2022
SDI
Negative
Emerging Tech Innovation Negative › Quad CP › 1NC — Quad CP
Luong and Chahal 22 — Ngor Luong, Research Analyst at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology at Georgetown University, Nonresident Fellow in the Global China Hub at the Atlantic Council, and Husanjot Chahal, Research Analyst at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology at Georgetown University, former Security Analyst at the World Bank, holds an M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown University, 2022 (“The Future of the Quad’s Technology Cooperation Hangs in the Balance,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 14th, Available Online at https://www.cfr.org/blog/future-quads-technology-cooperation-hangs-balance, Accessed 07-12-2022)
U.S. President Joe Biden last month made a historic trip to Tokyo, where he met with the prime ministers of the other countries in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, known as the Quad: Australia, India, and Japan. The four leaders reaffirmed their commitment to a free, open, inclusive, and resilient Indo-Pacific, as well as their interest in collaborating on critical and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI).
AI has taken center stage for the Quad. In the last five years, all four countries have announced national AI strategies aiming to leverage the technology for societal development, economic prosperity, and military power. Beyond national agendas and investments, the Quad countries also see multinational technology collaboration with like-minded democracies as key to responsible AI development. Promising to promote an accessible and secure technology ecosystem, Quad-led AI collaboration could also help counter China’s disruptive behavior in the region, particularly the country’s malicious use of AI for surveillance, censorship, and misinformation.
2022
SDI
Negative
Emerging Tech Innovation Negative › Germany and Italy CP › They Say: “Multi-Actor International Fiat Bad”
Bel 19 — Olivier-Rémy Bel, Visiting Fellow at The Atlantic Council, former Advisor for Europe, Africa, and Arms Export Control and Head of the EU Desk at the French Ministry of Defense, holds an M.A. in Public Affairs from Sciences Po (France), 2019 (“‘Brain-dead’ or not ‘brain-dead’? That is not the question.,” The Atlantic Council, November 12th, Available Online at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/brain-dead-or-not-brain-dead-that-is-not-the-question/, Accessed 07-14-2022)
If anything, French President Emmanuel Macron has managed to stir up quite a debate. Macron’s assertion in an interview with The Economist that NATO is experiencing “brain death” quickly spurred responses from other transatlantic leaders. German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that she doesn’t “think that such sweeping judgments are necessary, even if we have problems and need to pull together.” Commentators on both sides of the Atlantic have now jumped into the fray to argue about the strength of the Alliance or the wisdom of such public pronouncements by one of NATO’s most important leaders.
Let’s get hasty readings out of the way. Macron does not want NATO to be “brain-dead.” By replying “I don’t know” to a question about whether NATO’s Article Five mutual defense clause was effective, he is not signaling French reluctance to come to the aid of NATO allies. He is rather taking stock of the current travails of the Alliance, of the lack of coordination regarding Syria, and of the doubts cast by what he calls the “guarantor of last resort”: the United States.
2022
SDI
Negative
Emerging Tech Innovation Negative › Germany and Italy CP › They Say: “NATO Deficit/NATO Good”
Nemeth 22 — Bence Nemeth, Lecturer in Defence Studies Education at King's College London (UK) where he primarily teaches British and international military officers at the UK Defence Academy and European military staff colleges including the Baltic Defence College, the Czech University of Defence, the Irish Command and Staff School and the Netherlands Defence Academy, former Defense Official at the Hungarian Ministry of Defence, holds a Ph.D. in Defence Studies from King's College London (UK) and an MBA in Defense Systems Management from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 2022 (“Bilateralism and Minilateralism Are Europe’s Secret Strengths,” War on the Rocks, June 3rd, Available Online at https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/bilateralism-and-minilateralism-are-europes-secret-strengths/, Accessed 07-13-2022)
As a result of the war in Ukraine, policymakers in Europe and North America have scrambled to strengthen defense cooperation in Europe. The headlines inevitably focus on NATO and the European Union. Yet this ignores the reality of how European defense cooperation is actually established, fostered, and solidified. Indeed, the essence of defense cooperation in Europe is a web of hundreds of bilateral and minilateral collaborations. Often, NATO and the European Union work merely as a framework into which European countries upload their existing bi- and minilateral efforts.
To better enhance European defense, policymakers should appreciate the dynamics of these many collaborations. Taking advantage of the current circumstances to build more mini and bilateral ties, particularly where leadership and financial circumstances are most conducive, will strengthen Europe and make its multilateral institutions that much more formidable.
2022
SDI
Negative
Emerging Tech Innovation Negative › Germany and Italy CP › They Say: “CP Doesn’t Solve Strategic Autonomy”
Marras 21 — Stefano Marras, Analyst on European Security and Foreign Policy at The Defence Horizon Journal, Policy Analyst at the Atlas Institute for International Affairs, holds an M.A. in International Relations and Affairs from Utrecht University (Netherlands) and an M.A. in History from the University of Bologna (Italy), 2021 (“Germany and Italy Should Be Strong Security Actors: European Security Demands It,” The Geopolitics, July 24th, Available Online at https://thegeopolitics.com/germany-and-italy-should-be-strong-military-powers-european-security-demands-it/, Accessed 07-13-2022)
As the world enters into a new period of instability and great power competition, European security cannot be given for granted anymore. The times when the US was fully committed to European defense and the continent lacked any meaningful peer competitor, besides transnational threats such as piracy and terrorism, are over. In particular, the return of Russia, Turkey and China as great powers pose significant security implications for Europe. This is especially true in light of the recent United States’ strategic tilt to the Indo-Pacific and on the containment of China, which implies a diminished availability of resources and a minor willingness to engage in military operations for the defense of Europe. As a result, Europeans are being forced to spend more in their armed forces and think more strategically to defend their national security, without having to rely too much on Washington. France and the United Kingdom, the two countries with the most powerful militaries in Europe, do not seem capable and willing of covering the whole spectrum of threats. Thus, the rest of European countries should do more and increase their share of responsibility for European defense. While many improvements have been reached in the last five years, such as higher defense spending and the launching of PESCO and the European Defense Fund to increase interoperability among the armed forces of the continent and the development of military technology, these efforts are not enough to guarantee an acceptable level of European security if two key countries, Italy and especially Germany, do not fully commit their military and political institutions to this cause. Because of their geographical position and economic resources, these two nations are essential to tackle the present and future challenges to European security and prosperity.
Due to its central location at the heart of Europe and as the biggest economy of the continent, Germany in particular, has always been the cornerstone of European stability and defense. For centuries and for better or worse, Germany’s weakness or strength have decided the fate of the continent. Nowadays, Berlin plays chiefly an economic role of semi-hegemony with a high degree of political influence. However, unless Germany also become a military power commensurate to its economic and technological resources, and it assumes more security responsibility, it cannot be regarded as a fully-rounded geopolitical power. And this is a problem for European security, for a weak Germany also means a vulnerable Europe. As the former foreign minister of Poland Radoslaw Sikorski said in 2011 during the Euro financial crisis, “I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity. You have become Europe’s indispensable nation.” This condition is primarily due to its recent history in Second World War, after which German leaders have developed a pacifist, economy-oriented and non-strategic attitude to questions related to foreign policy and military affairs. This can be clearly observed in the reluctance in engaging in military missions abroad and in the precarious state of its armed forces.
2022
SDI
Negative
Emerging Tech Innovation Negative › Germany and Italy CP › Top-Level + Net-Benefit Explanation/Extension
Morcos and Simón 22 — Pierre Morcos, Visiting Fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former Deputy Head of the Strategic Affairs and Cybersecurity Division at the French Foreign Service, holds an M.P.A. from Sciences Po (France), and Luis Simón, Argyros Family Foundation Visiting Fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Director of the Brussels Office of the Elcano Royal Institute (Spain), Research Professor in International Security and Director of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy, and Strategy at the Brussels School of Governance (Belgium), holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of London (UK), 2022 (“NATO and the South after Ukraine,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 9th, Available Online at https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-and-south-after-ukraine, Accessed 07-14-2022)
“We, the Heads of State and Government of the 30 NATO Allies, have met today to address Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades.” In this solemn statement released after an extraordinary summit in Brussels on March 24, 2022, NATO leaders sent a clear signal: Russia poses an unprecedented threat that the alliance needs to address as a matter of priority. Beyond its decisions to assist Ukraine and reassure frontline allies, NATO is also preparing for the long-term implications of the return of war to the European continent. Incidentally, this reorientation coincides with the preparation of a new strategic concept that will be adopted in Madrid.
The strategic concept is arguably NATO’s most important political document as it scans the international security context, identifies the main threats and challenges to Euro-Atlantic security, and outlines an approach to addressing such challenges. The previous strategic concept, adopted in Lisbon in 2010, signaled a meaningful rebalancing among NATO’s so-called core tasks, namely collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. Inter-state competition took a back seat because the alliance still hoped it could strike a cooperative relationship with Russia despite the invasion of Georgia in 2008. The return of great-power competition in Europe—arguably best illustrated by Moscow’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014—forced allies to put collective defense once again at the center of NATO strategy. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is further compounding this shift. A renewed commitment to territorial defense will undoubtedly be at the forefront of the Madrid strategic concept.
2022
SDI
Negative
Emerging Tech Innovation Negative › Germany and Italy CP › 1NC — Germany and Italy CP
Hiltermann 22 — Joost Hiltermann, Program Director for the Middle East and North Africa at the International Crisis Group, Research Affiliate at the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, former Consultant to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq, former Adjunct Professor in the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University, former Executive Director of the Arms Division at Human Rights Watch, holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of California-Santa Cruz, 2022 (“Managing Crises, the Least-Bad Option,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Number 44, Winter, Available Online at https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/managing-crises-the-least-bad-option/, Accessed 07-13-2022)
The year 2011 was a watershed in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as the popular uprisings that cascaded through the region precipitated the collapse of several regimes at astonishing speed. These developments in turn triggered civil wars in Libya, Syria, and Yemen that converged in dangerous ways, raising the potential for a wider conflict between regional actors, directly or through proxies, including potent armed groups supported by powers external to the region.
Over ten years later, Yemen is going from bad to worse, but the big war in Syria is for now frozen. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a shadow of its former self, and the Libyan civil war isn’t raging on as it used to. Some of the intersecting disputes have calmed down—at least for the moment—as states in the region direct greater energies toward diplomacy.
2022
SDI
Negative
Emerging Tech Innovation Negative › Germany and Italy CP › 1NC — Germany and Italy CP
Antinozzi and Varvelli 22 — Isabella Antinozzi, Research Associate at the European Council on Foreign Relations, holds an M.A. in International Conflict Studies from King's College London (UK), and Arturo Varvelli, Senior Policy Fellow and Head of the Rome Office at the European Council on Foreign Relations, former Co-Head of the MENA Center and Head of the Terrorism Programme at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (Italy), former Lecturer in History and Institutions of the Middle East at IULM University (Italy), holds a Ph.D. in International History from the University of Milan (Italy), 2022 (“Armed for innovation: How to drive German-Italian defence industrial cooperation,” European Council on Foreign Relations, April 4th, Available Online at https://ecfr.eu/article/armed-for-innovation-how-to-drive-german-italian-defence-industrial-cooperation/, Accessed 07-13-2022)
European defence is a team game. Following Germany’s decision on 27 February to massively increase its military budget in response to Russia’s all-out war on Ukraine, other European countries need to catch up – by adapting their own defence planning and spending accordingly. Italy was one of several EU member states that, soon after Berlin announced this huge shift in policy, called for a hike in defence spending to 2 per cent of GDP in line with its commitments as a NATO member. Yet, despite the initial fanfare over the move, the Italian government is now vacillating. The leader of the Five Star Movement, Giuseppe Conte, recently expressed reservations about the increase in military spending, explaining that “the priority must be to protect families and businesses from the crisis”.
Conte’s statement is questionable not only because he participated in NATO summits at which Italy committed to more military spending but also because it suggests that increases in the defence budget and support for people’s livelihoods are mutually exclusive. As research by the RAND Corporation shows, the defence industry has a value that goes beyond the protection of a country and its population from adversaries – it also creates economic opportunities. Therefore, Italy should follow in Germany’s footsteps by increasing defence spending and developing a closer alliance with Berlin on military matters. Indeed, joint defence investment could substantially contribute to industrial development and integration in Europe.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › T/N – Miscalc
Hyde-Price 12 Adrian Hyde-Price, Professor of International Politics at the University of Bath, “The Future of the European Security System,” Studia Diplomatica, 65(1), 2012, pp.127-139, JSTOR /GoGreen!
The final scenario envisages a more organic and fluid European security system, evolving without the conscious architectural design of the first three models, and taking shape through a process of mutual give and take. It is a model of a Europe of independent nation-states, defending their national interests but cooperating together for mutual benefit, without attempting to create a hierarchical security architecture or overarching multilateral governance. In this scenario, European security would involve shifting patterns of bilateral, minilateral and multilateral cooperation, with ad hoc groupings (‘coalitions of the willing’) forming to deal with specific problems, and a ‘variable geometry’ of security cooperation developing across the continent. This is a vision of Europe that lacks many committed advocates; indeed, it is one which is widely viewed as the nightmare scenario, involving a ‘renationalisation’ of security policy, multipolar instability, and a situation in which – in Thucydides words – the strong do what they will, and the weak do what they must.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › T/N – Miscalc
Richter 17 Wolfgang Richter, (Colonel ret.) Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin, Research Group on Security Politics, “Return to Security Cooperation in Europe: The Stabilizing Role of Conventional Arms Control,” Deep Cuts Working Paper No.11, September 2017, /GoGreen!
No matter how one might assess sub-regional force balances, the assumption that an aggression against a NATO ally could be limited to a sub-regional war seems flawed. Nevertheless, a narrow focus on sub-regional Russian geographical advantages as to quick movements of land forces has been shaping the western discussion on military response options.
But launching a deliberate major aggression against an alliance that disposes at superior conventional forces and positive security guarantees by nuclear powers would entail incalculable risks of a global war. This is not a plausible scenario.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › Deficit – Political Sustainability
Skidmore 12 David Skidmore, Drake University, “The Obama Presidency and US Foreign Policy: Where’s the Multilateralism?” International Studies Perspectives, no.13, 2012, pp.43-64, DOI 10.1111/j.1528-3585.2011.00454.x /GoGreen!
Policymakers tend to assume that foreign aid can attract public support only to the extent that it is perceived to serve narrowly focused national interests. Yet, the 1995 survey found that humanitarian rationales for aid attracted the strongest support. Americans were less inclined to favor aid programs designed to reward friendly countries or to win economic benefits for US business. Military aid was also quite unpopular. But majorities ranging from 74% to 91% wanted to maintain or increase aid devoted to ends such as child survival, humanitarian relief, repairing the environment, family planning, and long-term economic development. There existed strong support for targeting aid toward the poorest countries. Americans were skeptical, however, that aid actually reaches those who need it or achieves humanitarian aims. Roughly 80% of respondents believed that too much aid went to undemocratic regimes, that aid is plagued by waste and corruption, and that foreign assistance programs often foster dependence on the part of recipients.11
One obvious implication of these findings is that advocates for increased foreign aid would do well to correct public misperceptions that the United States is bearing a disproportionate burden as compared with other aid-giving countries. Yet, research conducted by the Aspen Institute suggests that the problem is more complicated: ‘‘When informants were confronted with such information, they showed momentary surprise, and then reverted to their old patterns of reasoning. A core rule of strategic frame analysis is at play here: if the facts don’t fit the frame, it is the facts that are rejected, not the frame’’ (Bales 2001:8).
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › Deficit – Norm-Setting
Arts 21 Sophie Arts, senior program coordinator for security and defense policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Steven Keil, fellow for security and defense policy and future of geopolitics, German Marshall Fund of the United States; “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” GMF Policy Paper, February 2021, /GoGreen!
But ad hoc approaches also pose challenges to organizations like NATO. Madeleine Albright warned against the “three Ds” in the 1990s when she highlighted the risks of de-linking from, or duplicating NATO efforts, as well as discriminating among members.24 These issues remain an important concern—particularly in U.S. policy discussions – when it comes to more recent ad hoc or minilateral formats focused on European defense. A more concerted NATO role in guiding flexible efforts within the alliance could help address this concern to minimize redundancies and buttress cohesion.
NATO should work as much as possible with members and partners to ensure minilateral formats complement, rather than compete with, the alliance. Moreover, NATO should consider how it can more effectively apply the lessons of these formats to its partnership policy to craft a more flexible approach. This includes lessons from previous efforts to create flexible formats within the alliance.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › Deficit – Multilat Key
Nunes 20 Isabel Ferreira Nunes, Head of the Research Centre and former Deputy Director of the National Defence Institute, Portugal, PhD Political Science, University of Twente, postdoc International Relations, University of Groningen, “Prospects for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation,” National Defence Institute, June 2020, /GoGreen!
The development of this new European strategic approach reveals a constant tension between two political centres, within which engagement in collaborative crisis management can happen. That of Brussels, calling for further security and defence integration, while cooperating with NATO and that of capable and willing European member states interested in preserving their sovereignty and strategic autonomy. These developments towards what sometimes appears to generate conflicting courses of action, has produced a layered system where cooperation occurs in different configurations. These configurations coexist and sometimes compete with formal organizations such as the EU/CSDP and NATO and the cooperative framework that result from EU-NATO Joint Declarations of 2016 and 2018. This system of security governance is a three-layered system where multilateralism, minilateralism and strategic bilateralism coexist, allowing participants to accommodate goals, benefits and security practices that emanate at the EU and NATO level, with those driven by particular national interests.
Each serves a different collaborative purpose. Multilateralism20 in the framework of cooperative security arrangements comprehends a majority of participants in a given security regime21 for instance that of the UN, NATO or EU, leading to the development of formal and long-lasting cooperation and coordination among states and organizations. Conversely, minilateralism comprises a few like-minded and willing participants, with similar national interests and approaches to foreign and security policy, as well as identical operational output. Distinctive from multilateralism and minilateralism, “strategic bilateralism” (Renard 2016, p. 14) involves particular forms of selective engagement of strategically able and willing participants with self-interested motives in converging security views and policies, whether those are defence and security policies or security issue-based concerns such as terrorism, cyber or hybrid threats.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › Deficit – Multilat Key
Thaler 16 David E. Thaler, Senior International/Defense Researcher at RAND, MIA International Security Policy/Middle East, Columbia University; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Beth Grill, Senior Policy Analyst at RAND, MA Middle Eastern Studies and Economics, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; and Amanda Kadlec, RAND; “From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation,” RR1438, RAND Corporation, 2016, /GoGreen!
Three other limitations or gaps have been raised in numerous discussions with SC personnel in DoD. We indicated above that DoD has been limited in some authorities to working only with foreign forces associated with national defense agencies. Emerging transnational threats and mission areas require the ability to work with interior agency forces or other gendarme or civil authorities when their security forces retain primary responsibility for those mission areas or operate in close collaboration with MoDs. For example, in many cases, the ministry or department of interior is responsible for securing national infrastructure and cyber assets; of six countries CENTCOM officials are engaging on infrastructure security, only in Jordan is the military responsible for protecting the country’s infrastructure.66
A second gap in Title 10 authorities is in the flexibility for DoD to work with regional organizations rather than just bilaterally with national governments. Under Title 10, even regional programs (such as the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund [CTPF]) are implemented bilaterally with national governments. There are no mechanisms for training and equipping regional organizations.67 When this limitation is combined with the limitation on U.S. military engagement with non-MoD security forces, it inhibits the U.S. ability to facilitate coordination among agencies with similar responsibilities within and across partners to have regional effects and to address local security threats.68
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › AT: NB – Cohesion – 1AR
Hopkinson 5 William Hopkinson, former visiting researcher at Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, read history at Pembroke College Cambridge, “The Atlantic Crises: Britain, Europe, and Parting from the United States,” Naval War College Newport Papers 23, May 2005, /GoGreen!
Even immediately following the attacks, when for the first time in its history NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, its mutual defense commitment, the United States preferred to deal with its allies bilaterally rather than through the alliance. As regards the actual conduct of operations in Afghanistan, it is understandable that the United States did not use alliance machinery; however, that it did not use NATO as a forum for consultation over what it saw (and sees) as the principal security issue confronting itself and others, and the one through which it appears or purports to view most international affairs, raised major questions about the role of the alliance.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › AT: NB – Cohesion – 2AC
Economist 3 “European defence: Divide and fall,” The Economist, 10-23-2003, /GoGreen!
Are Europe and America having doubts about their decades-long habits of common defence? America's ambassador to NATO darkly describes the current spat between NATO and the European Union (and for that matter within the EU itself), over what military things Europeans might plot to do together and where they might plot them, as “one of the greatest dangers to the transatlantic relationship”. France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, who started the quarrel by announcing that the EU should build its own operational-planning headquarters in Tervuren, a previously inoffensive suburb of Brussels, claim that causing a rift in the alliance could not be further from their minds. But more is at stake than bricks and mortar. How the row is settled will affect the way Europe and America can work together in the future.
They have supposedly already agreed on many of the basics: that Europe's armies should boost their limited firepower, for example; and that the EU should be able to act independently of NATO in cases where the alliance, with right of first refusal, chooses not to be involved itself. Indeed a painstakingly worked-out formula, finalised in March, enables the EU to use NATO equipment for these sorts of military operations, as is already happening in the Lilliputian mission the Europeans have taken over from NATO in Macedonia. There is even general agreement that the EU should be able to plan for its own military operations.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › AT: Spill-Up
Arts 21 Sophie Arts, senior program coordinator for security and defense policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Steven Keil, fellow for security and defense policy and future of geopolitics, German Marshall Fund of the United States; “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” GMF Policy Paper, February 2021, /GoGreen!
Despite this impressive list, NATO’s partnership mechanisms are not currently achieving their full potential and are due for a rethink. Many major issues are being neglected. This is not to say that partners no longer play a role in NATO’s operations and priorities. On the contrary, some—such as Sweden and Finland— are about as closely integrated in NATO’s planning as they could possibly be short of membership. But, as is also true with Georgia and Ukraine, most of these activities take place in bilateral or trilateral formats, although these countries are also part of other, larger partnership frameworks.
This reality reveals some flaws in NATO’s partnership policy. There are not only redundancies, but many of the broader frameworks have lost momentum and purpose. Many formats lack clear processes and goals, lumping together diverse groups of nations that have very different hopes and expectations in how they engage with NATO. In addition, formats like the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which aim to catalyze broader cooperation beyond the traditional Euro-Atlantic area, continue to fall short of their intended purpose and lack a clear agenda for the future. While these frameworks demonstrate their usefulness by building political ties and space for dialogue, they are less effective when it comes to driving actual outcomes that benefit NATO’s interests or strategy, or those of its partner countries.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › AT: Spill-Up
Donaghy 16 Aaron Donaghy, Visiting Scholar 2016-2017 & EU Marie Curie Global Fellow, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, “Panel 3: Europe’s Security and Foreign Policy Challenges,” Summit on the Future of Europe 2016, Europe and the Forces of Disunion, Executive Summary, 2016, /GoGreen!
Rawi Abdelal, Herbert F. Johnson Professor of International Management at Harvard Business School and Director of Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, warned of the trend towards bilateralism at the expense of multilateralism. The ability of European institutions to multilateralize challenges was one of the foundations of its long history of success. Now, however, there is an increasing danger of the United States negotiating bilaterally rather than on collective terms (e.g. defense and trade arrangements), bypassing Brussels in the process. The spread of bilateralism is a growing threat to transatlantic security cooperation, particularly in lieu of recent Russian activities in what it sees as its sphere of influence. Abdelal points out, however, that Russia also has its weaknesses. Chief among them is its heavy dependence on the European market. He cites the example of Gazprom, the state-run gas company, whose supply of fuels to Europe provides Russia with roughly two-thirds of its government revenue.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › Perm: Do Both – 1AR
--MDC = multinational defense cooperation
Németh 14 Bence Németh, Teaching fellow in the Defence Studies Department, King's College London, “Why won't Europeans use NATO and the EU?” Friends of Europe, 3-19-2014, /GoGreen!
Instead of using NATO and EU institutional frameworks, European nations have recently established a series of new regional ‘multinational defence co-operations’ (MDCs) and reenergised old ones. Although policymakers and analysts support all kinds of defence co-operation, they have not taken into consideration the negative consequences of unstructured defence collaborations. For instance, if the emerging regional MDCs do not prove successful, they will hinder defence co-operation in Europe in general, including within NATO and the EU, as nations become even less willing to work with larger organisations where co-operation is slower and more complicated.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › Perm: Do Both – 2AC
--MDC = multinational defense cooperation
Németh 14 Bence Németh, Teaching fellow in the Defence Studies Department, King's College London, “Why won't Europeans use NATO and the EU?” Friends of Europe, 3-19-2014, /GoGreen!
Although regional MDCs have been proliferating and strengthening in Europe, they remain fragile and this fragility will have a significant impact on the landscape of European defence. The weakness of regional MDCs is that they are driven mostly by national Ministries of Defence and do not have a well-grounded, strategically sophisticated background for collaboration. Countries often co-operate on defence issues without defining their common foreign policy goals. This can undermine the raison d’être of defence cooperation, even in the short-term, and cause significant problems in situations where participating states of regional MDCs are divided on the necessity of military action.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › Perm: Do CP – 1AR
Jacobson 12 Alice Jacobson, member of Task Force 2012, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, “Human Rights Watch & the Arab Spring,” Chapter 13.3, Can NATO React to the Arab Spring? Democracy, Human Rights, & the Rule of Law, 2-27-2012, /GoGreen!
Human rights violations as outlined in broad terms in the 2011 World Report, and pressure from organizations such as Human Rights Watch most certainly add to the international pressure on NATO to intervene. This has led to the discovery that military power may not be a useful instrument in dealing with specific country by country issues in the region. NATO is a group of democratic countries who in turn each have an individual agenda when dealing in the Middle East and North Africa, and are tied to the region by their oil dependency; but protection of human rights as justification for military intervention must be across the board or not at all. Military intervention in Libya was completed swiftly based largely on the economic incentives of NATO’s democratic powers, whereas in Syria, NATO has been immobilized as more people die everyday.