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Topicality---Starter Pack 2022 › Artificial Intelligence › AI---Excludes Semi-Autonomous Weapons---1NC
Allen ’22 [Gregory; June 6; director of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Governance Project and a senior fellow in the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C; CSIS; “DOD Is Updating Its Decade-Old Autonomous Weapons Policy, but Confusion Remains Widespread,” https://www.csis.org/analysis/dod-updating-its-decade-old-autonomous-weapons-policy-confusion-remains-widespread]
While describing a military system as AI-enabled or machine learning-enabled provides useful information, it often remains unclear just what functionality is being provided by AI and how central AI is to the system overall. Suppose, hypothetically, that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program Office decided that it should use machine learning to improve the performance on one of the aircraft’s many different types of sensors. Does that mean that the entire F-35 program, with its more than $8.5 billion in annual spending, is building AI-enabled weapon systems? The DODD 3000.09 update is a good opportunity to formally define “AI-enabled” in DOD policy and to specify how using machine learning does or does not affect the autonomous weapon senior review process.
Confusingly, common usage of these terms differs significantly in other countries. For example, Russian weapons manufacturers routinely refer to their automated and robotic military systems as using AI even if the system does not use machine learning, and they rarely make it clear when it does. Varied definitions complicate international diplomacy on these subjects.
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Topicality---Starter Pack 2022 › One or More of the Following Areas › ‘Or’ = One or More---2AC
Scalia ’12 [Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner; 2012; Justice on the Supreme Court of the United States; American lawyer, lexicographer, and teacher; Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, “Conjunctive/Disjunctive Canon,” Ch. 12]
The conjunctions and and or are two of the elemental words in the English language. Under the conjunctive/disjunctive canon, and combines items while or creates alternatives. Competent users of the language rarely hesitate over their meaning. But a close look at the authoritative language of legal instruments—as well as the litigation that has arisen over them—shows that these little words can cause subtle interpretive problems. Although these conjunctions can appear in countless constructions, we have identified six types of sentences in which they most frequently appear in legal instruments.
#1: The Basic Requirement
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Topicality---Starter Pack 2022 › In › In---Enclosed Within
Smith ’60 [Gen. Am. Indem; Oct 25; Judge for the Supreme Court of Texas; Co. v. Pepper, 161 Tex. 263, 339 S.W.2d 660, 1960 Tex. LEXIS 612, 4 Tex. Sup. J. 79]
The word "in" means inside of, within the bounds or limits of. "In" is defines to mean: primarily, in denotes situation or position with respect to a surrounding, encompassment, or enclosure, indicating being within, as a bounded place, a limited time, an encompassing material. The word "in" is said in its most usual significance and popular use to mean enclosed or surrounded by limits, as in a room. A person may be said to be traveling in a carriage, while alighting therefrom, until he completely disconnects himself and lands.
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Topicality---Starter Pack 2022 › In › In---Not Completely WIthin
Rader, 97 – US Circuit Judge for the Federal Circuit (Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18989 (United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit July 14, 1997, Decided ).
Next, the district court construed the claim language "in," "within," and "between." Each of these claim construction issues is similar to the interpretation of "between" discussed above in relation to claims 5 and 33-36 The district court construed these words more narrowly than required by the claim language and context. The word "in" does not require that something be completely and continuously inside of something else. The word "within" does not require that something be completely and continuously within something else. Further, as discussed above in more detail, the word "between" does not require that something be completely and continuously between two things.
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Topicality---Starter Pack 2022 › In › In---AT: Throughout---2AC
Cullen ’52 [Court of Appeals of Kentucky, Commissioner, Court of Appeals of Kentucky, November 13, 1952, Riehl et al. V. Kentucky unemployment compensation commission; the judgment is affirmed. Rehearing denied; COMBS, J., and SIMS, C. J., dissenting, ]
We do not find any ambiguity in KRS 341.070(1). It is our opinion that the key word in the statute is the word 'in,' preceding the words 'each of three calendar quarters', and if the word is accorded its ordinary and common meaning, the statute does not require simultaneous employment. According to Webster's New International Dictionary, the word 'in,' used with relation to a period of time, means 'during the course of.' The same meaning, expressed in another way, would be 'within the limits or duration of.' Employing this meaning, the statute says that an employer is subject to the Act if, during the course of, or within the limits or duration of each of three calendar quarters, he had in covered employment four or more workers, to each of whom the required amount of wages was paid. This clearly means that the employment need not be simultaneous. Obviously, the word 'in' does not mean 'throughout' or 'for the entire period of,' because then there would be no point in adding the requirement of the payment of a minimum of $50 in wages. In these times, no worker employed for a full calendar quarter would be paid less than $50 in wages. The appellant seeks to read into the statute the words 'at the same time,' following the words 'had in covered employment'. There is no justification for this, unless the word 'in' means 'during any one period of time in.' We are not aware of any authority for ascribing such a meaning to the word 'in'.
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Topicality---Starter Pack 2022 › The North Atlantic Treaty Organization › NATO---Includes Partners---1AR
Matlary ’14 [Janne Haaland; 2014; Professor of International Politics at the University of Oslo and at the Norwegian Defence University College, Norway; “Partners versus Members? NATO as an Arena for Coalitions,” in NATO’s Post-Cold War Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, London]
In this chapter, I discuss the importance of burden-sharing partnerships with NATO as a development that is, as I argue, symptomatic of the evolution of the Alliance into becoming an arena or platform for coalitions of the 'willing and able'. After the end of the Cold War, we live in an era where armed attacks against one or several Alliance members, obliging others to respond immediately (although not necessarily by military means), have become rare and unlikely. As a result, the organization has increasingly turned into a 'two-tiered' or 'multi-tiered' alliance. Current operations are mostly Article 4 and hence, unlike Article 5 cases, voluntary. This implies that partners, as well as members, may contribute. Moreover, few members seem to be willing and able to make a contribution,1 something that inter alia the Libya operation has shown - only eight allies were actually willing to contribute combat capabilities. In other operations, like ISAF, all members contribute, but only a few with risk-willing capabilities. All 'show the flag', but few are willing and able to contribute to sharp operations that require top skill and risk-willingness.
In NATO's currently valid Strategic Concept, the necessity for a part-nership policy is visibly highlighted: 'The promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner relations with countries and organizations around the globe. These partnerships make a concrete and valued contribution to the success of NATO's fundamental tasks' (NATO 2010). The section continues to underline how flexible NATO will be in the time ahead: 'We will enhance our partnerships through flexible formats that bring NATO and partners together - across and beyond existing frameworks' (NATO 2010). NATO is also prepared to give partners in operations a 'structural role in shaping strategy and decisions on NATO-led missions to which they contribute' (NATO 2010, my emphasis).
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Topicality---Starter Pack 2022 › The North Atlantic Treaty Organization › NATO---Includes Partners---1AR
NATO ’21 [North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Aug 25; “Partnerships: projecting stability through cooperation,” https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84336.htm?]
The Allies seek to contribute to the efforts of the international community in projecting stability and strengthening security outside NATO territory. One of the means to do so is through cooperation and partnerships. Over more than 25 years, the Alliance has developed a network of partnerships with non-member countries from the Euro-Atlantic area, the Mediterranean and the Gulf region, and other partners across the globe. NATO pursues dialogue and practical cooperation with these nations on a wide range of political and security-related issues. NATO’s partnerships are beneficial to all involved and contribute to improved security for the broader international community.
Partners are part of many of NATO’s core activities, from shaping policy to building defence capacity, developing interoperability and managing crises.
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Topicality---Starter Pack 2022 › The North Atlantic Treaty Organization › NATO---Includes Partners---2AC
NATO ’21 [North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Aug 25; “Partnerships: projecting stability through cooperation,” https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84336.htm?]
A flexible network of partnerships with non-member countries
Dialogue and cooperation with partners can make a concrete contribution to enhance international security, to defend the values on which the Alliance is based, to NATO’s operations, and to prepare interested nations for membership.
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Topicality---Starter Pack 2022 › The North Atlantic Treaty Organization › NATO---AT: “Only Article 5”---2AC/1AR
Matlary ’14 [Janne Haaland; 2014; Professor of International Politics at the University of Oslo and at the Norwegian Defence University College, Norway; “Partners versus Members? NATO as an Arena for Coalitions,” in NATO’s Post-Cold War Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, London]
If this is so, then NATO is important as an arena and increasingly so. But the main political dynamic is between the US, on the one hand, and remaining NATO members and partners, on the other. Moreover, if Article 5 contingencies remain unlikely as during the past two decades, then the boundary between members and partners will remain rather fuzzy. Even the border violations from June to November 2012 (of Turkey by Syria) have not resulted in Article 5 invocations by the former, which have twice called for consultations under Article 4. This was also the case when the Turkish border was violated in the 'spillovers' in the run-up to the Iraq war in 2003. At that time, the Turks asked for NATO assistance under Article 4, something which severely split the Alliance. Hence, Article 5 situations are very rare, with September 11, 2001 being an exception when the North Atlantic Council (NAC) declared it an Article 5 but was rebuffed by the US which wanted full control of its response.
My point is simply that absent the threat of inter-state war in the Euro-Atlantic area, most NATO cases will be under Article 4, and thus voluntary. This makes for a political dynamic where those who fight together, stay together. Moreover, the fact that both members and partners find it useful and perhaps necessary to contribute begs the question of why contribute.
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Topicality---Starter Pack 2022 › The North Atlantic Treaty Organization › NATO---AT: “Only Article 5”---2AC/1AR
Weaver ’21 [John Michael; 2021; Associate Professor of Intelligence Analysis at York College of Pennsylvania (USA), a retired DOD civilian from the United States' Intelligence Community, and has served as an officer in the US Army (retiring at the rank of lieutenant colonel); NATO in Contemporary Times: Purpose, Relevance, Future, Palgrave Macmillan]
The political aspects that the NATO diplomats bring is essential for the success of the Alliance; diplomacy itself is an instrument of power and one that is critical as a "soft" component to bring about influence in the world (Weaver 2018a; Weaver 2018b; Weaver 2020; Weaver and Pomeroy 2018; Weaver and Pomeroy 2019, 2020; Weaver and Johnson 2020). To be effective and to remain relevant, it must look to clearly articulate objectives to NATO commanders at all levels (Kruger-Klausen and Odgaard 2014). The Alliance also helps enable nations like the United States to leverage others to minimize the burden of being the sole bearer of the problem while adding legitimacy to the mission (Jakobsen 2014, 5). What's more, is that NATO can bring together a variegated mix of capabilities that single nations might lack (Jakobsen 2014, 60).
Similar to the United Nations, it is frequently quite challenging to come to commonly acceptable terms due to the disparate mix of nations each with their own agendas to help maintain their relevancy and position on the global stage (Geoana 2020). It is not easy to realize consensus and when looking at divides between individual nations, like the United States and France (cultural differences), Greece, and Turkey (a history of hostility), and divisions between larger members like the United States and the European Union, the United Kingdom and the European Union (over Brexit), and many NATO nations and Turkey (due to Turkey's move towards a closer relationship with Russia), and one can quickly see how challenges abound for the political leaders of the Alliance.
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Topicality---Starter Pack 2022 › The North Atlantic Treaty Organization › NATO---Informal Cooperation CI---2AC
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni ’14 [Mette; 2014; Lecturer in International Studies at the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge, UK; “Informal cooperation beyond the alliance,” in NATO’s Post-Cold War Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, London]
A large literature charts NATO's post-Cold War transformation from a close-knit, defensive alliance to a more versatile, multifaceted security organization. This literature focuses mainly on changes to the formal institutional makeup of the Alliance, such as the adoption of new Strategic Concepts, inclusion of new member states, and reform of command and decision procedures. Less analytical attention has been paid to changing patterns of informal cooperation within and around the Alliance. Indeed, while scholars have identified a growing tendency to supplement formal NATO cooperation with ad hoc, flexible forms of collaboration this tendency is often cited as a sign of disintegration of the Alliance (for example, Noetzel and Schreer 2009) rather than an integral part of NATO's post-bipolar institutional practice, which is conducive to the continued functioning of the Alliance.
This chapter focuses explicitly on forms of informal cooperation involving NATO members, but occurring beyond the official institutional boundaries of the Alliance. Perhaps the most visible instantiation of ad hoc, informal cooperation are the short-term 'coalitions-of-the- willing' that have brought together NATO and non-NATO countries to intervene militarily in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq. However, 'extramural' security cooperation also takes other, less visible forms, including Anglo-American special intelligence-sharing, the G8's informal Counter-terrorism Action Group or the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). What characterises these initiatives is that they bring together prominent NATO members (often in concert with powerful third-party states) in order to address issues that fall generally within the institutional scope and mandate of NATO but that are nonetheless pursued outside the formal institutional boundaries of the Alliance.
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Topicality---Starter Pack 2022 › The North Atlantic Treaty Organization › NATO---Political/Military Alliance CI---2AC
Weaver ’21 [John Michael; 2021; Associate Professor of Intelligence Analysis at York College of Pennsylvania (USA), a retired DOD civilian from the United States' Intelligence Community, and has served as an officer in the US Army (retiring at the rank of lieutenant colonel); NATO in Contemporary Times: Purpose, Relevance, Future, Palgrave Macmillan]
NATO is both a political and a military Alliance that exists to guarantee the security and freedom of its members with both political and military means. Politically, NATO seeks to promote democratic values and empower member states to consult and collaborate on both security and defense-related issues to solve problems, build trust, and prevent conflict in the long run (What is NATO, n.d.). Militarily, NATO is committed to peacefully resolving disputes. If diplomacy fails, NATO has the military power to commence crisis management procedures. These can be carried out under a United Nations mandate or Article 5, which is the collective defense clause of NATO's founding treaty. Military operations can be conducted alone or with other countries and international organizations (What is NATO, n.d.).
2.3 MISSION
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Topicality---Starter Pack 2022 › The North Atlantic Treaty Organization › NATO---Core Military Limits---2NC
NATO ’21 [North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Aug 25; “Partnerships: projecting stability through cooperation,” https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84336.htm?]
Through partnership, NATO and partners also pursue a broad vision of security:
integrating gender perspectives into security and defence;
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Topicality---Starter Pack 2022 › The North Atlantic Treaty Organization › NATO---Core Military Activities---1NC
----even if it includes partners, it excludes ‘broad’ cooperation on issues like pandemic cooperation unrelated to preparing for an Article 5 contingency
Skaluba ’17 [Christopher; Nov 7; served as the principal director for European and NATO policy in the office of the secretary of defense from 2012 to 2015; War on the Rocks, “In Praise of NATO's Dysfunctional, Bureaucratic Tedium,” ]
A year after Donald Trump’s election to the presidency, the furor around his approach to transatlantic security has predictably calmed. Part of the reason is saturation. Like antibiotics, provocation of one’s allies loses its potency when used excessively. Part of the reason is that the president has found a more willing and compelling foil, in the form of Kim Jong Un, than those buttoned-up European leaders he accuses of freeloading. Certainly, part of the reason includes the administration’s Russia-related scandals and Robert Mueller’s investigation. The president’s hostility toward NATO has always felt more like a sop to Moscow than a matter of principle and thus not a good look with indictments swirling.
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Topicality---Starter Pack 2022 › The North Atlantic Treaty Organization › NATO---Core Military Activities---1NC
Becker ‘14 [David S; Winter; Partner in the Litigation and Intellectual Property Practice Groups at Freeborn & Peters, LLP, J.D. from DePaul University College of Law, & John C. Hammerle, Associate in the Litigation Practice Group at Freeborn & Peters, LLP, J.D. from DePaul University College of Law; Committee News, “The Trouble With “Substantial Completion” in Construction Projects,” https://freeborn.com/assets/the_trouble_with_substantial_completion_in_construction_projects-aba_winter_2014_newsletter.pdf]
3 See, e.g., Kinetic Builder’s, Inc. v. Peters, 226 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Ocean Winds Corp. v. Lane, 556 S.E.2d 377, 379 (S.C. 2001) (citing statutory definition of substantial completion as “that degree of completion of a project, improvement, or a specified area or portion thereof . . . upon attainment of which the owner can use the same for the purpose for which it was intended”) (internal citations and emphasis omitted); Daugherty v. Bruce Realty & Dev., Inc., 892 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (“a building is substantially complete . . . when it has reached the state of its construction so that it can be put to the use for which it was intended, even though comparatively minor items remain to be furnished or performed to conform to the plans and specifications of the completed building”); E.R. Stone v. City of Arcola, 181 Ill. App. 3d 513, 526 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (acknowledging that a project is “substantially complete” at a given date where “it could be used for the purpose for which it was intended on that date”). See also Sorenson v. Dager, 601 N.W.2d 564, 570 (Neb. Ct. App. 1999) (*fix this parenthetical); Evans & Assocs. v. Dyer, 246 Ill. App. 3d 231, 239 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (“Substantial performance . . . . means performance in all the essential elements necessary to the accomplishment of the purpose of the contract. ‘Substantial’ means in substance; in the main; essential, including material or essential parts.”)..
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Topicality---Starter Pack 2022 › The North Atlantic Treaty Organization › NATO---Collective Defense---2NC
Markert ’17 [Jennifer; July 1; Writer, citing U.S. treaty police and the Department of State; Curiousmatic, “U.S. Mutual Defense Treaties: Which Countries Has America Sworn To Protect,” ] *Images omitted
Currently, the United States is involved with seven mutual defense pacts, tying the nation’s fate (and military) to a number of others.
1947 – Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance (Rio Treaty)
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Topicality---Starter Pack 2022 › The North Atlantic Treaty Organization › NATO---Collective Defense---2NC
Raitasalo ’15 [Jyri; July 2; Docent of Strategy and Security Policy at the Finnish National Defence University, (Lt. Col. (GS), Dr.Pol.Sc; War on the Rocks, “NATO Is Not A Real Military Actor,” https://warontherocks.com/2015/07/nato-is-not-a-real-military-actor/]
In addition, there are no separate strategic interests of NATO that could be fulfilled apart from the interests and actions of its member-states. The truth is that the Secretary General and the Chairman of the Military Committee — and a bunch of other NATO officials and actors — can persuade, plead and ask, but they cannot make any significant or binding decisions related to the use of military force within the territory of the Alliance, or elsewhere. It is the task of the member-states of NATO to bolster their own defenses and capabilities. This is the only way for NATO to retain the significance it once had in the arrangements of international security.
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Topicality---Starter Pack 2022 › The North Atlantic Treaty Organization › NATO---Collective Defense---2NC
Fukuyama ’21 [Francis; December 14; Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow and director of the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy program at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies; “Ukraine and NATO,” https://www.americanpurpose.com/blog/fukuyama/ukraine-and-nato/]
Saying this upsets many of my Georgian and Ukrainian friends, but there are very good reasons for shelving the NATO membership issue for the foreseeable future. My reasons have to do with the essence of NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a military alliance, built around its Article 5 guarantee that an attack on one member would be considered as an attack on the whole alliance. Were NATO to accept Ukraine as a member today, its members would immediately be engaged in an ongoing war with Russia—a position no member of the alliance wants to be in.
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Topicality---Starter Pack 2022 › The North Atlantic Treaty Organization › NATO---Collective Defense---1NC
Fukuyama ’22 [Francis; Jan 31; Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow and director of the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy program at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies; “Dangerous Revisionism,” ]
This doesn’t mean that NATO could or should have been expanded indiscriminately. As I argued in an earlier post, NATO is fundamentally a security treaty built around its Article V guarantee that an attack on one member would be considered as an attack on all. Countries that cannot actually be defended by the alliance should face a very high barrier to entry. This is not a matter of principle, but one of physical geography and military logistics. This is why I was opposed to offering eventual membership to Ukraine and Georgia back at the time of the Bucharest Declaration in 2008; there was no realistic way for the Article V commitment to be met if those countries faced a determined Russian attack.
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Topicality---Starter Pack 2022 › With › With---Involves NATO---2AC
Colangelo ’10 [Anthony; September; Assistant Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law; “ARTICLE: THE FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE,” Virginia Law Review, 96 Va. L. Rev. 949]
It was precisely this general, national regulatory power that saved application of the federal Controlled Substances Act ("CSA") to homegrown medical-use marijuana in the Court's 2005 decision Gonzales v. Raich, 128 and that has constitutionally justified numerous federal laws designed to prevent various races to the bottom "among" the states. 129 The Foreign Commerce Clause contains no equivalent, globally-encompassing authority to regulate "among" foreign nations, only the power to regulate commerce "with" them. 130 The difference between the power to regulate among members of the domestic system, but only with members of the international system, suggests that Congress has no more power to regulate inside foreign nations than it has inside the several states.131 Indeed, as Section B explains in more depth - and [*974] contrary to leading lower-court decisions - this textual difference actually deprives Congress of some of the more sweeping regulatory powers abroad that it enjoys at home.132 To preview the argument, Congress cannot independently create comprehensive global regulatory schemes over international markets or prevent races to the bottom among the world's nations the same way it can create comprehensive national regulatory schemes over domestic markets and prevent races to the bottom among the states. Because Congress lacks primary authority to create such global schemes, it cannot claim a derivative authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to reach local foreign conduct that threatens to undercut those schemes the same way it can reach local intrastate conduct to [*975] effectuate regulation "among the several States."133 Rather, for Congress to regulate local foreign conduct pursuant to a comprehensive international regulatory scheme, that scheme must be created "with foreign Nations."134 In this sense, the word "with" contemplates agreement or cooperation with foreign nations in establishing the scheme, without which Congress cannot extend U.S. law over local foreign conduct to effectuate that scheme.