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2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › Perm: Do CP – 1AR

It’s a group of countries

Jacobson 12 Alice Jacobson, member of Task Force 2012, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, “Human Rights Watch & the Arab Spring,” Chapter 13.3, Can NATO React to the Arab Spring? Democracy, Human Rights, & the Rule of Law, 2-27-2012, /GoGreen!

Human rights violations as outlined in broad terms in the 2011 World Report, and pressure from organizations such as Human Rights Watch most certainly add to the international pressure on NATO to intervene. This has led to the discovery that military power may not be a useful instrument in dealing with specific country by country issues in the region. NATO is a group of democratic countries who in turn each have an individual agenda when dealing in the Middle East and North Africa, and are tied to the region by their oil dependency; but protection of human rights as justification for military intervention must be across the board or not at all. Military intervention in Libya was completed swiftly based largely on the economic incentives of NATO’s democratic powers, whereas in Syria, NATO has been immobilized as more people die everyday.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › Perm: Do CP – 2AC

“NATO” refers to member countries – the “North Atlantic Council” is the institution

Masters 22 Jonathan Masters, Deputy Managing Editor, Council on Foreign Relations, MA social theory, the New School, BA political science, Emory University, “What Is NATO?” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, last updated 5-4-2022, /GoGreen!

Established during the Cold War, NATO is a transatlantic security alliance composed of thirty member countries, including the United States.

NATO has focused on deterring Russian aggression in recent years, but it has also conducted security operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and Somalia.

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › K Links --- Security

Bad strategic studies terminology turns the case.

Stoker and Whiteside '20 [Donald and Craig; Winter 2020; Professor of Strategy and Policy for the US Naval War College's Monterey Program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey; associate professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College at Naval Postgraduate School, senior associate with NWC’s Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups, fellow at the International Centre for Counter-terrorism; "Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War-Two Failures of American Strategic Thinking," Naval War College Review, Vol. 73, Issue 1, p. 19-54]

Commentators frequently use the gray zone phrase to describe the war Vladimir Putin launched against Ukraine in 2014, implying that the actions were opaque enough to cloud perceptions about whether war had erupted in the Donbas. Commentators also use gray zone and its variations to describe China's moves to cement its extralegal territorial claims in the South China Sea against weaker opponents, as well as Iranian moves in Syria and the Persian Gulf.

The popularization of the term gray zone appears to have been inspired by its incorporation into military documents and speeches. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review references challenges that occur in an "ambiguous gray area that is neither fully war nor fully peace."16 But it took the remarks delivered five years later by General Joseph L. Votel, USA, the then head of Special Operations Command, to bring the term into the public eye. He incorporated the concept into his briefing to Congress on the unique challenges posed by Russia and the Islamic State, noting that "our success in this environment will be determined by our ability to adequately navigate conflicts that fall outside of the traditional peace-or-war construct"17

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › K Links --- Security

Use of the terms hybrid war and gray zone turn the case -- blurs the boundaries between war and peace and cause policymakers to think war is inevitable -- alt solves.

Stoker and Whiteside '20 [Donald and Craig; Winter 2020; Professor of Strategy and Policy for the US Naval War College's Monterey Program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey; associate professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College at Naval Postgraduate School, senior associate with NWC’s Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups, fellow at the International Centre for Counter-terrorism; "Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War-Two Failures of American Strategic Thinking," Naval War College Review, Vol. 73, Issue 1, p. 19-54]

Among today's great ironies is that, despite the fact that the United States has been at war for the better part of two decades, rare is the American policy maker who speaks adeptly about our use of military power in a coherent manner. On the one hand, political leaders attempt to avoid categorizing our air strikes and raids targeting al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in countries around the world as war, while on the other hand they conflate hostile Russian acts with some form of hyphenated war. This article argues that the adoption of two prominent and fashionable theoretical terms and their various iterations-the gray zone or grayzone conflict (usually described as the space between peace and war) and hybrid war (often described as Russia's new form of mixed-methods warfare birthed by General Valery Gerasimov)-is an example of an American failure to think clearly about political, military, and strategic issues and their vitally important connections.

These terms, as well as the concepts arising from them, should be eliminated from the strategic lexicon. They cause more harm than good and contribute to an increasingly dangerous distortion of the concepts of war, peace, and geopolitical competition, with a resultant negative impact on the crafting of security strategy for the United States and its allies and partners around the world.

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › CP Solvency --- State Department

CP solves --- state department can share cyber intelligence with allies

Ford 22 --- Christopher A. Ford, Distinguished Policy Advisor at MITRE Labs and a Visiting Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. He previously served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, “Conceptualizing Cyberspace Security Diplomacy”, SPRING 2022,

A less well known but growing component of the West’s cyber defense, however, is also diplomatic, in the form of cyberspace security diplomacy. As exemplified by the U.S. State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues (CCI)5] this work involves engaging with foreign counterparts to develop and articulate common understandings of peacetime norms for cyber activity; this includes the principles set forth by United Nations experts in 2013 that states should not attack each other’s civilian critical infrastructure in peacetime.[6] It also involves promoting the adoption of common positions in attributing cyberattacks to malicious cyber actors and in imposing penalties (e.g., sanctions, public condemnation, or prosecution) upon those actors.

Cyberspace security diplomacy was responsible for a 2019 agreement reached by 28 Western countries expressing support for the “evolving framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace,” supporting “targeted cybersecurity capacity building to ensure that all responsible states can implement this framework and better protect their networks from significant disruptive, destructive, or otherwise destabilizing cyber activity,” and pledging to “work together on a voluntary basis to hold states accountable when they act contrary to this framework.”[7] It is now not unusual for US officials to impose sanctions upon malicious cyber actors in other countries, nor for US law enforcement agencies to issue criminal indictments.[8] Work by US diplomats, intelligence officials, and law enforcement officers to engage their international counterparts, moreover, has helped encourage foreign governments impose concrete international steps to penalize such malefactors as well.[9]

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Advantage CP

Cyber hotline solves

Banco 19 Erin Banco National Security Reporter. Kevin Poulsen Sr. National Security Correspondent. Updated Mar. 07, 2019. “U.S. intelligence officials are looking to Washington-Moscow hotline as a last-ditch crisis channel that might just prevent a cataclysmic online showdown.” {DK}

As concerns mount that Russia will unleash hackers and online disinformation brigades to wreak havoc in another American election, senior U.S. officials are taking a second look at a technology handed down from the age of Gorbachev and Reagan: an emergency “hotline” between officials in the U.S. and Russia that might someday pull both countries back from the brink of an all out cyberwar.

The secure messaging system, known colloquially in the White House as the “cyberhotline,” already exists. It was set up in 2013—building off a Cold War messaging system, in fact—in the hope that it might facilitate conversations between the two countries during a crisis in cyberspace, where the identities and intentions of attackers are often muddled. So far it’s been used only once, in the waning days of the Obama administration, when the White House’s cyberchief fired off a carefully worded warning to Moscow not to attack the “infrastructure” for the 2016 election.

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Advantage CP

CP solves NATO-Russia escalation

Kubiak 19 --- Dr Katarzyna Kubiak et al, Policy Fellow on nuclear and arms control policy at the European Leadership Network. Previously, she was a Transatlantic Post-Doc Fellow for International Relations and Security (TAPIR) at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies and an associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), , “Towards a More Stable NATO-Russia Relationship” EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY REPORT, Feb 2019, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/31012019-Towards-a-more-stable-Russia-NATO-relationship.pdf

There are functioning channels of communication between NATO and Russia, including meetings of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) at ambassadorial level. But these channels are of limited effectiveness. The intensity of NATO-Russia contacts has been drastically reduced following Russia’s actions against Ukraine and NATO’s subsequent April 2014 decision to suspend practical cooperation with Russia. With increased military activities and what each side perceives as pressure or probing of its limits and ‘red lines’ by the other, whether intended or not, the existing communication channels are inadequate and insufficient to clarify concerns or deal with uncertainties, especially during periods of increased tension. The level of mutual understanding between Russia and NATO is low, and the deterrence signalling of each side can be misunderstood by the other side or dismissed by them as posturing.

NATO and Russia will have to navigate better a space filled with substantial and genuine disagreements, ballooning mistrust regarding the other side’s intentions, and continued prioritisation of deterrence and strengthening of respective military potentials.

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Disad --- Disclosure Bad › China Revisionism

They are committed to counter extended deterrence, it’s a core of liberal order of alliances

Dean Cheng 2017, Senior Research Fellow The Heritage Foundation 6. Space Deterrence, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and Asian Security: A U.S. Perspective, In Harold, Scott W., Yoshiaki Nakagawa, Junichi Fukuda, John A. Davis, Keiko Kono, Dean Cheng, and Kazuto Suzuki, The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Deterring Gray Zone Coercion in the Maritime, Cyber, and Space Domains. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. .,

A final complication stems from the asymmetric alliance relationships that characterize the United States and China. During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union had allies and commitments outside their national territories. Consequently, there were at least some parallels in terms of understanding extended deterrence. In the case of China, however, Beijing does not have any real allies that it is clearly and credibly committed to defending. (Although China and North Korea are, at least on paper, linked by their 1961 Mutual Defense Treaty, many observers doubt that this commitment is truly binding on either side.) For Beijing, neither Pakistan nor North Korea, the closest analogues, are really comparable to the U.S. relationship with Japan.

As a result, China does not face the problem of extending deterrence; it is defending itself but it is not attempting to defend allies. Indeed, it would be more accurate to say that China is not focused on engaging in extended deterrence, but on countering extended deterrence. Along its periphery, China does not directly confront the United States; it is seeking to deter and coerce U.S. friends and allies. This creates substantially different asymmetric concerns between China and the United States. Where Washington is engaged in extended deterrence in support of allies, Beijing is concerned about direct deterrence—i.e., direct threats to China.

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Disad --- Disclosure Bad › China Revisionism

C. Space weapons

Dean Cheng and Carson 18 (Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at the Heritage Foundation. He specializes in China’s military and foreign policy, in particular China’s relationship with its Asian neighbors and with the United States. He’s being interviewed on the Jaw-Jaw podcast by Brad Carson is a professor at the University of Virginia, where he teaches in the Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy. 11-13-2018, "Jaw-Jaw: China is a Funny Sort of Revisionist Power — A Conversation with Dean Cheng," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2018/11/jaw-jaw-china-is-a-funny-sort-of-revisionist-power-a-conversation-with-dean-cheng/, Accessed: 7-27-2019 /Kent Denver-YBJL)

And we’re seeing the Chinese regularly now threatening items in space. The 2007 ASAT test, other tests with lasers, things like that. Development of ASAT capabilities. Again, what is outer space? It is international common space. You can’t draw boundary up 100, 300, 5,000 miles from your border and say, “This is mine.” And yet the Chinese are increasingly making moves to say, “You know you shouldn’t be able to just fly over my country with your satellite.” Never mind orbital mechanics. “And take pictures and eavesdrop, just like you shouldn’t be able to fly aircraft and do other things off my shores.”

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Disad --- Disclosure Bad › China Revisionism

B. Internet censorship

Dean Cheng and Carson 18 (Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at the Heritage Foundation. He specializes in China’s military and foreign policy, in particular China’s relationship with its Asian neighbors and with the United States. He’s being interviewed on the Jaw-Jaw podcast by Brad Carson is a professor at the University of Virginia, where he teaches in the Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy. 11-13-2018, "Jaw-Jaw: China is a Funny Sort of Revisionist Power — A Conversation with Dean Cheng," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2018/11/jaw-jaw-china-is-a-funny-sort-of-revisionist-power-a-conversation-with-dean-cheng/, Accessed: 7-27-2019 /Kent Denver-YBJL)

When we look at the internet and how China has balkanized the internet, how it is trying to basically affect where and who has access to the internet. Where it is saying, “Only nation states should be really allowed to authorize what is allowed onto the internet.” And by the way, if I, China, don’t like who you’re letting on, you should take measures. Follow the gold, pro-Democratic elements, the New York Times, we have the right to keep you off the internet, or at least outside of China’s piece of the internet. Free flow of information, an absolute bedrock of modern day global economies, would fall by the wayside.

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Disad --- Disclosure Bad › China Revisionism

A. Territory

Dean Cheng and Carson 18 (Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at the Heritage Foundation. He specializes in China’s military and foreign policy, in particular China’s relationship with its Asian neighbors and with the United States. He’s being interviewed on the Jaw-Jaw podcast by Brad Carson is a professor at the University of Virginia, where he teaches in the Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy. 11-13-2018, "Jaw-Jaw: China is a Funny Sort of Revisionist Power — A Conversation with Dean Cheng," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2018/11/jaw-jaw-china-is-a-funny-sort-of-revisionist-power-a-conversation-with-dean-cheng/, Accessed: 7-27-2019 /Kent Denver-YBJL)

If you look at the South China Sea and the so-called Nine-Dash Line, the Chinese are very upfront, often in stating. Vietnam? It doesn’t get an exclusive economic zone. It barely gets territorial waters three miles off of its shores. Never mind 12 or 24. Same for the Philippines. They are now pushing Indonesia, which even 10 years ago, the Chinese said, “Well, you know no Indonesian territory falls within our claims.” Now, they’re like, “Oh, no. Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone needs to be truncated,” because of China’s claims. International waterways that transit through the South China Sea carry 5.3 trillion dollars of trade. We are talking the carotid artery of global trade, and the Chinese are saying, “That’s my artery.”

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Disad --- Disclosure Bad › A2: “Won’t Invade/Will Be Lower Level”

Even lower scale coercive measures escalate

Michael E. O’Hanlon 19. Senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, specializing in defense and foreign policy issues. He co-directs the Security and Strategy team, the Defense Industrial Base working group, and the Africa Security Initiative within the Foreign Policy program. Adjunct professor at Columbia, Georgetown, and Syracuse universities, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. 4-30-2019. "The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War Over Small Stakes." Brookings Institution Press. Chapter 2. pg. 43-50. JSTOR. accessed 10-23-2019//JDi

A possible Chinese blockade of Taiwan, on the other hand, clearly has even higher stakes, and history suggests that crises may again occur in connection with Taiwan. Beijing might convince itself that a blockade-centered operation against Taiwan, designed to force it to reverse whatever purportedly offending action or rhetoric had caused China’s reaction in the first place, might not be hugely risky. In principle, China could scale back or suspend enforcement of the blockade at any point if it needed to, and could do so while saving face, especially if the blockade was conducted principally by submarines. Moreover, Beijing might believe that even a partially effective naval blockade could be a potent instrument of coercion against Taiwan. Such a blockade would almost assuredly be nowhere near complete or airtight.84 However, China would not need to stop all commercial ships transiting into and out of Taiwan. It would simply need to deter enough ships from risking the journey that Taiwan’s economy would suffer badly. The goal would likely be to squeeze the island economically to the point of capitulation. This solution might seem quite elegant from Beijing’s point of view: it could involve little or no loss of life, little or no damage to Taiwan itself, and the ability to back off the attack if the United States seemed prepared to intervene or if the world community slapped major trade sanctions on China in response.85 In any such blockade, China might well combine various elements of military power, including cyberattacks, into a multidimensional operation.86 It could attack command and control as well as reconnaissance capabilities both on land and in space (the latter intended largely to blind the United States). The centerpiece of the approach would probably be the PRC submarine fleet introducing a significant risk factor into all maritime voyages into and out of Taiwan by occasionally sinking a cargo ship, either with submarines or with mines it had laid in Taiwan’s harbors.87 The PRC submarine force has improved by leaps and bounds in recent decades. Over the past twenty years, China’s fleet of modern attack subs has grown from roughly two to forty.88 China’s precision-strike capabilities have improved to the point that China could conceivably use a preemptive missile and air attack against Taiwanese airfields and ports and associated infrastructure to hobble Taiwan’s ability to strike back, though it might choose not to attack Taiwan’s territory in the first instance.89 To allow humanitarian supplies to reach Taiwan, Beijing might offer countries the option of first docking in a PRC port for inspection before sailing to their destinations. In this and other ways, it could limit the dangers to innocent civilians. Since this strategy might require the Chinese submarine fleet to sink only a few ships to achieve the desired aims, even in the worst case Beijing might believe that it was acting humanely— threatening the lives of only 100 to 200 commercial seamen. Given the perceived stakes involved, Beijing could well consider this a reasonable risk. If they chose to try to break the blockade, the basic concept of operations for the United States and Taiwan would probably be to assemble enough forces in the western Pacific to set up a protected shipping lane east of Taiwan. To carry out that mission, the United States would need to establish air superiority throughout a large part of the region, together with Taiwan (and perhaps other countries such as Japan). The United States and Taiwan, and perhaps others, would also need to protect ships against Chinese submarine attack while coping with the threat of mines near Taiwan’s ports. And they might have to do all this without assured access to much of their satellite architecture, especially for imagery and some types of signals intelligence. That is because China’s abilities to shoot down or disable low Earth orbit satellites, through direct-ascent interceptors or directed-energy weapons or other means, have improved in recent years (even as some aspects of U.S. access to space have become more distributed and resilient as well).90 China might well be willing to shoot at American satellites even if it sought, at least initially, not to attack U.S. ships or aircraft. However, its willingness to do the latter in addition should not be dismissed, in light of Taiwan’s importance to Beijing. And its willingness would likely grow very quickly after the first Chinese submarine was sunk, which could happen if the U.S.-Taiwan blockade-busting and convoy escort operation shot back at a PLA submarine that had just attacked a cargo vessel. Escalation could happen fast. Later in a conflict, China might even consider using nuclear weapons in such an attack, despite its official no-first-use policy, as Columbia professor Thomas Christensen has argued.91 While the term “surgical nuclear strike” is almost oxymoronic and Strangelovian, to the extent it has any faint resemblance to reality, it is probably in a situation like an attack on a lone ship at sea. Establishing air superiority has become much harder for the United States and Japan in these kinds of scenarios because of the PLA Air Force’s modernization trends in recent years, combined with the limited options for basing U.S. aircraft in the region. Fortunately, modern U.S. stealthy or “fifth-generation” aircraft are still far superior to Chinese planes. Unfortunately, China now has close to 1,000 “fourth-generation” fighters roughly comparable to U.S. aircraft such as the F-15 and F-16. And it can base perhaps 1,000 aircraft within several hundred miles of Taiwan. A RAND simulation estimates that China might be able to surge about half that number in an attack on Taiwan or on the shipping around it, including a mix of air-to-air, air-to-ground, and electronic-warfare planes. Using a basic model and some simplifying assumptions, RAND estimates that the United States could prevent such a surge force from reaching most of its targets only by continuously keeping some two wings or about 150 aircraft airborne near Taiwan. The United States and its partners would likely succeed in such an effort because, according to RAND’s model, the United States’ fifthgeneration aircraft—F-22s and F-35s, and to a lesser degree F/A-18E/F Super Hornets—could have 50 percent more lethality and up to 90 percent less vulnerability than Chinese combat jets.92 But the success would come at a price, and only with considerable effort and difficulty. China could choose the time and place of its surge, and the United States (with any allies) would therefore have to be vigilant at all times. It would need to keep fighters airborne near Taiwan essentially for as long as the crisis endured. It would also need the continued presence of airborne warning aircraft in the vicinity. Bases on Okinawa are about 750 kilometers away from Taiwan, or about an hour of flight time; aircraft carriers might be kept roughly that close too. But other bases in the area—Misawa Air Base on Japan’s main Honshu island, Andersen Air Force base on Guam— would be 2,500 kilometers or more distant, meaning some three hours of flying each way to get to station and then return after flying a patrol. If aircraft and crews are limited to a daily flight average of about six hours a day, jets from Okinawa could average 1.5 sorties per day and those from the more distant bases slightly less than one sortie per twenty-four hours. That would translate into three hours a day on station flying from Kadena and 1.5 hours a day flying from Guam or Honshu. Put differently: Eight aircraft (plus or minus) based on Kadena would be needed to sustain one on station near Taiwan. Sixteen aircraft or so based at Misawa or Andersen Air Force Base would be needed to keep one on station near Taiwan. Averaging this out, keeping two wings of fighters aloft at a time could require about ten to twelve times that number being based in the region, or twenty to twenty-four wings—more than half the total U.S. military aggregate. (The RAND study actually estimates that fourteen to thirty would be needed, depending on specific assumptions; I have simplified the analysis above.93) Moreover, the United States could lose a number of aircraft in this process, perhaps even dozens. China could lose dozens or even hundreds. The backdrop would be set for escalation. Both sides would be increasingly tempted to attack the land bases and aircraft carriers from which planes operated.94 Ballistic missiles and ballistic missile defense would be important in this kind of engagement, too. China now has missiles, such as the medium-range DF-21 in the Dong-Feng series, that are capable of being fired from its homeland and reaching ships east of Taiwan. It is not clear whether the United States could blind China’s sensors adequately to deprive the PLA of targeting information. Any PLA attack against military facilities in a place like Okinawa therefore could well shut down runways for at least some stretch of time and destroy aircraft or ordnance and fuel stocks not in underground areas or hardened shelters.95 Again, Chinese nuclear attacks against American and any allied naval assets in the region are hard to dismiss categorically. The antisubmarine warfare (ASW) effort could have multiple aspects. The United States would probably be tempted to deploy its own attack submarines as close as possible to China—certainly in the Taiwan Strait, maybe just outside PRC ports. This approach would provide American submarines a good prospect of destroying PRC submarines at their source, before they were in position to fire on commercial shipping (or U.S. aircraft carriers) in more distant waters. However, this type of ASW could be escalatory if it involved attacks in Chinese territorial waters. Whatever happened near Chinese shores, there would surely be additional layers of American ASW farther out to sea. American ASW assets on ships and planes would accompany convoys of merchant ships as they sailed in from the open ocean waters east of Taiwan. These convoys might form a thousand miles or more east of Taiwan and enjoy armed protection from that point onward as they traveled to the island, and then later as they departed. The ASW assets would use sonar to listen for submarines, and for the sound of any torpedoes being fired. The United States would have to deploy significant numbers of surface combatants and airplanes such as P-3s and P-8s, as well as helicopters, to the region for this mission. Some would help protect U.S. aircraft carriers east of Taiwan. Others would provide additional protection to merchant ships or mine warfare vessels as they operated near Taiwan’s shores. Any Chinese submarine wishing to fire a torpedo at a merchant ship or aircraft carrier would then first have to run a gauntlet (if it were firing long-range antiship missiles, it could avoid some of the gauntlet, but would depend on targeting information provided by another platform). It would likely have to evade submarine detection as it left port, avoid any openwater search missions that the United States and Taiwan established, and then somehow penetrate the defensive ASW perimeter of whatever convoy it was attacking as it approached its target. To survive the overall engagement and return to port, it would then need to successfully negotiate all of this in the other direction. Unfortunately for Chinese submarines, this would be risky business. Unfortunately for the United States, Taiwan, and any other allies participating in the effort, it would also be risky for their assets, and some would surely be lost in the operation. During the Cold War, the effectiveness of ASW operations was commonly assessed at 5 to 15 percent per barrier. (Cold War barriers were often more linear and literal perimeters than would be likely here, but the fact remains that Chinese submarines would have to survive perhaps three types of pursuers on three different parts of their journey to or from home base.) By those odds, the typical Chinese submarine would do well to survive for two or three round-trip missions from base.96 But it might succeed in getting off several shots against valuable, and vulnerable, surface ships before meeting its own demise.97 A recent major RAND study on the U.S.-China military balance concurred with this broad result, especially in cases where Chinese submarines could be cued by sensors to a general area where a target such as a U.S. aircraft carrier might operate. In that case, a given submarine might have multiple opportunities to get off shots at lucrative surface targets.98 China might hope that a quick strike that sank a major U.S. ship and killed hundreds of Americans (or even thousands, in the event of a carrier sinking) would cause Washington to waver in its future commitment to the defense of Taiwan. The United States might face serious challenges in waters near Taiwan as well, despite the proximity of land-based assets that could join in the ASW hunt. Shallow waters are complex sonar environments in which sound waves bounce back and forth in multiple and unpredictable directions. This makes ambush a real worry, especially for the mine warfare vessels and surface ships that would have to escort commercial vessels all the way into Taiwan’s ports.99 Toward a Net Assessment Where does this leave us? Although I have not provided a detailed scenario analysis or combat modeling exercise here, the broad contours of the situation drive home some central points. They are also consistent with the more detailed modeling work of others, such as RAND. Once a Chinese blockade operation against Taiwan began, it would be difficult to be confident that it would end without a significant and escalating conflict pitting the United States, Taiwan, and perhaps Japan against China. If that occurred, sustained naval, aerial, and missile combat in and around Taiwan would likely lead to substantial losses on all sides. American advantages in fifth-generation combat aircraft and modern attack submarines would give the United States and its partners in the operation a significant edge. However, that edge is less than it used to be. China would clearly have the edge in geography, and it also increasingly possesses good attack submarines and precision-strike missiles as well. Myriad uncertainties, including the survivability of space and cyber systems, as well as ships and land bases, make it hard to be confident in predicting outcomes. Indeed, when I modeled uncertainties with respect to a possible U.S.- led invasion of Iraq in 2002, I produced a likely band of possible casualties in which higher estimates were literally ten times greater than lower estimates. This broad approach was eventually vindicated: it initially appeared, in April 2003, that U.S. losses might be very modest, but over the course of several years it became clear they were much higher. A U.S.- China war would be far more uncertain. For most scenarios involving blockades and other possible intense operations over and in the waters of the western Pacific, the United States and allies could probably muscle their way to victory over China at this point, as we approach 2020. Taiwan could also likely endure the privations that would be experienced during the military campaign before victory was assured.100 My best guess is that both sides would lose most low-altitude satellites and some cyber as well as command, control, and communications capability, so the war would ultimately be fought in a certain fog. Yet American high-tech advantages in weapons platforms would ultimately provide an important and probably decisive edge. This somewhat sanguine conclusion is far from certain, however. It hinges in part on a willingness in Washington to accept many thousands of American battlefield dead and at least some risk of nuclear escalation. Even though U.S. nuclear forces far exceed those of the PLA, China might conclude that its disproportionate interests in the Taiwan issue warranted nuclear brinkmanship, especially if China had already possibly lost thousands of its own people in conventional combat, which would heighten the stakes as well as the reputational importance of the outcome of the conflict. These concerns could be amplified if the United States, intentionally or not, began to strike the nuclear assets of the PLA in the course of conventional fighting near Taiwan. If that happened, China might face a “use them or lose them” dilemma.101 Nuclear attack against a carrier, or a high-altitude nuclear airburst over a base like Kadena (designed to destroy people and equipment immediately below, without generating lots of fallout), might seem particularly attractive options to Beijing. Nuclear escalation might happen in another way as well. Perhaps China would attempt a large-scale cyberattack against the United States (and quite possibly Japan too) in the course of such a conflict. Its hope might be, for example, to incapacitate the U.S. electricity grid—as National Security Agency director Admiral Michael Rogers said in 2014 that China might well be able to do. Such a result could badly incapacitate many of the Defense Department systems in the United States that require civilianproduced electricity to function.102 Even if such systems could be restored quickly, the U.S. electrical system as a whole might remain damaged for many months, as might national infrastructure needed to deploy military forces abroad. Whether the United States could muster a major military response at a time when its national capacities were needed to take care of the many Americans left in the cold and dark, without medicine or sanitation or clean water or viable living quarters, is an open question. China might hope that U.S. military assets would be devoted to missions closer to home, to prevent mass famine, privation, or disease, after such a catastrophe. China might do this, if already losing in a conventional conflict or expecting to lose, even if its own cyber systems could be just as vulnerable to attack.103 Countries sometimes start wars or escalate not out of complete confidence that they will succeed but after concluding that the risks of inaction outweigh those of even risky action.104 And if China conducted such a cyber operation, it might be the very type of non-nuclear strategic attack that the Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review envisions as a plausible basis for possible American nuclear first use.105

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Disad --- Disclosure Bad › Terminal --- China / Taiwan

China/Taiwan war goes nuclear

Glaser 11

(Charles, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, “Will China’s Rise lead to War? ,” Foreign Affairs March/April 2011, )

THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Disad --- Disclosure Bad › Terminal --- China / Taiwan

Global nuclear war

Hunkovic 9 (Lee J, , “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict: Possible Futures of a Confrontation between , and the ”, )

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Disad --- Disclosure Bad › Terminal --- China / Taiwan

Taiwan goes nuclear

Lowther 13 – William Lowther, Taipei Times, citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3/16/13, “Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report,”

Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US, a new academic report concludes.“Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and China,” says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).Prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwan’s independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwan’s defense.“Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the situation remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements,” the report says.In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing Taiwan as “the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia.”The report also quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis.“This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation,” Betts wrote in a separate study of his own.The CSIS study says: “For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.”Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the US, but they do “provide kindling” for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US.The danger posed by flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study says.“Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion,” the report says.For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party.To make things worse, “neither side seems to believe the other’s declared policies and intentions, suggesting that escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict,” it says.Although conflict “mercifully” seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that “it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky.”The report says: “With both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.”

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Disad --- Disclosure Bad › A2: China Won’t Risk It

Yes risk, they are ramping up military pressure, and Xi has control of the party decision making and lacks checks, if Xi can deliver on his promise for Chinese glory he will take it

Bas van Beurden. Bas van Beurden is a student enrolled in the Master’s program International Relations & Diplomacy at Leiden University in cooperation with the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands.This article is part of a special issue on Taiwan-US relations under Biden presidency for the Taiwan studies programme, The Taiwan Studies Programme is a research centre based at the University of Nottingham focusing on all aspects of contemporary Taiwan. The Taiwan Studies Programme does not privilege political positions and the views published on Taiwan Insight are those of the author and not the institute., 12-3-2020, Deterrence & Dialogue: How Washington Can Prevent a US-China War Over Taiwan," Taiwan Insight, https://taiwaninsight.org/2020/12/03/deterrence-dialogue-how-washington-can-prevent-a-us-china-war-over-taiwan/, Accessed: 1-17-2021, MB

Can the United States and China escape Thucydides Trap? While international relations experts grapple with the question whether the two powers are destined for war, a storm seems to be gathering in the Asia-Pacific, and it seems increasingly clear where lightning might strike. Considering recent developments, the Taiwan Straits seems to be the most likely battleground for Sino-American conflict. The prospect of conflict appears to be looming as Beijing closes in on Hong Kong and ratchets up its rhetoric on a forceful reunification with Taiwan.

China has backed its statements on “the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation” with a substantial increase in military activity surrounding Taiwan. It has conducted an unprecedented amount of more than ten military and transit exercises in close proximity to Taiwan in 2020. Additionally, China’s air force made an incursion into Taiwanese airspace for the first time in 20 years. Since then, it has done so an accumulative number of times. A former top military official of Taiwan commented that Beijing might be looking to provoke a military reaction by Taipei, which could give them a casus belli for an invasion.

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Disad --- Disclosure Bad › Internal Link --- China Cyberstrikes US

China would initiate preemptive cyber strikes on the US

Freedberg 13 --- Freedberg, Sydney J. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. is the deputy editor for Breaking Defense. He graduated summa cum laude from Harvard with an AB in History and holds an MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University and a MPhil in European Studies from Cambridge University. During his 13 years at National Journal magazine, he wrote his first story about what became known as "homeland security" in 1998, his first story about "military transformation" in 1999, and his first story on "asymmetrical warfare" in 2000. Since 2004 he has conducted in-depth interviews with more than 200 veterans of Afghanistan and Iraq about their experiences, insights, and lessons-learned, writing stories that won awards from the association of Military Reporters & Editors in 2008 and 2009, as well as an honorable mention in 2010. "China’s Fear Of US May Tempt Them To Preempt: Sinologists," Breaking Defense. 10-1-2013. http://breakingdefense.com/2013/10/chinas-fear-of-us-may-tempt-them-to-preempt-sinologists/2

WASHINGTON: Because China believes it is much weaker than the United States, they are more likely to launch a massive preemptive strike in a crisis. Here’s the other bad news: The current US concept for high-tech warfare, known as Air-Sea Battle, might escalate the conflict even further towards a “limited” nuclear war, says one of the top American experts on the Chinese military. [This is one in an occasional series on the crucial strategic relationship and the military capabilities of the US, its allies and China.] What US analysts call an “anti-access/area denial” strategy is what China calls “counter-intervention” and “active defense,” and the Chinese approach is born of a deep sense of vulnerability that dates back 200 years, China analyst Larry Wortzel said at the Institute of World Politics: “The People’s Liberation Army still sees themselves as an inferior force to the American military, and that’s who they think their most likely enemy is.” That’s fine as long as it deters China from attacking its neighbors. But if deterrence fails, the Chinese are likely to go big or go home. Chinese military history from the Korean War in 1950 to the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 to more recent, albeit vigorous but non-violent, grabs for the disputed Scarborough Shoal suggests a preference for a sudden use of overwhelming force at a crucial point, what Clausewitz would call the enemy’s “center of gravity.” “What they do is very heavily built on preemption,” Wortzel said. “The problem with the striking the enemy’s center of gravity is, for the United States, they see it as being in Japan, Hawaii, and the West Coast….That’s very escalatory.” (Students of the American military will nod sagely, of course, as we remind everyone that President George Bush made preemption a centerpiece of American strategy after the terror attacks of 2001.) Wortzel argued that the current version of US Air-Sea Battle concept is also likely to lead to escalation. “China’s dependent on these ballistic missiles and anti-ship missiles and satellite links,” he said. Since those are almost all land-based, any attack on them “involves striking the Chinese mainland, which is pretty escalatory.” “You don’t know how they’re going to react,” he said. “They do have nuclear missiles. They actually think we’re more allergic to nuclear missiles landing on our soil than they are on their soil. They think they can withstand a limited nuclear attack, or even a big nuclear attack, and retaliate.” What War Would Look Like So how would China’s preemptive attack unfold? First would come weeks of escalating rhetoric and cyberattacks. There’s no evidence the Chinese favor a “bolt out of the blue” without giving the adversary what they believe is a chance to back down, agreed retired Rear Adm. Michael McDevitt and Dennis Blasko, former Army defense attache in Beijing, speaking on a recent Wilson Center panel on Chinese strategy where they agreed on almost nothing else. That’s not much comfort, though, considering that Imperial Japan showed clear signs they might attack and still caught the US flat-footed at Pearl Harbor. When the blow does fall, the experts believe it would be sudden. Stuxnet-style viruses, electronic jamming, and Israeli-designed Harpy radar-seeking cruise missiles (similar to the American HARM but slower and longer-ranged) would try to blind every land-based and shipborne radar. Long-range anti-aircraft missiles like the Russian-built S-300 would go for every plane currently in the air within 125 miles of China’s coast, a radius that covers all of Taiwan and some of Japan. Salvos of ballistic missiles would strike every airfield within 1,250 miles. That’s enough range to hit the four US airbases in Japan and South Korea – which are, after all, static targets you can look up on Google Maps – to destroy aircraft on the ground, crater the runways, and scatter the airfield with unexploded cluster bomblets to defeat repair attempts. Long-range cruise missiles launched from shore, ships, and submarines then go after naval vessels. And if the Chinese get really good and really lucky, they just might get a solid enough fix on a US Navy aircraft carrier to lob a precision-guided ballistic missile at it. But would this work? Maybe. “This is fundamentally terra incognita,” Heritage Foundation research fellow Dean Cheng told me. There has been no direct conventional clash between major powers since Korea in the 1950s, no large-scale use of anti-ship missiles since the Falklands in 1982, and no war ever where both sides possessed today’s space, cyber, electronic warfare, and precision-guided missile capabilities. Perhaps the least obvious but most critical uncertainty in a Pacific war would be invisible. “I don’t think we’ve seen electronic warfare on a scale that we’d see in a US-China confrontation,” said Cheng. “I doubt very much they are behind us when it comes to electronic warfare, [and] the Chinese are training every day on cyber: all those pings, all those attacks, all those attempts to penetrate.” While the US has invested heavily in jamming and spoofing over the last decade, much of the focus has been on how to disable insurgents’ roadside bombs, not on how to counter a high-tech nation-state. China, however, has focused its electronic warfare and cyber attack efforts on the United States. Conceptually, China may well be ahead of us in linking the two. (F-35 supporters may well disagree with this conclusion.) Traditional radar jammers, for example, can also be used to insert viruses into the highly computerized AESA radars (active electronically scanned array) that are increasingly common in the US military. “Where there has been a fundamental difference, and perhaps the Chinese are better than we are at this, is the Chinese seem to have kept cyber and electronic warfare as a single integrated thing,” Cheng said. “We are only now coming round to the idea that electronic warfare is linked to computer network operations.” In a battle for the electromagnetic spectrum, Cheng said, the worst case “is that you thought your jammers, your sensors, everything was working great, and the next thing you know missiles are penetrating [your defenses], planes are being shot out of the sky.”

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Disad --- Disclosure Bad › Internal Link --- China Cyberstrikes US

Cyber capabilities are key to deterrence and defending against China

Gompert and Libicki 15 --- Gompert, David C. and Libicki, Martin. David C. Gompert is the Principle Deputy Director of National Intelligence. He is a Senior Fellow at RAND and a Distinguished Visiting Professor at the National Defense University's Center for Technology and National Security Policy. Gompert received his BA in Engineering from the US Naval Academy and his MPA from Princeton University. Martin Libicki received his PhD in Economics from UC Berkeley, his MA in City and Regional Planning from UC Berkeley, and his BSc in Mathematics from MIT. He is a Professor at the RAND Graduate School and a Senior Management Scientist at RAND. “Waging Cyber War the American Way,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy. August–September 2015. Vol 57., 4th ed, pp 7-28. 07-22-2015. http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2015-1e95/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-august-september-2015-c6ba/57-4-02-gompert-and-libicki-eab1

At the same time, the United States regards cyber war during armed conflict with a cyber-capable enemy as probable, if not inevitable. It both assumes that the computer systems on which its own forces rely to deploy, receive support and strike will be attacked, and intends to attack the computer systems that enable opposing forces to operate as well. Thus, the United States has said that it can and would conduct cyber war to ‘support operational and contingency plans’ – a euphemism for attacking computer systems that enable enemy war fighting. US military doctrine now regards ‘non-kinetic’ (that is, cyber) measures as an integral aspect of US joint offensive operations.8 Even so, the stated purposes of the US military regarding cyber war stress protecting the ability of conventional military forces to function as they should, as well as avoiding and preventing escalation, especially to non-military targets. Apart from its preparedness to conduct counter-military cyber operations during wartime, the United States has been reticent about using its offensive capabilities. While it has not excluded conducting cyber operations to coerce hostile states or non-state actors, it has yet to brandish such a threat.9 Broadly speaking, US policy is to rely on the threat of retaliation to deter a form of warfare it is keen to avoid. Chinese criticism that the US retaliatory policy and capabilities ‘will up the ante on the Internet arms race’ is disingenuous in that China has been energetic in forming and using capabilities for cyber operations.10 Chinese criticism is disingenuous Notwithstanding the defensive bias in US attitudes toward cyber war, the dual missions of deterrence and preparedness for offensive operations during an armed conflict warrant maintaining superb, if not superior, offensive capabilities. Moreover, the case can be made – and we have made it – that the United States should have superiority in offensive capabilities in order to control escalation.11 The combination of significant capabilities and declared reluctance to wage cyber war raises a question that is not answered by any US official public statements: when it comes to offence, what are US missions, desired effects, target sets and restraints – in short, what is US policy? To be clear, we do not take issue with the basic US stance of being at once wary and capable of cyber war. Nor do we think that the United States should advertise exactly when and how it would conduct offensive cyber war. However, the very fact that the United States maintains options for offensive operations implies the need for some articulation of policy. After all, the United States was broadly averse to the use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, yet it elaborated a declaratory policy governing such use to inform adversaries, friends and world opinion, as well as to forge domestic consensus. Indeed, if the United States wants to discourage and limit cyber war internationally, while keeping its options open, it must offer an example. For that matter, the American people deserve to know what national policy on cyber war is, lest they assume it is purely defensive – or just too esoteric to comprehend. Whether to set a normative example, warn potential adversaries or foster national consensus, US policy on waging cyber war should be coherent. At the same time, it must encompass three distinguishable offensive missions: wartime counter-military operations, which the United States intends to conduct; retaliatory missions, which the US must have the will and ability to conduct for reasons of deterrence; and coercive missions against hostile states, which could substitute for armed attack.12 Four cases serve to highlight the relevant issues and to inform the elaboration of an overall policy to guide US conduct of offensive cyber war. The first involves wartime counter-military cyber operations against a cyber-capable opponent, which may also be waging cyber war; the second involves retaliation against a cyber-capable opponent for attacking US systems other than counter-military ones; the third involves coercion of a ‘cyber-weak’ opponent with little or no means to retaliate against US cyber attack; and the fourth involves coercion of a ‘cyber-strong’ opponent with substantial means to retaliate against US cyber attack. Of these, the first and fourth imply a willingness to initiate cyber war. Counter-military cyber war during wartime Just as cyber war is war, armed hostilities will presumably include cyber war if the belligerents are both capable of and vulnerable to it. The reason for such certainty is that impairing opposing military forces’ use of computer systems is operationally compelling. Forces with requisite technologies and skills benefit enormously from data communications and computation for command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), targeting, navigation, weapon guidance, battle assessment and logistics management, among other key functions. If the performance of forces is dramatically enhanced by such systems, it follows that degrading them can provide important military advantages. Moreover, allowing an enemy to use cyber war without reciprocating could mean military defeat. Thus, the United States and other advanced states are acquiring capabilities not only to use and protect computer systems, but also to disrupt those used by enemies. The intention to wage cyber war is now prevalent in Chinese planning for war with the United States – and vice versa. Chinese military planners have long made known their belief that, because computer systems are essential for effective US military operations, they must be targeted. Chinese cyber capabilities may not (yet) pose a threat to US command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks, which are well partitioned and protected. However, the networks that enable logistical support for US forces are inviting targets. Meant to disable US military operations, Chinese use of cyber war during an armed conflict would not be contingent on US cyber operations. Indeed, it could come early, first or even as a precursor of armed hostilities. For its part, the US military is increasingly aware not only that sophisticated adversaries like China can be expected to use cyber war to degrade the performance of US forces, but also that US forces must integrate cyber war into their capabilities and operations. Being more dependent on computer networks to enhance military performance than are its adversaries, including China, US forces have more to lose than to gain from the outbreak of cyber war during an armed conflict. This being so, would it make sense for the United States to wait and see if the enemy resorts to cyber war before doing so itself? Given US conventional military superiority, it can be assumed that any adversary that can use cyber war against US forces will do so. Moreover, waiting for the other side to launch a cyber attack could be disadvantageous insofar as US forces would be the first to suffer degraded performance. Thus, rather than waiting, there will be pressure for the United States to commence cyber attacks early, and perhaps first. Moreover, leading US military officers have strongly implied that cyber war would have a role in attacking enemy anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) capabilities irrespective of the enemy’s use of cyber war.13 If the United States is prepared to conduct offensive cyber operations against a highly advanced opponent such as China, it stands to reason that it would do likewise against lesser opponents. In sum, offensive cyber war is becoming part and parcel of the US war-fighting doctrine. The nature of US counter-military cyber attacks during wartime should derive from the mission of gaining, or denying the opponent, operational advantage. Primary targets of the United States should mirror those of a cyber-capable adversary: ISR, command and control, navigation and guidance, transport and logistics support. Because this mission is not coercive or strategic in nature, economic and other civilian networks should not be targeted. However, to the extent that networks that enable military operations may be multipurpose, avoidance of non-military harm cannot be assured. There are no sharp ‘firebreaks’ in cyber war.14

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Disad --- Disclosure Bad › Internal Link --- China Invades Taiwan

Losing our comparative advantage emboldens China to take Taiwan – that breaks down cyber deterrence and turns heg

Hjortdal 11 --- Magnus Hjortdal is a researcher associated with CHINA-SEC, Centre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen, "China's Use of Cyber Warfare: Espionage Meets Strategic Deterrence." Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 2 (2011) : 1-24. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.2.1 Available at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss2/2

China's military strategy mentions cyber capabilities as an area that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) should invest in and use . 13 The U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, has also declared that China's development in the cyber area increasingly concerns him, 14 and that there has been a decade-long trend of cyber attacks emanating from China. 15

Virtually all digital and electronic military systems can be attacked via cyberspace. Therefore, it is essential for a state to develop capabilities in this area if it wishes to challenge the present American hegemony. The interesting question then is whether China is developing capabilities in cyberspace in order to deter the United States. 16 

2022 SDI Negative
**Off-Case** › Disad --- Disclosure Bad › Internal Link --- Zero-Days K2 Deterrence

Zero-days are key to effective cyber-war offensive capabilities

Gjelten 13 --- Gjelten, Tom. TOM GJELTEN is a correspondent for NPR. Over the years, he has reported extensively from Europe and Latin America, including Cuba. He was reporting live from the Pentagon when it was attacked on September 11, 2001. Subsequently, he covered the war in Afghanistan and Iraq invasion as NPR's lead Pentagon correspondent. Gjelten also covered the first Gulf War and the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia. From Berlin (1990–1994), he covered Europe’s political and economic transition after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Gjelten’s series From Marx to Markets, documenting Eastern Europe’s transition to a market economy, earned him an Overseas Press Club award for the the Best Business or Economic Reporting in Radio or TV. His reporting from Bosnia earned him a second Overseas Press Club Award, a George Polk Award, and a Robert F Kennedy Journalism Award. Gjelten’s books include Sarajevo Daily: A City and Its Newspaper Under Siege, which the New York Times called “a chilling portrayal of a city’s slow murder.” His 2008 book, Bacardi and the Long Fight for Cuba: The Biography of a Cause, was selected as a New York Times Notable Nonfiction Book. "First Strike: US Cyber Warriors Seize the Offensive," World Affairs Journal. January/February 2013. http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/first-strike-us-cyber-warriors-seize-offensive

That was then. Much of the cyber talk around the Pentagon these days is about offensive operations. It is no longer enough for cyber troops to be deployed along network perimeters, desperately trying to block the constant attempts by adversaries to penetrate front lines. The US military’s geek warriors are now prepared to go on the attack, armed with potent cyberweapons that can break into enemy computers with pinpoint precision. The new emphasis is evident in a program launched in October 2012 by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Pentagon’s experimental research arm. DARPA funding enabled the invention of the Internet, stealth aircraft, GPS, and voice-recognition software, and the new program, dubbed Plan X, is equally ambitious. DARPA managers said the Plan X goal was “to create revolutionary technologies for understanding, planning, and managing cyberwarfare.” The US Air Force was also signaling its readiness to go into cyber attack mode, announcing in August that it was looking for ideas on how “to destroy, deny, degrade, disrupt, deceive, corrupt, or usurp the adversaries [sic] ability to use the cyberspace domain for his advantage.” The new interest in attacking enemies rather than simply defending against them has even spread to the business community. Like their military counterparts, cybersecurity experts in the private sector have become increasingly frustrated by their inability to stop intruders from penetrating critical computer networks to steal valuable data or even sabotage network operations. The new idea is to pursue the perpetrators back into their own networks. “We’re following a failed security strategy in cyber,” says Steven Chabinsky, formerly the head of the FBI’s cyber intelligence section and now chief risk officer at CrowdStrike, a startup company that promotes aggressive action against its clients’ cyber adversaries. “There’s no way that we are going to win the cybersecurity effort on defense. We have to go on offense.” The growing interest in offensive operations is bringing changes in the cybersecurity industry. Expertise in patching security flaws in one’s own computer network is out; expertise in finding those flaws in the other guy’s network is in. Among the “hot jobs” listed on the career page at the National Security Agency are openings for computer scientists who specialize in “vulnerability discovery.” Demand is growing in both government and industry circles for technologists with the skills to develop ever more sophisticated cyber tools, including malicious software—malware—with such destructive potential as to qualify as cyberweapons when implanted in an enemy’s network. “Offense is the biggest growth sector in the cyber industry right now,” says Jeffrey Carr, a cybersecurity analyst and author of Inside Cyber Warfare. But have we given sufficient thought to what we are doing? Offensive operations in the cyber domain raise a host of legal, ethical, and political issues, and governments, courts, and business groups have barely begun to consider them. The move to offensive operations in cyberspace was actually under way even as Pentagon officials were still insisting their strategy was defensive. We just didn’t know it. The big revelation came in June 2012, when New York Times reporter David Sanger reported that the United States and Israel were behind the development of the Stuxnet worm, which had been used to damage computer systems controlling Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities. Sanger, citing members of President Obama’s national security team, said the attacks were code-named Olympic Games and constituted “America’s first sustained use of cyberweapons.” The highly sophisticated Stuxnet worm delivered computer instructions that caused some Iranian centrifuges to spin uncontrollably and self-destruct. According to Sanger, the secret cyber attacks had begun during the presidency of George W. Bush but were accelerated on the orders of Obama. The publication of such a highly classified operation provoked a firestorm of controversy, but government officials who took part in discussions of Stuxnet have not denied the accuracy of Sanger’s reporting. “He nailed it,” one participant told me. In the aftermath of the Stuxnet revelations, discussions about cyber war became more realistic and less theoretical. Here was a cyberweapon that had been designed and used for the same purpose and with the same effect as a kinetic weapon: like a missile or a bomb, it caused physical destruction. Security experts had been warning that a US adversary could use a cyberweapon to destroy power plants, water treatment facilities, or other critical infrastructure assets here in the United States, but the Stuxnet story showed how the American military itself could use an offensive cyberweapon against an enemy. The advantages of such a strike were obvious. A cyberweapon could take down computer networks and even destroy physical equipment without the civilian casualties that a bombing mission would entail. Used preemptively, it could keep a conflict from evolving in a more lethal direction. The targeted country would have a hard time determining where the cyber attack came from. In fact, the news that the United States had actually developed and used an offensive cyberweapon gave new significance to hints US officials had quietly dropped on previous occasions about the enticing potential of such tools. In remarks at the Brookings Institution in April 2009, for example, the then Air Force chief of staff, General Norton Schwartz, suggested that cyberweapons could be used to attack an enemy’s air defense system. “Traditionally,” Schwartz said, “we take down integrated air defenses via kinetic means. But if it were possible to interrupt radar systems or surface to air missile systems via cyber, that would be another very powerful tool in the tool kit allowing us to accomplish air missions.” He added, “We will develop that—have [that]—capability.” A full two years before the Pentagon rolled out its “defensive” cyber strategy, Schwartz was clearly suggesting an offensive application. The Pentagon’s reluctance in 2011 to be more transparent about its interest in offensive cyber capabilities may simply have reflected sensitivity to an ongoing dispute within the Obama administration. Howard Schmidt, the White House Cybersecurity Coordinator at the time the Department of Defense strategy was released, was steadfastly opposed to any use of the term “cyber war” and had no patience for those who seemed eager to get into such a conflict. But his was a losing battle. Pentagon planners had already classified cyberspace officially as a fifth “domain” of warfare, alongside land, air, sea, and space. As the 2011 cyber strategy noted, that designation “allows DoD to organize, train, and equip for cyberspace as we do in air, land, maritime, and space to support national security interests.” That statement by itself contradicted any notion that the Pentagon’s interest in cyber was mainly defensive. Once the US military accepts the challenge to fight in a new domain, it aims for superiority in that domain over all its rivals, in both offensive and defensive realms. Cyber is no exception. The US Air Force budget request for 2013 included $4 billion in proposed spending to achieve “cyberspace superiority,” according to Air Force Secretary Michael Donley. It is hard to imagine the US military settling for any less, given the importance of electronic assets in its capabilities. Even small unit commanders go into combat equipped with laptops and video links. “We’re no longer just hurling mass and energy at our opponents in warfare,” says John Arquilla, professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School. “Now we’re using information, and the more you have, the less of the older kind of weapons you need.” Access to data networks has given warfighters a huge advantage in intelligence, communication, and coordination. But their dependence on those networks also creates vulnerabilities, particularly when engaged with an enemy that has cyber capabilities of his own. “Our adversaries are probing every possible entry point into the network, looking for that one possible weak spot,” said General William Shelton, head of the Air Force Space Command, speaking at a CyberFutures Conference in 2012. “If we don’t do this right, these new data links could become one of those spots.” Achieving “cyber superiority” in a twenty-first-century battle space is analogous to the establishment of air superiority in a traditional bombing campaign. Before strike missions begin against a set of targets, air commanders want to be sure the enemy’s air defense system has been suppressed. Radar sites, antiaircraft missile batteries, enemy aircraft, and command-and-control facilities need to be destroyed before other targets are hit. Similarly, when an information-dependent combat operation is planned against an opposing military, the operational commanders may first want to attack the enemy’s computer systems to defeat his ability to penetrate and disrupt the US military’s information and communication networks. Indeed, operations like this have already been carried out. A former ground commander in Afghanistan, Marine Lieutenant General Richard Mills, has acknowledged using cyber attacks against his opponent while directing international forces in southwest Afghanistan in 2010. “I was able to use my cyber operations against my adversary with great impact,” Mills said, in comments before a military conference in August 2012. “I was able to get inside his nets, infect his command-and-control, and in fact defend myself against his almost constant incursions to get inside my wire, to affect my operations.” Mills was describing offensive cyber actions. This is cyber war, waged on a relatively small scale and at the tactical level, but cyber war nonetheless. And, as DARPA’s Plan X reveals, the US military is currently engaged in much larger scale cyber war planning. DARPA managers want contractors to come up with ideas for mapping the digital battlefield so that commanders could know where and how an enemy has arrayed his computer networks, much as they are now able to map the location of enemy tanks, ships, and aircraft. Such visualizations would enable cyber war commanders to identify the computer targets they want to destroy and then assess the “battle damage” afterwards. Plan X would also support the development of new cyber war architecture. The DARPA managers envision operating systems and platforms with “mission scripts” built in, so that a cyber attack, once initiated, can proceed on its own in a manner “similar to the auto-pilot function in modern aircraft.” None of this technology exists yet, but neither did the Internet or GPS when DARPA researchers first dreamed of it. As with those innovations, the government role is to fund and facilitate, but much of the experimental and research work would be done in the private sector. A computer worm with a destructive code like the one Stuxnet carried can probably be designed only with state sponsorship, in a research lab with resources like those at the NSA. But private contractors are in a position to provide many of the tools needed for offensive cyber activity, including the software bugs that can be exploited to provide a “back door” into a computer’s operating system. Ideally, the security flaw or vulnerability that can be exploited for this purpose will be one of which the network operator is totally unaware. Some hackers specialize in finding these vulnerabilities, and as the interest in offensive cyber operations has grown, so has the demand for their services. The world-famous hacker conference known as Defcon attracts a wide and interesting assortment of people each year to Las Vegas: creative but often antisocial hackers who identify themselves only by their screen names, hackers who have gone legit as computer security experts, law enforcement types, government spies, and a few curious academics and journalists. One can learn what’s hot in the hacker world just by hanging out there. In August 2012, several attendees were seated in the Defcon cafe when a heavy-set young man in jeans, a t-shirt, and a scraggly beard strolled casually up and dropped several homemade calling cards on the table. He then moved to the next table and tossed down a few more, all without saying a word. There was no company logo or brand name on the card, just this message: “Paying top dollar for 0-day and offensive technologies . . . ” The card identified the buyer as “zer0daybroker” and listed an e-mail address. A “zero-day” is the most valuable of computer vulnerabilities, one unknown to anyone but the researcher who finds it. Hackers prize zero-days because no one knows to have prepared a defense against them. The growing demand for these tools has given rise to brokers like Zer0day, who identified himself in a subsequent e-mail exchange as “Zer0 Day Haxor” but provided no other identifying information. As a broker, he probably did not intend to hack into a computer network himself but only to act as an intermediary, connecting sellers who have discovered system vulnerabilities with buyers who want to make use of the tools and are willing to pay a high price for them. In the past, the main market for these vulnerabilities was software firms themselves who wanted to know about flaws in their products so that they could write patches to fix them. Big companies like Google and Microsoft employ “penetration testers” whose job it is to find and report vulnerabilities that would allow someone to hack into their systems. In some cases, such companies have paid a bounty to freelance cyber researchers who discover a vulnerability and alert the company engineers. But the rise in offensive cyber operations has transformed the vulnerability market, and hackers these days are more inclined to sell zero-days to the highest bidder. In most cases, these are governments. The market for back-door exploits has been boosted in large part by the burgeoning demand from militaries eager to develop their cyber warfighting capabilities. The designers of the Stuxnet code cleared a path into Iranian computers through the use of four or five separate zero-day vulnerabilities, an achievement that impressed security researchers around the world. The next Stuxnet would require the use of additional vulnerabilities. “If the president asks the US military to launch a cyber operation in Iran tomorrow, it’s not the time to start looking for exploits,” says Christopher Soghoian, a Washington-based cybersecurity researcher. “They need to have the exploits ready to go. And you may not know what kind of computer your target uses until you get there. You need a whole arsenal [of vulnerabilities] ready to go in order to cover every possible configuration you may meet.” Not surprisingly, the National Security Agency—buying through defense contractors—may well be the biggest customer in the vulnerability market, largely because it pays handsomely. The US military’s dominant presence in the market means that other possible purchasers cannot match the military’s price. “Instead of telling Google or Mozilla about a flaw and getting a bounty for two thousand dollars, researchers will sell it to a defense contractor like Raytheon or SAIC and get a hundred thousand for it,” says Soghoian, now the principal technologist in the Speech, Privacy and Technology Project at the American Civil Liberties Union and a prominent critic of the zero-day market. “Those companies will then turn around and sell the vulnerability upstream to the NSA or another defense agency. They will outbid Google every time.”