2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
CP causes civil war
Cooper 18 (Ryan Cooper is a national correspondent at TheWeek.com. His work has appeared in the Washington Monthly, The New Republic, and the Washington Post., America's Constitution is terrible. Let's throw it out and start over., https://theweek.com/articles/750816/americas-constitution-terrible-lets-throw-start-over)
5. Throw the entire Constitution in the garbage. One of the biggest problems with the Constitution as written is it makes changing anything nearly impossible. Other countries regularly ditch or overhaul their constitutions to deal with new problems — and even America has done so in the distant past. When the first stab at a U.S. Constitution proved totally unworkable, Americans of the day didn't fuss around with stipulations that "the Union shall be perpetual." Instead they threw the whole thing out and started from scratch. When it comes to major reform, I reckon this is the most likely actual possibility. One of these days, a standoff will come to a head, and will lead to some kind of total breakdown. Legal mechanisms like a constitutional convention are completely untested and would probably create such explosive controversy that we'd effectively end up with a new constitution anyway. Make no mistake, a constitutional collapse would be a tremendously destabilizing and dangerous event, and raise a significant chance of insurrection, civil war, or a military dictatorship. But if and when it comes, it won't be by choice — it will be because the ancient, janky mechanisms of the American Constitution simply failed. If we wish to avoid such a breakdown, moderating reforms like the ones mentioned above must be considered and adopted, posthaste.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
Forrester 89 (Ray, Professor, Hastings College of the Law, University of California. 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1636. Lexis)
On the basis of this report, the startling fact is that one [man] [person] alone has the ability to start a nuclear war.
A basic theory--if not the basic theory of our Constitution--is that concentration of power in any one person, or one group, is dangerous to mankind. The Constitution, therefore, contains a strong system of checks and balances, starting with the separation of powers between the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court. The message is that no one of them is safe with unchecked power. Yet, in what is probably the most dangerous governmental power ever possessed, we find the potential for world destruction lodged in the discretion of one person.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
Schaffner 5, (Joan, Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. 54 Am. U.L. Rev. 1487. Lexis)
[*1525] Through amendment, the legislative branch has the power to enact laws that establish societal standards only so long as the laws enacted do not violate the constitutional rights of individuals. 222 The legislature is not empowered to draft laws to enshrine illegitimate prejudices of the majority. Allowing the legislature, with the endorsement of the executive, to amend the Constitution to expressly overrule a decision of the judiciary, which acted consistently with democratic principles by protecting the rights of a minority of the people, destroys the delicate balance of power among the branches.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
Dyck & Lascher 19 [, Associate Professor of Political Science; Director of the Center for Public Opinion, University of Massachusetts Lowell, Professor and Chair, Department of Public Policy and Administration, California State University, Sacramento, “Expanding direct democracy won’t make Americans feel better about politics”, , 9/17/19, imp]
As Americans watch the Brexit-related , it is important to remember that the chaos there began in a form of direct democracy. When U.K. voters set in motion their exit from the European Union, .
Normally, such major policy would have been initiated, deliberated and voted on by their elected officials in Parliament.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Constitution DA
Hemesath 00 (Paul A., Law Journal, August, 88 Geo. L.J. 2473, Lexis)
In the case of an offensive nuclear attack, the importance of a coherent and legitimate decision cannot be overestimated. Even with the force of a congressional declaration of war, Harry Truman still faced critics that questioned the sagacity of his atomic decision in World War II. 183 Although the wisdom of any nuclear use may always remain open to criticism, the legality of such a decision should be beyond reproach. As previously noted, the potentially "unlimited costs" of a nuclear war are extremely difficult to fathom, both physically and politically. 184 A legitimate decision to utilize a nuclear weapon thus requires a high level of legality and consensus--two qualities that cannot be attained with a Congress plausibly asserting the nonexistence of the Executive's very constitutional authority to carry out the act. Finding a resolution to nuclear war powers uncertainty is not an obvious endeavor. However, the harms associated with an unprepared and contentious "on-the-fly" decisionmaking process are serious enough to demand a principled solution based on the Constitution and not on improvised convenience. To reach such a solution, Congress must cohere in an attempt to draft an unambiguous War Powers Act and proceed to pursue remedies in the courts well in advance of a nuclear crisis. In return, the courts must either deign to decide the issue on its merits, or provide a definitive jurisdictional holding upon which the courts and the President may come to rely.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Constitution DA
Lucas 16 – James W. Lucas is an attorney in New York City and member of the New York Bar., June 2nd 2016, "To Originate the Amendment of Errors: Reforming Article V to Facilitate State and Popular Engagement in Constitutional Amendment by James Lucas :: SSRN," No Publication
Madison was right – a convention is procedurally unworkable. In its time the Philadelphia convention of 1787 was not unusual. Many states had then recently held conventions and other assemblies to write state constitutions and address other matters, and the convention at Philadelphia had seemed to come off well.109 Of the framers, only Madison sensed that another national convention would be a far more difficult matter when left as procedurally vague as in Article V. Scholars and advocates have spilt much ink confidently announcing their numerous and contradictory solutions to these multitudinous issues. However, state legislators who are charged with the constitutional duty to actually decide whether to summon a second convention have time and time again emerged from the jungle of unresolved procedural questions to find themselves, not in the promised land of constitutional reform, but rather at the edge of a dangerous precipice whose base is shrouded in clouds of uncertainty. These legislators have repeatedly shied away from taking the leap into the unknown. No one can really assure these state legislators what constitutes a proper application for a convention, whether, how or to what extent Congress would count their applications, whether the convention could be limited as to subject matter, or who would go to the convention, how they would be selected and, most critically, how their votes would be counted. There can be no assurance that the federal Congress and/or courts will not control how these issues are decided or, conversely, if there is any predictable mechanism with certain authority to sort out all of these fundamental issues. Instead, there is a real possibility of the kind of constitutional confrontations predicted by Professor Tribe in testimony before the California state legislature. (Here “constitutional” does not mean technically legal under the Constitution, but rather fundamental political conflicts which could tear the very fabric of the governmental system created in 1787.) These are confrontations between Congress and the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court and the states, and the Congress and the convention itself if it ever came into being.110 After surveying these issues during the first great convention drive of recent years in the 1960s, Professor Robert Dixon concluded that even “without exhausting here all of the possible complexities, the state petition and federal convention route to constitutional amendment emerges as a veritable can of worms, and seems unlikely to be used successfully.”111 Experience since then has proven him right, as well as Madison. There has been no Article V convention, nor is there any realistic prospect of one. However, Professor Dixon went on to observe that “situations can be imagined even in this age where the disposition of congressional forces, including a Senate filibuster, could block the initiation of an amendment which, if submitted, would receive adequate popular support for ratification.”112 This brings us to our next question.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Delay DA
The constitutional amendment process.(teaching content). Kahlil Social Education 69.7 (Nov-Dec 2005): p373(9). )
Even though the steps can be described briefly, actual ratification can take much longer. Some amendments, such as the 27th (Congressional pay increases), took many years to complete the ratification process. It was proposed by James Madison in 1789, but not ratified until 203 years later. This amendment required that any change in the salary of members of Congress only take effect after the next general election (so lawmakers were not voting to increase their own salaries). Congress ratified other amendments in short order, such as the 18th (Prohibition), which took little more than a year. The length of time depends upon the gravity of the issue the amendment is intended to address, the intensity of public sentiment concerning the issue, and whether or not a time limit for ratification was written into the amendment during the proposal stage.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Delay DA
Olson, 16 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute’s Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies and is known for his writing on the American legal system (Walter, “An Article V Constitutional Convention? Wrong Idea, Wrong Time”, CATO Institute, 1/5/2016, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/article-v-constitutional-convention)//RCU
Some of these ideas are better than others—Gov. Abbott’s 92-page report () is rather erudite, and lays out its arguments skillfully even if I do not find all of them sound—but every such scheme to stage an Article V convention should come with a giant ACME brand stenciled on its side. If it doesn’t just sit there doing nothing, it’s apt to blow up on the spot. The detonation that skeptics most fear is what’s called a runaway convention, in which the delegates called together to, say, install term limits or revamp campaign finance decide to venture into other areas as well, and perhaps start proposing whatever new amendments they think might be a good idea. Hence Justice Antonin Scalia’s brusque dismissal: “I certainly would not want a constitutional convention. Whoa! Who knows what would come out of it?” Some respected scholars who favor a convention argue that strict instructions would deter the assembled delegates from venturing beyond the velvet rope. But if that cannot be made a legal requirement, it winds up more like an honor code. “Congress might try to limit the agenda to one amendment or to one issue, but there is no way to assure that the Convention would obey,” wrote the late Chief Justice Warren Burger. Don’t believe Scalia or Burger? Go ahead and read the instruction kit for a convention, such as it is, in Article V of the U.S. Constitution. It’s quite brief. Here’s the full relevant text: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress… Note what this does *not* say. It says not a word expressly authorizing the states, Congress, or some combination of the two to confine the subject matter of a convention. It says not a word about whether Congress, in calculating whether the requisite 34 states have called for a convention, must (or must not) aggregate calls for a convention on, say, a balanced budget, with differently worded calls arising from related or perhaps even unrelated topics. It says not a word prescribing that the make-up of a convention, as many conservatives imagine, will be one-state-one-vote (as Alaska and Wyoming might hope) or whether states with larger populations should be given larger delegations (as California and New York would surely argue). Does Congress, or perhaps the Supreme Court, get to resolve these questions—the same Congress and Supreme Court that the process is aimed at doing an end run around? If the Supreme Court resolves them, does it do so only at the very end of the process, after years of national debate have been spent in devising amendments that we find out after the fact were not generated in proper form? Justice Burger described the whole process as “a grand waste of time.” One reason is that after advocates get the process rolling by convincing two-thirds of states, or 34, itself a fairly demanding number, the amendments that emerge from a convention do not get ratified unless three-quarters of states ratify, or 38, a quite demanding number. Put differently, it takes only 13 states to refuse to act to kill any of these ideas, bad or good, in the end. Sorry, Cenk and Marco, but so long as we have a nation fairly closely divided between Blue and Red sentiment, there will be at least 13 states skeptical of some systemic change so big that you had to go around the backs of both Congress and the Supreme Court to pull it off. If you’re a progressive who thinks the populist winds blow only in your favor, reflect for a moment on the success of Donald Trump. If you’re a conservative to whom radio call-ins resound as the voice of the people, consider that state legislatures confronted with the hard legal issues a convention would raise might turn for advice and assistance to elite lawyers (yikes) or even law professors (double yikes).
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Delay DA
Chism 5 [Chism, National Archives education specialist, 2005, The constitutional amendment process.(teaching content). Kahlil Social Education 69.7 (Nov-Dec 2005): p373(9)]
Even though the steps can be described briefly, actual ratification can take much longer. Some amendments, such as the 27th (Congressional pay increases), took many years to complete the ratification process. It was proposed by James Madison in 1789, but not ratified until 203 years later. This amendment required that any change in the salary of members of Congress only take effect after the next general election (so lawmakers were not voting to increase their own salaries). Congress ratified other amendments in short order, such as the 18th (Prohibition), which took little more than a year. The length of time depends upon the gravity of the issue the amendment is intended to address, the intensity of public sentiment concerning the issue, and whether or not a time limit for ratification was written into the amendment during the proposal stage.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Veto
Michael B. Rappaport, 10, director of USD’s Center for the Study of Constitutional Originalism, November, 2010, “REFORMING ARTICLE V: THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE NATIONAL CONVENTION AMENDMENT METHOD AND HOW TO FIX THEM”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20788836.pdf?acceptTC=true
Now, consider a different amendment provision. This provision allows Congress to amend the Constitution, subject to ratification by state legislatures or conventions, but it provides no other amendment method. Thus, it gives Congress a veto on any amendments. This provision would also make the Constitution less reflective of popular views and less desirable. Given the desire of political entities to maintain and expand their power, Congress is unlikely to allow the Constitution to be amended to limit its power. Moreover, because Congress tends to adopt the perspective of the federal government generally, Congress might not be quick to limit the power of the other branches of the federal government.62 Thus, if a change in values or circumstances were to require additional limitations on Congress or even on the federal government, it is unlikely that an amendment adopting those changes would be passed. Moreover, if Congress were to abuse its power, no constitutional reform would be forthcoming. Over time, then, one would expect the Constitution to become increasingly distorted normatively. The Constitution would fail to add needed checks on Congress and the federal government, but would grow to include additional limitations on the states (and perhaps the President). Finally, consider the existing Article V provisions. We can see that it is [are] largely the same as the one described immediately above that permits only the congressional amendment process. Given the defects in the convention process, it is as if that process does not exist. Thus, the same normative distortions that apply to a constitution with only the congressional amendment procedure--a bias in favor of Congress and the national government, and against the states--apply to the existing Constitution. The one exception to this claim is that the national convention process would be available if matters ever turned catastrophic. At that point, the state legislatures might be willing to risk a runaway convention and the other costs to address genuinely overriding problems. But absent this extraordinary situation, the national convention process would not be employed and the Constitution would exhibit serious normative problems. My argument that the failure of the national convention method undermines the constitutional amendment process by preventing certain amendments from being enacted is confirmed by our constitutional history. The dominant pattern of constitutional amendments reveals an amendment process that has neither placed checks on Congress or the federal government, nor provided protections to the states. Instead, it has often expanded the federal government's power or taken actions that have been largely orthogonal to the federal government's interests.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Alliances Deficit
Howell & Pevehouse 11 [William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, both associate professors at the University of Chicago's Irving B. Harris School of Public Policy, “Chapter 1: Possibilities of Congressional Influence,” in While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers, Princeton University Press, 6-27-2011, p.27-29]
The Importance of Congressional Appeals/Dissent Because they are legally binding, legislation and appropriations passed by Congress directly impinge on a president’s discretion to wage war. Not surprisingly, then, opponents of a president’s war typically call on Congress to pass laws and cut appropriations. But the public debates that precede military actions also have important consequences for presidential power. Two stand out. By expressing dissent, members of Congress can weaken the presidents ability to credibly convey resolve to foreign allies and adversaries, and they can turn public opinion against him.73 Here, we briefly summarize both of these avenues of congressional influence. SIGNALING RESOLVE To the extent that congressional discontent signals domestic irresolution to other nations, the job of resolving a foreign crisis is made all the more difficult. As Kenneth Schultz shows, an “opposition party can under- mine the credibility of some challenges by publicly opposing them. Since this strategy threatens to increase the probability of resistance from the rival state, it forces the government to be more selective about making threats”—and, concomitantly, more cautious about actually using military force.74 When members of Congress openly object to a planned military operation, would-be adversaries of the United States may feel emboldened, believing that the president lacks the domestic support required to see a military venture through. Such nations, it stands to reason, will be more willing to enter conflict, and if convinced that the United States will back down once the costs of conflict are revealed, they may fight longer and make fewer concessions. Domestic political strife, as it were, weakens the ability of presidents to bargain effectively with foreign states, while increasing the chances that military entanglements abroad will become protracted and unwieldy. A large body of work within the field of international relations supports the contention that a nation’s ability to achieve strategic military objec- tives in short order depends, in part, on the head of states credibility in conveying political resolve. Indeed, a substantial game theoretic literature underscores the importance of domestic political institutions and public opinion as state leaders attempt to credibly commit to war.75 Confront- ing widespread and vocal domestic opposition, the president may have a difficult time signaling his willingness to see a military campaign to its end. While congressional opposition may embolden foreign enemies, the perception on the part of allies that the president lacks support may make them wary of committing any troops at all. The dangers of domestic political dissent are not lost on presidents and members of Congress. Indeed, for Bush (43) it constituted an important reason for seeking congressional authorization to use force against Iraq in the fall of 2002. In a Rose Garden ceremony on October 2, the presi- dent noted, “The statement of support from the Congress will show to friend and enemy alike the resolve of the United States. In Baghdad, the regime will know that full compliance with all U.N. security demands is the only choice and that time remaining for that choice is limited.”76 Then, in remarks eight days later on the House’s vote to authorize the use of force, the president proclaimed, “The House of Representatives has spoken clearly to the world and to the United Nations Security Council: The gathering threat of Iraq must be confronted fully and finally. Today’s vote also sends a clear message to the Iraqi regime: It must disarm and comply with all existing U.N. resolutions, or it will be forced to comply. There are no other options for the Iraqi regime. There can be no negoti- ations. The days of Iraq acting as an outlaw state are coming to an end.”77 By securing congressional authorization, it was supposed, the president could communicate his views and intentions more effectively to the international community that Iraq’s defiance of United Nations resolutions would no longer pass unnoticed.'8 In doing so, it was hoped, Saddam Hussein would finally relent to Bush's demands. Imagine what might have happened during the lead-up to and execu- tion of the Iraq War had Congress not authorized the use of force. Two outcomes seem plausible, even likely. First, the president would have had an even more difficult time assembling an international coalition in sup- port of military action. Recall, after all, that the president expressly sought congressional authorization in the hopes that it would improve the chances of later securing a UN Resolution in support of military action. Second, and in a more speculative vein, had Congress not authorized the use of force, the military operation itself might not have gone so smoothly. Dur- ing the early stages of the Iraq War, the U.S. military took pains to per- suade the enemy to lay down its arms and surrender, rather than fight and face certain death. Accompanying these claims were regular assurances that the United States would see this war through to the end, that it would not stop until the entire Hussein regime was dismantled. To substantiate these claims, Congress’s authorization was critical. For a moment, put yourself in the place of an Iraqi field officer in the spring of 2003. On the one hand, the United States military is bearing down upon you, threatening to kill you and every one of your comrades unless you abandon the fight. On the other hand, should you surrender prematurely, and should the United States fail to depose the Hussein regime, then you can expect to face the wrath of a spurned and spiteful ruler—as the southern Shi’a did a decade prior, after they had risen up in defiance of the Hussein regime only to be persecuted the moment that U.S. troops withdrew. Which option seems preferable critically depends on the likelihood that the United States will see the campaign to its end. For if you have reason to doubt the nation’s resolve, and Congress's refusal to authorize the use of force would buoy this concern, then the latter op- tion might be the right one—producing a longer, bloodier military conflict and raising the cost to an invading army. Similar concerns arose in subsequent years when the United States con- templated troop withdrawals from Iraq. Though the insurgency contin- ued to take its toll on U.S. forces, the president’s popularity waned, and calls for the Iraqi government to police its own state intensified. Bush nonetheless refused to set a firm timetable for troops to leave. And his rea- sons for doing so were plain enough. The president insisted that insurgents were watching U.S. politics closely and that a timetable would encourage the insurgents to “just go ahead and wait us out." Setting a fixed with- drawal date, Bush concluded, simply “concedes too much to the enemy.”79 Whether this prediction was accurate or not, its logic relied on the realization that others monitor U.S. politics generally, and Congress in particular, to gauge the nation’s resolve.
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Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Theory › 2NC – AT: Con Con Theory
Lessig ’14 [Lawrence; May 30; Professor of Law and Leadership at Harvard University, Director of Harvard’s Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics; The Atlantic, “A Real Step to Fix Democracy,” https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/05/a-real-step-to-fix-democracy/371898/]
In the 225 years since the Constitution was drafted, we’ve never had a federal convention. But the idea is familiar within the states. There have been more than 230 state constitutional conventions. Across our history, conventions to revise a constitution are more common than presidential and congressional elections—combined.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Theory › 2NC – AT: Con Con Theory
Tremmel 13 [Joerg Chet Tremmel is a Professor for "intergenerationally just policies" at the University of Tuebingen. He is Editor-in-chief of the Intergenerational Justice Review and a visiting lecturer at the Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-University Frankfurt, the University of Stuttgart and the Heinrich-Heine-University in Dusseldorf, Germany. An extended separation of powers model as the theoretical basis for the representation of future generations. July 26, 2013. https://www.futurejustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Paper_Future-Branch_Tremmel.pdf]
The aim of this paper was to identify the right questions, not provide answers. The basic idea was that in order to institutionalise sustainability, the division of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches should be extended to include a new institutional level. But the devil lies in the details. He who demands for a new representation for future generations must find solutions to the following question:
• Should the fourth branch be able to suggest laws, stop them, or consider laws with veto power? Should it have a rather proactive or reactive role? Put differently: Should such a body be connected to the legislature in order to formulate sustainable laws? Or is its responsibility to review whether laws meet the criterion of sustainability, which would seem to suggest that it should be conceptualised similarly to the judiciary?
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Theory › 2NC – AT: Con Con Theory
Strait and Wallace ’7 [L. Paul, USC and Brett, George Mason U., The Scope of Negative Fiat and the Logic of Decision Making, Policy Cures? Health Assistance to Africa, Debaters Research Guide, p. A2]
More to the point, debate certainly helps teach a lot of skills, yet we believe that the way policy debate participation encourages you to think is the most valuable educational benefit, because how someone makes decisions determines how they will employ the rest of their abilities, including the research and communication skills that debate builds. Plenty of debate theory articles have explained either the value of debate, or the way in which alternate actor strategies are detrimental to real-world education, but none so far have attempted to tie these concepts together. We will now explain how decision-making skill development is the foremost value of policy debate and how this benefit is the decision-rule to resolving all theoretical discussions about negative fiat. Why debate? Some do it for scholarships, some do it for social purposes, and many just believe it is fun. These are certainly all relevant considerations when making the decision to join the debate team, but as debate theorists they aren’t the focus of our concern. Our concern is finding a framework for debate that educates the largest quantity of students with the highest quality of skills, while at the same time preserving competitive equity. The ability to make decisions deriving from discussions, argumentation or debate, is the key skill. It is the one thing every single one of us will do every day of our lives besides breathing. Decision-making transcends boundaries between categories of learning learning like “policy education” and “kritik education,” it makes irrelevant considerations of whether we will eventually be policymakers, and it transcends questions of what substantive content a debate round should contain. The implication for this analysis is that the critical thinking and argumentative skills offered by real-world decision-making are comparatively greater than any educational disadvantage weighed against them. It is the skills we learn, not the content of our arguments, that can best improve all of our lives. While policy comparison skills are going to be learned through debate in one way or another, those skills are useless if they are not grounded in the kind of logic actually used to make decisions.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › INB › 2NC – AT: No Spillover
Boston 14 [Jonathan Boston, Professor of Public Policy, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington, Fulbright Fellow, American University. Governing for the Future: How to bring the long-term into short-term political focus. November 5, 2014. https://www.american.edu/spa/cep/upload/jonathan-boston-lecture-american-university.pdf]
Further, the problem under consideration is fundamentally one of ‘governance’ and how it can be improved. It is about societal steering and prioritization, especially steering and prioritization over extended periods of time. It is about how democratic societies can shape, ‘weave’ or ‘navigate’ the future in desirable directions (Dror, 2003), implement coherent and sustained efforts to address long-term challenges (Lempert, 2007a), minimize foreseeable, yet avoidable, damages, and prepare for the unexpected - such as ‘wild cards’ (Fukuyama, 2007) and ‘black swan’ events (Taleb, 2007). Accordingly, it is not a narrow policy problem; nor is it limited to a particular policy domain or even a specific category or class of policy issues; and nor is it primarily about finding once-and-for-all solutions to major long-term policy problems. Such problems, after all, are frequently highly complex and require a never-ending series of efforts to address. And even if complete and durable solutions can be found, new and equally difficult problems are constantly emerging. The dilemma of how to govern well for the long-term, therefore, is enduring and relentless; it confronts each and every generation of policy-makers; it is not limited to one particular epoch. To be sure, the precise contours and the specific manifestations will be constantly evolving, thereby posing fresh, novel and distinctive challenges for each successive generation. But the broad structure of the problem - namely, of how best to encourage prudent intertemporal decision-making - remains the same.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › INB › 2NC – AT: No Spillover
Spijkers 21 [Otto Spijkers, Professor of International Law at Wuhan University’s China Institute of Boundary and Ocean Studies (CIBOS) as well as its Research Institute of Environmental Law (RIEL) and Founding Staff Member of its International Water Law Academy (IWLA). He is also a member of the Committee on the Role of International Law in Sustainable Natural Resource Management for Development of the International Law Association. “Equity across Generations in Implementing International Law on Water.” Future Trends. (2021). In M. Cordonier Segger, M. Szabó, & A. Harrington (Eds.), Intergenerational Justice in Sustainable Development Treaty Implementation: Advancing Future Generations Rights through National Institutions (Treaty Implementation for Sustainable Development, pp. 703-791). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.]
This chapter first examined the relationship between the principle of intergenerational equity and the two most fundamental principles of international water law – the no harm rule and the principle of equitable utilization – as reflected in the UN Watercourses Convention. It then looked at how this relationship between intergenerational equity and water law’s foundational principles played out in specific agreements regulating a particular transboundary watercourse. Many of these agreements use the Watercourses Convention’s proclamation of the principles as starting point, but then add more intergenerational elements to them. It appears that States are more and more confident in doing so, and thus the principles slowly evolve into more sustainable, intergenerational versions of themselves.
We also see this evolution in domestic law and policies. All examples referred to above have attempted to find a way to share the burdens and benefits of freshwater resource management and utilization among the present and future generations. The exact formulation of this balance differs. Sometimes the present generation has an obligation to ensure that future generations have at least as many resources and opportunities as the present generation currently has. Sometimes the present generation is asked only to keep the interests of future generations in mind when utilizing the freshwater resources. Very few legal frameworks give a role to representatives of future generations as participants. It is more common for the present generation to simply accept an obligation for itself to take into account the interests of future generations, without giving the latter any means to ensure compliance with this commitment. If we take all these examples together, we find an interesting laboratory of intellectual experiments, most of them of very recent date, which may provide a source of inspiration. The question of how to ensure compliance with these water laws remains beyond the scope of this chapter, but the next step is to faithfully carry out those plans and to respect the commitments that have been made to present and future generations.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › INB › 2NC – AT: No Spillover
Graham 17 [Hilary Graham, J. Martin Bland, Richard Cookson, Mona Kanaan, and Piran White -- Department of Health Sciences and Environment Department at the University of York. Do People Favour Policies that Protect Future Generations? Evidence from a British Survey of Adults. Journal of Social Policy, 2017. https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/D722EA2340DB8139FA2476E00E4612EC/S0047279416000945a.pdf/div-class-title-do-people-favour-policies-that-protect-future-generations-evidence-from-a-british-survey-of-adults-div.pdf]
How to represent the interests of future generations in policy decision-making has long been recognised as a central challenge of policy evaluation. The accelerating pace of environmental and climate change is adding urgency to this issue (Steffen et al., 2011; Stern, 2006).
Our study of adults in Britain raises questions about a core assumption underpinning standard policy evaluation: that people prefer policies that most benefit their generation. The study points, instead, to a strong preference for policies bringing greater benefit to the generations that follow. These findings accord with sociological evidence that concern for future generations is among the values that many people hold in common.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › INB › 2NC – Impact -- AT: Defense
West 16 [Darrell West is an American author, political scientist, and political commentator. West is the vice president and director of governance studies and director of the center for technology innovation at the Brookings Institution. Megachange: Economic Disruption, Political Upheaval, and Social Strife in the 21st Century -- Chapter 1, Overcoming Presentism. 2016. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/chapter-one-_-megachange.pdf]
It is no accident that large-scale change is taking place in the contemporary period. Many of the beliefs and institutions that once anchored international and domestic affairs have grown weak. Political tidal waves have occurred in many parts of the world. We live in an era where major events occur on a seemingly regular basis.6 Megachange refers to dramatic shifts in social, economic, or political phenomena. These alter-ations can include economic disruptions, political upheaval, or social strife, among other things. Any one of these can generate ramifications that go beyond the small-scale, incremental shifts that historically typified many societal developments.
While the extent and pace of change today seems exceptionally dramatic, the current period is not the first to show evidence of large-scale change. Throughout history, empires and civilizations came and went with regularity. Nations rose in prominence and then collapsed due to economic challenges, foreign invasion, internal conflicts, or natural disasters. Dramatic scientific discoveries disrupted business practices, or new societal orders such as the Reformation and the Industrial Revolution fundamentally altered people’s lives.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › INB › 2NC – Impact -- AT: Defense
White and Haughton 17 [Iain White, Geography and Environmental Planning, University of Waikato. Graham Haughton, University of Manchester. Risky times: Hazard management and the tyranny of the present. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction Volume 22, June 2017, Pages 412-419. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212420916305696]
This paper examines how the processes and practices of hazard management skew decision-making towards current concerns, shaping the treatment of the future in the present. We reveal how norms of science and policy combine to manage the complexity, uncertainty and intangibility inherent in working to long-term time horizons by defining, bounding and codifying how we understand the future. These processes, we argue, frequently but not inevitably, constrain the influence of long-term considerations, resulting in ‘hazardscapes’ where risks become embedded spatially, transferred temporally and difficult for future generations to reverse. We introduce the notion of a ‘tyranny of the present’ as a means to critique the ways in which the future is heard in risk management, that is, how the future is known, bounded, and incorporated, and the legacies that this may create. Overall, we highlight how more effective management of risks is not just a matter of better data or improved policy, rather that discourses of risk are subject to a ‘presentist’ bias, the underpinnings of which need to be better understood in order to make more effective decisions for future generations.
1. Introduction
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Solvency › 2NC – Con-Con – AT: No International Modelling
Krotoszynski, Director of Faculty Research, and Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law, 2009 (Ronald, Arkansas Law Review, 61 Ark. L. Rev. 603)
In the early years of the republic, our ability to go it alone was substantially more limited than in the years following World War I and World War II. Indeed, without French assistance in what amounted to a proxy war between the French and English crowns, it is uncertain whether Cornwallis would have surrendered at Yorktown. n5 By the mid-twentieth century, however, American economic and military created the opportunity for the United States to play a much larger role on the world stage. Instead of simply attempting to maintain our own institutions and political values, the federal government increasingly sought to export these values to others.∂ Lawyers in the United States effectively drafted the post-war constitutions of Germany n6 and Japan, n7 which remain in [*605] effect to this very day. n8 In fact, the United States model of a written constitution, with a Bill of Rights enumerating particularly important human rights, has become an almost universal norm. As Robert Badinter, former President of the French Constitutional Council, and United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer have explained, "Today almost all Western democracies have come to believe that independent judiciaries can help to protect fundamental human rights through judicial interpretation and application of written documents containing guarantees of individual freedom." n9∂ Only a few years ago, former Chief Justice Aharon Barak, of the Supreme Court of Israel, tied these developments directly to the contribution of United States constitutional law stating, "United States public law in general, and United States Supreme Court decisions in particular, have always been, to me and to many other judges in modern democracies, shining examples of constitutional thought and constitutional action." n10 He also noted that "the United States is the richest and deepest source of constitutionalism in general and of judicial review in particular." n11 Further, he acknowledged, "We foreign jurists all look to developments in the United States as a source of inspiration." n12