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2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › AI Interoperability 1AC › 1AC – AI Leadership

Their turns are false--US leadership on advanced technologies will increase deterrence and not threaten aggression.

Matthew Kroenig, 2021 (Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Will Emerging Technology Cause Nuclear War?: Bringing Geopolitics Back In,” , Retrieved 6/15/2022)

The spread of new technology to the United States and its Allies and partners would likely serve, on balance, to reinforce the existing sources of stability in the prevailing international system. At the end of the Cold War, the United States and its Allies and partners achieved a technological- military advantage over its great power rivals, with the US using its unipolar position to deepen and expand a rules- based system. They also employed their military dominance to counter perceived threats from rogue states and terrorist networks. The United States, its Allies, and part¬ners did not, however, engage in military aggression against great power, nuclear- armed rivals or their allies. In the future, these status quo powers are apt to use military advantages to reinforce their position in the international system and to deter attacks against Allies and partners in Europe and the Indo- Pacific. These states might also employ military power to deal with threats posed by terrorist networks or by regional revisionist powers such as Iran and North Korea. But it is extremely difficult to imagine scenarios in which Washington or its Allies or partners would use newfound military advantages provided by emerging technology to conduct an armed attack against Russia or China.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › AI Interoperability 1AC › 1AC – AI Leadership

War with China can happen by miscalculation:

Michèle A. Flournoy, 6/18/2020 (Co-Founder and Managing Partner of WestExec Advisors. From 2009 to 2012, she served as U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, “How to Prevent a War in Asia,” , Retrieved 8/11/2021)

Amid all the uncertainty about the world that will follow the pandemic, one thing is almost sure to be true: tensions between the United States and China will be even sharper than they were before the coronavirus outbreak. The resurgence of U.S.-Chinese competition poses a host of challenges for policymakers—related to trade and economics, technology, global influence, and more—but none is more consequential than reducing the risk of war. Unfortunately, thanks to today’s uniquely dangerous mix of growing Chinese assertiveness and military strength and eroding U.S. deterrence, that risk is higher than it has been for decades, and it is growing. Neither Washington nor Beijing seeks a military conflict with the other. Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump both undoubtedly understand that a war would be disastrous. Yet the United States and China could all too easily stumble into conflict, sparked by a Chinese miscalculation of the United States’ willingness or capability to respond to provocations in disputed areas such as the South China Sea or to outright aggression against Taiwan or another U.S. security partner in the region.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › AI Interoperability 1AC › 1AC – AI Leadership

Threats to US hegemony lead to nuclear war:

Lu Yuanzhi, 2/4/2021 (journalist, Global Times, “Washington’s reckless attitude toward nuclear war a threat to world peace,” , Retrieved 8/11/2021)

Fox News reported that the head of US Strategic Command Charles Richard is calling on the US military and federal leaders to reimagine methods of deterring aggressive action from rivals such as China and Russia. He wrote in the February issue of Proceedings, the US Naval Institute's monthly magazine, that, "There is a real possibility that a regional crisis with Russia or China could escalate quickly to a conflict involving nuclear weapons." It's not uncommon to hear the noise preaching so-called threats of China and Russia. Yet it's still shocking to see a US senior military official publicly urging leaders of his country to consider a nuclear war. His narratives have drawn wide attention. Song Zhongping, a Chinese military expert and commentator, told the Global Times on Thursday that Richard's rhetoric may be out of the following intention. First, he may hope to increase the strategic value of the Strategic Command in the US military. Second, Richard wants the US Congress to allocate more funds to create a new US nuclear weapons system, in a bid to reinforce a new triad of strategic nuclear forces. Third, he seeks to pursue the Strategic Command's larger control over US nuclear weapons. For whatever reason, a top military official from the US, the most powerful country and whose new administration has pledged to restore its global leadership, is irresponsible to express such a crazy idea, as it poses huge challenges to world peace and security. It should be condemned by the international community. Most nuclear-weapon countries including China, tend to keep their nuclear force for the purpose of safeguarding their national security. Only when their safety, sovereignty or territory is threatened, will they consider resorting to using nuclear weapons. But the principle of the US totally differs. The US military might be the strongest, possessing the largest and most advanced nuclear arsenal. In spite of vowing to pursue disarmament, Washington actually spent trillions of dollars in upgrading its nuclear arsenal. Apart from terrorists, no country is capable of posing any threat to the US homeland. Just as Song said, spending trillions of dollars to upgrade its nuclear arsenal is mainly to maintain its global hegemony. This is the fundamental difference between the US and other nuclear-weapon countries in terms of keeping nuclear forces. Washington covers a wide range when it comes to defending its hegemony. It includes safeguarding its national security as well as its core interests on a global scale. Just as former US president Barack Obama said at the US Military Academy at West Point in 2014, "America must always lead on the world stage… If we [the US] don't, no one else will." If any country gravely threatens US hegemony, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the US may use nuclear weapons to remarkably impair its rivals' military capability. This is the huge threat of US radical nuclear policy posed to the world. It is a big challenge for all countries, including China and Russia, and to global peace and safety. The US is the biggest trouble-maker in the world, which has the potential to overturn global peace.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › AI Interoperability 1AC › 1AC – AI Leadership

Chinese tech leadership risks war over Taiwan or the East and South China Seas—these scenarios risk nuclear escalation.

Matthew Kroenig, 2021 (Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Will Emerging Technology Cause Nuclear War?: Bringing Geopolitics Back In,” , Retrieved 6/15/2022)

Similarly, Moscow and Beijing would likely use any newfound military strength to advance their preexisting geopolitical aims. Given their very different positions in the international system, however, these states are likely to employ new military technologies in ways that are destabilizing. These states have made clear their dissatisfaction with the existing inter¬national system and their desire to revise it. Both countries have ongoing border disputes with multiple neighboring countries. If Moscow developed new military technologies and operational con-cepts that shifted the balance of power in its favor, it would likely use this advantage to pursue revisionist aims. If Moscow acquired a newfound ability to more easily invade and occupy territory in Eastern Europe, for example (or if Putin believed Russia had such a capability), it is more likely Russia would be tempted to engage in aggression. Likewise, if China acquired an enhanced ability through new technology to invade and occupy Taiwan or contested islands in the East or South China Seas, Beijing’s leaders might also find this opportunity tempting. If new technology enhances either power’s anti- access, area- denial network, then its leaders may be more confident in their ability to achieve a fait accompli attack against a neighbor and then block a US- led liberation. These are precisely the types of shifts in the balance of power that can lead to war. As mentioned previously, the predominant scholarly theory on the causes of war—the bargaining model—maintains that imperfect in¬formation on the balance of power and the balance of resolve and credible commitment problems result in international conflict.52 New technology can exacerbate these causal mechanisms by increasing uncertainty about, or causing rapid shifts in, the balance of power. Indeed as noted above, new military technology and the development of new operational con¬cepts have shifted the balance of power and resulted in military conflict throughout history. Some may argue emerging military technology is more likely to result in a new tech arms race than in conflict. This is possible. But Moscow and Beijing may come to believe (correctly or not) that new technology pro¬vides them a usable military advantage over the United States and its Al¬lies and partners. In so doing, they may underestimate Washington. If Moscow or Beijing attacked a vulnerable US Ally or partner in their near abroad, therefore, there would be a risk of major war with the potential for nuclear escalation. The United States has formal treaty commitments with several frontline states as well as an ambiguous defense obligation to Taiwan. If Russia or China were to attack these states, it is likely, or at least possible, that the United States would come to the defense of the victims. While many question the wisdom or credibility of America’s global com¬mitments, it would be difficult for the United States to simply back down. Abandoning a treaty ally could cause fears that America’s global commit¬ments would unravel. Any US president, therefore, would feel great pres¬sure to come to an Ally’s defense and expel Russian or Chinese forces. Once the United States and Russia or China are at war, there would be a risk of nuclear escalation. As noted previously, experts assess the greatest risk of nuclear war today does not come from a bolt- out- of- the- blue strike but from nuclear escalation in a regional, conventional conflict.53 Russian leaders may believe it is in their interest to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict with the United States and NATO.54 Russia possesses a large and diverse arsenal, including thousands of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, to support this nuclear strategy. In the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, Washington indicates it could re-taliate against any Russian nuclear “de- escalation” strikes with limited nuclear strikes of its own using low- yield nuclear weapons.55 The purpose of US strategy is to deter Russian strikes. If deterrence fails, however, there is a clear pathway to nuclear war between the United States and Russia. As Henry Kissinger pointed out decades ago, there is no guarantee that, once begun, a limited nuclear war stays limited.56 There are similar risks of nuclear escalation in the event of a US- China conflict. China has traditionally possessed a relaxed nuclear posture with a small “lean and effective” deterrent and a formal “no first use” policy. But China is relying more on its strategic forces. It is projected to double—if not triple or quadruple—the size of its nuclear arsenal in the coming decade.57 Chinese experts have acknowledged there is a narrow range of contin-gencies in which China might use nuclear weapons first.58 As in the case of Russia, the US Nuclear Posture Review recognizes the possibility of limited Chinese nuclear attacks and also holds out the potential of a lim-ited US reprisal with low- yield nuclear weapons as a deterrent.59 If the nuclear threshold is breached in a conflict between the United States and China, the risk of nuclear exchange is real. In short, if a coming revolution in military affairs provides a real or perceived battlefield advantage for Russia or China, such a development raises the likelihood of armed aggression against US regional allies, major power war, and an increased risk of nuclear escalation.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › AI Interoperability 1AC › 1AC – AI Leadership

Lack of US leadership on emerging technologies risks great power nuclear conflict.

Matthew Kroenig, 2021 (Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Will Emerging Technology Cause Nuclear War?: Bringing Geopolitics Back In,” , Retrieved 6/15/2022)

In order to fully understand the link between nuclear stability and emerging technology, the current geopolitical situation must be accounted for. Incorpo-rating emerging technologies into US, Ally, and partner militaries will likely reinforce the prevailing global strategic stability. Will emerging technology cause nuclear war? For more than 70 years, the world has avoided major- power conflict, and many attribute this era of peace to nuclear weapons.1 In situations of mutually assured destruction, neither side has an incentive to launch a nuclear first strike because doing so will only result in self- annihilation. Maintaining secure, second- strike capabilities—the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating counterattack—is the key to deterrence.2 Recently, analysts have begun to worry, however, that new military technologies may call into question this model of global strategic stability.3 The world is experiencing a fourth industrial revolution (4IR) in which a wave of new and transformative technologies is being developed, includ¬ing artificial intelligence (AI), additive manufacturing, quantum informa¬tion technology, hypersonic missiles, biotechnology, and directed energy.4 While these technologies are expected to have profound implications for societies and economies, most are dual use and will also affect national security, including nuclear strategic stability. According to an emerging conventional wisdom, new technology may upset nuclear strategic stability by calling into question the survivability of nuclear forces.5 The solution, according to some analysts, is for nuclear- armed states to eschew military applications of at least some of these tech¬nologies and lead an international effort to control their spread.6 But these studies too often consider new technology and nuclear strategy in the abstract without adequately considering the prevailing geopolitical con¬text into which these new technologies have been introduced. This article argues understanding the link between new technology and nuclear stability must consider the prevailing geopolitical context. For the past several decades, the United States, its Allies, and like- minded part-ners have formed the core of the existing international order.7 They have benefited from this system and would like to see it strengthened, revital-ized, and defended. If the new technologies of the 4IR are incorporated into US, Ally, and partner militaries, then any advantages they provide will likely reinforce the prevailing distribution of power and existing sources of strategic stability. In contrast, China and Russia are revisionist powers intent on disrupt-ing or displacing the US- led system, and they would likely employ new technological advantages to pursue revisionist aims. The greatest danger from emerging technology for nuclear stability, therefore, may result from the possibility that new technology provides Russia or China an enhanced military advantage over vulnerable US Allies and partners, leading to a regional conflict with a significant risk of nuclear escalation.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › AI Interoperability 1AC › 1AC – AI Leadership

Chinese power undermines the liberal world order and leads to multiple scenarios for nuclear conflict:

Thomas H. Henriksen, 3/23/2017 (Senior Fellow at Hoover Institution, Stanford University, USA, “Post-American World Order,” , Retrieved 8/11/2021)

China’s Not So Peaceful Rise A series of dramatic events took place in response to Obama’s growing disengagement policies, as world powers noted Washington’s burgeoning inwardness. China switched from its “peaceful rise” policy to aggressively asserting and expanding its international presence. Xi Jinping, the all-powerful Chinese leader, moved to advance Beijing’s political and military suzerainty over the South China Sea (SCS) by seizing and reconstructing the disputed shoals into artificial islands with dredged ocean sands in 2014. Next, China militarized three micro-isles of the Spratly Islands (also claimed by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam) with runways, radars, and surface-to-air missile sites—actions that broke Beijing’s earlier promise not to militarize the waterway. Since then, Chinese officials have made it clear that the SCS is now their exclusive lake. Other states are expected to recognize China’s claims to most of the energy-rich waters, through which $5 trillion of trade passes annually, roughly half the world’s merchant fleet tonnage. China backs its assertions by modernizing the arsenals of its advanced warships, aircraft, missiles, and ground forces. Xi and company seem bent on restoring the ancient tribute system in which South Korea and Vietnam would become modern-day vassals, while more distant Asian states become supplicants in a Sinocentric sphere. In short, China has become a revisionist juggernaut. Along with its fortifying of these artificial islands, the world’s second largest economy and military spender has emerged as an economic, political, and ideological competitor of the United States not only in Southeast Asian maritime zones but globally. China is maneuvering to set up bases or harbors in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Greece—and is even extending its reach to the long U.S.-allied Portuguese Azores in the mid-Atlantic. In reaction to Beijing’s SCS actions, the Trump administration has stepped up America’s own show of force by sending warships, fighter jets, and submarines to the waters. To underline its not-too-subtle counter-signal to China, the United States also test-fired four Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles over 4,000 miles into the Pacific Ocean from the California coast last month, the first four-missile salvo in the post-Soviet era. The western Pacific is becoming a tinderbox. Russia’s Resurgence At the other end of the Asian continent, Russia longs to restore its lost prestige and political influence, forfeited with the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. Under Vladimir Putin, Russian forces backed the seizure of Crimea from Ukraine before taking over its eastern borderlands. Earlier, Moscow perfected its “frozen war” tactics against two provinces in the Republic of Georgia, thereby yanking them from Georgian sovereignty. Russia’s bullying and intimidation of its Baltic and Eastern European neighbors have become commonplace. Meanwhile, the Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, called for “a post-West world” at the Munich Security Conference in mid-February. What China and Russia have in common is that both are engaged in advancing their spheres of influence in their neighborhoods and beyond. Both also seek to crack the Western liberal world order. The United States, meanwhile, has become blasé about its former leadership position in the Western hemisphere, where China’s companies have entered into business deals, some with strategic implications. Washington, without a hint of nostalgia, treats the Monroe Doctrine as a relic of yesteryear’s Yankee imperialism in Latin America. These newly assertive major powers are not alone in shattering the post-Cold War order, which witnessed the unrivaled predominance of the United States—the “indispensable nation,” in the words of the Clinton administration. Trouble-making regional powers, such as Iran, Syria, and North Korea either spread terrorism, provoke instability, or arm themselves with longer-range missiles and nuclear weapons. While they were independent actors a few years ago, each of these pariah regimes increasingly aligns with the two chief U.S. adversaries. Iran and Syria cozy up to Russia, and North Korea depends for fuel and food on a China that hypocritically protests that it lacks influence over a nuclear-armed Pyongyang. Western Europe, once a powerful but independently minded U.S. ally, has faltered. Its slippage is evident in the refugee crisis, its sagging economies, its 20 percent youth unemployment rate, and its reluctance to fund an adequate military defense in the face of Russia’s continuing provocations, including cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, and fake news stories. Europe’s paltry defense reflects the continent’s lost belief in its own purpose—and even, some might say, its own civilization. Sino-Russian Partnering Little of this threatening world existed when the United States enjoyed its unipolar moment after the eclipse of its Soviet nemesis, and even after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The emergent world, divided between the United States, China, and Russia, points to the new global order. Particularly worrisome are the warming relations between Beijing and Moscow, despite Chinese designs on Siberian lands and resources. Overcoming a centuries-old rivalry, the recent Sino-Russian rapprochement compounds Washington’s difficulties. Separating Russia from China, as Kissinger and Nixon did, would be a sensible goal for President Trump. It has always been a wise recourse to divide one’s adversaries. Besides, the United States and Russia have worked together in the past. During the World War II, they collaborated against the Third Reich. And during the Cold War, they cooperated in nuclear arms treaties and wheat deals, while mutually trying to skirt a flashpoint that could end in a nuclear war. Washington can work to steer the Kremlin, as it has done before, toward acceptable conduct with its neighbors before Russia can be more than a tactical ally in the great game with China. In the immediate future, the United States can adopt international and domestic approaches to cope with Russian and Chinese territorial expansionism. The tensions stoked by the assertive regimes in the Kremlin or Tiananmen Square could spark a political or military incident that might set off a chain reaction leading to a large-scale war. Historically, powerful rivalries nearly always lead to at least skirmishes, if not a full-blown war. The anomalous Cold War era spared the United States and Soviet Russia a direct conflict, largely from concerns that one would trigger a nuclear exchange destroying both states and much of the world. Such a repetition might reoccur in the unfolding three-cornered geopolitical world. It seems safe to acknowledge that an ascendant China and a resurgent Russia will persist in their geo-strategic ambitions. What Is To Be Done? The first marching order is to dodge any kind of perpetual war of the sort that George Orwell outlined in “1984,” which engulfed the three super states of Eastasia, Eurasia, and Oceania, and made possible the totalitarian Big Brother regime. A long-running Cold War-type confrontation would almost certainly take another form than the one that ran from 1945 until the downfall of the Soviet Union. What prescriptions can be offered in the face of the escalating competition among the three global powers? First, by staying militarily and economically strong, the United States will have the resources to deter its peers’ hawkish behavior that might otherwise trigger a major conflict. Judging by the history of the Cold War, the coming strategic chess match with Russia and China will prove tense and demanding—since all the countries boast nuclear arms and long-range ballistic missiles. Next, the United States should widen and sustain willing coalitions of partners, something at which America excels, and at which China and Russia fail conspicuously. There can be little room for error in fraught crises among nuclear-weaponized and hostile powers. Short- and long-term standoffs are likely, as they were during the Cold War. Thus, the playbook, in part, involves a waiting game in which each power looks to its rivals to suffer grievous internal problems which could entail a collapse, as happened to the Soviet Union. Some Chinese and Russian experts predict grave domestic problems for each other. They also entertain similar thoughts about the United States, which they view as terminally decadent and catastrophically polarized over politics, ethnicity, and the future direction of the country. So, the brewing three-way struggle also involves a systemic contest, which will test the competitors’ economic and political institutions. At this juncture, the world is entering a standoff among the three great and several not-so-great powers. Averting war, while defending our interests, will prove a challenge, calling for deft policy, political endurance, and economic growth, as well as sufficient military force to keep at bay aggressive states or prevail over them if ever a war breaks out.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › AI Interoperability 1AC › 1AC – AI Leadership

US leadership in AI technology is key to protect the liberal international order.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 2/12/2019 (“SUMMARY OF THE 2018 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY,” Retrieved 6/12/2022 from .)

Other nations, particularly China and Russia, are making significant investments in AI for military purposes, including in applications that raise questions regarding international norms and human rights. These investments threaten to erode our technological and operational advantages and destabilize the free and open international order. The United States, together with its allies and partners, must adopt AI to maintain its strategic position, prevail on future battlefields, and safeguard this order. We will also seek to develop and use AI technologies in ways that advance security, peace, and stability in the long run. We will lead in the responsible use and development of AI by articulating our vision and guiding principles for using AI in a lawful and ethical manner. The costs of not implementing this strategy are clear. Failure to adopt AI will result in legacy systems irrelevant to the defense of our people, eroding cohesion among allies and partners, reduced access to markets that will contribute to a decline in our prosperity and standard of living, and growing challenges to societies that have been built upon individual freedoms.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › AI Interoperability 1AC › 1AC – AI Leadership

China is winning the AI race now with the United States—this will give them the edge in global supremacy.

RUQAYYA ANWER, 1/18/2022 (Academic at Riphah International University, Pakistan, Ph.D. holder of media and communication studies, “China is winning the power battle in AI race with US,” , Retrieved 6/15/2022)

There is a widespread belief that China is establishing itself as a new superpower, displacing the United States from the global power structure. China has undeniably become a worldwide economic powerhouse, and it is anticipated to overtake the U.S. as the world's largest economy by 2028. With increased spending on weapons research and the development of multiple covert weapons, China is on the verge of surpassing the U.S. in military capability. Significantly, countries that lead in the research and application of artificial intelligence (AI) will determine the future of the technology and increase their economic competitiveness greatly, while those that fall behind risk losing competitiveness in critical industries. AI is set to revolutionize the world, empowering those countries that fully realize its promise. It will be a key driver of future economic growth and national security. Moreover, AI is sometimes referred to as a general-purpose technology because of its wide range of applications in practically every industry – the GUID Partition Table (GPT). A GPT is a technology with widespread economic implications. Only a few examples exist such as steam engines, electricity and computers. These technologies have had a profound impact on our civilizations by modifying preexisting economic and social systems. AI is the newest brilliant, dazzling object on the technological horizon. It has grown very popular in today's globe. It's the simulation of human intellect in computers that have been programmed to learn and mimic human behavior. AI will have a significant impact on our quality of life as it develops. It has the potential to significantly boost the economy of a developed country. For its technological advancements, China has won the AI battle with the U.S. and is on its way to world supremacy. According to Western intelligence assessments, China, the world's second-largest economy, is expected to dominate many major emerging technologies, including AI, synthetic biology and genetics, within a decade or two. Pentagon official’s words The Pentagon's first chief software officer, Nicolas Chaillan stressed that “in 15 to 20 years, we have no competing fighting chance against China.” It's already decided; “Whether it requires a war or not is kind of anecdotal right now.” He also claimed that several government departments in the U.S. had "kindergarten-level" cyber defenses. Moreover, Chaillan also criticized the reluctance of U.S. firms, such as Google, to collaborate with the government on AI, and extensive ethical disputes over technology for the U.S.’ delayed innovation. While China was destined to rule the world's future, everything from media narratives to geopolitics is under their control. One of the reasons China has been able to move more rapidly than the U.S. is that it is not mired in enormous arguments about AI ethics. But partly because Chinese businesses are compelled to collaborate with the government, whereas many American businesses are wary of working with the Pentagon. Google, for instance, halted working with the Pentagon on AI in 2018 after a dozen employees departed after the business assisted the Department of Defense in developing software that could boost drone attack accuracy. Chaillan, on the other hand, stated that Chinese corporations were obligated to comply with the Chinese government and were making "huge expenditures" in AI without concern for ethical considerations. Notably, the U.S. has attempted to curb China's emergence as a digital power by prohibiting Huawei's 5G network from operating in the U.S. and establishing a virtual embargo on U.S. companies supplying software and components to Chinese tech firms. Whereas China’s President Xi Jinping is pushing China to establish technological self-sufficiency in fields such as microchip manufacturing to wean the country off its reliance on the U.S. Significantly, there will always be economic ups and downs, but the underlying drive that's occurring in Chinese culture right now will continue to create new prospects and growth. China has announced a five-year plan worth $1.8 trillion to dominate AI, robotics, 6G and all other technologies by 2035, releasing a five-year plan worth $1.8 trillion. In comparison to the European Union and the U.S., China's AI capabilities have advanced in several areas. China has surpassed the bloc as the world's largest AI publisher. Moreover, the quality of its AI research has consistently improved over time. Its software and computer services companies have increased their R&D expenditures. China's determination to master AI goes far beyond the recognition that this group of technologies will be the most crucial driver of economic advancement over the next quarter-century. China's data collection and national determination have helped it to close the gap with American leaders in this area over the last decade. China now has nearly twice as many supercomputers ranked in the top 500 for performance as the U.S., even though the U.S. was once the leader in this category. Furthermore, China is likely to maintain its advantage in terms of data generation. Overall, though, China has not dramatically narrowed the AI gap with the U.S., but its steady growth could eventually erode U.S. dominance over the technology. Consequently, countries that lead in the research and application use of AI will determine the future of the technology and increase their economic competitiveness greatly, while those that fall behind risk losing competitiveness in critical industries. As a result, China has taken the lead. The Chinese government, rules and regulations, public attitudes toward privacy and strong collaboration between corporations and the government are all contributing to the country's AI progress. At the same time, American AI confronts significant challenges, including a culture that prioritizes privacy over security, distrusts authority and the government; as such, firms are wary of collaborating with the U.S.

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Maybe relevant for a wave 2

Interop

https://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/amp/the-rhetoric-vs-the-reality-understanding-nato-s-capacity-to-address-russian-gray-zone-conflict

Despite this, examples of solidarity remain the exception, as challenges persist between NATO nations to integrate capabilities. First, there is no alliance-wide synergy of response tools enabling NATO nations. The 2015 Strategy on NATO’s Role in Countering Hybrid Warfare deferred on this, conceding the primacy of individual nations over collective action in countering hybrid acts.[18] Thus, several controlled technical resources are restricted to national use and remain unavailable to NATO formations.[19] Intelligence collection also remains varied between states. Intelligence sharing, a major tool in attributing hybrid threats, also remains limited. For example, there is not an Alliance-wide technical architecture for sharing near-real-time intelligence, especially between the NATO command structure and its subordinate formations. Protocols defining appropriate response options are limited and delineated command authority in multi-domain operations clarifying suitable, or legally appropriate responses to threshold activities are non-existent. This is especially challenging when Russia’s gray-zone behavior bypasses the norms of democracy and the rule of law abided by the US and NATO.

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Maybe relevant for a wave 2

CBM (but is that IS with hostile actors?)

Housen-Couriel 22 --- Deborah Housen-Couriel, Chief Legal Officer and Vice-President Regulation for Konfidas Digital Ltd., a cyber and data protection consulting firm, She currently serves on the Advisory Board of the Hebrew University Law School’s Cyber Security Research Center and as a research fellow with the Reichman University’s Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya’s Institute for CounterTerrorism, Chapter 3 “Information Sharing as a Critical Best Practice for the Sustainability of Cyber Peace” in “Cyber Peace Charting a Path Toward a Sustainable, Stable, and Secure Cyberspace”, edited by Scott J Schakelford et al, published in 2022 by Cambridge Univ Press, Pages 54-

Building on this understanding of IS as a best practice, it is argued here that IS further supports sustainable cyber peace as a CBM at the international level, among the states, international organizations, and multinational companies that are critical to ensuring global cybersecurity. The framing of IS as a CBM, rather than as a binding, substantive norm to which these entities are subject as a matter of law or policy, is beneficial to the utilization of IS platforms at the international level (Borghard & Lonergan, 2018). By sidestepping substantive multilateral commitments, IS can be more readily utilized to support cybersecurity and cyber peace. Examples where this has occurred include the UN’s 2015 GGE (United Nations General Assembly, 2015), the OSCE’s 2016 listing of cybersecurity CBMs (Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, 2016), and the 2018 Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace (Principle 9).

CBMs were originally used in the context of the Cold War to further disarmament processes in the context of the diplomatic and political standoff between the USSR and the West. Nonmilitary CBMs have been defined more generally as “actions or processes undertaken … with the aim of increasing transparency and the level of trust” between parties (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2013). They are “one of the key measures in the international community’s toolbox aiming at preventing or reducing the risk of a conflict by eliminating the causes of mistrust, misunderstanding and miscalculation” (Pawlak, 2016, p. 133). CBMs are also critical in the global cybersecurity context and have been described as a “key tool in the cyber peacebuilder’s toolkit” (Nicholas, 2017).

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff A2: Ks › A2: Security K

Hybrid warfare disrupts NATO’s ontological security---contingency planning solves by isolating NATO from existential fear

Maria Mälksoo 18, Senior Lecturer in International Security at the Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent, “Countering hybrid warfare as ontological security management: the emerging practices of the EU and NATO,” European Security, 27:3, 374-392, https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/772169/mod_resource/content/0/malksoo.pdf

Hybrid warfare indicates a multitude of possible contingencies, generating anxiety about one’s ability to remain oneself and to continue to act. It is thus linked to “anxiety over the vulnerability of [Western] power” (Bell 2012, pp. 230–231), threatening the West about losing its particularistic form of existence (cf. Creppell 2011, p. 455). Anxiety, in contrast to fear, which per Giddens (1991, p. 43) constitutes a response to a specific threat, concerns “perceived threats to the integrity of the security system of the individual” (Giddens 1991, pp. 44–45, cf. Browning and Joenniemi 2017, p. 38; Rumelili 2015). OS-seeking aims to mitigate the effects of such hard uncertainty, bringing it within bearable limits (Mitzen 2006, p. 346). Routines are instrumental here, as they “pacify the cognitive environment … ‘inoculating’ individuals against paralytic, deep fear of chaos” (Mitzen 2006, p. 347).

Being able to survive the “hybrid threats” is directly pertinent to the survival of the EU and NATO as particular kinds of organisations, underpinned and driven by specific values – which cannot be sacrificed or diluted in the struggle for physical and institutional survival. Yet, hybrid warfare disturbs the OS of the EU and NATO in subtly distinct ways. Due to the particularities of their institutional set-ups and historical foundations, the OS drives of the two organisations are somewhat distinctive. NATO’s history is occasionally told through its surpassing of a sequence of crises, albeit the end of the Cold War and the collapse of its original enemy created a situation of unprecedented uncertainty and ontological insecurity for the Alliance. Meanwhile, the EU’s ontological insecurity is a more recent phenomenon, stemming mostly from the Eurocrisis and the looming possibility of a Grexit a few years ago; the refugee/migration crisis in Europe of 2015 (Dingott Alkhoper 2018; Mitzen 2018); the actual UK decision on Brexit in 2016 (Browning 2018); and the rise of populist politics within the EU (Kinnvall, Manners, Mitzen 2018) and the United States. NATO as a military alliance has been historically more accustomed to the othering practices of concrete geographical places, whereas the EU is generally regarded as an organisation that has risen above geopolitical othering, juxtaposing itself to Europe’s dark past instead (Rumelili 2018, Subotic 2018, and Della Sala 2018). Accordingly, the EU might be more at home with hybrid threat management due to its historically broader conceptualisation of security through the paradigm of intertwined risks rather than being focused more strictly on “the threat, use and control of military force” in the manner of a traditional defence alliance (Walt 1991, p. 212; Manners 2002). Regardless of its perpetual transformer’s self-image, hybrid threats represent the uncomfortable “hard” or “fundamental” uncertainty for NATO (cf. Mitzen 2006, p. 346) and are thus ontologically disturbing for the security of its self as a traditional alliance with a collective security pledge bound to “armed attack” against one or more of its member states.

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff A2: Ks › A2: Security K

Hybrid warfare disrupts NATO’s ontological security---reproduces the narrative of the “other” and turns the K---strengthening collective identity solves

Bahar Rumelili 15, Professor and Jean Monnet Chair at the Department of International Relations, Koc University, Istanbul, “Identity and desecuritisation: the pitfalls of conflating ontological and physical security,” Journal of International Relations and Development volume 18, pages52–74 (2015), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/jird.2013.22

With regard to ontological security, the distinction between security and insecurity is the more critical one. In a state of ontological insecurity, the Self experiences instability and uncertainty of being. Ontological insecurity refers to a state of disruption where the Self has lost its anchor for the definition of its identity and, consequently, its ability to sustain a narrative and answer questions about doing, acting, and being (Kinnvall 2004). It may arise from deep uncertainty (Mitzen 2006a) and/or from the failure to have its sense of Self affirmed by others (Zarakol 2010). Conversely, in a state of ontological security, the Self experiences a stable, certain, and consistent social existence, where it remains in control about its identity and capacity for action. While I do not rule out the possibility of a state of ontological asecurity, where the Self is simply not concerned with the stability and certainty of its identity, I do not explore this possibility and how it varies across different states of physical security in this article.

Having identified different states of physical and ontological security, I make the further assumption that since ontological and physical security are distinct, states of security do not vary uniformly across the ontological and physical layers of security. One can be at a state of physical insecurity while being at a state of ontological security, and vice versa. Consequently, Table 1 charts out the four possible states of security based on the conception of security as both ontological and physical.

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff A2: CPs › A2: Adv CP

CP fails --- cant be enforced

Scott Neuman and Greg Myre 21. Scott Neuman Writer/Editor, Digital News @ NPR. Greg Myre National Security Correspondent @ NPR. "Hacks Are Prompting Calls For A Cyber Agreement, But Reaching One Would Be Tough". NPR.org. 7-2-2021. https://www.npr.org/2021/07/02/1009925791/hacks-are-prompting-calls-for-a-cyber-agreement-but-reaching-one-would-be-tough

Such discussions have been kicking around for years, but many cyber experts remain deeply skeptical that such an agreement could be reached, let alone enforced.

Cyber strikes are low-cost and high-reward

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff A2: CPs › A2: Adv CP

NRC fails --- too many differences

Robert G. Papp 19. Retired in 2017 after service as a naval officer and a career in federal civil service, including as director of the Center for Cyber Intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency. PhD from Columbia University. “A Cyber Treaty with Russia”. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/kennan_cable_no._41.pdf

Prospects for meaningful cyber negotiations with the Russian Federation, let alone a bilateral agreement or cyber treaty, seem almost impossible to imagine today. Our anguish over Russia’s meddling in American elections, preoccupation with alleged ties between the Trump administration and the Russian government during the recently concluded Mueller investigation, and major disagreements on geopolitical issues including Ukraine, Syria, and Venezuela, have left us at an impasse. Instead of genuine dialogue between the United States and Russia, we see the two nations talking past each other and posturing to both domestic and international audiences.

More alarmingly, the very framework of bilateral and multilateral arms control treaties that got us through the last decades of the Cold War, starting in 1972 with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the interim Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement (SALT I), is in disarray. This process of unraveling likely began in 2002 when the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty. The Russian Federation suspended its participation in the1992 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty in 2007 and completely halted its participation in 2015. Most recently, the U.S. announced, on February 22, 2019, its intent to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed in 1987.

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff A2: CPs › A2: DoD PICs

CYBERCOM responsible for sharing intel with allies

LOPEZ 19 --- C. TODD LOPEZ, writer at the U.S. Department of Defense, “Persistent Engagement, Partnerships, Top Cybercom’s Priorities “, MAY 14, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/1847823/

Air Force Maj. Gen. Charles Moore Jr., the command’s director of operations, spelled out several focus areas Cybercom has pursued in its first year as a unified combatant command. Chief among those priorities, he said, is “persistent engagement” -- being fully engaged with adversaries in the cyber domain, full-time.

“We recognize and understand the importance of being in constant contact with the enemy in this space, especially below the level of armed conflict, so we can defend ourselves and impose cost,” Moore said.

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff A2: CPs › A2: DoD PICs

CYBERCOM does intel gathering

Mizuhiro 22 --- Keisuke Mizuhiro, Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of National Strategic Studies (INSS) of National Defense University (NDU), “Prospects for U.S.-Japan Cyber Cooperation: Critical Infrastructure Protection and Joint Operations Perspectives”, April 12, 2022, https://inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/2997363/prospects-for-us-japan-cyber-cooperation-critical-infrastructure-protection-and/

Military cyber differences are even more pronounced, and with significant implications for bilateral cooperation between allies. Over the past decade, the U.S. military's role in cyberspace has been substantially strengthened. In 2010 a U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), previously two sub-unified joint task forces under US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), was designated a unified four-star command and combined under the Director, National Security Agency (NSA) and focused on support of global networked cyber operations planned and executed by and through the US Combatant Commands. In 2018, USCYBERCOM was upgraded to a Unified Combatant Command. Still joined with NSA under a single 4-star commander, USCYBERCOM now has the responsibility for developing cyber-unique, global operations planned and conducted with the support of other US military commands. In this role, USCYBERCOM focuses on intelligence gathering, deterrence, and counterattack in cyberspace. As of 2019, USCYBERCOM consists of 133 teams and 6,200 personnel, including the Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF) which is tasked with deterring cyber attacks from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff A2: Disads › A2: Deterrence/Disclosure DA

Deterrence not key to prevent Taiwan war

Lungu 21 --- Andrei Lungu is president of The Romanian Institute for the Study of the Asia-Pacific (RISAP), “Taiwan invasion doesn’t hang in the military balance”, East Asia Forum, Aug 19th 2021, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/08/19/taiwan-invasion-doesnt-hang-in-the-military-balance/

There is growing speculation and alarm about a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan after Beijing sharpened its rhetoric towards the Taiwanese government and increased its military manoeuvres around the territory. The Biden administration is worried that if Chinese leaders are overconfident in China’s growing power and assume Washington’s decline, they might decide to invade Taiwan.

The US government has taken numerous actions to clearly signal its capacity and commitment to defend Taiwan. Growing diplomatic engagement with Taiwan, increased military manoeuvres, joint statements alongside Japan, South Korea and the G7, as well as developing a common response to a war over Taiwan with Japan and Australia are all part of this new framework.

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff A2: Disads › A2: Deterrence/Disclosure DA

China wont invade Taiwan

Lo 20 --- Alex Lo has been a Post columnist since 2012, covering major issues affecting Hong Kong and the rest of China. A journalist for 25 years, he has worked for various publications in Hong Kong and Toronto as a news reporter and editor. He has also lectured in journalism at the University of Hong Kong, “China invade Taiwan? You must be joking”, SCMP, Oct 24th 2020, https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3106893/china-invade-taiwan-you-must-be-joking?module=perpetual_scroll&pgtype=article&campaign=3106893

Suddenly, some very important people in the West are warning mainland China may invade Taiwan. It reminds me of other Western VIPs who thought the People’s Liberation Army would roll in the tanks at the height of violent unrest in Hong Kong last year.

Back then, sensible local businesspeople and informed expatriate commentators had argued otherwise. Doing so would mean the PLA had to take over the city, and Beijing would have to take ownership of all of the city’s domestic problems.

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff A2: Disads › A2: Deterrence/Disclosure DA

Turn --- hoarding vulnerabilities makes aggressive cyber attacks MORE likely

McGraw 13 --- Gary McGraw, PhD, Chief Technology Officer of Cigital, and author of Software Security (AWL 2006) along with ten other software security books. He also produces the monthly Silver Bullet Security Podcast forIEEE Security & Privacy Magazine (syndicated by SearchSecurity), Cyber War is Inevitable (Unless We Build Security In), Journal of Strategic Studies - Volume 36, Issue 1, 2013, pages 109-119

Also of note is the balancing effect that extreme cyber vulnerability has on power when it comes to cyber war. In the case of the Stuxnet attack, the balance of power was clearly stacked high against Iran. Subsequently, however, Iran responded with the (alleged) hijacking of a US drone being used for surveillance in Iranian airspace.10 Ironically, it may be that the most highly developed countries are more vulnerable to cyber warfare because they are more dependent on modern high-tech systems. In any case, failure to build security into the modern systems we depend on can backlash, lowering the already low barrier to entry for geopolitically motivated cyber conflict. Defending against cyberattack (by building security in) is just as important as developing offensive measures. Indeed it is more so. War has both defensive and offensive aspects, and understanding this is central to understanding cyber war. Over-concentrating on offense can be very dangerous and destabilizing because it encourages actors to attack first and ferociously, before an adversary can. Conversely, when defenses are equal or even superior to offensive forces, actors have less incentive to strike first because the expected advantages of doing so are far lower. The United States is supposedly very good at cyber offense today, but from a cyberdefense perspective it lives in the same glasshouses as everyone else. The root of the problem is that the systems we depend on – the lifeblood of the modern world – are not built to besecure.11This notion of offense and defense in cyber security is worth teasing out. Offense involves exploiting systems, penetrating systems with cyberattacks and generally leveraging broken software to compromise entire systems and systems of systems.12 Conversely, defense means building secure software, designing and engineering systems to be secure in the first place, and creating incentives and rewards for systems that are built to be secure.13 What sometimes passes for cyber defense today – actively watching for intrusions, blocking attacks with network technologies such as firewalls, law enforcement activities, and protecting against malicious software with anti-virus technology – is little more than a cardboard shield.14 If we do not focus more attention on real cyber defense by building security in, cyber war will be inevitable.

2022 SDI Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff A2: Disads › A2: Deterrence/Disclosure DA

Turn --- Cyberdefense outweighs any offensive capabilities --- deliberately weakening the internet guarantees successful attacks

Masnick 13 --- Mike, founder and CEO of Floor64 and editor of the Techdirt blog, Oct 7th 2013, “National Insecurity: How The NSA Has Put The Internet And Our Security At Risk,” Techdirt,

But, really, the issue is that the NSA's actions aren't actually helping national security, but they're doing the exact opposite. They're making us significantly less safe. Bruce Schneier made this point succinctly in a recent interview: The NSA’s actions are making us all less safe. They’re not just spying on the bad guys, they’re deliberately weakening Internet security for everyone—including the good guys. It’s sheer folly to believe that only the NSA can exploit the vulnerabilities they create. Additionally, by eavesdropping on all Americans, they’re building the technical infrastructure for a police state. The folks over at EFF have dug into this point in much greater detail as well. Undermining internet security is a really bad idea. While it may make it slightly easier for the NSA to spy on people -- it also makes it much easier for others to attack us. For all this talk of national security, it's making us a lot less secure. In trying to defend this situation, former NSA boss Michael Hayden recently argued that the NSA, when it comes across security vulnerabilities, makes a judgment call on whether or not it's worth fixing or exploiting itself. He discussed how the NSA thinks about whether or not it's a "NOBUS" (nobody but us) situation, where only the US could exploit the hole: You look at a vulnerability through a different lens if even with the vulnerability it requires substantial computational power or substantial other attributes and you have to make the judgment who else can do this? If there's a vulnerability here that weakens encryption but you still need four acres of Cray computers in the basement in order to work it you kind of think "NOBUS" and that's a vulnerability we are not ethically or legally compelled to try to patch -- it's one that ethically and legally we could try to exploit in order to keep Americans safe from others. Of course, that ignores just how sophisticated and powerful certain other groups and governments are these days. As that article notes, the NSA is known as a major buyer of exploits sold on the market -- but that also means that every single one of those exploits is known by non-NSA employees, and the idea that only the NSA is exploiting those is laughable. If the NSA were truly interested in "national security" it would be helping to close those vulnerabilities, not using them to their own advantage. This leads to two more troubling issues -- the fact that the "US Cyber Command" is under the control of the NSA is inherently problematic. Basically, the NSA has too much overlap between its offensive and defensive mandates in terms of computer security. Given what we've seen now, it's pretty damn clear that the NSA highly prioritizes offensive efforts to break into computers, rather than defensive efforts to protect Americans' computers. The second issue is CISPA. The NSA and its defenders pushed CISPA heavily, claiming that it was necessary for "national security" in protecting against attacks. But a key part of CISPA was that it was designed to grant immunity to tech companies from sharing information with... the NSA, which was effectively put in control over "cybersecurity" under CISPA. It seems clear, at this point, that the worst fears about CISPA are almost certainly true. It was never about improving defensive cybersecurity, but a cover story to enable greater offensive efforts by the NSA which, in turn, makes us all a lot less secure