Moore ‘22 [Gregory J. Moore; Professor of Global Studies and Politics, Colorado Christian University; 6-3-22; “Huawei, Cyber-Sovereignty and Liberal Norms: China’s Challenge to the West/Democracies”; https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11366-022-09814-2#Sec4; accessed 7-19-2022; AH]
Said’s orientalism construct [26] is an important contribution to the study of colonialism, post-colonial thought, international relations and sociology. There is no reason to challenge it here. It’s application to the digital realm is an interesting and important one. The premise of the editors of this special issue is that the West expected China to evolve into a liberal democracy, but that this has not happened, and moreover this (from the West’s perspective “fundamentally illegitimate”) power has been able to increasingly compete head to head with the US and the West in military, political, economic and technological terms, and this has created deep fear among Western/democratic leaders. Fear is a key part of this orientalist narrative. The argument is that it is fear of this digital, political and cultural other that drives a tough US, Australian, British (for example) policy toward China, and drives a harsh stand toward Huawei. To set this up in a cause and effect framework, then digital orientalism is the independent variable that causes fear in the US and others towards China, that brings about the dependent variable, harsh policies toward China and Huawei specifically. What this would mean is that other factors would not explain the dependent variable, the harsh US/Western policy toward Huawei. The question we will pose here is, is this correct? There are several potential problems with this argument. First, establishing that fear is an independent variable is not easy. Despite the quality of their work generally speaking, the editors have not done the thick description necessary to establish this. Simply showing tough rhetoric, hawkish views on the US/Western/democratic side (which are indeed there), does not really do the job effectively. Second, we haven’t considered counterfactuals or ruled out other methods that might test our hypothesis or do a better job explaining the outcome we observe (the harsh US/Western policy toward Huawei) than the proposed independent variable, digital orientalism. Following on from this point, I would propose a consideration of the hypothesized independent variable, “China and Huawei pose credible threats to national security of the US and other democracies” as a way to understand the approach the US, Australia, the UK and others have taken toward Huawei. Securitization provides a way of looking at this issue that is helpful in this case. As Buzan, Waever and de Wilde [3: 25] put it, Securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects…The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations: When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed? There can be no doubt that in the United States, Australia, India and other countries, Huawei’s 5G offerings have been securitized, and this is evident by the “discourse and political constellations” in those and other countries, as I’ve illustrated above. Yet why hasn’t this been the case in all countries? As Buzan et al. note, referencing the work of Arnold Wolfers [3: 30], security threats may be objective/real, or subjective/perceived, and where the twain meet or diverge is not always easy to ascertain. It is possible that A. China’s Huawei is acting as a threat in some countries and not in others. It’s also possible that B. China’s Huawei and its 5G are a threat wherever they operate but some countries don’t yet understand that or don’t believe it. It’s also possible that C. Huawei and its 5G are not a threat and have simply been socially constructed as a threat, needlessly securitized. The notion that digital orientalism is the reason for the securitization of Huawei and its 5G would line up with the last tack, or C. The argument presented here, however, is that digital orientalism does not explain the US/Western/democratic response to China’s growing illiberal impact on global internet governance or its worrisome presence, via Huawei, in more and more national 5G internet infrastructure schemes. On the contrary, the hypothesis posed here is something like B. above, that real security concerns do, that the securitization of Huawei is not an irrational response to Huawei 5G because of 1. some of Huawei’s actions/track record, 2. the nature of its relations with the Chinese state, and 3. the track record or broader actions (now and in the past) of that Chinese state at home and abroad as it regards media freedoms, intellectual property theft, human rights problems, and more. Having said this, digital (or conventional) orientalism may be lurking in the background and exacerbating technological and political dynamics. I suspect it is. The editors are likely not incorrect in that sense, for certainly there is a sense that China represents a “digital other,” a “political other” and a “cultural other” for Westerners and Liberals in general, and the notion of digital orientalism may explain certain aspects of that. At the same time, the argument presented here is that a careful study of China’s practices in the cyber-realm, whether at home or abroad,Footnote9 make it clear that there are very clear security-centric reasons for concern about China’s and Huawei’s presence in 5G internet infrastructure construction, mobile phone handset production, and even Chinese apps like TikTok and WeChat, which India has banned, and both of which the Trump Administration tried but failed to ban in the US. US, Australian, British, Swedish and other countries’ increasingly robust pushback against Huawei and other Chinese players in the construction of global 5G infrastructure can be easily understood by studying A. China’s cyber practices at home and abroad, and B. the impact they have on the security (and perceptions of security) of nations they work with. Very simply, those pushing back see what China is doing, they don’t like it, and they don’t want Chinese companies to have any major role in constructing telecommunications infrastructure inside their countries. This is because they believe they know what that will lead to, and they don’t believe that is good from their perspectives. If China/Huawei was a player like Nokia, Ericsson or Samsung, the US and these others would not be raising alarms. In fact, the US, Australia and UK have not been raising alarms about Nokia, Ericsson or Samsung, the other major players in 5G. Why? Is it digital orientalism? In fact, given that Samsung is Korean, one might expect the US to push back against Samsung, for it too is “oriental,” non-Western, following the logic of Said. We don’t really see that, however. South Korea is a democratic polity and a US ally, so there is no angst on Washington’s part, no concerns about security. Moreover, the South Korean government does not have a history of stealing US IPR, of spying on the US as China has been, or doing anything that could be considered a national security threat toward the US, so there has been no pushback from Washington in the face of Samsung’s growing presence in the US or in US 5G operations. Some argue that the US simply refuses to yield the number one spot to anyone, whether in technology or in economic dominance. Yet if the US was pushing back against Huawei because the US wanted to be number one, because the US wanted to dominate, why wouldn’t the US fund AT&T, Apple, Google or someone else in the US to be number one? Why wouldn’t the US hinder the advances of Nokia, Ericsson and/or Samsung in the US and elsewhere? We don’t really see any of that, however. Digital orientalism doesn’t really explain this, in this case. I will argue here that it’s because first, American thinkers do not think in such hierarchical terms as their Chinese counterparts do (they aren’t unified in an obsession with being number 1 as is the case with the Chinese state and its companies; see [18]. Second, the US is not pushing back against Huawei primarily because of market imperatives/motivations, but rather because of concerns about security and lack of trust in the Chinese state and Chinese companies that are subject thereto. The US trusts the leadership of Nokia, Ericsson and Samsung, and they don’t see their home governments (Finland, Sweden and South Korea, respectively) as bent on spying, stealing IPR and undermining free expression at home and increasingly around the world. It’s about the Chinese state’s very bad track record of stealing intellectual property, of suppressing free expression, of cyber-surveillance and hacking, of suppressing truth and suppressing dissidents – increasingly not only inside China but abroad as well.Footnote10 Pushing back against Huawei and China’s cyber-sovereignty model has become an existential fight for those who see things in the way I have depicted here. In a telling statement by former Obama National Security Advisor Susan Rice to Canada’s CBC about the security threat Huawei posed to Canada and others, Rice said,