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2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- S --- NATO Key

Alliance wide cyber information sharing is critical for operational strength

Canbolat and Sezgin, 16 (Mustafa Canbolat and Emrah Sezgin, 1st Lieutenant, Turkish ArmyB.S., Turkish Military Academy, 2008 , 1st Lieutenant, Turkish Air ForceB.S., Turkish Air Force Academy, 2009, December 2016, accessed on 6-16-2022, DTIC, "Is NATO Ready for a Cyberwar", )//Babcii

b. Recommendations As Matthijs Veenendaal, Kadri Kaska, and Pascal Brangetto (2016) note, cyber capabilities are still regarded as strategic assets by most states. Because of the secrecy of these capabilities, states are reluctant to delegate the authority to use them, particularly in offensive operations. For instance, in the United States, “only the President can approve a cyber-attack likely to result in ‘significant consequences.’ However, this does not mean that these capabilities are irrelevant to NATO and NATO-led operations” (Veenendaal et al., 2016). NATO must plan for the “contingency of nations wanting to deploy them during a NATO-led military operation” (Veenendaal et al., 2016). However, without information sharing and knowing the level of possible contribution of an allied member, it will be very difficult to plan for possible cyber scenarios and react swiftly to cyber-attacks against NATO and its members. Handling “the need for secrecy or political sensitivity concerning specific military operations is not new for the Alliance” (Veenendaal et al., 2016). To enhance a full-fledged cyber doctrine, it would be beneficial to check the NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations. It states in its introduction that special operations may be described as military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, trained, and equipped forces using operational tactics, techniques, and modes of employment not standard to conventional forces. Politico-military considerations may require low prominence, covert or discreet techniques, and the acceptance of a degree of physical and political risk not associated with conventional operations. (Veenendaal et al., 2016) The approach for special operations is applicable for NATO to develop information sharing among members for cyber operations. NATO has the capacity to develop a sound doctrine, which deals with unconventional small sized units depending on secret information and conducting clandestine operations. Countries hesitate to share information because of their vulnerabilities in the cyber domain; however, if NATO becomes a more powerful cyber actor, willingness to share information among members will increase, and the bonds of NATO members will strengthen.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- S --- NATO Key

NATO OCOs are key to deter Russian gray-zone aggression, but coordination is key.

Alexander Vershbow, 1-25-2021, [Alexander Vershbow is the Wolk Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House and a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. During his diplomatic career, he served as NATO deputy secretary general, assistant secretary of defense for International Security Affairs, ambassador to NATO, Russia, and the Republic of Korea, special assistant to the president for European Affairs at the National Security Council, and State Department director of Soviet Union Affairs., "REFLECTIONS ON NATO DETERRENCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY," Texas National Security Review, https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/90610/TNSRVol4Issue4Vershbow.pdf?sequence=2]

NATO thinking on deterrence today, even more than in the Cold War, should go beyond conventional and nuclear weapons to encompass cyber and other gray-zone threats. Offensive cyber capabilities offer the means to inflict strategic effects without the direct use of military force — such as by disabling nuclear missiles in their launchers or by destroying or disrupting reconnaissance and command-and-control systems. Cyber capabilities complement the more traditional basket of tools used by Russia to destabilize its adversaries below the level of armed conflict (such as political subversion, economic sabotage, disinformation, and fomenting separatism). Russia uses these so-called hybrid means to undermine states and alliances, damage infrastructure, and erode social cohesion, all while concealing the identity of the attacker.26 NATO has sought to deter cyber aggression, first of all, by declaring that even though the Washington Treaty refers to “armed attack” as the basis for

NATO action under Article 5, a cyber attack could inflict sufficient damage to be considered the functional equivalent of an armed attack, triggering Article 5.27 Beyond this, deterrence in the gray zone may depend on developing the capability to inflict equal or greater damage in response to large-scale cyber aggression and to make clear that NATO reserves the right to react symmetrically (i.e., cyber versus cyber) or asymmetrically, to include kinetic and non-kinetic options such as sanctions. In this regard, the adapted NATO Command Structure includes a new 24/7 cyber operations center at its main headquarters and allies have agreed that NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for Europe can turn to nations with offensive cyber capabilities if needed in a conflict.28

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- UQ --- Russian Attacks

The invasion of Ukraine proves uniqueness---NATO must increase trans-Atlantic cooperation to ensure cyber-threats don’t escalate

Maigre 22 – senior cybersecurity expert at e-Governance Academy in Estonia

Merle Maigre, "NATO’s Role in Global Cyber Security," German Marshall Fund of the United States, 4-6-2022, https://www.gmfus.org/news/natos-role-global-cyber-security

Malicious cyber activity has increased substantially over the past years, ranging from ransomware and espionage to politically motivated cyberattacks and sophisticated malware used in the war in Ukraine. NATO allies must remain on high alert.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- UQ --- Russian Attacks

Russian cyberattacks are increasing now because of an uncoordinated US response strategy and perceived lack of consequences for cyber-aggression---that ensures catastrophic Russian cyberattacks on critical infrastructure and kinetic retaliation.

Rondeaux 20 – Senior fellow and professor of practice at the Center on the Future of War, a joint initiative of New America and Arizona State University

Candace Rondeaux, “Why Is the U.S. Still So Vulnerable to Russian Cyberattacks?,” World Politics Review, December 2020, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29298/why-is-the-u-s-still-so-vulnerable-to-a-russian-cyber-attack

To call the revelations about Russia’s devastating cyberattack on U.S. government agencies and thousands of American businesses chilling would be a gross understatement. What is even scarier, though, is that despite wave after wave of Russian-sponsored cyberattacks on the United States and its allies for more than a decade now, Washington still apparently lacks the political will to defend against this Russian aggression.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- Iran A/O

Goes nuclear

Kaveh L. Afrasiabi & Nader Entessar 19, Kaveh L. Afrasiabi is an Iranian-American political scientist, Nader Entessar is a professor and chair of the department of political science and criminal justice at the University of South Alabama, 2 July 2019, “A nuclear war in the Persian Gulf?” https://thebulletin.org/2019/07/a-nuclear-war-in-the-persian-gulf/

Tensions between the United States and Iran are spiraling toward a military confrontation that carries a real possibility that the United States will use nuclear weapons. Iran’s assortment of asymmetrical capabilities—all constructed to be effective against the United States—nearly assures such a confrontation. The current US nuclear posture leaves the Trump administration at least open to the use of tactical nuclear weapons in conventional theaters. Some in the current administration may well think it to be in the best interest of the United States to seek a quick and decisive victory in the oil hub of the Persian Gulf—and to do so by using its nuclear arsenal.

We believe there is a heightened possibility of a US-Iran war triggering a US nuclear strike for the following reasons:

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- Iran A/O

Iran will escalate GPS attacks, causing escalation in the Persian gulf

Micah Halpern 2019, former lecturer @ Yale, has also taught at Brandeis University and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, political and foreign affairs commentator, 8 August 2019, “Iran Plays a Dangerous Hi-Tech Game,” https://www.newsmax.com/micahhalpern/strait-of-hormuz-jamming-centcom/2019/08/08/id/927875/

Iran is playing dirty tricks in and around the Strait of Hormuz.

To begin with, they are jamming the GPS of tankers, causing ships to wander off course —and in to their waters. They are also spoofing andradioing the vessels, proporting to be friendly and even U.S. navy ships.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- Grid Impact A/O

Grid collapse is an existential threat.

Gray 19 – Senior journalist at BBC Future Richard Gray, “What would happen in an apocalyptic blackout?,” BBC Future, October 2019, https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20191023-what-would-happen-in-an-apocalyptic-blackout

“So much of our lives and almost everything we do is now dependent on energy, and particularly on our electricity supplies,” says Juliet Mian, technical director of the Resilience Shift, an initiative to help organisations and individuals prepare for failures in critical infrastructure. “We used to use the phrase ‘when the lights go out’, but the lights not working are the least of our worries now.” She is right. While the term “black sky” events illustrates perhaps the most visible impact of widespread power failures, it fails to convey the scale of the impact these can have. In our modern world, almost everything, from our financial systems to our communication networks, are utterly reliant upon electricity. Other critical infrastructure like water supplies and our sewer systems rely upon electric powered pumps to keep them running. With no power, fuel pumps at petrol stations stop working, road signs, traffic lights and train systems go dead. Transport networks grind to a halt. Our complex food supply chains quickly fall apart without computers to coordinate where produce needs to be, or the fuel to transport it or refrigeration to preserve it. Air conditioning, gas boilers and heating systems also rely upon electricity to work. A little over 100 years ago, our cities ran on human and animal muscle power to ferry goods and waste around. Modern infrastructure is now utterly reliant upon electricity. “In today’s world, our systems are highly interdependent and it is very hard to find many systems that are not fundamentally reliant upon power,” says Mian. “A black sky scenario will affect everyone.” The causes of a black sky event are many. They vary from natural disasters like hurricanes or earthquakes to geomagnetic storms triggered by enormous flares from the Sun, or coronal mass ejections, that send a barrage of electrically charged particles racing across the Solar System and can overload electrical grids. One intense geomagnetic disturbance caused a nine-hour outage across large areas of Canada in 1989. The Electric Infrastructure Security Council, an international body that reviews threats to power grids, also lists a number of human threats that can trigger a mass black out. These include cyberterrorism attacks or coordinated physical assaults on energy infrastructure such as power stations, and electromagnetic pulses that can disable electricity grids. “Our national power grids are tremendous feats of engineering and operations that have supported rapid economic growth around the world,” say Melissa Lott, a research fellow at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University in New York. “But more investment is needed if electric power grids are going to keep up with rapid technology shifts and increasingly extreme weather events.” She says that while true black sky events are mercifully rare, the deep impact they have on businesses and people means more needs to not only update grid technology and management, but also improve infrastructure so it can be more resilient against physical threats like flooding. “In the summer of 2012, blackouts in India cut power to more than 600 million people over two days. In Puerto Rico, Hurricane Maria crippled infrastructure across the island, leaving people in the dark and triggering a humanitarian crisis. In 2018, an earthquake on Japan’s Hokkaido island left more than 5 million people without power. In order to keep these events from becoming more common and to minimise their impact, we need to invest in our grids.” Putting measures in place to counter all of these potential threats is difficult and expensive. Critical systems can be guarded from human attacks and they can be shielded from electromagnetic pulses with enough money being spent on them. Building new systems for protecting transformers from coronal mass ejections can also help to keep systems safe. But there are some events that cannot be planned for and the complex, interconnected nature of our electricity grids are remarkably vulnerable. Take what happened in September 2003 when a fallen tree brought down a power line in Switzerland’s Lukmanier Pass over the Alps into Italy and 24 minutes later another tree came down onto a line in the nearby Great St Bernard pass. The sudden failure of these two key lines caused other connections to Europe’s electricity network to trip, which triggered power plants across Italy to shut down. The whole of Italy was left without power because of two fallen trees starting a cascade of events. Modern electricity grids are increasingly interconnected and complicated, making failures like this difficult to predict. Most of Europe now runs off a massive interconnected power grid – probably the largest in the world – that supplies more than 400 million customers in 24 countries. The USA is made up of five different grids. But there are some that are seeking ways of anticipating potential power failures and are enlisting the help of artificial intelligence to help them grapple with this highly complex problem. When a power plant goes down, for example, it causes an abrupt spike in load on others on the network, which in turn slows down the generators at these plants and causes the frequency held on the grid to decrease. This risks destabilising the delicate balance that electricity grids are held in, and operators have to deploy countermeasures rapidly – often within milliseconds – to prevent sections of the grid being cut off. Researchers at the Fraunhofer Gesellschaft research institute in Ilmenau, Germany, recently revealed they are developing an AI system to automatically detect these disturbances and take steps to address them. The US Department of Energy is also funding $7m (£5.4m) of research into using artificial intelligence to not only predict potential outages and spot anomalies that might lead to larger problems, but also to help find ways of keeping supplies constant in the event of a problem. General Electric is using machine learning to help analyse weather forecasts past outage history and information on the ground from its response crews to predict the impact that impending storms might have on its networks. It is also using it to predict where its repair crews might need to be so that downed lines can be restored more quickly. Power grids can also help to protect themselves by increasing the amount of energy storage such as large scale batteries they have available so that supplies can be supplemented when generators do go off-line unexpectedly. But completely protecting our power networks from failures is almost impossible, says Mian. “We can’t necessarily design our systems so that failures don’t happen,” she says. “There’s so much complexity in our systems these failures can cascade and they can become much more widespread, which means the failure is quite often unavoidable. But what we can do is design our systems so that they can respond and recover quickly.” This is what the Resilience Shift is now trying to improve. It has been organising exercises in collaboration with the Electric Infrastructure Security Council (EIS) that help large organisations, universities, schools, community groups and even families prepare themselves for an event that might lead to mass power cuts for several days at a time. The Emergency All-sector Response Transnational Hazard Exercise, or Earth Ex, is an online exercise that allows people to rehearse the decisions they need to make and put in place the plans they need should the worst happen. (Try Earth Ex for yourself and see how prepared you are.) “We want people to be thinking about these things long before there is a problem,” says John Heltzel, director of resilience planning at the EIS. “It’s important because when the electricity grid fails, there is this risk of cascading impacts that can occur from what might at first seem to be a relatively minor event. This cascade effect is where the real damage can be done. As the people of Venezuela have discovered, even basic service like water can stop when the power goes out. “It’s effectively [like going] back to the dark ages,” says Heltzel. A report by scientists at University College London mapped out how the loss of power can filter through communities, from the loss of health care provision and sanitation services to citizens trapped in lifts and disruption to transport systems. Then there are the social consequences that percolate out. Crime rates often go up during blackouts as they provide opportunities for theft and fraud. The supply of cash and credit – particularly in our modern societies so reliant upon electronic and card payments – dry up meaning people have to rely on whatever cash they happen to have squirreled away. Communication networks and the ability to contact loved ones disappear, while vulnerable people like the elderly are often left stranded in their own homes. Businesses are also left largely unable to operate, resulting in huge economic impacts. In 2004, the Department of Energy estimated the annual cost of power outages in the US to be around $80bn (£62bn) annually. When two million customers in California had their supplies cut for two days in October this year, experts estimated the cost to the economy to be around $2.5bn (£1.9bn).

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- Grid Impact A/O

Yes access, short timeframe, and the threshold is low---Russia’s already compromised our utilities, which proves motive is all that matters---try-or-die for deterrence.

Vasquez 20 – E&E News reporter

Christian Vasquez, “Huge federal hack ripples across energy industry,” E&E News, December 2020, https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063720933

Electric utilities are grappling with the fallout from one of the most significant cyber intrusions in years, as the far-reaching impact of a sophisticated hacking campaign comes into sharper focus.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- Grid Impact A/O

Now is key---the US power grid is increasingly vulnerable, Russian intrusions are increasing, and catastrophic hacks are an inevitability absent the aff.

Cunningham 21 – Opinion contributor for USA Today

Jim Cunningham, “Extreme weather is the culprit in the Texas power crisis, but that's not our worst problem,” USA Today, February 2021, https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2021/02/19/texas-power-crisis-real-threat-cyberattacks-not-weather-column/4491652001/

Today the culprit in Texas and several other states is extreme winter weather, but the greater threat we face is not weather related. It is the daily bombardment of cyberattacks on our nation’s critical infrastructure — most notably on the electric sector that provides the power upon which the rest of that infrastructure relies to operate.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- Grid Impact A/O

European grid collapse cascades---cross-country dependencies mean collapse rips across countries.

Starn et al. 21 – Writer for Bloomberg

Jesper Starn, Brian Parkin, Irina Vilcu, “The Day Europe’s Power Grid Came Close to a Massive Blackout,” Bloomberg, January 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-27/green-shift-brings-blackout-risk-to-world-s-biggest-power-grid

Germany is the biggest producer of green electricity in Europe. The nation is culling a quarter of coal and nuclear capacity next year, a gap it will need to plug. Instead of building a huge fleet of batteries, Germany plans to rely more on more its neighbors, importing power along huge cables.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- Grid Impact A/O

Independently, Russian attacks on Eastern European critical infrastructure are intensifying---that ensures increasingly destabilizing aggression.

Park et al. 17 – Assistant Professor, Korea Army Academy at Yeongcheon, Ph.D., University of Washington

Donghui Park, Julia Summers, Michael Walstrom, “Cyberattack on Critical Infrastructure: Russia and the Ukrainian Power Grid Attacks,” University of Washington Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, October 2017, https://jsis.washington.edu/news/cyberattack-critical-infrastructure-russia-ukrainian-power-grid-attacks/#_ftnref90

Ukraine’s crisis is ultimately a part of a larger system of events in the East-European region. Russia is conducting its foreign policy in the region chiefly based on its perception of the ongoing events there and their impact on Russia’s foreign and domestic interests. To achieve its goals, Russia is using various methods to influence the course of development that its neighbors choose to pursue. The methods now appear to include, among others, the combination of conducting the covert military operations on the ground and in cyberspace, spreading of pro-Russian and anti-Western disinformation domestically and internationally, as well as attacking various elements of critical infrastructure and exerting control over the national economies of the Eastern European states.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- Terror A/O

Nuclear terror causes extinction

Arguello and Buis, 18 – *Irma, Founder and Chair of the NPSGlobal Foundation (Non-proliferation for Global Security), degree in Phyisics Science from the University of Buenos Aires, Master degree in Business Administration from IDEA/Wharton School, Defense and Security studies (Master level) at the Escuela de Defensa Nacional, Argentina; **Emiliano, lawyer and associate professor of public international law, international humanitarian law, international law of disarmament, and the origins of international law in antiquity (Irma Arguello & Emiliano J. Buis, “The global impacts of a terrorist nuclear attack: What would happen? What should we do?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1436812)

But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures. Regarding the economic and financial impacts, a severe global economic depression would rise from the attack, likely lasting for years. Its duration would be strongly dependent on the course of the crisis. The main results of such a crisis would include a 2 percent fall of growth in global Gross Domestic Product, and a 4 percent decline of international trade in the two years following the attack (cf. Figure 3). In the case of developing and less-developed countries, the economic impacts would also include a shortage of high-technology products such as medicines, as well as a fall in foreign direct investment and a severe decline of international humanitarian aid toward low-income countries. We expect an increase of unemployment and poverty in all countries. Global poverty would raise about 4 percent after the attack, which implies that at least 30 million more people would be living in extreme poverty, in addition to the current estimated 767 million. In the area of international relations, we would expect a breakdown of key doctrines involving politics, security, and relations among states. These international tensions could lead to a collapse of the nuclear order as we know it today, with a consequent setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. In other words, the whole system based on the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty would be put under severe trial. After the attack, there would be a reassessment of existing security doctrines, and a deep review of concepts such as nuclear deterrence, no-firstuse, proportionality, and negative security assurances. Finally, the behavior of governments and individuals would also change radically. Internal chaos fueled by the media and social networks would threaten governance at all levels, with greater impact on those countries with weak institutional frameworks. Social turbulence would emerge in most countries, with consequent attempts by governments to impose restrictions on personal freedoms to preserve order – possibly by declaring a state of siege or state of emergency – and legislation would surely become tougher on human rights. There would also be a significant increase in social fragmentation – with a deepening of antagonistic views, mistrust, and intolerance, both within countries and towards others – and a resurgence of large-scale social movements fostered by ideological interests and easily mobilized through social media.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- Terror A/O

US integration of OCO’s with allies is key to stop terrorism --- They don’t have the authority or capabilities to do it themselves

Pomerleau, 19 (Mark Pomerleau, Mark Pomerleau is a reporter for C4ISRNET, covering information warfare and cyberspace., 4-2-2019, accessed on 6-18-2022, C4ISRNet, "How military hacking can improve",

It’s not just the United States that has unique offensive cyber capabilities. In a March 27 speech, Mike Burgess, Australia’s director general of the Australia Signals Directorate, how his government’s hackers conducted operations against ISIS in Syria to aid military ground forces as part of the global coalition to defeat the terrorist group. Burgess said this was “the first time that an offensive cyber operation had been conducted so closely synchronized with the movements of military personnel in theater.” The Australian offensive cyber operation took place in conjunction with a ground raid on an Islamic State position and degraded ISIS communications 11,000 km from the battlespace so commanders couldn’t connect to the internet or communicate with each other. The speech was . The operation is similar to those described by U.S. officials, who have detailed operations conducted by U.S. Cyber Command as well as partner forces supporting ground operations as part of the coalition. In some cases, U.S. officials have described the importance of the partnerships and capabilities of other nations in these contexts because sometimes the United States might not have the authority or the access to conduct the cyber effect itself. “What we recognize is we have some foreign partners that give us very unique access or very unique capabilities. They operate off of different authorities that compliment our own authorities so they are very, very important,” Lt. Gen. Stephen Fogarty, commander of Army Cyber Command, told reporters in October. “Episodic synchronization” The nature of remote cyber operations, despite common conception, are incredibly arduous. They involve first gaining access to adversaries’ networks, mapping those networks to understand where things are and then figuring out how to degrade or destroy portions of the network. Complicating matters further, if an adversary changes portions of the network via a software patch — an anomaly with no physical world comparison — the access gained could be negated. In the Australian example, Burgess said, “While the effect was almost instantaneous, it took weeks of planning by specialist ASD and [Australian Defense Forces] personnel to make sure it all went exactly to plan.” Indeed, despite the success of the Australian cyber operation and other similar operations detailed by U.S. officials, others have lamented that such operations today take too long to plan and only have a limited effect.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- Terror A/O

Evolving technologies make kinetic terrorist attacks an increasingly likely option

Missiroli 19 – Antonio Missiroli, Dr. Antonio Missiroli is the Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges. As well as being a professional journalist, he has also taught at Bath and Trento as well as Boston University, SAIS/Johns Hopkins, at the College of Europe (Bruges) and Sciences Po (Paris). Dr. Missiroli holds a PhD degree in Contemporary History from the Scuola Normale Superiore (Pisa) and a Master’s degree in International Public Policy from SAIS/Johns Hopkins University, 1/7/2019, “NATO and the South,”

Terrorists are also making an increasing use of modern technologies. While there have been no cases of ‘cyber-terrorism’ –ie, no proved terrorist act carried out through cyber means only– terrorist groups have indeed used cyberspace for recruitment and funding as well as operational purposes. This is an area where intelligence agencies are very busy and alert, although these activities are unlikely to reach the level of sophistication and disruption that only State-sponsored groups can achieve in this domain. There is, however, a growing concern about the possible use of unmanned vehicles for kinetic terrorist attacks –and not only on the battlefield (where they have already occurred) but also in civilian and especially urban environments–. What happened around Christmas 2018 at Gatwick airport in London was quite telling, especially in light of the commercial affordability and availability of such tools and their potential impact on civilian life. NATO has just launched a specific initiative to counter –on the battlefield but potentially also elsewhere– such a misuse of new technologies by terrorists.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › 1AC › 1AC --- Adv --- Cohesion

The US can’t do it alone --- Cooperative integration with alliances is key

Joseph S. Nye 20. Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor, Emeritus. "COVID-19’s Painful Lesson About Strategy and Power". War on the Rocks. 3-26-2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/covid-19s-painful-lesson-about-strategy-and-power/

In 2017, President Donald Trump announced a new National Security Strategy that focused on great-power competition with China and Russia. While the plans also note the role of alliances and cooperation, the implementation has not. Today, COVID-19 shows that the strategy is inadequate. Competition and an “America First” approach is not enough to protect the United States. Close cooperation with both allies and adversaries is also essential for American security. Under the influence of the information revolution and globalization, world politics is changing dramatically. Even if the United States prevails in the traditional great-power competition, it cannot protect its security acting alone. COVID-19 is not the only example. Global financial stability is vital to U.S. prosperity, but Americans need the cooperation of others to ensure it. And while trade wars have set back economic globalization, there is no stopping the environmental globalization represented by pandemics and climate change. In a world where borders are becoming more porous to everything from drugs to infectious diseases to cyber terrorism, the United States must use its soft power of attraction to develop networks and institutions that address these new threats. For example, this administration proposed halving the U.S. contribution to the World Health Organization’s budget — now we need it more than ever. A successful national security strategy should start with the fact that “America First” means America has to lead efforts at cooperation. A classic problem with public goods (like clean air, which all can share and from which none can be excluded) is that if the largest consumer does not take the lead, others will free-ride and the public goods will not be produced. As the technology expert Richard Danzig summarizes the problem: Twenty-first century technologies are global not just in their distribution, but also in their consequences. Pathogens, AI systems, computer viruses, and radiation that others may accidentally release could become as much our problem as theirs. Agreed reporting systems, shared controls, common contingency plans, norms and treaties must be pursued as a means of moderating our numerous mutual risks. Tariffs and border walls cannot solve these problems. While American leadership is essential because of the country’s global influence, success will require the cooperation of others. On transnational issues like COVID-19 and climate change, power becomes a positive-sum game. It is not enough to think of American power over others. We must also think in terms of power to accomplish joint goals, which involves power with others. On many transnational issues, empowering others helps us to accomplish our own goals. The United States benefits if China improves its energy efficiency and emits less carbon dioxide, or improves its public health systems. In this world, institutional networks and connectedness are an important source of information and of national power, and the most connected states are the most powerful. Washington has some sixty treaty allies while China has few. Unfortunately, as Mira Rapp-Hooper recently argued, the United States is squandering that power resource. In the past, the openness of the United States enhanced its capacity to build networks, maintain institutions, and sustain alliances. But will that openness and willingness to engage with the rest of the world prove sustainable in the current populist mood of American domestic politics? Even if the United States possesses more hard military and economic power than any other country, it may fail to convert those resources into effective influence on the global scene. Between the two world wars, America did not and the result was disastrous.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › 1AC › 1AC --- Adv --- Cohesion

And a unified NATO stops every existential threat.

Kolga 21 – founder of DisinfoWatch.org and is a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute’s Centre for Advancing Canada’s Interests Abroad

Marcus Kolga, "Improving NATO’s cohesion is critical to combat Russia and China’s threat: Marcus Kolga for Inside Policy," Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 10-5-2021, https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/improving-natos-cohesion-critical-combat-russia-chinas-threat/

A united NATO is critically important to projecting credible deterrence. The erosion of domestic trust and confidence in the Alliance among its member states, including Canada, represents a threat to this cohesion. A proposal to withdraw Canada from NATO was tabled at a recent policy conference for one of Canada’s three major political parties. The proposal was defeated, but it represents a fringe anti-NATO narrative within Canada’s illiberal left; if left unaddressed, such a narrative could grow.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › 1AC › 1AC --- Adv --- Cohesion

Allied mistrust sparks conflict in every region---nuclear war

Dr. A. Wess Mitchell 10, President of the Center for European Policy Analysis, Doctorate in Political Science from the Otto Suhr Institut für Politikwissenschaft at Freie Universität, Master’s Degree from the Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, and Robert Kron, Research Association at the Center for European Policy Analysis, 2/1/2010, “Counting the Costs of Insecurity in North Central Europe”, http://www.cepa.org/ced/view.aspx?record_id=219

America’s deprioritization of allies creates opportunities for revisionist powers. Such transition is recurrent in geopolitics; international relations are always characterized by uncertainty. Policy makers have to navigate a landscape that is often difficult to delineate, full of strategic actors whose purposes are often obscure and whose power is difficult to assess. Intentions are notoriously hard to divine, in part because rival states obfuscate them but in part because often the states themselves do not have a clear and consistent perception of what they want to achieve. Uncertainty arises also out of a more quantifiable source of knowledge, an assessment of hard power, which is imperfect and results in widely different estimates. It is sufficient to recall the challenges of assessing Soviet power throughout the Cold War. Moments characterized by alleged large shifts in relative power present particularly acute problems of assessing power and intentions, adding an additional layer of ambiguity and uncertainty. Rumors of change put in doubt the relatively well- known, or at least familiar, geopolitical situation. All parties involved are unsure about their position relative to the others, the extent of their political sway, and the match between their commitments and their power. The established great powers may have a crisis of confidence, while emboldened rising states are uncertain how far their influence extends as well as how solid and credible is the power reach of their weakening rival. Revisionist powers now openly but cautiously question what was the grudgingly accepted geopolitical status quo. Rising powers are thus curious but careful. They are interested in pushing the existing boundaries of their influence but do not know how far they can do so without meeting a firm opposition of the other power. In the current case, U.S. rivals— China, Russia, and Iran— appear keen to assert their influence and establish what they deem their rightful position in their respective regions and in the world but are also eager to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States. Uncertain about their own power relative to the United States, they test the hypothesis of a growing American economic and military fragility and decaying political reach. To figure out the new map of power, and possibly to redraw it at low cost, revisionist powers engage in probing. In this chapter we examine this behavior— the probing by revisionist powers. We define probing as a low- intensity and low- risk test aimed at gauging the opposing state’s power and will to maintain security and influence over a region. It is a set of actions that studiously avoids a direct military confrontation with the leading power by targeting the outer limits of its commitments and interests. There, along the outer rim of its influence, the hegemon is at the furthest of its commitments and power projection. The perception, or rather the suspicion, of its decline is most consequential along these frontiers of power because the revisionist state senses opportunities in its own neighborhood and searches for confirmation of the rival’s weakness. Probing is an opportunistic behavior. It occurs when the revisionist states detect a permissive international situation, namely, when they think that the existing great power is retreating. It is still a behavior that is characterized by self- doubt and uncertainty, although if unanswered it results in the confirmation of the belief in the rival’s decline and may lead to ever more assertive challenges to the international order and expansions of influence by the geopolitical challenger. Over the past few years, and with greater frequency and brazenness, regional powers opposed to the United States have been engaging in probing. Russia, Iran, and China in their respective regions have been working under the hypothesis that the United States is retreating, out of choice, fatigue, or weakness, or all three combined. The American retrenchment is more pronounced in the Middle East, with the ending of U.S. combat presence in Iraq and the drawdown in Afghanistan as well as the unwillingness to intervene in Syria, leaving a vacuum for Iranian influence. But there is an equally pervasive perception of American withdrawal or decline in the other two key regions, Europe and Asia. In Europe, the perception is that Washington is redirecting its strategic focus and resources toward Asia and has limited willpower to back its extended deterrent, giving Moscow a window of opportunity to redraw the map in Europe’s eastern “borderlands. ” And in Asia, a rising and confident China looks at a United States hobbled by financial crises, fiscal imbalances, and a decade- long military overstretch in the Middle East. The reasons are different, but the broad perception is similar: the revisionist states sense an opening left by a distracted and weakening United States. And they probe along the periphery of American influence, from Ukraine to the South China Sea through the Persian Gulf. ORIGINS OF PROBING BEHAVIOR Probing stems out of a tentative belief that the existing geopolitical order is amenable to change, and it seeks to confirm this suspicion. A perceived geopolitical change remains only that, perceived, until facts on the ground confirm it. An assessment of a state’s power is merely an estimate of how that state may fare in a clash with others. As such, it informs a set of expectations for the future, and it may or may not reflect reality. Often there is little agreement among powers as well as within those powers as to which assessment of power is correct.1 Today, for instance, questions about the continued resilience of American power abound both abroad and in the United States, and there are analysts on both sides of the argument.2 Regardless of where one stands on the issue of American relative decline or retrenchment, the mere existence of such a debate is a source of concern because it points to an absence of clarity on the geopolitical scene. The various strategic actors no longer know where they stand on the international pecking order and are confused as to how far their own influence can reach and what the responses of their rivals may be.3 These are periods of a tense peace but also of great uncertainty about the nature of the security environment. As a scholar put it, it is the “fog of peace” that makes strategic planning more difficult because it is unclear who the enemy is, how much power a potential rival may have, and where the boundaries of political influence are.4 As history indicates, often such an uncertain strategic environment degenerates into war, which is a “dispute about the measurement of power. ”5 The outcome of a war is the violent clarification of such confusion. It settles the dispute about the assessment of power. A victory or defeat in war, followed by changes in boundaries, military bases, or political affiliations of governments, is one way to prove or disprove a perceived alteration in relative power. As British historian A.J.P. Taylor observed, the “test of a Great Power is . . . the test of strength for war. ”6 After its defeat in the 1853– 1856 Crimean War, Russia was clearly militarily inferior to European states (even though the victorious powers, Britain, France, Turkey, and later Austria, also encountered serious difficulties in projecting power to the Black Sea theater) and consciously chose to retreat, reform, and rebuild its foundations of power, known as a policy of recueillement, in order to maintain its status as a European great power.7 There is no clearer confirmation of a state’s decline than a loss in a direct confrontation with a rising power; there is equally no better proof that the perception of relative decline was incorrect when the aspirant revisionist state is soundly defeated. In the immediate aftermath of a war it is therefore easier to assess one’s own power relative to that of the other players. War lifts the “fog of peace. ” But war is rarely pursued simply to clarify one’s own uncertain standing relative to the other strategic actors. To engage in war, the ultimate test of power, is exceedingly dangerous, and no leader wants to enter into a violent conflict simply as a way of assessing the power of its own state relative to the target. Wars are realms of luck and un knowns as much as of more calculable kinetic clashes, and consequently the outcomes do not always align with the expectations preceding them.8 In fact, the losing party in a conflict has often entered that war having overestimated its own capability relative to the rival. Many in Europe, for instance, expected in summer 1914 to be “home for Christmas, ” only to remain in the bloody trenches for several years. Given this inherent uncertainty, the risk of being proven wrong for both the perceived rising and declining powers is high, and great powers in history seem to stumble into wars rather than consciously pursue them as tests of strength. The risks of war are incalculable and thus extremely high. A less risky way of assessing a changing equilibrium of power is through probing. This is a form of strategic behavior meant to test existing perceptions of power relations, seeking at the same time to draw the presumably new boundaries of influence. The rising or revisionist state, in particular, is strongly motivated to test the will of its seemingly declining rival power. It has the aspiration, mitigated by the fear of the rival great power, to alter the existing geopolitical map. Such states, unhappy with the existing international order, which they perceive perhaps as imposed on them and certainly as increasingly not reflective of their own rising aspirations and power, have the most to gain from probing. If this behavior confirms the perception that the existing great power is on the wane and that the map drawn by it is no longer supported by its strength and will, the revisionist state may be able to reassert lost influence over its neighborhood and revise a previous settlement. At the same time, such a state has also a strong incentive to avoid a direct clash with its main antagonist lest the perception of its relative weakening turns out not to match reality. A strategy of direct confrontation is risky because its success is predicated on the relative weakness of the targeted power, the existing hegemon, and this is exactly what is unknown. If the probing power becomes convinced that its hypothesis of its own superiority (and of the relative decline of the rival) is true, then a direct clash may occur. But until that confirmation, a safer, less risky course of action is to engage in a probing behavior, akin to testing the water before jumping in. Probes target the frontier of the rival power’s influence, where its interests are less pronounced, its power is at its farthest projection, and its political clout at its weakest. At these outer edges the response of the great power is expected to be most restrained, while the gains of the probing state are most likely to occur. The purpose of probing, therefore, is to gauge the resolve of the targeted powers. We will return to this later, but here it is important to note that a probing action is also a way of showing the renewed or freshly acquired capabilities and aspirations that otherwise would remain latent and without tangible effects. One cannot revise an established order by keeping one’s own intentions and capabilities hidden. Showing a new military platform, often in a carefully choreographed event, is one way of signaling growing power. The 1907– 1909 voyage of the American “Great White Fleet, ” meant to showcase the emergent global naval strength of the United States, was one such episode. The round- the- globe cruise was not targeted at a specific power and did not aim to extend American influence over a particular state or region. Rather, it was a broad assertion of American capabilities and global reach, and the other powers, Great Britain in particular, certainly received it as a sign that the United States was a power to be reckoned with. But probing is more than showing off. It is not simply an action of strutting on the world stage with newly acquired military gadgets and political confidence but a precisely targeted action with clear objectives. Through probing, a revisionist state aims at changing the existing geopolitical order where it thinks it can, namely, at the farthest points of the ruling great power’s influence. Probing, therefore, is not just mere signaling of displeasure with the rules of the international order and the map of power; it aims to revise the order gradually and carefully, starting from the outer layers of the rival great power’s influence. FEATURES OF PROBING The purpose of probing is threefold. First, a probing state aims to check whether the rumors of its rival’s weakening are true. A probe is a test, meant to elicit a response from the targeted power. Second, the revisionist state that engages in probing behavior wants to avoid a direct military clash with the existing great power. The risks of being wrong about the rival’s resolve and capability are simply too big. Third, the state’s objective is to achieve, if possible, low- cost revision of the existing regional order. These purposes can be seen in the features that characterize a probe and distinguish it from other types of behavior, ranging from fullout aggression to commercial pressures and diplomatic démarches. First, probes are low intensity, vigilantly avoiding a direct war with the main rival power. They are below the horizon of direct military confrontation. The revisionist state has no interest in starting an allout military conflict with the rival great power, perhaps declining but still more than a match. The level of violence used, therefore, is low, and probes are limited projections of power in areas of less pronounced interest to the rival. A probing power engages in a lot of selfrestraint; it intentionally elects to keep the use of force at a minimum. It can but chooses not to escalate. A probe is a calculated gamble, not a foolish thrashing around. The desire to avoid a war with the existing hegemon often leads the revisionist to project power under cover of civilian or paramilitary forces, part of a larger trend of “civilianization” of conflict.9 By using unmarked units to harass a U.S. protégé, a state is able to de ny authorship of provocative actions and thereby avoid a more violent and direct war while at the same time chipping away at the rival’s influence and wealth. The possibility of denying that an aggression has occurred drives costs of revisionism lower. For instance, the sixteenth- century privateer Sir Francis Drake acted on behalf of Queen Elizabeth I, raiding Spanish shipping but never in an official capacity. The queen went so far as to tell a Spanish ambassador that “Drake was a private adventurer, and that she had nothing to object to his alleged execution. ” She was careful in not provoking Spain too much but eager to “singe the King of Spain’s beard. ”10 A similar approach can be seen around the world today. The initial Russian push into Crimea in 2014 was done anonymously with unmarked special forces, dubbed by Ukrainians as the “little green men, ” a clear example of a long- standing Russian practice of tactical deception and disguise (maksirovka).11 It was an indication that Moscow was unsure whether Ukrainian forces would react, and, in the event of a determined opposition, it maintained the option of either escalating with larger conventional forces or halting operations and denying. Moscow seemed to be more careful in masking the identity of its forces in eastern Ukraine, where the local opposition was more assertive and the Western displeasure with Russian aggression more pronounced. The greater the risk of a strong response from the actors targeted, the more carefully tailored, dissimulated, and low- intensity is the probe. The use of unmarked troops and paramilitary forces allows Russia to claim that no aggression has occurred, and thus no military response from Ukraine or from the West is warranted. China has been testing the limits of the influence of the United States and its allies in the South China Sea using an array of civilianlooking vessels. Its fishing fleet, combined with a fishery- enforcement fleet, is integrated into its military institutions and plays an active role in expanding China’s maritime reach. As Lyle Goldstein observes, this is part of a “strategy of ‘defeating harshness with kindness’ (yi rou ke gang)” whereby China deploys “unarmed fishing vessels or fisheries enforcement vessels to confront foreign vessels operating in its EEZ and claimed waters. ”12 This low- intensity push tests the fron tier of American influence in a way that makes a U.S. response difficult.13 A foray by a Chinese naval vessel into contested waters can be countered with the might of the United States and its ally’s navy; a probe by fishing vessels manned by Chinese fishermen does not warrant the involvement of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. This is risky behavior, but it also indicates a desire by China to avoid a war with the other regional powers as well as with the United States.14 If it is openly a military attack, a probe is conducted with a strong and perhaps warranted belief that the rival power will not intervene because it is distracted elsewhere and because it deems the targeted region to be of little immediate interest. This was the case of the Russian war with Georgia in 2008, when Moscow felt emboldened by NATO ambivalence to extending its membership process to Tbilisi and by the American strategic distraction by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (where a small Georgian contingent was deployed). The Russian gamble was based on the expectation of no meaningful Western, and American in particular, response. The objective was to chip away at the unwelcome Western influence in Russia’s neighborhood but without spurring an equally unwelcome Western military reply— to “singe America’s beard, ” as it were. Second, a revisionist state engages in probing because it sees it as a low- risk but high- reward behavior. The low risk stems in part from the first feature, the carefully tailored level of aggressiveness that is expected not to elicit a full- out military response by the rival. It is also related to the third feature, explained below, namely, the fact that the immediate target of probing is geographically and political peripheral to the interests of the rival great power, and consequently contributes to the low likelihood of a forceful military response. But on top of being pursued as a low- risk action, a probe can yield high strategic rewards. Most often the revisionist power seems to direct probing behavior to its immediate vicinity, hoping to expand its influence over neighboring and thus more controllable regions.15 It is there that it has the greatest chances of extending its own political shadow successfully. Probes are rarely long- distance projections of power because incursions deep into the rival’s sphere of influence are more liable to be met with more assertive responses as well as being less likely to establish durable control by the probing state. The farther the revisionist state engages in probing behavior, the more high risk and low reward it is, and vice versa. Hence the more likely locations for probing behavior are in the near neighborhood of the revisionist power. Furthermore, probes focus on strategically important regions, either resource rich or located along lines of communication, or both. Elizabethan England, for example, conducted raiding probes of Spain’s vulnerable transatlantic arteries bringing gold from the New World— not its stronger positions in the Mediterranean. Imperial Germany’s probes of the Anglo- French alliance targeted Morocco, located near the strategically important choke point of Gibraltar but beyond easy reach of the main British fleet. Today China’s probes of U.S. allies in Asia often target oil and gas fields in the South China Sea. In all these cases, since the goal of probing is to test the power and commitment of a rival state, it has to be directed at regions where the rival’s influence is present but not preponderant. It is unlikely that regions of no geostrategic value or with few resources have much of a presence of the rival great power, and as such they are not prime material for probing. A state may still have imperial aspirations in such regions, but not every extension of power is a probe. Probing is not simply grabbing new areas of influence but first and foremost to test the will of the rival. There may be, of course, the bonus that if the probe is successful, it may result in the addition of strategically important regions. The third feature of probing is that it is peripheral or indirect. The target of the probe is the periphery or the frontier of the tested power where the rival’s presence is at its farthest reach, its interests are less pronounced, and thus its response is expected to be muted. Fearful of a militarily assertive response, the state that is probing is careful not to target areas that are clearly considered of primary and existential interests, such as the rival’s homeland or its immediate neighbors. Hence the visits of Russian or Iranian naval vessels to Venezuelan ports are less a probe per se than an act of grandstanding, since all sides know that the United States could quickly bring overwhelming force to bear in the event of a crisis. These are temporary publicity stunts rather than a calculated attempt to test the hegemon’s commitment to maintaining the status quo. Probes test for perceived weaknesses, not strengths, and it is on the outer boundaries of the existing great power that its influence is likely to appear the most fragile. The revisionist power is interested in probing the power and influence of its rival in places where that influence is at its weakest, overstretched, and uncertain. During the Peloponnesian War the Spartan general Brasidas adopted such a peripheral strategy, but only a decade into the conflict. The initial Spartan approach of annual invasion of Attica, Athens’s immediate neighborhood, failed to inflict sufficient damage to end the war. It was only with Brasidas, sent north with a small force of helots (minimizing thus the risk to Spartan manpower), that Sparta changed its strategy to one similar to probing, by persuading or forcing distant Athenian allies in Thrace to switch sides. And many did reconsider their allegiance to Athens, because, as Thucydides observes, there did not seem to be much risk given the distance from Athens and their belief that this empire was on the wane.16 Striking the rival’s periphery, and its allies, not only was cheaper than assaulting it directly but also forced it to devote a lot of resources to reasserting the lost influence. Global powers in particular have a “periphery or frontier problem” that invites probing. A lengthy frontier, distant from the homeland and thus from key logistical bases, is difficult to protect. The sheer amount of power needed to outfit the distant outposts, combined with the uncertainty as to the location and timing of potential attacks, makes it impossible to have an impermeable frontier. When a power assesses threats, the key questions of “where, when, and by whom” are directly related to the length of the imperial frontier. A regional power has well- delimited borders and a clear idea of who the rival is. For instance, from the final decade of the nineteenth century on, Germany was burdened with the possibility of a two- front war, with France on one side and Russia on the other; a serious problem of military planning caused by poor diplomacy but not a source of strategic confusion. For a global power, it is that strategic clarity that is missing, resulting in the need to prepare for multiple contingencies and ultimately to stretch resources in several theaters of potential action.17 While imperial Germany could concentrate on its two- front problem, Great Britain at the turn of the twentieth century had to consider threats from Russia (in Central Asia, pushing toward India), Japan (in the Asian littoral sphere), France (in Africa as well as the Mediterranean), and Germany (in Europe and the North Sea in particular). Through deft diplomacy, it managed to neutralize the first three, allowing it to focus on the German naval threat, thereby limiting its “frontier problem. ” In practice, probing the periphery of a rival’s great power often translates into testing the strength of its alliances. Most great powers, or empires, expand their influence in informal ways, through political arrangements with local elites and formal alliances.18 The security of these great powers, in particular of ones with global reach, therefore resides not only in the safety of their borders but in their ability to hold rivals at a distance and thwart their challenges to faraway interests. They do so only in part through their own forces and rely heavily on the presence of allies that provide additional military strength and local deterrence (see chapter 5). Allies are at the periphery of influence and strength of great powers, and it is there that the powers’ commitment and influence are at their weakest. It is clear that a state will respond to an encroachment on its territorial possessions or to an attack against its forward deployed forces. It is less certain, however, that a state will respond in the same strong fashion to similar actions directed against its allies and their interests. The security guarantee extended to them, the foundation of the alliance, is a promissory note that carries a high degree of uncertainty. Placing bases with troops on the territory of an ally is a time- tested way of diminishing this uncertainty. As Thomas Schelling put it, the role of U.S. troops in South Korea was simply to die, buttressing the American security guarantee to its ally.19 The loss of American soldiers to an initial attack by the enemy would, so the argument goes, create powerful pressures for Washington to respond. French general Ferdinand Foch, when asked before World War I how many British troops would be needed for the security of France, replied, “One single private soldier . . . and we would take good care that he was killed. ”20 Probes by the revisionist power are not attacks against these bases and forces that underwrite the credibility of the extended deterrent. Rather, they target areas that may be of great importance to the ally but not necessarily to the security patron. That is the periphery of the periphery, so to speak, the tip of the great power’s commitment. The United States has a particularly pronounced “periphery” problem. There are few direct threats to the continental United States, short of a large- scale assault with weapons of mass destruction or the tragic yet relatively small and isolated terrorist attack. While the absence of a contiguous threat is a geopolitical blessing, it also means that most of the menaces to U.S. interests and security are outside of the North American continent. Hence, in the competitive international environment, “the strategic position of the United States rests ultimately on its ability to project power over great distances. ”21 In practice this entails managing alliances that maintain stability and keep U.S. rivals on the defensive in key regions of the world, in particular along an arc from Europe to East Asia through the Middle East. And historically this has been, and continues to be, achieved by extending U.S. deterrence beyond the North American continent to the countries, some allied by treaty and some neutral. Such an extended deterrence is a “ ‘three- nation problem’ involving an aggressor nation, the United States, and some smaller nation which is the object of the aggressor’s designs and which Washington seeks to protect. ”22 Probing by an “aggressor nation” aims to test U.S. commitment to these “smaller nations, ” which constitute the periphery of American interests and power. In the most successful case, probing could achieve a dual purpose: first, it tests the level and credibility of the commitment of the distant security patron, and second, it can weaken the rival alliance. It does so by targeting the foundation of the alliance, the belief that the alliance is beneficial to both parties and that it is effective. As Michael Mandelbaum has observed, alliances need to manage two concurrent fears: one of entrapment, namely, of being dragged into undesirable wars of limited significance and local interest, and one of abandonment, the apprehension of often the weaker ally of be ing abandoned by its security provider when the need comes. 23 Probing aims to increase the rival’s fear of entrapment while at the same time stoking worries of abandonment among its weaker and more dependent partners. By harassing the local interests of the rival’s peripheral allies, the revisionist power wants to drive up the risk of a local war, perceived by the rival as a distraction and a potential drain of resources. At the same time, it wants to indicate to the smaller allies that they may not rely on their security provider to defend their local, narrow interest, and that they may be abandoned. The goal is to drive a wedge in the opposing alliance by leveraging the fundamental dilemma of alliances— the fears of entrapment and abandonment. This is where probing becomes more than a simple test of the rival’s strength. By targeting the outer edges of the existing hegemon, and thus harassing its alliance system, the revisionist is engaging in a much more significant endeavor. The contest for regional, or global, control is in the end a contest for allies. A.J.P. Taylor observed that when Germany “was bidding for the domination of Europe” in the decade before the outbreak of World War I, “her chosen method was to isolate the independent Powers one from another. ”24 As we point out in chapter 5, allies are, among other things, an extension of the distant patron’s power. Were they to peel away from the side of their security guarantor— or vice versa, were the security guarantor to decide that the risk of continued support of a distant ally pressured by a regional revisionist power is too big— it would in either case signify a retrenchment of power for that offshore patron. The loss of allies is both a confirmation of the waning sway of that rival great power as well as a further reduction in its reach. To be alone in inter national relations is to be vulnerable, inviting further aggressive behavior from the rival. Walter Lippmann observed in 1943, “No one knew, not Hitler, not Stalin, not Chamberlain or Daladier, the relative strength of the Axis and of the opposing combination. Only when Hitler succeeded at Munich in separating the Franco- British allies from Russia, had he so altered the balance of power in his favor that a war for the conquest of Europe was from his point of view a good risk. ”25 War is an extension of successful probing. The benefits of targeting allies of a rival, rather than the rival itself, are well recognized in history. The astute observer of history and politics Niccolò Machiavelli noted in his Discourses that attacking a rival’s ally is always a preferred option: “For I know especially that if I assault his friend, either he will resent it and I will have my intention of making war with him, or by not resenting it he will uncover his weakness or faithlessness in not defending a client of his. Both the one and the other of these two things are able to take away his reputation and to make my plans easier . ”26 In the strategic behavior we describe, the probing power is not interested in “making war” with the rival, and therefore a probe is not a full- out attack on a rival’s ally or supported state. The risks of activating the security guarantees or assurances that ought to be at the foundation of that alliance are too big. But it is an offensive act of sorts, which threatens the interests of the rival’s ally. The security patron will either respond, thereby disproving the perception of its weakness, or will not, “taking away his reputation” and undermining its alliance. China has been particularly astute in picking geographic objectives that are important to U.S. allies but only indirectly important to the United States, such as the shoals and reefs around the Spratly and Paracel Islands. By ratcheting up the pressure in these areas, China causes the targeted states to intensify their demands for American assurance while diminishing U.S. willingness to back allies over seemingly petty issues that could lead to a larger conflict. Americans do not want to risk their lives for insignificant and distant rocks. Russia achieves a similar effect by reigniting NATO’s eastern frontier through its attack on Ukraine and a series of threats against exposed NATO members around the Baltic Sea. Those are areas that until recently have not been prominent on the U.S. strategic radar screen but are naturally vital to those smaller states inhabiting the region, which in turn are driven to make increasingly vocal requests for security reassurances from Washington. As in the case of the South China Sea, however, the local and limited nature of the rival’s probes generates in Washington as much a perception of threat as fear of a larger conflict, raising doubts about the benefits of extending security guarantees to these allies and partners. In the end, these peripheral probes pursued by U.S. rivals can create a wedge between Washington and its regional friends and allies. These three features— low intensity, low risk but high reward, peripheral— point also to the timing of the probing behavior. Probing is a strategic behavior that arises out of an uncertain assessment of power relations. It is the product of doubt, not confidence, in the resilience of the existing international order. As such it arises early on in the transition of power, when perceptions of rise and decline are not firm. The vagueness of the security environment creates among revisionist powers the perception of opportunities that a probing behavior aims to test. Hence probing should occur with less frequency in the immediate aftermath of a war, when, as we point out, an assessment of relative power carries the weight of the ultimate test, war. A defeated power may have all the incentives to upset the existing order, but unless it has no ability to evaluate its clearly weakened position, it has no capacity to do so. After a defeat probing may be tempting but is unfeasible. Such states are more likely to pursue a policy of recueillement (introspection, a moment of pause and strengthening), characterized by internal reforms, modernization, and very limited foreign engagements mostly aimed at dividing the opposing alliance.27 When, however, the perceived weakening of the founding power puts in doubt the existing international settlement, the desire to revise it is matched by the possibility of doing so. The perception of American weakening, or at least retrenchment, therefore opens up a window of opportunity for those powers that aspire to expand their own influence and resent the Western order and its institutions. THE AUDIENCES OF PROBING Another useful way of looking at the strategic behavior of probing is by considering the audiences involved. As we argued, a revisionist power pursues probing behavior to check whether new boundaries of influence are feasible given the perceived weakening of the rival. The main purpose is therefore to elicit a response from the targeted audiences. That response, or lack thereof, supplies information necessary to draw the new outline of the geopolitical map. Probing is first and foremost a violent and risky didactic exercise. The most direct audience is the immediate target of the probing behavior, usually an ally, or an aspirant to be an ally, of the rival great power. Probing here seeks to gauge the willingness and capacity of the targeted state to withstand pressure, and ultimately it aims to push that state to sever itself from its security patron. As we examine in chapter 4, vulnerable frontier allies of a great power actively consider alternative strategic options, especially when they perceive themselves to be under threat from a neighboring revisionist pow er and to have a fraying security guarantee from a distant patron. A probe is meant to ratchet up the threat perception while also attempting to establish a sense of strategic isolation and separation from the security provider. Hence as important as, if not more important than, the first audience is the second one: the distant but more powerful ally and security provider. Probing tests indirectly the regional staying power of the rival hegemon. While carefully avoiding direct confrontation, the revisionist power wants to assess the commitment of the opposing great power to its ally in the near neighborhood. What the revisionist is testing, therefore, is not the rival’s resolve to oppose other great powers, but the rival’s reliability to its own allies.28 Resolve is the willingness to risk war to achieve one’s own objectives: the more diffuse and distant the threatened interests, the less the resolve. Given that the target of probes is peripheral and not the rival’s homeland or troops and bases, the resolve is assumed to be small. Direct war between the revisionist probing state and the rival great power is unlike ly to erupt as a result. Moreover, the probing state is not interested in finding out whether the rival has the will to fight a direct war: the stakes would be simply too high and the outcome too uncertain. A direct challenge would test the resolve of the rival. Poking around the periphery, therefore, is a poor test of the rival’s willingness to fight a war. History seems to confirm this. For instance, as scholars have pointed out, Soviet leaders did not think that U.S. responses to peripheral threats (e.g., in the Third World) could serve as indicators of future American behavior when its core interests (NATO allies, Japan, or the U.S. homeland) were threatened.29 Whether the United States responded militarily or not to a Soviet foray in Angola or Ethiopia could not be easily translated into expectations of future American behavior in Europe. But it does affect the perception of whether the United States wants to fight in other peripheral areas. “If Soviet leaders were to gain the impression that the United States is firmly set upon a course of neo- isolationism and the absolute avoidance of intervention in local wars, they might become dangerously adventurous in the Middle East and elsewhere. ”30 Probing, however, tests the reliability of the rival great power— that is, its willingness to protect and stand by its ally or aspiring allies. The immediate target is not a test of the rival’s general credibility but only of its commitment to the security ties to the state. Probing wants to elicit a response (or lack thereof) from the rival great power regarding the seriousness of its commitment to the directly targeted state. To be perceived as a reliable ally means to instill the belief that promised security guarantees will hold even in cases of heightened tensions and, in final analysis, of conflict. Consequently a perception of low reliability results in the belief that the alliance is fragile and that it may be in the small state’s interest to seek accommodation with the nearby revisionist power. As delineated above, probes are care fully tailored to split the distant security patron from its regional allies, showing it to be unreliable. Even if it achieves nothing else, probing can introduce doubts about the security guarantees, forcing the security patron to renew its promises. The less reliable the security patron is perceived by its allies, the more insistent are their demands for continued security guarantees. Probing thus imposes an immediate cost on the rival great power by reactivating a frontier region that until then was dormant and by pressing the rival to expend more resources and political capital to reassert its security guarantees. Finally, the third audience is composed of the geopolitical onlookers, states that are watching the behavior and derive their own conclusions about the resilience of the existing great power. The strategic interaction spurred by a probe does not directly affect them, but they perceive it as a regionally circumscribed development with potentially more global repercussions. That is, a probe is limited to a specific region but has radiating effects as others also see it for what it really is: a test of the resilience and reliability of the great power that may be analogous in other regions. Recent academic literature puts in doubt the idea that reputation for commitment is interdependent. Thomas Schelling, among others, articulated that idea in his classic work from 1966 where he argued that U.S. reputation was global, and a loss in one region would have negative impact in other areas. Reputation was not compartmentalized in different regions, in large measure because the rival, the Soviet Union, was one and the same across the world map. Hence “we tell the Soviets that we have to react here because, if we did not, they would not believe us when we say that we will react there. ”31 Academics have relentlessly questioned this argument, resulting in copious writings asserting that reputation is not interdependent and, according to some, does not even matter.32 Reputation is merely a cult and does not exist in international relations.33 Policy makers, however, disagree and continue to speak of reputation for resolve and reliability as something that not only matters and requires constant work but also is interdependent. They prefer to rely on time- tested authors, from Thucydides to Machiavelli, who consider reputation as indispensable to political power.34 In brief, there is a deep gap between academics and policy makers on the issue of reputation. By observing recent events in the three frontier regions— Central Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia— we think that the truth is closer to Schelling’s view. It is clear that the effects of probing behavior do not remain confined to the immediate actors involved (the probing power, the direct target— usually a rival’s ally— and the rival great power). Other actors in the region are keenly aware of the revisionist state’s probing and of the responses of the United States. For instance, other states, from the Baltics to Poland and Ukraine, observed Russia’s war against Georgia in 2008 and its invasion of Crimea in 2014 with great trepidation.35 These wars were symptoms of a more assertive Russia; a source of worry in themselves. But they were also meant to elicit an answer from the United States. Any sign of American hesitation to respond quickly and firmly to Russian small wars in the two states was perceived as affecting directly these other states, not directly involved in the probing event. America’s reputation for reliability, in other words, was at stake, even though Georgia and Ukraine were not NATO members but only aspiring to closer security and political relations with the United States and the EU. Similarly, Pacific nations from Japan to Australia follow with great attention China’s probing behavior in the South China Sea that puts pressure on Vietnam, the Philippines, and Taiwan. They too seek to figure out whether the United States has the will to remain as a security provider in this region and to the “global commons” in general. How the United States responds to a probe in a particular region therefore affects its regional image. The question is whether there is also a wider, global audience to regional probes. Do Middle Eastern leaders watch American responses to Russia’s probing in Eastern Europe? Do Kremlin elites draw lessons from U.S. actions along the “first chain of islands” in East Asia? Or, do Chinese neo- Mahanian leaders think the United States is on the wane if it accommodates Putin’s imperial fantasies? According to the latest academic literature, the answer should be negative: how the United States is perceived to be doing in one region does not translate into a similar perception elsewhere. The practical implication of such a view is that the United States should not have fought in Vietnam to prove that it would stand its ground in Europe; similarly, it ought not to oppose Putin around the Black Sea basin simply to demonstrate that it will oppose China in the South China Sea. But we are not so confident that there are no connections between regional demonstrations of will and power. It is at least plausible, and perhaps safer, to argue that there are wider, global effects of probing. First, the world is indeed global, and regions are not hermetically separated from each other. As Nicholas Spykman observed, “Global war, as well as global peace, means that all fronts and all areas are interrelated. No matter how remote they are from each other, success or failure in one will have an immediate and determining effect on the others. It is necessary, therefore, to see the world as a whole and to weigh the measures taken to achieve victory in the light of conditions in all theaters. ”36 Leaders watch and learn from other regions, more than previously in history when conflicts were limited by technology and geographic knowledge to a contiguous region. Because of their domestic opacity, it is difficult to prove that America’s rivals learn from U.S. behavior in other regions, but the question whether they do so needs to be asked. Chinese military officials, for example, have commented publicly on lessons for China from the U.S. handling of the war in Ukraine.37 As one analyst noted, “It might be impossible to determine definitively whether the Ukraine Crisis has impacted China’s risk calculus in hotspots such as the South and East China Sea, but the evidence . . . certainly suggests that such eastern reverberations are quite plausible. ”38 At a minimum we have to recognize that some cross- regional analyses do occur, and it is safer to assume that the U.S. reputation does not stay limited to a region. Second, the much stronger effect of probing appears to be on U.S. allies and friends, the key geopolitical spectators. They watch how the United States treats other allies and form an opinion regarding American reliability. The former director of Saudi intelligence summed up the view of many officials from U.S. allied states in the Persian Gulf when he said in reaction to the Russian seizure of Crimea, “While the wolf is eating the sheep, there is no shepherd to come to the rescue. ”39 Israel was interested in the war in Georgia; Japanese analysts followed the Obama administration’s decision to cancel the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program in Central Europe; and Polish experts watch U.S. moves in East Asia.40 The probing by revisionist states is first and foremost an attempt to test the strength of their rival’s commitment to its allies and friends. In sum, probing behavior by revisionist states targets these specific audiences in order to elicit responses from them. The goal is to figure out whether and how to draw the new map of power. And it puts the burden on the targeted audiences: their responses determine whether the probe is successful. EVALUATION OF PROBING: SUCCESS OR FAILURE From the perspective of the revisionist power that engages in probing, whether a probe has achieved its objectives determines its success or failure. The minimum objective of the probing state is to measure the rival’s staying power in its neighboring region, an objective that is achieved whether the targeted powers respond or not, but it is difficult to interpret. The targeted rival may be tempted to ignore the probe not out of a sense of its own weakness but in the belief that ignoring the test will send a signal of strategic insouciance from its pedestal of power. Also, because of the local and limited nature of a probe, directly involving only the regional actors, it is tempting for the distant security provider to leave the response to its allies and friends. A direct and strong intervention by the offshore patron would escalate the interaction, raising the chances of a larger war, an outcome that neither party desires. But the shrewdness of a probing strategy is that it puts the targeted rival power in the position of having either to escalate the tensions in order to respond or to choose a less confrontational approach but one that risks weakening its alliances. The response to the probe, not the probe itself, is perceived as a potential cause of war. This creates strong disincentives for the tested great power to react by opposing the revisionist state’s probe in a direct and forceful way, or to respond at all. For instance, in the case of China’s probing actions in the South China Sea, the Obama administration’s approach seems to have been to accommodate Beijing, acknowledging a decline in U.S. naval capabilities and welcoming a greater Chinese role in providing security to the global commons.41 Similarly, after Russia’s takeover of Crimea, Washington’s first response was to turn the episode into a strictly regional affair. As President Obama put it in February 2014, “Any violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity would be deeply destabilizing, which is not in the interest of Ukraine, Russia, or Europe, ” tellingly not including the United States in the list of the affected parties.42 The problem is that the temptation of the existing great power to either ignore or regionalize the tension stemming from the revisionist state’s probes— an attempt to de- escalate the strategic interaction— also constitutes a response. It may, however, be one that serves for the revisionist power as a confirmation of its initial suspicion that the rival’s commitment to the region was on the wane. An unanswered— ignored or regionalized— probe is an indication that the existing map of power is open to revisions. Another way to put this is that a probe is a question of sorts: does the existing hegemon have the will and capacity to oppose the revisionist power? An attempt to dismiss the question or to let allies respond to it is a tacit admission by the tested great power that its interest in maintaining a strong foothold and influence in the region is in decline. Silence in response to a probe is telling. Probing, therefore, always elicits some sort of answer, and in this narrow sense it is a success. The purpose of a probe is also to attain a secondary, albeit crucial, goal of beginning to redraw the map of influence without generating counterbalancing pressures from the tested great power and its allies. The most successful probe would be one that pushes the targeted small states and other regional spectators closer to the revisionist power (or at least convinces them to distance themselves from their existing security patron, the rival great power) while at the same time convincing the rival great power that it is too costly to maintain its political influence and provide security in the region. Hence the probe needs to be evaluated on what it achieves in the three audiences: the directly targeted neighboring small state, the distant security patron, and the geopolitical onlookers (in particular other states in the region). The success or failure of a revisionist state’s probe depends on the actions by these three groups, and, arguably, it can attain partial success by achieving a revision of the status quo in one audience but not the other. For instance, a probe can succeed in extending the revisionist power’s influence over the immediate target, the ally or would- be ally of the rival, but at the same time it may generate more vigorous efforts by regional onlookers to counterbalance it through a variety of strategies, ranging from military modernization to tighter defense cooperation with the distant security patron. This seems to be the case for Russia’s takeover of Crimea. Moscow quickly conquered Crimea and destabilized Ukraine’s easternmost oblast, successfully demonstrating its ability and willingness to use force to achieve limited territorial adjustments. While Kiev maintains its political independence, it has also been shown to be weak and unable to oppose Russian pressures. The quasi– civil war in the eastern regions and Russia’s conquest of Crimea make Ukraine an unlikely candidate for a closer relationship with the EU and NATO, even if Ukrainian political elites and public opinion may continue to be in favor of it. Russia’s probe, in the form of its intervention in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, has thus been successful in neutering the westward drift of Kiev. The EU, and in particular states such as France and Germany, have now an even smaller desire to bring Ukraine closer, as it is deemed too dangerous and risky; Ukraine is not worth losing business deals with Russia, not to mention starting a war with Russia. The Ukraine War has also damaged American credibility in the region. Washington after all had given assurances (not “guarantees, ” which are reserved for NATO members) to the Ukrainian government in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. This is undoubtedly a Russian success. But there are also other consequences of Russia’s probing, unintended and unwelcome by Moscow. Some states in the Central European region, in particular Poland and the Baltic states, have awakened from the geopolitical vacation of the past two decades. The 1990s and the 2000s were characterized by a widespread sense that threats to the territorial security of the region were minimal, and most of the strategic focus was on economic cooperation with the EU and on keeping in the good graces of the United States through participation in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is over, at least in part. While strengthening the EU continues to be a priority in Central European capitals, there is simply no more interest in “out- of- area” operations, which drain resources and time from territorial defense. From this perspective, Russian probes have altered the geostrategic outlook of some Central European states. The eastern frontier is what really matters to them now, as their threat assessment has changed. Russia, in other words, has reached an upper threshold in its probes, creating a backlash among some of the states in the region, which are pursuing diplomatic counterbalancing and defense modernization. They are also calling for more visible and permanent NATO (and in particular, U.S.) security presence on their territories to shore up the extended deterrent against Russia. It appears therefore that Russia is less successful than the other revisionist power, China. Moscow is less subtle in its probes, choosing dramatic military interventions (Georgia and Crimea) that generate growing fear and opposition among some European states as well as the United States. In part Moscow’s more aggressive behavior is a result of a Russian assessment of the weakness and divisions of the West. But in part the seeming Russian rush to restore influence over its “near neighborhood” is due to internal demographic, economic, and political problems. The growing weakness of Russia, a great power more by courtesy and by nuclear weapons than by economic and political strength, gives little time to Putin to shore up his country’s position facing China’s rapid economic growth and Europe’s political appeal. It is a short- term approach of large probes, and it may be successful only by extending influence over its most immediate nearby target.43 China, on the other hand, may have a different time frame, allowing it to probe in a much more indirect and less violent way, though this could change in the months ahead. It is therefore more careful and guarded, pursuing a long- term strategy of small probes over, quite literally, small rocks in the South China Sea. The U.S. “pivot” or “rebalancing” to Asia makes American presence and resolve more pronounced, increasing the doubt of a U.S. retrenchment and thus, from China’s perspective, the need to be cautious in testing the limits of American influence and commitment. Moreover, the counterbalancing efforts of regional onlookers, from Japan to the Philippines and Vietnam, are increasing in intensity, in both the rhetoric used and the arms buildup. Similarly, unlike Russia in Crimea, Beijing has not succeeded in extending its direct control over a large piece of real estate. But in the end it may be more successful, because it is establishing a gradual change in the map of power, visible only after a decade- long period. Through its probes, China is pursuing a classic example of “salami tactics. ” As Thomas Schelling describes them, “If there is no sharp qualitative division between a minor transgression and a major affront, but a continuous gradation of activity, one can begin his intrusion on a scale too small to provoke a reaction, and increase it by imperceptible degrees, never quite presenting a sud den, dramatic challenge that would invoke the committed response. ”44 Many small probes into areas of contested influence do not individually invite a strong response, but they erode steadily the perception and in the end the reality of the opponent’s influence. Moreover, a continuing sequence of gradual probes signals the seriousness of the revisionist’s intent to alter the status quo. In the mind of the hegemon, the steady drumbeat of low- intensity and peripheral incidents creates the impression that the revisionist both has special claims for and may someday be willing to fight over a particular piece of real estate. These claims are often backed up by legal, historical, or ethnic justifications and a creeping physical presence— in Ukraine, Russian forces and equipment; in the South China Sea, artificially created reefs. Over time, this places the onus of a response on the shoulders of the hegemon and its allies in the region for why the status quo should be maintained. For a weary hegemon like the United States today, probes communicate that the act of supporting the regional status quo is no longer cost free but will require a level of exertion that was not needed in the past, inevitably leading to questions of whether such effort and resulting escalation are worthwhile. Nonetheless, it is certainly possible to see failed instances of probing, which achieve the opposite of the revisionist power’s intentions. The historic scorecard of probing states is mixed. A clear failure of probing would be if the targeted regional states and offshore security patron responded strongly, tightening their alliance and even initiating a direct war. This is an unintended consequence of a probe and can take several forms, from a tightening of alliances countering the revisionist power to increased military contingency planning and rearming. In the worst- case scenario, it results in a combination of actions that counterbalance the revisionist state more effectively and forcefully than before the probing behavior started. The revisionist state did not want nor expect this response before engaging in probing. It amounts to a disconfirmation of the initial hypothesis that the rival great power is in decline and retreat, and in the end it worsens the strategic position of the probing state. The biggest loser may thus be the probing power, which puts in motion a series of strategic interactions that undermine its own strength. This was the case of Germany in the early twentieth century. Kaiser Wilhelm’s visit to Tangier in 1905 initiated the first Moroccan crisis, manufactured by Berlin to, among other objectives, probe the strength of the brand new and untested Franco- British Entente Cordiale. 45 By challenging French interests in Morocco in a nonviolent way, Berlin wanted to pressure Paris, “the weakest link in the surrounding chain” of states opposing Germany.46 But it desired to do that in an area and in a way that were expected not to draw Great Britain into a direct confrontation, so that Germany could demonstrate to Paris that the entente was in effect useless. Morocco was important to France but not to Great Britain, and the German Foreign Office expected that London would not back Paris. Great Britain after all was also seen as retrenching after a bloody war with the Boers and unable and unwilling to project power on land to guarantee the security of its French quasi- ally. As Friedrich von Holstein put it, the French would seek a rapprochement with Germany, in effect bandwagoning, “when they have seen that English friendship . . . is not enough to gain Germany’s agreement to the French seizure of Morocco, but rather that Germany wishes to be loved on its own account. ”47 Germany, however, greatly miscalculated the British need for a continental ally and resulting commitment to France. The Moroccan crisis was resolved in a multilateral conference in Algeciras where Berlin ended in a position that was considerably worse than before the crisis: its only support was from the weak Austro- Hungarian Empire, while London was firmly and actively on the side of Paris. Instead of weakening the nascent strategic friendship between Britain and France, “German bullying” strengthened it.48 From then on, the “European Balance of Power, which had been ignored for forty years, again dominated British foreign policy; and henceforth every German move was interpreted as a bid for continental hegemony. ”49 London reoriented its attention away from the empire and toward the European continent, gradually planning to ready an expeditionary force to come to France’s defense.50 Berlin’s probe in Morocco turned into a clear failure.51 Probing is low risk, insofar as it is tailored to minimize a strong reaction of the rival, but it is not danger free for the revisionist state. Despite the fact that it arises out of a desire to clarify an allegedly new map of power, the effects of probing are difficult to interpret. All parties involved— the revisionist power and the targeted states— can miscalculate their reactions. In a case of moral hazard, the smaller states, directly targeted by the revisionist power, may respond violently to the low- intensity probe, feeling secure thanks to the alliance with a more powerful patron. Or, sensing that their distant patron is no longer capable of maintaining its influence, they may decide the exact opposite and accept the hegemony of the rival. This was the case of Athenian allies in Thrace, switching sides under General Brasidas’s pressure and persuasion. They were mistaken because their “judg ment was based more upon blind wishing than upon any sound prediction. ”52 Athens rallied and sent large forces north to restore its sway. The probing power can also be the one to miscalculate, either not seeing the success or ignoring the failure. The nature of probing is such that the effects are often not visible immediately and require time to alter the perceptions and realities of power. The episode of Spartan commander Brasidas is again telling. Sparta did not follow up on his successes, in part because Spartan kings were jealous of his military exploits, but in part because they thought the damage inflicted on Athens was sufficient to strike a deal and end the war.53 They were of course wrong, as the war continued for decades. Alternatively, despite being checked, the probing power may simply up the ante, seeking some gain. This may have been the case of Germany, which did not stop challenging France and Britain after 1905, despite its diplomatic isolation, the military conundrum of a two- front war, and a robust Franco- British entente. In brief, there is no easy single interpretation of a probe and its effects. A related risk is that a probe may lead to an unintended and untimely escalation of the strategic rivalry. As we described, the purpose of probing is to see how permissive the geopolitical order is, and to that goal a probe is limited in geographic reach and means used. It targets an issue presumed peripheral to the rival great power, seeking, for instance, a small territorial adjustment that is costly to the weaker neighboring state but not deemed worthy of a direct conflict by the distant and more powerful security patron. But the limited nature of the probe is somewhat at odds with its ultimate purpose to check the limits of an allegedly declining rival great power. A probe is a low- intensity, local pinprick with wider repercussions; limited geographically yet potentially global in outcome. The probing state has a strong interest in keeping the crisis limited and circum scribed to the narrowly defined area, but it is also poking the rival great pow er to see what the reaction may be. It is banking on the fact that the probe is on the periphery of the rival’s influence and interests, and thus that the rival will not escalate the interaction. The probing challenger, in other words, is betting that its great power rival will fear entrapment, being involved in an undesirable conflict, more than loss of prestige, reputation, or influence. The revisionist power seeks to use the fact of alliances (which it lacks itself) as a source of competitive disadvantage for the hegemon. This is based on two reinforcing perceptions— first, that the commitment involved in their maintenance is an encumbrance depriving the hegemon of strategic flexibility; and second, that the hegemon’s temptation to devalue its own alliances suggests that it feels the weight of this encumbrance. Probes therefore arise from a view that entrapment is the congenital flaw of alliances. They are the ultimate act of attempting to expose the dangers of entrapment to hegemon and ally alike. This is ultimately a gamble— an expectation, not a certainty. And the gamble can backfire, as there is always the possibility that a probe will result in a dramatic escalation since it is targeted at multiple audiences. There is thus a clear recognition that a probe has a much wider purpose than its immediate action may convey, and consequently the desire to keep it limited runs against the desire to have a much larger demonstrative effect. As a result, the interaction a probe initiates has an inherent risk of escalating into a much larger confrontation.54 The revisionist state neither desires nor expects the escalation, but its possibility and perhaps likelihood are a direct outcome of probing. A probe by definition crosses a limit, a tacit or an explicit line of influence, in the expectation that it no longer reflects the actual will and power of the rival state. The revisionist power tests limits that until then were accepted and unchallenged and takes the first step in an “escalatory ladder” of competitive behavior. For instance, Kaiser Wilhelm’s support of Boer independence in 1896 was a test of British strength in what Berlin wrongly thought was a peripher al area of the British Empire. Similarly, the Moroccan crisis in 1905 was a test of British commitment to France in a region that should have been of no importance to London. Both, however, were a “move in the European Balance of Power, ” and that, beyond the details of the individual probes, was becoming of paramount concern to Great Britain. 55 Both were met by a strong British response, intensifying the Anglo- British rivalry. Escalation here was a willful choice of the targeted power. Finally, probing can be in many cases a violent act, raising even further the likelihood of escalation and war. Probing is a political act first and foremost, only at times pursued by military means, but it does involve a careful application of violence or threat of violence. This requires strict political control, which is easier to maintain if the probe is not militarized and violent. But the more violent it becomes, the more difficult it is to keep it under political control. The logic of war may overwhelm the political rationale. Bismarck was keenly aware that the limited wars he fought, such as the Franco- Prussian one in 1870, would result in political outcomes that were different from his objectives were other great powers to become involved. But his greatest obstacle was the German military, resentful of civilian interference in what they deemed to be affairs in their exclusive purview. Political control over a limited war is paramount, because otherwise operational war objectives can overwhelm the larger political goals.56 The fact that Russia and China probe through a variety of nontraditional means, such as fishing vessels in the South China Sea and specially formed battalions (Vostok) of Chechens, makes political control more difficult. There is an incentive to use such means in a more aggressive way than would be warranted by official state forces, because in case of defeat one can always deny control over them and claim that they are simply individual citizens. Moreover, the “civilian” paramilitary forces that the probing power uses (e.g., the “Russian separatists” in eastern Ukraine) may not be easily recalled if the conflict ceases to be useful. The civilianization of conflict has its own risks. This makes probing behavior inherently destabilizing to an international order, as it sets forces in motion that, once unleashed, can be hard to control. Probing can, moreover, spiral into war, unexpected and perhaps unwanted by the revisionist power. For instance, in the third century BC, Rome started to probe Carthaginian power in Sicily. It extended protection to Messana (or, more precisely, to a band of mercenaries, the Mamertines, who controlled it), thereby asserting Roman influence in northern Sicily. The peaceful withdrawal of the Punic garrison from the area seemed to suggest that a war was avoidable and the probe successful in attaining a low- cost revision to the balance of power. But the Romans miscalculated and were emboldened by this small success. As Polybius put it, they “now cherished the hope that they could drive the Carthaginians out of Sicily altogether, and that once this goal was attained their own power would be greatly increased. ”57 Carthage sent a large force to Sicily and solidified its alliance with Syracuse against Rome and its new ally Messana. Rome then escalated and sent a large army to besiege Syracuse, starting the first Punic war, which lasted more than twenty years.58 What started as a low- cost, low- risk probe turned into a long and costly slugfest. To sum up, the risk of probing is that it may result in a slide toward a direct clash. Miscalculation and escalation by all parties involved can elevate what is a small, localized harassment into a wider, more violent war. Moreover, a pattern of probing may gradually lead all sides to accept war as necessary and perhaps inevitable, as each probe and reaction escalates the competitive interaction.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › 1AC › 1AC --- Adv --- Cohesion

2---Intrusions---Squo policy of unilateral OCO frameworks cause network intrusions from allies that undermines trust, cohesion, and cooperation --- Integration solves

Smeets, 20 (Max Smeets, Max Smeets is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich and Director of the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative., 2-15-2020, accessed on 6-18-2022, Taylor & Francis, "U.S. cyber strategy of persistent engagement & defend forward: implications for the alliance and intelligence collection", https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2020.1729316?journalCode=fint20)//Babcii

Benefits and the creation of partnerships The strategy of persistent engagement and defend forward can help less capable cyber actors defend themselves against adversaries. Both the U.S. Cyber Command vision and the DoD cyber strategy stress the importance of working closely with international and private sector partners to successfully operate in cyberspace.xxix The DoD strategy states the following: “Our strategic approach is based on mutually reinforcing lines of effort to build a more lethal force; compete and deter in cyberspace; expand alliances and partnerships; reform the Department; and cultivate talent.” xxx On international partnerships, it more explicitly states: “Many of the United States’ allies and partners possess advanced cyber capabilities that complement our own. The Department will work to strengthen the capacity of these allies and partners and increase DoD’s ability to leverage its partners’ unique skills, resources, capabilities, and perspectives. Information-sharing relationships with allies and partners will increase the effectiveness of combined cyberspace operations and enhance our collective cybersecurity posture.” xxxi The United States has also signed several memoranda of understanding and over the years addressed cyber cooperation in some way, shape or form. In 2008, a MoU was signed between the Department of Defense and the German Federal Ministry of Defence about computer network defense and information assurance.xxxii A year later, a similar MoU on computer network defense was signed with South-Korea. xxxiii More recently, the Cyber Command worked alongside Montenegrin cyber defenders with as aim “to increase interoperability, build partner capability, and deter malign influence on the democratic processes of our allies, partners and the U.S.” xxxiv It was reported that U.S. Cyber Command personnel operated in the networks of Ukraine and Macedonia as well to help those countries defend against malicious cyber activity.xxxv At the 2019 Cyber Command symposium, specific examples were discussed on how cooperation can also help in not just detecting or deterring adversaries but also cause friction in their operational activity.xxxvi For example, the U.S. might upload foreign APT malware samples on VirusTotal, an online malware repository and file scanning service, forcing adversaries to go back to the drawing broad and adapt.xxxvii One can think of several other scenarios how international partnerships (also with the private sector) can help to ensure more coordinated take down of adversarial operations - actions beneficial to both the US and its partners. Risks for Allies and Intelligence Collection This section addresses four connected risks associated with US strategy. The first risk is perhaps the most obvious: if U.S. Cyber Command directly operates in allied networks without consent, it creates friction by allies undermining trust. Operating instantly makes sense considering the potential operational tempo of adversaries: You cannot have protracted diplomatic discussions for two months with an ally about whether or not to take down some command and control infrastructure of an adversary hosted in the allied country. You don’t have days, let alone months. As a participant mentioned at the 2019 Cyber Command Symposium on strategy: “Opportunities within this domain are fleeting.” xxxviii Operating seamlessly could also make sense if an ally does not mind the U.S. coming into its networks to address the malicious activity. In this vein, the U.S. can continue to build partnerships with countries that do not have the capacity to defend against cyber attacks on their own, as described above. But, what if an allied country is not keen on having the U.S. military in its networks, actively, seamlessly, and continuously disrupting an adversary’s cyber operations? As the German case shows, this scenario will likely come up a lot more in the near future. Second, it is not just about cyber effect operations taking place in systems or networks in allied territory. There could also be a negative impact on allied intelligence operations and capabilities beyond these systems and networks. The U.S Cyber Command - and other military cyber organizations - are operating in a global environment historically dominated by intelligence agencies, and the Five Eyes has always been the most dominant actor in cyberspace.xxxix But the anglophone intelligence alliance is not the only intelligence actor operating across the world. Recent cases—such as the infiltration of the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service into the Russia-based network of the infamous hacking group Cozy Bear—have illustrated the continued global prevalence and value of allies’ intelligence operations beyond the Five Eyes alliance.xl If U.S. Cyber Command increasingly take up the role of ‘disrupter’ it may negatively impact global intelligence collection of allies—particularly those countries that favor long-term access over immediate effect. It will also more likely uncover and burn allied capabilities. The risks of occurring are higher than one may think as intelligence agencies have a tendency and incentive to target and track the same entities. For example, in late 2014, cybersecurity company Kaspersky Lab reported on the so-called "Magnet of Threats”. The cybersecurity company discovered a server belonging to a research organization in the Middle East that simultaneously hosted implants for at least five Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors: Regin and the Equation Group, Turla and ItaDuke, Animal Farm, and Careto. xli All of these APTs have been associated with prominent national security and intelligence agencies. Equation group and Regin are connected to the Five-Eyes. As said, Animal Farm has been attributed to France's external intelligence agency. Turla Group has been associated with the Russian federal security service (FSB). ItaDuke is said to be linked to the Russian government too. Finally, it is theorized that Spain is behind Careto, also known as ‘The Mask’. Consider what would have happened if one of those five APT groups had sought to cause a disruptive effect - rather than collect intelligence - against the target in the Middle East. It likely would have resulted in much earlier discovery and analysis by threat intelligence companies (or other actors) exposing the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of each actor group. Also, even the anticipation of more cyber effect operations in non-allied networks from one allied state could lead to a change in operations by another state. Indeed, states have shown in the past that the anticipation of early discovery of an operation has led to a change in their TTPs. For example, the National Security Agency (NSA) created an "exploit orchestrator" called FoxAcid, an internet-enabled system capable of attacking target computers in a variety of different ways, depending on whether it is discovered—or likely to be discovered—in a given network.xlii FoxAcid has a modular design, with flexibility allowing the NSA to swap and replace exploits and run different exploits based on various considerations. Against technically sophisticated targets where the chance of detection is high, FoxAcid would normally choose to run low-value exploits. Third, allied friction could potentially be exploited by adversaries. Adversaries do not randomly choose which intermediate nodes to direct their operations through. If Russia has the choice to go through a network that would raise some serious diplomatic friction between the U.S. and a U.S. ally, or operate through a network that would cause no diplomatic friction for the U.S., what would it prefer? It would make sense for adversaries to operate through the networks of exactly those countries with which the U.S. has a strong relationship but that do not want the U.S. to operate within their networks causing any effects. Russia is already good at exploiting divisions between the U.S. and its allies. Cyber Command’s new strategy might give it another avenue to do so. Fourth, whilst allies can integrate their cyber efforts into U.S. strategy of persistent engagement, if allies would adopt their own strategy of persistent engagement - mirroring U.S. current doctrine and practice - it would likely further undermine the alliance relationships. If US strategy of persistent engagement leads allies to adopt their own strategy of persistent engagement, it would mean allies also seek “superiority in cyberspace”; “continuously engaging and contesting adversaries and causing them uncertainty wherever they maneuver”; and operating “seamlessly, globally and continuously” - as stated in the Cyber Command vision. More specifically, it would mean that allies seek to swiftly achieve effects in systems and networks that are potentially located on U.S. territory, without necessarily notifying the U.S. government before. In other words, it means that networks and systems turn into red space and gray space for allies - like allied networks are now gray and red space for the U.S. to actively disrupt and degrade adversarial operations. It is unlikely that the U.S. government would react positively if Germany, or any other allied country for that matter, hacks into a server hosting Russian propaganda that was located in the United States, with some form of notification but without Pentagon’s consent.xliii There are numerous reasons why the US government would be upset with this type of behavior. It would likely be seen as reckless from Germany - especially if the US was already on those same networks for intelligence collection purposes. An important dimension of this scenario is derived from the fact that the U.S. is a vast target rich environment, potentially even prioritized as a target by adversaries such as China, Russia, North Korea, Iran - as well as non-state actors. As stated above, red space and gray space are defined, according to U.S. Joint Publication 3-12 on Cyberspace Operations, based on what “nodes” adversaries “control”. There are many nodes adversaries (of US allies) want to control in the US. In other words, if US allies would seek to swiftly disrupt and degrade cyber operations in red space and gray space on a constant-basis, much of that would be in the United States. Last year the NATO alliance reached a landmark that went largely unnoticed: there are now more NATO member states that have publicly declared they are seeking to establish an institutional capacity within the military forces to conduct cyber effects operations than there are member states that have remained publicly silent on this issue.xliv Yet, most NATO members are still at the early stages of organizational development - and pour relatively few resources into their military cyber organizations to conduct cyber effects operations.xlv Their operational capacity is limited. France and Germany stand out for the extent of resources officially allocated to their military cyber organizations (beyond the Five-Eyes) - but public statements about these figures are generally hard to interpret and compare given distinct institutional design across military cyber organizations of states.xlvi This risk is therefore less significant for the short term, but is likely to grow in the medium to long term. Conclusion and Discussion The purpose of this paper was to provide a benefit-risk assessment of US strategy for its allies and intelligence collection. Whilst the U.S. government’s mission to persistently engage with adversaries may have benefits for allied states, the paper identified several avenues how the strategy leads to negative implications for the alliance. To conclude, it is therefore worth considering how these risks can be mitigatedFirst, the principles of persistent engagement and defend forward are often jointly discussed. How the two principles relate to each other, however, remains unclear. According to some, persistent engagement is an ‘operationalization’ of the defend forward concept. Others believe there is a difference between the two concepts. If the latter is the case, it is important to assess to what degree a strategy of persistent engagement necessitates ‘defending forward’ and contesting adversaries wherever they are. In other words, the question is whether sufficient friction can be created without causing disruption in allied networks. Second, terminology about terrain in cyberspace is frequently confused by policymakers and experts. The U.S. government needs to (re)assess how its terminology of terrain in the physical domains applies to cyberspace. Last, NATO allies should consider establishing memoranda of understanding on offensive cyber effects operations in systems or networks based in allied territory.xlvii The goal of the proposed memorandum would be to reduce discord among the allies; enhance trust, transparency and confidence between allies; and improve the effectiveness of disrupting and deterring adversaries’ operations in cyberspace. The scope of the memorandum would include: i) developing a common notification equity framework for out-of-networks operations which seek to achieve cyber effects in allied systems or networks; ii) identifying procedures for communicating the consideration and conduct of offensive cyber effects operations between states against systems or networks in allied territory; and iii) identifying technical solutions and administrative documentation required for the continuous exchange of information on offensive cyber operations. In writing the memorandum, states first and foremost should agree on the equities involved in permitting signatories to conduct cyber effect operations in each other’s networks—and the relative weight of those equities. Equities that should be considered include: i) the ability of an actor to take action to negate known threats on or to the other parties’ networks and systems; ii) the likelihood that an action will negate known threats; iii) the imminence and scale of the threat; iv) the risk of collateral damage; v) whether the computer system or network is government-owned or privately owned; and vi) the certainty that the system or network will be used to achieve strategic effects by the adversary.xlviii Finally, though the memorandum of understanding may help in promoting stability and enhancing confidence amongst allies, it is not a silver bullet. It can only reduce allied concerns rather than mitigate them. Military cyber organizations may still conduct effect-based operations in allied territory without consent, leading allies to assert that their sovereignty has been violated.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › 1AC › 1AC --- Adv --- Cohesion

1---Secrecy---Refusal to disclose capabilities causes internal strife amongst allies --- Undermines faith in the US and NATO that “tears apart the alliance”

Porter and Jordan, 19 (Christopher Porter and Klara Jordan, hristopher Porter is the chief intelligence strategist of cybersecurity company FireEye and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council., Klara Jordan is director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, 2-14-2019, accessed on 6-17-2022, Lawfare, "Don’t Let Cyber Attribution Debates Tear Apart the NATO Alliance", https://www.lawfareblog.com/dont-let-cyber-attribution-debates-tear-apart-nato-alliance)//Babcii

Therein lies the rub. Both formal alliances, such as NATO, and more ad hoc arrangements, such as what the , will require members to share intelligence and eventually, to the best of their ability and perhaps in different domains, contribute to joint action against a presumably well-armed foreign aggressor. States including the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Estonia, and Denmark have publicly declared their willingness to lend sovereign offensive cyber effects to deter, defend against and counter the full spectrum of threats. Sharing intelligence and information is a key element of NATO’s core decision-making process enshrined in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. Political consultations are part of the preventive diplomacy between member states, but they are also an avenue to discuss concerns related to the security threats member states face. These consultations can be a catalyst for reaching a consensus on policies to be adopted or actions to be taken—including those on the use of sovereign cyber effects to support a NATO operation. The alliance has a track record of collective action and cooperative security measures. For example, Operation Active Endeavour helped to deter, disrupt and protect against terrorist activity in the Mediterranean in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, in solidarity with the United States. For the seventh time, the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative will be among the organizations privileged to organize an event on the sidelines of the Feb. 15–17 . This year in particular, the Atlantic Council’s event, “Defending Human Dignity: Limiting Malicious Cyber Activity Through Diplomacy,” will complement the topics high on the agenda of the main conference, such as transatlantic collaboration, the consequences of a resurgence of great power competition and the future of arms control. In the United States, the greatest failures of response and deterrence to foreign aggression in cyberspace have not been caused by a lack of intelligence, capability or imagination. Rather, U.S. policy has been serviceable in theory but impotent in practice because of an inability to translate technical findings and intelligence into public support for sufficiently tough responses ordered by elected political leaders. North Korea’s repeated operations targeting U.S. companies and critical infrastructure have been met with public skepticism over their culpability, limiting the strength of retaliatory options needed to deter further events. Chinese cyber economic espionage continued for years despite widespread knowledge of China’s activities because political leaders found it difficult to confront Beijing without undermining U.S. companies in return. Russian information operations did not sow enough doubt to mislead experts, but they succeeded in exacerbating the partisan polarization of an already-divided electorate and its leaders. That inability to translate the findings of cyber experts into public sentiment and therefore political action has sidelined America’s cyberwarriors, by far the most technologically advanced and well-resourced in the world. Imagine the political response of an ally that is asked to burden-share in response to cyber aggression but is probably much closer to any resulting kinetic fight than the United States. Now imagine the response of that ally when it’s being asked to take causus belli on faith: The United States is presenting attribution for a cyberattack elsewhere in the world, but perhaps is depending on the ally lacking critical details due to classification, and is presenting that information alongside a request for help that might well put the ally in the crosshairs of its own cyberattack or lethal action. How can allies with different capabilities to collect, analyze and understand intelligence be part of a consensus on using sovereign cyber effects to support a NATO operation? How can a commander achieve a common operational picture to authorize the use of sovereign effects in a NATO operation if all the allies are not on the same page with respect to critical attribution and other technical information needed for a use of effect in an operation? We all know what a tank looks like on a shared satellite image, but if you ask three cyber experts to interpret the attribution for a set of indicators, you are likely to get at least four answers. For most U.S. allies in Europe and elsewhere, there is simply a dearth of technical know-how within the government when it comes to cyber attribution and operations. This is already a for the United States, with a massive defense budget, Silicon Valley innovation and an educated workforce to pull into . But for many U.S. allies, tech-savvy public servants will have long fled for the private sector, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and academia before reaching ministerial positions. To its credit, the U.S. National Cyber Strategy does propose capacity-building measures to support allies. This means building up law enforcement, intelligence, and military operational and investigative capability. But even with successful capacity-building programs, many nations could, in a crisis, end up in the same place the United States is—with good options stuck on the shelf while political leaders and their electorates lack a critical mass of informed voters to trust, understand and act on expert findings. For countries weighing whether to risk their own blood and treasure in support of an ally’s cyber attribution findings, this hurdle could well prove insurmountable if not addressed well before a crisis emerges. Many such countries will no doubt recall being burned when placing too much confidence in U.S. technical and human sources without an ability to evaluate the evidence for themselves, as with the Iraq weapons of mass destruction findings. The private sector will probably play a crucial role in providing intelligence to support alliance responses to cyberattacks, especially as a stopgap over the next few years. FireEye and its peer competitors and partners regularly produce analyses of major world cyber events—many that fly below the radar of Western leadership, in fact—sometimes at a near-government quality and often covering much of the same “classified” evidence. More important, private-sector analysts are accustomed to writing for impact with both their technical counterparts, like chief information security officers (CISOs) and threat hunters, and nontechnical stakeholders such as boards of directors, CEOs and other persons controlling the purse strings. In this sense, unclassified, private-sector and NGO-driven cyber threat intelligence can become the lingua franca of discussions. Relying on commercial reporting generated by international teams, rather than declassified government-generated reports, both broadens the audience enough to make alliance discussions feasible and mitigates against disparities in terminology across national lines—the tendency of even closely integrated allies to describe cyber “attack,” “information operations,” and attribution findings with different implicit assumptions or implications. Long-Term Thinking In the long run, though, the U.S. and its more technologically advanced allies—such as its fellow Five Eyes (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the U.K.), France and Japan—will have to make important policy changes in the interests of furthering alliance cooperation in cyberspace: a willingness to sometimes risk sensitive sources and methods in order to get cyber threat intelligence into the hands of other countries better positioned to take policy action, an end to classifying public information like IP addresses solely because of their acquisition via classified means, and greater transparency on their own decision-making. Government cyber leaders within the alliance should consider taking another page out of the private-sector playbook as well: running cyber-crisis exercises that involve more than the IT department. In the commercial world, the more successful practice runs involve leaders at both the CISO level and some presence from nontechnical teams that would weigh in during a crisis, such as communications and legal. The best exercises involve executives, too, who despite their busy schedules must see for themselves how their companies would survive and respond during a potentially ruinous cyberattack, and work through the minutiae of leading a response themselves. The experience and confidence is invaluable if ever called on during a real-life crisis, and the organizational introspection by involving decision-makers at all levels is irreplaceable. Military-to-military cyber training as part of cross-country force standardization and joint operational planning could pull in more senior national leadership, beyond battlefield commanders, and be coupled with increased funding for foreign affairs-led training for nontechnical leaders. The private sector could also meaningfully contribute during NATO consultations when developing Allied Joint Publications to make sure that definitions and requirements for threat intelligence incorporate the best practices of NATO member countries’ private sectors. If a U.S. diplomat reaches out to his or her counterpart in an allied country to ask for assistance responding to malware that’s damaging critical infrastructure, and that counterpart has to ask what malware is, the response isn’t going to happen. NATO’s essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Tolerating cyberattacks, especially those deliberately targeting civilians and the political legitimacy of governments—without the alliance having the capability to jointly discuss attribution and have the confidence to act and assist one another—undermines this core purpose of the alliance. Likewise, pursuing only deterrence and response without an active role for the alliance in reaching peaceful  with potential adversaries abrogates member responsibilities to their citizens but is impossible without a common language and operational picture to discuss enforcement of such agreements. The U.S. is stronger with allies, and with attention to these issues its cybersecurity can be too.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › 1AC › 1AC --- Adv --- Cohesion

Inability of NATO to cohere integration of OCO’s into the alliance risks fracturing the alliance

Iftimie, 20 (Ion Iftimie, Eisenhower PhD Candidate Fellow, NATO Defense College, and Senior Advisor, European Union Research Center, George Washington University School of Business, 5-28-2020, accessed on 6-17-2022, NDC, "NATO’s needed offensive cyber capabilities", https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1441)//Babcii

NATO Cyber Rapid Reaction teams are already equipped to conduct defensive cyber operations in support of member states if called upon. A mandate of cyber defence and security implies, however, that NATO also starts to engage in active military measures to deny, degrade, disrupt, deceive, or destroy an adversary’s offensive cyber capabilities. This requires the development of not only offensive cyber A2/AD capabilities by Allies, but also the restructuring of the NATO command structures, policies, processes (procurement, intelligence, operations, etc.) and engagements needed to integrate them by the Alliance. NATO coordination with both national and regional entities charged with cyber security aspects will, in particular, need to be enhanced. Many agreements already exist in the realm of defensive cyber at national and regional levels (as seen with the 2016 NATO-EU Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defence), but political consensus among Allies is missing on whether they should be expanded to incorporate the collective use of offensive cyber A2/AD capabilities. Conclusion The lack of integrated offensive cyber A2/AD capabilities undermines both the unity of the Alliance and its mandate of defence and deterrence. On the former, the lack of coordination between Allies during unilateral cyber operations could lead to friction when resulting effects infringe on Allied cyber-physical infrastructures. It could also lead to cyber fratricide, when failure to properly attribute Allied digital personas occurs during these military operations. On the latter, while most Allies are developing offensive cyber capabilities, some remain unable to face the growing number of cyber threats unilaterally. Successful defence and deterrence in the cyber domain calls, thus, for ready collective offensive cyber A2/AD capabilities that, when integrated with NATO operations, would complement national and/ or regional responses to malicious cyber activities. If and when this integration occurs, NATO Flexible Deterrence Options would also need to be agreed upon in order to signal cyber adversaries that Allies will respond with one voice if attacked in the cyber domain. Ultimately, political consensus within the Alliance would still need to be built on the type of needed collective offensive cyber capabilities (such as for A2/ AD purposes) and on how to integrate them into NATO’s existing operations and missions.