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2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › Sustainability › 2AC---UQ---No Heg Decline

U.S. unipolarity is inevitable---no rivals are strong enough to challenge it

Beckley 18 [Michael Beckley, Michael Beckley is a leading expert on the balance of power between the United States and China. The author of two books and multiple award-winning articles, Michael is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Previously, Michael was an International Security Fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and worked for the U.S. Department of Defense, the RAND Corporation, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He continues to advise offices within the U.S. Intelligence Community and U.S. Department of Defense. Unrivaled : Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower., pg. 135-154, Cornell University Press, 2018. EBSCOhost]//AA

CHAPTER 6 The Unipolar Era “If Sparta and Rome perished,” the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau asked, “what State can hope to endure forever?”1 The resounding answer given by history is “no state.” In time, perhaps in another century or so, the American empire will crumble and new powers will rise. But we are not there yet, nor will we be for many decades. We are living in the unipolar era, and it will probably outlive us. So what? The United States might be the most powerful country in his- tory, but it has a limited presence in many corners of the globe, and weaker nations routinely trample on U.S. interests.2 The United States failed to pre- vent the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the rise of the Islamic State, the Russian inva- sion of Crimea, Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, North Korean nuclear proliferation, and Chinese island-building in the South China Sea. Unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity: What difference does it make? In this final chapter, I explain why this view is wrong by highlighting several ways that unipolarity transforms world politics. The good news is that unipolarity dramatically reduces the likelihood of great power war. The bad news is that it may increase the likelihood of asymmetric conflict and undermine American national unity and the liberal world order. No Hegemonic Rivalry The story of world politics is often told as a game of thrones in which a rotating cast of great powers battles for top-dog status. According to researchers led by Graham Allison at Harvard, there have been sixteen cases in the past five hundred years when a rising power challenged a rul- ing power.3 Twelve of these cases ended in carnage. One can quibble with Allison’s case selection, but the basic pattern is clear: hegemonic rivalry has sparked a catastrophic war every forty years on average for the past half millennium. The emergence of unipolarity in 1991 has put this cycle of hegemonic competition on hold. Obviously wars and security competition still occur in today’s unipolar world—in fact, as I explain later, unipolarity has made certain types of asymmetric conflict more likely—but none of these con- flicts have the global scope or generational length of a hegemonic rivalry. To appreciate this point, just consider the Cold War—one of the four “peaceful” cases of hegemonic rivalry identified by Allison’s study. Although the two superpowers never went to war, they divided the world into rival camps, waged proxy wars that killed millions of people, and pushed each other to the brink of nuclear Armageddon. For forty-five years, World War III and human extinction were nontrivial possibilities. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, by contrast, the United States has not faced a hegemonic rival, and the world, though far from perfect, has been more peaceful and prosperous than ever before. Just look at the numbers. From 1400 to 1991, the rate of war deaths world- wide hovered between 5 and 10 deaths per 100,000 people and spiked to 200 deaths per 100,000 during major wars.4 After 1991, however, war death rates dropped to 0.5 deaths per 100,000 people and have stayed there ever since. Interstate wars have disappeared almost entirely, and the number of civil wars has declined by more than 30 percent.5 Meanwhile, the global economy has quadrupled in size, creating more wealth between 1991 and 2018 than in all prior human history combined.6 What explains this unprecedented outbreak of peace and prosperity? Some scholars attribute it to advances in communications technology, from the printing press to the telegraph to the Internet, which supposedly spread empathy around the globe and caused entire nations to place a higher value on human life.7 Such explanations are appealing, because they play on our natural desire to believe in human progress, but are they convincing? Did humans sud- denly become 10 to 20 times less violent and cruel in 1991? Are we orders of magnitude more noble and kind than our grandparents? Has social media made us more empathetic? Of course not, which is why the dra- matic decline in warfare after 1991 is better explained by geopolitics than sociology.8 The collapse of the Soviet Union not only ended the Cold War and related proxy fighting, it also opened up large swathes of the world to democracy, international commerce, and peacekeeping forces—all of which surged after 1991 and further dampened conflict.9 Faced with overwhelming U.S. economic and military might, most countries have decided to work within the American-led liberal order rather than fight to overturn it.10 As of 2018, nearly seventy countries have joined the U.S. alliance network—a Kantian community in which war is unthinkable—and even the two main challeng- ers to this community, China and Russia, begrudgingly participate in the institutions of the liberal order (e.g., the UN, the WTO, the IMF, World Bank, and the G-20), engage in commerce with the United States and its allies, and contribute to international peacekeeping missions.11 History may not have ended in 1991, but it clearly changed in profound ways—and mostly for the better.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › Sustainability › 2AC---UQ---No Heg Decline

U.S. hegemony resists collapse

Kovac 2/19 (Igor Kovac, PhD in political science from the University of Cincinnati and Foreign Policy Advisor for the Slovenian Prime Minister, 2/12/22, “Persistent Imbalance of Power – A Pervasive Hegemony Theory”, pg ii-iii, accessed 6/18/22)//sfs

Most International Relations literature suggests that when power becomes imbalanced, such a situation will be corrected – hegemony cannot persist over time. However, history offers us several examples of hegemonies lasting over a century, e.g., Ancient Rome, Ming China. So far scholars have offered four explanations for such enduring hegemony (Coercive Hegemony, Cooperative Hegemony, Cultural Hegemony, and Opportunist Hegemony), with a common mechanism: ineffective balancing. Namely, the hegemon has the capacity to put balancing at bay using different strategies flowing from the nature and fundamental principles of its hegemony. Hence, the hegemon uses coercion, institutional leverage, ideological indoctrination, or buyout, in order to assure its hegemony can endure. Yet, through time and through crisis the capacities of the hegemon to make the balancing ineffective diminishes. As such, these theories all share a similar assumption – imbalance is transitory and thus hegemony will breakdown. But what if that common assumption is incorrect. What if under certain conditions, imbalance is not resisted, but rather serves interests of non-hegemonic states as well as the hegemon? Twentieth and twenty-first century US hegemony suggests such conditions may exist. This American imbalance displays a different nature and fundamental mechanism behind its functioning. Although US relative power is declining, its global monetary network centrality is not. Moreover, even in times of severe crisis, such as the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, or the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, we have not witnessed US monetary centrality decline. In fact, quite the opposite is true. The dynamics associated with an imbalance of power in favor of the United States runs against the expectations of existing theories. Therefore, we need a different theory to make sense of these particularities and make better policy recommendations. Thus, I have developed a Pervasive Hegemony Theory, which is based on a ‘buy-in’ behavior, that better explains US hegemony compared to existing alternatives. The ‘buy-in’ behavior relates to non-hegemonic states as well as the hegemon, in which all countries continue to use hegemon’s monetary unit in their monetary relations, even in times of severe economic crisis. This reinforces the hegemony. Even though non-hegemonic states may not prefer the imbalance of power, they prefer conducting their economic relations within the hegemon’s monetary unit and thus perpetuate the imbalance. Subsequently, they can only maximize their selfish interests and autonomy by buying-in to the hegemony and reproducing the imbalance of power. Conversely, the hegemon may not like the current rules and norms of the international system, but it can change those and obtain the support of the non-hegemonic states if it accepts to provide its monetary unit as the central currency of the system. In pursuing this argument, I use both quantitative (Network Analysis and Time Series) and qualitative methods (Process Tracing). I use the former on available economic data to establish the claim of US economic centrality, and that it is something different than what we have seen in the past. Second, I process trace the mechanisms of hegemonic and non-hegemonic state behavior in two international monetary systems (Bretton Woods and post-Bretton Woods) in order to isolate and identify the buy-in mechanism and provide an explanation of enduring imbalance – ownership over the central monetary unit in global economy. The dissertation, thus, assesses existing theories and indicates their inadequacies in explaining an important international phenomenon and provides a more robust explanation of enduring hegemony with the economic centrality, namely the ownership of the central monetary unit.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Impacts---T/L › 2AC---European Stability

Loss of US power now risks Russian conquest of Europe and global instability.

Brands 6/1 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 6-1-2022; "The World Doesn’t Need a More Restrained America”; ; Bloomberg; accessed 6-22-2022; AH]

It has been a bumpy year for the restraint coalition — that loose network of analysts, advocates and politicians calling for a sharply reduced US role in the world. Having reached peak influence with the withdrawal from Afghanistan, this group initially found itself marginalized by Russia’s war in Ukraine. Now, the restraint crowd is offering a renewed critique of US policy, one that will probably prove to be persistent, though not persuasive. Restraint is a broad church. It features anti-interventionist academics, who often style themselves as non-ideological “realists,” alongside well-funded think tanks such as the Quincy Institute. It includes libertarians such as Senator Rand Paul who deplore the financial costs of US foreign policy and progressives who contend that American globalism is a cover for imperialism and neoliberalism. There are pacifists who believe that all wars are criminal, as well as nationalists such as Senator Josh Hawley who argue that being appropriately hawkish on China requires being more dovish on nearly everything else. Some restrainers seek wholesale global retrenchment; others mainly decry ongoing US involvement in Europe and the Middle East. What unites them is a conviction that the overuse of US power has been catastrophic for America and the world. This coalition seemed ascendant a year ago, when President Joe Biden denounced the “forever wars” while pulling out of Afghanistan. That decision, two analysts argued, marked Biden as a hard-nosed realist — and perhaps an ally in the struggle to reshape American diplomacy. Yet the moment didn’t last. The collapse of the Afghan state even before the US finished withdrawing showed that, while waging wars is expensive, losing them can impose a serious cost. Then came Russia’s assault on Ukraine. As Vladimir Putin’s forces sought to restore the Soviet empire and murdered Ukrainian citizens, they revealed just how awful a world shaped by great powers other than Washington might be. Indeed, Biden isn’t getting much praise from self-proclaimed realists today. While refusing to intervene militarily, Biden has otherwise backed Ukraine with money, weapons and other support. NATO — whose peaceful expansion allegedly forced Putin to order a campaign of aggression and murder — now appears likely to add two new members, Finland and Sweden. Biden has even invoked the rhetorical legacy of his cold war predecessors, declaring that Ukraine is a vital front in the struggle to save the free world. In response, the restraint coalition has itself opened a new front, finding multiple reasons to attack Biden’s Ukraine policy. First is cost. Sustaining a medium-sized country under a ferocious military assault is fantastically expensive. The latest US support package for Ukraine totals some $40 billion — money, Hawley complained, that could be better spent on giving US military personnel a generous raise. Some Republicans in Congress seem to agree — 57 representatives and 11 senators voted, unsuccessfully, against the aid package. Second is risk. No one knows how the war in Ukraine will end. If the US helps Ukraine defend itself too successfully, the thinking goes, then perhaps a humiliated Russia will escalate wildly rather than accept defeat. Finally, there is politics. With Biden having gone all-in on Ukraine, there’s little space for the restraint contingent on the left. But Hawley and other Republicans seeking to inherit Donald Trump’s political base clearly believe that there is a constituency for claims that supporting a vulnerable democracy equates to putting “America last.” It is uncharitable to label such arguments “pro-Putin.” Forty billion dollars is real money, given that the Pentagon is struggling to find a 10th of that for urgent near-term improvements to America’s military posture in the Pacific. There is, undoubtedly, danger in a scenario where Putin worries that he is losing the war — and in consequence loses his head. But the perpetual problem with restraint is the corresponding unwillingness to consider what happens after America pulls back. Suppose Washington does slash support to Ukraine and leave European security to the Europeans. What does that bring? Judging by the past century — or even the past six months — the answer is not a stable Europe and a more solvent America. Rather, the result is likely to be a partially successful Russian war of conquest that creates pervasive insecurity in Europe; a continent that, lacking American leadership, is less united and confident in opposing Putin; and greater global instability that ultimately makes it harder to contain China, as well.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Impacts---T/L › 2AC---Laundry List---T/L

US heg boosts transatlantic unity, keeps Russia and China in check, spreads democracy, and leads world peace

Ville Sinkkonen 22, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), Center on US Politics and Power, 6/7/2022, "A Fleeting Glimpse of Hegemony? The War in Ukraine and The Future of The International Leadership of The United States ," Transatlantic Policy Quarterly,

The war in Ukraine is a world-historical moment – a pivotal event that comes around maybe once every decade. Already the Russian invasion has upended the post-Cold War European security order. However, beyond shattering established structures, crises tend to create opportunities. In this regard, the war in Ukraine is no different. From the standpoint of the United States, Moscow’s blatant aggression has creating an opening to reassert its leadership of the Western alliance and even recapture some of its post-Cold War hegemonic position, which has been challenged by revisionist powers China and Russia and domestic travails.[1] A little over six months after a chaotic exit from Afghanistan, President Biden and his administration are being hailed for the successful coordination of a joint transatlantic response in sanctions against Russia and military aid to Ukraine. Joe Biden’s triumphant inaugural declaration looks prescient: “America is back”.

However, in the midst of such triumphalism, it is vital to pause and consider pathways forward. As the old international order receded, the Biden administration is facing questions regarding the future direction of America’s international engagement in the “post-February 24, 2022” world.[2] After briefly outlining how the Biden administration arrived at its pivotal date with history, this article zooms in on five sets of challenges that the U.S. needs to deal with to sustain the current “hegemonic moment.” Without attention and resolve to mitigate these challenges, the re-emergence of U.S. leadership in the transatlantic domain, not to mention any visions of reasserting U.S. hegemony more broadly, may prove but a flash in the pan.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Impacts---T/L › 2AC---Laundry List---T/L

U.S. heg is a prerequisite to solve existential risks, including the rise of authoritarian regimes and climate change

Betz 21 [11/3/2021, Betz, Hans-Georg, Hans-Georg Betz is an adjunct professor of political science at the University of Zurich. Before coming to Zurich, he taught at various universities in North America, including Johns Hopkins University's School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC, and York University in Toronto. He is the author of several books and numerous articles and book chapters on radical right-wing populism. He holds a PhD in Political Science from MIT., “Uncertain Times in a World Without American Hegemony”, Fair Observer, ]//AA

The international order is in deep trouble, and not only since the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic. This is not how things were supposed to turn out. The collapse of the “evil empire,” the end of the Cold War and the integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU were supposed to bring about a new era of stability and prosperity, the latter epitomized most prominently by China’s embrace of the market. Liberalism was supposed to reign supreme. In the grand battle of ideas, Marx had lost out, Hegel had won — or so his American acolyte, Francis Fukuyama, claimed. Fukuyama proclaimed that the “end of history” was at hand, and the cognoscenti and would-be cognoscenti on both sides of the Atlantic enthusiastically applauded. Three decades later, the world is in disarray. The attacks of September 11 were a drastic reminder that not everybody was sold on Fukuyama’s utopia. The financial crisis that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers and, with it, the house of cards built on a derivatives market that had spun out of control exposed the irrationality of rational behavior — taking more and more risks simply because everybody else did so. Finally, COVID-19 has demonstrated how quickly the beautiful world of ever-expanding consumer choices, sustained by cheap labor in remote parts of the world, can grind to a screeching halt. Benign Hegemon It is too early to tell whether or not global turbulences have reached a point of no return. The prospects are not great, and that has a lot to do with the United States. There is a strong sense that America’s hegemonic position, which it assumed after World War II, is on the wane and, with it, the country’s “commitment to promoting a liberal international order.” Or, perhaps, the United States suffers from a severe case of “leadership fatigue” and no longer wants to play the role of the “benign hegemon.” The notion of the benign hegemon is derived from hegemonic stability theory, popular among some experts in international relations. The theory posits that order and stability in world affairs crucially depend on a Great Power capable of sustaining them and willing to do so. As Stephen Kobrin, of the Wharton School, has recently put it, “A stable, open economy requires a hegemon, a dominant power who can provide some of the necessary public goods, absorb costs, and order the system.” Although this pertains particularly to international economic relations, it can be applied to other areas, such as international security. Order and stability require, among other things, that the hegemonic power formulate and underwrite the rules that define and govern the interactions between states in the international system. This was the case in the second half of the 19th century when Great Britain assumed this role, providing and guaranteeing global public goods such as free trade, capital mobility and the British pound, backed up by the gold standard, as the global reserve currency. The system came to an end with World War I. The conflict left Britain weakened and largely unable to reassume its prewar role. The interwar period was characterized by turmoil and crises, paving the way for the rise of autocratic regimes, committed to establishing a new order on the ruins of the old one. They accomplished the latter, but the new order was not theirs to create. The new hegemonic power that emerged from the war was not Hitler’s Germany but the United States, which filled the void left by an exhausted Great Britain. This was anything but a natural transition. In fact, for most of the interwar period, the United States had refused to get entangled in international affairs. America’s retreat from internationalism after World War I was epitomized by Congress’s refusal to join the League of Nations — and that despite the fact that the league had been the brainchild of US President Woodrow Wilson. Isolationism went hand in hand with protectionism. Throughout the 19th century and way into the beginning of the 20th, the United States boasted some of the highest tariffs in the world. The culmination was the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which had a devastating impact on international trade and contributed to the Great Depression. It was not until the United States entered the war against Nazi Germany that it assumed the role commensurate to its position as the economically and militarily by far strongest power in the world. Alternative Options The failure of the most recent G20 meeting in Rome to arrive at a meaningful common position on global warming and climate change ahead of the COP26 in Glasgow is further proof that the United States is no longer in a position to fill this role. Instead of leading, President Joe Biden blamed China and Russia “for any disappointment over the level of commitment by G20 leaders to fight climate change.” This is not to deny that Biden has a point. But given the enormity of the impact climate change is bound to have on the natural environment and life on this planet, it is little more than an exercise in passing responsibility. Biden’s remark, however, does address a serious issue, namely the role of China in a rapidly changing world. A few weeks ago, Chinese coal production reached new historic highs, amounting to an estimated 4 billion tons for this year. Accelerated coal production is supposed to alleviate energy shortages that have threatened to slow down the country’s growth. Unfortunately, emissions-wise, coal happens to be one of the worst sources of energy. A new study on the impact of carbon dioxide emissions on coastal areas predicts catastrophic devastation as a result of rising sea levels for some of the world’s megacities, particularly in India, Indonesia, Vietnam and China — all major coal consumers. Given the concentration of China’s population in a string of coastal cities, one might assume that it has a particular interest in combating climate change. In theory, this would entail an active involvement in global governance, a proposition that China has been more than reluctant to embrace, presumably because it would entail directly challenging the United States. At the same time, however, China has launched major initiatives, such as the foundation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and particularly the One Belt, One Road initiative. Together with China’s massive engagement in Africa, these projects leave the impression that they are part of a comprehensive drive designed to establish China as an alternative to the United States. This might herald the emergence of a new system, no longer dominated by one power but multipolar, and certainly very different from the one established after World War II. For, as Princeton’s John Ikenberry has noted a few years ago, “there is no liberal internationalism without American and western hegemony — and that age is ending.” With the decline of the United States and the parallel rise of China, countries have the option to “seek alternative patrons rather than remain dependent on Western largess and support.” The end result might very well be a bifurcated world order, on the heels of a period of instability and turmoil, or what Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini have called a “G-Zero” world, one without clear leadership and global cooperation. Bifurcation means the coexistence of competing systems that follow fundamentally different rules. This can already be observed in the realm of economic governance. Olga Petricevic and David Teece have recently warned of a “noticeable defiance of the principles of classical economic liberalism and the rule-of-law” by Russia and China. The Chinese “alternative model of governance,” they note, “is deploying coordinated protectionist trade and investment policies and government intervention aimed at accessing and acquiring foreign intellectual property, thereby influencing the global economic and innovation system.” Its success is likely to inspire imitation and attempts to jump on the bandwagon, resulting not only in bifurcation but in polarization reminiscent of the Cold War period.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
NATO Bad › 1NC --- CP Shell

The counterplan ENDS NATO and any permutation LINKS --- U.S. security cooperation is what keeps NATO alive --- if the U.S. reduces its commitments to NATO it will whither and European Allies will shift to collective defense

Shifrinson ‘21

(Joshua, PhD in political science/international relations from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute and Assistant Professor with the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University and a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Shifrinson’s research focuses on U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy, European and Asian security, alliance politics, and diplomatic history, “The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to NATO and its Future,” pg online @ //um-ef)

Although Trump has now left office, NATO is nonetheless in for difficult times, as strategic circumstances change and China’s rise draws American attention toward East Asia. Though some European NATO members now express interest in helping to counter Beijing, and the alliance itself is working to stake out a position on China’s rise, as the NATO Reflection Group Report underscored in November 2020, the United States will inevitably be more invested in Asian developments than will other NATO members.16 The net result presents two possible avenues for deeper, substantive divides in the alliance. First, if competition with Beijing escalates, the United States may be impelled to devote fewer resources and attention to European affairs. This would invert the Cold War experience, creating the potential for the alliance to wither away as American attention moves elsewhere and NATO’s European members seek alternatives for their security. Alliances, after all, usually change as new threats appear; as American priorities change, NATO cohesion may decline as well. Then, too, European actors might also be expected to complain about prospective American “abandonment.” Mounting Chinese–American competition may also encourage NATO’s European members to distance themselves, perhaps dramatically, from the United States. During the contest with the Soviet Union, European allies regularly feared that Soviet–American tensions might entangle them in a conflict with Moscow at times and places beyond their control. A U.S.–China contest would carry even greater risks. With less at stake in Asia, NATO’s European members can be expected to separate themselves from U.S. policy. If the United States were to respond by pressuring its European allies to assist against Beijing, an alliance rupture would become possible. President Biden’s path forward Recognizing these limits, what are the options for the United States under the Biden administration? Any policy must start from a recognition that America’s postwar mission in Europe has reached a natural end-state born of overwhelming success. Great powers no longer pose threats to dominate the region’s security or deny the independence of most countries therein. China, of course, is making economic and political inroads in the area, but is also encountering increasing opposition as it overplays its hand and, in any case, does not threaten the survival or sovereignty of European states. Russia, on the other hand, has notable military capabilities that can threaten neighbors along its immediate perimeter, but it lacks the wherewithal to imperil countries much beyond that. Moreover, its force structure seems designed to raise the costs for any U.S.–led NATO operation near Russia’s own borders, just as Europe’s member states have the economic and military capacity to oppose any Russian designs. As a result, a stable European balance of power can exist. This is a sea-change from the postwar, or even post–Cold War periods. NATO’s original purpose has been vindicated; the victory is won. Any policy must start from a recognition that America’s postwar mission in Europe has reached a natural end-state born of overwhelming success. In addition, the United States faces diminishing returns, and several negative results, from continuing its present approach to NATO. The alliance has now been enlarged to the point where few strategically meaningful European actors exist outside of NATO’s orbit, even as those that exist, such as Ukraine, would constitute a net loss for U.S. national security by risking a direct conflict with Moscow. In short, little can be gained from continued expansion. Likewise, as European leaders continue pressing for greater autonomy from the United States and NATO, the U.S. will generate increased friction with its allies if it continues to suppress their initiatives in this direction. This tension, meanwhile, comes at a time when Europe itself is of diminishing relative importance to an American grand strategy increasingly fixed on Asia, as most of the actors involved recognize. As the U.S.–led alliance continues moving toward Russia’s borders, it may play some role in driving Moscow and Beijing to cooperate in international affairs. In short, U.S. policy in Asia complicates U.S. strategy in Europe, and vice-versa. The United States requires a course correction. U.S. policy toward NATO now injects a large degree of instability and unsustainability into the region, which ironically possesses the preconditions for an unprecedented degree of stability thanks in part to prior U.S. efforts. In consequence, the Biden administration should consider proceeding along four tracks, with the goal of significantly reducing the U.S. security presence via NATO. Ending enlargement In coordination with its partners, the United States should credibly renounce further NATO enlargement. Whatever one makes of the merits of America’s post–1945 presence in Europe, the gains from further enlargement are few and the risks substantial. Several pathways exist to develop a policy of ceasing enlargement. Most directly, the U.S. government could simply declare it will not support the alliance’s further growth; thanks to NATO’s “one state, one vote” procedures, this would be enough to scuttle a further expansion push. Less unilaterally, U.S. planners could attempt to craft an intra–NATO consensus that expansion is no longer worth the costs. Given that many alliance members have long been skeptical of the merits of expansion — German policymakers, for example, were famously ambivalent over the Bucharest Declaration of 2008, which embraced Ukraine’s and Georgia’s interest in NATO membership — forging a broad front on this agenda ought not be difficult. Along the way, U.S. and allied diplomats should also seek to dampen the membership aspirations of those states still outside the alliance. Cutting troop commitments Second, the U.S. government should forgo permanently stationing combat forces in the Eastern European states admitted to NATO since the Cold War. Amid mounting calls to bolster the alliance’s presence along the so-called “eastern flank” due to collapsing relations with Moscow, the U.S. government should encourage European NATO members to bear primary responsibility for defense obligations east of the Oder–Neisse line. Not only have NATO’s European members taken an active role in the alliance’s ongoing “Enhanced Forward Presence” in Poland and the Baltic States; there is more than enough latent military capability in the European portion of the alliance to see this task through.17 For example, the former members of the Warsaw Pact (excluding Albania and the Baltic States) that have joined NATO since 1995 have nearly the same gross domestic product ($1.55 trillion, measured in 2010 dollars) as Russia ($1.76 trillion). Their population, 92 million people versus Russia’s 144 million, is also significant. Add in the other European members of NATO, and the numbers shift decisively against Russia. Although non–U.S. military investments in NATO remain underwhelming, even limited growth in non–U.S. NATO defense capabilities could thus provide a significant force able to take the lead in Eastern Europe. The United States should promote this result, with the goal of shifting the defense burden in Europe to the highly capable states in the area to reduce U.S. defense obligations. Rebalancing trans–Atlantic politics The United States ought to prepare for a broader recalibration of political responsibilities in Europe. Precisely because the United States has other domestic and international obligations, and because NATO’s European members are increasingly disenchanted with U.S. predominance, conditions are ripe to empower the European allies. The objective should be to strengthen intra–European solidarity and cooperation while the United States steps back from active management of European security. The United States should pivot toward becoming the pacifier of last resort rather than the manager of early squabbles.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
!!!Bilat CPs!!! › Aff Answers › 2AC --- Perm Do CP

The strategic concept refers to ‘NATO’ as the MEMBERS of the alliance

Sula et al ‘13

(Ismail Erkam Sula ** PhD Candidate, Bilkent University, Department of International Relations;, and Cagla Luleci“Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice: The Evolution of NATO’s Security Agenda,” pg online @ //um-ef)

The Strategic Concept is also clear with regard to the referent object of security. In the broadest sense, NATO refers to the security of the ‘alliance’ constituted of North America and Europe (NATO 1991, Article 16). However, throughout the whole Strategic Concept NATO makes clear that its security conception refers to the member states of the alliance. In particular NATO refers “to security amongst the members of the alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities relative to each other” 46. NATO refers to ‘collective security’ as a broad framework that is constituted of member states. In terms of both agency and referent object the security conception of NATO remains both statist and state-centric. With regard to the policy to

2022 Michigan Counterplan
!!!Bilat CPs!!! › Aff Answers › 2AC --- Unilat Fails

US unilat foreign policy fails – makes us unable to tackle common challenges or succeed domestically

Haass ‘21 - President of the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of The World: A Brief Introduction (Richard, Foreign Affairs, “The Age of America First”, December 2021, )//RG

Whatever the failings of this new paradigm, there is no going back; history does not offer do-overs. Nor should Washington return to a foreign policy that, for much of three decades, largely failed both in what it did and in what it did not do.

The starting point for a new internationalism should be a clear recognition that although foreign policy begins at home, it cannot end there. The United States, regardless of its diminished influence and deep domestic divisions, faces a world with both traditional geopolitical threats and new challenges tied to globalization. An American president must seek to fix what ails the United States without neglecting what happens abroad. Greater disarray in the world will make the task to “build back better”—or whatever slogan is chosen for domestic renewal—much more difficult, if not impossible. Biden has acknowledged the “fundamental truth of the 21st century . . . that our own success is bound up with others succeeding as well”; the question is whether he can craft and carry out a foreign policy that reflects it.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
!!!Bilat CPs!!! › Aff Answers › 2AC --- DCAs Fail

2 – mistrust and obligational concerns

Kinne ‘18 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, )//RG

DCAs show strong evidence of collaboration problems. When governments coordinate their defense policies, pool defense-related research-and-development (R&D) resources, transfer sophisticated weapons and military technologies, exchange classified information, hold joint exercises, and so on, they engage in inherently risky activities that create opportunities for exploitation. The key danger in signing a DCA with an untrusted partner is that the partner might ultimately employ the gains of cooperation for its own strategic advantage. In the event of direct confrontation, the improvements in military capacity that DCAs enable—better training, access to classified material, first-hand knowledge of others’ tactics and operating procedures—can be readily used to exploit a nominal defense partner. These concerns further extend to relations with third parties, both governmental and nongovernmental. For example, the US has long worried that military cooperation with countries like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan indirectly supports extremist organizations. More benignly, DCA partnerships also involve managerial concerns about the ability of partners to fulfill their obligations.40 In 2007, for example, the Japanese self- defense force unintentionally leaked classified details of the US-built Aegis weapons system, causing a furor in the US defense community.41 For all these reasons, DCAs require credible assurances of trustworthiness.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
!!!Bilat CPs!!! › Aff Answers › 2AC --- DCAs Fail

1 – variation and uncertainty doom proceedings – Singapore and Indonesia prove

Kinne ‘18 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, )//RG

Coordination problems are also apparent in DCAs. Variations in the institutional characteristics of DCAs partially reflect distributional concerns. Governments worry about asymmetric gains—that is, the possibility that one’s partners will gain more than oneself.47 Further, negotiators know that revealing a preference for particular design features may lead others to increase their demands accordingly. Given these incentives, governments anticipate that their interlocutors may not be fully transparent about their treaty preferences. That uncertainty, in turn, increases the risk of bargaining failure. Given their broad flexibility as framework agreements, DCAs particularly raise concerns about scope, precision, and the degree of reliance on implementing arrangements.

A contentious 2007 negotiation between Singapore and Indonesia offers an illuminating example. In response to Singapore’s request for access to Indonesian waters for training purposes, the resulting DCA included a seemingly benign implementing arrangement that designated an “Area Bravo” southwest of Indonesia’s Natuna Islands.48 Almost immediately upon signature of the DCA, Indonesian politicians accused Singapore of disingenuousness and began speculating on the “broad latitude” that the Singapore military would wield in Area Bravo, involving naval exercises, air support, live fire, and even participation of third parties—all of which, given Singapore’s growing military strength, would likely intensify over time.49 Indonesia’s defense minister, seizing on ambiguities within the agreement, declared that “Singapore still wants rules of their own, without having to negotiate ... on their military training here.”50 He further asserted, “We want clear rules of the game on the frequency and scope of Singapore military training, including how many times Singapore can fire its missiles in our territory.”51 While Singapore’s true preferences remain opaque, the mere perception of duplicity by the Indonesian government was sufficient to doom the proceedings.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
!!!Bilat CPs!!! › Aff Answers › 2AC --- DCAs – L2NB

DCAs strengthen NATO – allow NATO members to signal alignment

Kinne ‘18 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, )//RG

Fourth, traditional military alliances exercise influence in a variety of ways. Allied countries are better equipped to meet one another’s modernization needs, more likely to face common threats, and more likely to share foreign-policy goals. Thus, alliances should generally increase demand for DCAs. However, I anticipate a unique influence for NATO because its unusually broad mandate spills into issue areas—training, defense research, joint exercises, etc.—also addressed by DCAs. Accordingly, demand for DCAs should be lower between NATO states. At the same time, because DCAs are an important mechanism for prospective NATO members to signal alignment, I anticipate a positive effect for pairings between NATO members and Partnership-for-Peace (PfP) states.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
!!!Bilat CPs!!! › DCA Mechanism › 2NC --- Solvency --- AT: Trust Deficit

Engaging in DCAs builds trust and confidence – that overcomes pre-agreement mistrust

Kinne ‘18 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, )//RG

If states lack sufficient ex ante trust (that is, prior to treaty signature), cooperative efforts may fail.42 Unsurprisingly, the language of trust permeates DCA negotiations. Australia’s controversial 1995 DCA with Indonesia reflected the new reality that Australia “no longer sees Indonesia as an expansionist threat.” Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating bluntly stated: “It is a declaration of trust.” Indonesia’s President Suharto echoed the sentiment, asserting that “if there is still suspicion about Indonesia, then it should be eliminated.”43 Because trust is a necessary condition for defense cooperation, the creation of a DCA functions as a reassuring signal of cooperative intent to observant third parties.

DCAs also increase ex post trust. For example, the defense minister of Iran referred to his country’s 2002 DCA with Kuwait as a “trust-building effort,” echoing a phrase that appears repeatedly in leaders’ statements and in the texts of DCAs themselves.44 The prime ministers of China and India made this logic explicit in a joint public statement on their 2005 DCA, noting that “broadening and deepening of defense exchanges between the two countries [are] of vital importance in enhancing mutual trust and understanding between the two armed forces.”45 DCAs build confidence by repeatedly engaging governments in concrete acts of cooperation that entail non-trivial risks.46 While collaboration problems primarily involve issues of ex ante trust, I show later that increased ex post trust amplifies the network effects of DCAs.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
!!!Bilat CPs!!! › DCA Mechanism › 2NC --- Solvency --- Cooperation

DCAs solve – they empirically lead to cooperation and reduce disputes.

Kinne ‘19 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, “The Defense Cooperation Agreement Dataset (DCAD)”, June 1, 2019, )//RG

Defense cooperation has long intrigued scholars of international relations. Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War is, perhaps most of all, a treatise on alliance politics. Like Thucydides, contemporary scholars have focused heavily on formal military alliances—and have produced a formidable literature.1 Yet, governments rarely sign new alliances, and the global alliance structure has remained relatively static for decades. While alliance-making experienced a resurgence in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, only a dozen new alliances have emerged since 9/11—most of them ententes or nonaggression pacts rather than mutual defense pacts (Gibler 2009).

When governments pursue cooperation in defense, military, and security issues, they increasingly turn not to alliances, but to a type of framework treaty known as a defense cooperation agreement, or DCA. Nearly always bilateral, DCAs establish broad legal umbrellas for the range of cooperative defense activities in which states might engage, from coordinating defense policies to conducting joint exercises to jointly producing weapons and technology. In short, DCAs facilitate the routine interactions that comprise day-to-day defense cooperation. Taken as a whole, these agreements provide insight into the pragmatic tools that governments have developed to address the complex threats, both interstate and nontraditional, that define the contemporary global security environment.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
!!!Bilat CPs!!! › DCA Mechanism › 2NC --- Solvency --- General

DCAs are comprehensive solutions to cooperation problems – they are diverse and taken seriously

Kinne ‘18 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, )//RG

Defense cooperation agreements are an exciting new phenomenon. Nearly as many countries now participate in DCAs as in traditional military alliances. The shifting global security environment has generated demand for new forms of defense cooperation. However, states continue to face long-standing cooperation problems, such as informational asymmetries and distributional conflicts, which dampen willingness to cooperate and lead to an undersupply of defense agreements. A comprehensive approach to DCAs reinforces the important role of exogenous security influences while also emphasizing the importance of network influences. The DCA network helps to endogenously alleviate cooperation problems and encourage otherwise chary states to sign agreements. In-depth empirical analysis shows not only that these network effects are key drivers of defense cooperation, but that the network effects themselves likely derive from informational mechanisms. States respond to the ties of others precisely because those ties reveal strategically valuable information about trust, reliability, and institutional design preferences.

The study of DCAs promises fruitful insights on contemporary internatonal security. I consider three avenues of future research to be especially promising. First, the substantive impact of DCAs deserves consideration. Voluminous anecdotal evidence shows that governments take DCAs very seriously—an insight reinforced by the dramatic proliferation of DCAs over the past two decades. And DCAs often espouse ambitious goals, such as the coordination of the entirety of their respective signatories’ defense relations. Yet we know relatively little about how DCAs accomplish these goals. Figure 2 shows that the potential impact of DCAs is wide ranging, involving arms trade, defense spending, joint military exercises, training and exchange, and militarized conflicts.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
!!!Bilat CPs!!! › DCA Mechanism › 2NC --- Solvency --- General

DCAs are proliferating, but maintaining compliance is insufficient – creating new ones is key

Kinne ‘18 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, )//RG

Exogenously motivated demands for defense cooperation, though important, do not explain how states have managed to overcome the information asymmetries that plague cooperative efforts. While some powerful, wealthy governments may be willing to risk cooperation despite uncertainty, DCAs have proliferated far beyond the powerful and wealthy. Even former adversaries like Australia and Indonesia, Brazil and Argentina, and Ukraine and Russia have now signed DCAs. I argue that when states sign DCAs, they reveal information about their trustworthiness and design preferences to third-party observers, and those revelations in turn drive empirically observable network influences. As the density of the DCA network increases, network influences multiply. Information about the trustworthiness and institutional design preferences of prospective partners becomes more readily available, merely supplementary. Post-Cold War, they are in fact the primary determinants of new DCAs.

I thus operationalize DCAs as a global network, where a network is simply a collection of “nodes” (that is, countries) connected to one another via “edges” (that is, DCAs), and where the edges, though separable, are not independent of one another. The probability of a tie between a given i and j is then endogenous to the probability of a tie between i and k, or k and j, or k and l, and so on. Figure 4 illustrates the DCA network in Asia in 2010. As a network, the probability of any given edge is a function, in part, of other edges in the network, which defines the phenomenon of network influence. Conditional on the various exogenous influences discussed previously, the probability of a DCA between a given i and j depends on who else has signed DCAs.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
!!!Bilat CPs!!! › DCA Mechanism › 2NC --- Solvency --- Russia/Cyber

Bilat DCAs are key – solves Russian aggression and cyber warfare

Kinne ‘18 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, )//RG

In the years since, US defense policy has evolved to manage an increasingly complex security environment. US Secretary of Defense Ash Carter recently articulated the need for a “principled security network,” of which bilateral defense agreements are a key component.55 This network would address both traditional concerns (for example, “Russian aggression from the east”) and new threats like terrorism, piracy, refugee flows, humanitarian assistance, natural disasters, and cyber warfare.56 In short, the new global security environment has increased demand for novel forms of cooperation. Governments do not simply sign DCAs wantonly. States differ in their exposure to novel security threats, and partnerships with some states offer more promise in managing these threats than others. I employ historical accounts to identify three related but analytically distinct pressures on bilateral demand for defense cooperation. Subsequently, I translate these bilateral influences into a series of control variables.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
!!!Bilat CPs!!! › DCA Mechanism › 2NC --- Solvency --- Threats

DCAs spill over into broader cooperative communities that strengthen regional stability

Kinne ‘18 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, )//RG

Scholars have long argued that states use defense ties to signal affinity with particular collaborators.66 A Brazilian military analyst, explaining the 2010 DCA with the US, argued that “Brazil is aligning itself strategically with the US, like the European nations have done with NATO,” while Secretary of Defense Robert Gates described the deal as “a formal acknowledgement of the many security interests and values we share.”67 At their most ambitious, alignment efforts coalesce into nascent communities.68 Upon signing a DCA with Chile in 2012, the Canadian government reiterated a commitment to “working with like-minded nations to promote peace and security throughout the Americas.”69 In 2012, a Philippines senator argued that a DCA with Australia—complementing DCAs with South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Indonesia—would finalize a pan-Asian “security umbrella.”70 And Secretary Ash Carter’s farewell memo describes the above-mentioned principled security network as “open to all that seek to preserve and strengthen the rules and norms that have undergirded regional stability for the past seven decades.”71

2022 Michigan Counterplan
!!!Bilat CPs!!! › DCA Mechanism › 2NC --- Solvency --- Threats

DCAs solve common threats, both emerging and traditional

Kinne ‘18 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, )//RG

States respond not merely to global threats but to threats shared in common with potential partners. For example, the Grand Mufti of Brunei argued for a DCA with Indonesia by appealing to a sense of shared fate, declaring that “in the future, we will likely face nontraditional threats, which do not recognize state borders. It is thus a must for two neighboring countries to set up military cooperations.”62 Indonesia’s defense minister explained his country’s 2016 DCA with Sweden by stating that “our common enemy is terrorism.”63 Although asymmetric threats receive disproportionate attention, leaders also retain concerns about traditional interstate threats. The defense ministers of Iran and Syria described a 2006 DCA as a response to the “common threat” posed by the United States and Israel.64 Iran’s defense minister similarly declared that a 2005 DCA with Tajikistan would “deter foreign forces who aim to find a foothold in the region on the pretext of restoring security.”65

2022 Michigan Counterplan
!!!Bilat CPs!!! › DCA Mechanism › 2NC --- Solvency --- Readiness/Mod

DCAs solve military readiness – modernization improves capacity

Kinne ‘18 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, )//RG

Governments increasingly turn to DCAs as a means of improving their military capacity. For example, Bulgaria has waged a modernization campaign since the 1990s, involving dozens of DCAs that, according to US diplomats, are “based on the premise that Bulgaria faces new asymmetrical security threats rather than traditional threats to its national territory.”57 In 2011, Indonesia pursued DCAs with a wide swath of partners—including Russia, South Korea, China, Serbia, and India—in an effort to “modernize the country’s main armament system.”58 Modernization also includes R&D and industrial cooperation. In 2005, Ukraine’s defense minister argued that a DCA with Russia would capitalize on the “scientific and industrial potentials of Ukraine and Russia” and enable “co-production arrangements for defense-industry enterprises in the development and production of armaments and military hardware.”59 Officer exchanges and training programs comprise yet another source of military capacity. A defense official from the Philippines, following a 2006 agreement with Australia, observed: “It’s like a basketball game. We need to practise with other players from other teams to learn new skills and techniques to raise the level of our game.”60 The defense minister averred, “In three years, we could raise the military’s readiness from 45 percent to 70 percent.”61

2022 Michigan Counterplan
!!!Bilat CPs!!! › DCA Mechanism › 2NC --- Solvency --- Solves Better

DCAs are empirically better at promoting collective defense and cooperation – traditional alliances are inadequate

Kinne ‘18 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, )//RG

Do DCAs matter? Related work explores DCAs as an independent variable.20 Here, I briefly presage those findings. Diplomatic correspondence reveals that states increasingly view traditional military alliances as inadequate to the current global security environment. Shortly after the election of Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007, US diplomats reported that the new French government considered its alliances with African governments to be “patently absurd and out of date.”21 France sought to “radically convert the present system of defense agreements,” which were mostly traditional postcolonial defense pacts, and focus instead on “combating illicit trafficking and terrorist acts,” while also encouraging “cooperation on defense and security, favoring the rise in strength of African capacities to carry out peacekeeping.”22 African leaders supported these shifts. Comoros, for example, argued for a “new military cooperation arrangement with France,” focusing not on traditional mutual defense issues, but on “training and exchange programs.”23

Leaders also frequently tout the material benefits of DCAs. For example, the 2011 annual plan between France and Estonia “lays down nearly twenty different activities,” varying from “training of Estonian air force ground intercept controllers” to “participation of French ships in the Baltops and Open Spirit exercises” to “admitting a French student to the Baltic Defense College.”24 Russia’s defense minister boasted that the 2016 annual plan with Belarus “stipulates over 130 events and measures.”25 According to Indonesia’s national news agency, Indonesia’s numerous DCAs have allowed it to obtain Sukhoi fighters and Mi-17 helicopters from Russia, platform dock ships and submarines from South Korea, and C-802 missiles from China.26 And a 2008 DCA between Latvia and Norway allowed Latvia to increase its peacekeeping presence in Afghanistan and coordinate with Norwegian command.27