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Ruckelshaus 17 (Jay, Rhodes Scholar and graduate student in political theory at the University of Oxford, and the founder and president of Ramp Less Traveled, a nonprofit organization that helps students with spinal cord injuries pursue higher education, "The Non-Politics of Disability”, 1/18/17, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/opinion/denouncing-trump-wont-help-disability-rights.html)
Disability rights enjoy a seemingly ironclad moral consensus, an ostensible unanimity that is striking given America’s entrenched polarization and the antagonism surrounding other identity movements. Many are wary of L.G.B.T. rights or the Black Lives Matter movement, but it seems beyond the pale — almost cruel — to oppose disability rights. Nobody wants to be anti-disability. Initially, this harmony would seem helpful. Free from partisan discord, advancements for the approximately 57 million Americans with disabilities should be easier to achieve, borne aloft by the wings of certain progress. Why, then, do rampant unemployment and educational disparities endure, and why does success remain the exception? I think part of the reason is the insulation of our pro-disabled political consensus. Its logic is rooted not in any deep belief in the equal worth of citizens with disabilities, but rather in a general aversion to disability. This is related to the charity impulse that has always surrounded disability — and has constrained liberation efforts by assuming that inequities are unfortunate but natural realities to be mitigated through compassion, rather than politically structured injustices. There is also a profound lack of disabled people in the public sphere, meaning any substantive discussion that does occur is extremely rare. I suspect many people I talk to about disability maintain an implicit hope that, if they nod as vigorously as possible, the issue will simply go away. In this way, support for disability rights is similar to the act of expressing perfunctory thanks to military veterans. It temporarily absolves us of the responsibility to address the heart of the matter. Moreover, the apparent moral consensus may be mostly superficial. In trying to enact accessibility, disability advocates encounter increasing resistance as the effort and costs involved in proposals come closer to being realized. (Consider the neighborhood store that decides it’s just too costly to install a ramp, or the community lecture that excludes deaf attendees by refusing to hire a sign-language interpreter.) Instead of facilitating change, false unity actually restrains change. It stifles the more substantive conversations true progress requires. And our inability to speak honestly — and contentiously — about disability shows how the politics of disability is in this sense non-political. We are the worse for it. In addition to greater participation in the public sphere, true progress for citizens with disabilities will require a willingness to confront the issues head-on, even when — especially when — citizens disagree on competing solutions. We must politicize disability — not in the cable-news, grandstanding kind of way, but in the term’s more formal sense. The work of the Belgian political theorist Chantal Mouffe can help illuminate what’s at stake. Mouffe begins with the premise that human relations are inherently antagonistic: Political change always requires controversial transfers in power or prestige, and it is an illusion to imagine politics without confrontation. Per this “agonistic” conception of democracy, a healthy political order is one that prefers vigorous, good-faith argumentation to complacent consensus. Until we publicly recognize real disagreements surrounding disability and accessibility, Mouffe would insist, we are doomed to a vacuous, empty debate that is neither political nor productive. Recall the Kovaleski incident. I’m not suggesting that the abhorrence of Mr. Trump’s actions is open to legitimate questioning. But in their forcefully reassuring comments and messages, my friends prevented any serious discussion of disability at the level where reasonable disagreement does exist. Where will the money come from to fund disability employment schemes? How do we even define “disability”? Despite — and, I would argue, partly because of — the broad condemnation of Mr. Trump for his insensitivity, there was no substantive public discussion of such issues. You may be thinking, haven’t we had enough politics lately? Maybe it’s a blessing that disability isn’t as political as it might be; it avoids the drama and messiness that now seem to define our common life. Avoiding politics might be possible if disability were an exclusively private affair. But it is fundamentally a public concern, affecting everyone directly or indirectly and revealing our obligations to one another as members of a democratic society. Issues of accessibility can be fully addressed only through public institutions and collective effort. For the disability community, there is no answer but politics. But politics need not be repulsive. That’s the beauty of Mouffe’s agonism: By legitimating clashing arguments and welcoming them into the political fold, unproductive antagonism becomes constructive, and compromises emerge.
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The aff’s theory is contingent on institutions and their engagement with language in debate can’t achive any success. Only political engagement can solve.
Brock 22 – Brian Brock holds a personal Chair in Moral and Practical Theology. He joined the University of Aberdeen in 2004, following postdoctoral studies at the Friedrich Alexander University Erlangen-Nurnberg and a doctorate in Christian ethics at King's College London. (Brian Brock, “On the limits of justice as eradicating ‘isms’”, Taylor and Francis Online, 23 Feb 2022, Vol. 22, Issue: 1, pgs. 75-85, ) || PZ
**Edited for language**
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State action can be good for people with disabilities – ADA proves
Mckeever 20 (Amy Mckeever, JULY 30, 2020, "How the Americans with Disabilities Act transformed a country," History, ) //RB
More than 2,000 disability rights advocates gathered on the South Lawn of the White House in Washington, D.C., on a hot summer day. It was July 26, 1990, and they’d come together to witness one of the most momentous civil rights victories in decades: President George H.W. Bush signing the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) into law.
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The bidirectionality of this topic allows for state action for info sharing which resolves the securitization of collective trauma that caused the War on drugs, terror, and poverty
Jonathon P. Whooley 21 [San Francisco State University, International Relations, Ontological (In)visibility and Cyber Conflict: The Problem of Sight and Vision in Establishing Threat, Global, Local, Political 2021, Vol. 46(2) 47–51, , -ekh-]
International Relations (IR) is a field of vision. Elements traditional to IR like nuclear deterrence, armed conflict, terrorism, or great power balancing, all require states to interpret the behavior and posture of other actors to define the menu of options that are available to them. Ontological security theorists in general agree with this position, arguing that feelings and interpretations of their security are required for states to understand their position in relation to others in the international system. Thus, a state’s identity is defined as much by its relationship and feeling of threat toward and among other states. But what happens if the linchpin of defining a state’s security is covert, what if the mechanisms by which a state understands its security standing is accomplished not in the light, but rather in the shadows, around computer networks, non-state actors, disinformation campaigns, hacking, and at least for democratic states like the US through electoral manipulation?
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Badano 13 (Gabriele – PhD candidate at the Centre for Philosophy, Justice and Health at University College London – “Political liberalism and the justice claims of the disabled: a reconciliation,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, April 2013, http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/tHKkbrxhGYIWAxTcJrAW/full#.UxyV-PldX-4)
I argue that any proposal abandoning the language of political justice would not seem to do enough for those individuals with disabilities who fall outside the basic idea of persons as depicted by Rawls. In fact, the intuitions supporting the idea that concepts like rights and opportunities are indispensable are very strong.11 Let us go back to the examples of individuals falling outside Rawls’s idea of persons because their disabilities prevent them from being a net benefit to social cooperation. They are individuals who need multiple carers to work, or whose disabilities prevent them from providing a benefit to social cooperation that is large enough. To put the point more sharply, it is worth noticing that the disabilities in question are compatible with being in full possession of one’s logical and moral powers. Now, should we accept that those individuals ought to be given no rights or opportunities? An affirmative answer would strike us as implausible, and for a good reason. In a liberal society, having one’s rights, opportunities and basic distributive entitlements acknowledged is one and the same as being recognized as an equal. And what is missing from Rawls’s political liberalism is precisely the idea that falling below a threshold of full cooperation should not be enough to prevent the disabled from being regarded as persons on an equal footing with anyone else. In sum, Rawls’s political liberalism is not amenable to any extension that, keeping the basic ideas of society and persons intact, is able to include a concern with the status of individuals with disabilities. In addition, the proposal that the interests of the disabled are not for public reason to protect is not satisfactory. Consequently, a substantial revision is the only way to reconcile political liberalism with our intuitions concerning what is due to the disabled. 5. Revising political liberalism I: beyond Hartley’s contractualism The aim of this section and the next is to propose a substantial revision of Rawls’s theory that accommodates the justice claims of the disabled while upholding the project of political liberalism. A question that needs to be answered at this point is: why should we uphold the project of political liberalism, rather than endorsing a different model that more neatly fits with our intuitions concerning what is due to the disabled? First, the general project of political liberalism is compelling. Rawls’s political liberalism aims to identify a common ground of political ideas that can work as the basis on which the most important political decisions should be made. This project is of the greatest importance because, if successful, it creates legitimacy by building institutions on the basis of concepts that are acceptable to each reasonable individual. Moreover, it promotes stability in societies that are characterized by deep pluralism. Second, despite Rawls’s failure to take the interests of the disabled into consideration, political liberalism is well suited to support the justice claims of individuals with disabilities. This is because the idea that the disabled are citizens who deserve our respect is part of the common culture of our societies. In other words, there is an overlapping consensus on the idea that rights, opportunities and distributive shares must be granted to individuals who are not fully cooperating members of society, including those who fall below full moral powers. It is widely believed that those with physical disabilities should have the same rights as their fellow citizens, live in a social environment that does not excessively limit their opportunities and receive benefits that help meet their special needs. Besides, although the state or third parties are given exceptional rights to interfere with the autonomy of individuals with severe cognitive disabilities, it is widely recognized that the mentally disabled are citizens whose basic interests must be protected by the law.12 In the public space, any proposal that individuals who are not fully cooperating members of society should have their basic interests neglected would be widely received with outrage. Such proposal would be said to fit a fascist society, not a decent one. Among other legal documents, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN General Assembly, A/61/611) can be taken as the epitome of this widespread attitude. Adopted in 2006, the Convention requires that all individuals with disabilities should share in the enjoyment of equal fundamental rights.
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Cyborg theorizing is rooted in ableist and Anti-Black logics that ensure it’s failure.
Knadler 19 - ( Stephen Knadler; Stephen Knadler is an associate professor of English at Spelman College, where he teaches US literature and cultural studies. He has been published in American Literature, American Literary History, American Quarterly, Minnesota Review, and Modern Fiction Studies.; Originally published: August 6, 2019; “Vitality politics : health, debility, and the limits of black emancipation”; http://link.umsl.edu/portal/Vitality-politics--health-debility-and-the/n6SXiAQq3ac) Dōgen
What I am also unwilling to take with the theory of assemblage is the freighted territory of the cyborg: the feminist materialist theory of becoming developed by Donna Haraway that combines human, animal, and machine as a radical political enterprise that ushers in the future both theoretically and practically. I have found it useful as a thought exercise that complicates the relationship of the body to itself and to others and deals with our very real reliance on machines and kinship with animals. Since the cyborg opens up the conversation about futurity—which usually elides madness and Blackness—it also becomes a useful space to consider who we are becoming.60 Certainly, to think through our kinship with machines is apropos for discussions of disability given the medicalization of certain bodies, and remains so given my emphasis on speculative fiction. But the cyborg is an incomplete, politically fraught, and ethically suspicious answer to a series of questions about raced and disabled futurity. Material reality must reckon with what others have pointed out are the lived experiences of the Black and disabled body, what amount to (in this project, at least) the gaps and folds within Black speculative fiction. Read in alignment with Tobin Siebers’s theory of complex embodiment and Alison Kafer’s questioning of spatial, cultural, and temporal logics, the emphasis on the cyborg and the desire to supersede the body has an antagonistic relationship with concerns at the heart of disability studies: pain, fiscal access, and the validity of embodied experience, to name a few.61 What happens when one does not desire cyborgian intervention as cure? What of those for whom material cyborgian realities are more painful than useful or pleasurable? As much as cyborgian futures promise a radical set of possibilities for considering disability, we ought to be wary of them because they are also reliant on a set of middleclass (or rich) realities. I have elsewhere pointed out the way the cyborg’s promise of radical potential hinges on an original white Western subject.62 Leaning on Donna Haraway’s original definition, João Costa Vargas and Joy A. James understand the Black cyborg as a postbellum construction that requires Black degradation: “A Black cyborg: a modified, improved human whose increased ethical, spiritual, and physical capabilities generate unusual strength, omniscience, and boundless love.”63 They invoke Haraway’s understanding of the cyborg as both real and fictive to pinpoint how the Black cyborg relies on a set of interracial dynamics that extend from a history steeped in anti-Blackness. The Black cyborg is required to participate in its own self abnegation since it is built on top of the foundations of American democratic and imperial projects reliant on phobic understandings of Blackness. The Black cyborg, then, in Vargas and James’s formulation, echoes that of the disabled cyborg: neither can escape the desire for normalcy that erases Blackness and madness both. Alison Kafer reads in the gaps of Haraway’s work and its intellectual genealogy to reinsert the oft-overlooked contributions of women of color—among them Octavia E. Butler and Chela Sandoval—to the definition of the cyborg. She pinpoints that the cyborg as transgressive figure has limited potential precisely because of how it has been developed and mobilized in ways that erase women of color and reify the virgule between disabled and able-bodied. Though the cyborg asks for blasphemous interpretation—a promise and proposition Kafer, Vargas, and James readily champion—as part of its political transgression, I question how much the cyborg can map a future of any kind when it relies on a past and path of erasure. What the cyborg ushers in—that I’d prefer to leave aside for this discussion—is an assemblage yoked to anti-Blackness and ableism, a method of becoming that requires theoretical overcoming since the theories rely on but refuse disabled and Black embodiment.
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Vehmas & Watson 13 (Simo Vehmas & Nick Watson, “Moral wrongs, disadvantages, and disability: a critique of critical disability studies”, p. 648-649)
Further, deconstructing differences will not in and of itself produce respect and equality between all people with various characteristics. Neither will it result in a social order free from a sense of difference. It is simply unrealistic to assume that a society could exist were people would not see some other people as different, and their lives or characteristics as representing a deviation from some norm considered important regarding good human life. This is because some of the individual characteristics that define disabled people are, sometimes with good reason, undesirable, even in a utopia where all differences would have been queered. Disability is not the same as many other group identities and we need to explore both morally and socially disability and difference rather than simply use difference as a concept through which to critique the disability identity. There are no rational reasons to consider homosexuality or gender undesirable characteristics whatever the social context, but there are many impairments that can reasonably be seen as undesirable (Shakespeare 2006). Motor neuron disease, depression or spinal cord injury are the kinds of conditions that we would prefer not to have, and this is not merely because of the cultural representations attached to them but because these conditions are the kinds of predicaments that cause suffering irrespective of one’s cultural environment. In acknowledging that impairments can include an undesirable dimension does not imply devaluing people with impairments nor their positive group identity (Shakespeare and Watson 2010). As long as people are genuinely free to decide for themselves and feel about themselves however they wish to feel, we are pretty close to relational justice, free from hierarchical evils. Imposing on people ableist or disablist assumptions is certainly wrong, but so would be the denial of the personal experiences of fearing the loss of one’s physical and mental capacities, or the fear of dying (Carel 2008). To explain the psychological anguish related to conditions such as motor neurone disease or depression merely in terms of internalized oppression and ableism would be insensitive, disrespectful and simply nonsensical.
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AFF › Impact Turn
Ward, 17 - Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University (Steven, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers, p. 217-218
The former approach is one that few policymakers and scholars openly promote.23 If the United States is interested in avoiding the creation of a deeply revisionist, anti-Western China, it needs to accommodate China’s status claims. Since these likely include the right to a sphere of influence in East Asia, accommodation would likely have to involve a reduction of the American military presence and American influence in that region. This does not mean conceding global leadership to China. Rather, the aim would be to acknowledge that China, as a great power, deserves the same rights that the United States does in world politics – including the right to manage East Asia and the South China Sea the way that the United States manages Latin America and the Caribbean.
This approach carries with it great risks and costs as well.What would be the effect on navigation and trade through the South China Sea? Would important American allies like Japan and South Korea turn into Beijing’s vassals? What if an American withdrawal from East Asia produces a regional arms race? And what if China grows more ambitious rather than more satisfied as the United States withdraws overseas?
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AFF › Impact Turn
Goldstein 20, associate professor in the Strategic Research Department at the US Naval War College. (Lyle, 7-22-2020, "China’s Putative Threat to U.S. National Security", Published in A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security, https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/chinas-putative-threat-us-national-security)
Factions and interests on both the right and the left are now disturbingly united in an effort to cast China as the next multidimensional threat to the U.S.—on par with or even exceeding that of the Soviet Union in its dimensions. Many of those interests, moreover, are poised to profit from such a characterization. A few obvious facts, however, are worth repeating when considering the putative threat posed by China to U.S. national security: China has not resorted to any significant use of force in more than three decades, it has no foreign bases, and it remains rather weak (compared with U.S. forces) in the domains of power projection and nuclear war fighting. In the coming decades, all of those metrics may reverse, and China could morph from a bungling, paranoid panda into a fire‐breathing, goose‐stepping dragon. It seems likely that Beijing will have the requisite resources, bureaucratic discipline, and talent to make such a transition. Moreover, it is not short of strategists advocating for more aggressive steps to counter the United States.41 Washington’s overall goal should be to forestall that metamorphosis, in part by acknowledging China’s security concerns and by seeking compromises on the many issues that divide the United States and China, as outlined in the previous section. It is worth reiterating that Beijing is planning neither to attack the United States nor to conquer East Asia. Rather, its foreign policy behavior has, by and large, comported itself well with current international norms—in rather stark contrast to Moscow’s much more confrontational approach toward the West.
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AFF › Impact Turn
Depetris 8-18-2020, fellow at Defense Priorities and a columnist at the Washington Examiner. (Daniel Depetris, "China isn't the Soviet Union, and the US needs to find a different way to compete", Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-needs-to-find-different-way-to-compete-with-china-2020-8)
Unfortunately, simplifying China as a modern-day Soviet Union misdiagnoses the problem and leads to a faulty cure. Combatting Chinese power everywhere and anywhere will exhaust the US, deplete its resources and weaken US power over the long-term.
For nearly 30 years, the Washington foreign policy establishment has gotten used to the United States being the paramount power in the global system. But this is no longer the world we are living in.
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AFF › Solvency
Evelyn Farkas 08-11-2011 [Evelyn N. Farkas, Ph.D., Senior Advisor for Public-Private Partnership to the Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) and Commander, U.S. European Command, Atlantic Council, “Public-Private Collaboration in NATO,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/publicprivate-collaboration-in-nato///ZW]
From Evelyn Farkas, U.S. European Command: “Why should the public and private sectors collaborate today?” The answer? The complex challenges that we face around the world today often require skills and approaches beyond traditional military capabilities. Collaboration allows us to meet these challenges utilizing specific expertise found in the private sector. The private sector can provide agility, swift innovation, and a unique resource set. Together, government and private entities can reduce shared risks, minimize costs, and address mutual threats like terrorism, organized crime, cyber attacks, and climate change. The government gains access to the private sector’s expertise and resources, and private sector entities benefit from the information sharing involved in collaboration and the legitimacy gained from meeting complex challenges to provide for the greater good. . . . NATO adopted a comprehensive approach that recognized the need to build partnerships with non-military entities both inside and outside the government. With this in mind, in 2008, NATO launched the Building Integrity Initiative, which works with private NGOs like Transparency International, to reduce corruption in defense establishments in Europe and Afghanistan. . . . First, is the issue of trust. Neither sector likes to broadly share information about vulnerabilities. Corporations worry that it could lead to the public revelation of weaknesses and of sensitive intellectual property. The government is cautious about disclosing national security vulnerabilities to private entities that have international ownership or global interests and about safeguarding the privacy of U.S. citizens. And finally, there is the problem of how to institutionalize this collaboration. Because the responsibility for advancing public-private collaboration is so decentralized, optimization and coordination of efforts across the government has proven to be difficult.
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AFF › PDB
Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovíc 06-16-2022 [Former President of Croatia, Defense One, “NATO Must Ensure Defense and Civilian Industries Work Together,” https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/06/nato-must-ensure-defense-and-civilian-industries-work-together/368250///ZW]
The internet, microwaves, and synthetic rubber came into our lives as products invented for military purposes. Even everyday things, such as undershirts and concentrated fruit juice were created to improve the combat readiness of armed forces. Though many people typically associate the military with war and suffering, this industry has been a source of incredible progress, producing inventions that made our lives longer, healthier, and easier. These days, innovation is likely to run the other way, with the military benefiting from inventions developed with private funding. A symbiotic relationship between military needs and human progress is not necessarily the default. Instead, it requires a well-oiled innovation ecosystem in which military and civilian industries share their expertise and knowledge with one another. NATO has recently announced several initiatives to build on past success, but more are needed—particularly as members increase their military funding. Virtually all alliance members are investing more in defense or are soon planning to do so. Germany, for example, declared that it would create a 100-billion-Euro fund and reach its 2% goal in 2022. Poland, which shares the longest EU border with Ukraine, has taken in more than 3.5 million Ukrainian refugees and promised to dedicate 3% of its GDP to defense. Croatia ramped up its defense investment to 2.3% of GDP. To ensure that this new investment spurs innovation and co-operation between military and civilian industries as well as academia, NATO announced in April the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic. DIANA will concentrate on deep technologies, including artificial intelligence, big-data processing, quantum-enabled technologies, biotechnology, novel materials, and outer space. In addition, 17 NATO nations have agreed to set up the world’s first multi-sovereign venture capital fund. It will invest 1 billion Euros in early-stage startups and other deep tech funds aligned with its strategic objectives. But NATO members need to do more to maintain their technological advantage over Russia and China, who are also increasing spending on military research and development. The trends make this clear. In 1960, the U.S. accounted for 69 percent of global R&D investments, with U.S. defense-related R&D accounting for no less than 36% of global spending. The bulk (65%) of U.S. investments in defense-related R&D was financed from the federal budget. However, by 2019, the U.S. share of global R&D fell to 30%, and the share of federal government investment in defense-related R&D fell from 65% to 21%, whereas the share of business investment in R&D has grown from 33% to 71%. This leaves no doubt that meaningful innovation is not possible without close co-operation with the private sector. As NATO prepares to adopt its next Strategic Concept at the summit in Madrid, it is essential that it focus on mechanisms that maintain its technological advantage. As part of GLOBSEC’s work at the Future Security and Defense Council, we have proposed several ideas to help promote innovation in the Alliance. We are convinced that NATO’s innovation ecosystem must integrate public and private sectors to ensure this edge.
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AFF › PDCP
MAJ Nicholas R. Simontis, 13 - U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas “SECURITY COOPERATION: AN OLD PRACTICE FOR NEW TIMES”
How we deal with our adversaries is changing in response to these developments in the security environment. How we deal with our international allies and partners also should change. For many years, the term “security cooperation” referred to efforts by the Department of Defense (DOD) to promote U.S. security interests through the interaction with and development of friendly and allied security capabilities.2 This definition is evolving, however, as illustrated by recent strategic documents and statements by the President and Secretary of Defense.3 The term as used recently includes synchronized efforts by the whole-of-government to build the security capacity of U.S. friends and allies, including the development of economic and political capabilities. The most recent strategic guidance calls for increased emphasis on an interagency and interorganizational approach to building partner capacity and capability, focused on promoting stability and preventing conflict before it begins, all within a framework that emphasizes governance and rule of law. Put another way, recent strategic guidance advocates a whole-of-government approach as the means for translating national security objectives into the outcome of increased partner capacity. This change represents recognition that a wide variety of skill sets is necessary to address these changes in the security environment. Unfortunately, this change presents challenges for current security cooperation practices.
The current structure of security cooperation, that is, the infrastructure of government agencies that participate in security cooperation activities, does not readily support this new guidance. The current security cooperation organization originated in the aftermath of World War II, and continued to evolve through the Cold War. Although the Department of State (DOS) has responsibility for planning and executing security cooperation, the system primarily addresses the military component of security in terms of equipment and training. The DOD, under the auspices of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) executes these portions of U.S. Security cooperation endeavors, which constitute the preponderance of efforts, both in terms of labor and fund allocation. Furthermore, the DOD’s share has grown considerably in the past five years as Congress significantly increased funding authorities in order to facilitate stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan.4 The key issue, then, is how to shift the emphasis from the Department of Defense to efforts shared among Defense, State, USAID, and other agencies as needed.
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Aff Answers › 2AC --- Perm Do CP
Sula et al ‘13
(Ismail Erkam Sula ** PhD Candidate, Bilkent University, Department of International Relations;, and Cagla Luleci“Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice: The Evolution of NATO’s Security Agenda,” pg online @ //um-ef)
The Strategic Concept is also clear with regard to the referent object of security. In the broadest sense, NATO refers to the security of the ‘alliance’ constituted of North America and Europe (NATO 1991, Article 16). However, throughout the whole Strategic Concept NATO makes clear that its security conception refers to the member states of the alliance. In particular NATO refers “to security amongst the members of the alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities relative to each other” 46. NATO refers to ‘collective security’ as a broad framework that is constituted of member states. In terms of both agency and referent object the security conception of NATO remains both statist and state-centric. With regard to the policy to
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Aff Answers › 2AC --- Unilat Fails
Haass ‘21 - President of the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of The World: A Brief Introduction (Richard, Foreign Affairs, “The Age of America First”, December 2021, )//RG
Whatever the failings of this new paradigm, there is no going back; history does not offer do-overs. Nor should Washington return to a foreign policy that, for much of three decades, largely failed both in what it did and in what it did not do.
The starting point for a new internationalism should be a clear recognition that although foreign policy begins at home, it cannot end there. The United States, regardless of its diminished influence and deep domestic divisions, faces a world with both traditional geopolitical threats and new challenges tied to globalization. An American president must seek to fix what ails the United States without neglecting what happens abroad. Greater disarray in the world will make the task to “build back better”—or whatever slogan is chosen for domestic renewal—much more difficult, if not impossible. Biden has acknowledged the “fundamental truth of the 21st century . . . that our own success is bound up with others succeeding as well”; the question is whether he can craft and carry out a foreign policy that reflects it.
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Aff Answers › 2AC --- DCAs Fail
Kinne ‘18 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, )//RG
DCAs show strong evidence of collaboration problems. When governments coordinate their defense policies, pool defense-related research-and-development (R&D) resources, transfer sophisticated weapons and military technologies, exchange classified information, hold joint exercises, and so on, they engage in inherently risky activities that create opportunities for exploitation. The key danger in signing a DCA with an untrusted partner is that the partner might ultimately employ the gains of cooperation for its own strategic advantage. In the event of direct confrontation, the improvements in military capacity that DCAs enable—better training, access to classified material, first-hand knowledge of others’ tactics and operating procedures—can be readily used to exploit a nominal defense partner. These concerns further extend to relations with third parties, both governmental and nongovernmental. For example, the US has long worried that military cooperation with countries like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan indirectly supports extremist organizations. More benignly, DCA partnerships also involve managerial concerns about the ability of partners to fulfill their obligations.40 In 2007, for example, the Japanese self- defense force unintentionally leaked classified details of the US-built Aegis weapons system, causing a furor in the US defense community.41 For all these reasons, DCAs require credible assurances of trustworthiness.
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Aff Answers › 2AC --- DCAs Fail
Kinne ‘18 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, )//RG
Coordination problems are also apparent in DCAs. Variations in the institutional characteristics of DCAs partially reflect distributional concerns. Governments worry about asymmetric gains—that is, the possibility that one’s partners will gain more than oneself.47 Further, negotiators know that revealing a preference for particular design features may lead others to increase their demands accordingly. Given these incentives, governments anticipate that their interlocutors may not be fully transparent about their treaty preferences. That uncertainty, in turn, increases the risk of bargaining failure. Given their broad flexibility as framework agreements, DCAs particularly raise concerns about scope, precision, and the degree of reliance on implementing arrangements.
A contentious 2007 negotiation between Singapore and Indonesia offers an illuminating example. In response to Singapore’s request for access to Indonesian waters for training purposes, the resulting DCA included a seemingly benign implementing arrangement that designated an “Area Bravo” southwest of Indonesia’s Natuna Islands.48 Almost immediately upon signature of the DCA, Indonesian politicians accused Singapore of disingenuousness and began speculating on the “broad latitude” that the Singapore military would wield in Area Bravo, involving naval exercises, air support, live fire, and even participation of third parties—all of which, given Singapore’s growing military strength, would likely intensify over time.49 Indonesia’s defense minister, seizing on ambiguities within the agreement, declared that “Singapore still wants rules of their own, without having to negotiate ... on their military training here.”50 He further asserted, “We want clear rules of the game on the frequency and scope of Singapore military training, including how many times Singapore can fire its missiles in our territory.”51 While Singapore’s true preferences remain opaque, the mere perception of duplicity by the Indonesian government was sufficient to doom the proceedings.
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Aff Answers › 2AC --- DCAs – L2NB
Kinne ‘18 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, )//RG
Fourth, traditional military alliances exercise influence in a variety of ways. Allied countries are better equipped to meet one another’s modernization needs, more likely to face common threats, and more likely to share foreign-policy goals. Thus, alliances should generally increase demand for DCAs. However, I anticipate a unique influence for NATO because its unusually broad mandate spills into issue areas—training, defense research, joint exercises, etc.—also addressed by DCAs. Accordingly, demand for DCAs should be lower between NATO states. At the same time, because DCAs are an important mechanism for prospective NATO members to signal alignment, I anticipate a positive effect for pairings between NATO members and Partnership-for-Peace (PfP) states.
2022
Michigan
Topicality
**Topicality** › Cybersecurity – Cyber Threats
Shea, Gillis, and Clark ND [Sharon Shea is executive editor of the Security Media Group, overseeing SearchSecurity, SearchCloudSecurity and SearchCompliance; Alexander S. Gillis is a technical writer and editor in the WhatIs group at TechTarget; Casey Clark is a former assistant site editor for SearchSecurity; “What is cybersecurity?”; No date; ] //CH
Cybersecurity is the protection of internet-connected systems such as hardware, software and data from cyberthreats. The practice is used by individuals and enterprises to protect against unauthorized access to data centers and other computerized systems.
A strong cybersecurity strategy can provide a good security posture against malicious attacks designed to access, alter, delete, destroy or extort an organization's or user's systems and sensitive data. Cybersecurity is also instrumental in preventing attacks that aim to disable or disrupt a system's or device's operations.
2022
Michigan
Topicality
**Topicality** › SC – WM – TEVV
Schmidt et al. 21 [Eric Schmidt is a technologist and entrepreneur, served as Google’s Chief Executive Officer and Chairman from 2001 to 2011, as well as Executive Chairman and Technical Advisor, and co-founded Schmidt Futures in 2017; other author’s works listed on page 741; “National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence”; Last cited 1/31/21; ] //CH
Component 3: Foster the JAIC AI Partnership for Defense (AI PfD) as a critical vehicle to further AI defense and security cooperation.
Launched in 2020, the AI PfD is a DoD-led effort to convene partner nations to “provide values-based global leadership” on adoption of AI in the defense and security context.16 Current members include Australia, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Israel, Japan, Norway, South Korea, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.