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2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › Solvency – 2NC › General – Solvency – 2NC

The plan is not key - Turkey’s only security cooperation with the U.S. is happening outside of NATO platforms

Oğuzlu 12 (Tarık Oğuzlu, He is currently a Prof. Dr. in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Antalya International University. He holds a Ph.D. degree in IR, a Master of Science degree in IR, and another Master of Arts degree in IR taken taken from Bilkent University. He teaches courses on International Relations Theories, International Politics, European Union Foreign, Security and Defense Policies, Turkey’s relations with the European Union, Foreign Policy Analysis and Turkish Foreign Policy. He works on the following subjects: international relations theories, Europeanization of foreign policy, European Union foreign and security policy, transatlantic relations, Turkish foreign policy, Turkey’s relations with EU and NATO/US, Turkey-Greece relations, Cyprus dispute, Turkey and the Middle East. He has academic articles published in such journals as Political Science Quarterly, Washington Quarterly, Middle East Policy, International Journal, Security Dialogue, Middle Eastern Studies, Turkish Studies, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, European Security, International Spectator, Contemporary Security Policy, Mediterranean Politics, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Journal of Balkans and Near Eastern Studies, Insight Turkey and Uluslararası İlişkiler, etc. He is also the head of Center for Social, Economic and Politics Research, “Turkey's Eroding Commitment to NATO: From Identity to Interests,” Turkish Studies, The Washington Quarterly, 7-25-12, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.706578)//nehahahahha

Also, the reluctance of some Western European Alliance members to recognize the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as a terrorist organization and to push for the PKK to end its activities in Turkish territory has worried Ankara. As long as a majority of Turks believes that the PKK owes its existence in part to support coming from European countries, Turkey’s commitment to NATO is bound to decrease in the years to come.5 In contrast, the United States, the leading member of the Alliance, has gradually adopted a non-European strategic outlook by considering developments outside the continent as more vital to its national security interests. Yet, Washington has begun to value Turkey’s security cooperation in more bilateral rather than multilateral platforms. In other words, even though Washington’s need to secure Turkey’s strategic cooperation has dramatically increased, the Americans have generally tried to achieve this bilaterally, outside of NATO platforms. Another important factor contributing to the rise of Turkish skepticism toward NATO has been the changing nature of global politics. As the world has become more multipolar, or even nonpolar, and as interstate relations have increasingly taken shape in more multilateral and interdependent settings, NATO-like collective defense organizations have become outdated. In addition, changing power configurations within the international system seem to have increased Turkey’s capability to pursue a multi-dimensional and multi-directional foreign policy. Finally, Turkey’s relations with Russia on one hand, and Middle Eastern countries on the other, will likely also shape Turkey’s future view of NATO.6 Turkey is not an exception to the idea that, as the world has increasingly become post-Western, many states have revised their foreignand security-policy strategies to adapt to the new security environment.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › No Kickout – NB – 2NC › EU Cred – Brink – ! – 2NC

EU cred is at stake.

Lahodynsky 20 (Otmar Lahodynsky, former president of the Association of European journalists. The EU’s credibility is at stake, New Europe, 11/20/20, ) – JL

In July, after a four-day marathon summit in Brussels, there was agreement on the EU budget for 2021-2027 and a recovery fund for the EU’s 27 members following the COVID-19 crisis. Together, almost €2 trillion have been reserved for this purpose. The €750 billion corona aid package is intended to help those countries that have been the most affected by the disease, including as Italy, Spain and France, but also the other Member States as they will need to rebuild their economies. At the EU summit, a typical Brussels-style compromise was reached – each head of government presented themself as a winner at home if they will receive a lot of money for economic recovery. It was then that the so-called “frugal four” – Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden (plus Finland) – forced a reduction in the number of grants in exchange for an increase in the share of loans and a cut in their membership fees. The heads of Poland and Hungary also celebrated at home after the successfully de-linked their access to EU funding from their records on the rule of law. Subsequently, however, the other EU states introduced this clause by a clear majority. The Poles and Hungarians felt pressured and they vetoed the seven-year EU budget, which requires unanimity despite the fact that they were not bothered that they had previously approved it. In his explanatory statement, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki railed against an “attack on Polish sovereignty” and adding that the EU was no longer the same as when Poland had joined the bloc in 2004, a generation after the end of Communism. Morawiecki said the Polish economy was so strong that it no longer needed any subsidies from Brussels (more than €12 billion each year). Morawiecki said that Poles were even considering an EU withdrawal along the lines of Brexit. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Brussels’ bête noire, went even further. In his view, the EU is acting like the Soviet Union once did. It wants to blackmail Hungary and force it to accept Middle Eastern refugees. In the future, Orban added, the European Commission would have the power to meddle in the internal politics of all of the Member States, as it sees fit. Orban also emphasized that the EU’s previous accusations against Hungary were all unfounded and that the concept of the rule of law was not precisely or universally defined. The reality is that these core concepts of the bloc were long-ago enshrined in the EU treaties and in Europe’s charter of fundamental rights. Conditions for EU accession were already laid down in the 1993 Copenhagen criteria and include the stability of institutions, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and respect and protection of minorities. The Commission has, for too long, turned a blind eye to the transgressions of the nationalistic populists in Poland, Hungary and other Eastern European countries. The isolated attempts to bring about punitive proceedings under Article 7 of the EU Treaty did not act as a deterrent, because sanctions were not imposed. For this reason, the governments of Hungary and Poland mutually helped each other. But now the basic principles of the EU, above all the rule of law, are being put to the test. When Brussels collectively raises billions of euros for emergency aid against the pandemic for the first time through common debts, it must be ensured that this money is spent correctly. The EU also owes this to its taxpayers. In Hungary, Orban’s confidants and his family have collected a lot more than €5 billion in subsidies from Brussels every year, mainly through agricultural subsidies. The European Council in a new report this week criticized Hungary for not fighting against corruption. In an ironic echo of Hungary’s totalitarian Communist past, nearly all of Hungary’s independent or critical media have been brought into line or closed down and the scientific community and cultural institutions are also under Orban’s control. In Poland, the independence of the judiciary was dangerously undermined on several occasions. Some cities have established their own “LGTB-free zones” and, with the support of Poland’s notoriously arch-conservative branch of the Catholic Church, a ban on abortion was imposed recently with only a few exceptions. The EU must protect the rule of law and fundamental European values more strongly than before for another reason. If these are violated without consequences, how can Europe require new candidate countries to respect these values? A way out of the stalemate seems difficult. The European Parliament has made it clear that it will not accept any amendments to the draft. “These nationalistic, populist positions and unanimity are the grave-diggers of the EU,” said Othmar Karas, the Vice-President of the European Parliament who asked for the exclusion of Orban’s Fidesz-party from the European People’s Party. Fortunately, the budget for 2021 has already been adopted. It contains innovations, including more money for future areas such as digitalization and climate protection. If Poland and Hungary retain their veto, this budget could be prolonged annually. The €750 billion COVID aid package could possibly be decoupled from the EU budget. In that case, such support through joint borrowing could only be decided for 24 countries – without Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. It is a more laborious path, but possibly the only one, as the EU’s credibility as a global player is at stake.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › No Kickout – NB – 2NC › XT: EU Cred – ! – 2NC

EU credibility is a necessity for global stability

Weinstein 2017

(“Why the US needs Europe” President and CEO of Hudson Institute, written widely on international affairs for leading publications in the United States, Europe, and Asia. He is an expert on U.S. foreign policy and international affairs who comments on national and international affairs on television and in numerous publications, including The Wall Street Journal, The Weekly Standard, Bungei Shimbun (Japan), Le Figaro and Le Monde.) 15. 3. 2017) - JL

Today, by any number of measures, the EU and the U.S. are drifting apart. Support for the transatlantic alliance is at a post-World War II low. There are many manifestations of what has been termed “continental drift”: inwards turns by both the U.S. and the EU after the economic crisis, an America increasingly focused on the Pacific, tensions over the Snowden revelations, the absence of U.S. leadership on Syria and Ukraine, and lastly, divergent views within Europe of the critical importance of the U.S. The potential future effectiveness of the alliance has been put into question by weakening European defense capabilities and a U.S. President determined to shrink America’s footprint abroad. In short, the Atlantic Alliance is in crisis. Presidents Clinton and Bush undertook historic efforts to bring critical parts of post-Communist Eastern Europe into the Alliance. By contrast, President Obama’s lack of engagement in European affairs seems to signal to Europe that it is no longer a major American strategic concern after the end of the Cold War. This crisis notwithstanding, the U.S. needs closer engagement with Europe on crucial defense and foreign policy matters. The U.S. under President Obama may be turning inward; but the fact remains: Europe is vital and irreplaceable to us. History and culture bind the U.S. and Europe together; Europe discovered us, shaped our thinking, and forms of government. But there is more than just cultural affinity that unites us. There is a deep moral scope to the alliance. It was, after all, in the West that concepts such as limited government, individual rights, freedom of worship, free markets, and equal rights for women arose. The moral basis of our alliance embodied in these concepts was critical to our heroic joint efforts leading the fierce external opposition to totalitarianism that helped bring down the Iron Curtain. The common defense threats we face in the 21st century—almost all on the periphery of the U.S. or the EU—are different in scope and kind: conventional challenges such as Russia bent on dominating its near abroad or China’s increasing assertiveness in territorial matters and growing military prowess; others are unconventional, including the spread of radical Islam and terrorism in the Middle East and beyond, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to countries such as Iran and North Korea. In an age of extremist ideologies, non-state actors with increasingly widespread technological capacities could pose the greatest threats of all to international order. Other challenges that arise from the “arc of instability” to the south of Europe—including migration and unruly political transitions in the Arab world—require a mix of hard and soft power. The diplomatic flexibility that approaches by a multiplicity of states in Europe can afford— combined with the potential threat of hard power when necessary—offers the most diverse set of tools to handle such crises. Our moral message and policy prescriptions are much stronger when unified; we are able to achieve far more together than alone. But to achieve unity, as the last decade has shown, we really have to work at it. This means more than occasional consultations, after the fact, as has often been the case during the Obama administration. Strong U.S.-European relations require regular consultations, give and take, even blunt conversations— not just lectures from Washington or from Brussels or European capitals—to give Europeans a stake of ownership in policies. This ownership will allow them and us to make the case for shared sacrifice to their and our polities—a case that needs to be made in politics since the choices officials face in security policy are often less than optimal. The failure of American leadership since 2009 to make such arguments at home has weakened our ability to expect our allies to make the same kinds of cases to their publics, thereby harming the alliance. Americans cannot “go it alone.” Europe offers America an invaluable tool: a key multilateral dimension to policy. With it, comes greater credibility in the international arena and a greater capacity to undertake complex missions. America has to lead, but Europe has to be our partner, willing to be vocal when we are unwilling to meet out responsibilities. Without it comes the excessive swings of American foreign and defense policy that have led us, in recent years, to shirk our global responsibilities. Europeans contributed in crucial ways to the US-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and were absolutely central to the intervention in Libya. France’s willingness to intervene in Mali and the Central African Republic with assistance from the U.S. and the E.U. at a time when the U.S. is less willing on new anti-terror interventions is a very positive sign. But French interventionism, as welcome as it is, cannot make up for shrinking defense budgets and reluctant leadership from both Germany and the U.K. The U.S. needs to encourage its allies to assume their responsibilities. Although Europe’s armed forces are less strong and less well equipped than desirable, European armed forces are, in fact, well-trained, technologically sophisticated and also geographically closer to the regions that are likely to be critical in the 21st century—North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. The manpower and cost efficiencies from potential joint operations cannot be overstated. Europeans can bring unmatched sensibilities in their own backyard, but need to assume their responsibilities. Their knowledge of history and culture is essential. This knowledge and willingness to use “soft power” has to be joined to a sense of the importance of burden sharing, especially as American forces are overstretched in a time of declining American defense budgets. Increasing isolationism in both American political parties should serve as a wakeup call to Europe that we might not always be there to help police Europe’s periphery as in Kosovo or Libya. The greater distance we are assuming from Europe should make us all the more sympathetic to European defense initiatives. Given the deeper challenges we face, it is time to leave aside “theological” debates over whether NATO or the EU should be the prime focus for the future of European defense. Instead, we need to focus on how best to meet common strategic challenges with the array of resources, diplomatic and military, that we can muster. When Europeans and Americans work together for shared purpose, the partnership enhances us both and makes our complex and simultaneous missions much easier to accomplish.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › No Kickout – NB – 2NC › NATO/EU Cred – I/L – 2NC

Turkey has historically acted upon its own interests, rather than those of NATO

Brown 22 (Ethan Brown, 11-year veteran of the U.S. Air Force as a Special Operations Joint Terminal Attack controller, currently the senior fellow for Defense Studies at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress, “NATO must push for full accountability from Turkey,” The Hill, 7/1/22, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3543770-nato-must-push-for-full-accountability-from-turkey//eo)

All eyes this week were on the Madrid summit, where NATO leaders were expected to announce new military postures, security cooperation, and future planning for collective defense in light of the ongoing Ukraine crisis. The biggest thing to come out of the summit was Turkey’s ultimate reversal of its block on Finland and Sweden from becoming new members — new member admittance requires a unanimous vote to pass. This issue loomed largely and reiterated Ankara’s confrontational and often complicating role in the alliance to date. As a great many changes in Europe’s security organization are expected to evolve in the near future, now is an ideal time to address issues with Turkey’s actions as a NATO member, for the sake of future accountability and legitimacy within the alliance. With Russia backpedaling from global pressure, to say nothing of its flagging efforts in Eastern Ukraine, Turkey’s most significant geopolitical clout outside of NATO is at its weakest point in years. Historically, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has played both sides of the alliance. The Turkish president has courted Moscow’s favor (purchasing S-400 air defense systems) while enjoying benefits of mutual security and military aid, such as F-16s and other aviation equipment expected later this year in a “make or break” moment in the U.S.-Turkey relationship. Turkey has never hesitated to exploit unrest in Europe to further Erdogan’s personal agenda. In 2019 it crossed the Syrian border to butcher formerly American-allied Kurds, while also throwing its considerable military weight behind Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to bolster its regional influence. More recently, Ankara has simultaneously closed off the Bosporus to Russian warships and offered to mediate between Moscow and Kyiv — mere months after meeting with President Vladimir Putin hat in hand to bargain for economic and military concessions and aid. President Erdogan’s bid to block Finland and Sweden from joining NATO was due to their alleged support of Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) members, whom Turkey has labeled a terrorist organization, a point of contention — though not accountability — between Ankara and the West. Turkey has been able to conduct itself thusly because of the unique importance of its geography. Its close proximity to the Levant served as a waystation (Incirlik Air Base) for nearly two decades of the global war on terror, where tens of thousands of U.S. and coalition service members passed through on their way to Iraq and Afghanistan — meaning Ankara’s actions were often ignored when addressing global policy, so long as the bases and airspace allowed for the use in the ongoing war efforts elsewhere. Assertions that “there is a strongman holding NATO hostage, and it’s not Putin” are both accurate and compelling and require NATO to rethink what it demands of its member states. Like much else regarding European security, the war in Ukraine upset existing norms of state conduct and geopolitics, or at least simplified them. NATO member states have all increased defense spending, vowed to take more pronounced roles in ensuring the continents’ stability and have universally condemned the conduct of authoritarians like Vladimir Putin — all signs that the alleged ‘brain death’ of NATO is now in recovery. Yet for Turkey’s part, hamstringing the needs of the alliance over its own regional power brokerages, even if it has reversed course on the matter of Finland and Sweden joining NATO, has been a regular and consistent means of undermining the alliance. NATO has excelled at unifying against unacceptable behaviors since Feb. 24, when Russian troops first crossed into Ukraine. It has thus far achieved tremendous success in finding means to counter Moscow while not directly engaging in the conflict in Eastern Europe, demonstrating resolve and fortitude in preparing for further aggression. But much of legitimizing the alliance in the future hangs on member states acting in common purpose on all accounts — and Ankara’s actions to date demand a higher level of accountability. The reversal by President Erdogan to confer Finland and Sweden is a positive sign, one that should be seized upon by NATO leaders to demand greater accountability for one of its oldest and foremost member states. The alliance’s own purpose statement, chiefly asserting collective trans-Atlantic security, also provides that the institution “engages where possible and when necessary to project its values further afield, prevent and manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.” Any claim that Turkey has prevented or managed crises, stabilized conflict situations, or upheld the collective values of the Alliance is sorely misplaced. NATO must demand the highest conduct of its member states, both as a means to discredit authoritarian tyrants and to ensure its future cooperative security efficacy. This includes incentivizing Turkey’s responsibility in NATO membership and retracting from Russian cooperation. Permitting new NATO members should only be the beginning of Turkey’s return to credible alliance membership.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › No Kickout – NB – 2NC › NATO/EU Cred – I/L – 2NC

Turkey continually damages NATO’s democracy and it’s credibility in political and millitary alliances

Conley 18 (Heather Conley, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR EUROPE, EURASIA, AND THE ARCTIC AND DIRECTOR OF THE EUROPE PROGRAM AT CSIS, “Judy Asks: Is Turkey Damaging NATO?,” Carnegie Europe, 1-24-18, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/75345) //nehahaha

Any NATO member that purposefully diminishes its democratic principles and institutions damages the alliance. Every NATO member is a signatory to the alliance’s founding document, the 1949 Washington Treaty, and its preamble states that all members are “… determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” Although we associate NATO solely with its military operations, NATO is a political-military alliance with democratic principles at its core. Turkey has so greatly diminished its democracy over the past several years that an independent U.S. organization, Freedom House, has recently declared the country “not free.” Unfortunately, Turkey is not a NATO outlier in this regard but is part of a growing trend. Poland, Hungary, and Romania are also actively diminishing judicial independence, institutional transparency, and the ability to express political opposition; the very essence of democracy. These countries also damage the credibility of this crucial political alliance. But as a critical NATO member, Turkey’s military interventions in the Middle East—whether it is the shooting down of a Russian military aircraft or repeated unilateral military interventions in Iraq and Syria—increasingly place Turkey’s national security at risk, which places NATO at risk of becoming involved in the broader regional conflict. Thus, Turkey inflicts ongoing damage to NATO politically and militarily.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › No Kickout – NB – 2NC › NATO/EU Cred – I/L – 2NC

Turkey is becoming an unreliable ally in NATO and seems to be getting closer with Russia

Randall 17, Ryan Randall, commander of 104th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, attended Air Command and Staff College and Air War College, “Turkey and NATO – (Un) Happy Together”, 1/1/17, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1054982.pdf //AB

In 1952 both Turkey and Greece joined NATO, decided largely out of Cold War strategies against the Soviet Union. While some question why Turkey, a country nearly 2,000 miles from the north Atlantic, was offered membership into the Alliance, the reason was two- fold: its strategic location within Europe and the underlying principle of the Truman Doctrine – “extending military and economic aid to states vulnerable to Soviet threat / expansion.”1 Membership in NATO guaranteed that Turkey would not become a Soviet ally and expanded NATO’s reach eastward toward, what was then, the Soviet Union. With firmly anti-Communist governments, “Greece and Turkey were viewed by the West as bulwarks against Moscow and the spread of communism in Europe.”2 With the Korean War on the horizon, “fears of China and Russia expanding their influence into other parts of the world were realized. (Both Greece and Turkey contributed troops to fight in Korea).”3 While Turkey can be viewed as an important member of the Alliance and a reliable ally for nearly six decades, Turkey’s relationship with NATO and the West has been both complicated and tumultuous. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s continual defiance of the democratic principles that form the bedrock of the United Nations Charter has pinned the Alliance against one of its own members. Last year’s failed coup attempt to overthrow President Erdogan was a watershed moment that has further strained Turkey-NATO relations, jeopardizing Turkey’s close ties with the Alliance, while pushing it toward warming relations with Russia. NATO must not stand by and watch the erosion of democracy take place from within Turkey. The Alliance must come together and develop new protocols for dealing with a member that continually defies the fundamental principles shared by all Allies: freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The Organization must reaffirm their clear commitment to the democratic values that form the cornerstone of the Alliance and oppose any and all actions that deter from their mission to establish peace and stability around the world.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › No Kickout – NB – 2NC › NATO/EU Cred – I/L – 2NC

Turkey creates conflict within NATO

Tuncer 22, Murat Abdullah Tuncer, studied political science in Conley American University, “Turkey's Options for Finland and Sweden's NATO Membership Applications”, May 2022, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Murat-Tuncer-7/publication/360815928_Turkey%27s_Options_for_Finland_and_Sweden%27s_NATO_Membership_Applications/links/628cd57fd4e5243d9b961df4/Turkeys-Options-for-Finland-and-Swedens-NATO-Membership-Applications.pdf//AB

After Turkey intervened in Cyprus in July 1974, Greece left the military wing of NATO, claiming that NATO did not prevent Turkey's intervention in Cyprus. This event undoubtedly affected Turkey-Greece relations deeply; moreover, it worried the Western imperial powers sensitive to the control of the Aegean-Mediterranean. Western powers intensified their attempts to bring together their two allies, whose presence and cooperation they needed in the Aegean- Mediterranean, once again, under the umbrella of NATO. They advised Greece to return to NATO and Turkey not to take a negative stance.

Shortly after the intervention, Turkey declared NOTAM 714 in July 1974 and made flights in a 50-mile area over the Aegean subject to its permission. Greece, which was in a difficult situation and lost its command and control authority in the Aegean, announced in 1976, two years later, that it wanted to return to the military wing of NATO. Still, Turkey stipulated the redefinition of the command-control areas in the Aegean for this. NATO European Commander-in-Chief Alexander Haig and then Gen. Rogers attempted with Bülent Ecevit and Süleyman Demirel, but they could not get results.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › No Kickout – NB – 2NC › NATO/EU Cred – I/L – 2NC

Turkey’s partnership with Russia threatens NATO/EU Cred

Mehta 19 (Arnav Mehta, deputy editor and senior Pentagon correspondent for Defense News, covering policy, strategy and acquisition at the highest levels of the Defense Department and its international partners, “Turkey officially kicked out of F-35 program, costing US half a billion dollars,” DefenseNews, 7/17/19, /eo

WASHINGTON — The U.S. has removed Turkey from the F-35 joint strike fighter program, and Turkey will lose its production work on the jet by March 2020, following its acceptance of the S-400 Russian-made air defense system last Friday. However, a top Pentagon official would not close the door on Turkey rejoining the program in some form, should it reverse the decision to buy the S-400. The White House issued a statement Wednesday confirming the move, which Washington had threatened for months. “Turkey’s decision to purchase Russian S-400 air defense systems renders its continued involvement with the F-35 impossible,” the White House statement read. “The F-35 cannot coexist with a Russian intelligence collection platform that will be used to learn about its advanced capabilities.” “Turkey has been a longstanding and trusted partner and NATO Ally for over 65 years, but accepting the S-400 undermines the commitments all NATO Allies made to each other to move away from Russian systems," the statement continued. Shortly after the statement was released, the Pentagon held a rare on-camera press conference to explain the process moving forward, with Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Ellen Lord and Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy David Trachtenberg. “Turkey cannot field a Russian intelligence collection platform in proximity to where the F-35 program makes repairs, and houses the F-35,” Lord said. “Much of the F-35′s strength lies in its stealth capabilities, so the ability to detect those capabilities would jeopardize the long term security of the F-35 program. We seek only to protect the long term security of the F-35 program.” Turkey, a partner in the F-35 program that helped fund the development of the jet, planned to buy 100 F-35As. Its first jet was rolled out in June 2018 in a festive “delivery ceremony." Though Turkey formally owns its jets, the U.S. has said it has the power to keep the planes from moving to Turkish soil and intends to keep all four existing Turkish jets from leaving the U.S. Lord avoided saying that the door was shut on Turkey returning to the program should the S-400 be removed from its soil and repeatedly used the term “suspension” to characterize Turkey’s status in the F-35 program. When asked twice whether Turkey could be welcomed back if the situation changes, Lord did not give a direct answer one way or the other. “At this point, the Turks have made a decision. We have said the F-35 and S-400 are incompatible. We will work forward at this point to unwind the relationship," she said. All Turkish F-35 personnel have been informed they must leave the U.S. by July 31, including 20 individuals assigned to the Joint Program Office. Neither official would comment on if any of those individuals have requested asylum. By March 2020, Turkey’s industrial participation in the F-35 program, which includes production on about 900 parts for the stealthy fighter, will be “unwound." Lord said the projection is this will cost Turkey’s economy around $9 billion over the life of the program. American suppliers will initially fill those production roles, but the goal is to eventually farm some of it out to other partners. Lord said the process will have “minimal” impacts on the larger F-35 program because of the planning that has already gone on for several months. To move the production from Turkey to the U.S. will require between $500-$600 million in nonrecurring engineering costs, Lord said. Which partners, if any, would be willing to buy the F-35s already in production for Turkey was still being worked out. Trachtenberg consistently delivered the same message over and over: that this situation is not one that should impact the broader NATO alliance. That includes Turkey’s participation in NATO exercises, particularly upcoming events in Georgia, Germany and Ukraine. Asked several times how Turkey having an air-defense system that cannot be linked to other NATO systems and could be used to spy on NATO jets would not harm alliance cohesion, Trachtenberg repeatedly said the relationship between Turkey, the U.S. and NATO will be able to continue. In a statement, Lockheed Martin, the prime contractor on the F-35 program, said, “This is a government-to-government matter, and as always, we are following official U.S. Government guidance as it relates to delivery of the F-35 to Turkey and the export of goods from the Turkish supply chain.” “Over the last several months we’ve been working to establish alternative sources of supply in the United States to quickly accommodate Turkey’s current contributions to the program. These actions will limit any future production or sustainment impact and we remain on track to meet our commitment of delivering 131 F-35s this year,” the statement added.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › No Kickout – NB – 2NC › NATO/EU Cred – I/L – 2NC

Turkey currently lowers NATO and EU credibility with relations to Russia

Kogan 18 (Eugene Kogan, held research fellowships at Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Auswaertige Politik, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, the Swedish Defence Research Agency, the Swedish National Defence College, and the Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Was a researcher for Harvard. Russian-Turkish Relations and their Impact on NATO and the EU, European Security and Defense. 6-26-18. ) – ED 

The Black Sea region is one of the re- gions in which Turkey has lost its influ- ence to Russia. NATO and the EU have no influence on relations between Rus- sia and Turkey, as the Presidents of both countries either ignore the EU's efforts or, as in the case of Erdogan, despise their at- tempts to appease him. In addition, NATO has no mechanism for excluding Turkey as a member state. Although the EU has implicitly suspended negotiations on Tur- key's possible EU membership, it is not prepared to make a clear statement that Turkey will not join the Union in the fore- seeable future. The leaders of both organ- izations continue to hope that Erdogan will change the authoritarian course of the country and return to a European way and reconsider the comfortable relations with Putin. Erdogan has other plans, and as a result the leaders of NATO and the EU are likely to wait in vain. It must be emphasised that Erdogan was and is not an equal partner in the Turkish– Russian relationship, although both Presi- dent Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Er- dogan have a similarly authoritarian style of government. Erdogan called Putin "my dear friend Vladimir" at a press confer- ence in St. Petersburg on 9 August 2016, shortly after the restoration of bilateral relations, which were damaged by a Turk- ish F-16 fighter plane on 24 November 2015 after the launch of a Russian Su-24 bomber. But Putin did not call Erdogan "my dear friend" Tayyip. There is a saying that Russia has no friends. As the Russian Tsar Alexander III previously said: has only two allies – the army and the navy." And in the 21st century, Russia also has nuclear deterrence and the right of veto in the UN Security Council. It can therefore be said that Putin does not regard Erdogan as a friend, but as an unequal counterpart. In addition, Murat Bilhan, former head of the Turkish Foreign Ministry's Strategic Re- search Centre, said: "Behind Putin's smile, Russia remains a great state and can show its talons whenever it suits him. Turkey could never compete with Russia. Russia is a superpower, while Turkey is a regional power." Turkey should not be under any illusions about its role in relations, namely that of the second fiddle. While Erdogan's authoritarian rule has alienated allies in Europe and the United States, it has strengthened Putin's control over Turkey and embarrassed Erdogan. Pu- tin's economic sanctions against Turkey in November 2015 caused serious damage to the Turkish economy when Russian tour- ists stayed away from Turkey. Putin can im- pose these economic sanctions and travel Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad met with representatives of the Russian Defence Ministry to discuss Russian “counter-terrorism operations” in Syria. On 13 November 2017, Vladimir Putin met with President of Turkey Re- cep Tayyip Erdogan in Sochi to discuss bilateral relations and current issues on the international agenda. 28 European Security & Defence · March 2018 Photo: Kremlin.ru Photo: Kremlin.ru have received unconditional support from Russia. The cost of unconditional support from Russia remains high and has a long- term impact. In addition, the renewed co- operation between Ankara and Moscow is to take place on Russian terms, and Turkey reluctantly accepts this reality." The never-ending story of Erdogan's deci- sion to buy the S-400 air defence system from Russia is an example of Putin's view of Moscow's support for Turkey. Turkey buys a system that is not compatible with NATO standards and cannot be integrated into NATO's air defence system. That is why Turkey must confine itself to its own archi- tecture. Even if Russia is ready to carry out maintenance work, maintenance is carried out by Russian and not by Turkish workers. At the same time, Russia is not prepared to supply software codes, IFF systems, joint production with Turkey and certainly no technology transfer to Turkey. And this de- spite the Turkish side's persistence to gain access to the software codes and the IFF system. In addition, the system cannot be delivered to Turkey before 2020. This is a high price paid by Turkey for unconditional support from Russia. The statement by Ca- SECURITY POLICY  restrictions on Turkey if he feels that Er- dogan is not listening to him. In addition, Putin can impose sanctions at any time and without warning, which he can promise. Therefore, the relationship is one of senior and junior partners, even though Erdogan does not see this reality. But as Atilla Yesi- lada of Global Source Partners, a consul- tancy firm based in Istanbul, said in January 2017: "The Turkish government has com- pletely decoupled itself from reality. This is not the case with Putin, who is playing a tough, well-calculated and manipulative game against Erdogan and at the same time knows how to deal with the volatile Erdogan correctly, compared to the rather timid attitude of Turkey's Western allies." There is no doubt that Turkey did not only push itself into Russian orbit in 2015, but al- ready in 2008, because Turkey was already dependent on 60 percent of gas supplies from Russia at that time. Today, the figure is 55 percent. Turkey has no choice but to rely on Russia's good will, and Turkey pays in hard currency. The idea that Turkey must diversify its gas imports away from Russia and become a gas hub has remained an idea. In 2014, according to Turkey's foreign trade statistics, exports to Russia amount- ed to US$5.9Bn, while imports from Rus- sia amounted to US$25.2Bn. The first six months of 2016 were Turkey's worst export result since 2004, and the most striking as- pect of trade with Russia is that it has been in favour of Russia from the outset. Russia sells more to Turkey than Turkey sells to Russia. Turkey's dependence on Russian gas and oil (10 percent of oil comes from Russia) is a major factor in this imbalance. The current situation is unlikely to change, as Turkey's energy requirements will dou- ble in the next decade. Another factor in this imbalance is the increasing number of Russian tourists in Turkey. In addition to Turkey's dependence on Rus- sian gas and Russian tourists, the Russian- Georgian war in August 2008 sent a clear message to Ankara, namely that Ankara can only increase its influence in its imme- diate neighbourhood, namely in the Black Sea region, by coordinating with Moscow and not with its NATO allies. And that is exactly what has happened since then. Turkey's failed coup d'état on 15 July 2016 has further consolidated relations between Russia and Turkey. In a telephone call with Erdogan on 17 July 2016, Putin stressed the "categorical inadmissibility of anti-consti- tutional acts and violence in state life" and reaffirmed his intention to meet Erdogan in Russia. Putin's reaction was in stark con- trast to that of the Western allies. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said on 25 July 2016: "Unlike other countries, we A Russian S-400 Air Defence System on a BAZ trailer chassis On 24 November 2015, a Turkish F-16 fighter aircraft shot down a Rus- sian Su-24 aircraft near the Syrian-Turkish border. The Turkish Air Force claimed that the Russian aircraft violated Turkish airspace. The Russian pilot Capt. Konstantin Murakhtin said on Russian TV there was "no way" the jet could have violated Turkish airspace. Turkey says the pilots were warned 10 times before the plane was shot down. Capt. Murakhtin was rescued from rebel-held territory in Syria in a 12-hour operation involving Russian Special Forces. The incident strained Russian-Turkish relations. March 2018 · European Security & Defence 29 Graphics: Donor Furfur, Wikipedia CC Photo: Vitaly Kuzmin, Wikipedia CC vusoglu that "Ankara can refuse to buy the S-400 if Moscow refuses to stop joint production in Turkey on 9 October 2017" should be taken with a grain of salt. Cavusoglu is not the one who decided to buy the S-400. Cavusoglu's attempt to put the Russians under pressure is not taken seriously by Moscow and the Russians laugh behind Cavusoglu's back. After all, the Turkish cash deposit of around US$100M for the purchase of the S-400 will not be repaid. Finally, General Petr Pavel, Chairman of the Military Committee, said on 25 October 2017: "Although the principle of sovereignty obviously consists in the procurement of defence equipment, as the nations are sovereign in decision-making, they are also sovereign in coping with the consequences of this decision.” It remains to be seen whether Pavel's statement can be interpreted as an explicit warning to Erdogan, but it is obvious that NATO is not satisfied with Erdogan's decision to buy the S-400. The unequal bilateral relations are a major headache for NATO and the EU, as relations between Turkey and its Western allies have deteriorated since the failed coup d'état in Turkey. Let us recall the state of bilateral relations between Germany and Tur- key, and in particular the USA and Turkey, as well as the bitter relations between Austria and The Netherlands and Turkey. It is obvious that relations between Turkey and its Western allies will not change as long as Erdogan remains president. Although Turkey remains an ally of NATO, Turkey has become a difficult ally. Erdogan is fully aware of this fact and will not change his behaviour, making the NATO and EU response difficult. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg's polite statement that Turk- ish officials told him that "Ankara remains a strong NATO ally" is without substance. Erdogan is acting in bad faith, knowing that Western allies cannot punish Turkey in the present circumstances. On the other hand, Putin behaves like a spectator and enjoys the confusion without moving a finger. As long as NATO does not succeed in including an article on the right of expulsion and penalties for misconduct of a member of NATO in the North Atlantic Treaty, Erdogan will continue to be- have boldly. As long as the EU heads of state and government dis- agree on the fate of Turkey's possible membership and therefore do not take a unanimous decision, Erdogan will treat these heads of state and government with contempt. It is an opportunity for Putin to bind the Turkish Gulliver to the land of the Lilliputians, to continue his policy of changing the military balance in the Black Sea region (with intensive militarisation of the Crimean peninsula) in his favour and to scorn the NATO alliance.NATO and the EU are in an unprofitable position because of consensus and compromise, while Putin and Erdogan continue to behave with impunity, knowing the internal weaknesses of the EU, which is unable to make a final decision on Turkey's EU membership. As long as NATO's language remains vague and ambiguous, Erdogan will not do anything to shake NATO's boat, but will enjoy the protection of NATO and Russia's embrace. Whether the Turkish formula of NATO protection and Russian embrace can also apply to other NATO member states goes beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, it can be said that other NATO members are carefully evaluating the Turkish experience. Putin will continue to draw Turkey into its sphere of influence by offering smaller trade, energy and tourism concessions and with the unresolved conflict in Syria, as Erdogan is also in an unprofitable position. The author can only repeat what Bilhan said above: "Behind Putin's smile Russia remains a great state and can show its claws whenever it suits it." And this is something that Erdogan and his government should remember well.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › No Kickout – NB – 2NC › NATO/EU Cred – I/L – 2NC

Turkey paralyzes NATO and decks credibility and influence

Got 20 (Antoine Got, current Europe policy advisor for the Canadian gov, former Staff Officer for NATO in the Operations division and Crisis Response Systems and Exercises division, former Staff Officer for SHAPE in the Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre; “Turkey’s Crisis with the West: How a New Low in Relations Risks Paralyzing NATO”, War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/turkeys-crisis-with-the-west-how-a-new-low-in-relations-risks-paralyzing-nato/ )

NATO’s most important challenge today may not come from Russia, but from within. With the number of disputes between Turkey and several European allies yet again on the rise, the two parties’ souring relations have begun undermining the organization’s cohesion and ability to make timely collective decisions. If left unaddressed, these tensions could cause serious damage to the world’s most powerful alliance. The latest flashpoint came from Turkey’s open backing of Azerbaijan’s war effort in the small landlocked enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, which ended abruptly in early November thanks to a Russian-brokered deal. Reports of  and alleged  sent by Turkey placed Ankara at loggerheads with its  for a peaceful, negotiated resolution to the conflict. The deal, which foresees Baku reacquiring sizeable portions of the disputed enclave, has made Turkey one of the  of the recent flare-up, while its Western allies . For some, this could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back, adding to a long list of complaints they have recently leveled against their NATO ally.

Last month, Greece and Turkey came dangerously close to a  in disputed Eastern Mediterranean waters over Turkey’s gas exploration activities near the Greek island of Kastellorizo, just a few hundred meters away from the Turkish coast. Though Turkey later withdrew its ship, tensions between the two NATO allies spiked again following  that it would send the ship back for a 10-day seismic research mission in the area, renewing Greek calls for sanctions. What makes this a particularly explosive situation, of course, is the two Eastern Mediterranean powers’ lingering dispute over the post-1974 division of Cyprus and the discovery of energy resources in the area. A similar confrontational encounter occurred in June when France and Turkey nearly  after a French warship, the Courbet, tried to inspect a Turkish vessel for allegedly breaching a U.N. arms embargo on Libya — a claim Ankara .  in the Libyan Civil War, the two allies have been engaged in a war of words over each other’s provocative deeds in the ,  and  conflicts, as well as over Turkey’s territorial claims in the Mediterranean. The latest spat followed President Emmanuel Macron’s  to caricature religious figures in the wake of a teacher’s beheading, to which Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan responded by  of French products.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › No Kickout – NB – 2NC › Logistics – Solvency – 2NC

Turkey is continuously mistrusted over military logistics – It’s empirical collaboration with Russian defense systems proves

Cohen 21 (Rachel Cohen, Rachel Cohen joined Air Force Magazine, covers science and technology programs, space, Congress, the nuclear enterprise, C4ISR, and mor, graduated from American University and previously worked at Inside Defense, Inside Health Policy, the Frederick News-Post (Md.), the Washington Post, “Biden’s Pentagon to keep Turkey out of the F-35 Program,” AirForce magazine, 2-5-21, https://www.airforcemag.com/bidens-pentagon-to-keep-turkey-out-of-f-35-program/)//nehahahhaha

The Biden administration is continuing its predecessor’s policy of excluding Turkey from the international F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, Pentagon spokesman John Kirby indicated Feb. 5. Pentagon officials kicked Turkey, a NATO ally, out of the F-35 coalition because it bought the S-400 air defense system from Russia—a purchase the U.S. said puts American military information at risk. The Trump administration believed the advanced fighter jet used by troops around the world cannot coexist with a surface-to-air missile system designed to take out those same planes. That argument remains, even as new leadership takes the reins. “Our position has not changed,” Kirby said at a Pentagon press briefing. “The S-400 is incompatible with the F-35 and Turkey has been suspended from that program.” The U.S. urges Ankara not to keep the S-400, which began arriving in 2019. Turkey should instead invest in the American-made Patriot air defense missile system, Kirby added. “Turkey had multiple opportunities over the last decade to purchase the Patriot defense system from the United States and instead chose to purchase the S-400, which provides Russia revenue, access, and influence,” he said. The U.S. Air Force bought the eight F-35As initially built for Turkey, but never delivered under an $861.7 million contract. Turkey had already ordered when it was ousted, and is being cut out of the F-35 supply chain over the course of the next two years as well. In December, the U.S. sanctioned Turkey over its embrace of the S-400, in accordance with federal law, though the Trump administration held off on doing so for more than a year. The 2021 National Defense Authorization Act further mandated that the government impose at least five penalties on Turkey, as required by the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), within 30 days of its enactment on Jan. 1.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › No Kickout – NB – 2NC › Logistics – Solvency – 2NC

Turkey’s previous involvement in Russia’s military systems shows loss of commitments with NATO allies in areas of military logistics and sustainment

Mehta 19 (Aaron Metha, Aaron Mehta is the Senior Pentagon Correspondent and Associate Editor for Defense News, covering policy, strategy and acquisition at the highest levels of the Defense Department. He previously covered the Air Force and aerospace industry for Defense News from October 2012 to April 2015, and before that spent four years at the Center for Public Integrity, a non-profit investigative news organization. Over the course of his career, Mehta has interviewed dozens of top officials from the Pentagon, the defense industry and international partners. He has traveled abroad with the Secretary of Defense, conducted one-on-one meetings with defense ministers from the United Kingdom, Norway, Poland and Sweden, and had work featured on NPR, CNN and other outlets. Among his professional recognitions, Mehta was selected for the Center for a New American Security’s 2017 Next Generation National Security Leaders fellowship, the National Press Foundation’s 2011 Paul Miller fellowship, and was named “Best Young Journalist” at the 2015 Aerospace Media Awards. Mehta is a native of the Boston area and a graduate of Tufts University, “Turkey officially kicked out of F-35 program, costing US half a billion dollars,” 7-17-19, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2019/07/17/turkey-officially-kicked-out-of-f-35-program/)//nehahahah

WASHINGTON — The U.S. has removed Turkey from the F-35 joint strike fighter program, and Turkey will lose its on the jet by March 2020, following its acceptance of the S-400 Russian-made air defense system . However, a top Pentagon official would not close the door on Turkey in some form, should it reverse the decision to buy the S-400. The White House issued a statement Wednesday confirming the move, which Washington had threatened for months. “Turkey’s decision to purchase Russian S-400 air defense systems renders its continued involvement with the F-35 impossible,” the White House statement read. “The F-35 cannot coexist with a Russian intelligence collection platform that will be used to learn about its advanced capabilities.” “Turkey has been a longstanding and trusted partner and NATO Ally for over 65 years, but accepting the S-400 undermines the commitments all NATO Allies made to each other to move away from Russian systems," the statement continued. Shortly after the statement was released, the Pentagon held a rare on-camera press conference to explain the process moving forward, with Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Ellen Lord and Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy David Trachtenberg.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › No Kickout – NB – 2NC › Turkey-CN/Russia Relations – Increasing – UQ

Turkey has had history of helping both sides

Wilkinson, 22 (Tracy Wilkinson, She is an experienced journalist for crisis and wars, “So, why is Turkey in NATO, anyway? A look at the country’s complex history with the alliance”, Los Angeles Times, June 29, 2022, https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2022-06-29/so-why-is-turkey-in-nato-anyway)//IW

Emerging from World War II, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established by 10 European countries, the United States and Canada to form a bulwark against the communist-ruled Soviet Union. It was a pillar in the new world order that was to last for the rest of the century and into this one.

In the years following World War II, Turkey found itself in a unique geopolitical position, at the crossroads of numerous civilizations, many of them at odds: Europe, Asia, the Middle East, the Caucasus. And sandwiched between the Black Sea to the north and the Mediterranean to the south.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › No Kickout – NB – 2NC › Turkey-CN/Russia Relations – Increasing – UQ

Turkey participates in security cooperation with China and Russia, competing against NATO

Gaspers and Huotari 17 (Jan Gaspers and Mikko Huotari, Gaspers has a PhD in international studies, conducts research and have published various pieces on different aspects of EU-NATO cooperation, the OSCE Corfu Process, the European External Action Service and the the evolution of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, worked inter alia with the OSCE Section of the Delegation of the European Union to the International Organisations in Vienna, the European Union Institute for Security Studies, the OSCE and the European Centre for Development Policy Management. Mikko Huotari is the Executive Director of MERICS. His research focuses on China’s foreign policy, China-Europe relations and global (economic) governance and competition. He has published on China’s rise as a financial power, trade and investment relations with Europe as well as on geopolitical shifts related to China's emergence as a global security actor, “Turkey Looks to China for Security Cooperation Alternatives”, The German Marshalls Fund, 2017, ) //nehahahah

Lately, Ankara has looked more actively to the East for alternatives to Euroatlantic integration, focusing in on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Observers often point to the recent Turkish–Russian strategic rapprochement as an important indicator of the viability of Ankara’s SCO ambitions. While Russia has doubtlessly been a key player within the SCO since its creation in 2001, it will be China that sets the tone for Turkey’s future relations with the SCO and the transatlantic community. Turkish suggestions that closer ties with the SCO might be traded in for NATO membership threaten to further erode transatlantic security cooperation. The United States and Europe should therefore clearly signal to Beijing that Turkey’s relationship with the SCO could increase tensions between China and transatlantic partners. At the same time, devising a convincing approach to managing Turkey’s strategic realignment will be critical to ongoing U.S. and European efforts to shape China’s increasingly visible global security ambitions in a way that is conducive to transatlantic strategic interests. Ankara Turns to the SCO The SCO serves China, Russia, and Central and South Asian member states as a forum for security cooperation, especially related to border management and counterterrorism, with training and exchanges on the latter being coordinated within the framework of an SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure. SCO members also regularly conduct joint military exercises, and they cooperate on cybersecurity matters. Though Turkey has been an SCO dialogue partner since 2012, which constitutes the most basic form of association with the SCO, Ankara has used various high-profile opportunities to express interest in obtaining SCO observer status or joining the organization as a full member since 2013. President Erdoğan made his latest public reference to the idea of full SCO membership in November 2016.3 Western security analysts tend to refute the geostrategic significance of the SCO and rightly downplay its potential as a direct military competitor to NATO. Nevertheless, Turkey’s cozying up to the SCO and implicit suggestions of a trade-in for NATO membership and European integration should ring some alarm bells in Europe and the United States. Ankara might feel less inclined to please Brussels institutions as the EU membership option crumbles away and disappointment with NATO Allies grows. There can be little doubt, though, that Turkey continues to hold significant strategic value for the West when it comes to tackling regional security challenges. For EU member states, it is paramount that the refugee deal struck with Turkey in March 2016 holds firm. Turkey hosts a range of important NATO military facilities that are of vital strategic importance to the Alliance’s ability to project force in the Middle East. Turkey also remains one of the few remaining conduits the West has for communicating with Russia about strategy in Syria — even though the extent to which Turkish and wider transatlantic strategic interests on this issue align is increasingly questionable.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › No Kickout – NB – 2NC › Turkey-CN/Russia Relations – Increasing – UQ

Turkey’s relationship with China and Russia is getting stronger

Eldem 21, Tuba Eldem, Assistant professor of Political Science and International Relations at Fenerbahçe University, “Spotlight Turkey: A pivotal Swing State in NATO”, September 2021, GD

Turkey has sought to expand its strategic autonomy by forming intergovernmental, military, and economic links with autocratic powers, such as Russia, China, Iran and Qatar, which provided incumbents alternative sources of political and economic support. The earlier attempts to build alternative intergovernmental linkages out of NATO had occurred in 2010 when the Chinese-Turkish joint military drills, known as Peace Mission 2010 and sponsored by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), took place in Turkey. Two years later, Turkey became a dialogue partner with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and has expressed an interest in obtaining observer status or even joining as a full member. Turkey’s contract with the blacklisted Chinese company, China Precision Machinery Export-Import Corporation for a T-LORAMIDS air missile program in 2013, had eventually backfired in November 2015 under the intense pressure of the NATO and its members. In his visit to Beijing in 2019, President Erdoğan stressed that Turkey and China share a “common future vision” and re-mentioned Turkey’s desire to join SCO, which he first discussed with Russian leader Vladimir Putin back in January 2013.

Turkey’s estrangement from the West following the abortive military coup attempt on 15 July 2016 changed the external opportunity structure in favor of China and Russia. Several high-level Chinese delegations to Turkey and the strategic coordination between China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Turkey’s Middle Corridor Initiative (MCI) — stretching through the Caucasus and Central Asia, all accelerated and promoted strategic cooperation between two countries that have started back in 2010.In November 2016, Turkey and China signed an agreement to align China’s BRI with Turkey’s MCI. Turkey’s geostrategic location with trade access to Europe, Iran and Russia gave Turkey primary position within the framework of the BRI, and as a result the volume of China’s FDI in Turkey has, since then, increased more than threefold. The trade volume between China and Turkey has also improved significantly reaching to 24 billion US dollars as of 2020, as Beijing became Ankara’s second-largest trading partner. Turkey and China have also engaged in developing alternative connectivity and information linkages. In 2017, Turkey signed The Belt and Road Digital Economy International Cooperation Initiative to build an interconnected Digital Silk Road. In the same year, Turkey’s leading GSM operator Turkcell and Chinese technology giant Huawei signed an agreement in 2018 to collaborate on smart cities. In 2019, Turk Telekom partnered with Huawei to build the country’s 5G Network and claimed to set world record for single user 5G smartphone speed. In May 2021, two countries agreed during State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi visit to Ankara to further promote the synergy between China’s BRI and Turkey’s MCI, to strengthen strategic cooperation in various fields including connectivity, infrastructure construction and investment and to deepen communication and coordination for achieving the security and stability in the Middle East. Russia has also skillfully exploited the new external opportunity structure after the failed coup for its own benefit. Russia’s full-throated support for President Erdoğan during and after the coup has deepened bilateral security cooperation culminating into the arrival of the Russian S-400 air-defense system in Turkey on the date of the third anniversary of the abortive coup. While economic linkages in the areas of trade, investment, energy, and tourism have asymmetrically strengthened Russian leverage, intergovernmental linkages between two countries are also expanded thanks to several high-level state visits and formal bilateral agreements, such as the High-Level Russian-Turkish Cooperation Council.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › No Kickout – NB – 2NC › NATO-Turkey Relations – Brink – UQ

Turkey has been making controversial decisions even in the NATO

Crowley and Erlanger, 22 (Michael Crowley and Steven Erlanger- Diplomatic correspondent, Chief diplomatic correspondent, “For NATO, Turkey is a Disruptive Ally”, The New York Times, May 30, 2022 https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/30/us/politics/turkey-nato-russia.html)//IW

When President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey threatened this month to block NATO membership for Finland and Sweden, Western officials were exasperated — but not shocked. After a rupture in relations between Turkey and Israel the next year, Mr. Erdogan prevented the alliance from working with the Jewish state for six years. A few years later, Mr. Erdogan delayed for months a NATO plan to fortify Eastern European countries against Russia, again citing Kurdish militants and demanding that the alliance declare ones operating in Syria to be terrorists. In 2020, Mr. Erdogan sent a gas-exploration ship backed by fighter jets close to Greek waters, causing France to send ships in support of Greece, also a NATO member. Now the Turkish leader is back in the role of obstructionist, and is once again invoking the Kurds, as he charges that Sweden and Finland sympathize with the Kurdish militants he has made his main enemy. “These countries have almost become guesthouses for terrorist organizations,” he said this month. “It is not possible for us to be in favor.” It is a situation that plays to the advantage of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, who has grown friendlier with Mr. Erdogan in recent years. For the Russian leader, the rejection of Swedish and Finnish admission into NATO would be a significant victory. The quandary would be simpler were it not for Turkey’s importance to the alliance. The country joined NATO in 1952 after aligning with the West against the Soviet Union; Turkey gives the alliance a crucial strategic position at the intersection of Europe and Asia, astride both the Middle East and the Black Sea. It hosts a major U.S. air base where American nuclear weapons are stored, and Mr. Erdogan has blocked Russian warships headed toward Ukraine. But under Mr. Erdogan, Turkey has increasingly become a problem to be managed. As prime minister and then as president, he has tilted his country away from Europe while practicing an authoritarian and populist brand of Islamist politics, especially since a failed coup attempt in 2016. He has purchased an advanced missile system from Russia that NATO officials call a threat to their integrated defense systems, and in 2019 he mounted a military incursion to battle Kurds in northern Syria who were aiding the fight against the Islamic State with U.S. support. An this month that was co-written by Joseph I. Lieberman, a former independent U.S. senator from Connecticut, argued that Mr. Erdogan’s Turkey would flunk the alliance’s standards for democratic governance in prospective new member states. The essay, published by The Wall Street Journal, warned that Ankara’s policies, including a coziness with Mr. Putin, had undermined NATO’s interests and that the alliance should explore ways of ejecting Turkey. Some members of Congress have said as much. “Turkey under Erdogan should not and cannot be seen as an ally,” Senator Bob Menendez of New Jersey, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said after Turkey’s 2019 incursion into Syria. “Turkey has undermined its own image,” said Alper Coskun, a former Turkish diplomat who is now a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. But, he added, “it is still a critical member of the alliance.” Some American analysts are skeptical. Eric S. Edelman, a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey and Finland, warned that Mr. Erdogan could be seeking to curry favor with Mr. Putin — or at least ease the anger in Moscow over the sale of lethal drones to Ukraine’s military by a private Turkish company. Others believe the Turkish leader wants a payoff from Washington. Mr. Erdogan is angry that the United States denied Turkey access to the F-35 stealth fighter after his 2017 purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system. Turkey is now lobbying instead to buy enhanced F-16 fighters but has met stiff resistance in Congress from the likes of Mr. Menendez. Mr. Erdogan may also be seeking presidential attention. He had a friendly rapport with President Donald J. Trump, but Mr. Biden has kept his distance. Mr. Peker believes that an agreement can be negotiated between Turkey and the Nordic countries before a NATO summit in Madrid next month, which would allow for the accession protocols to be signed there. At last week, Representative Adam Smith, Democrat of Washington and the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, suggested that the stakes of Swedish and Finnish membership were great enough to warrant direct U.S. involvement.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › No Kickout – NB – 2NC › NATO-Turkey Relations – Brink – UQ

Turkey disagrees with and disrupts NATO cooperation and decision-making

Ebrahim & Lawati 6/29 (Ebrahim and Lawai, both journalists and reporters for CNN, specializing in Middle East reporting, “How Erdogan’s Turkey became NATO’s wild card”, CNN, 6/30/22, https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/29/middleeast/turkey-nato-erdogan-mime-intl/index.html)

Erdogan has disagreed with NATO allies on a number of issues, including Syria and Libya, and has used his country's strategic location to extract concessions from his European neighbors by threatening  of refugees from neighboring conflict zones.

In 2009, Turkey  of Denmark's Anders Fogh Rasmussen as head of NATO until then-US President that one of Rasmussen's deputies would be a Turk. Turkey had argued that Rasmussen's  to Prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper in 2006 were problematic. In perhaps its boldest and most , Turkey in 2019 bought the Russian S-400 missile defense system, calling into question a decades-long alliance with both the US and NATO. The S-400 missiles were designed to shoot down NATO planes. , a former Turkish diplomat and chairman of Istanbul-based think-tank EDAM, said Erdogan's "hyper-centralized decision-making" and his ", [and] less consensus-driven" leadership style has caused difficulties for NATO. "This is also a reflection of the increased unpredictability of ," he said. But experts say that it's only natural that a member of an alliance will prioritize national interests where it can. The problem arises when those interests diverge from NATO's agenda. "The Turks complicate NATO's consensus-based decision-making because they refuse to go with the flow until national interests are satisfied," said , a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC and former US military officer and State Department official. "This is not bad alliance behavior; it is typical alliance behavior for states with the weight to pull it off," he added.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › No Kickout – NB – 2NC › NATO-Turkey Relations – Brink – UQ

The US-Turkey partnership has reached its climax and tensions are high

Beyoghlow 20, Kamal Beyoghlow, Adjunct Associate Professor of Government at American University, “Turkey and the United States on the Brink: Implications for NATO and US-Turkish Strategic and Military Partnership”, USAWC Press, January 18th 2020, pg 1-5, // GD

The US-Turkish strategic partnership established at the end of World War II reached its climax in the late eighties, and is at a dangerous crossroad. Such an outcome has had a devastating effect on Turkey’s relationship with other Western partners, especially NATO, which has been the backbone of America’s defense alliance since the start of the Cold War. This situation, if it continues, is likely to force the unraveling of NATO as a cohesive organization at a time when it is facing a myriad of collective global security challenges, particularly in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan—far beyond its traditional defensive posture on the European continent. All is not lost, however, and with more diligent diplomatic and military-to-military dialogue and compromises, US-Turkish relations can be salvaged.

States with long and deep commitments to one another seldom experience the kind of political and military distrust and uncertainties characterizing the current state of affairs between Turkey and its traditional Western allies, including the United States. Much of the ongoing tensions can be traced to the American-led interventions in Iraq and Syria, as well as to other fundamental strategic disagreements over how best to shape the future of the Greater Middle East and North Africa. Although some agencies within the US government have had differences with Turkey over the latter’s increasingly authoritarian bent, not all elements within the US government are in agreement with the reasons or path forward. No one factor can be attributed to the new authoritarian trend in Turkey. After all, the majority of the Turkish public, through elections and referendums, has given President Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) the mandate they need to rule and change the political rules of the game in Turkey. Moreover, Turkey’s deeply fragmented political system and its weak political parties have played a role in the changes in the nature and the character of Turkey’s political system from a military authoritarian one to a civilian authoritarian one.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › Kickout – NB – 2NC › Kickout Good – NATO Cred – ! – 2NC

Turkish expulsion is good --- prevents Russia/China infiltration AND re-establishes NATO as a liberal community

Williamson 5/22- a fellow at National Review Institute, the roving correspondent for National Review (KEVIN D. WILLIAMSON “It’s Time to Boot Turkey from NATO,” National Review, May 22, 2022,

We ought to do Turkish caudillo Recep Tayyip Erdogan the courtesy of being frank with him: A NATO that includes Sweden and Finland but excludes Turkey is preferable to one that includes Turkey but excludes Sweden and Finland. It is time for Turkey to go. As Russian war criminals murder and rape their way through Ukraine, Russia’s long-suffering neighbor, Finland, has finally decided that it is time to formally join NATO. Sweden, though a larger and more powerful country (twice as big by population and by GDP), is following Finland’s lead and is ready to sign the North Atlantic Treaty, as well. Turkey, the odd man out in NATO, plans to veto any move to bring Finland and Sweden into the alliance. At least, that is the official position. Erdogan’s real agenda is something simpler: blackmail. Notionally, this is about the presence of a handful of Kurdish militants in Nordic exile. In reality, this is about the fact that Turkey under Erdogan has come to much more closely resemble Vladimir Putin’s Russia in its fundamental political character than it does any of its fellow NATO members. Turkey has developed close economic and political relations with Russia, and Erdogan has worked hard not to irritate Putin during the Ukraine war. Every political axis needs a third member, and Ankara today fits more easily between Moscow and Beijing than it does between Paris and Berlin. NATO is not only a military alliance. It is also a community of liberal-democratic values — values which Turkey rejects with increasing vigor and openness. The West once hoped — naively, as it turns out — that Erdogan would carry the banners of secularism, democracy, and liberty for the Turkish people, but he has led Turkey in the opposite direction: toward Islamist politics, authoritarianism, and tyranny. It is time to expel Turkey from NATO. This is a possibility that has been considered before. Erdogan’s brutal suppression of dissent beginning in 2016 and his cooperation with Moscow in acquiring Russian air-defense technology both led to calls for NATO to sever ties with Turkey. Booting Turkey out of NATO will be tricky on both the legal and political fronts, not least because the North Atlantic Treaty does not contain an explicit mechanism for expelling a member. The lawyers will no doubt dice it pretty fine if NATO members argue that Turkey is in material breach of its treaty obligations, but as a matter of fact Turkey is undermining NATO in the service of Erdogan’s domestic political needs. Turkey is advancing the interests of Moscow and Beijing and making it more difficult for NATO members to engage in collective self-defense, which is the point of NATO. And morally, Turkey does not deserve to be in NATO. NATO’s job is to defend its members against police states, not to provide a snug harbor in which authoritarianism may be cultivated. NATO’s neighboring bureaucracy in Brussels should also do Erdogan the courtesy of being frank and formally ending all consideration of Turkey as a candidate for membership in the European Union. Turkey was not a very good fit for the European Union at its best, and it is far from at its best today. Beyond its backsliding into soft dictatorship, Turkey is an economic basket case with 70 percent inflation and increasingly irresponsible economic policies. The European Union had a hard enough time with Greece’s financial shenanigans, and Greece is Denmark compared to Turkey. Geopolitics is not a matter of friendship. As Lord Palmerston put it (and here the full quotation is more illuminating than the apocryphal proverb attributed to Charles de Gaulle), “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” There was a time when it seemed that Turkey was fitted to NATO’s permanent interests. Turkey joined NATO in 1952, when the organization was not yet a decade old and Joseph Stalin was still extant, if only barely that. NATO’s optimism was perhaps excessive, but, at the time, Turkey identified itself very strongly with the West and looked westward toward its future. Today’s Turkey looks eastward, and that fact should be acknowledged. Things did not have to go this way, but Turkey has made its choices — not only the autocratic junta of Recep Tayyip Erdogan but the Turkish people, too. Perhaps that looks like a tragedy when seen from Brussels and like something else when seen from Ankara. But however we feel about them, the facts on the ground are what they are, and it is time for NATO to recognize this and act accordingly.

2022 UTNIF Counterplan
Block › Kickout – NB – 2NC › L---CP Leads to Turkish Expulsion

Implicitly identifying Turkey as in material breach ends Turkey’s membership in NATO either through Turkish withdrawal or formal exclusion. Key to Sweden and Finland membership.

Shackleford 6-2-2022, senior fellow on U.S. foreign policy with the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. She was previously a U.S. diplomat and is author of “The Dissent Channel: American Diplomacy in a Dishonest Age.” (Elizabeth, “Elizabeth Shackelford: When it comes to Turkey, NATO needs to consider divorce,” Chicago Tribune,

Partnerships, among people and nations, have a wide range of possible meanings and scope. But alliances are formal agreements that indicate a specific kind of commitment, such as marriage. An alliance is a promise between nations to support and defend each other, in good times and bad, sickness and health, or more specifically, peace time or war.

Alliances shouldn’t be entered into casually, but they shouldn’t be unalterable either. If an alliance becomes an obstacle to a nation’s ability to secure its needs, the standards and path for getting out should be clear and reasonable. This brings me to Turkey. As any real friend to NATO would, I have to ask: is Turkey today really the Turkey you were drawn to as a partner 70 years ago? I fear you and Turkey have grown apart, most recently with its threat to block NATO membership for Sweden and Finland. I worry the growing differences are becoming irreconcilable. In the early NATO days, Turkey was sitting on the border of the Soviet Union. When stopping Soviet expansion was NATO’s primary purpose, Turkey’s geography might have been compelling enough to overcome other shortcomings. This was easy to do, too, given Turkey’s potential at the time. It seemed to be moving firmly toward a Western identity and embracing liberal, democratic values that NATO saw within itself. As often happens in relationships, that promise didn’t turn out, and Turkey saw coups and unrest in the coming decades. In 2002, the West thought this time could be different, with the democratic election of Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), but the commitment to democracy still wasn’t real, and Turkey took a hard turn toward illiberal, authoritarian rule. Turkey’s antidemocratic nature isn’t just a bad look for an alliance that claims to be grounded in democratic principles. It also undermines NATO’s security. Turkey wields its veto within the alliance like a cudgel, slamming its allies on unrelated issues to punish it for not validating Erdogan’s obsession with punishing the Kurds. Erdogan is in it for what Erdogan wants — and that frequently doesn’t align with the alliance’s interest and security. While they clash on several issues, Erdogan is still close to Putin, as he tries to play both sides. Turkey’s purchase of Russian missile defense systems in 2019 was a slap in NATO’s face and direct violation of U.S. sanctions. Can Turkey still be trusted with NATO’s weapons systems, or does Turkey’s snug relationship with Russia risk the compromise of classified NATO weapons system information? NATO, you can do better. Finland and Sweden are courting you, after all. Like Turkey, they have capable, professional militaries and strategic geography, but they also share your values, such as democracy and the rule of law. You’re not likely to catch Finland or Sweden imprisoning political opponents or threatening journalists. And Erdogan’s objection to the accession of Finland and Sweden raises the question of whose side Erdogan is on at all. Other NATO members have long tired of Turkey’s duplicity and games. This isn’t the first time booting Turkey out of the alliance has been a topic of debate. The possibility was raised after Erdogan’s harsh crackdown in 2016 following a failed coup attempt, as well after Turkey invaded northeastern Syria in 2019. But since NATO has no mechanism for suspending or expelling an ally, a path out isn’t clear. If the rest of the alliance finds that Turkey has consistently violated NATO principles, they can unanimously agree to withdraw Article 5 protections from Turkey, effectively suspending its participation and any assistance it receives from NATO. This is probably the closest to divorce it can get, but even this determination would require a clear-eyed assessment of the benefits Turkey brings to the table and the risks too. Perhaps Turkey would agree to a no-fault divorce — it can always choose to withdraw. If not, marriage counseling might be in order. No ally is the perfect ally, and no spouse the perfect spouse. Some manner of compromise and understanding is always necessary. It’s ultimately up to NATO to decide whether Turkey is worth the formal defense commitment, but it’s a decision they should feel empowered to make rather than accept the alliance as is. Periodically reconsidering the value and legitimacy of these commitments isn’t unreasonable. In fact, it’s one marker of a healthy relationship.