2022
Michigan
Negative
DA/Case Turns › China-Specific Work › Links --- China Attacks UUV
Zhao ‘18
(TONG, PhD in science, technology, and international affairs from the Georgia Institute of Technology is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, based at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing. His research focuses on strategic security issues, including nuclear weapons policy, arms control, nonproliferation, missile defense, space security, and other international security issues. He was previously a Stanton nuclear security fellow with the Managing the Atom Project and the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. He has held a number of other positions, including as a nonresident WSD-Handa fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS and working for the Office of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Government of Beijing Municipality. He holds a and received a BS in physics and an MA in international relations from Tsinghua University, “Tides of Change,” pg online @ //um-ef)
In a scenario in which Chinese forces believed one of their SSBNs was threatened, they would face only two realistic options: either leaving the foreign UUV or USV alone—potentially putting the SSBN at risk—or using physical force to disrupt the unmanned foreign system’s operations, whether by capturing it or by attempting to destroy it. In such a case, it would be very difficult for China to signal that its intentions were defensive. Washington, in turn, could interpret Chinese interference with a U.S. UUV or USV as a provocation or the use of force, especially during a crisis. Indeed, Beijing has recently signaled its willingness to interfere with unmanned systems. After the December 2016 incident in which a PLA Navy ship seized a U.S. UUV in the South China Sea, an article published through an account managed by the overseas edition of the People’s Daily argued that there is currently no international law that regulates the maritime activities of unmanned systems. This line of reasoning states that, unlike manned vessels, unmanned systems do not enjoy a right to freedom of navigation and, therefore, “in this grey area, as long as the United States dares to send its underwater drones [to China’s coastal waters], China certainly has the right to seize them.”22
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA/Case Turns › China-Specific Work › Links --- Perception k
Zhao ‘18
(TONG, PhD in science, technology, and international affairs from the Georgia Institute of Technology is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, based at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing. His research focuses on strategic security issues, including nuclear weapons policy, arms control, nonproliferation, missile defense, space security, and other international security issues. He was previously a Stanton nuclear security fellow with the Managing the Atom Project and the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. He has held a number of other positions, including as a nonresident WSD-Handa fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS and working for the Office of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Government of Beijing Municipality. He holds a and received a BS in physics and an MA in international relations from Tsinghua University, “Tides of Change,” pg online @ //um-ef)
If the United States were to use UUVs to help hold Chinese SSBNs at risk—or even if Beijing believed U.S. UUVs were being used in this way—there would be a chance that the Chinese surface ships and aircraft tasked with protecting SSBNs might misunderstand the intentions behind specific maneuvers conducted by U.S. unmanned systems. An unmanned mission for collecting intelligence against nearby Chinese SSBNs could be misinterpreted as cueing subsequent ASW strikes. In addition, there would be a chance that Chinese forces might mistakenly assume that foreign UUVs and USVs tasked with general surveillance are specifically targeting Chinese SSBNs.
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA/Case Turns › China-Specific Work › Links --- SCS War
Johnson 20. Dr. James Johnson is a postdoctoral research fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, Monterey. He holds a PhD in politics and international relations from the University of Leicester, where he is also an honorary visiting fellow with the School of History and International Relations; “Artificial Intelligence: A Threat to Strategic Stability”; STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY, Spring 2020; //BY
Finally, in the maritime domain, unmanned underwater vessels (UUV), unmanned surface vessels (USV), and UAVs supported by AI-enabled intra-swarm communication and ISR systems could be deployed simultaneously in both offensive and defensive antisubmarine warfare operations to saturate an enemy’s defenses and to locate, disable, and destroy its nuclear-armed or nonnuclear attack submarines.64 Despite continued advances in sensor technology design (e.g., reduced size and extended detection ranges) to overcome quieting challenges, other technical challenges still remain. These include communicating underwater between multiple systems, processing power requirements, generating battery life and energy, and scaling the system. 65 Q2019-07-08 AI Strategic Stability 9958 13 While some experts do not expect a technically reliable and effective capability of this kind will be operational for at least a decade, others are more optimistic.66 From a tactical perspective, drone swarms would not need ocean-wide coverage (or full ocean transparency) to effectively detect and track submarines. According to UK rear admiral John Gower, a relatively even spread of sensors might be sufficient to enable “a viable search and detection plan . . . conceived for the open ocean” (emphasis added).67 Moreover, advances in mobile sensing platforms could enable drones in swarms to locate submarines through chokepoints (or gateways) as they emerge from ports. Due to the current slowness of drones with extended sea ranges, however, trailing them autonomously seems implausible.68 Future iterations of machine-learning-augmented UUVs and USVs may eventually complement, and perhaps replace entirely, the traditional role of general-purpose nuclear-powered submarines (SSN) and manned surface vehicles in tracking and trailing submarines of adversaries at chokepoints while simultaneously mounting sparsely distributed and mobile distributed network systems (DNS) sensors on UUVs. 69 If a state views the credibility of its survivable nuclear weapons (especially nuclear-armed submarines) to be at risk,70 conventional capabilities such as drone swarms will likely have a destabilizing effect at a strategic level.71 Thus, even if swarm sorties were not intended as (or indeed technically capable of) a disarming first strike, the perception alone of the feasibility of such an operation would be destabilizing nonetheless. Moreover, the speed of AI could put the defender at a distinct disadvantage, creating additional incentives to strike first (or preemptively) technologically superior military rivals. Consequently, the less secure a nation considers its second-strike capabilities to be, the more likely it is to countenance the use of autonomous systems within its nuclear weapons complex to bolster the survivability of its strategic forces. According to analyst Paul Scharre, “winning in swarm combat may depend upon having the best algorithms to enable better coordination and faster reaction times, rather than simply the best platforms” (emphasis added).72 Combining speed, persistence, scope, coordination, and battlefield mass, AWS will offer states attractive asymmetric options to project military power within contested A2/AD zones.73 Enhanced by sophisticated machine learning neural networks, China’s manned and unmanned drone teaming operations could potentially impede future US freedom of navigation operations in the South China Seas.74 Its air- and sea-based drones linked to sophisticated neural networks could, for example, support the People’s Liberation Army’s manned and unmanned teaming operations. Were China to infuse its cruise missiles and hypersonic glide capabilities with AI and autonomy, close-range encounters in the Taiwan Straits and the East and South China Seas would become more complicated, accident-prone, and destabilizing—at both a conventional and nuclear level.75 China is reportedly developing and deploying UUVs to bolster its underwater monitoring and antisubmarine capabilities as part of a broader goal to establish an “underwater Great Wall” to challenge US undersea military primacy. US AI enhanced UUVs could, for example, theoretically threaten both China’s nuclear ballistic and nonnuclear attack submarines.76 The deployment of new military technology in the nuclear domain, therefore, affects states differently depending on the relative strength of their strategic force AI Strategic Stability structure. Thus, even if US UUVs were programmed only to threaten China’s nonnuclear attack fleets, Chinese commanders might nonetheless fear that their country’s nascent and relatively small—compared to US and Russian SSBN fleets—sea-based nuclear deterrent could be neutralized more easily.77 Moreover, advances in machine learning sensor technology for enabling more accurate detection of Chinese SSBNs would likely reinforce Beijing’s concerns that it was being targeted by a militarily superior power— especially the United States. To test the veracity of this scenario, a better understanding of Chinese thinking on the utility of its nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities—and how it could inform China’s attitude to escalation risk—would be required
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA/Case Turns › China-Specific Work › Links --- Mapping
Zhao ‘18
(TONG, PhD in science, technology, and international affairs from the Georgia Institute of Technology is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, based at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing. His research focuses on strategic security issues, including nuclear weapons policy, arms control, nonproliferation, missile defense, space security, and other international security issues. He was previously a Stanton nuclear security fellow with the Managing the Atom Project and the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. He has held a number of other positions, including as a nonresident WSD-Handa fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS and working for the Office of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Government of Beijing Municipality. He holds a and received a BS in physics and an MA in international relations from Tsinghua University, “Tides of Change,” pg online @ //um-ef)
If unmanned systems turn out to be capable of substantially upsetting the offense-defense balance in underwater warfare, they could provoke an unforeseen radical change to the future survivability of Beijing’s sea-based nuclear deterrent. In recent years, China has captured foreign unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) close to Hainan Island in the South China Sea. The country’s national security agencies suspect that these UUVs are monitoring Chinese military vessels and collecting other forms of close-in intelligence, such as mapping the seabed and gathering hydrographic information.1 Chinese analysts are particularly concerned that UUVs and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) are being used to spy on Chinese SSBNs operating in the area, survey their operational environment, and even directly threaten them with offensive weapons.2 This analysis focuses more on the impact of UUVs, which is generally considered representative of the impact of other types of unmanned maritime systems including USVs. The United States tops the list of Chinese concerns about the development and deployment of unmanned systems. Since 1994, the U.S. Navy has published four Navy Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) Master Plans.3 Since the publication of the second master plan in 2000, the U.S. Navy has increasingly focused on using UUVs for ASW missions. This trend is reflected in other U.S. defense planning documents, including the Department of Defense’s Unmanned Systems Roadmaps, which were later renamed Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmaps.4
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA/Case Turns › China-Specific Work › Links --- UUV = Destablize China
Zhao ‘18
(TONG, PhD in science, technology, and international affairs from the Georgia Institute of Technology is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, based at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing. His research focuses on strategic security issues, including nuclear weapons policy, arms control, nonproliferation, missile defense, space security, and other international security issues. He was previously a Stanton nuclear security fellow with the Managing the Atom Project and the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. He has held a number of other positions, including as a nonresident WSD-Handa fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS and working for the Office of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Government of Beijing Municipality. He holds a and received a BS in physics and an MA in international relations from Tsinghua University, “Tides of Change,” pg online @ //um-ef)
New technologies, especially autonomous and unmanned systems, could further fuel the emerging nuclear dimension of the naval competition between China and the United States. In particular, U.S. efforts to intensify its development and use of unmanned systems could greatly expand U.S. ASW capabilities in destabilizing ways that China would view as threatening to the survivability of its SSBNs. To avoid being disadvantaged, China would likely be prompted to counter by building more unmanned systems of its own and adopting more destabilizing military countermeasures.
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA/Case Turns › Strategic Stability DA › Impacts --- NW = Ext
Starr 14 Steven Starr, the Senior Scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility and Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri. Starr has published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic Arms Reduction (STAR) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, June 11th, 2014, “There Can be No Winners in a Nuclear War”, Truth Out, , EO
Nuclear war has no winner. Beginning in 2006, several of the world’s leading climatologists (at Rutgers, UCLA, John Hopkins University, and the University of Colorado-Boulder) published a series of studies that evaluated the long-term environmental consequences of a nuclear war, including baseline scenarios fought with merely 1% of the explosive power in the US and/or Russian launch-ready nuclear arsenals. They concluded that the consequences of even a “small” nuclear war would include catastrophic disruptions of global climate and massive destruction of Earth’s protective ozone layer. These and more recent studies predict that global agriculture would be so negatively affected by such a war, a global famine would result, which would cause up to 2 billion people to starve to death. These peer-reviewed studies – which were analyzed by the best scientists in the world and found to be without error – also predict that a war fought with less than half of US or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would destroy the human race. In other words, a US-Russian nuclear war would create such extreme long-term damage to the global environment that it would leave the Earth uninhabitable for humans and most animal forms of life. A recent article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Self-assured destruction: The climate impacts of nuclear war,” begins by stating: “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self-assured destruction.” In 2009, I wrote “Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflicts” for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. The article summarizes the findings of these studies. It explains that nuclear firestorms would produce millions of tons of smoke, which would rise above cloud level and form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would rapidly encircle the Earth. The smoke layer would remain for at least a decade, and it would act to destroy the protective ozone layer (vastly increasing the UV-B reaching Earth) as well as block warming sunlight, thus creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last 10 years or longer. Following a US-Russian nuclear war, temperatures in the central US and Eurasia would fall below freezing every day for one to three years; the intense cold would completely eliminate growing seasons for a decade or longer. No crops could be grown, leading to a famine that would kill most humans and large animal populations. Electromagnetic pulse from high-altitude nuclear detonations would destroy the integrated circuits in all modern electronic devices, including those in commercial nuclear power plants. Every nuclear reactor would almost instantly meltdown; every nuclear spent fuel pool (which contain many times more radioactivity than found in the reactors) would boil off, releasing vast amounts of long-lived radioactivity. The fallout would make most of the US and Europe uninhabitable. Of course, the survivors of the nuclear war would be starving to death anyway. Once nuclear weapons were introduced into a US-Russian conflict, there would be little chance that a nuclear holocaust could be avoided. Theories of “limited nuclear war” and “nuclear de-escalation” are unrealistic. In 2002 the Bush administration modified US strategic doctrine from a retaliatory role to permit preemptive nuclear attack; in 2010, the Obama administration made only incremental and miniscule changes to this doctrine, leaving it essentially unchanged. Furthermore, Counterforce doctrine – used by both the US and Russian military – emphasizes the need for preemptive strikes once nuclear war begins. Both sides would be under immense pressure to launch a preemptive nuclear first-strike once military hostilities had commenced, especially if nuclear weapons had already been used on the battlefield. Both the US and Russia each have 400 to 500 launch-ready ballistic missiles armed with a total of at least 1800 strategic nuclear warheads, which can be launched with only a few minutes warning. Both the US and Russian Presidents are accompanied 24/7 by military officers carrying a “nuclear briefcase,” which allows them to transmit the permission order to launch in a matter of seconds. Yet top political leaders and policymakers of both the US and Russia seem to be unaware that their launch-ready nuclear weapons represent a self-destruct mechanism for the human race. For example, in 2010, I was able to publicly question the chief negotiators of the New START treaty, Russian Ambassador Anatoly Antonov and (then) US Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, during their joint briefing at the UN (during the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference). I asked them if they were familiar with the recent peer-reviewed studies that predicted the detonation of less than 1% of the explosive power contained in the operational and deployed US and Russian nuclear forces would cause catastrophic changes in the global climate, and that a nuclear war fought with their strategic nuclear weapons would kill most people on Earth. They both answered “no.” More recently, on April 20, 2014, I asked the same question and received the same answer from the US officials sent to brief representatives of the NGOS at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee meeting at the UN. None of the US officials at the briefing were aware of the studies. Those present included top officials of the National Security Council. It is frightening that President Obama and his administration appear unaware that the world’s leading scientists have for years predicted that a nuclear war fought with the US and/or Russian strategic nuclear arsenal means the end of human history. Do they not know of the existential threat these arsenals pose to the human race . . . or do they choose to remain silent because this fact doesn’t fit into their official narratives? We hear only about terrorist threats that could destroy a city with an atomic bomb, while the threat of human extinction from nuclear war is never mentioned – even when the US and Russia are each running huge nuclear war games in preparation for a US-Russian war. Even more frightening is the fact that the neocons running US foreign policy believe that the US has “nuclear primacy” over Russia; that is, the US could successfully launch a nuclear sneak attack against Russian (and Chinese) nuclear forces and completely destroy them. This theory was articulated in 2006 in “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,” which was published in Foreign Affairs by the Council on Foreign Relations. By concluding that the Russians and Chinese would be unable to retaliate, or if some small part of their forces remained, would not risk a second US attack by retaliating, the article invites nuclear war. Colonel Valery Yarynich (who was in charge of security of the Soviet/Russian nuclear command and control systems for 7 years) asked me to help him write a rebuttal, which was titled “Nuclear Primacy is a Fallacy.” Colonel Yarynich, who was on the Soviet General Staff and did war planning for the USSR, concluded that the “Primacy” article used faulty methodology and erroneous assumptions, thus invalidating its conclusions. My contribution lay in my knowledge of the recently published (in 2006) studies, which predicted even a “successful” nuclear first-strike, which destroyed 100% of the opposing side’s nuclear weapons, would cause the citizens of the side that “won” the nuclear war to perish from nuclear famine, just as would the rest of humanity.
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA/Case Turns › Strategic Stability DA › AT: Nuclear Primacy
Starr, ’14 Steven Starr, the Senior Scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility and Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri. Starr has published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic Arms Reduction (STAR) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, June 11th, 2014, “There Can be No Winners in a Nuclear War”, Truth Out, , EO
Nuclear war has no winner. Beginning in 2006, several of the world’s leading climatologists (at Rutgers, UCLA, John Hopkins University, and the University of Colorado-Boulder) published a series of studies that evaluated the long-term environmental consequences of a nuclear war, including baseline scenarios fought with merely 1% of the explosive power in the US and/or Russian launch-ready nuclear arsenals. They concluded that the consequences of even a “small” nuclear war would include catastrophic disruptions of global climate and massive destruction of Earth’s protective ozone layer. These and more recent studies predict that global agriculture would be so negatively affected by such a war, a global famine would result, which would cause up to 2 billion people to starve to death. These peer-reviewed studies – which were analyzed by the best scientists in the world and found to be without error – also predict that a war fought with less than half of US or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would destroy the human race. In other words, a US-Russian nuclear war would create such extreme long-term damage to the global environment that it would leave the Earth uninhabitable for humans and most animal forms of life. A recent article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Self-assured destruction: The climate impacts of nuclear war,” begins by stating: “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self-assured destruction.” In 2009, I wrote “Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflicts” for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. The article summarizes the findings of these studies. It explains that nuclear firestorms would produce millions of tons of smoke, which would rise above cloud level and form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would rapidly encircle the Earth. The smoke layer would remain for at least a decade, and it would act to destroy the protective ozone layer (vastly increasing the UV-B reaching Earth) as well as block warming sunlight, thus creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last 10 years or longer. Following a US-Russian nuclear war, temperatures in the central US and Eurasia would fall below freezing every day for one to three years; the intense cold would completely eliminate growing seasons for a decade or longer. No crops could be grown, leading to a famine that would kill most humans and large animal populations. Electromagnetic pulse from high-altitude nuclear detonations would destroy the integrated circuits in all modern electronic devices, including those in commercial nuclear power plants. Every nuclear reactor would almost instantly meltdown; every nuclear spent fuel pool (which contain many times more radioactivity than found in the reactors) would boil off, releasing vast amounts of long-lived radioactivity. The fallout would make most of the US and Europe uninhabitable. Of course, the survivors of the nuclear war would be starving to death anyway. Once nuclear weapons were introduced into a US-Russian conflict, there would be little chance that a nuclear holocaust could be avoided. Theories of “limited nuclear war” and “nuclear de-escalation” are unrealistic. In 2002 the Bush administration modified US strategic doctrine from a retaliatory role to permit preemptive nuclear attack; in 2010, the Obama administration made only incremental and miniscule changes to this doctrine, leaving it essentially unchanged. Furthermore, Counterforce doctrine – used by both the US and Russian military – emphasizes the need for preemptive strikes once nuclear war begins. Both sides would be under immense pressure to launch a preemptive nuclear first-strike once military hostilities had commenced, especially if nuclear weapons had already been used on the battlefield. Both the US and Russia each have 400 to 500 launch-ready ballistic missiles armed with a total of at least 1800 strategic nuclear warheads, which can be launched with only a few minutes warning. Both the US and Russian Presidents are accompanied 24/7 by military officers carrying a “nuclear briefcase,” which allows them to transmit the permission order to launch in a matter of seconds. Yet top political leaders and policymakers of both the US and Russia seem to be unaware that their launch-ready nuclear weapons represent a self-destruct mechanism for the human race. For example, in 2010, I was able to publicly question the chief negotiators of the New START treaty, Russian Ambassador Anatoly Antonov and (then) US Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, during their joint briefing at the UN (during the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference). I asked them if they were familiar with the recent peer-reviewed studies that predicted the detonation of less than 1% of the explosive power contained in the operational and deployed US and Russian nuclear forces would cause catastrophic changes in the global climate, and that a nuclear war fought with their strategic nuclear weapons would kill most people on Earth. They both answered “no.” More recently, on April 20, 2014, I asked the same question and received the same answer from the US officials sent to brief representatives of the NGOS at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee meeting at the UN. None of the US officials at the briefing were aware of the studies. Those present included top officials of the National Security Council. It is frightening that President Obama and his administration appear unaware that the world’s leading scientists have for years predicted that a nuclear war fought with the US and/or Russian strategic nuclear arsenal means the end of human history. Do they not know of the existential threat these arsenals pose to the human race . . . or do they choose to remain silent because this fact doesn’t fit into their official narratives? We hear only about terrorist threats that could destroy a city with an atomic bomb, while the threat of human extinction from nuclear war is never mentioned – even when the US and Russia are each running huge nuclear war games in preparation for a US-Russian war. Even more frightening is the fact that the neocons running US foreign policy believe that the US has “nuclear primacy” over Russia; that is, the US could successfully launch a nuclear sneak attack against Russian (and Chinese) nuclear forces and completely destroy them. This theory was articulated in 2006 in “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,” which was published in Foreign Affairs by the Council on Foreign Relations. By concluding that the Russians and Chinese would be unable to retaliate, or if some small part of their forces remained, would not risk a second US attack by retaliating, the article invites nuclear war. Colonel Valery Yarynich (who was in charge of security of the Soviet/Russian nuclear command and control systems for 7 years) asked me to help him write a rebuttal, which was titled “Nuclear Primacy is a Fallacy.” Colonel Yarynich, who was on the Soviet General Staff and did war planning for the USSR, concluded that the “Primacy” article used faulty methodology and erroneous assumptions, thus invalidating its conclusions. My contribution lay in my knowledge of the recently published (in 2006) studies, which predicted even a “successful” nuclear first-strike, which destroyed 100% of the opposing side’s nuclear weapons, would cause the citizens of the side that “won” the nuclear war to perish from nuclear famine, just as would the rest of humanity.
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA/Case Turns › Strategic Stability DA › AT: UUVs only Defense
Zhao ‘18
(Tong, PhD in science, technology, and international affairs from the Georgia Institute of Technology is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, based at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing. His research focuses on strategic security issues, including nuclear weapons policy, arms control, nonproliferation, missile defense, space security, and other international security issues. He was previously a Stanton nuclear security fellow with the Managing the Atom Project and the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. He has held a number of other positions, including as a nonresident WSD-Handa fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS and working for the Office of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Government of Beijing Municipality. He holds a and received a BS in physics and an MA in international relations from Tsinghua University, “Tides of Change,” pg online @ //um-ef)
So far, the United States has been relatively restrained in its use of unmanned systems for ASW missions. A RAND report observes that, to date, the main U.S. objective in using UUVs for ASW has been “to conduct ASW operations short of weapons engagement.”15 That said, the report does note that a “further objective is to perform this function [of weapons engagement].” For their part, Chinese analysts expect that the United States will deploy the most advanced unmanned ASW first to the Asia Pacific and that China will be the primary target. They expect Washington to deploy an ASW-capable USV as early as 2018. Unmanned ASW platforms are expected to be deployed first along the First Island Chain and at U.S. bases in Singapore; Okinawa, Japan; the Philippines; and Australia to monitor Chinese submarines operating in the East and South China Seas as they transit through the region’s limited number of chokepoints.16
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA/Case Turns › Strategic Stability DA › 2NC --- AT: AI Inevitable
Horowitz 19 – Michael C. Horowitz is Professor of Political Science and Associate Director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania. (“A Stable Nuclear Future? The Impact of Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence,” December 2019, , Accessed 7-2-2022, LASA-SC)
For example, Russia is reportedly developing a “new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, nuclearpowered, undersea autonomous torpedo.”83 On March 1, 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed the existence of an “unmanned underwater vehicle…that would carry massive nuclear ordnance.”84 He characterized the weapon, known as “Status-6” or “Poseidon,” as a response to U.S. investments in missile defenses, which Russian leaders fear could be used alongside longrange non-nuclear precision strike weapons to neutralize Russia’s nuclear deterrent.85 Putin went on to say that Status-6 is designed for use against aircraft carrier groups or coastal targets, and that it would rely on speed, depth, maneuverability, and quietness to reach its target.86 The Russian government has said little about the role of AI in Status-6, but a Russian source suggests that the Status-6 might be able to use AI to evade enemy anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces on the way to its target.87
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA/Case Turns › Strategic Stability DA › 2NC --- AT: Deterrence
Johnson 21 – Dr. James Johnson is a postdoctoral research fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, Monterey. He holds a PhD in politics and international relations from the University of Leicester, where he is also an honorary visiting fellow with the School of History and International Relations. (James, "Inadvertent escalation in the age of intelligence machines: A new model for nuclear risk in the digital age," Cambridge Core, 10-15-2021, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/inadvertent-escalation-in-the-age-of-intelligence-machines-a-new-model-for-nuclear-risk-in-the-digital-age/D1F1FC47D12FA4DCB12D1648412B696B, Accessed 7-2-2022, LASA-SC)
Given the confluence of secrecy, complexity, erroneous, or ambiguous intelligence data (especially from open-source intelligence and social media outlets),Footnote110 AI-augmentation will likely exacerbate compressed decision-making and the inherent asymmetric nature of cyberspace information.Footnote111 For example, using AI-enhanced cyber capabilities to degrade or destroy a nuclear-states command and control systems – whether as part of a deliberate coercive counterforce attack or in error as part of a limited conventional strike – may generate pre-emptive ‘use it or lose it’ situations.Footnote112 In a US-China conflict scenario, for instance, a US penchant for counterforce operations targeting adversaries’ command and control, the comingled nature of China's (nuclear and conventional) missile forces, US and Chinese preference for the pre-emptive use of cyberweapons, and domestic-political pressures on both sides to retaliate for costly losses (either physical/kinetic or non-physical/political), increases the dangers of inadvertent escalation.Footnote113
These risks should give defence planners pause for thought using advanced conventional capabilities to project military power in conflicts with regional nuclear powers. In short, conventional doctrines and operational concepts could exacerbate old (for example, third-party interference, civil-military overconfidence, regime type, accidental or unauthorised use, or an overzealous commander with pre-delegation authority) and create new pathways (for example, AI-enhanced ISR and precision missile targeting and guidance, drone swarms, AI-cyberattacks, and mis/disinformation subversion) to uncontrollable inadvertent escalation. Missile defences and advanced conventional weapons are unlikely to prevent these escalatory mechanisms once battlefield perception shifts and the nuclear threshold is crossed.Footnote114
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA/Case Turns › Strategic Stability DA › 2NC --- AT: Other Countries Thump
Johnson 20 – Dr. James Johnson is a postdoctoral research fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, Monterey. He holds a PhD in politics and international relations from the University of Leicester, where he is also an honorary visiting fellow with the School of History and International Relations. (James, "Artificial Intelligence: A Threat to Strategic Stability," STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY, Spring 2020, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-14_Issue-1/Johnson.pdf, Accessed 7-2-2022, LASA-SC)
The deployment of new military technology in the nuclear domain, therefore, affects states differently depending on the relative strength of their strategic force structure. Thus, even if US UUVs were programmed only to threaten China’s nonnuclear attack fleets, Chinese commanders might nonetheless fear that their country’s nascent and relatively small— compared to US and Russian SSBN fleets—sea-based nuclear deterrent could be neutralized more easily.77 Moreover, advances in machine learning sensor technology for enabling more accurate detection of Chinese SSBNs would likely reinforce Beijing’s concerns that it was being targeted by a militarily superior power—especially the United States. To test the veracity of this scenario, a better understanding of Chinese thinking on the utility of its nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities—and how it could inform China’s attitude to escalation risk—would be required. Perceived as a relatively low-risk force majeure with ambiguous rules of engagement, and absent a robust normative and legal framework, autonomous weapons will likely become an increasingly attractive asymmetric to erode a militarily superior adversary’s deterrence and resolve.78 In sum, notwithstanding the remaining technical challenges (especially the demand for power), swarms of robotic systems fused with AI machine learning techniques may presage a powerful interplay of increased range, accuracy, mass, coordination, intelligence, and speed in a future conflict.79
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA/Case Turns › Strategic Stability DA › 2NC --- Links --- Autonomous Swarms
Johnson 20 [James Johnson, James has a PhD in Politics and International Relations from the University of Leicester. He is the author of The US-China Military & Defense Relationship During the Obama Presidency. He is also a Postdoctoral Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation. 4-16-2020, Taylor & Francis, "Artificial Intelligence, Drone Swarming and Escalation Risks in Future Warfare", mimou]
Finally, in the maritime domain, UUVs, USVs and UAVs – supported by AI-enabled intra-swarm communication and ISR systems – could be deployed simultaneously in both offensive and defensive ASW operations to saturate an enemy’s defences and locate, disable and destroy its nuclear-armed or non-nuclear attack submarines.67 Tracking a submarine from a ship (or even from another submarine) is a challenging operation even in relatively benign conditions68 because of the stealth technology – especially minimal acoustic signatures – of modern diesel-electric submarines (SSKs) and SSBNs, along with the immense challenge of coordinating such an operation.69 While some experts do not expect a technically reliable and effective capability of this kind to be operational for at least a decade, others are more optimistic.70 From a tactical perspective, drone swarms would not need ocean-wide coverage (or full ocean transparency) to detect and track submarines effectively.71 According to British Rear Admiral John Gower, a relatively even spread of sensors might be sufficient for ‘a viable search and detection plan [to] be conceived for the open ocean’, requiring ‘high tens of thousands or low hundreds of thousands of UUVs’.72 Moreover, advances in mobile sensing platforms could enable drone swarms to locate submarines through chokepoints (or gateways) as they emerge from ports, and then to trail them autonomously.73 In this way, new iterations of machine-learning augmented UUVs and USVs might complement, and perhaps replace entirely, the traditional role of general-purpose SSBNs and manned surface vehicles in tracking and trailing submarines of adversaries at chokepoints, while simultaneously mounting sparsely distributed and mobile-distributed network system sensors on UUVs.74 Algorithm Warfare and Force Majeure Autonomous Weapons If a state views the credibility of its survivable nuclear weapons (especially nuclear-armed submarines) to be at risk, conventional capabilities such as drone swarms will likely have a destabilising effect at a strategic level.75 Thus, even if swarm sorties were not intended as (or indeed technically capable of) a disarming first strike, the perception alone of the feasibility of such an operation would be destabilising. Moreover, the speed of AI could put the defender at a distinct disadvantage, creating additional incentives to strike first (or pre-emptively) at technologically superior military rivals. Consequently, the less secure a state considers its second-strike capabilities to be, the more likely it is to countenance the use of autonomous systems within its nuclear weapons complex to bolster the survivability of its strategic forces. According to analyst Paul Scharre, ‘winning in swarm combat may depend on having the best algorithms to enable better coordination and faster reaction times, rather than simply the best platforms.76 Combining speed, persistence, scope, coordination and battlefield mass, AWS will offer states attractive asymmetric options to project military power within contested anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zones.77 Enhanced by sophisticated machine-learning neural networks,78 China’s manned and unmanned drone teaming operations could potentially impede future US freedom of navigation operations in the South China Seas.79 Were China to infuse its cruise missiles and hypersonic glide capabilities with AI and autonomy, close-range encounters in the Taiwan Strait, and the East and South China Seas would become more complex, accident-prone and destabilising – at both a conventional and nuclear level.80 China is reportedly developing and deploying UUVs to bolster its underwater monitoring and antisubmarine capabilities, as part of a broader goal to establish an ‘underwater Great Wall’ to challenge US undersea military primacy.81 US AI-enhanced UUVs could, for example, potentially threaten both China’s nuclear ballistic and non-nuclear attack submarines.82 Thus, even if US UUVs were programmed only to threaten China’s non-nuclear (or non-strategic) attack submarine fleets, Chinese commanders might nonetheless fear that China’s nascent and relatively noisy and small (compared with US and Russian SSBNs) sea-based nuclear deterrent could be neutralised more easily.83
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA/Case Turns › Strategic Stability DA › 2NC --- Links --- UUVs
Xiang ‘21
(Li Xiang, assistant engineer with the China Shipbuilding Information Center. He has a master’s degree from Renmin University, Beijing, “Artificial intelligence and its impact on weaponization and arms control,” pg online @ //um-ef)
In recent years, the maturity of military artificial intelligence (AI) has advanced rapidly. Open source information indicates that the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea), among other countries, are engaged in such developments. Among the weapons and equipment that have been deployed in various countries, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), unmanned surface vessels, battlefield robots and other platforms have been put into use. AI technology based on big data, cloud computing, neural network-based deep learning, computer vision, intelligent robots, natural language processing and speech is of great military value. It can play a key role in intelligence monitoring and reconnaissance, target recog nition, communication and navigation, automated command and control, firepower strikes, and cyber-electromagnetic countermeasures. Because AI enables improvement in the operational effectiveness of weapons and equipment, the future format of warfare is likely to be altered. This essay first analyses (in section I) how AI technology is shaping strategic weaponry in terms of strategic reconnaissance, missile defence, and nuclear command, control and communications (NC3). It then (in sections II and III) reviews these AI-related developments in the realm of cyberspace and lethal autono mous weapon systems (LAWS). It concludes (in section IV) by suggesting means of mitigating the negative impact of some of these developments on traditional arms control. I. Strategic weapons Missile defence and strategic reconnaissance AI can improve the effectiveness of missile defence and enhance target recognition, trajectory calculation and judgement of damage effects. It thereby improves the ability of countries with missile defence systems to offset their opponents’ nuclear retaliation. Further, the application of AI technology has a marked impact on strategic stability among nuclear powers and may undermine the mutual vulnerability and strategic stability of nuclear-armed states of unequal power. Because AI boasts strong capabilities in image and pattern recognition, similar to facial recognition, its ability to recognize still images is strong and it will greatly enhance the effective ness of strategic reconnaissance. By improving the ability to interpret the impact of ai on strategic stability and nuclear risk satellite images and the deep reconnaissance of long-distance UAVs, the country that possesses nuclear superiority will be able to gain further intelligence on the basic characteristics and procedures of its opponent’s nuclear force deployment and movements. This will enhance a country’s confidence in its ability to disarm its opponent’s nuclear weapons with a first strike. When there is a large gap between the nuclear forces of the two countries, this situation will make a preemptive strike by the more powerful one more advantageous, thus weakening the strategic stability of the two countries during a crisis. At sea, AI technology can be used to improve the capability to collect and process a submarine’s sound signature. In anti-submarine warfare, UUVs can also be used to conduct close-range reconnaissance, which can strengthen the capacity to detect and recognize enemy nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). On the one hand, this reduces the survivability of the enemy SSBNs, thereby weakening the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence and reducing strategic stability.1 On the other hand, this AI technology can reduce the probability of accidental nuclear war: by improving the ability to identify SSBNs, a country can avoid accidentally hitting an SSBN as part of conventional anti-submarine warfare. Facing the huge quantitative and qualitative advantages of the USA in nuclear weapons, China has maintained a slim and effective retaliatory nuclear force based on mobile strategic missiles with relatively strong concealment, manoeuvrability and survivability. This force is predicated on increasing the opponent’s ‘first-strike uncertainty’ (第一次打击的不确定性) to ensure credible deterrence.2 However, once the USA is able to effectively employ AI technology to improve its reconnaissance capabilities against China’s mobile strategic missiles—enabling discovery of deployment rules, manoeuvring routes and launch site locations—this ‘first strike uncertainty’ would be eliminated. The USA would thereby gain the advantage of being able to decapitate China’s nuclear arsenal. To overcome concerns over this potential, China would have to increase the alert level of its nuclear weapons to ensure the credibility of its deterrent. This would lead to a state in which both sides tend toward pre-emption, weakening the strategic stability of the two countries and increasing the risk of nuclear conflict. In the case of sea-based nuclear deterrence, the employment of AI-based detection technology and offensive UUVs may also have similar effects. In particular, due to the difficulty of underwater communication, it would be difficult for these weapon platforms to receive onshore command and control signals in a timely manner. This would make it difficult to control, much less recall such platforms when engaged in operations.
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA/Case Turns › Strategic Stability DA › 2NC --- Links --- Transparency
Kallenborn ‘19
(Zachary, freelance researcher and analyst, specializing in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, CBRN terrorism, drone swarms, and emerging technologies, October 2019 Proceedings Vol. 145/10/1,400, “pg online @ // um-ef)
The Most Survivable Leg of the Triad? A more transparent ocean would pose a significant risk to the nation’s second-strike nuclear capability, at least as currently conceptualized. The second-strike capability maintains a credible threat to retaliate with nuclear force in the event of an adversary’s large-scale nuclear bombardment. The U.S. nuclear submarine force is usually considered the key component of U.S. second-strike capability, because of the ocean’s vastness and the limited ability of sensors to track all subs all the time. If sensor technology coupled with other military capabilities overcomes this challenge, submarines will lose much of their stealth. An adversary could launch a successful strike without fear of retaliation, because each nuclear submarine could be targeted and destroyed. Even without complete transparency, a window may open in which an adversary has enough awareness to risk a first strike. Thankfully, these risks are unlikely because the hider-finder model of submarine warfare is incomplete.
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA/Case Turns › Strategic Stability DA › 2NC --- Links --- Russia Miscalc
Kattan 21 [Ari Kattan, Ari Kattan is a policy analyst at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), where he supports the DefenseScience Board. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of SAIC or itsgovernment clients., 08-15-2021, accessed on 7-2-2022, Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Emerging Submarine Detection Technologies and Implications for Strategic Stability", mimou]
The U.S.-Russia relationship is defined by Russian fear of its own weaknesses (economic, technological, etc.) and paranoia about U.S. and NATO threats to its security. Russia currently fears U.S. conventional superiority20 and has invested in capabilities and tactics to circumvent it.21 It is embarking on a modernization program for its nuclear weapons in part because it feels insecure about the survivability of its nuclear forces as the United States increases its progress on ballistic missile defense. If the United States were able to track Russian nuclear-armed submarines with increased confidence, it could exacerbate these Russian fears even more, causing Russia to respond in destabilizing ways. While it is true that Russia has never relied as much on submarine-based weapons as the United States has, the degradation of the survivability of Russia’s nuclear-armed submarines would likely cause Russia to compensate for this new vulnerability. This is especially true if continued advancements in precision strike make Russia’s air- and land-based nuclear forces more vulnerable. If Russia can no longer rely on hardening and concealment for survivability, they may double down on redundancy, producing and deploying larger numbers of nuclear weapons to complicate U.S. targeting and increase the odds that a retaliatory capability survives any U.S. first strike. This, in turn, could put the final nail in the coffin of arms control and lead to an arms race with the United States that drains resources, intensifies mistrust, and makes miscalculation more likely. In short, a significant U.S. advantage in submarine detection (which would likely develop in parallel with a U.S. advantage in remote sensing and precision strike capabilities in other domains) would likely be destabilizing due to Russian sensitivity over its technological inferiority. This could compel Russia not only to increase redundancy with a larger number of warheads, but to change the doctrine governing their use as well. It is possible that in an environment of degraded second-strike stability, Russia could move further towards a first-use doctrine to deter escalation and to avoid the “lose them or lose them” dilemma. China would likely be less sensitive to advancements in U.S. submarine detection capabilities for two reasons. First, China’s strategic relationship with the United States, at least currently, is not defined by an assumed need for parity but by a need for a minimum reprisal capability, which it believes it has and will continue to have in the future.22 It currently has a much smaller nuclear arsenal than the United States and relies on hardened and road-mobile land-based ICBMs for its retaliatory capability, which it believes is sufficient as long as it can hit the United States with just a few nuclear warheads, or even a single nuclear warhead.23 Second, China has not historically relied on SSBNs for its second-strike capability, and even as it begins deploying a credible sea-based nuclear deterrent for the first time,24 it recognizes that its submarines are less advanced and thus more vulnerable to ASW than U.S. submarines. Therefore, China will likely continue to rely on land-based nuclear forces.25 The remote sensing and precision strike revolution will certainly have implications for U.S.-China relations, but in the narrow hypothetical of U.S. superiority in submarine detection, China would be less concerned than Russia. They may, however, be sufficiently concerned that they decide to expand the size of their arsenal as a hedge. Overall, conditions under which the United States had a significant advantage in submarine detection could push some adversaries away from an assured retaliation nuclear posture and towards what Vipin Narang calls an asymmetric escalation nuclear posture.26 An asymmetric escalation nuclear posture entails threatening to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict to deter conflict and to prevent successful counterforce targeting by an adversary. If nations currently predisposed towards adopting assured retaliation postures no longer feel that the second-strike forces necessary for such a posture are secure, they may be forced to adopt asymmetric escalation postures.
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA/Case Turns › Strategic Stability DA › 2NC --- Perception Links
Mishra 19 [Sylvia Mishra, Sylvia Mishra is a researcher at the Institute for International Science and Technology Policy at George Washington University. Image courtesy of the US Department of Defense. 5-8-2019, The Strategist, "Could unmanned underwater vehicles undermine nuclear deterrence?", mimou]
Nuclear deterrence rests on the ability of strategic assets to survive an enemy’s first strike and to retaliate, ensuring mutually assured destruction. Nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) are considered to be the most survivable of all nuclear platforms due to their stealth capabilities, mobility and discretion. Placing nuclear assets underwater puts them at a safer distance from a crippling first strike. But as technology improves and the ocean battlefield becomes more complex, these advances could undermine the survivability of strategic forces around the world and make them far more vulnerable. Emerging technologies like unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) add to the complexity of the battle space and disrupt the status quo. Swarms of autonomous underwater drones could be deployed to hunt ballistic-missile submarines, targeting a cornerstone of nuclear deterrence. In their 2017 ‘The new era of counterforce’, Keir A. Lieber and Daryl Press argue that for most of the nuclear age, the survivability of retaliatory forces seemed straightforward. However, improvements in counterforce technology have eroded this cornerstone of nuclear deterrence. As new technology continues to raise the potential for major shifts in the military realm, the rapid advent of these drones may reduce the credibility and effectiveness of SSBNs. UUVs can function without the direction of a human operator and have wide . Some are used for commercial purposes, hydrography and oceanographic research. Lockheed Martin’s yellow Marlin drone submarine offshore rigs and underwater pipelines, a task that’s worth around a billion dollars a year in the Gulf of Mexico. But UUV technologies have been evolving from defensive to more offensive roles. UUVs increasingly play a (ASW) and perform missions such as placing and monitoring sensors on the sea floor to track enemy submarines. They can gather intelligence on opponents, detect and neutralise mines, hunt submarines and chart the ocean floor. They could, potentially, detonate warheads. And they could take part in a coordinated attack on an enemy submarine in conjunction with ‘friendly’ submarines and surface vessels. The United States, Russia and China are investing in this technology to bolster their ASW capability and it’s evident that UUVs will be deployed in the near future in combat operations. The US Navy released a in 2004 that set out nine priority areas for future UUV capabilities. In 2015, Brigadier General Frank Kelly became the . In 2016, the Department of Defense US$232.9 million on procuring UUVs (US$86.7 million more than in 2015). In 2018, the US Office of Naval Research a US$29.7 million contract for developing a naval prototype of a ‘low-cost UAV swarming technology’, or LOCUST, system that can overwhelm an adversary.
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA/Case Turns › Strategic Stability DA › 2NC --- Perception Links
O'Rourke 21 [Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs 02-25-2021, Worldcat, "Navy large unmanned surface and undersea vehicles: background and issues for Congress Internet resource, 2019 [WorldCat.org]", mimou]
Another oversight issue for Congress concerns the potential implications of large UVs, particularly large USVs, for the chance of miscalculation or escalation in when U.S. Navy forces are operating in waters near potential adversaries. Some observers have expressed concern about this issue. A June 28, 2019, opinion column, for example, states The immediate danger from militarized artificial intelligence isn't hordes of killer robots, nor the exponential pace of a new arms race. As recent events in the Strait of Hormuz indicate, the bigger risk is the fact that autonomous military craft make for temping targets and increase the potential for miscalculation on and above the high seas. While less provocative than planes, vehicles, or ships with human crew or troops aboard, unmanned systems are also perceived as relatively expendable. Danger arises when they lower the threshold for military action. It is a development with serious implications in volatile regions far beyond the Gulf not least the South China Sea, where the U.S. has recently confronted both China and Russia. As autonomous systems proliferate in the air and on the ocean, [opposing] military commanders may feel emboldened to strike these platforms, expecting lower repercussions by avoiding the loss of human life. Consider when Chinese naval personnel in a small boat seized an unmanned American underwater survey glider54 in the sea approximately 100 kilometers off the Philippines in December 2016. The winged, torpedo-shaped unit was within sight of its handlers aboard the U.S. Navy oceanographic vessel Bowditch, who gaped in astonishment as it was summarily hoisted aboard a Chinese warship less than a kilometer distant. The U.S. responded with a diplomatic demarche and congressional opprobrium, and the glider was returned within the week. In coming years, the Chinese military will find increasingly plentiful opportunities to intercept American autonomous systems. The 40-meter prototype trimaran Sea Hunter, an experimental submarine-tracking vessel, recently transited between Hawaii and San Diego without human intervention. It has yet to be used operationally, but it is only a matter of time before such vessels are deployed. China's navy may find intercepting such unmanned and unchaperoned surface vessels or mini-submarines too tantalizing to pass up, especially if Washington's meek retort to the 2016 glider incident is seen as an indication of American permissiveness or timidity. With a captive vessel, persevering Chinese technicians could attempt to bypass anti-tamper mechanisms, and if successful, proceed to siphon off communication codes or proprietary artificial intelligence software, download navigational data or pre-programmed rules of engagement, or probe for cyber vulnerabilities that could be exploited against similar vehicles. Nearly 100,000 ships transit the strategically vital Singapore Strait annually, where more than 75 collisions or groundings occurred last year alone. In such congested international sea lanes, declaring a foreign navy's autonomous vessel wayward or unresponsive would easily serve as convenient rationale for towing it into territorial waters for impoundment, or for boarding it straight away. A memorandum of understanding signed five years ago by the U.S. Department of Defense and the Chinese defense ministry, as well as the collaborative code of naval conduct created at the 2014 Western Pacific Naval Symposium, should be updated with an expanded right-of-way hierarchy and non-interference standards to clarify how manned ships and aircraft should interact with their autonomous counterparts. Without such guidance, the risk of miscalculation increases. An incident without any immediate human presence or losses could nonetheless trigger unexpected escalation and spark the next conflict.55
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA/Case Turns › Strategic Stability DA › 2NC --- Link Overview
Johnson 20 [James Johnson, James has a PhD in Politics and International Relations from the University of Leicester. He is the author of The US-China Military & Defense Relationship During the Obama Presidency. He is also a Postdoctoral Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation. 4-16-2020, Taylor & Francis, "Artificial Intelligence, Drone Swarming and Escalation Risks in Future Warfare", mimou]
Significant advances in power, sensor technology and communications would be needed before these autonomous systems have a game-changing strategic impact on submarine reconnaissance. However, irrespective of the veracity of this emerging capability, the mere perception that nuclear capabilities face new strategic challenges would nonetheless elicit distrust between nuclear-armed adversaries, in particular where strategic force asymmetries exist. Autonomous capabilities – like the Defence Advanced Research Project Agency’s (DARPA) Sea Hunter – demonstrate how autonomous weapons could accelerate the completion of the iterative targeting cycle to support joint operations – thereby reducing the reliability and survivability of states’ nuclear second-strike capability, and potentially causing use-them-or-lose-them situations. In the near term, therefore, the most significant destabilising impact of AI on nuclear deterrence will likely be the synthesis of autonomy with a range of machine-learning-augmented sensors, potentially undermining states’ confidence in the survival of their second-strike capabilities, which could trigger a retaliatory first strike. Enhanced exponential growth in computing performance, together with advances in the machine-learning techniques that can rapidly process data in real time, will empower drone swarms to perform increasingly complex missions, such as hunting hitherto hidden nuclear deterrence forces. In short, the ability of future iterations of AI that are able to make predictions based on the fusion of expanded and dispersed datasets, and then locate, track and target strategic missiles in underground silos (especially mobile intercontinental ballistic missile launchers), onboard stealth aircraft, SSBNs and truck- or rail-mounted transporter erector launchers (TELs), is set to grow.
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA/Case Turns › Strategic Stability DA › 2NC --- Link Overview
Mendenhall 19 [Elizabeth Mendenhall, Dr. Elizabeth Mendenhall has a Ph.D. in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University and is now an assistant professor at the University of Rhode Island's Department of Marine Affairs. She teaches International Ocean Governance in Marine Affairs, and has a (limited) joint appointment with Political Science. Her research centers on the ocean governance regime, especially the Law of the Sea Convention. January 2019, accessed on 7-2-2022, Journal of Military Strategies, "Fluid Foundations: Ocean Transparency, Submarine Opacity, and Strategic Nuclear Stability", mimou]
Transparency does not have to be synoptic to make submarines vulnerable. The small number of SSBNs each national military has on patrol, and the even smaller number of submarine bases, means that sensing technologies can achieve functional transparency before they achieve global-scale transparency. 161 AUV platforms in particular could pick up a submarine as it exits its base or transits maritime chokepoints, and then track its course automatically.162 This situation, where a state locates all of its rival’s SSBNs today, but may not be able to keep track of them tomorrow, is particularly destabilizing. A closing window of first strike opportunity increases crisis instability, which is why forces that are always invulnerable are best for stability.163 There are many other possible ways that military actors may respond to increasing ocean transparency. The isolated, open-ocean patrols that formerly hid SSBNs safely under the surface may become a thing of the past. The bastion strategy could be adopted by all major nuclear powers, such that SSBNs are kept in noisy, covered, or well-defended areas. Large swarms of AUVs may travel in convoys around SSBNs to disrupt localization by acoustic or non-acoustic measures. Fear of transparency could lead vulnerable nuclear powers to target communications nodes that enable networked sensing, or develop techniques to trawl AUVs out of certain areas. Attempts to sustain survivability could be relatively simple – such as investing in mobile ICBMs or adopting “launch on warning” postures – or complex, involving ASW measures and counter-measures without one having a clear advantage. Any of these scenarios represent a significant risk of instability. Conclusion If ocean transparency made nuclear strategic submarines more detectable, locatable, and targetable, the military and political implications would be significant. Yet the topic of SSBN vulnerability is “virtually taboo” in the US Navy’s public documents. 164 A culture of complacency has set in regarding the role and missions of SSBNs, such that submariners are poorly equipped to adjust to potentially novel operational realities. 165 Other countries are walking the same path: the planned development of SSBNs by India and Pakistan is driven by a judgment about their superior and durable survivability. 166 This paper challenges the assumption that extrapolations from the past can serve as reliable guides for the future. Specifically, the security of second-strike capabilities, and therefore the assurance of mutual destruction, rests on fluid material foundations. Whether the potential obsolescence of “hiding” technologies occurs as a slow erosion of usefulness, or an avalanche of illumination, could have serious implications for nuclear strategic stability. The possibility of, and reactions to, ocean transparency present a challenge for the prevailing arms control regime. The force structures created and shaped by existing arms control treaties assume the superior survivability of SSBNs as the foundation of nuclear deterrence. If transparency were to arrive as a “technological surprise,” this feature of the regime sets the stage for instability.167 The responses to transparency described in the final section each have negative implications for the existing arms control regime. Without invulnerability, nuclear states may pursue a “safety in numbers” approach to achieving a secure second strike, which would require a substantial buildup in weaponry. The pursuit of “launch on warning” postures conflicts with the arms control agenda of “lengthening the fuse.”168 If “mutually assured destruction” were abandoned wholesale, the possible return to a “war strategism” approach that sees nuclear weapons as usable would be especially detrimental to the arms control agenda. An arms control regime that accounts for the possible erosion of transparency might replicate the Treaty on Open Skies, which regulates the frequency and resolution of aircraft surveillance.169 This strategy would entail rebuilding opacity by treaty where it may be undermined by technology.
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA/Case Turns › Strategic Stability DA › 2NC --- Impact O/V
Mendenhall 19 [Elizabeth Mendenhall, Dr. Elizabeth Mendenhall has a Ph.D. in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University and is now an assistant professor at the University of Rhode Island's Department of Marine Affairs. She teaches International Ocean Governance in Marine Affairs, and has a (limited) joint appointment with Political Science. Her research centers on the ocean governance regime, especially the Law of the Sea Convention. January 2019, accessed on 7-2-2022, Journal of Military Strategies, "Fluid Foundations: Ocean Transparency, Submarine Opacity, and Strategic Nuclear Stability", mimou]
Force structure changes occur slowly, and countries reacting to transparency may pursue interim strategies for achieving nuclear deterrence. One means of making a retaliatory strike secure is to launch the weapons before the first strike hits. In the early Cold War, American strategists proposed adopting a “launch on warning” posture until a survivable force – such as mobile ICBMs – could be built and deployed.155 The adoption of such a posture would in itself be a negative development for strategic nuclear stability; “launch on warning” is understood to significantly increase the risk of accidental war.156 If countries like the United States and Russia adopt this posture, China, India, and Pakistan are likely to do the same.157 A “launch on warning” posture would be even more dangerous in South Asia.158 The possibility of an effective first strike by the United States could destabilize great power politics by encouraging such risky strategic postures, and even military pre-emption.159 The best way to “de-alert” from a dangerous “launch on warning” posture is to assign the function of retaliation to a completely survivable force.160