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2022 Michigan Counterplan
DOS CP › Internal NB---CP Boosts DoS Leadership

The CP solves rebalancing. DoS assistance and resource expansion strengthens oversight of DoD.

Serafino 16 [Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs; "Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense"; Congressional Research Service; Published: 5-26-2016; Accessed: 6-20-2022; https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R44444.pdf; KL]

On one hand are concerns that the expansion of DOD authority has rendered the State Department unable to carry out its 1961 FAA Section 622(c) oversight responsibility of security assistance and cooperation activities to ensure a coherent foreign policy. Since 9/11, some analysts have perceived DOD as acting with growing autonomy, increasingly independent of State Department direction and supervision. The proliferation of DOD security cooperation authorities is viewed by some analysts as an element of the militarization of foreign policy, with GCCs disproportionately influencing the tenor of relations with countries in their theaters of operations.36 This viewpoint reflects a broader perception that DOD’s overwhelming advantage in personnel and funds allows it to evade State Department direction and oversight and to conduct activities better carried out by civilians, which may be to the detriment of long-term U.S. interests.

As a result, some analysts and practitioners argue that Congress should “rebalance” the State Department-DOD division of labor by strengthening State Department input into and oversight of DOD security cooperation. One way to do so might be to streamline the modes of State Department-DOD cooperation, an effort that Administration officials state is underway. Another would be to expand State Department oversight resources, including new posts in State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, which oversees security assistance, and at U.S. embassies. Still another might be to reform the statutory framework, placing some or most DOD security assistance activities under existing or expanded Title 22 authority or conducting such activities under an existing or new State Department-DOD “joint formulation” authority.37

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Asian Futurism fails

Asian futurity gets coopeted by the same neoliberal contradictions it tries to overcome

Bahng 15 (Aimee Bahng | “The Cruel Optimism of Asian Futurity and the Reparative Practices of Sonny Liew’s Malinky Robot” | Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media pg 163-165 | DOA: 7/17/2022 | SAoki)

The cover of Kishore Mahbubani’s 2008 publication The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East presents readers with what seems to be the global sign for financial growth: skyscrapers under construction. Cranes perch atop every tower, suggestive of the “all-at-once-ness” of growth in Asia. The illuminated construction site stretching into the night sky highlights the unrelenting pace of growth, which proceeds even as the rest of the world sleeps. The scene is a familiar one, prefigured by the race for the tallest building that ran across parts of Asia (Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan) in the early 2000s. 1 But the unpainted, all white structures feel eerily hollow and decontextualized. There’s no sign of the human laborers who welded and wired these structures. The lot is all but empty, with the exception of one nondescript car parked in the foreground. This scene of speculative building— construction predicted but not contracted to sell—feels like an already haunted future, in which “New Asia” has become an empty lot, evacuated of its denizens and prepared to signify the sheer potential of capital. Published amid the financial crisis of 2008, Mahbubani’s book, as well as his Financial Times declaration of a realizable Asian Century that serves as this essay’s epigraph, excite what Alan Greenspan once called “irrational exuberance.” Uttered in a speech Greenspan gave in 1996, in his capacity as chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, the phrase characterized the “unduly escalated asset values” of Japan’s economic bubble. The next day, Tokyo’s stock market fell sharply, closing 3 percent down, and Greenspan’s speech largely presaged the Asian financial crash a year later. The extent to which economic projections hang on the words of figureheads like Alan Greenspan demonstrates how such speculations work as performative speech acts that call the future into being. Similarly, the optimism Mahbubani announces in forward-looking, prophetic tones (“optimism will deliver the Asian Century”), affectively structures speculative investment in Asian futures. This vision of the new Asian hemisphere, colonized by empty high-rises reaching toward limitless horizons and built by deterritorialized workers, projects a future of automated speculative building, fueled by investment hungry banks. If Greenspan and Mahbubani both grasp how their respective declarations of pessimism and optimism will affect the global economy, they do so with two different Asias in mind: Japan of the late 1990sand Singapore at the dawn of a “new Asia” in 2008. 2 The so-called Asian Century, toward which Mahbubani’s optimism strains, functions as a largescale speculative fiction spawned from neoliberal fantasies that capitalize on a literary genre’s already problematic investments in techno-Orientalism. In their 1995examination of techno-Orientalism, David Morley and Kevin Robins call attention to U.S. and European fantasies of Japan and its shift in those imaginaries in the 1980s from an exotic playground to a land of emotionless automatons. Perhaps epitomized by Western dystopian cyberpunk such as Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982) and William Gibson’s Neuromancer (1984), techno-Orientalism figures the Japanese as “unfeeling aliens; they are cyborgs and replicants. But there is also the sense that these mutants are now better adapted to survive in the future”(170). While Morley and Robins understand techno-Orientalism as primarily born out of Western anxieties about Japan’s challenge to U.S. economic hegemony, they also suggest more specifically how techno-Orientalism arises just as Japan emerges as “the largest creditor and the largest net investor in the world” (153). What Morley and Robins never fully develop, and what I want to explore in more depth here, is this coordinated turn toward Asian futures in both financial and cultural forms of speculation. Mathematical models of probability and investment strategies based on extrapolation are forms of speculative fiction that project finance capitalism’s visions of futurity onto the world. Interdisciplinary scholarship from the past two decades has pointed to the performative aspects of economic speculation (MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu), the sociological systems of financial markets (Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger), the impact on subjectivity of financial instruments such as derivatives and debt bundling (LiPuma and Lee), and the “financialization of daily life” (Martin). Because speculative economies rely ever more on rhetorical tools and narrative strategies to explain and market the practice of trading on futures and securities, financial speculation and speculative fiction both participate in the cultural production of futurity, and futurity becomes the arena in which new subject formations emerge. Does techno Orientalism register anxieties about finance capitalism, or does finance capitalism use techno-Orientalism as a basis for its extrapolations of futurity? I emphasize the co-constitutive relationship between the cultural production and financial worlding of Asian futurity. A peculiar question arises then, when Asian economic and political architects themselves participate in the projection of Asian futurity, all the while drawing on a techno-Orientalist toolkit. I argue that critical analysis of the discursive site of Asian futurity reveals points of contradiction in American neoliberalism as it travels that have to do with earlier forms of racial and colonial subjugation providing the scaffolding for the architecture of neoliberalism itself.3 As Asia develops its own neoliberal rhetoric, articulating its own futurity poses certain problems that necessitate a disavowal of the racism of techno-Orientalism. What stands in to “smooth” that difficulty is the heteronormativity techno-Orientalism always espoused that Asian futurity posits anew as part of its road map, capitalizing on aspirational teleologies, valuations of privatized worth, and nationalisms consolidated through processes of racialization. I focus my investigation on techno-Orientalism’s role in the production ofa global neoliberal subject in contemporary Singapore, where a tech economy adopts and adapts localized versions of seemingly universalized notions of “the good life.” Building on Lauren Berlant’s theorization of “cruel optimism,” this essay levies a critique of “the Asian Century” as imagined by economists around the world. It argues that a revisionist Asian futurity needs to intervene in the neoliberal orientations of “the good life” and, in the face of foreclosed futures, open possibilities of what Eve Sedgwick has called “reparative practices.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Anti-eurocentrism fails

Anti-eurocentrism is flawed and unneeded – western-centrism’s role in IR has decreased exponentially

Kuru 15(Historicising Eurocentrism and antiEurocentrism in IR: A revisionist account of disciplinary self-reflexivity, DENIZ KURU*, sep 21 2015, page 352-353)//BRownRice

‘All scholars are Eurocentrics’: The limits of anti-Eurocentrism What can be seen as a major problem with critics of Eurocentric IR is their tendency to overstate the impact of Eurocentrism as an ideology by confusing it with a more geo-historically situated form of Eurocentric world order. Stated differently, anti-Eurocentrics do not differentiate in general between Eurocentrism as an ideology (one that sees Europe, or a more global West as the only active subject of world politics) and Eurocentrism as a picture of the world that derives from the significance of European powers at a certain point in time, basically from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries. This perception leads the critics to exaggerate the extent of Eurocentrism in IR. Virtually all forms of analysis that give a prominent role to the European (and Western) actors in the global political order come to be seen as Eurocentric. Whenever a scholar chooses to focus on the significance of the European powers (or the impact of the West), [they are] targeted as Eurocentric.3 The extent of this problem becomes more visible when considering the work of anti-Eurocentric scholarship, which demonstrates an unending circle of intra-IR disciplinary blaming and bashing. For instance, feminist IR scholarship points to the prevalence of Eurocentric biases among their more mainstream colleagues.4 In turn, they are accused by Hobson of Eurocentrism. He sees in feminist IRʼs focus on women in the Third World ʻthe risk of returning us back into the Eurocentric cul-de-sac of rendering Eastern women as but passive victims of Western power, thereby stripping them of agencyʼ. 5 Postcolonialists criticise in turn the approach most closely associated with Hobsonʼs approach, that is, historical sociology for carrying Eurocentric features.6 Finally, postcolonialists are attacked by advocates of decolonising approaches who find the presence of Eurocentric positions in the work of the former.7 This inherent race to the bottom in the form of accusing others as Eurocentrics demonstrates that a mere proliferation of anti-Eurocentric analyses will not suffice to de-Eurocentricise IR. Otherwise, disciplinary self-reflexivity will be reduced to blaming others for Eurocentrism without turning to a broader contextualisation of and variation between Eurocentrisms. It should be evident that this would help us neither in reducing the actual impact of ideologically motivated Eurocentric analyses in the discipline nor in gaining a better understanding of our own positions and scholarly motives. A major aspect in this context concerns the differences between the continuing impact of European/Western influences in todayʼs world and the way in which Western-dominated power-knowledge connections of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are to a certain extent overcome. Although many scholars criticise IRʼs Eurocentrism for the close relations they find between knowledge (production) practices and the supposed power impact of the West, they overlook the extent to which the gradual decline in the Westʼs power has also changed these interactions. This means that one has to approach Eurocentrism in a more nuanced fashion so that the residual impact of the Western powersʼ relatively decreasing global significance can be recognised as the instantiation of a gradual process of de-Eurocentricisation that goes in line with a less Western, more post-Western world. Immanuel Wallerstein speaks of ʻanti-Eurocentric Eurocentrismʼ. According to him, this form of Eurocentric scholarship asserts either that Europe just interrupted others from doing what they were doing and did it herself, or that Europe did something which was just ʻa continuation of what others had already been doing for a long time, with the Europeans temporarily coming to the foregroundʼ. To overcome such anti-Eurocentric Eurocentrism, scholars must ʻcease trying to deprive Europe of its specificity on the deluded premise that we are thereby depriving it of an illegitimate creditʼ. Wallerstein suggests that ʻ[w]e must fully acknowledge the particularity of Europeʼs reconstruction of the world because only then will it be possible to transcend it.’ 8 Following this assumption, even Hobsonʼs anti-Eurocentrism emerges as an instance of Eurocentrism, for he tends to look for non-Western origins in virtually all historical developments of the modern era, overlooking thus the extent to which the Western dominance in the nineteenth century made its previous interactions with the non-Western actors less relevant when thinking of Eurocentrism in that era.9 I turn to a detailed examination of Hobsonʼs approach after providing a more differentiated typology between various forms of Eurocentrism. As another example in which Wallerstein would have seen anti-Eurocentric Eurocentrism, one can refer to Kerem Nişancıoğluʼs recent study on the peripheral role given to the Ottoman Empire in studies of capitalist development. He argues that IR ʻhas been built on largely Eurocentric assumptionsʼ with the Ottomans being ʻabsent, passive, or merely a comparative foil against which the specificity and superiority of Europe has been definedʼ. 10 His counterpoint is that the Ottoman Empire ʻwas arguably the most powerful actor in the Early Modern periodʼ. Based on his employment of Trotskyʼs theory of uneven and combined development, the combined impact of Ottoman strength and Europeʼs privilege of backwardness would lead the latter (especially its northwestern parts, that is, England) to gain ʻthe geopolitical space required to conduct modern state-buildingʼ. Thus, Nişancıoğlu presents a revision of the historical sociology of international relations, which he accuses of being too concentrated on European history. The point of contention is about conditions affecting the birth of modern capitalism. However, it is possible to see this as another issue, one that is researchable in a historical framework without accusations of Eurocentrism. Nişancıoğlu himself is careful to add that his goal is not ʻto argue that capitalismʼs origins were entirely extra-Europeanʼ nor to ʻseek to substantially diminish the centrality or uniqueness of Europe in this processʼ. 11 These are big caveats that show that even self-declared non-Eurocentric accounts recognise Europeʼs specific role in the emergence of the modern world order. Hence, it becomes possible to reject Nişancıoğluʼs general critique of IRʼs Eurocentrism, for his own work illustrates that the broader assumptions of IR still hold with regard to Europeʼs dominant role in the emergence of modern capitalism and the international order associated with it.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

AT: retooling rhetoric alt

The alt recreates the epistemological failures they try to critique

Eun 18(Yong-Soo Eunm Yong-Soo Eun, PhD, is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Hanyang University, South Korea, and the Editor-in-Chief of the Routledge series, IR Theory and Practice in Asia. Yong-Soo is broadly interested in IR theory, pluralism in social and international studies, emotion, and the international politics of the Asia-Pacific region. His work has been published in scholarly journals including Review of International Studies, PS: Political Science and Politics, Perspectives on Politics, and The Pacific Review., 10-17-2018, "Opening up the debate over ‘non-western’ international relations," SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0263395718805401)//BRownRice

Criticisms At the same time, a number of empirical, epistemological, and normative criticisms have been raised against attempts to develop a Chinese IR theory and (by extension) ‘non-Western’ IR. Empirically, Asian IR are not fundamentally different from those of Europe, in the sense that anarchy, survival, and the balance of power have been the key operating principles of state-to-state interactions since the pre-modern period. For example, based on a detailed archive analysis of China’s foreign relations under the Song and Ming dynasties, Yuan-kang Wang concludes that in the ‘anarchical’ international environment at that time ‘Confucian culture did not constrain … [Chinese] leaders’ decisions to use force; in making such decisions, leaders have been mainly motivated by their assessment of the balance of power between China and its adversary’ (Wang, 2011: 181). This finding leads Wang to defend the theoretical utility of structural realism based on the Westphalian system. Epistemologically, too, critics point out that it is ‘unscientific’ to emphasise and/or incorporate a particular culture or the worldview of a particular nation or region into IR theory, for a legitimately ‘scientific’ theory should seek ‘universality, generality’ (Choi, 2008; Song, 2001). Mainstream (positivist) IR theorists and methodologists argue that IR studies ought to seek observable general patterns of states’ external behaviour, develop empirically verifiable ‘covering law’ explanations, and test their hypotheses through cross-case comparisons. For example, Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba make it clear that generality is the single most important measure of progress in IR, stressing that ‘the question is less whether … a theory is false or not … than how much of the world the theory can help us explain’ (King et al., 1994: 101, emphasis in original). From this perspective, any attempt to develop an indigenous IR theory, be it non-Western or Western, is suspect because it delimits the general applicability of theory. In the case of a Chinese IR theory, criticism of this kind can increasingly be found in studies by younger Chinese IR scholars. According to Xinning Song (2001: 68), Chinese scholars, especially younger ones who have studied in the West, think that it is ‘unscientific or unnecessary to emphasize the so-called Chinese characteristics’. A similar criticism can be found among Korean IR scholars in regard to attempts to build a ‘Korean-style’ IR theory (Cho, 2015). Critics of the ‘Korean School’ of IR frequently ask how can we make a distinctively Korean IR theory while trying to be as generalisable as possible? In Jongkun Choi’s (2008: 215) words, ‘any theorising based on Korea’s unique historical experiences must be tested under the principle of generality’. Normative criticisms of attempts to build a ‘non-Western’ IR theory highlight the relationship between power and knowledge. Critics point out that although theory-building enterprises from the perspective of the ‘non-West’ commonly begin by problematising Western-dominated IR, the ongoing scholarly practices and discourses associated with ‘non-Western’ IR can also entail (or reproduce) the same hierarchic and exclusionary structure of knowledge production, which can fall prey to particular national or regional interests. For example, in his discussion of Chinese visions of world order, William Callahan doubts the applicability of ‘Tianxia’. He claims that what the notion of Tianxia does is ‘blur’ the conceptual and practical ‘boundaries between empire and globalism, nationalism, and cosmopolitanism’. Rather than help us move towards a ‘post-hegemonic’ world, Tianxia serves to be a philosophical foundation upon which ‘China’s hierarchical governance is updated for the twenty-first century’ (Callahan, 2008: 749). Supporting this view, Ching-Chang Chen (2011: 1) argues that: re-envisioning IR in Asia is not about discovering or producing as many “indigenous” national schools of IR as possible. Scholars … must also recognise and resist the pitfalls of equating the mere increase of non-Western voices with the genuine democratisation of the field, if they are to live up to their responsibility to jointly construct a non-hegemonic discipline. In a similar vein, Josuke Ikeda (2011: 12–13) argues that ‘there needs to be a “post-Western” turn rather [than a] “non-Western” [one] … in order to address another kind of “Westfailure” in IR theory’. In short, critics argue that although it is our ‘responsibility’ to make IR more pluralistic and democratic, ‘most intellectual endeavors to construct non-Western IRT in Asia run the risk of inviting nativism’ (Chen, 2011: 16). Most recently, Andrew Hurrell (2016: 149–150) has added that although developing culturally specific ways of understanding the world ‘undoubtedly encourages greater pluralism’, attempts to do so can also lead to a national and regional ‘inwardness’ that works to reproduce the very ‘ethnocentricities’ that are being challenged.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

T/L

The squo solves and any alt fails

Owen 12 [Owen, Roger, Roger Owen is the A.J. Meyer Professor of Middle East History at Harvard University and was previously the Director of the university’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies., 4-20-2012, "Edward Said and the Two Critiques of Orientalism," Middle East Institute, https://www.mei.edu/publications/edward-said-and-two-critiques-orientalism]//AA

Second, we need to continue the good work of combining training in languages, history, and culture with training in the social sciences begun in most American and European centers of Middle Eastern studies. One without the other is no longer enough — and is no longer seen to be enough. Third, the social sciences provide a necessary additive to works of analysis which operate simply at the level of discourse and the various ways this has been used to answer questions with little or no attention to what I would still want to call material reality. Last, but not least, and in answer to those critics who accuse Said-influenced social scientists of managing to avoid most of the important political and ideological issues of the moment, we now have the tools to make important contributions to such vital contemporary Middle Eastern subjects as military occupations, religious politics, the explosive growth of the Gulf port cities, and Islamic banking, not to mention the enormous impact of globalization, where a knowledge of the history of the region has to be combined with an ability to pick out and to describe those underlying structures, dynamics, and trajectories which define them now and will continue to do so in the future. All this is good news, and would certainly be good news to Edward Said himself. Given that the field of modern Middle East Studies is only some 50 years old, that it had to extract itself from the hold of a first generation of scholars who still saw the Middle East in very reductionist, ahistorical terms, and that it takes time to build up a core of experts versed in language, history, local knowledge, and the social sciences, we finally have a set of praiseworthy scholars. Conclusion It is important to see Edward Said’s work, and the mixed reception it received, in the round. This means reading Orientalism as carefully as its author would wish and then being able to understand its role as the first part of a project which required the construction of alternative methodologies as its complement. Inevitably, this alternative project proved to be much more difficult for reasons Edward himself could not anticipate and for which his own critique shares a small part of the blame. Nevertheless, viewed from the perspective of modern Middle East studies, the present and the future look surprisingly good, with the ever expanding production of highly skilled graduate students around the world well-supplied with the tools not just to make use of whatever data the field contains but also to use their knowledge of the various social science disciplines to challenge the conventional wisdom and the old paradigms which continue to stand in the way of a proper understanding of how Middle Eastern societies, economies, and political systems really work.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

No China Link

The China threat is real – any notions that suggest otherwise are equally orientalizing – turns the K

Dicicco et. Al 20(Jonathan M. Dicicco, Ja Ian Chong, Tadeusz Kugler, Jack S. Levy, J. Patrick Rhamey Jr., Yuan-Kang Wang, AyŞE Zarakol, Steve Chan, November 9 2020 "Roundtable 12-2 on Thucydides’s Trap? Historical Interpretation, Logic of Inquiry, and the Future of Sino-American Relations," H-Diplo | ISSF, https://issforum.org/roundtables/12-2-thucydides)//BRownRice

Indications exist that the Xi leadership may be less satisfied with the status quo than Chan claims given that current PRC actions push up against not only the United States and Taiwan. South Korea reported economic punishment from China as a result of the deployment of a missile defense system to guard against possible North Korean attacks and repeated dangerous behavior by Chinese fishing vessels.[8] Japan expressed concern over increased naval and aerial activity by PRC assets in and over contested areas.[9] Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam indicate growing PRC harassment of their fishing and other civilian vessels in the South China Sea, which is notable given that Indonesia and the PRC do not have overlapping territorial claims.[10] Then there are tensions along the Sino-Indian border that recently resulted in deadly clashes between Indian and Chinese troops.[11] Current PRC behavior is worrisome for regional actors in other ways as well. Australia reports economic pressure for not conforming to Beijing’s preferences on pushing for an open investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic and complaining about PRC efforts to influence its internal politics.[12] Along with Canada, Australia saw citizens detained and charged for illegal activities under suspicious circumstances.[13] Singapore too faced Chinese state pressure over its insistence on adherence the rule of law over the arbitration over the South China Sea brought by the Philippines against the PRC.[14] That such issues do not receive more treatment by Chan is curious since they raise questions about PRC’s commitment to self-restraint and can potentially trigger the chain-ganging effects on U.S.-China ties that Chan warns readers about (21-22, 211-215). Such friction can potentially harden positions and raise the stakes over an issue such that prevailing becomes more tied to status and other concerns, driving more aggressive and even revisionist behavior.[15] Chan’s finding that misplaced worries about the PRC and its intentions stem in part from misunderstandings of perspectives on international politics that are informed by theories from “the West” rather than China deserves elaboration and debate. So-called “Western” international relations theories often have parallels in the Chinese tradition, broadly construed. Work analyzing Spring and Autumn, Warring States, Song, and Ming documents indicate that the strategic thought that is prominent in these periods closely resembles statecraft familiar to those in the contemporary “West.”[16] Texts as varied as the Han-era annals Records of the Grand Historian and the Ming-era fiction Romance of the Three Kingdoms will suggest the same.[17] Parallels between “Western” and “Chinese” approaches to politics are unsurprising. Several millennia of collective human experience, thought, and debate over statecraft, conflict, as well as governance are almost certainly bound to produce similarities in responses. Dividing the world into “Western” and “Chinese” views of the world ignores the fact the PRC has disagreements with ostensibly “non-Western” polities such as India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, each with their own distinct philosophical traditions.[18] Also, despite sharing cultural origins, people in the PRC and on Taiwan disagree fundamentally issues of political values and rights, not the relatively simple issues of who should rule China or what a Chinese state should entail geographically.[19] Moreover, the PRC’s ruling Chinese Communist Party draws at least some of its inspiration from European thinkers in the form of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin. Successive dynasties from historical China also proved themselves very adept at conquest—that is how regimes and empires get built.[20] Attributing tensions between the United States and PRC to culture suggests an overly monolithic view of the rich and varied philosophical and political traditions both major powers draw from, giving them less credit than is due.[21] To claim that contemporary international scholarship and U.S. policy are unable to adequately understand China because they are “Western” may oversimplify the nature and seriousness of problems dogging U.S.-China relations and their consequences for the world. Relegating difference to culture is not only Orientalizing, it can encourage a misplaced expectation that understanding can bring some sort of happy, mutually acceptable outcome. Perhaps Beijing and Washington understand each other well. They simply disagree fundamentally over values and interests in ways that make finding mutually acceptable accommodation increasingly difficult. This does not have to imply that either side is morally superior or normatively “better” than the other, just that understanding provides little promise for improving relations and avoiding confrontation. Better accounting for such possibilities invites fuller consideration of the roles that agency and contingency play in major power relations, two features that Chan clearly identifies as critical in the volume. Thucydides’s Trap? deserves much credit for grappling with important, pressing, and difficult questions about the drivers behind the downturn in U.S.-China relations and possible ways to address this slide. Yet, Chan’s outlook is more similar to Graham Allison’s than he initially lets on. Allison’s call for creative statecraft is possible only if the United States and China are not locked in a structural situation which neither can escape or beset by contingent circumstances that prevents Washington and Beijing from effectively exercising the agency Chan believes is central. Chan offers some insight when he points to divergences in perspectives between Washington and Beijing but may be overly limiting the ways he conceives of effects of culture and socialization. Likewise, the volume can go further in conceptualizing the various ways third parties such as regional actors and international organizations can affect U.S.-China ties, given that world politics is not just major powers going at each other—a fact both Chan and Allison recognize. Major power interactions simply do not occur in a vacuum. Such dynamics may reinforce competition as much as ameliorate them, but their effects await further clarification and explanation.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

AT: Digital Orientalism

Digital orientalism is not the driver behind hardline US foreign policy against China – American trust in the technological leadership of other Asian countries such as South Korea prove that it isn’t orientalism but rather the existential security threat from Chinese hacking and intellectual theft that necessitates US action.

Moore ‘22 [Gregory J. Moore; Professor of Global Studies and Politics, Colorado Christian University; 6-3-22; “Huawei, Cyber-Sovereignty and Liberal Norms: China’s Challenge to the West/Democracies”; https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11366-022-09814-2#Sec4; accessed 7-19-2022; AH]

Said’s orientalism construct [26] is an important contribution to the study of colonialism, post-colonial thought, international relations and sociology. There is no reason to challenge it here. It’s application to the digital realm is an interesting and important one. The premise of the editors of this special issue is that the West expected China to evolve into a liberal democracy, but that this has not happened, and moreover this (from the West’s perspective “fundamentally illegitimate”) power has been able to increasingly compete head to head with the US and the West in military, political, economic and technological terms, and this has created deep fear among Western/democratic leaders. Fear is a key part of this orientalist narrative. The argument is that it is fear of this digital, political and cultural other that drives a tough US, Australian, British (for example) policy toward China, and drives a harsh stand toward Huawei. To set this up in a cause and effect framework, then digital orientalism is the independent variable that causes fear in the US and others towards China, that brings about the dependent variable, harsh policies toward China and Huawei specifically. What this would mean is that other factors would not explain the dependent variable, the harsh US/Western policy toward Huawei. The question we will pose here is, is this correct? There are several potential problems with this argument. First, establishing that fear is an independent variable is not easy. Despite the quality of their work generally speaking, the editors have not done the thick description necessary to establish this. Simply showing tough rhetoric, hawkish views on the US/Western/democratic side (which are indeed there), does not really do the job effectively. Second, we haven’t considered counterfactuals or ruled out other methods that might test our hypothesis or do a better job explaining the outcome we observe (the harsh US/Western policy toward Huawei) than the proposed independent variable, digital orientalism. Following on from this point, I would propose a consideration of the hypothesized independent variable, “China and Huawei pose credible threats to national security of the US and other democracies” as a way to understand the approach the US, Australia, the UK and others have taken toward Huawei. Securitization provides a way of looking at this issue that is helpful in this case. As Buzan, Waever and de Wilde [3: 25] put it, Securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects…The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations: When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed? There can be no doubt that in the United States, Australia, India and other countries, Huawei’s 5G offerings have been securitized, and this is evident by the “discourse and political constellations” in those and other countries, as I’ve illustrated above. Yet why hasn’t this been the case in all countries? As Buzan et al. note, referencing the work of Arnold Wolfers [3: 30], security threats may be objective/real, or subjective/perceived, and where the twain meet or diverge is not always easy to ascertain. It is possible that A. China’s Huawei is acting as a threat in some countries and not in others. It’s also possible that B. China’s Huawei and its 5G are a threat wherever they operate but some countries don’t yet understand that or don’t believe it. It’s also possible that C. Huawei and its 5G are not a threat and have simply been socially constructed as a threat, needlessly securitized. The notion that digital orientalism is the reason for the securitization of Huawei and its 5G would line up with the last tack, or C. The argument presented here, however, is that digital orientalism does not explain the US/Western/democratic response to China’s growing illiberal impact on global internet governance or its worrisome presence, via Huawei, in more and more national 5G internet infrastructure schemes. On the contrary, the hypothesis posed here is something like B. above, that real security concerns do, that the securitization of Huawei is not an irrational response to Huawei 5G because of 1. some of Huawei’s actions/track record, 2. the nature of its relations with the Chinese state, and 3. the track record or broader actions (now and in the past) of that Chinese state at home and abroad as it regards media freedoms, intellectual property theft, human rights problems, and more. Having said this, digital (or conventional) orientalism may be lurking in the background and exacerbating technological and political dynamics. I suspect it is. The editors are likely not incorrect in that sense, for certainly there is a sense that China represents a “digital other,” a “political other” and a “cultural other” for Westerners and Liberals in general, and the notion of digital orientalism may explain certain aspects of that. At the same time, the argument presented here is that a careful study of China’s practices in the cyber-realm, whether at home or abroad,Footnote9 make it clear that there are very clear security-centric reasons for concern about China’s and Huawei’s presence in 5G internet infrastructure construction, mobile phone handset production, and even Chinese apps like TikTok and WeChat, which India has banned, and both of which the Trump Administration tried but failed to ban in the US. US, Australian, British, Swedish and other countries’ increasingly robust pushback against Huawei and other Chinese players in the construction of global 5G infrastructure can be easily understood by studying A. China’s cyber practices at home and abroad, and B. the impact they have on the security (and perceptions of security) of nations they work with. Very simply, those pushing back see what China is doing, they don’t like it, and they don’t want Chinese companies to have any major role in constructing telecommunications infrastructure inside their countries. This is because they believe they know what that will lead to, and they don’t believe that is good from their perspectives. If China/Huawei was a player like Nokia, Ericsson or Samsung, the US and these others would not be raising alarms. In fact, the US, Australia and UK have not been raising alarms about Nokia, Ericsson or Samsung, the other major players in 5G. Why? Is it digital orientalism? In fact, given that Samsung is Korean, one might expect the US to push back against Samsung, for it too is “oriental,” non-Western, following the logic of Said. We don’t really see that, however. South Korea is a democratic polity and a US ally, so there is no angst on Washington’s part, no concerns about security. Moreover, the South Korean government does not have a history of stealing US IPR, of spying on the US as China has been, or doing anything that could be considered a national security threat toward the US, so there has been no pushback from Washington in the face of Samsung’s growing presence in the US or in US 5G operations. Some argue that the US simply refuses to yield the number one spot to anyone, whether in technology or in economic dominance. Yet if the US was pushing back against Huawei because the US wanted to be number one, because the US wanted to dominate, why wouldn’t the US fund AT&T, Apple, Google or someone else in the US to be number one? Why wouldn’t the US hinder the advances of Nokia, Ericsson and/or Samsung in the US and elsewhere? We don’t really see any of that, however. Digital orientalism doesn’t really explain this, in this case. I will argue here that it’s because first, American thinkers do not think in such hierarchical terms as their Chinese counterparts do (they aren’t unified in an obsession with being number 1 as is the case with the Chinese state and its companies; see [18]. Second, the US is not pushing back against Huawei primarily because of market imperatives/motivations, but rather because of concerns about security and lack of trust in the Chinese state and Chinese companies that are subject thereto. The US trusts the leadership of Nokia, Ericsson and Samsung, and they don’t see their home governments (Finland, Sweden and South Korea, respectively) as bent on spying, stealing IPR and undermining free expression at home and increasingly around the world. It’s about the Chinese state’s very bad track record of stealing intellectual property, of suppressing free expression, of cyber-surveillance and hacking, of suppressing truth and suppressing dissidents – increasingly not only inside China but abroad as well.Footnote10 Pushing back against Huawei and China’s cyber-sovereignty model has become an existential fight for those who see things in the way I have depicted here. In a telling statement by former Obama National Security Advisor Susan Rice to Canada’s CBC about the security threat Huawei posed to Canada and others, Rice said,

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Binary DA

Orientalism causes the problems it attempts to prevent by exacerbating divisions between the east and west

Owen 12 [Owen, Roger, Roger Owen is the A.J. Meyer Professor of Middle East History at Harvard University and was previously the Director of the university’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies., 4-20-2012, "Edward Said and the Two Critiques of Orientalism," Middle East Institute, https://www.mei.edu/publications/edward-said-and-two-critiques-orientalism]//AA

Back to the Social Sciences When it comes to the immediate reception of Edward’s work, it was not only many Orientalists, or near-Orientalists, who were upset but also many well versed in what they regarded as a progressive science of society. This certainly applied to persons such as Harry Magdoff, the New York editor of the Monthly Review, who asked me to review Orientalism, a book about which he had very mixed feelings. It was also true of colleagues such as Fred Halliday, who argued that Orientalism could easily be read as creating an irreconcilable division between East and West, thereby undermining one of the basic features of our universalistic approach. No less telling was Fred’s second argument that, for many peoples of the Middle East in the 1970s, works by the scholars Edward defined as Orientalists were sometimes the only source of data for understanding large parts of their own national history. Al-Azm was to make the same point only a few years later. Several enormously important implications follow. The first is that we need the social sciences in Middle East studies not just for their own sake, but also to be able to continue to make use of works by persons we regard as Orientalists, though without falling prey to their assumptions and reductionism. This is the more significant as our own thinking contains either unexamined assumptions from the Orientalist period or, at the very least, questions which we cannot help students to answer properly because we do not know how to frame them or where to look for answers. A good example of this is what used to be called Islamic legal studies, studied only through certain canonic texts, and posited on the notion that the master story was one in which modern legal codes imported tout court from the West quickly supplanted so-called traditional Shari‘a law, confining it simply to the area of personal status.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Essentialism DA

Essentialism DA: Said’s analysis of hegemonic discourses creates a binary of East and West which serves to uphold the very westernism he criticizes – takes out any links to hegemony too

Potter 19(Naomi Potter, Orientalism: in review, Jan 15, 2019, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lseupr/2019/01/15/orientalism-in-review/)//BRownRice

Said’s essentialising of the Western scholars does not constitute the start and end of his problems in Orientalism. Turning to Said’s (mis)use of Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony can help us to illustrate instances of essentialism in categories of East and West in Orientalism which goes beyond Western scholars. Said draws on the role of hegemony, the presence and construction of ‘certain cultural forms which dominate over others’ (2003: 6-7) in order to demonstrate how Orientalism managed to take a sustained position as the hegemonic discourse, being internalised by Western and Eastern cultures alike. However, Said does not explore the concept fully, in particular he fails to offer the necessary depth in Gramsci’s concept of hegemony as distinct from those such as Hegel and Marx. For Gramsci, hegemony, unlike mere domination, is not something held over another group but rather the result of complex interplay of societal forces and groups (Stein and Swedenburg, 2004: 9-10). Hence, Gramsci had a unique focus on the active nature of counter-hegemony in history: its role in the ‘war of positions’ which helps to determine the character of the hegemonic forces (Chalcraft and Noorani, 2007). A complete Gramscian analysis of hegemony would therefore offer great depth in studying counter-hegemonic forces as active, autonomous agents in terms of their role, position and culture (ibid.). There seems to be a distinct lack of reference to such agency of subaltern groups in Said’s work (Ahmad, 1992: 108). Given the time in which Said was writing and the proliferation of such forces this does not seem acceptable. For instance, James McDougal illustrates the influence that religio-cultural resistance of Islamic Algerians had on French colonial policy and the distinctive practice by which the French ruled; such as citizenship policies regarding the settlers vis-à-vis the colonized (Chalcraft and Noorani, 2007, 49-66). These Islamic liberation forces such as the Association of Algerian Muslims had been active for decades before Orientalism was published (ibid: 56). Said misses the importance of the agency of counter-hegemonic forces in terms of the nature and force of hegemony itself. This has the unfortunate impact in his work of reflecting a specific idea of the eastern world as passive and incapacitated, paradoxically leading to the assumption he wants to criticise: that of an eternally distinct and less powerful Eastern region. The essentialist implications of Said’s misuse of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony do not end here, however. Hegemony does not concern just polarized forces but also the way in which it persists in culture within society at large. Said often refers in his work to the role of literature and culture, however, in this exploration he neglects to consider the many different forms in which culture is constructed, beyond the dominating group itself. Melman, in observing the role of women in constructing parts of the Oriental narrative, highlights how ‘Europe’s attitude towards the Orient was neither unified nor monolithic’ (1992: 7). In particular, she turns to the role of women from the West in depicting Eastern regions. The perspectives of these women often included more richer self-criticism towards cultural superiority. Gramsci’s account of hegemony necessarily involves an extension of analysis to include this intersectional group who are a subset of the bloc of Europeans who explored, observed and studies the Middle East in the colonial period. In ignoring the role of women in the construction of Western hegemony Said makes uncritical assumptions about the core features of Western culture, locating them in the writings of academics throughout history and thus essentialising the notion of the ‘West’ as a perpetually dominating and uniform region of the world. Conclusion Said’s failure to fully utilise the theoretical richness of the theories and concepts which lay the foundations for his account led him to essentialise the categories of East and West in Orientalism. Firstly, in using historical methodology, Said obscures his attempts at a Foucauldian discourse analysis generating a historical account which does not do enough to interrogate the mechanisms by which Orientalism comes about, seemingly presupposing their existence in Western scholarly writing. Furthermore, this is only made worse by his neglect of important aspects of the building of hegemonic discourses which leads him to simplify both Western and Eastern cultural production, making uncritical assumptions about their core features of these categories and the extent of variation within them. Both these errors lead to a paradoxical account from Said as his intentions were not only to avoid such essentialist narratives but also to critique them. Despite these intentions however his treatment of East and West does suffer due to his theoretical shortcomings leading to essentialist construction of the categories.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

A relational approach to digital sovereignty centering the national Self and its Other is key

Budnitsky 22 – PhD in Communication from Ottawa’s Carleton University. He also holds degrees in Nationalism Studies from Central European University and in Journalism and Media Management from Moscow’s Higher School of Economics. (Stanislav, “A Relational Approach to Digital Sovereignty: e-Estonia Between Russia and the West”, 3/1/22, International Journal of Communication 16(2022), https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/download/16896/3744, Accessed 7/19/22)//mackerel

What is to be gained from a relational approach to digital sovereignty? This article argued that centering the relationship between the national Self and its Others in the analysis of national digital sovereignty elucidates why and how it emerges and develops. This argument bridges two established claims from constructivist theories of culture and technology. One is that national identity as articulated and propagated by governing elites guides the state’s technological program. Another is that identity is an inherently relational category that is maintained through continuous boundary making between the Self and its Others. Taken together, these claims indicate that it is analytically productive and sometimes imperative to attend to relational dynamics between the national Self and its Others to grasp the logics of digital sovereignty. To illustrate this proposition, this article traced how Estonia’s cultural constructions of its Russian and Western Others shaped the contours of its digital sovereignty. It showed that Estonia’s digital initiatives, which are often couched in technofuturistic postnational discourse, are meant to reaffirm Estonia’s sovereign territorialized existence within the Euro-Atlantic community.

Whereas this article examined digital sovereignty as an elite political project manifested in highlevel official discourses and institutions, the relational lens’s theoretical and methodological versatility opens the door for diverse scholarly approaches to digital sovereignty. Ethnographies of infrastructure, for example, can investigate Self-Other dynamics in the everyday workings of digital sovereignty, what cultural anthropologist of technology Alix Johnson (2021) conceptualizes as the “mechanics of sovereignty.” This approach treats sovereignty as a process of material construction and explores its constitutive people and practices. Lorraine Kaljund (2018), for instance, draws on participant observation and interviews with the developers of a recent e-Estonia initiative, data embassy, to explore how this team embeds ethnocentric Estonian statehood into the project’s software, code, and policy.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

AT: Orientalism- Said’s“Ideal type”

Said’s narrative of Orientalism contains a damaging paradox in which he seeks to reject typification of “the orient” yet himself typifies European civilization as an “Ideal Type”, an agent of Orientalism creating an essentialist simplification

Sara R. Farris 10[Sara R. Farris, Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Goldsmiths, University of London , "AN ‘IDEAL TYPE’ CALLED ORIENTALISM",7-19-2010, Taylor & Francis, https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/1369801X.2010.489701, 1LEE]

The ‘whole impulse to classify nature and man into types’ (Said 2003: 119), for Said, was one of the elements that prepared the way for modern Orientalist structures. ‘In natural history, in anthropology, in cultural generalization, a type had a particular character which provided the observer with a designation and, as Foucault says, “a controlled derivation”’ (ibid.). Said goes on to list such designations: ‘the wild men’, ‘the Europeans’, ‘the Asiatics’ and so on. The practice of classification, as Said recognized, became crucial to sciences, both natural and social. However, in the field of the social sciences and humanities it resulted in the assembly of human/cultural types, thus producing stereotyped images of cultural collectivities. As we have seen, Said acknowledged that Max Weber's ideal types played a central role both in shaping the ways in which classification was employed by European – but also North American – social sciences and in assembling non-western cultures and individuals into Orientalized types.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Orientalism is false

Attempts to label Orientalism as an effect of all powers takes away from the true origin – modern Europe, which used anthropocentrism, knowledge and liberalism to dominate nature to throw the world into modernity.

Hallaq 19 – He’s the Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University, where he has been teaching ethics, law, and political thought since 2009. He has published over eighty books and articles on topics including law, legal theory, philosophy, political theory, and logic. (Wael, “An Interview with Professor Wael Hallaq”, 3/4/19, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, http://www.fletcherforum.org/home/2019/2/12/an-interview-with-professor-wael-hallaq, Accessed 7/17/22)//mackerel

WH: To answer your question, I want to begin with the blurb’s statement that Restating Orientalism is concerned with “re-evaluating,” “deepening,” and “extending” the critique of Orientalism. Let me begin with the last of the trio, “extending,” but let me insert a caveat first. At one level, I could not even begin to extend Said’s critique when he, like almost every scholar engaged in such matters, applies the term indiscriminately, almost to any idea or person writing about anything Islamic, Asian or African. Said erroneously thought that Orientalists are to be found everywhere, from ancient Greece to thirteenth century Latin scholars, to von Grunebaum, Bernard Lewis and their likes in the twentieth century. So it is not true that I extend the critique in any of these directions. If anything, in fact, I limit its diachronic scope, I reign it in, and refuse to accept its sweeping historical coverage. There was no Orientalism before modernity, not even in the high cultures of antiquity who, according to Said, were also “racist.” […] I may even counter by deploying an equally categorical statement: “No matter how ethnocentric and how dominating pre-modern empires all were, none could wed knowledge to power and redefine ethics as our modern empires did and continue to do.”

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DoD TRADEOFF DA › AFFIRMATIVE › War Turns DA

Specifically, a new war undermines Asian deterrence

Magsamen 19, vice president for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress and Michael Fuchs, senior fellow, (Kelly, “The Case for a New U.S. Relationship with Afghanistan,” Center for American Progress,

• Opportunity cost #5: Two decades of military conflict have eroded U.S. military readiness. While the U.S. military has global responsibilities, it has finite resources, and nothing drains U.S. military readiness like an active war, as made clear by the 2017 report of a Task Force on Defense Personnel co-chaired by former U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and former National Security Adviser James Jones.39 For the Pentagon, prosecuting the war in Afghanistan is a top-level priority that requires significant time from its top officials as well as tremendous resources—from regular rotations of thousands of personnel to equipment to budget expenditures. With pressing needs to bolster U.S. force posture in Asia and Europe to deter threats from Russia and China and adapt the military to emerging threats such as cybersecurity, the U.S. military will have a difficult time dedicating the necessary attention and resources to these threats while fighting an indefinite war with roughly 14,000 troops in Afghanistan.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DoD TRADEOFF DA › AFFIRMATIVE › War Turns DA

War turns the DA---a new conflict is a significant drain on all military resources

Magsamen 19, vice president for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress and Michael Fuchs, senior fellow, (Kelly, “The Case for a New U.S. Relationship with Afghanistan,” Center for American Progress,

Opportunity cost #4: Managing a war saps U.S. focus and diplomatic energy. While the United States is a global power, it does not have endless capacity. Inevitably, the attention of high-level policymakers is focused on the highest-priority concerns— and as long as the war in Afghanistan continues, it will rightly garner significant attention and resources from all sectors of the U.S. government. When it comes foreign policy priorities, urgency outweighs importance, so regular decisions about the war require the highest-level attention at the White House, the State Department, and the DOD. For the senior-most national security officials, time is precious, and dedicating enough time to issues such as climate change or China can be crowded out by the need for regular, high-level engagement on life-or-death decisions in Afghanistan.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DoD TRADEOFF DA › AFFIRMATIVE › China Not Revisionist

China isn’t revisionist

McKinney 19, *Jared Morgan; PhD candidate at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore); **Nicholas Butts; Center for Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum Young Leader. He holds an LL.M. from Peking University, an MSc from The London School of Economics and an MPA from Harvard University where he was also a Crown Prince Frederik Scholar and a Cheng Fellow. (Winter 2019, “Bringing Balance to the Strategic Discourse on China’s Rise”, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, pg. 75-76, )

In the abstract, such claims are alarming—in context, and in balance, rather humdrum. In fact, the evidence of any Chinese intention to destroy, or even merely undermine and exploit, the current order is slight. China is certainly using its growing military power to defend its claims in the SCS and even—on occasion— to coerce its neighbors. It uses protectionist economic policies to boost the prospects of Chinese companies and reduce competition. It employs economic statecraft to serve its interests abroad. And it certainly is opposed to America’s policy of global democracy promotion. However, none of these positions fundamentally challenge the existing order, none of them radically depart from America’s own actions when it was a rising power in the nineteenth century, and none of them obviously surpass America’s own contemporary record of order subversion.

When the United States was a rising power, it took half of Mexico and considered taking the rest, it colonized the Philippines and Hawaii, and it unilaterally seized the maritime choke points of the Caribbean (Puerto Rico and Cuba).21 The United States used tariffs—which by 1857 averaged 20 percent22 and by the end of the nineteenth century were “the highest import duties in the industrial world”23—to protect its industries. It stole intellectual property,24 and it ideologically challenged the governments of the “Old World.” Today, despite no longer being a rising power, the United States has launched two disastrous invasions, tortured prisoners, and dispatches drone strikes at a whim with little international legal authority.25 The point is not that two wrongs make a right; it is that international order is much more resilient than critics seem to realize,26 and it is utopian to expect any rising Great Power to act in a way that uniformly satisfies one’s moral scruples, evolving, in Friedberg’s words, “into a mellow, satisfied, ‘responsible’ status quo power.”27

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DoD TRADEOFF DA › AFFIRMATIVE › No China War

No US-China war

Lei 20, PhD and MA in International Politics, associate research fellow with the China Institute of International Studies. (Cui, 7-24-2020, "Despite heated talk, risk of a US-China hot war is small", South China Morning Post, )

Many observers are pessimistic about deteriorating US-China relations and believe the two countries are heading towards a cold war. Even worse, some argue that the situation might be more dangerous than the US-Soviet Union Cold War, and that a hot war might break out between the two. This argument is unconvincing. First of all, deterrents to a flare-up are much stronger in US-China relations than in US-Soviet relations. Although economic and people-to-people ties between China and the US are declining, they are still close compared to US-Soviet ties. It is hard to decouple two closely intertwined economies and societies. Take two examples. China is expected to become the world's largest consumer market, a temptation hard to resist for exporters, including those from the US. And in education, more than 300,000 Chinese students study in the US, bringing in huge revenues for the US education industry. Many universities go to great lengths to woo international students. Recently Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology even sued the government over its new visa restrictions, now aborted, on international students. Second, even if there is decoupling, the pain would not be too great and can be kept out of the national security sphere if properly handled. In fact, for national security reasons, a modest degree of isolation will make both sides more secure and comfortable. For instance, if China’s information technology equipment cannot capture Western markets, the US will be more relaxed. If China cannot get advanced technologies from the US and its technological progress slows down, the US will be less anxious. In the same vein, China feels assured knowing that if the Trump administration does impose a travel ban on Communist Party members, it would be abandoning one of the tools available to the US to promote “peaceful evolution” in China. Economic decoupling is undeniably more painful for China than for the US. But unlike Japan during WWII, which was hit hard by the US oil embargo because of its lack of natural resources, China has no such problems. Given its large domestic market, losing the US as a major customer is not a disaster for China, and can be compensated through more dynamic economic activities at home. China can also make up for being freezed out of technological exchanges by turning to indigenous innovation. As for the US, it can import goods from other developing countries, albeit less cheaply. The relative loss is acceptable when weighed against the heightened perception of economic independence and security. Third, the ideological confrontation between China and the US is less intense than that during the Cold War. Unlike the obsession with ideology in those days, the line between capitalism and socialism is blurred today. The market economy has become universally recognised as the best way to promote economic growth and, politically, many countries have embraced democracy. Even North Korea calls itself the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Although ideological hawks in the US still long for the day when the beacon of freedom will light up the world, after many years of fighting bloody wars overseas, most American people are not interested in promoting democracy abroad. Meanwhile, China just wants to preserve its political system and has no interest in exporting it to other countries, as the Soviet Union did. Thus, ideological antagonism in China-US relations can easily be eased by calculations of realistic interests, which create conditions for compromise and cooperation. Fourth, both China and the US have many options other than war to achieve their policy goals. While they have no allies to serve as a buffer, given the nature of the potential conflict in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait, both countries are adept at operating in grey zones and fighting psychological, public opinion or diplomatic warfare below the threshold of war. The forced closure of the Chinese consulate in Houston by the US government is just the latest act of brinkmanship. In addition, given China’s huge economic and financial interests in the US, the latter can wield the stick of sanctions when use of force is highly risky or not worth it. When both sides have many tools and options, why would they rush to war to achieve their goals? Last but not least, the imbalance of power will act as a deterrent. Some say the US and Soviet Union did not fight a hot war because they were evenly matched. It was not the case, actually. At the beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was at a relative military disadvantage. Moreover, a country needs the will to fight before going to war, even if it is stronger militarily than its adversary. Having fought years of meaningless wars, the US is weary of war. China, too, abhors war. Having a clear understanding of US strength, especially when its own economy is slowing down and it is facing various domestic challenges, China would not wish to recklessly start a war with the US. In summary, the possibility of a hot war between China and the US is very small. The greatest danger for China is not a cold or hot confrontation with the US, but policymakers’ interpretation of the momentary hostility towards Beijing of a portion of the American population and the larger world. An erroneous interpretation could end China’s march to further opening up, and see it turn instead towards self-isolation.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DoD TRADEOFF DA › AFFIRMATIVE › China Not a Threat

The US has the overwhelming military advantage

Sawant 12-13-2021, has a master’s in international affairs from Columbia University, where he concentrated in international security policy. He is a subject matter expert on military studies, defense, global security, and geopolitical risk analysis. Mangesh has more than 18 years of experience in studying military strategy and tactics, warfare, weapons systems analysis, conducting research, policy analysis and formulation, and developing case studies and lessons learned. His articles have been published in The National Interest, Small Wars Journal, Modern Diplomacy, Eurasia Review, E-International Relations, Indian Defense Review, Security Management. Geopolitical Monitor, Internationale Politik, and the Over the Horizon Journal. (Mangesh, “Why China Cannot Challenge the US Military Primacy,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs,

The US military dominates the strategic, tactical, and operational levels of warfare across the spectrum. The Pentagon is implementing sophisticated network warfare programs such as the Advanced Battle Management System, Project Convergence, and Joint All Domain Command and Control. China is concerned about the lethal and distributed US military, equipped with a potent combination of quantity and quality of weapon systems. The USN surpasses the PLAN in rapid deployment, maneuverability, and expeditionary warfare capabilities. The overwhelming display of US military power since 1945 is a credible deterrent for Beijing. Since the First Gulf War, the United States has demonstrated its capability of destroying the adversary through preemptive strikes consisting of long-range weapon systems such as cruise missiles in the first few days of the war, giving no time for the adversary to retaliate.75 According to Taylor Fravel, China is not a military superpower.76 There is not much evidence about China’s plans for global military capabilities on par with the United States. China’s military power is miniscule as compared to United States’ former adversary the Soviet Union. China’s military will be thinly stretched defending the third-largest country in the world. The top echelons of the CCP and PLA acknowledge US military advantages. Chinese scholars like Xu Ruike and Sun Degang admit that China is an economic heavyweight but is a military featherweight and will remain so for the coming decades.77 US primacy in the post–Cold War world has prevented World War III. The two most likely contenders for expansion, North Korea and China, have restricted their militaries within their borders. The United States retains unrivaled military power, and China is not in a position to challenge it.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DoD TRADEOFF DA › AFFIRMATIVE › US-Europe Relations Solve China War

Europe is a key counterbalance against Chinese leadership

Khatiri 21, studied Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (Shay, “Why Has America Forsaken Europe?,” The Bulwark,

The United States needs Europe to be peaceful because it needs NATO and the EU to be productive. The size of Europe’s economy makes it an important counterbalance to China’s growth. British, French, and Spanish ties with Africa are important in pushing back against China’s growing influence in the continent. European universities still produce stellar research which is crucial in the technological competition with China. Each of Europe’s strengths in a competition with China also makes it an important region in its own right. With three-quarters of a billion people, it is an important trade partner and plays a key role in the American economy. It is home to many U.S. military bases used for important missions, most recently during the evacuation from Afghanistan. Its scientific and technological achievements contribute to American prosperity—the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine that the president of the United States and millions of others recieved would not have been made without German partnership. America can’t afford to take Europe for granted anymore. They need us and we need them. The hard part of alliance management is supposed to be responding to the needs, wants, and objectives, and insecurities of the other side. But lately, the United States has had more trouble figuring out what its own needs, wants, and objectives in Europe are—or if it has any at all.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DoD TRADEOFF DA › AFFIRMATIVE › US-Europe Relations Solve China War

US-Europe relations are a force-multiplier that solve Chinese aggression

Lauren Sukin 11-18-2021, MacArthur Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (Lauren, “How Biden can improve European relations while pivoting to Asia,” The Bulletin,

France’s fretting should serve as a warning to the Biden administration. The US focus on East Asia continues to rock relations between Washington and its European allies. In transitioning its strategic priorities towards the Pacific, the United States cannot succeed alone. Incorporating allies and partners—including those in Europe—in the planning, negotiating, and implementation stages of its efforts to manage threats from China will be critical. The effort should also pay dividends. By restoring and reinvigorating damaged European alliances, the United States will be better positioned to manage threats in East Asia and elsewhere.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DoD TRADEOFF DA › AFFIRMATIVE › Asia Pivot Bad

Asia pivot breaks NATO

Lauren Sukin 11-18-2021, MacArthur Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (Lauren, “How Biden can improve European relations while pivoting to Asia,” The Bulletin,

The US focus on China is controversial, in part, because it comes at a moment when relations between NATO and Russia are severely strained. NATO’s Eastern European members don’t want China to “overshadow” concerns about Russia. Multiple Eastern European states have competed for additional US forces —though to little avail. Poland even offered, in 2018, to name a military base after President Donald Trump.

Now, NATO waits for the US Global Posture Review, which will provide guidance on how best to allocate US military resources going forward. The review will be heavily scrutinized. If it re-aligns US military resources towards East Asia, the cracks in NATO may continue to grow.