Snider desires. Gaming teaches participants to play by the rules and even when challenging the game, to do that within the games structures. Debaters who are moved by poetry are encouraged to bring that poetry back to the debate realm – not to become poets. There are certainly debate-activists who bring their debate skills to bear on the political community. These debaters seamlessly slide between academic hyperbole in the First Affirmative Constructive and talking to homeless folks at a Food Not Bombs meal. But these folks are few and far between. Most who hear the call to conscience turn their backs on the call and justify their (in)actions by valorizing debate. Let me be clear that the desire of individuals to make the world is not the enemy. It is a positive drive that encourages debaters to fiat worlds into existence or hypothesizes that the world would be good if George Bush were before the International Criminal Court on charges of crimes against humanity. This drive to create a better world is the will to power. The big question is, what we do with that will to power? Recognizing that there are many complex problems in the world that require smart articulate people to solve them, we can appreciate the potential value of will to power (McGuire). In the debate context, will to power becomes reified in a hyper-real role-playing exercise. Debate can be an amazing experience where students learn about complex ideas and then take those ideas into their own lives and communities. Debate can be a method for learning that people have their own voices in a world drowning with mediated/televised slime-balls. Debate can encourage intellectual growth and cause epiphanies. Debate encourages solidarity and teaches people to struggle together. Debate is primed to be a blast furnace for the will to power and take it to the furthest level of revolutionary potential. The only limitation is our own. If we frame debate to limit the revolutionary potential of the participants, then we do a disservice not only to our students, but also to the world. Nietzschean will to power is a drive for self-overcoming, transforming fuel for personal and collective change. Will to power exists in all of us as a lunging to escape our current world and create another beyond the moral structure and hierarchy of this world. This desire to create a better world is admirable and is at the root of social change. My criticism of gaming is that this energy is sublimated into a fantasy world rather than being brought to the larger world. But perhaps there is a kind of game that might elicit something of what I desire . . . from within debate. The Real Game: Potlatch As pointed out in the last section, the stakes for the game of debate are high. The method of debate contains the possibility for revolutionary insight and revolutionary praxis. The question is how to understand an activity without systematizing and controlling the potential of debate. What we really must do is let free the will to power within debaters. In this sense, we can use gaming as the topoi to launch our conversation to a debate game that might encourage revolution. But what does will to power look like? How do we encourage it? Lets get a feeling from George Bataille, who orients the Nietzschean impulse of will to power alongside a quote from Nietzsche himself: Through the shutters into my window comes an infinite wind, carrying with it unleashed struggles, raging disasters of the ages. And don’t I too carry within me a blood rage, a blindness satisfied by the hunger to mete out blows? How I would enjoy being a pure snarl of hatred, demanding death: the upshot being no prettier than two dogs going at it tooth and nail! Though I am tired and feverish . . . “Now the air all around is alive with the heat, earth breathing a fiery breath. Now everyone walks naked, the good and bad, side by side. And for those in love with knowledge, it’s a celebration.” (The Will to Power) (4). Will to power can be the outgrowth of debate that challenges existing structures. Bataille and Nietzsche desire a wild emancipation from traditional structures, far beyond conventional morality. Coupling Nietzsche’s theorizing with the practice of debate something new can emerge, but only if we free ourselves from the shackles of conventional debate, including gaming. How to break these chains? How do we get beyond that which has brought us so far? To help, I want to turn to Guy Debord and the Situationists. Guy Debord was a French revolutionary whose political theorizing and activism culminated in the creation first of the Letterist International and later in the establishment of the Situationist International. The Letterists/Situationists were revolutionary philosophers who believed that the situations of the modern world were increasingly controlled by mediated/corporate experience. They viewed traditional politics in all of its reformist formats as a waste of time. Through a variety of situations (manipulated by the situationists) it was possible to create revolutionary meaning. They used a variety of tactics in order to elicit revolutionary change. Some of their methods, like detournement, have become common post-modern critical theory concepts. I focus our attention on the Situationists because they succeeded in creating a revolution. Situationist propaganda and theorizing were at the heart of the Parisian rebellion of May of 1968. This was the most powerful expression of malaise against the increasingly wealthy industrial western world. The riots in Paris, which upended cars and collectives emerged in downtown, became a model for revolutions in the industrialized north. Debord was seen as an intellectual architect of the uprising of students and workers. Situationists/Letterists were increasingly capable of articulate criticisms of the nature of the spectacle. These were often told through journals, graffiti, and posters (Dark Star Collective, 2001; Debord, 1995; Jappe, 1992; Hussey, 2001). One of the most important Situationist tactics was articulated in the potlatch. The potlatch was a practice modeled on American indigenous communities of increasingly committed giving. In the potlatch, indigenous would give everything they had to each other, ever increasing the stakes of the gifts until the gifts were so outlandish the offers exposed the foolish nature of ownership. Potlatch became so important to these revolutionaries that they named their first journal potlatch because the writings held within the journal would hopefully be given on and on in an ever increasing spiral. Potlatch became an extended metaphor for the Situationists/Letterists, indicating all the possible spaces where revolution could emerge without capitalist economies. Every non-capitalist moment eked out of the day was articulated as a potlatch. Every relationship that emerged along side revolutionary dialogue became a potlatch. In a recent biography of Debord and the situationists, the author Hussey describes the Potlatch. Potlatch . . . is the highest form of game. It is also the living moment of poetry, a moment which breaks down or reverses conventional chronological patterns. Most significantly, the object or gift which the Letterist International gave functioned symbolically between the giver, the International Letterists, and the receiver. The relationship between the two constitutes a third term – the gift is also a catalyst of the future in the form of a crystallization of desire. ‘Don’t collect Potlatch!’ ran a line at the end of the journals second year. “Time is working against you!” (Hussey, 2001, p. 89) For the Situationists, the potlatch was the ultimate resistance to traditional economies. Originally a concept theorized by George Battaille, the potlatch was seen as a method to criticize the acquisition/showcase methods of modern capitalist economies. Because the potlatch could never be returned, it highlighted the foolishness of the modern economy and state. Through sacrifice and destruction, the act of giving overwhelms the possible response. Eventually, the social requirements of the potlatch necessitate that every society member give away everything they could ever have. Yet we should not move too far from the fundamental truth of the potlatch: it is in fact a game. Indigenous nations would choose to exchange gifts in the potlatch as a form of entertainment. But let us not understate the importance of games. This game was made illegal because it was so dangerous to colonial economies. The Potlatch was recognized as threatening the burgeoning trading economy that was central to westward expansion. The potlatch was the most dangerous idea that indigenous nations could forward against the white/capitalist drive. The act of giving too much was the threat. This move disturbed the intense drive for acquisition. Why fight to trade beaver pelt, when at the next potlatch your neighbor might give you all her possessions? Potlatch was threatening because it made competition meaningless. Non-competitive social structure was only one threat from the Potlatch. Situationist biographer Jappe discovers an obscure quotation by Debord on the Potlatch (Debord himself was remarkably close-lipped about the meaning of Potlatch): “Debord refers explicitly to the Indian custom of Potlatch and announces that ‘the non-saleable goods that a free bulletin such as this is able to distribute are novel desires and problems; and only the further elaboration of these by others can constitute the corresponding return gift’” (148). What was exchanged in Debord’s vision was not necessarily goods but rather ideas. Debate is the ultimate potlatch, demanding that we offer up something inside of ourselves without asking for something in return. Debate provides a few minutes carved out of lives that are otherwise consumed by pop-up ads, or email. When I think about the moments that I treasure in my life, few of them are moments of consumption. I don’t remember when I bought my television, but I remember with painful longing the last bicycle ride I took with friends. Alongside the memories of moments with friends and in nature, I treasure a collection of moments in debate. Moments when I first learned about ideas, late nights in the squad room, the friendships that emerged, and watching my debaters grow and develop. The parts of the potlatch where humans draw out moments of freedom with each other are increasingly the only thing that keeps me interested in debate. Debord and the Situationists wanted people to take their initial offerings of the Potlatch and move them along into their own lives. We can do the same thing with debate. Almost all of us have debate memories that are deeply infused with the Potlatch-ethic. All it takes is for us to seek out and celebrate those moments, and our community will change. But these moments of time have to be grappled away from the industrial-capitalist state with great gusto. We must be brave to crack open debate. In our own lives, we should strive to bring about the kinds of realizations that elicit revolutionary transformation. Snider’s gaming does not bring us forward in direct revolutionary thinking. Rather, it encourages revolutionary thought and then focuses its power into the system of debate. The solution for Snider is not to continue looking for a way to explain and systematize debate but, rather, to embrace the confluence of potential meaning in debate and lunge forward. Debate should be about taking risks and creating new meaning out of our desires. We should never sublimate our feral interests and instead should seek the highest level of meaning. Let us push gaming further. Let us find games that fulfill our revolutionary potential, take whatever moments we can for ourselves and try to push for as much change as we possibly can. In this case, perhaps it is not the game, but the players who have not yet made their move.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Top Level › 1AC---Digital Cyclops

Ressentiment has become a prevailing social attitude---racial scapegoating, authoritarianism, and clinging to illusory forms of control are the ultimate manifestation of ressentiment toward an ateleological future---only a political and affective strategy that loosens our attachments to idealized stability can generate alternative registers

Glezos 14 [Simon Glezos, Lecturer of Political Science at the University of Victoria, British Columbia, “Brown’s Paradox: Speed, ressentiment and global politics,” Journal of International Political Theory, Vol 10, Issue 2, 2014, published May 22, 2014] **edited for gendered language

Ressentiment against speed In a previous work, The Politics of Speed, I argued that this willingness to hand over authority to a centralized executive and reject democratic consultation is not due to the technical challenge of speed (any more than the panic over the MV Sun Sea had anything to do with the actual scope of immigration in Canada, the 500 Tamil refugees constituting a drop in the bucket of Canada’s 250,000 annual new permanent residents), but rather its existential challenge (Glezos, 2012: 31).11 This is to say that, in times of acceleration, people fear democratic consultation, and crave authoritative renderings because of the way in which stable identities and narratives come under threat. This reactionary mindset is rooted in a phenomenon I called “ressentiment against speed.” Ressentiment against speed is a kind of crystallized cultural dynamic which craves a stability and a certainty which the world is incapable of providing. This disappointment becomes activated as a drive for revenge against the world which is viewed as the source of instability; against scapegoats who are identified with this instability; and ultimately against ourselves, through calls for authoritarian governance to control us. In this article, I wish to make a more thorough study of this concept of a ressentiment against speed, uncovering its specifically Nietzschean roots. This investigation is important, because I think that a ressentiment against speed is, in fact, one of the central components of Brown’s Paradox. To understand this, we must understand Nietzsche’s philosophy of ressentiment in greater detail. Ressentiment should not be confused with resentment. Resentment, a sense of anger over pain or injury we may have suffered (of whatever sort), is a natural response, as is the attempt to challenge or overturn the sources of these pains or injuries.12Nietzsche (1976) does not council a kind of ascetic rejection of judgment, simply accepting everything as it comes—in which case, we would become, in his words, the ass which can only bray “Yeah-yuh” (p. 424)—nor is he arguing for a Christian “turning of the other cheek.” Being angry, resentful, unhappy, and so on are all perfectly acceptable to Nietzsche so long as—and this is crucial—they serve as a spur to action. So long as your resentment or anger becomes a vector for productive intervention in the world, then they have the potential to be good or noble. The trouble with ressentiment is that, counter to resentment, it does not act as a spur to productive action (although it does still frequently spur reactive behavior, a distinction I will shortly explain). Quite the contrary, ressentiment is resentment crystallized and spiritualized, and thus focuses not on any particular agent or actor, but rather simply on the world as a whole. Ressentiment expresses itself as a generalized resentment against a world that allows pain and suffering to occur. It frequently manifests as a rejection of the world, and the imagining of a world of perfection in opposition to this “imperfect” world. Nietzsche (1968a) makes clear how this drive to idealization is linked to ressentiment and the spirit of revenge. “To talk about ‘another’ world than this is quite pointless … we revenge ourselves on life by means of the phantasmagoria of ‘another,’ a ‘better’ life” (p. 49). This link between idealization and revenge is displayed quite strongly, Nietzsche (1968b) says, in many of the major works of metaphysics in the Western canon: Psychology of Metaphysics—This world is apparent: consequently there is a true world;—this world is conditional; consequently there is an unconditioned world;—this world is full of contradiction: consequently there is a world free of contradiction;—this world is a world of becoming: consequently there is a world of being:—all false conclusions … It is suffering that inspires these conclusions: fundamentally they are desires that such a world should exist; in the same way, to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative. (pp. 310–311) “It is suffering that inspires these conclusions” and ressentiment is “expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer.” This is the danger of ressentiment and how it differs from resentment. Resentment is a part of living in the world for Nietzsche, a world which produces suffering and which therefore must be responded to. But ressentiment takes one out of the world. It orients one’s actions to other worlds, worlds which do not exist. In the context of a discussion of an accelerating world, ressentiment against speed manifests as an existential resentment over the refusal of the world to provide one with the stability—either in time or in space—that one craves. In response, we construct idealized spaces and times, located either in the nostalgia of the past, or in an eschatological future. Nietzsche discusses idealist philosophy and religious cosmologies, but we can just as easily see these drives expressed in political narratives of “golden ages,” “the good old days,” “cities on the hill,” “the end of history,” or simply the security of “strong borders.” These spaces/times become refuges, defences, and weapons against an uncertain world of flow and becoming. Just as to live in the world is to suffer, to live in time is to be subject to contingency, and to live in space is to see that space is always invaded, reshaped, and de/reterritorialized. To wish otherwise is to close one’s eyes and stop up one’s ears, to refuse to intervene in the world as it is. This is exactly what ressentiment against speed produces. Nietzsche’s (1968a) discussion of the philosopher’s disdain for the “world of becoming” shows how ressentiment is always already a ressentiment against speed: All that philosophers have handled for millennia has been conceptual mummies; nothing actual has escaped from their hands alive. They kill, they stuff, when they worship, these conceptual idolaters—they become a mortal danger to everything when they worship. Death, change, age, as well as procreation and growth, are for them objections—refutations even. What is, does not become; what becomes, is not. (p. 45) This quote brings out another important element of Nietzsche’s thinking. Looking at Nietzsche’s critique of idealism, we might begin to take him for a kind of vulgar realist, criticizing flights of philosophical fancy. This is to misunderstand the complexity of Nietzsche’s conception of the world of becoming. Nietzsche never takes what the “world” is for granted and, with his focus on creativity, even were “one” to know what the “world” is, the world—and “one”—would almost certainly change immediately. But that is exactly the point. Nietzsche affirms that the world is a world of change, of becoming, of uncertainty, of contingency (and therefore necessarily of suffering and disappointment). This is the world that we live in, and the world in which we must act. Ressentiment and political action This is the greatest danger of ressentiment from a Nietzschean perspective. Unlike that active power which a sense of resentment can potentially inculcate, ressentiment functions as a reactive power. Deleuze (2002), in his analysis of Nietzsche, develops an important insight when he says that reactive powers are those which “decompose, they separate active force from what it can do; they take away a part or almost all of its power” (p. 57). By orienting us toward idealized spaces/times, and rejecting intervention in “this world,” ressentiment thus separates us from our power, from what we can do. This is the crucial point which brings us back to Brown’s Paradox, with its description of a state of affairs where we seem to have so much power at our fingertips, and yet seem able to do so little with it. Note the fact that ressentiment separating us from what we can do does not mean that we stop doing things. Indeed, quite the opposite. When under the sway of ressentiment we are just as prone to take action in the world. This is because in ressentiment we have judged the world and found it wanting. We find this world of becoming and speed to be a world of evil and suffering. This is why ressentiment also manifests as a spirit of revenge. We feel that the world has punished us and we wish to punish it back, and this frequently means seeking to punish those who are viewed as agents or avatars of that evil. Once again, this is different than the active behavior that might be undertaken in response to resentment. There the idea is to stop those who injure us, or overcome those things or people who block our way. It is never just the reactive desire for revenge, but always the active desire to achieve some goal, to further our plans, to assert our values. The reactive movement of ressentiment manifests as revenge. It is thus premised upon a moral judgment, and is itself a moralizing move (i.e. one acts primarily to punish an evil rather than achieve an end). Indeed, it is this ability to moralize suffering, to assign blame that is so useful to the agent of ressentiment. Nietzsche (1997) explains the difference between resentment and ressentiment quite well in the passage below: In my judgement, we find here the actual physiological causation of ressentiment, revenge and their ilk, in a yearning, then, to anaesthetize pain through emotion:—people generally look for the same thing, wrongly in my view, in the defensive return of a blow, a purely protective reaction, a “reflex movement” in the case of any sudden injury or peril, such as that performed even by a headless frog to ward off corrosive acid. But the difference is fundamental: in the one case the attempt is made to prevent harm being done, in the other case, the attempt is made to anaethetize a tormenting, secret pain that is becoming unbearable with a more violent emotion of any sort, and at least rid the consciousness of it for a moment—for this, one needs an emotion, the wildest possible emotion and, in order to arouse it, the first available pretext. “Someone or other must be to blame that I feel ill.” (p. 93) This desire to seek out somebody to blame is the pattern we see time and again in the reactionary politics of ressentiment. It is what we saw above in the case of the MV Sun Sea, and in other anti-immigration movements like it: the attempt to identify and blame particular actors as representative of what are broader movements and social forces, to take the individual migrant as a synecdoche of global acceleration as a whole. To return to Wendy Brown’s (2001) analysis: If, as Nietzsche recognized, impotent rage inevitably yields a moralizing (re)action, how might we succeed in rereading contemporary political life through this recognition? Might it help us understand, for example, the contemporary tendency to personify oppression in the figure of individuals and to reify it in particular acts and utterances, the tendency to render individuals and acts intensely culpable—indeed prosecutable—for history and for social relations? (pp. 21–22) And what is more, we tend to personify that oppression in the weakest, most vulnerable constituencies, themselves caught up in the same history and social relations as their attackers. This is because, having separated active force from what it can do, the politics of ressentiment naturally takes as its enemies those who are weakest, those who are most easily targeted and punished. In relation to these nationalist and xenophobic movements, it is instructive that, for Nietzsche (1997), one of the most important contemporaneous examples of the politics of ressentiment was the anti-Semite (p. 48). But these moralizing expressions of revenge and punishment, and the feeling of power which comes along with them, does not actually lead to the empowerment of the bearer of ressentiment. This is because the standards that it sets can never be achieved. A mindset overcome by ressentiment says that only a world free of suffering, of uncertainty, of insecurity, is of any value. One does not want less pain, but no pain. Not less insecurity, but no insecurity. Thus, no matter what is done, it will always fall short of this goalpost. Actual positive change which might improve their lot, or increase their power, is eschewed because it will never provide them with ideal world they crave. Better to engage in moralizing punishment which does nothing to solve their pain, but, as Nietzsche says, hem somewhat, gives them a feeling of moral superiority which will keep them going, at least for a while longer.13 What is more, this craving—for certainty, for stability, and most importantly, for moral superiority—makes these sufferers of ressentiment easy prey for those who wish to exploit them and gain their support. Nietzsche discussed this in terms of “the Priests,” but in our days, in democratic countries (and not just democratic countries), it is more useful to speak of the politician of ressentiment, the politician who does not just respond to the anxiety and fear of [their] public, but actively cultivates it. As Nietzsche (1997) describes it, He brings ointments and balms with him, of course; but first he has to wound so that he can be the doctor’ and whilst he soothes the pain caused by the wound, he poisons the wound at the same time—for that is what he is best trained to do, this magician and tamer of beasts of prey, whose mere presence necessarily makes everything healthy, sick, and everything sick, tame. (p. 93) The politician of ressentiment provides ever more targets and scapegoats for moralizing punishment, knowing that it will never actually solve the problems of his or her constituency (my god, if it did, what then?). Indeed, it is not at all coincidental that reactionary politicians of ressentiment frequently institute neoliberal policies, making the conditions of insecurity and acceleration which give rise to the ressentiment against speed even more prevalent. The politician of ressentiment relies on, and exploits, his or her constituency’s craving for certainty and stability, by presenting himself or herself as the potential source of the authority that will usher in this other world. The politicians of ressentiment present themselves to their constituency as “their support, defence, prop, compulsion, disciplinarian, tyrant, God” (Nietzsche, 1997: 92). People feel themselves incapable of bringing into being the world of security they desire, and therefore become willing to submit to anyone who claims that ability. How else to explain The Globe and Mail endorsement which simultaneously decries the “antidemocratic” behavior of the Conservative party, while craving the “discipline, leadership and bullheadedness” that they bring to government? In this regard, we see the final stage of ressentiment, and the final ascendancy of “The Priests,” of the politician of ressentiment: “I suffer: someone or other must be guilty”—and every sick sheep thinks the same. But his shepherd the ascetic priest, says to him, “Quite right, my sheep! Somebody must be to blame: but you yourself are this somebody, you yourself alone are to blame for it, you yourself alone are to blame for yourself.” (Nietzsche, 1997: 94) When we authorize increasingly centralized and authoritarian governments, when we do not jealously guard our civil liberties and democratic rights, what are we saying, other than that we accept that we are the problem with politics, that we ourselves are to blame? Give us, then, a “leader” who will provide us with the security we crave.14 Once again, ressentiment as that which separates an active force from what it can do, as that which separates people and communities from their power. And this is the irony of the ressentiment against speed. As people feel impotent in the face of acceleration, they become more willing to give up what power they do have to increasingly authoritarian structures or, when they do express their power, do so by attacking the weakest elements of the systems they oppose, usually in ways which actually shore up the systems they are supposed to be opposing.15 Living with/in Brown’s Paradox The result of this analysis is that both attempts to “solve” Brown’s Paradox prove unsatisfying. The neoliberal approach of embracing the uncertainty and instability of this accelerating world as progress requires us to ignore the violence and exploitation which goes along with it, and pretend that this “progress” is evenly distributed. Furthermore, it dismisses the very real desires for stability and security in our lives—and livelihoods—as somehow quaint, or even childish. We see how the frequent neoliberal complaint that “government cannot provide for everything” borrows the tropes of parenting, making the dissatisfied citizen into nothing more than a peevish toddler, rather than a stakeholder in a social contract with a legitimate grievance. Any response to Brown’s Paradox will require that we acknowledge the very real inequality and violence that are currently part of our accelerating world, and the impotence that most people feel in the face of it. It must also, therefore, have some sort of program for empowering people, for challenging these inequalities and violences, for providing people with genuine opportunities, rather than the neoliberal offer of “owning” one’s own subjugation. As Chantal Mouffe (2005) puts it in her attempt to understand a different, though related, paradox “One of the crucial stakes for left democratic politics is to begin providing an alternative to neo-liberalism. It is the current unchallenged hegemony of the neo-liberal discourse which explains why the left is without any credible project” (pp. 118–119). The fact that this is still the state of affairs even after the global meltdown of the neoliberal order in 2008 speaks to the urgency of this project, and the power of the neoliberal narrative. Genuine efforts must be made both to constrain the violent flows of global capital, and to insulate individuals and communities from these flows, efforts which must be pursued at the local, state, and global levels. One trajectory of future research on the question of speed therefore must be to look at effective policy responses to the exploitation of global acceleration. And yet, at the same time as we try to empower people, we must be sure that our desire for stability and security, our desire to oppose the uncertainty of an accelerating world, does not manifest itself as a ressentiment against speed. Some measure of uncertainty and instability in the world is ineradicable. This is true for both historico-empirical reasons (we are undergoing a period of social acceleration, and we are unlikely to uninvent the wheel of technological speed any time soon) but also for essentially ontological reasons. As discussed above, we must recognize that we live in a world of becoming, and that this necessarily introduces a note of flux, uncertainty, and acceleration into our lives. Our teleological projections will always be disturbed by irruptions of radical futurity, and the borders we try to police will always be criss-crossed by deterritorialized lines of flight. What is more, these contingencies are not necessarily bad things. First, they open us up to new experiences, new possibilities, new worlds. Brown was not lying when she said that we now live in “a global order more saturated by human power than ever before.” We must be careful how we think about, and use that power, but we cannot just ignore it or give it up lightly. Indeed, in terms of achieving our first goal, a willingness to interact constructively with the powers and opportunities our accelerating world provides us with will be crucial. Second, and more importantly, genuinely slow worlds, worlds with firm borders and thoroughly policed lines of time, usually require deep authoritarian power to maintain those borders and narratives. Certainly, it is exactly in the ressentiment of speed that the reactionary call for control is invoked; in the attempt to extinguish the novel, the unexpected, the different, the other. As William Connolly (2002) puts it “A slow, homogeneous world often supports undemocratic hierarchy because it irons out discrepancies of experience through which constituencies can become reflective about self-serving assumptions they habitually use to appraise themselves in relation to others” (p. 144). Our response to Brown’s Paradox must, therefore, be careful not to turn stability and control into a fetish, but to acknowledge the intractability—and also the benefits and pleasures—of a world of contingency, a world of becoming, a world of acceleration. We must therefore begin to cultivate a third way, a response which does not so much try to resolve Brown’s Paradox, as re-inflect. Such an approach would seek to embrace the power and opportunities which an accelerating world provides, using them to resist the exploitation and violence inherent in the contemporary world. However, at the same time as it sought some amount of security for individuals, it would be willing to accept that a certain amount of contingency and instability in the world is ineradicable. It would ensure that this desire for stability did not manifest as a reactionary drive for the exclusion and erasure of difference, nor through a totalitarian drive for complete mastery over contingency. It would thus be a politics that attempted to express itself as, in Nietzsche’s words, an “active force,” which is to say a force which expresses itself, which builds a world to its specifications, but does so with an understanding, and even affirmation, of the limitations of life in “this world.” Such a politics therefore would rigorously have to root out the sense of ressentiment against speed, and become comfortable with living, organizing, and taking action, in an accelerating world of becoming. Learning to live within a paradox (without resorting to tactics of violence or transcendence to overcome or resolve the paradox) is no easy thing. In recent years, many thinkers have tried to develop strategies for how to live within the confines of paradoxes which they considered to be constitutive of political life. William Connolly (1991), for example, repeatedly engages with the question of what he terms “the paradox of identity,” the tension between the fact that we must simultaneously “accept the indispensability of identity and live within the medium of identity while refusing (while struggling vigorously to refuse) to live [our] own identity as intrinsic truth” (p. 46). Chantal Mouffe (2005) struggles with what she terms “the democratic paradox,” the tension between democracy as that which expresses the will of the people and that which protects and expresses the rights and agencies of the individual (pp. 2–3). Although each of these paradoxes relate to specific topics, they are fundamentally linked to the issues I raise, insofar as all are about the tension between the human desire for stability and certainty (stable identities, stable communities, stable borders), and the recognition that individual flows will always disrupt those certainties (and the further recognition that suppressing those flows entirely would require escalating, and ultimately infinite, violence). All are thus about the tension between being and becoming. We can therefore look to the way these other thinkers seek to deal with paradox. In both cases, these two thinkers advocate the importance of recognizing the ineradicability of paradox. Mouffe (2005) says that “it is vital for a pluralist democratic politics to expose and acknowledge paradoxes” (p. 16), and Connolly (1991) argues that we must learn to think “within the code of paradox” (p. 60). Note that this recognition of paradox, this attempt to live within paradox, does not involve a complete letting go or rejection of our desires of stability. To do so would be to succumb to the temptation to will away the paradox (as in the neoliberal approach). Connolly recognizes the inescapable dimension of identity, Mouffe accepts (and lauds) the importance of a sense of community, and I understand the importance of some sense of stability to the lives of individuals and communities. However, living within the paradox also means acknowledging that these certainties will always be marked by an inescapable de gree of contingency. This does not mean letting go of our desire for stability, but it does mean loosening our attachment to it, recognizing the necessity (and indeed desirability) of some amount of difference, individuality, and flux in the world. This loosening of attachment is not easy, and cannot simply be the result of policy prescription. It will also mean challenging dominant narratives of identity, and working on the affective sensibilities of individuals and communities to make them more capable of coping with a certain amount of uncertainty and instability in the world. A second trajectory of future research on speed will therefore have to focus on how to draw on narrative and affective resources to inculcate a sense of comfort with uncertainty, and fight against the pull of ressentiment.16 In an ideal world, this project of loosening people’s attachments to stability would begin to integrate with the project of making them less subject to the violence of global acceleration, creating a self-reinforcing cycle.17 As people become more secure, they become less subject to ressentiment-laden tendencies. At the same time, as they affectively fight off the ressentiment-driven desire for stability, they potentially become more willing to engage in active political tactics which might actually provide for greater security and stability. Lessened ressentiment against speed might provide the conditions of possibility for greater solidarity and alliance building across borders and differences, a greater willingness to take advantage of some of the powers which global acceleration provides. Here we might look to increasing examples of global solidarity networks (Castells, 2012; Glezos, 2012: ch. 5) and to transnational labor activism (Stillerman, 2003). Let us be clear; this possibility of a feedback loop associated with living within paradox should not be taken as a resolution of that paradox. We must remember that this paradox is fundamentally irresolvable, and thus that it will be the source of an ongoing political struggle over crucial questions (“How much stability is enough?”; “How much velocity is desirable?”). This struggle will always run the risk of falling into either ressentiment against speed or indifference to the pain that it causes. This is as it should be. As Mouffe (2005) puts it, when it comes to paradox “[N]o final resolution or equilibrium between those two conflicting logics is ever possible, and there can be only temporary, pragmatic, unstable and precarious negotiations of the tension between them” (p. 45). The best that we can do is try to ensure that we live that paradox deliberately.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Top Level › 1AC---Digital Cyclops

Instrumental activism causes a perverse fascination with new and more destructive modes of technological management, which can only result in the suicidal nihilism of artificial war

Kroker 4 [Arthur, Chair in Technology, Culture and Theory, Professor of Political Science, and the Director of the Pacific Centre for Technology and Culture (PACTAC) at the University of Victoria, The Will to Technology and the Culture of Nihilism: Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Marx, University of Toronto Press: Toronto, Buffalo, and London (2004), p. 5-10]

Suiciding Itself to Virtual Life It would be inaccurate to say that ours is merely a civilization of technological hubris. Nietzsche was more insightful. For him, we are a "gamble," a "going-across," a "glance," a "gathering storm." Or perhaps Jean-Francois Lyotard for whom we are an "incommensurability," an impossibility that cannot be unrealized because we are perhaps never capable of full self-consciousness. Whatever the case, it can never, and probably will never be said of us, that we have not worn the membrane of technology as our deepest primal, that the horizon of technology is not the gamble upon which we stake the meaning of life itself. While it is a matter of strict epistemological warfare between social constructionists and hypermoderns to make much of the cultural issues attendant upon the meaning of the "post" - post-society, post-culture, post-gender - I do not think that we have yet grasped deeply into the interstices of our thought just how graphically, how bleakly, we truly have become a culture of the post. I do not mean this lightly. When the United States used nuclear weapons on Japan it precipitated a threshold event of the greatest cultural magnitude. History literally ended. If by history we mean the traditional cultural understanding of history as an indeterminate sense of unfolding time, an open future never fully under human control, then that sense of history decisively ended in the bio-flash of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. And again, Lyotard was right, but perhaps not in the sense he would wish. Post-history has been "driftworks," an indeterminate and increasingly violent series of technological experiments on the horizon of existence itself: the acceleration of space under the sign of digital culture until space itself has been reduced to a "specious present," and the social engineering of time into a micro-managed prism of empty granularities. Is it possible, just possible, that what Nietzsche described as ressentiment, this furious reaction formation at our own distorted instincts, now makes a new appearance at an exclusively cultural level? Is the real meaning of post-history the cultural road stories of a civilization suiciding itself to virtual life? Just as nuclear warfare gutted history, so too genetic engineering vacates the body. Suddenly and unpredictably, a new master discourse under the triumphant sign of biology as destiny has installed itself as the epistemological lynchpin of a global alliance of the so-called life sciences and the life industries. Cloaking itself in the antiseptic, technical language of genetic engineering, hyping itself as a "bible of life," institutionalizing itself as the Human Genome Project, here promising a future medical cornucopia of gene therapy, there warning against the dysgenic effects of unmodified organisms, everywhere dreaming anew of the genetic perfectibility of the human body, the language of biology as destiny marks the appearance of what I call "third wave eugenics". Having successfully immunized itself from the overt fascism of the second-wave eugenics of National Socialism and once having distanced itself from an open affiliation with its Darwinian and Mendelian origins, third wave eugenics projects itself into the future as the spearhead of the will to technology. Nihilism today speaks the language of biology as destiny. The culture of third wave eugenics is only awakening to its possibilities. We are, I believe, entirely unprepared for this transformation. Culturally, it is as if we are living through the cultural trauma of two abrupt, and ethically unfathomable, shutdowns: the ending of a progressive sense of history and an indeterminate sense of time with the climactic events of WWII; and the ending of an understanding of the body as something more than its genetic code. We are the victims of two Manhattan projects: one resulting in the extermination of history, and the other in the cryptography of the body. Might not cultural trauma of this pervasiveness not also serve simultaneously as both a precondition for the seduction of genetic determinism and an anticipatory sign of its coming triumph? Viewed ethically, shouldn't such 'big science' as the Human Genome Project not also be considered in the psycho-ontological language of trauma: the certain outcome of a world culture that once committed to the language of technology as destiny now finds itself exhausted, fatigued, feeding on its own referentials, while all the while warming itself in the sun of technicity? Heidegger, Marx, and Nietzsche, then, as trauma theorists diagnosing in advance the cultural preconditions necessary for the triumph of the will to technology as well as its nihilistic fallout. Artificial War "I think that space, in and of itself, is going to be very quickly recognized as a fourth dimension of warfare." General Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF, Ret Not just artificial life, but also now artificial war. Consider, for example, the recent war in Afghanistan where in an epochal break with traditional military strategy, RQ-1 Predator Drones equipped with Hellfire antitank missiles were utilized both as stationary platforms for long-term optical surveillance and as remotely controlled missile launchers. Real-time proximity (surveillance of the caves of Afghanistan) combined with strategies enhancing virtual control (those video screens in Washington displaying action on the ground in a remote battlefield)-- this technological mediation of the hyper-modern technologies of the twenty-first century with medieval tribal warfare of the third-century--suddenly migrates war to the planetary, digital dimension for purposes of space-based information warfare. With this, the age of Artificial War has begun. In its manifesto for the future of cyber-war, Vision 2020, the newly created United States Space Command theorizes a future battlefield of "full spectrum dominance." Abandoning the earth-bound dimensions of land, sea air, USSPACECOM projects a new era of artificial war in which the battlefield occurs in the "4th dimension" of space. Befitting a "space-faring nation" such as the United States, third-dimensional warfare is surpassed by a vision of future war in which "battle managers" are, in essence, computerized editing systems running on automatic, absorbing fluctuating data fields concerning attacks and responses, monitoring satellite transmissions from 20,000 miles in deep space, sequencing missile launches, integrating "dominant maneuvers" in space with "precision engagement" on the ground, sea and air, providing "full-dimensional protection" to "core national assets" and focusing logistics" for a virtual battlefield that stretches into an indefinite future. As USSPACECOM theorizes: the control of the seas in defense of commercial economic interests and the war of the western lands in defense of the expansion of the American empire to the shores of California has now migrated to a war for the "control of space" befitting a "space-faring nation" like the United States, this spearhead of technology. Consequently, a future of artificial warfare in which space itself is weaponized. 4th Dimensional warfare is the technical language by which the American empire now projects itself into a future of Artificial War: a 4th Dimensional rhetoric of "global engagement," "full-force integration," "global partnerships," weaponized space stations, tracking satellites, reusable missile launchers, and on-line, real-time remotely controlled anti-missile systems. I emphasize this story because it is revelatory of the meaning of the will to technology. Here, technology is not only the chosen aim of technological instrumentality (weaponizing space), but also involves technologies of mythology (the well-rehearsed story of the unfolding American frontier where wagon trains evolve into Predator Drones, and sea-faring navies migrate into space-bound automated battlefield manager systems), technologies of thinking (the fourfold "tactics" of space war: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, focused logistics), and technologies of (aggressive) judgment ("multinational corporations" are also listed in Vision 2020 as potential 'enemies' of USSPACECOM). More than futurist military doctrine for the 21st century, Vision 2020 represents the essence of the will to technology. Here, technology is both a space-faring means to the successful prosecution of artificial warfare and its sustaining ethical justification. The will to technology folds back on itself--a closed and self-validating universe of thinking, willing, judging, and destining--that brooks no earthly opposition because it is a will, and nothing else. As Nietzsche reflected in advance: "it is a will to nothingness." Or, as Hannah Arendt eloquently argues in her last book, The Life of the Mind, "the famous power of negation inherent in the Will and conceived as the motor of history (not only in Marx but also, by implication, already in Hegel) is an annihilating force that could just as well result in a process of annihilation as of Infinite Progress."[1] Could it be that the world-historical movement captured by the military logic of Vision 2020-- this command vision of America as the historical spearhead of the will to technology-- represents that which is probably unthinkable but consequently very plausible, a contemporary expression of the metaphysics of "not-being?" If "permanent annihilation" is the sustaining (military) creed of Vision 2020, then this also indicates that the world-historical movement, which it so powerfully strategizes, is driven onwards by the seduction of negation, another suicide note on the way to the weaponizing of space. Consequently, if the American novelist, Don DeLillo, can write so eloquently in his recent essay, "In the Ruins of the Future," that '(T)echnology is our fate, our truth" this also implies that in linking its fate with the "truth of technology," the United States, and by implication the culture of globalization, may have, however inadvertently, infected its deepest political logic with the will to nihilism. In the sometimes utopian, always militaristic, language of technological experimentalism, "Not-being" finally becomes a world historical project. Those who are only passive bystanders to the unfolding destiny of the contemporary American descendents of the Puritan founders can only look on with amazement coupled with distress as the "American project" embraces not only the weaponizing of space but also genetic experimentation with the question of evolution itself. While DeLillo goes on to say that (technology) "is what we mean when we call ourselves a superpower," his pragmatism sells short the point he really wants to make: namely, that by linking its fate, its truth, with the question of technology the United States has also enduringly enucleated itself within the larger historical, indeed if USSPACECOM is to be believed, post-historical, project of technology. Enucleated not as something other than the technological destiny which is its profession of faith, of truth, but enucleated in the more classical sense of the term, of being somehow interior to the unfolding destiny of the will to technology. The larger cultural consequence of this bold act of willing remains deeply enigmatic. In this case, is the will to technology an intensification of the pragmatic spirit upon which the American experiment was founded? Or has the will to technology, at the very moment of its historical self-realization, already reversed its course, becoming its own negation: Arendt's prophecy of "not-being" as a "process of annihilation." On the ultimate resolution of this question depends the American fate, the American truth, as the spearhead of technology. On the public evidence, what makes the American project truly distinct today is its enthusiastic abandonment of the pragmatic will for the uncharted metaphysical territory of "not-being." The will to the conquest of empty spatialization and the vivisectioning of the code of life itself has about it the negative energy of suicidal nihilism. Here, the language of "not-being"--the desiccating logic of what Heidegger memorably termed, "Nothingness nothings" as the historical form of the technological project of "permanent annihilation" --expresses itself vividly in two master commands: Space Command and Genetic Command. The first operates in the language of weaponized astrophysics where the curvature of space is manipulated for strategic purposes, and the other sequences the human genetic code itself. Thus, control of space is inextricably linked with control of time. The dynamic will to technology projects itself doubly in the macrophysics of a "space-faring nation" and the microphysics of a body-faring cellular biology. This is a collective demonstration of hubris that Greeks in the classical age would only admire, and then fear, for its (technical) audacity and stunning (metaphysical) innocence. Ironically, at the very instance that USSPACECOM projects an imperialist military future of "full spectrum dominance," 9/11 occurs and we are suddenly time-shifted into the age of viral terrorism. Similar to the incommensurability of technology itself where the reality of "permanent annihilation" is sometimes offset by other ways of thinking technology, the human imagination does not begin, cannot begin, with tactics of 'dominant maneuver' and 'precision engagement' and 'full-dimensional protection' and 'focussed logistics' but, with the terrorist side of fluid, earth-bound, real material warfare.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Top Level › 1AC---Digital Cyclops

Debates about the details of American military posture may seem like benign reform within broader imperialist politics, but the underlying metaphysics of American culture and society ensures that the political energy produced can only be expressed as exclusionary ressentiment or nihilist instrumental activism

Kroker 6 [Arthur, Chair in Technology, Culture and Theory, Professor of Political Science, and the Director of the Pacific Centre for Technology and Culture (PACTAC) at the University of Victoria, CTheory Books: Born Again Ideology: bai05 Date Published: 11/1/2006 ]

Yet for all its outward materialist accomplishments, the underlying metaphysics of the American expression of the will cannot, in the end, be denied. At some indefinable point in its cultural history, possibly bored with its accomplishments, fatigued with its obligations, perhaps contemptuous of the ease with which it has conquered a colony and then an empire, the American will inevitably folds back on itself. Thus begins the era of soft decadence when the will, dispensing with extrinsic objects as ultimately unsatisfactory forms of satisfaction, begins to feed on itself. Literally, America begins to make itself sick as a way of energizing the next phase of its historical project. While the American will in its political infancy is nourished by the language of expanding capital -- the aggressive construction of a coldly functional empire of social, economic, cultural and political power -- the fully mature expression of the American will does just the opposite. In these desolate, skittish days at the end of empire, American power feeds on the eschatology of postmodern phantasms: the death of the social, the end of politics, the virtualization of capital, the disappearance of culture. Reality shows on television are practical substitutes for social capital. Dense networks of expressways linking gated suburbs to downtown financial skyscrapers represent the architectural remainder of urban capital. Breast augmentation as the leading present by parents to graduating high school women constitutes the real language of body capital. Evangelical preachers, stock manipulators, and powerful vested interests feeding on the "common" body of the government perfectly express the death of politics as itself a way of renewing the language of power. While conservative political rhetoric appeals to the unity of American community and progressive thought continues to dream of social justice, the real driving force of American popular culture champions the death of the social. Exclusionary politics, political scapegoating, collective anger directed against the weak, posses of middle-class self-described "vigilantes" on the Arizona border with Mexico, drinking rates among some high school students declining because they are reported as spending more time popping prescription pills from their parents' medicine cabinets, television news of mass outbreaks of syphilis among the children of Baptists in Atlanta suburbs, newspaper chronicles of monster homes, abandoned families, and vacant relationships. A pleasure dome and a torture chamber, the Body Upon a Hill increasingly takes delight in its own humiliation. Its mass entertainment from CSI to the galaxy of reality shows can be death-oriented because in its last decadent phase power always prefers to speak in the language of thanatos. With a thin veneer of piety covering an inner reality of political cynicism, scenes of torture, death, accidents, mass plague, natural catastrophes are transformed into entertainment spectacles. In the mass media, false prophets abound while false gods are proclaimed just before being debunked. In its foreign policy, America throws off the legitimating language of democratic freedom, revealing itself to be a cold-eyed will to power, subordinating when necessary the (domestic) rhetoric of freedom and democracy to doing what's necessary to preserve an increasingly hegemonic world empire. In its domestic policy, the leaders of the Republic encourage its population to make a media spectacle of the spirit of negation within. Violence becomes the essential moment of rapture in the last decadent phase of American empire, with panic fear and panic deflation as oscillating moments in the public mind. Or perhaps something more psychologically complex as the American boundary condition: a strange combination of activism and panic fear, transformation and negation. Which explains why, for example, there can be such violent counter-reactions against any breaches of the closed boundaries of the American covenant. This is a political system wound up so tightly in a twin logic of violence and negation that the slightest hint of catastrophe threatens to draw out the panic fear within. Long before the projection of American power harvests the world in the pursuit of its imperial ambitions, the terms of the original Puritan covenant -- codified by the language of the American Constitution and sanctified by the official rhetoric of the Civil War as sacrificial violence in the interests of an indivisible Union -- specify that the American self will be a sacrificial offering -- a will and nothing but a will. Later, during the decadent days of empire, when the strategic interests of American power have been achieved and the middle-class population assured of the practical successes of the high-intensity consumer marketplace, it is difficult to rearticulate the original animating vision of the burning will that is the essence of American exceptionalism. More profoundly a metaphysical rather than a narrowly political rupture with its European origins, what really migrated with Puritans first, and waves of immigrants later, was a fundamentally new expression of the language of the will -- a will to survive, to create, to conquer, to dominate -- which carried in its path both a new form of (technical) knowledge as power as much as a new form of (crusading) emotion motivated by unbending determination American-style. The Double Helix A transformation matrix, the dominant American cultural pattern holds direct opposites in creative tension. This is the source of its fierce internal political debates, its messianic militarism, its scientific creativity, its dynamic capitalist experimentation, its often visionary art. Simultaneously pious and cynical, philanthropic and war-like, manipulative and generous, proselytizing and fearful, American culture intensifies extremes and laughs away the difference. Long before the science of evolutionary biology envisioned the model of the "double helix" as the basic building block of human life, American culture emerged full-blown as a society of twisted strands. Refusing to be enframed by the frozen binaries of Enlightenment logic, blasting away the philosophical obstructions between a vengeful god and an optimistic science, always in creative tension, always on the move towards the next frontier, the discourse of technology and the American mind was a brilliant scientific idea first experienced as a daring political project. For example, while the biological model of the double helix could be brilliantly proposed fifty years ago as the basic (DNA) building block of all life, perhaps in a strange case of science lagging behind life, Crick and Watson's discovery (with the unacknowledged, but indispensable X-ray photography by Rosalind Franklin) was anticipated by the political history and cultural logic of the United States. The American Republic of Bio-Power Sometimes, scientific consciousness articulates a vision of the future which, while ostensibly emergent from the physical universe actually represents a fantastic crystallization of a ruling idea, that had until that point been suspended in the cultural atmosphere. Like an intangible idea, floating everywhere, expressible nowhere, the double helix could perhaps be received with such instant global acclaim because it gave voice to a dynamic cultural representation which until that moment was unrecognized as the "building block" of modern (American) culture. In the same way that Lewis Mumford could note that the industrial model of the factory was anticipated by medieval practices of the monastery with its strict division of time, disciplining of labor, and specialization of work function,[4] so too the biological model of the double helix was anticipated by the singular way of being that is American identity. Could it be that what is most exceptional about American exceptionalism is that this was a culture which, from its inception, had somehow stumbled upon the language of biology as its ruling metaphysic? In this case, we might conclude that while Europe could rightfully be the originating continent of physics, the United States would be the culture born under the sign of genetic biology. When Michel Foucault spoke so eloquently about the movement from "power over death" to "power over life" as the essence of power/knowledge, he might well have been rehearsing in his thought the political creed of the United States: namely that this would be a culture where power would wager itself on the invention of a distinctive style of life itself, what is described colloquially, not without a certain sense of national pride, as the "American way of life." The passionate combination first of Puritan missionary consciousness and scientific experimentalism, and later of mass consumption and electronic gadgets, that would come to characterize the American eruption in an otherwise hostile, if not indifferent, world found its formula, and appropriately so, in the famous "Declaration of (Technological) Independence" with its bio-political rhetoric of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." What finally appeared in the 20th century language of genetic biology as the famous image of the double helix -- two twisting strands of nucleotides, strictly anti-parallel, connected by four base pairings -- is, I believe, but a scientific expression of a bio-political revolution that occurred much earlier with the founding of the American republic. Here, like a cultural precession of the scientific imagination of biotechnology, the dominant pattern of American discourse is structured in the form of a double helix whereby two great curving strands of cosmology -- faith-based religion and scientifically authorized reason -- follow a twisting, spiraling path from past to future: co-present, bound together in creative tension, decidedly not binaries, determining in their oppositions and continuities the specific codes of American political culture. Always running anti-parallel to one another (religion versus science, liberalism versus conservatism, individualism versus collectivity, nature versus culture, faith versus reason), the genetic memory of American discourse is connected by four base pairs: economy, politics, society, and culture. Like DNA, the base pairs of American culture -- its seductive model of political economy, social logic, media networks, and cultural values -- can be easily clipped and transplanted into colonized (alien) bodies. It was not for nothing that Marshall McLuhan described the United States as the "world environment." With a strikingly original "building block" of political life (the constitutional theory of the American Republic), genetic social memory (the "American dream"), great twisting strands of thought, and clashing ideological currents which run deep and always run anti-parallel, America was fated by its origins in genetic logic to be the ascendant ruling empire of the 21st century. More than its own imperial leadership may suspect, America was literally engineered for world power from its inception. In this continental nation, in this global empire, a dynamic genetic idea -- the building blocks of life itself as twisting strands of great codes, anti-parallel, connected by base pairs in constant motion -- somehow jumped from the sphere of biology to the world of political theory. Imprinting itself deeply in the language of American identity, arming itself with the religious fervor of the American dream, structuring a whole society with its biological rhythms, the double helix finds in the American Republic a way of coding that which is most vital, most powerful, most eschatological into a resilient, always expanding, body of (imperial) politics. As a nation the history of which begins not only with a fateful rupture with Europe but with a dynamic will to create a new society out of the twisting strands of fierce religious conviction and equally determined pilgrim energy, we are dealing here with the sudden eruption in the "New World" of an evolutionary break in the building blocks of (European) political and social life. Breaking with the fetters of monarchy, refusing the land-based fatalism of feudalism, placing its confidence in the bible and the axe, pushing westward, then global, then galactic, towards an unattainable imagination of the American spirit, the "New Republic" is possessed by the language of bio-politics. Ostensibly, we are dealing here with the social construction of American identity, the political constitution of mixed government combining executive, legislative and judicial powers in equal, measured proportions, the ideological formation of the American colonizing project from "Manifest Destiny" to "Redemptive Empire," and the invention of a style of capitalist initiative that is as creative, inventive, and transformative in its entrepreneurial energy as it is harsh, cold and calculating in its drive to quarterly profitability. All this may be true, but still there is something else, more subliminal, harder to detect, practically invisible because it is so omnipresent; and that is, the actual genetic constitution of the sustaining spirit of America as a way of being. Here, each person, each identity, each animating political idea, each cultural image, each entrepreneurial project, each cybernetic vision will either be a twisted strand containing clashing, brilliantly anti-parallel possibilities, or, as Puritan futurists declaimed: "it would perish from the face of this good earth." Catastrophe and rapture are the twisted song-lines of American being. Catastrophe and Rapture Who could have conceived of a society which would structure principles for its own undermining, for itself as a brilliantly creative accident -- always about to happen, always happening, always in the process of being redeemed -- for the auto-destruction of any tendency towards permanent stability, into its deepest constitutional principles? It's one thing to speak with awed reverence at the supposedly flawed Kantian marvel that is the United States where the (modernist) vision of universal human community of freely acting citizens invested with inalienable natural rights is somehow held to be threatened by faith-based, bible belt political insurgencies running straight from the pulpit to the White House, from Fox News to the deepest subjectivity of the inhabitants of the new middle class gated communities of this good (suburban) land. But it's quite something else, when taking off the blinkers of conventional modernism, to realize that with regard to the question of American being, something genuinely unique is happening here, that this is one culture which is structured by a very singular social history, namely that the only national constant in American history -- economic, political, social and cultural -- is the capitalist equivalent of Maoist "permanent revolution." Call it what you will -- Schumpeter's principle of "creative destruction, " Reagan's "New Morning for America," Microsoft's competitive software scorched earth policy symbolized by its "Windows on the World," the tabloids' daily spectacle of the dramatic burnout and eventual redemption of celebrity icons, or small business entrepreneurs who get up everyday with gritty dreams and mission statements to deconstruct, derail, and devolve what has gone before in order to reconstruct, realign and repurpose enterprise economy into something absolutely new, absolutely profitable. American rhetoric might wear the symbolic garments of Kantian universal freedom to the altar of political respectability in the community of (democratic) nations, but the essence of American identity lies elsewhere, precisely in the almost ecstatic collective pleasure taken in accidenting the future, crash-testing the economy, accelerating the body, abandoning culture, evacuating the social, harvesting the brain by new sciences of neuro-genetics, vicariously sharing in the rise and fall of celebrity icons. Fear Factor and Entertainment Tonight are not just prime-time TV shows: they also capture something of the element of radical deconstruction central to the American geist. The spirit of permanent revolution at the heart of American identity might be explained away by Rene Girard's concept of sacrificial violence -- namely that this is one culture which, perhaps exhausted with sacrificial rituals carried on at the (media) edges of its colonial borders, finally makes a sacrificial wasteland of itself, finding in the moment of sacrificial expenditure the real social capital of an advanced technoculture dying of its own boredom. But perhaps there is something about American identity that is post-Girard, that the ecstasy of sacrificial expenditure -- the insatiable drive to transform, undermine, innovate, create, destroy -- is not the empty symbolic ritual of an exhausted culture which desperately requires sacrifices (of always accidental others) as a means of internal moral cohesion, but the essential genetic logic of its historical drive to empire. This dynamic fusion of sacrificial logic and natural rights into the same political body, investing American identity, business, war, culture, knowledge, media with the twisted strands of different futures -- order and chaos -- always anti-parallel, always threatening to implode, to reconfigure, to instantly field-morph into a radical change of state is the essential creative energy driving the American dream. Neither exclusively political nor biological, American being is born bio-political. Here the future always accidents itself -- destabilizing, conflagrating, deconstructing -- in order to give rise to something greater: that is its energy, its creativity, its innovativeness, its undeniable seduction, its dark charisma. Reluctant to slow down sufficiently to develop a stable (modernist) Freudian ego, this is one culture which operates at the speed of light between a full-octane id and an aggressive cultural superego. Three Twisted Strands USA: An Open, Closed or Flat Universe? After the Big Bang precipitated by the meeting of covenant theology and the spirit of technological innovation in the American mind, what is the future of the United States? Is it an open universe rushing outwards in ever expanding concentric circles, radiating its implosive energy at the speed of light, burning up its material base until at some point in the indefinite future it will be left floating among the planets as an empty remainder of that which once was the leading 21st century empire of spacetime? Or is it a closed universe violently collapsing into itself, the infinite curvature of its spacetime fabric compressing into the dense, dark material of a black hole from which no light can escape? Or is the American future that of a flat universe with no real expansion nor necessary contraction, only an indefinite struggle between inflationary and deflationary forces, a prolonged political stalemate punctuated by violent event-horizons. Understood as an open universe, the secret of American power is that it always seeks to inflate beyond its controlling codes. The military projection of the American will to empire by sea, land and air always exceeds the more constrained political vision of the founding constitutional order. The political economy of advanced capitalism that has come to be known as the logic of globalization is always functionally bankrupt, incorporating a permanent liquidity crisis of over-indebtedness as its necessary motive. The greater the expansion of American influence off-shore, the more severe the internal legitimation crisis undermining American authority. The more universal the declaration of American values, the more intense the domestic debate concerning the ends of American political morality. In its expansive, inflationary phase, the fabric of American culture expands to consume the universe, investing societies seemingly everywhere with a unitary fabric of (American) spacetime linking together imperial power, capitalist profitability, media influence and messianic vision. Viewed as a closed universe, American culture is in the process of violently collapsing into itself, like a dead and dying star attracting into its dense, twisting spiral all the passing material of the social universe. Here, the language of redemptive empire can be revived as a way of signaling the swift contraction of the American experiment into its base elements of physical power, primitive capitalism, crusading morality, and imposed influence. Massively deflationary, inward looking, mistrustful of outsiders, increasingly paranoid about breaches of its (political) bodily boundaries, America as a closed universe has only one certain future. When the liquid growth of the symbolic media of power, money, influence and values are forced to contract towards their controlling codes, a critical tipping-point is quickly achieved. Here, America becomes a quantum singularity: a crushing density of political energy around which light-waves from other stars are forced to bend, disappearing into such an infinite immensity of darkness that America henceforth will only be known at second-hand by the astronomical signs of what is missing when other planets cross between outside observers and its violent event-horizon. Envisioned as a flat universe, America is a culture of twisted strands struggling to stabilize clashing pressures towards full (political) inflation and total (cultural) deflation. Possessing neither the pure energy of an open universe or the dense matter of a closed universe, the flat universe of America is something different. It is that moving point where the centripetal energies of an expanding (political) universe fold back into centrifugal matter of a deflationary (economic) culture to create an event-horizon that is known as the American singularity. Positioned on the outer edge of the spiral, marking a threshold between the black hole of the American religious past and the white hole of the American technological future, the American singularity is a warp hole between history and the present. Enter the American singularity, fully immerse yourself in the fusion of closed universe covenant theology and open universe technological innovation that is the American field of spacetime today, and you will find yourself instantly tunneling between religious time and technological space. Following the lessons of quantum physics which hold that every quantum singularity is accompanied by an event-horizon, could it be that America in all of its violence and seduction is the unique event-horizon which emerges from the convergence of covenant belief and creative technology, in North America first, in world history later, and perhaps in the deep space explorations, migrations and colonizations of the future? The New Puritans: Twisted Strands Take Root on American Soil Harvard University, which celebrated its 350th anniversary in 1986, is the oldest institution of higher learning in the United States. Founded 16 years after the arrival of the Pilgrims at Plymouth, the University has grown from nine students with a single Master to an enrollment of some 18,800 degree candidates, including undergraduates and students in 10 graduate and professional schools. Six presidents of the United States -- John Adams, John Quincy Adams, Theodore and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Rutherford B. Hayes, and John Fitzgerald Kennedy -- were graduates of Harvard. Harvard College was established in 1636 by vote of the Great and General Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and was named for its first benefactor, John Harvard of Charlestown, a young minister who, upon his death in 1638, left his library and half his estate to the new institution. During its early years, the College offered a classic academic course based on the English university model but consistent with the prevailing Puritan philosophy of the first colonists. Although many of its early graduates became ministers in Puritan congregations throughout New England, the College was never formally affiliated with a specific religious denomination. An early brochure, published in 1643, justified the College's existence: "To advance Learning and perpetuate it to Posterity; dreading to leave an illiterate Ministry to the Churches." [5] While the mythic Puritan story of the 'first encounter' at Plymouth Rock is a familiar part of the American foundational narrative, what is less remarked, but of probably greater lasting cultural importance, is that there was actually a second 'first encounter' in American discourse: this time not between Puritans and indigenous peoples, but between faith and reason, between Puritan missionary consciousness so necessary to the immediate development of born again ideology in the American mind and scientific reason so vital to its future ideology of technological liberalism, and all this within the famous brick walls and ivy-leafed square of Harvard University. Here the missionary zeal, disciplinary energies, and crusading spirit of the Puritan moment would meet up with a style of (Enlightenment) thought which in its rationality, pragmatism, and pluralism would soon seemingly best it to become the official intellectual core of the American mind. There the story might have ended except for one curious eventuality. What emerged as the liberal side of the American mind was, I believe, always deeply touched by American covenant theology. God is not a passive witness to the unfolding story of American power, technology, and liberalism, but a co-present, anti-parallel, and much called upon, active partner. Definitely post-Enlightenment in its ruling scientific epistemologies and creative technological innovations, America is equally, and this most definitely, pre-Enlightenment in its popularly subscribed messianic vision. Here the high tech marvels of the 21st century are always in the way of hurrying back to resolve the original terms of the 17th century Puritan covenant. American culture was born with a (covenant) debt which it can never satisfy, and on behalf of which it is fated to be that most singular of all nations: simultaneously part-quantum/part-confessional. Now I do not mean this in a reductive sense implying either the subordination of the Puritan outlook to the world-vision inspiring the American liberal imagination or, for that matter, the reduction of technological liberalism to its Puritan foundations. America has always had about it the barely discernable hint of enigma: namely that what would set it apart as a colonial, then national, and now empire, project, is that this would be a culture of twisted strands: the twisting together in an ascending spiral of two conflicting motivations -- religious and secular, puritan and scientific, born again and pragmatic -- which, taken together, constitute the core code of what for some is the rapture of the American dream, but for others the apocalypse of American imperialism. Long before 20th century quantum physics would envision the physical universe as always composed of opposite changes of state -- a world of both/and, not either/or -- American political reality would build, from its Puritan origins in the 17th century to the crusading military spectacles of the 21st century -- a society, culture, and political economy firmly based on the basic quantum principle that in life, as in science, only contradictions are true, that the ineluctable differences between religion and science confirm their necessary partnership in the deepest (political) affairs of the American mind. So then, to return to the original question concerning the Puritan roots of Harvard University. The question of technology and the American mind begins with what, at first, appears to be a historical curiosity, but upon further reflection reveals itself to be a cultural puzzle, then a still unresolved political predicament. The historical curiosity is this: What explains the fact that the Massachusetts Bay Company -- the emblematic sponsor of crusading, disciplinary Puritanism, shortly after the so-called "First Encounter" at Plymouth Rock also established Harvard University, now in its own publicity terms the "oldest corporation" in the New World. The cultural puzzle: Is the genealogical relationship between Harvard University, widely viewed as the intellectual spearhead of what might be viewed as technological liberalism in the United Sates, and the missionary spirit of Puritanism simply a historical coincidence -- what might be called a discursive situation in which the religious foundations of American knowledge migrated with the slow passage of time into a style of thought -- rational, experimental, pragmatic -- in short, scientific? Or could this meeting of the religious foundations of the American Republic and the epistemological model grounding its scientific future represent something more world-historical, more metaphysically convulsive, in its cultural importance? Was this meeting of Puritan faith and liberal thought a great metaphysical fusion of the divided European will? Were what might be called the Harvard Puritans a New World solution to a metaphysical problem which, while it may have had its historical origins in a European culture marked by the absolutist wars of religion and the creative, speculative dreams of the Renaissance, could not be solved within the closed orbit of European thought? And the political predicament? Once having come to full maturity as the historical embodiment, not only of a new (republican) political idea but, more importantly, of a new expression of the metaphysics of the will -- technology and the American mind -- what will impede the present American experiment in playing out the inevitable end-point of that story, what Heidegger described as "completed nihilism"? In seeking to understand the question of technology and the American mind, one fact is dramatically clear. Namely, that what truly distinguishes American thought, what really lies at the roots of American exceptionalism, is that this is not, and never was, a traditional European story of warring binaries -- faith versus reason -- but a complicated fusion of these two master narratives into the cultural idea of the American Republic. Even in its most eugenic, rationalist, and clinical manifestation the driving force of the American mind has always had about it the animating spirit of missionary consciousness, the epistemological activism of a moral crusade and the tangible smell of imperial rapture. Unlike other societies where understanding technology is a learned method, American culture is a technology. From the war technology research of MIT, the pioneering developments in genetic biology at Harvard University, the information technology of Stanford University to the leading-edge neuro-science of UCLA, American technological reason has always operated in active alliance with covenant theology. Certainly not in the simplistic, reductive sense of reason as passively subordinated to proselytizing religious sects, but definitely in the more invidious sense: namely that the overall historical project of the official American knowledge enterprise has deeply aligned itself as the level of value-preference and epistemological direction with the moral ends of covenant theology -- the creation in "this good land" of a form of thought which in its brilliantly vivisectionist-logic will universalize the American future. Consequently, regarding Harvard's Puritan origins: are we presented here with a simple case of intellectual coincidence -- the migration of two great master discourses, one religious, the other secular, wherein Harvard University itself is simply symptomatic of the greater passage of American society from its faith-based origins to its scientifically envisioned future? In this case, the story of Harvard University would be a representative case of the comforting discourse underlying America's received (official) culture, namely that what we have here is a fateful contestation over the space of four centuries between two warring discourses -- religion and science -- with the technological primacy of the scientific imagination gradually eclipsing the Puritan foundations. This is a truly comforting discourse because it would confirm the essentially binary character of American thought -- reason versus passion; nature versus culture; science versus religion; individuality versus collectivism -- which has always structured progressive (liberal) political thought in America, sustaining it in the present in the midst of the current resurgence of the religious right. But what if we were to consider another possibility? Could the Puritan origins of Harvard possibly be a story of the injection into the bloodstream of American thought, politics and culture of a new metaphysical virus: the folding together of faith and reason into the governing framework of American consciousness? In this case, if there can be such a peaceable shift from the founding Puritan spirit to the contemporary secular spirit of Harvard, could it be because there is no essential difference between the founding spirit of Puritanism and scientific knowledge, only a subtle shift of discourse as Puritanism ceases to wear its crusading (religious) spirit and takes up the garments of reason -- nominally secular, rational and (eventually) liberal, but in essence the epistemological spearhead of the civil religion that is America? In the genealogy of Harvard University are we really present at the birth of the discourse of technology as religion, replacing the original religious origins of American consciousness with pluralistic, rational, but competitive and always epistemologically redemptive knowledge? Again, this is not an argument for a narrow understanding of religion and technology, but something more constitutive. Namely, that what happened at the moment of Harvard University's Puritan origins was a dramatic rip in the space-time fabric of American culture, instantly linking the redemptive language of the covenant theology with a (rationalist) epistemology of discovery, invention, dissecting research logic. Understood in quantum terms as a warp-hole in the space-time fabric, the cultural importance of Harvard University was that it was the specific historical site where the past of religious enthusiasm and the future of epistemological discovery somehow fused on the common ground of (technological) knowledge as a key aspect of the civil religion of America. Here, the strictly Puritan religious creed could gradually disappear in the 18th century because an arc of intellectual electricity had already passed between the religious eschatology of the Puritan founders and intellectual Puritanism as a distinctive form of American thought. What might be described as the original Puritan habit of mind -- disciplined, vivisectionist, morally righteous, convinced of its redemptive singularity -- migrated easily and without a murmur of discontent into the ruling self-consciousness of American technological knowledge. Consequently, the project of technological reason, of which the scientific imagination is its leading epistemological spearhead -- could be viewed as the leading contemporary expression of religious enthusiasm. Conversionary, probing, proselytizing, tautological in its founding assumptions, powered by its moral self-confidence and linked to human (scientific) redemption in the name of technological freedom, Harvard University's lasting cultural importance is as the first historical singularity -- the original tear in the space-time fabric where (Puritan) ontology migrates into (technological) epistemology. Here, the twisted strands of faith and intelligence -- covenant theology and the rights of reason -- first took root in American soil, and while they would never be fated to find common ground in the surface clashes of Church and State, their common eschatological aspirations for the founding of the New Republic in a hostile world would definitely have common purchase in their strange alliance as twin vectors -- one a faith-based electorate, the other reason-driven science -- in the American imperial project. In American culture, god comes to wear the mask of reason, just as much as the spirit of religious enthusiasm is projected globally by a discourse of (technological) knowledge which is the culturally genetic expression of the American war spirit. The Double Helix as American Identity Understood as a quantum culture, American identity thrives on instant, total changes of state. Technologically, the intense digital euphoria of the late '90s was instantly replaced post- 9/11 by the hard politics of the "War on Terrorism." In finance capital, the speculative bubble of the new economy was washed away by an American political economy which went to ground in earthly energy resources, with oil commodities leading the way. In politics, just as the economic conservatism of the Bush administration replaced Clintonian social liberalism, so too the contemporary wave of evangelical Republicanism will undoubtedly be succeeded by a moderate Democratic regime focusing on the valorization of social capital and solutions for the approaching crisis of over-indebtedness. In space exploration, the Columbia Shuttle can explode across the empty skies of Texas while the Hubble Telescope can fade away with the passage of time, but still the International Space Station approaches its moment of architectural realization and plans are well underway for manned missions to planet Mars. In music, Seattle-based grunge, itself the death-note of '80s psychedelia, can be blasted away by the street rap of hip-hop with its seductive combination of fourth-world inner city violence and a first-world gated community iPod audience. In architecture, the tragic days of 9/11 with its spectacular glimpses of suddenly vulnerable New York skyscrapers quietly gives way to the fluid, configurative, free-floating architecture of Frank Gehry. A culture operating under the sign of the double helix, America always oscillates between the referential extremes of hyper-deflation and hyper-inflation -- between the expansive world of code and the deflationary forces of value-principle -- in culture, finance, architecture, art, politics, and maybe even in life itself. This is one country that will only be all ground or all figuration, with absolutely nothing in-between. Ironically, like the space-faring nation that it seeks to be, America succeeds in playing the extremes of inflation and deflation because of a stunning, but reliable, astronomical manoeuver. Like a space ship on a voyage to deep space which seeks out distant planets only to immediately sweep around them, using their gravitational fields as a way of accelerating towards the next galactic destination, the American mind uses the gravitational forces of cultural extremes as a way of animating its collective energy. The (stock market) excesses of the last great wave of tech euphoria taken to its logical (virtual) extreme reverses field, with the business world imploding into the grim scarcities of a commodity-based economy. The real estate bubble will likely collapse in the direction of a chronic crisis of consumer debt. Shuttle disasters inspire the sacrificial fervor of unlimited galactic explorations. Opposition to the moral relativism of liberal politics instantly mutates into bible belt visions of a redemptive empire. The psychic shock of 9/11 flips within the same week into proposals for the high-tech security apparatus of the new biometric state. Again, all ground and all figuration with no stabilizing mechanisms to split the difference, the American mind has only always known the logic of the double helix as deepest identity. Indeed, if it is possible to speak meaningfully of a social identity like Americanness, it would inaccurate to reduce its immense diversity to either of its extremes. America has never been exclusively fundamentalist or relativist, rock 'n' roll or country & western, biblical or scientific, suburbs or trailer parks, the working culture of bars, strip malls, and Wal-Marts or the professional culture of law firms, ad agencies, and exclusive consumer brands. Americanness means being always in motion, in competition, in flight, in careers -- moving fast from one change of state to another, perhaps caught up in traffic jams, plane vectors, taxi runs or high-speed trains, but always making of the speed of a single life a brilliant metaphor for the velocity of the entire culture. Americanness means actually making a double helix of your personality, ambitions, career, identity, relationships -- always being prepared to flip to the other side in the game of life: rewarding those who have succeeded in morphing the poles of American culture, whether in space, business, entertainment, sports; bestowing fame upon those who have failed most spectacularly; admiring those adept enough to have instantly changed states in order to survive, perhaps to play another day. Today instrumental activism refers to the expression of the scientific logic of the double helix in the cultural form of American identity.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Top Level › 1AC---Digital Cyclops

The intellectual foundations undergirding modernity have eroded. That we live precariously perched on the apocalyptic edge renders communication itself facile and incoherent. Carving out opportunities for critical space creates the opportunity for revelatory experiences that shatter the contours of our political imagination and gesture toward alternative possibilities.

Featherstone 10 [Mark Featherstone is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Keele University, UK, his areas of specialism are social and political thought and psychoanalysis, THEORY BEYOND THE CODES, “Virilio's Apocalypticism,” Ctheory, 9/16/2010, ]

Although I would risk the claim that the capitalist view of the productivity of violence, destruction, and catastrophe may be shaken by accidents that threaten the coherence of the socio-economic system or certainly the environmental life support system itself, it is not at all clear that this is the case and that capitalism will reform its practices when it looks like the world is about to end. This is because the high priest of neo-liberal economics, Milton Friedman [17], would regard the total collapse of the socio-economic system in apocalyptic terms, as an opportunity to re-boot the system in a more successful, more efficient form, rather than as a wake up to reform the mode of production in a general sense. In this respect, I think we must remain cautious of Virilio's [18] Augustinian theory of apocalyptic hope, which parallels Girard's [19] view that the contemporary world is balanced somewhere between the mimetic war of all against all and an apocalyptic turn that will usher in a new mode of being together. As Žižek [20], Badiou [21], and Kroker [22] explain, and Virilio knows all too well, contemporary capitalism is itself an apocalyptic world-less form rooted in metaphysics, science fiction, and the kind of quasi-theological mysticism that Der Derian [23] finds at the heart of the American military-industrial-media-entertainment network and the related project of virtuous war. As such, and because we must understand that post-modern capitalism may well not only survive, but also profit from the end of the world, we should recognise the importance of Virilio's [24] notions of critical space. What this idea captures is the possibility that we are currently balanced on the apocalyptic edge of the socio-economic system, on the line between violent destruction and the extinction of humanity as being-in-the world, and the turn to a new ecological mode of living able to reconcile our identity as natural, social, and technological beings.

Given this concern for the apocalyptic nature of hyper-modernity, and Drew Burk's [25] account of Virilio as the apocalyptic thinker of revelation, critical distance, and the scenic imagination par excellence, I want to claim that we should emphasise the link between Virilio's concept of critical space and his ideas of the museum of accidents [26] and more recently the university of disaster. [27] Through these notions he suggests the need to reveal the catastrophic nature of the empire of speed, to open up a space for critical engagement with our culture of disaster that is otherwise prohibited by the collapse of knowledge and thought into the ecstasy of communication and information [28], and ultimately to enable the turning or transformation of global society to a more humane form.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Top Level › 1AC---Digital Cyclops

The 1AC is a form of artistic practice that recodes the question of aesthetics towards the discontinuous, the fragmentary, the uncertain, the reversal. We are the glitch, the darkness, the specters hidden within the techo-imaginary of the future that float in the drifts of codes, history, and media as their intersecting point of evocation and undermining.

Kroker 14 (Arthur Kroker, emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, “Exits to the Posthuman Future,” pgs. 195-198)//JRD

What if we were to think media theory as itself an artistic practice, that is, as a form of aesthetic imagination that seeks to directly enter the world of data nerves, network skin, and increasingly algorithmic minds with the intention of capturing the dominant mood of these posthuman times – drift culture – in a form of thought that dwells in complicated intersections and complex borderlands? In its essence, thinking with and against the larger technopoesis of accelerate, drift, and crash that holds us in its sway requires a form of media reflection that is itself an exit to the posthuman future. Here, refusing to stand outside its immediate historical circumstances and always seeking to capture in its rhythms the mood of accelerate, drift, and crash, media theory of this order allies itself with a form of emergent consciousness that is pervasive in the digital world, namely figural aesthetics. With its global gathering of new media artists, remix musicians, pirate gamers, AI graffiti artists, anonymous witnesses, and code rebels, the emerging order of figural aesthetics reveals a new order, a brilliantly hallucinatory order, based on an art of impossible questions and a perceptual language as precise as it is evocative. Here, the aesthetic imagination dwells solely on questions of incommensurability: What is the vision of the clone? What is the affect of the code? What is the hauntology of the avatar? What is most excluded, prohibited, by the android? What is the perception of the drone? What are the aesthetics of the fold? What, in short, is the meaning of aesthetics in the age of drift culture? In this case, understood as an aesthetic order of (new media) art that seeks to enter directly into the circulatory regime of the code, literally in the process becoming itself symptomatically energized by the vortices of data flows and algorithmic coding, figural aesthetics is always multiple in its artistic expressions, certainly humanizing, but also tragic, neutral, and sometimes cynical. No longer an art of expression or representation, but art that literally catches the drift of its times by entering directly into the violent perturbations of the code-stream – a form of art that is figural precisely because it registers simultaneously all the fatal speed and tragic intimations of deprival implicit in an increasingly technical reality. Not necessarily, then, a multimedia art that evokes the contagious energy of the code, although that too, but a form of art that stands poised at the fracture (Duchamp's “hinge”)2 of presence and absence, drawing into itself all the contradictions and complexity and folds of digital reality itself. Driven by a speed of (aesthetic) perception that easily exceeds the speed of the code, mobilized by a new way of seeing that is balanced between in-depth participation in the (digital) object of its study and an incommensurable drawing away from ruling narratives that would capture it, and attentive to the fact every artifact of technological posthumanism, from digital devices to private autobiography, is a possible object of artistic interest, figural aesthetics floats in the drifts of codes, history, video, and media as their intersecting point of evocation and undermining. Sensitive to fundamental changes in the order of sense perception, the artistic imagination has always functioned as a navigator, simultaneously intimate with and at a critical distance from the digital recoding of the human sensorium. Consequently, it comes as no surprise that the first response to the emerging complexities of technological posthumanism is most definitely aesthetic in form. Not a mode of aesthetics that remains at one (safe) remove from the technological transitioning of the question of the human species-form, but the swift emergence now of a style of aesthetics – figural aesthetics – that enters directly into the complexities of drift culture. Sometimes, figural aesthetics adopts the language of design. It becomes a rider of the data storm, negotiating new pathways through the radical uncertainty of the digital future. At other points, figural aesthetics offers profound meditations on the accident of technology by invoking in the language of art the ancient tradition of lament. Deliberately challenging officially prescribed frameworks of understanding, figural art of this order quickly calls down upon itself the most severe form of policing. Literally, the framework of power involved in securing contemporary norms of political intelligibility is suspicious of thought, particularly of those artistic articulations of remembrance and lament that work to undermine otherwise invisible frameworks of official interpretation. Of course, when data slams into the human condition, the result is not only the swift eradication of familiar landmarks in understanding the here, there, and everywhere of social intelligibility, but the rapid rise to prominence of new forms of figural art – mobile, augmented, remix, scanner – that in both form and content reflect the shape of the unfolding future and, in that fatal reflection, render that future uncertain and truly enigmatic. And how could it be otherwise when the earliest signs of the coming of the posthuman allude to the surfacing of body futures that are multiple: sometimes enhanced data bodies, but also bodies that have gone off-grid, bodies colonized by mono-data, bodies circulating in the digital debris of spam, spyware, viruses and contagions, and even twisted bodies caught in the opposing energy flows of the seduction of connectivity and the negation of relentless digital overexposure. Figural aesthetics is the spectral eye of the posthuman, that point where art enters the order of digital being with such perceptual intensity that it makes of itself a mutating sign of the collision of the code, the human, the android, the metallic, and perhaps even of the digital zombie. Art of this (posthuman) order recodes the question of aesthetics by the creation of a mode of perception that fully opens to the discontinuous, the fragmentary, the uncertain, the reversal. What results is a form of figural art – posthuman art – that has no necessary medium of expression precisely because it is always an art of the intersection, the incommensurable, the bifurcation, the broken code, the glitch that reveals the darkness within, the static that reflects the passage of pure speed. Art of this order is a haunting talisman of the posthuman, neither its advent nor termination, but a form of posthuman aesthetics that can never express anything external to itself because figural art constitutes in its essence the uncanny meaning of the posthuman moment – fluid, mobile, folded, combinatorial, transitional. Consequently, figural aesthetics is an art of motion but also an art of inertia – speed and slowness, noise and silence. With its strange juxtapositions, unexpected folds, fluid intersections, figural art can be so strangely familiar to us, the earliest inhabitants of the technological posthuman, because it is an advance outrider of a new form of perception that is already practiced on a daily basis but nowhere fully culturally acknowledged. While most certainly this new aesthetic language seeks to describe what has happened to the body, consciousness, labor, culture itself when folded within the cyclotron of computation, it also brings to the surface the deeper ethical concerns of society: the terrorism of the code, the revenge-taking of the failing master narratives, the injured sensibility of subject narratives in rapid decline, the growing ressentiment of the human at its eclipse by the technological posthuman, the cynical relief of the abject human at being unburdened of its eschatological responsibility for being a coherent species being – the fatal embodiment of the will to technology. Lyotard's Driftworks announced the opening themes of figural art: “Here is a course of action: harden, worsen, accelerate decadence. Adopt the perspective of active nihilism, exceed the mere recognition – be it depressive or admiring – of the destruction of all values. Become more and more incredulous. Push decadence further still and accept, for instance, to destroy the belief in truth under all its forms.” Now that the posthuman condition has revealed decadence – incredulous, excessive decadence – as the basic ontology of late capitalism, the point of a figural art that would “harden, worsen, accelerate decadence” would be precisely the reverse, that is to say, it would draw into a greater visibility those intangible, but very real, impulses to social solidarity and ethical probity that haunt the order of the real. So, then, figural art is always a navigator of uncertainty because it remains, above all, an explorer, a hinge, a fracture, in the midst of the data storm.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Top Level › 1AC---Digital Cyclops

The will to technology and the exteriorization of consciousness onto technological saviorism are both the root cause and accelerator of masculine, racial, religious, political, psychic, and environmental violence

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 149-152, October 2021, MG)

If this era can be such a time of extremes – protests against police brutality, the resurgence of Aryan nationalism, bitter political divisions, religious fundamentalisms at war against secularism, LGBTQIA rights guaranteed in law in a few countries but savagely oppressed in many others, labour disciplined by primitive accumulation (work or starve) versus growing oligopolies of finance capital – perhaps it is because, in part, trajectories explored by new media have slammed into the human condition with such accelerating violence that the resulting social, political, economic, and environmental wreckage all around us is like so much free-floating debris after the blast. Key tendencies that were once only theorized as possible futures have now escaped the realm of imaginary futurism to become the alphabet of a society, indeed of a world, seemingly imploding. We see panic anxiety as the key psycho-ontology of contemporary times: spasms of seductive misinformation circulating everywhere through the interstices of information culture; human subjectivity effectively reduced to data trash; digital delirium as the governing mood of a technological society that advances with equal measures of magic and menace; massive digital platforms breaking the skin barrier like body invaders of the sci-fi future; and everywhere possessed individuals – possessed sometimes by reactionary beliefs, technological transcendentalism, or religious passions, but many literally possessed also by deep, pervasive, and mesmerizing flows of digital codes circulating through affect, imagination, and consciousness. In this drift culture, only the most extreme signals manage to break through the noise generated by flows of information, often taking the form of the hysterical male with his anger over the loss of traditional masculinist privilege but, at other times, rising white nationalism threatened by what is perceived to be a permanently threatening outside world and always, of course, breaking news about those psychic breakdowns in the digital stream of those who can’t or won’t keep up to the speed of the nervous breakthrough that is life in the wires. Overexposed, overcirculated, overinformed, overablated, the triumphant age of being digital with its dreams of universal connectivity has quickly made visible all the broken connections of the past – ethnic grievances, religious differences, unresolved political feuds, gender violence, sexual oppression, economic injustices, moral indifference to the lives of the asylum-seeker, the slum dweller, the immigrant – just as much as it has effectively stripped digital subjects of the saving vision necessary for navigating the future. When the dust finally clears from this gathering scene of the ruins, within and without, the only thing standing will likely be the will to technology with its prophetic talisman hard at work on the human remainder: the exteriorization of human consciousness, the generalized synchronization of emotion, the ecstasy of finally becoming object-like, and the virtualization of culture. In the gathering dusk, the codes of technology are like digital sunshine on a cold, grey rainy day.

This situation can be clearly seen in the turbulent events occurring in contemporary society with the very real fear over viral contagion mixed with the quick return of politics in the streets with protests against racialized violence, and all of it multiplied in its intensity many times over by the pressures of generalized economic recession, severe job losses, and coming financial defaults. It’s literally a time of imminent social chaos, deep anxiety, palpable anger over racialized injustice, with the inevitable political backlash just waiting to express itself, and all the while what is absolutely strengthened by the crisis are technological platforms putting down the codes for the will to technology. Today, remote communication is the digital lifesaver for an educational system that has quickly chosen to disappear into Zoom; mobile communication with its rich array of digital devices provides an instant working infrastructure for working online and at a safe distance; the death of the face-to-face social rapidly gives way to streams of information, gaming, news flashes, and communications as the technical lifeblood of network society; and most definitely, the end of (traditional) work as we know it has been accelerated by the pandemic with its reduction of the labour force to “essential services,” clearing the way for a future that will quickly link artificial intelligence, deep learning, and creative robotics as the coming labour force. Seemingly, everything moves now in the direction of intensified, functionally required technological platforms. Everywhere, of course, the present mood of political malaise, economic distress, and social isolation contrasts sharply with the rising gains of finance capital as the codes of capital accumulation move in precisely the opposite, specifically virtual, direction from social and political disturbances on the ground left behind. Literally, we are witness today to the profoundly historical moment when the will to technology takes off, quickly achieving escape velocity, dynamically and spectacularly, from the inertial drag pressures of the social wasteland. While it is simultaneously predator and parasite, magic and drudge, fast (codes) and slow (life), agent of creative destruction and equally visionary new designs for the future, no one can know with certainty what a future streaming the will to technology will look like. But again, there is really no need to be a traditional futurist in this (digital) case, since this is one time in which the future is already in our past. And that future  – the future of fully exteriorized consciousness, synchronized emotion, the desire to escape subjectivity and become object-like, the triumph of virtual culture – is in its fullest measure deeply, immeasurably paradoxical.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Top Level › 1AC---Digital Cyclops

The resolution attempts to impose a will to technological transcendence – reading the myth of digital salvation in favor of AI, cyber, and biotech culminates in the transformation of life into data-made-flesh, imposing a violent psychic commitment onto subjectivities while rendering marginalized bodies as accidental road kill on the way to a technological future

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 153-156, October 2021, MG)

Perhaps it’s no longer simply a digital universe of blended minds but something more generalized, namely blended bodies: emotions, subjectivity, imagination, perception living in a world of data made flesh. Like a technological makeover of the Christian Bible, which begins with the words “In the beginning was the Word” (John 1:1–3), the digital bible begins with the translation of the spoken word of divinity into the cold data of technological platforms. And, while the biblical story of the Word was recorded in prophecies of the Old Testament and gospels of the New Testament as the coming of the long-awaited messiah, for whose bodily sacrifice humanity would be indebted from birth to an eschatological debt that could never be repaid, the digital bible substitutes salvation by data, an epochal opportunity to shed the skin of the human in favour of the soft skin of the digital. When the story of this particular period in history is ultimately written, it will no doubt focus on salvation by running the numbers – data made flesh – as the animating impulse behind skinning the digital world with DIY bodies, surveillance that never sleeps, drone skies, robotic cyber-machines, singularity theory, artificial intelligence, deep learning, and biometric sensors everywhere. Here, digital devices are portals to the latest secular version of salvation, the instant connectivity of smart phones a re-enactment of a religious state of grace, artificial intelligence a gateway to transcendence, globally synchronized emotion a mass conversionary experience, desiring to become a data object drifting in the network a basic article of digital faith, and the fast streaming of virtual life as so many triumphant hosannas to the moment of digital redemption.

However, just like the story of Christianity before it, this newest reenactment of the myth of salvation in digital form has its competing myths: one, the myth of order, is literally the attempt by power and capital to channel the explosive energies released by network connectivity into a new digital order maximizing political loyalty and economic profit; and the other, the myth of freedom, is network society pushed to its limits and beyond by a rising generation of blended minds, data flesh, and virtual perception, particularly by the generation of the young today moving at particle speed.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Top Level › 1AC---Digital Cyclops

The new security state attempts to inscribe bodies in debate with cold information, chilling them to degree zero where they are nothing more than recombinant flows of information

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 80-83, October 2021, MG)

Machines to Bodies (M2B): Smart Bodies, Cold Data, and “Five Eyes”

Are smart bodies in a culture of cold data the probable future of technologies of mass surveillance? In response to the challenge of bodily materiality, with its hidden passions, secret dreams, and unexpected – and often unpredictable – actions, the new security state is rapidly moving towards the deployment of a new generation of smart bodies located on the always searchable smart grid of technologies of mass surveillance. Since machine readability is enhanced by biometric identifiers, the aim would be to populate the skin surface with an array of sensors for improved machine readability. For the moment, the transition to smart bodies equipped with electronic skin tattoos, locatable media, and prosthetics facilitating easy biometric tracking is marked by technical, and then political, challenges, as the new security state works to filter, archive, and tag the immense data oceans of global communication. It is in this context that there can be such dramatic political encounters between passionate defenders of individual privacy and proponents of the new security state interested in the total awareness provided by networked communication.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR

Notes

Thanks to James, Guy, Michael, Steven, and Eleanor for their hard work on this file. Please email with any questions or concerns.

Notes from Michael Greenberg: The aff is a critique of communication and thinking about technology. I want to make this explicitely clear – the aff says the WILL to technology is bad, not that technology itself is bad – you should read the cards to understand why but the words “technological saviorism” and “digital salvation” absolutely need to be in your vocabulary.

I think the best framework angle is either the glezos stuff or the improvement bad angle – either one implicates the subjecthood of debaters, again read the 1ac ev it’s pretty good

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › At: Sjoberg

They overstate gender and their root-cause arguments re-create essentialism – this directly indicts Sjoberg

Prugl 14 (Elisabeth, professor of International Relations/ Political Science at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, March, http://www.cambridge.org.secure.sci-hub.bz/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/div-classtitlea-discussion-of-laura-sjobergandaposs-span-classitalicgendering-global-conflict-toward-a-feminist-theory-of-warspandiv/16E6B6EA6CCAB1DACFC1B1A4D9F26837)

One of the dangers of unmooring feminism from itself and from other critical approaches is that its insights become molded so as to be all things to all approaches. In the process, its core propositions get flattened so they can adjust to other theoretical axioms. This is the case here with regard to gender, arguably feminism ’ s core analytical concept. Sjoberg develops a “ realist feminism, ” proposing that gender hierarchy is a structural feature of the international system and a permissive cause of war, in addition to or substituting for anarchy (p. 98). In this approach, gender becomes “ genders ” (pp. 76 ff), that is, the categories women and men, and gender hierarchy an organizational attribute of states. What is lost is gender as a relational concept and as an analytical category, the usages preferred by many feminists. Casting aside feminist debates about the sense and nonsense of structuralist theories of patriarchy, Sjoberg resurrects them under the mantle of gendering neorealism. In her dialogue between unequals, gender yields to the theoretical axioms of the mainstream.

Another casualty of this dialogue between unequals is the explanatory status of masculinity, which has become somewhat contested in feminist IR. In Sjoberg’s hands, hegemonic masculinity freezes into a predictive variable. She hypothesizes that “ the more competitive a state ’ s hegemonic masculinity, the more likely that state is to make war. . . . States with elements of hypermasculinity in the nationalist discourse would be expected to be more aggressive ” (p. 100). We are left to guess why masculinities always seem to be (more or less) competitive, what hypermasculinity consists of, and how its characteristics can be known in advance. Despite the feminist truism that gender (and thus masculinity) is a social construct, pro- fessed also by Sjoberg, she seems to imply that too much masculinity somehow brings about war. That is, masculinities always seem to be already tainted with militarism and aggression, suggesting some masculine core that no amount of social construction can overcome. Perhaps it is overdrawn to assign responsibility for this confusion to a dialogue between unequals in which gender is reformu- lated to fi t positivist epistemologies; however, a targeted engagement with feminist literatures on militarist masculinities might have prevented this mistake. Indeed, Gendering Global Con fl ict i s most satisfying when the author leaves the mainstream behind, as she does in the next to last chapter, on gendered experiences of war. Here, she brings to life one of the most important con- tributions of feminist writings on war, that is, recalling what war feels like to those who participate in it, its economics, its deprivations, its sensual impressions, and its violences. This is the starting point I would love to have seen Sjoberg take in this book, using her encyclopedic knowledge of the fi eld, together with her analytic prowess, not just to argue but to demonstrate the unique contri- butions of feminist security studies.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › AT: Empiricism/Rationality Bad

Empiricism is good and compatible with a feminist framework

Neilson, 05 (Joyce, Sociology Prof @ University of Colorado at Boulder, Vital Variables and Gender Equity in Academe: Confessions from a Feminist Empiricist Project, Signs 31(1), pp. 1-28)

The now substantial literature on the topic describes feminist research as “passionate, scrappy, energizing” (Garko 1999, 167) and also as contradictory, controversial, revolutionary, dynamic, problematic, oxymoronic, explosive, and filled with creative tension. Deborah L. Tolman and Laura A. Szalacha refer to “epistemological unrest” (1999, 10). Michelle Fine and Susan Gordon describe feminist psychology as an inherent contradiction, pointing out that psychological laboratory studies, with their isolation, sterility, and lack of relationships, are designed to “drive women mad” (1992, 11). Elizabeth Merrick (1999) describes her complex feminist reanalysis of data on teen pregnancy as “like chewing gravel.” There is agreement in the literature that traditional methods need feminist-inspired interruption (Harding 1987). Indeed, Ellen Scott and Bindi Shah (1993, 99) cite Beatriz Pesquera as wondering if “we can develop empowering methodologies without examining the whole process of academic production within the university.” Certainly we have accomplished one goal of this article, that is, to capture the contradictory, emergent, and potentially revolutionary nature of feminist research as it is practiced. Backstage, inside-story accounts of research in progress have been contributing to improving methodologies at least since Julius A. Roth’s “Hired Hands Research” (1966). Feminist research is especially known for its reflectivity. It is not surprising, then, that there is a substantial literature of case studies of feminist research projects.16 Indeed, there is so much that Jane Ussher (1999) asks if feminist researchers are obsessed with methods. A second purpose of this article is to contribute to this literature. Our focus is specifically on feminist empiricism, something described in the literature as in transition and controversial even (or primarily) among feminists. See, for example, Sandra Harding’s (1993) detailed comparison between the feminist standpoint, on the one hand, and prefeminist and spontaneous feminist empiricist epistemologies, on the other; Richmond Campbell’s (1994) model of internal feminist empiricism; Helen Longino’s (1993) philosophical model of contextual empiricism; and Lynn Hankinson Nelson’s (1990, 1993) naturalized empiricism. Thus, juxtaposing our reflective thoughts on feminist empirical work with writings by theorists and philosophers on the topic should be informative. Not surprisingly, we do not exactly fit any one description of feminist empiricism—not completely and not yet anyway. Certainly we recognize what Harding (1993) calls spontaneous feminist empiricism in the earliest stages of this project. But our thinking quickly became unstable, transitioning across different feminist approaches.17 To contribute to current discussion and debate around feminist empiricism, how it is practiced, and how it is transitioning, we present a few close-to-the-ground conclusions based on this particular research experience. As stated earlier, we recognized, perhaps agonizingly, that our feminist thinking had outpaced available methods and strategies. This was most obvious in efforts to measure feminist consciousness when we realized that it was impossible to capture conceptual complexities and refinements in a few or even a series of survey questions. We also realized that to generate useful data and capture the thinking of our respondents, we had to abandon our own constructs and temporarily adopt our respondents’ points of view. We saw the same pattern—that our feminist thinking had outpaced our empiricist approach—with respect to understanding salary differences between male and female faculty. We began with an effort to explain (away) via regression analyses the gendered gap in salaries at this university. We ended with critical questions about the larger social structure and culture—questions that are unanswerable within regression-mode thinking. The questions that emerge when one attempts a deeper—behind the numbers—understanding of this pattern relate to the division of labor by sex. That is, answers to questions about salary differences are found in patterns of sex segregation by academic discipline and likely by associated patterns of work distribution (research, teaching, and service) across and within disciplines. These in turn are patterns that reflect the larger societal division of labor by sex. It is interesting that these kinds of substantive questions begin to approach those that constitute starting points for feminist standpoint theory. We cite, for example, Harding’s description of Dorothy Smith’s questions about women’s work that are generated by a strategy of grounding knowledge in women’s everyday experience: “She [Smith] points out that if we start thinking from women’s lives, we (anyone) can see that women are assigned the work that men do not want to do for themselves” (Harding 1993, 53). We come to a similar conclusion—that our feminist work developed similarities to standpoint and postmodern approaches—from our experience of dual vision. That is, as we shifted between views of the university from central and from marginal social locations, from both the inside and the underside, we experienced firsthand the multivocal and complex nature of the realities we were studying. In other words, this process erased, eroded, and undermined any semblance of the monologic voice that usually underlies and characterizes prefeminist empiricism and much of feminist empiricism. Does it matter what we call our practice of feminist research? Does it matter whether what we have described is contextual (Longino 1993), spontaneous (Harding 1993), positivist, internal (Campbell 1994), or naturalized feminist empiricism (Nelson 1990, 1993)? It does insofar as feminist empiricism is still emerging and this work can be seen as part of the transition toward delineating an effective, successful, and transforming version of feminist research. As a feminist project whose researchers are cognizant of the variety of feminist alternatives, it has descriptive and thus epistemological value. As an actual project against which primarily theoretical work can be compared, its value is in its very doing. Why confessions? This account feels confessional in the sense that alternatives to feminist empiricism—standpoint and postmodern feminism—seem more cutting edge because they are more deliberately critical of traditional ways of producing knowledge. We felt apologetic for continually falling back on known empiricist strategies when we were thinking more radically and aware of being constrained methodologically. This is an odd stance to take, though, since feminist empiricism has been revolutionary in its contribution to women’s liberation, and, as Francesca Cancian (1996) and Longino (1993) point out, despite much writing about creating innovative methods, most feminist work revises mainstream methodologies. (An oft-repeated theme in the literature is that feminism is not in the methods per se but in their use.) Postmodern thinking in particular is often more exhilarating and challenging theoretically, yet insofar as it rejects grand theory, large-scale models, and indeed any kind of generalization, it poses almost irresolvable empirical challenges. Our theme that feminist empiricism is outgrowing its traditional methods is worth pursuing through further analysis of specific research projects such as the one we describe. For now, we continue to stretch and expand the research paradigm with which we began.