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2022 Michigan Disadvantage

Non UQ – Coop Now

Turkey already cooperates with the US on security

NTI ’21 (The Nuclear Threat Initiative is a nonprofit, nonpartisan global security organization focused on reducing nuclear and biological threats imperiling humanity., “Turkey Overview,” ) JHK

As part of NATO’s nuclear umbrella, Turkey continues to host approximately 50 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on its territory at Incirlik Air Base. 5 While the Cold War-era B61 bombs serve little military purpose, they provide tangible evidence of a continued American commitment to Turkish security. There is ongoing debate in the policy community about whether the United States should continue to station tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey, given political instability in Turkey and the wider Middle East. 6 However, advocates for the continued presence of the weapons argue that, although they serve little military purpose, they provide tangible evidence of a continued American commitment to Turkish security.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

Non UQ – F-35 Sales

No UQ – F-35 sales to Greece will trigger Turkish aggression

Insinna and Mehta, 7/12/22, Senior Reporter on Air Warfare and Breaking Defense, editor in chief of Breaking Defense, , , BradAs

The tables have turned for regional rivals  and  in the realm of fighter jet acquisition plans, with Greece headed for a buy of the Lockheed Martin F-35 just three years after Turkey was kicked out of the 

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cap K Ups › Alt – Degrowth

Only alternative is degrowth through socialist movements – ecosystem collapse imminent

--decoupling and recycling are insufficient

Labonté 6/14/22 [Ronald, professor at the University of Ottawa, “Ensuring Global Health Equity in a Post-pandemic Economy,” International Journal of Health Policy and Management, ocp]

Degrowth/Post-growth: Should We Build Back at All? Two common elements in many post-pandemic plans are commitments to decouple economic growth from carbon intensity, and to embrace a ‘circular economy’ in which all goods are reused or repurposed to reduce material throughput and to eliminate (or massively reduce) waste. Such measures are essential, but many environmental economists are sceptical that they are sufficient. They also allow societies to avoid confronting ‘an inconvenient truth’[1]: That capitalism’s growth imperative is predicated on ever increasing levels of material consumption. The human population already consumes annually 1.7 times the ecological resources the world can regenerate. If everyone consumed at the level of OECD countries it would require the resources of 4.7 earths,21 even before accounting for the environmental damages such consumption generates. A relatively new concept has entered the lexicon of environmental economics: degrowth[2], which captures the importance of reducing aggregate global consumption levels to avoid catastrophic ecosystem collapse. The bulk of this responsibility lies with citizens, governments, and corporate actors in the historically over-consuming Global North,32 partly to make space for those in the Global South to reach consumption levels compatible with healthy life expectancies while remaining within safe planetary limits: “…it’s abundantly clear it’s in the poorest parts of the world that income growth makes a huge difference to prosperity. Life expectancy increases. Infant mortality decreases. Maternal morbidity decreases. Participation in education increases…that’s where growth makes a difference” (T. Jackson, interview communication, October 28, 2017). Labonté 4 International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2022, x(x), 1–5 The implications of such a transition are enormous. The burden of change rests heaviest on the world’s wealthiest regardless of which country they may live in. Their carbon emissions and consumption levels massively exceed those of the majority of the world’s population, indicative of the link between rising economic inequality and environmental devastation.33 But a degrowth (or ‘fair growth’) economy will demand substantial change for hundreds of millions, and although: “…degrowth is the only alternative at this point in time, there will need to be political and social psychological transformations from societies that have been weaned on overconsumption. I will not underestimate this cost [since] we’re talking about transformations in the way that we have structured our lives” (W. Bello, interview communication, October 27, 2021). Others describe this as transitioning to a post-growth economy, one in which the pursuit of ‘prosperity’ replaces that of growth: “Many of our problems, both social and structural and environmental, arise from the idea that progress is about increasing productivity, the speed with which we create material goods and services, distribute them to people to buy and throw away as fast as possible, the belief that this material sense of productivity and progress is what human prosperity is really about. But what we saw through the pandemic is that health is really the meaning of prosperity. Health is the foundation for prosperity(T. Jackson, interview communication, October 28, 2017). This requires a very different economy: “…a care economy, one that enriches us as well as saving lives. It’s a lower carbon economy, with a lower footprint because it is about engagement and attention and time in the service of each other” (T. Jackson, interview communication, October 28, 2017). Such an economy is an extension of what: “…feminist economists have always talked about. There is the direct care which is looking after people… Then there’s extended care…doing things that help in adaptation to climate change…it is essential work that is being done in unpaid fashion by a significant part of the population” (J. Ghosh, interview communication, November 14, 2021).[3] Towards a Post-growth Caring Economy: Can We Challenge the Rise in Autocratic Regimes? Transforming from a consumption-based capitalism to a sustainable caring economy requires governments willing to discipline markets for public good purposes, and to initiate tax and fiscal policies that radically redistribute access to the resources people need for healthy lives. The immediate challenge to this aspirational goal is reversing the fifteen years’ worldwide decline in democratic accountability and parallel rise in authoritarian rule.34 One of the pandemic’s ironies is that even as it increased the state’s role in health and economic protection, it incentivized alt-right populism and provided opportunities for autocrats to increase their grip on power. As Walden Bello, a sociologist and economist who was interviewed for this editorial, noted: “We are in a race between the forces of the far right and progressive forces [which threaten] any sort of coordinated global action on climate” (W. Bello, interview communication, October 27, 2021). In response, Bello ran as a vice-presidential candidate in the May 2022 Philippines elections in an effort to avoid that country’s “resurgence of authoritarianism.” He did not win, but remains committed to the scale of transition needed for a survivable post-pandemic economy, one in which democratic participation must remain strong: “We can’t leave it just to the politicians. We’ve got to have civil society stepping in because if we leave it to the usual actors, we’re not going to get anywhere” (W. Bello, interview communication, October 27, 2021). Even as the space for such participation is under authoritarian attack, the importance of civil society efforts to retain and expand it is more important now than in the pre-pandemic period. We know the political economy tools that can bring us closer to what the Sustainable Development Goals describe as ‘the world we want.’ But only organized citizen demand will create the political will to adopt these tools, with recent history bringing us evidence of unwavering activism in global climate strikes, Black Lives Matter, buen vivir and peasant’s movements, and poor people’s campaigns worldwide. The post-pandemic public health imperative now is to protect and support such movements.35

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cap K Ups › Capitalism Unsustainable

Capitalism unsustainable – drives consumption and inequality which destroy the ecosystem

Hertrick et al 22 -- Sarah Jaclyn Hertrick is an MPA and writer for Circular Triangle, Jennifer Hill is Circular Triangle’s executive director, and Dirk Philipsen is Research Professor of Economic History at the Duke University Sanford School of Public Policy (“The elephant in the room: Capitalism is not sustainable,” Circular Triangle, Sept. 2022, ] A.G

Capitalism is an unsustainable economic system. That idea may seem radical or extreme, particularly since the vast majority of us have been taught about and regularly experience neoliberal economics, but the truth is our current economic system is designed for consumption and growth, creating unsustainable conditions that are depleting our planet. To further understand and explore this concept, Circular Triangle’s Executive Director, Jennifer Hill, recently interviewed Associate Research Professor of Economic History at the Duke University Sanford School of Public Policy, , for his thoughts and expertise. Philipsen, a political economist and historian, has been working in the sustainability arena for thirty years and has written extensively about sustainability and economic metrics. The interview began with what Phillipsen described as the five million dollar question, “What does sustainability mean to you?” Unsurprisingly, there are a lot of different definitions. Philipsen explained that initially sustainability came out of conversations concerned about the limits to growth. Therefore from the very beginning, in the political spirit, it is a question with an economic dimension. Philipsen said that the term originated in the German forest industry by a ranger who wanted to maintain a forest in a way that could serve future generations the same way it serves the current. “Ultimately it is trying to figure out a way to run an economy and run a society in a way... so that we have in the 7th generation the same kinds of opportunities that you and I have today.” Specifically, sustainability means getting away from depletion and pollution, from degradation, destruction, and moving towards a circular economy. “If someone cares about sustainability, why should they also care about economics?”, Hill asked next. Phillipsen expressed his difficulty conceiving of anyone that does not care about sustainability, stating that if you care about the future of our children and grandchildren you have to care about sustainability because it is the proposition that we leave behind a world that provides equal or better opportunities. However, “we are increasingly leaving behind a burning trash heap,” and the reason why is mostly because of our economic system. Phillipsen further explained that our current economic system does not know how to care for the future. Its one purpose is to create profit and growth through “extracting and exploiting and producing and creating evermore output,” ultimately producing for the trash dump. If our current economic system works this way because it was designed for consumption and growth, we could also make it work a different way, Hill notes, further adding that we can choose a different economic model with different outcomes. “I describe waste as not a bug in the system but a feature of the system; it is designed to create waste and therefore it does.” “I describe waste as not a bug in the system but a feature of the system; it is designed to create waste and therefore it does.” The biggest elephant in the room is that the growth regime of our current economic system is not only unsustainable, it is logically impossible. Phillipsen turns to a book “Doughnut Economics,” by , in which she describes that “sweet spot” in the center of a doughnut where everyone has what they need to thrive without exceeding the limits of the ecosystem. Her book also examines the graph of exponential growth. Considered to be healthy and robust by economists, the United States currently has a growth rate of about 3%. At this rate, the economy (meaning consumption) would have to double every 25 years. Phillipsen states that this simply cannot happen no matter how much we innovate and improve efficiency. “This is a system that, more than any other system ever, benefits a shrinking number of people and we are now at a point where 8 people in the world have as much wealth as the bottom 50 percent (4 billion) of all people combined.” He continues to highlight the levels of inequality, “...you can basically throw out everything we believe about prosperity, freedom, democracy, justice ... all of that goes out the window.” And yet, conservatives, liberals, and socialists have all subscribed to this idea of exponential growth. Phillipsen argues that we are already at a point where economic growth comes with more costs than benefits by destroying and exploiting, alienating, and producing inequalities. However, we continue to live in a system that was deliberately designed to require growth. “Capitalism cannot function without growth and so here is the big thing that nobody wants to talk about and yet we have to, which is, if we can’t have growth we have to change capitalism.” Perhaps the biggest challenge to making a change, is not so much designing an alternative economic model, as Philipsen states, but rather recruitment and organizing. “How do you get people to give themselves permission to imagine something different and better, because you and I and everybody in the world has never experienced anything other than capitalism. And to figure out a way to make it politically possible, to overcome the massively concentrated power and control in the hands of capital. That's a big step.”

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cap K Ups › Capitalism Unsustainable

Capitalism is unsustainable—it’s self-destructive and obfuscates the causes of existential risks

Chomsky & Mascirota 21 -- Noam Chomsky is a major figure in analytic philosophy and founder of cognitive science and David Masciotra is a political columnist with Salon and has also written for The Atlantic and The Washington Post. (“Dismantle all of this stuff: A conversation with Noam Chomsky,” Los Angeles Book Review, 5/14/21, , // E.H.☭

One of the simple but profound statements in the book is that the “problem isn’t individual, but institutional.” Mainstream political discussion tends to obsess over individuals rather than institutions. There are many Americans who are angry about politics but aren’t exactly sure why or how to direct their rage. Is part of that because — as much as, say, Biden is preferable to Trump — the overall problem isn’t individual, it’s institutional? There are differences, which are significant, but basically institutions place tight constraints on what can happen. Let’s take the most urgent issue that has arisen in human history: the destruction of the environment. If we don’t take care of that in the next couple of decades, nothing else matters. We’ll be off on an irreversible course of self-destruction. Well, there are institutions and individuals. There’s the CEO of ExxonMobil. There’s Jamie Dimon, who runs JPMorgan Chase. They make decisions, and the decisions to some extent reflect their own goals, priorities, sentiments, and so on. But they are narrowly constrained. So, for example, the CEO of ExxonMobil surely knows as much about global warming as you or I do, probably a lot more, at least if he reads the materials that come to him from his own scientists and engineers, and they’ve known it for 50 years. ExxonMobil scientists were in the lead, back before many people were warning about the extraordinary dangers of heating in the environment. In fact, when James Hansen, a famous geoscientist, made a speech in 1988 warning of the threat of global warming, putting it into the public realm, ExxonMobil responded with significant efforts to undermine the idea that there is a threat. They didn’t do it stupidly. They didn’t deny it, because that would have been easily refuted. What they did is try to develop doubt — “Maybe we don’t know,” “We haven’t looked into clouds,” “Let’s put off any big decisions so we can have a richer society,” “We might have to do something about it a long time from now,” etc. They all knew that was nonsense. They all knew that if we don’t do something about it quickly, we are in severe danger. Back to your question. Suppose a different individual CEO came in and said, “Let’s tell the population the truth. Let’s tell them that we are destroying the prospects for organized human life on earth. Let’s tell them that we are going to stop doing it. We’re going to move to renewable energy, because we care about your grandchildren and ours.” He would be out in five minutes. That’s part of the institutional structure. If you aren’t maximizing profit and market share, you aren’t going to stand. Of course, there is a point to criticizing individuals, but the real point is that, within the system, they don’t have a lot of choices. Therefore, we have to ask, “What is it about the structure of our institutions that is leading us in this direction?” Let’s take another current example, right in the headlines. We are in the midst of a pandemic. It is well understood, across the board, that unless vaccines are provided quickly to the poor, suffering areas of the world, such as parts of Africa, it is going to be a disaster, not only for them, but for us. Mutations will take place. It is unpredictable, but some might be lethal. They’ll get back to Europe and the United States, and we’ll all be in deep trouble. So, we have a choice. We can work on a people’s vaccine, sending the vaccine freely and openly to the people of Africa. That’s good for them, of course, but it will also protect us from future disaster. That’s one choice. The other choice is to protect the profits of the major pharmaceutical corporations, already loaded with profits because of the highly protectionist elements of the mislabeled “free trade agreements.” Which are we pursuing? Not just us, but Europe as well. The idea is you work for yourself, for the system of power within your society, and if it kills people elsewhere, that’s someone else’s problem. That is the way the institutions work. In fact, if you look at the details, it is pretty shocking. Imagine yourself a rational observer from outer space watching this species. Take a look at the United States, which has one of the best — or least bad — records on the vaccine. There happens to be a surplus of vaccines in the United States, because the FDA has not yet authorized the use of AstraZeneca, and there’s a large extra supply. So, Biden did the sensible thing. He dispensed them to other countries. Which countries? The first one is Canada, which is the world’s champion in storing unused vaccines that it will never be able to use because it has hoarded them way beyond any potential use. So, that’s the first recipient. The second recipient is Mexico, as part of a bribe to violate international law and minimal ethics by keeping desperate refugees away from our border. This isn’t because Biden is a bad person. He seems like a nice guy. It is just the way that institutions structure decisions. That said, there are different forces operating on how decisions are structured. There are the corporate boardrooms, and there are the activists in the streets. Who is going to win? That’s the issue, and it’s not subtle. Go back to the beginning of this 40-year assault on the general population called “neoliberalism.” It was pretty obvious at the start. You may not be old enough to have heard it, but I’m sure you’ve read about Reagan’s inaugural address in 1981. The punchline was, “Government is the problem, not the solution.” Okay, so if government is not the solution, who is the solution? Where will decisions be made if not in government? Does it take a genius to figure this out? They’ll be made in corporate boardrooms. So, in other words, we shift decisions from government — which whatever its flaws, is, at least, partially responsive to the general population — to private tyrannies, which are totally unaccountable to the public, and which are dedicated, explicitly — there’s no secret about it — to maximizing what’s called “shareholder value”: dividends, benefits to management. That’s their task. The name for that in the United States is “libertarianism.” All of these are ways in which, to go back to my and Marv’s course, “common sense” is instituted. We happen to start with Gramsci. We go back to earlier sources, even David Hume’s “Of the First Principles of Government.” These themes run through, and it is understood that you have to impose common sense. You have to manufacture consent. As progressive democratic theorists have argued, “The people are too stupid and ignorant to do what is in their own interest. So, we the responsible men have to make decisions for them.” Of course, the intellectuals and the responsible men are actually following the dictates of private power. They don’t like that part of the story. They like to see themselves as running the show. In my lifetime, I’ve seen it over and over. During the Kennedy and Johnson years, the technocratic and meritocratic elite, my colleagues from Harvard and MIT, were flocking down to Washington to show how the world should be run. Well, in Vietnam, we saw what came of that. It was not unpredictable. Those of us in the streets were warning of it all along. Now, it is the same. Neoliberalism, whatever is in the minds of people who advocate for it, maybe they don’t even think about it, is an explicit effort, and it is evident from the structure, to hand power to private institutions, which are dedicated to self-enrichment. It would be obvious to a 10-year-old, even if economists don’t see it, because they have some theory that says it leads to “Pareto optimality.” Whatever. We have 40 years of experience, and we can see what’s happened. It was totally predictable. To give you just one example, you may have seen it, but a couple of months ago the RAND Corporation did a detailed study trying to determine how much wealth was transferred from the working class and middle class to the superrich during the 40 neoliberal years. They estimated $47 trillion. Some call it “transfer.” “Robbery” is a better term. Meanwhile, the top 0.1 percent of the population doubled their share of total wealth from 10 percent to 20 percent. Take a look at the effects: the majority of the population gets by paycheck to paycheck. Real wages have stagnated for 40 years. The gains of productivity growth concentrate in very few pockets. This leads to what you mentioned before — unfocused anger. Is it surprising? People aren’t told what is really robbing them. Instead, they are told that it is immigrants, Blacks, some pedophiles from outer space, if you believe QAnon. Anything but what is actually happening. That’s another mode of manufacturing consent and establishing “common sense.” The job of people like you, activists on the streets, people who are trying to change the world for the better, is to dismantle all of this stuff. It is to get people to see what is not that far from right in front of their eyes. None of it is very profound. You can talk about it to high school students. They often understand it better than graduate students at major universities, who have been more indoctrinated. As we discuss in the book, this is a point George Orwell made. Something that not many people read but should is the introduction to Animal Farm. Animal Farm is seen as safe, because it is a satire of the totalitarian enemy. The introduction, which was not initially published, is addressed to the people of England. Orwell warns not to feel too self-righteous, because in free England, unpopular ideas can be suppressed without the use of force. He calls it “literary censorship in England,” and one of the means he describes is simply a good education. You go to the best schools, like Oxford and Cambridge (similar to Harvard and Yale), and have it instilled in you that there are certain things that it just wouldn’t do to say, or even think about. It is funny the way it works. A couple of days ago I had a talk with a group of Latin American activists. They were from all over Latin America. Well, just for fun, I read for them a column that appeared in The New York Times that day by one of their top foreign affairs specialists. It was about how the United States has been committed to the rule of law, human rights, and democracy. They just burst out laughing. They’re living in the real world, not the world of US intellectual culture.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cap K Ups › Impacts - War

Capitalism causes war – crisis justifies military accumulation

Robinson ‘22 -- a distinguished professor of sociology, global studies and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara (William I., “Global Capitalism Has Become Dependent on War-Making to Sustain Itself”, “Truth Out”, 4-24-22, A.G

This crisis of global capitalism is economic, or structural, one of chronic stagnation in the global economy. But it is also political: a crisis of state legitimacy and capitalist hegemony. The system is moving towards “a general crisis of capitalist rule” as billions of people around the world face uncertain struggles for survival and question a system they no longer see as legitimate. Historically, wars have pulled the capitalist system out of crisis while they serve to deflect attention from political tensions and problems of legitimacy. Economically, global capitalism faces what is known in technical language as “overaccumulation”: a situation in which the economy has produced — or has the capacity to produce — great quantities of wealth but the market cannot absorb this wealth because of escalating inequality. Capitalism by its very nature will produce abundant wealth yet polarize that wealth and generate ever greater levels of social inequality unless offset by redistributive policies. The level of global social polarization and inequality now experienced is without precedent. In 2018, the richest 1 percent of humanity controlled more than half of the world’s wealth while the bottom 80 percent had to make do with just 5 percent. The international development agency Oxfam reported in January that during the first two years of the coronavirus pandemic, the 10 richest men in the world more than doubled their fortunes, from $700 billion to $1.5 trillion, while 99 percent of humanity saw a fall in their income and 160 million more people fell into poverty. Such inequalities end up undermining the stability of the system as the gap grows between what is — or could be — produced and what the market can absorb. The extreme concentration of the planet’s wealth in the hands of the few and the accelerated impoverishment and dispossession of the majority means that the transnational capitalist class, or TCC, has increasing difficulty in finding productive outlets to unload enormous amounts of surplus it accumulated. In the years leading up to the pandemic, there was a steady rise in underutilized capacity and a slowdown in industrial production around the world. The surplus of accumulated capital with nowhere to go expanded rapidly. Transnational corporations recorded record profits during the 2010s at the same time that corporate investment declined. Along with militarized accumulation, the TCC has turned to unprecedented levels of financial speculation and to debt-driven growth to sustain profit-making in the face of the crisis. If left unchecked, overaccumulation results in crisis — in stagnation, recessions, depressions, social upheavals and war — just what we are experiencing right now. But there is a related dynamic at work in the global war economy: the need for dominant groups to suppress mass discontent and deflect the crisis of state legitimacy. International frictions escalate as states, in their efforts to retain legitimacy, seek to sublimate social and political tensions and to keep the social order from fracturing. All around the world, a “people’s Spring” has taken off. From Chile to Lebanon, Iraq to India, France to the United States, Haiti to Nigeria, South Africa to Colombia, Jordan to Sri Lanka, waves of strikes and mass protests have proliferated and, in some instances, appear to be acquiring an anti-capitalist character. Wars and external enemies allow the ruling groups to deflect attention away from domestic malaise in their effort to maintain a grip on power as the crisis deepens. The transnational elite, led by Washington, have had to conjure up one enemy after another to legitimate militarized accumulation and deflect crises of state legitimacy and capitalist hegemony onto external enemies and contrived threats. In the U.S., this sublimation has involved efforts to channel social unrest towards scapegoated communities such as immigrants or other marginalized groups — this is one key function of racism and was a core component of the Trump government’s political strategy — or towards an external enemy such as China or Russia, which had clearly become a cornerstone of the Biden government’s strategy well before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. U.S. presidents historically reach their highest approval ratings when they launch wars. George W. Bush reached an all-time-high of 90 percent in 2001 as his administration geared up to invade Afghanistan, and his father George H.W. Bush achieved an 89 percent approval rating in 1991, right as the U.S. declared the end of its (first) invasion of Iraq and the “liberation of Kuwait.” It is unlikely that an increasing militarization of the world economy can in the long run offset either the economic or the political dimensions of the crisis of global capitalism. Global capitalism is emerging from the coronavirus pandemic with more inequality, more authoritarianism, more militarization, and more civic and political strife. In the U.S., class struggle is heating up, with a wave of strikes and of unionization drives in Amazon, Starbucks, and elsewhere in the gig economy. The current inflationary spiral and the escalation of class struggle in the United States and around the world point to the inability of the ruling groups to contain the expanding crisis. The drive by the capitalist state to externalize the political fallout of the crisis increases the danger that international tensions and localized conflicts such as in Ukraine will snowball into broader international conflagrations of unforeseen consequences. As the Ukraine crisis continues to drag on and the global revolt escalates, there will be a radical reconfiguration of global geopolitical alignments to the drumbeat of escalating turbulence in the world economy that will feed new political upheavals and violent conflicts, making global capitalism all the more volatile. While it is hard to imagine a return to the status quo antebellum in Eastern Europe, in the larger picture, the Ukraine crisis is not the cause but a consequence of the general crisis of global capitalism. That crisis will only get worse. Fasten your seat belts; it will get much worse.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cap K Ups › Impacts - War

Capitalism drives war – cycles of deconstruction and reconstruction provide outlets for over-accumulation

Robinson ’22 -- a distinguished professor of sociology, global studies and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara (William I. Robinson, “Global Capitalism Has Become Dependent on War-Making to Sustain Itself,” section: “Militarized Accumulation”, truthout, 4/24/22, //EH☭

The Russian invasion — brutal, reckless and condemnable by any standard — has sparked debate on NATO’s proposed expansion into Ukraine and the role that it played in motivating the Kremlin. U.S. officials were keenly aware, in fact, that the drive to expand NATO to Russian borders would eventually push Moscow into a military conflict. “We examine a wide range of nonviolent measures that could exploit Russia’s actual vulnerabilities and anxieties as a way of stressing Russia’s military and economy and the regime’s political standing at home and abroad,” notes a 2019 study by the RAND Corporation, a Pentagon-affiliated think tank. “The steps we examine would not have either defense or deterrence as their prime purpose,” it states, but rather, “these steps are conceived of as elements in a campaign designed to unbalance the adversary, leading Russia to compete in domains or regions where the United States has a competitive advantage, and causing Russia to overextend itself militarily or economically.” But the provocation could not be reduced to geopolitical competition, however important, as most observers were keen to do. Missing from the larger picture was the centrality of militarized accumulation — of endless low- and high-intensity warfare, simmering conflicts, civil strife and policing — to the global political economy. Militarized accumulation refers to a situation in which a global war economy relies on the state to organize war-making, social control and repression to sustain capital accumulation in the face of chronic stagnation and saturation of global markets. These state-organized practices are outsourced to transnational corporate capital, involving the fusion of private accumulation with state militarization in order to sustain the process of capital accumulation. Cycles of destruction and reconstruction provide ongoing outlets for over-accumulated capital; that is, these cycles open up new profit-making opportunities for transnational capitalists seeking ongoing opportunities to profitably reinvest the enormous amounts of cash they have accumulated. There is a convergence in this process of global capitalism’s political need for social control and repression in the face of mounting popular discontent worldwide and its economic need to perpetuate accumulation in the face of stagnation. Wars provide critical economic stimulus. They have historically pulled the capitalist system out of accumulation crises while they serve to deflect attention from political tensions and problems of legitimacy. It took World War II to finally lift world capitalism out of the Great Depression. The Cold War legitimated a half century of expanding military budgets and the Iraq/Afghanistan wars, the longest in history, helped keep the economy sputtering along in the face of chronic stagnation in the first two decades of the century. From the anti-Communist fervor of the Cold War, to the “war on terror,” then the so-called New Cold War, and now the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the transnational elite, led by Washington, have had to conjure up one enemy after another to legitimate militarized accumulation and deflect crises of state legitimacy and capitalist hegemony onto external enemies and contrived threats. The events of September 11, 2001, marked the start of an era of a permanent global war in which logistics, warfare, intelligence, repression, surveillance and even military personnel are more and more the privatized domain of transnational capital. The Pentagon budget increased 91 percent in real terms between 1998 and 2011, while worldwide, total state military budget outlays grew by 50 percent from 2006 to 2015, from $1.4 trillion to more than $2 trillion. (This figure does not take into account the hundreds of billions of dollars spent on intelligence; contingency operations; policing; bogus wars against immigrants, terrorism and drugs; and “homeland security.”) During this time, military-industrial complex profits quadrupled. However, focusing just on state military budgets only gives us a part of the picture of the global war economy. As I showed in my 2020 book, The Global Police State, the various wars, conflicts and campaigns of social control and repression around the world involve the fusion of private accumulation with state militarization. In this relationship, the state facilitates the expansion of opportunities for private capital to accumulate through militarization, such as by facilitating global weapons sales by military-industrial-security firms, the amounts of which have reached unprecedented levels. Global weapons sales by the top 100 weapons manufacturers and military service companies increased by 38 percent between 2002 and 2016 and can be expected to escalate further in the face of a prolonged war in Ukraine. By 2018, private for-profit military companies employed some 15 million people around the world, while another 20 million people worked in private security worldwide. The private security (policing) business is one of the fastest-growing economic sectors in many countries and has come to dwarf public security around the world. The amount spent on private security in 2003, the year of the invasion of Iraq, was 73 percent higher than that spent in the public sphere, and three times as many persons were employed in private forces as in official law enforcement agencies. In half of the world’s countries, private security agents outnumber police officers. These corporate soldiers and police were deployed to guard corporate property, provide personal security for executives and their families; collect data; conduct police, paramilitary, counterinsurgency and surveillance operations; carry out mass crowd control and repression of protesters; run private detention and interrogation facilities; manage prisons and participate in outright warfare. Now, these same private military and security firms are pouring into Ukraine, with some mercenary companies offering between $1,000 and $2,000 a day for those with combat experience. The Russian invasion has accelerated but did not originate the ongoing surge in military spending around the world. It is notable that state military spending worldwide skyrocketed in the wake of the 2008 global financial collapse even beyond the post-9/11 spending hike, rising from about $1.5 billion in 2008 to over $2 trillion in 2022. The fact that this explosion in spending coincides perfectly with continued worldwide stagnation following the Great Recession suggests that the heightened militarization of the global economy is as much or more a response to this chronic stagnation than to perceived security threats. If bursts of militarized accumulation (such as that unleashed by 9/11, then by the 2008 financial collapse, and now by the Russian invasion) help offset the overaccumulation crisis further into the future, they are also high-risk bets that heighten worldwide tensions and push the world dangerously towards all-out international conflagration.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cap K Ups › Impacts - Environment

Neoliberalism intrinsically causes inequality and environmental degradation

Labonté 6/14/22 [Ronald, professor at the University of Ottawa, “Ensuring Global Health Equity in a Post-pandemic Economy,” International Journal of Health Policy and Management, ocp]

From Shareholder to Stakeholder Capitalism: More of the Same? The political economy that characterizes most of today’s world – capitalism – is centuries old, although its most recent form – neoliberalism – only became dominant in the 1980s.2 Neoliberalism’s core elements (trade and financial liberalization, low taxation, minimal state intervention, strong property rights) birthed our now familiar globalized economy, criticized almost at its outset for the inequalities it was fomenting. To WEF founder, Klaus Schwab, the problem Labonté 2 International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2022, x(x), 1–5 lay less with capitalism itself than with its neoliberal emphasis on maximizing shareholder value, where economic decisions are based on creating the greatest return on investment in the shortest time possible. Schwab’s and the WEF’s promoted solution is ‘stakeholder capitalism,’ in which everyone (and not just shareholders) should have a stake in capitalism’s benefits.5 Few might object to the idea of all gaining (even if not equally) from liberalized market activities, but as one economist argued, the stakeholder model is essentially: “…just a way of bringing the opponents of capitalism to a common venture of extending its lifespan, while ignoring the system’s intrinsic and destabilizing profit motive” (W. Bello, interview communication, October 27, 2021). As one example, in a post-pandemic ‘Great Reset’ wealthy investors are encouraged to invest in businesses whose activities align with the Sustainable Development Goals. This, it is said, would allow them to “make a profit and still save the world.”6 To the extent that such investments go into non-fossil-fuel renewables this win-win hyperbole is a partial truth; but with many of these ethical investment portfolios being non-compliant with global climate change goals7 this may simply be ‘greenwashing’ what remains fundamentally profit-motivated investing. We might also ask: What economic policies and practices enable investors to become disproportionately wealthy in the first place? As a recent study noted, the stakeholder capitalism model will do little to redistribute wealth but will strengthen the private sector’s (not unself-interested and growing) role in global health governance.8 The Return of the State: Can Governments Mitigate Capitalism’s Inherent Inegalitarianism? The state is certainly a critical ‘stakeholder’ in capitalism since its policy choices enable or constrain the actions of economic actors within and across borders. The post-1980 drift to neoliberalism saw the state increasingly defer to market interests in efforts to have their countries remain globally competitive (T. Jackson, interview communication, October 28, 2021).9 Tax rates fell, financial markets deregulated, and inequalities within most countries soared.2 The 2008 global financial crisis saw a rapid volte-face, with wealthier country governments spending trillions of dollars to bail out ‘banks too big to fail.’2 The return of the state was brief, with austerity measures (fiscal contraction) quickly following to cover the public costs of rescuing private banks and investors2 at the cost of eroding health systems that proved ill-prepared for a global pandemic. The pandemic saw the state roar back once again, with many countries responding with wage support, cash transfer, credit schemes, tax cuts and delays, support to importers and exporters, policy rate cuts, support to businesses, and rent subsidies or deferrals.10 This fuelled speculation of a turning point in state/market dynamics, which some attributed to the COVID-19 crisis being different from the one in 2008: “It showed us that the people who matter most in society, the ones who protect our lives and care for us, the ones we applauded from our doorsteps during the pandemic, yet they were…left behind in terms of wages, security, the value of their jobs, their status in society” (T. Jackson, interview communication, October 28, 2017). Certainly, the need for greater public investment in health and social protection is an undisputed outcome of the pandemic, especially given how government responses to COVID-19 increased women’s care burdens, employment losses and experiences of domestic violence.10-12 Others saw massive government interventions in the economy as demonstrating that: “…all that neoliberal talk about government intervention is bad, bad, bad just got thrown out the window…what we’ve seen is the ideological assumption of neoliberalism laid low” (W. Bello, interview communication, October 27, 2021). Early post-pandemic recovery plans for those countries with the requisite fiscal capacities appeared to embody such transformative optimism. The original US multi-trillion Green New Deal promised substantial environmental protection, a rapid shift away from fossil fuels, and expansive new social spending.13 When it was later tabled as a ‘Build Back Better’ plan its ambitions were trimmed substantially, and then even more due to fossil fuel industry lobbying and the rise in right-wing populism.14 There are concerns that polarized politics in the USA may prevent it from ever being enacted.15 The EU’s ‘Next Generation’ plan16 has similar intentions to be green and socially more just and, while insufficiently generous,17 it fares better than its American counterpart. It could still be undone by the EU’s own right-wing drifts and, with geopolitical tensions rising globally, notably following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU and many other countries are pivoting back to energy (fossil fuel) independence, questioning their 2021 commitments to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050.18

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › EU CP

The EU has collaborated on AI initiatives before, the counterplan solves---but the EU still has a long way to go

Andrés ’22 (Moisés, Lawyer of the Council of State , Professor of Digital Law at the Carlos III University of Madrid, “Towards legal regulation of artificial intelligence”, Published 3/14/2022, Accessed 7/13/2022, http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1870-21472021000200035#aff1)

The European Union has launched several initiatives aimed at developing a comprehensive AI strategy, including its regulation. The three key documents in this regard are the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the European Parliament’s Resolution of February 2017 on Civil Laws for Robotics, and the Ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI produced by the European Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI HLEG), a final version of which was presented in April 2019.

Although the GDPR was not aimed specifically at AI, its provisions nevertheless appear likely to have fairly drastic effects on the industry even beyond what its drafters might have intended. The GDPR extends the scope of EU data protection law to all foreign companies processing data of EU residents. The GDPR is intertwined with AI for several reasons, including that it requires a certain amount of explanation, which can be challenging with “black box” AI systems. Article 22 GDPR stipulates that: “In particular, the controller must allow for a human intervention and the right for individuals to express their point of view, to obtain further information about the decision that has been reached on the basis of this automated processing, and the right to contest this decision.” The European Parliament’s Resolution of February 2017 on Civil Laws for Robotics includes thought-provoking content, but it has not yet created binding law; instead it was merely a recommendation to the Commission for future action. Specifically, it is the preparatory document for the drafting of a Directive concerning civil-law rules on robotics. The results and a summary of this consultation were made available in a later report published in October 2017. Meanwhile, the European Parliament voted on the resolution in February 2017 to regulate the development of AI and robotics throughout the European Union. The Joint Declaration on the EU’s legislative priorities for 2018-2019 also named data protection, digital rights, and ethical standards in artificial intelligence and robotics as priorities. Taking up the European Parliament’s appeal to create binding legislation, the European Commission issued a call in March 2018 for a High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI HLEG), which, according to the Commission, “will serve as the steering group for the European AI Alliance’s work, interact with other initiatives, help stimulate a multi-stakeholder dialogue, gather participants’ views and reflect them in its analysis and reports.” The work of the AI HLEG includes “propos[ing] to the Commission AI ethics guidelines, covering issues such as fairness, safety, transparency, the future of work, democracy and more broadly the impact on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, including privacy and personal data protection, dignity, consumer protection and non-discrimination.” An initial version of the guidelines was published on 18 December 2018 and the experts presented their final version to the Commission in April 2019 after extensive consultation throughout the European AI Alliance. Based on fundamental rights and ethical principles, the document lists seven key requirements that relevant systems should meet in order to be trustworthy. Aiming to operationalise these requirements, an assessment list is presented to provide guidance on the requirements’ practical implementation. This assessment list will undergo a piloting process to which all interested stakeholders can participate. The objective is to then bring Europe’s ethical approach to the global stage. The Commission is opening up cooperation to all non-EU countries that are willing to share the same values. In April 2018, 25 EU countries signed a joint declaration of cooperation on AI, the terms of which included a commitment to “[e]xchange views on ethical and legal frameworks related to AI in order to ensure responsible AI deployment”. Subsequently, on 25 April 2018, the European Commission adopted a Communication on Artificial Intelligence for Europe laying down the European approach to take utmost advantage of the opportunities offered by AI and address the new corresponding challenges of AI. In 2019, the Commission developed and made available the Guidance on the interpretation of the Product Liability Directive to prepare its reform in 2020. Also, on 7 December 2018, the Commission submitted a Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence, accompanied by the Coordinated Plan on the Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence Made in Europe - 2018 prepared by Member States (as part of the Group on digitizing European industry and Artificial Intelligence), Norway, Switzerland, and the Commission. Next, on 19 February 2020, the European Commission published a White Paper aiming to foster a European ecosystem of excellence and trust in AI and a Report on the safety and liability aspects of AI. The White Paper proposes measures that will streamline research, foster collaboration between Member States and increase investment into AI development and deployment. It also proposes policy options for an imminent EU regulatory framework that would determine the types of legal requirements that would apply to relevant actors, with a particular focus on high-risk applications. Finally, on 20 October 2020, the European Parliament has approved three resolutions that analyze how the European Union understands that different matters affected by Artificial Intelligence (AI) can be regulated, while promoting innovation, ethical standards and confidence in this technology. These resolutions analyze (i) the intellectual property rights for the development of AI technologies (supporting an effective system to guarantee them and to safeguard the European patent standards); (ii) the civil liability regime in matters of AI (a regulatory framework is proposed to guarantee the strict liability of the operators of “high risk” AI systems in case of damages); and (iii) certain ethical aspects of AI, robotics and related technologies (having as a key guiding principle the human control and centrality). Despite these encouraging signs and laudable intentions, the EU’s regulatory agenda remains at a nascent stage.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › UN CP › 2NC

The counterplan models existing IIGOs and centralizes global AI policy

Erdélyi and Goldsmith ‘18 (Olivia, faculty of Law at University of Canterbury and Judy, faculty at University of Kentucky Department of Computer Science, “Regulating Artificial Intelligence Proposal for a Global Situation, Published February 2018, Accessed 7/13/2022, https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3278721.3278731)

Low long-term transaction costs vs. low initial contracting costs: International discussions on AI are just beginning and powerful states will likely have divergent preferences with respect to the regulation of this high-impact field. Compounded with the difficulties discussed in the context of previous tradeoffs, this makes the prospect of reaching a workable international consensus on the short term rather remote. Yet crucially, swift regulatory response is imperative to prevent proliferating unregulated AI applications from causing social harm and to ensure that the opportunity presented by the rise of AI is harvested to humanity’s benefit rather than detriment — an aim best facilitated by lowering initial contracting costs with soft legalization and low institutional formalization. This is not to say that the idea of setting up a more robust regulatory framework with standard operating procedures should be abandoned. On the contrary, such a step has merit but only at a later stage, in possession of sufficient expertise and political consensus to better assess the implications of various policy options and formulate informed policy recommendations. Complex centralized administration vs. minimalistic administrative functions: Similar considerations apply as far as the level of administrative sophistication of the IAIO is concerned. In the initial stage of determining the purpose of the organization, its membership, the issues that need to be regulated, and the backbone of its regulatory agenda, less is probably more. Later, with perhaps binding legal instruments governing selected aspects of AI for a wide membership, work will get more complex, requiring stronger oversight, dispute resolution, and enforcement mechanisms as well as more powerful bureaucratic functions to service them. Routine management vs. crisis/uncertainty management: In view of AI’s novelty, extreme complexity, unforeseeable evolution, and the controversies it is expected to elicit among a very heterogeneous circle of members, we are up against managing an extraordinarily uncertain issue area. Consequently, we need time and soft legalization’s flexibility to establish commonly shared ideas, interests, cooperation mechanisms, and solutions, which can then form the basis of more formalized cooperation arrangements in the future. In summary, at least initially, the IAIO should start out as an IIGO displaying a relatively low level of institutional formality and using soft law instruments, such as non-binding recommendations, guidelines, and standards, to support national policymakers in the conception and design of AI-related regulatory policies. Its interim goal should be to galvanize international cooperation in this domain as early as possible, before states develop their own, diverging policies, which may be hard to rescind without political damage. Whether the international community wishes to move towards more formalized cooperation at some point in the future, remains to be seen. Sometimes informality turns out to be the key to an organization’s success. This seems to be the case with the Bank of International Settlements especially during its initial years of operation and World War II, or the BCBS and the different GGroups at present [2]. Another common trajectory is when initially informal arrangements turn into formal frameworks of cooperation. A case in point is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s (GATT) gradual transformation into the WTO [1]. Finally, there are examples for remarkably successful, sustained, complementary, and mutually beneficial cooperation between several organizations of varying institutional formality in the same issue area. This sort of relationship is characteristic for the IMF and various G-Groups in financial regulation, or the Australia Group (AG), an IIGO, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), a FIGO, in the regulation of chemical and biological weapons [18]. Our excursus in the domain of international lawmaking shows that beyond the optimal level of legalization and institutional formality, the IAIO must fulfill a number of more subtle requirements to be perceived as a fair and legitimate regulator. While leaving the elaboration of details to future research, we would like to stress the importance of two points: (1) including an interdisciplinary mix of experts (with, e.g., AI, legal, political, and ethics background) in the initial deliberations related to the IAIO’s establishment, modus operandi, and regulatory agenda, and (2) conducting regular, largescale consultation processes with a diverse spectrum of interested stakeholders from public sector, industry, and academia, to ensure due consideration of all relevant perspectives

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › UN CP › 2NC

The creates an IIGO which solves best

Erdélyi and Goldsmith ‘18 (Olivia, faculty of Law at University of Canterbury and Judy, faculty at University of Kentucky Department of Computer Science, “Regulating Artificial Intelligence Proposal for a Global Situation, Published February 2018, Accessed 7/13/2022, https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3278721.3278731)

International institutions are the prevalent vehicles of international cooperation in our interconnected world. When a critical mass of states and/or non-state actors feel that transnational cooperation is necessary to solve a problem that is impossible to tackle by isolated national measures, they establish a new IGO or NGO for that particular purpose. Based on legal and international relations definitions in circulation — see [9, 14, 18] — we define an IGO as a formal entity (1) established by an international agreement governed by international law; (2) with at least three (sometimes two) members — typically states but increasingly also IGOs; and (3) having at least one organ with a will distinct from that of its members. FIGOs’ organizational purpose is laid down in a binding international agreement such as a treaty or a formal legal act of another IGO, their membership is clearly defined in the founding legal act, and they have a permanent and significant institutionalization in place. By contrast, IIGOs operate based on an explicitly shared, but informal expectation about purpose, their membership is not always clear, as members are explicitly associated but only by non-legal mutual acknowledgment, and they do not possess any significant institutionalization. NGOs differ from IGOs in that they are not created by treaty — meaning they are governed by national rather than international law — and their membership is made up of non-state actors. Given the severity and global nature of AI’s anticipated impact on humanity, we expect it to join the long line of issue areas requiring interstate cooperation, raising the question of establishing an IGO at some point in the future. Against this background, we propose the creation of the IAIO as a new IGO, which could initially serve as a focal point of policy debates on AI-related matters and — given sufficient international support — acquire increasing role in their regulation over time. We start by determining the degree of desired institutional formalization by examining, in turn, the six above elaborated tradeoffs in relation to AI.

Binding commitment vs. flexible cooperation arrangements: As pointed out earlier, AI will fundamentally transform human society worldwide. Since this process of transformation is likely to be inescapable for any single state, states will probably wish to cooperate sincerely. Also, violations will be difficult to detect as keeping pace with technological innovation will require considerable technical expertise and capacities, presumably exceeding especially weaker countries’ capabilities and evoking severe power asymmetries. While apart from this latter circumstance, these factors speak for hard legal commitments, it must be kept in mind that AI research and AI-human interactions are relatively young phenomena and their novelty severely restricts our ability to anticipate the spectrum and extent of the impending changes, let alone the dimension of the problems they will raise. Many AI instantiations encroach on our most basic rights, pose an existential threat, or bring up profound ethical and social questions, not to mention that they will utterly and completely upset our legal system. So, we are looking at heated debates among radically diverse parties over a variety of uncertain issues, which may change in rapid and currently unimaginable ways — conditions that, based on past experience, do not exactly favor international consensus. Therefore, we need all the flexibility we can get to acquire familiarity with the issues at hand, sort out differences, and establish common ground, before we can contemplate drawing up a more binding framework for cooperation. Delegation/high sovereignty costs vs. state autonomy/low sovereignty costs: Weaponized AI technologies and certain data mining practices are clearly relevant for national security. As this is a sensitive issue area involving particularly high sovereignty costs, at least initially, states will show reluctance to give up and delegate decisionmaking authority to the IAIO. On the long run, however, powerful collective oversight and enforcement mechanisms will probably be indispensable in order to curb incentives for violations and opportunistic behavior, which should otherwise be high in light of the major shifts in international power constellations triggered by changes in countries’ competitive positions. Also, domestic AI policies will produce significant externalities, affecting other countries. Based on this analysis, it is hard to escape the conclusion that a highly institutionalized organization with binding legislative, dispute resolution, and enforcement authority would be better suited as new international AI regulator. Nevertheless, the political reality remains that until sufficient clarity is reached on the IAIO’s precise purpose, membership, the issues to regulate, and the broad directions to follow, international consensus supporting such a high degree of institutionalization is off the table. Collective control of information vs. close control of information: History shows that states are generally cautious about sharing information on fate-changing technologies, which speaks for close control of information with respect to AI. However, if and when we manage to gather consensus for hard legal commitments (e.g., treaty on certain AI applications), we will probably need to be more forthcoming with certain information to ensure compliance with those instruments. This is again a strong argument in favor of starting cooperation on AI regulation in a softer institutional framework and using soft law instruments, although a move towards harder legalization seems to be desirable over time.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › UN CP › 2NC

The UN can create ethical standards that globally build trust

Fournier-Tombs ’21 (Eleonore, data scientist, researcher and author at United Nations University Institute Macau, “Towards a United Nations Internal Regulation for Artificial Intelligence, Published August 30, 2021, Accessed 7/13/2022, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/20539517211039493)

Ethical frameworks and best practices As we have seen, just like most AI initiatives developed in recent years globally, this work has happened largely without regulatory oversight. However, there have been many attempts within the organisation to set up ethical modes of operation, as well as to influence AI ethics globally. For example, OCHA's Peer Review Framework sets out a method for overseeing the technical development and implementation of AI models (OCHA, 2021b). Its objective is to provide a method for the review of models developed by humanitarian organisations by peers in the same sector, thereby providing a layer of validation that might hitherto not have existed. While there is no legal obligation for developers working with vulnerable populations to use it, it does attempt to increase accountability and transparency of models, in the hope of attenuating its risks and building trust ITU has also sought to encourage ethical uses of AI through its yearly conference entitled AI for Good, which is specifically oriented towards uses of AI that promote the Sustainable Development Goals. Several of AI for Good talks listed for 2021 address the ethics of AI use in specific cases, such as democratic participation or self-driving cars. However, the approach appears more focused on promoting implementations that drive sustainable development, rather than mitigating their possible risks (ITU, 2021). Finally, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has done considerable work in AI ethics, notably by convening intergovernmental meetings since 2019 to articulate a recommendation on the ethics of AI. The 2020 draft of this document focuses on values, such as transparency, gender equity, human rights and fairness, among others. While different from the European Commission's risks-based approach, this is certainly aligned with other United Nations documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Like the various United Nations Conventions, this document is therefore aimed at Member States, and could possibly inform the future United Nations convention on AI (UNESCO, 2020). Going a step further than the recommendation, the convention would be voluntarily ratified by Member States, who would then commit to following its principles in their own jurisdictions. Even without a convention, the United Nations would certainly have an incentive to apply internally its own recommendations to Member States. As such, the UNESCO work, along with other efforts of the ITU, OCHA and other agencies, can certainly be seen as building blocks towards a regulatory framework. However, without legal backing, they are not sufficient to ensure the safety of AI technologies as they are currently being used. Regulation to build trust in implementations In addition, the lack of AI regulation at the United Nations can be considered a barrier for agencies seeking to adopt more effective and novel technologies. While some systems, such as the OCHA-Bucky Model, which predicted COVID-19 cases in Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and Sudan, have been deployed for humanitarian use (OCHA, 2021d); others appear not to have been integrated into actual decision-making systems. An example of this is the Jetson tool, which was developed by UNHCR to predict the arrival of internally displaced persons to refugee camps in Somalia (UNHCR, 2021). According to the project's public-facing website, the tool has not been updated since 2019. Several of the numerous proof-of-concept projects developed by the UN Global Pulse have also not been deployed into production (Global Pulse Lab, 2021). One of the most important difficulties in deploying these solutions is related to trust, both in terms of internal adoption of the tools by decision makers, as well as acceptance by the target populations. Trust in artificial intelligence systems is notoriously difficult to obtain, particularly in the work in which the United Nations engages, which is highly political and impacts very vulnerable populations. Some of the attempts at promoting transparency in AI, such as the OCHA Peer Review Framework, can be seen as a way to build trust. In fact, there have been other similar initiatives outside of the United Nations, such as Datasheets for Datasets (Gebru et al., 2018) and Model Cards for Model Reporting (Mitchell et al., 2019), as well as IBM's AI Factsheet, which provide tools for technical developers to explain their technologies, and therefore increase public trust in them. As explained by Aicardi et al. (2021), transparency is the most prevalent principle included in AI ethics. In the EU Guidelines on AI, which served to inform the 2021 regulation, transparency is listed as one of the ‘seven requirements in the realisation of a trustworthy AI.’ Rossi (2019) describes lack of trust as one of the key obstacles to the adoption of AI systems, regardless of the potential benefit. The onus has largely been on the technical developers of these tools, such as data scientists, computer scientists and engineers, to develop the credibility of their tools. While the United Nations has invested, and continues to invest, large amounts of money into research labs and private partnerships, unless it is able to build internal and external trust in them, it will also face important barriers in their implementation. A regulatory framework like the one proposed by the European Commission, however, especially with an authorisation procedure like the one described for high-risk activities, would take the pressure off technology developers in the humanitarian sector to individually justify their activities to decision-makers. Instead, agencies or research labs who wanted to develop an AI solution would work towards authorisation, likely quelling many internal doubts as to the effectiveness, safety and accuracy of their system. Given the powerful nature of AI, the risks of research and development initiatives and the threat of unregulated public–private partnerships, an internal, enforceable United Nations regulation on AI is highly recommended. An UN-wide AI regulation would not only protect the risks posed by the technologies to the mission itself of the organisation, but it would also build trust in those applications that are actually supporting its work. This is an opportunity to concretise the efforts of the organisation in AI ethics and best practices, as well as further demonstrate its leadership on an issue of global importance.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › UN CP › 2NC

The UN works within international frameworks, more so than NATO

Fournier-Tombs ’21 (Eleonore, data scientist, researcher and author at United Nations University Institute Macau, “Towards a United Nations Internal Regulation for Artificial Intelligence, Published August 30, 2021, Accessed 7/13/2022, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/20539517211039493)

On 21 April 2021, the European Commission published a proposal for a regulation on artificial intelligence (AI) (European Commission, 2021), the first of its kind to attempt to integrate the multi-tentacled beast that is AI. The document enters into detail in terms of definitions and uses of the technologies, as well as very important sections on the forbidden uses of AI and high-risk activities, proposing that the latter go through an authorisation process much like a drug or a car would before being made available to the public. However, as set out in Article 2, the regulation does not apply to international organisations, regardless of whether they are operating in European Union (EU) territory. Naturally, the EU does not have jurisdiction over international organisations such as the United Nations, which is governed by international law (United Nations, 2021). The exclusion therefore does not come as a surprise but does point to a gap in the AI regulation, especially since technologies that are classified as forbidden or high risk for European citizens would presumably be also very risky for all other citizens, regardless of nationality. Furthermore, as explained by Bradford (2020) in The Brussels Effect, the EU is known to set regulatory precedents globally. It is therefore likely that the new regulation will have a ripple effect, which would reach many other countries. In that context, regulating at the United Nations itself would be an important way for the organisation to demonstrate its leadership on this important societal issue. The activities of the United Nations are regulated in a series of legal instruments in international law that have been developed since the drafting of the Charter of the United Nations (United Nations, 1945). The UN Charter sets out the role of the Secretary General, the General Assembly, and the Security Council, as well as the activities of UN Peacekeepers. Since 1945, there have been a few amendments to the Charter, as well as Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on issues that were not considered at the onset of the organisation. The United Nations itself is very likely to develop a convention on AI, which member countries would likely sign and possibly ratify (Garcia, 2020; ). However, such a document, like other United Nations conventions, would consist of a commitment by its member states to more ethical AI practices, rather than a regulation for the organisation itself to follow. This article therefore sets out the rationale for a United Nations Regulation for Artificial Intelligence, which is needed to set out the modes of engagement of the organisation when using AI technologies in the attainment of its mission. It argues that given the increasing use of AI by the United Nations, including in some activities considered high risk by the European Commission, a regulation is urgent. It also contends that rules of engagement for AI at the United Nations would support the development of ‘good artificial intelligence’1, by giving developers clear pathways for authorisation that would build trust in these technologies. Finally, it argues that an internal regulation would build upon the work in AI ethics and best practices already initiated in the organisation that could, like the Brussels Effect, set an important precedent for regulations in other countries. The United Nations’ artificial intelligence ecosystem AI technologies have, over the past decade, been increasingly used by United Nations agencies, funds and programs. Several research and development labs, including the United Nations Secretariat’s Global Pulse Lab (2021), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR's) Jetson initiative (UNHCR, 2021), Innovation Labs (UNICEF, 2021) and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Centre for Humanitarian Data (OCHA, 2021a) have focused their work on developing AI solutions that would support the UN's mission, notably in terms of anticipating and responding to humanitarian crises. These research labs are largely composed of United Nations staff members and consultants trained in data science technologies. Many of the research labs have developed proofs of concept, which are yet to be integrated into the United Nations’ activities.2 They aim, for example, to explore the use of AI modelling in anticipating refugee arrivals (Jetson), predict coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) cases in countries with ongoing humanitarian crises or better understand risks to the Sustainable Development Goals (Global Pulse). United Nations agencies have also used biometric identification to manage humanitarian logistics and refugee claims. For example, Population Registration and Identity Management Ecosystem (PRIMES) was launched in 2018 by UNHCR to provide a centralised platform for the management of refugee data. By the end of 2018, the biometrics of 7.1 million refugees were managed by the platform (UNHCR, 2019). The World Food Programme (WFP) has also used biometric identification in aid distribution to refugees, coming under some criticism in 2019 for its use of this technology in Yemen (Raftree and Steinacker, 2019). In parallel, however, the organisation has begun partnering with private companies that provide advanced analytical services. A notable example is the WFP, that in 2019 signed a USD45-million-dollar contract with Palantir, an American firm which specialised in data collection and AI modelling (Greenwood, 2019). In 2014, the United States Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) awarded a USD20 billion-dollar contract to Palantir, to track undocumented immigrants in the United States (Woodman, 2017). Their methodology was a classic case of what is called the ‘Mosaic Effect’, which is a technique used by intelligence agencies, which involves using multiple data sources to find personally identifiable information that might otherwise have been obscured. This technique is discussed in some detail by OCHA (OCHA 2021c), which explains that these databases can be used to reidentify highly vulnerable populations such as migrants to expel them from an area, recruit children for warfare, or otherwise threaten their safety. Palantir used this technique as part of its ICE contract by collecting and centralising large numbers of databases to reveal the location of migrants, leading to their eventual expulsion. Several human rights watchdogs, however, including Amnesty International, have raised concerns about Palantir, writing in a September 2020 report that: ‘Given Palantir's increasingly entrenched role in government operations and its multiple contracts across federal agencies, concerns about its human rights record are growing in urgency and deserve scrutiny’ (Amnesty International, 2020).

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › UN CP › 2NC

Debates about AI tend to leave the global South behind—the growing, militarized issue should involve their input.

Eugenio V. Garcia 9/10/2019 (diplomat, AI and global governance researcher, minister-counsellor and Chargé d’affaires ad interim at Conakry Brazilian Embassy, former senior adviser on peace and security, Office of the President of the United Nations General Assembly;Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brazil; “The militarization of artificial intelligence: a wake-up call for the Global South”; file:///C:/Users/ellaf/Dropbox/PC/Downloads/SSRN-id3452323.pdf//EF)

Artificial intelligence (AI) will have a profound impact upon world politics across the board, as much as upon society generally. Converging technologies that often overlap and affect each other have become drivers of innovation, as in the case of nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science (NBIC). Usage of AI in business, government, and everyday life has been developing at breakneck pace, fueled by powerful hardware capacity, abundant data, and online training of self-learning algorithms. As the discipline of International Relations (IR) takes on this expanding research field and its systemic implications, a coming AI race has frequently been portrayed as a perilous trend capable of reshaping the character of international security. 1 An overview of state initiatives, strategies, and related governmental investments in AI reported that at the time of writing less than 20 countries had active AI national plans and, not surprisingly, almost all of them were developed countries.2 Indeed, there is no shortage of analyses focusing upon great-power competition and an epic struggle for AI global supremacy, picturing prominently the United States and China, followed closely by military powers and wealthy nations (Russia, G7 countries, Israel, and others), and a few second-tier, aspiring tech players, which may occupy someday a special place in the AI landscape.3 The Global South, however, is clearly underrepresented in this debate, with many areas of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean completely absent in terms of scholars, politicians, and policymakers engaged in this vital conversation. And yet, when it comes to assess global risks in peace and security and identify where new AI weapons are likely to be deployed in the first place, both researchers and practitioners in the developing world have reasons to be concerned. It is no wonder that proponents of a Global IR have been urging for greater participation from actors of the non-Western world as a means to ‘bring the Rest in’. 4 This article will take as a starting point the fact that the militarization of AI has already begun and will pose many challenges beyond the realm of security itself. I argue that AI governance is also bound to gain traction and the United Nations will eventually get further involved in providing space for international cooperation and facilitating negotiations on how to deal with controversies surrounding AI policymaking. In this context, diplomatic deliberations in Geneva on lethal autonomous weapons systems are a revealing case-study of opportunities and predicaments encountered along the way, insofar as they highlight inter alia how critical it is for the Global South to be abreast of developments in this area, prepare in advance, and act accordingly on distinct fronts.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › UN CP › 1NC

A subcommittee encourages multilateralism and facilitates effective AI governance.

Eugenio V. Garcia 9/10/2019 (diplomat, AI and global governance researcher, minister-counsellor and Chargé d’affaires ad interim at Conakry Brazilian Embassy, former senior adviser on peace and security, Office of the President of the United Nations General Assembly;Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brazil; “The militarization of artificial intelligence: a wake-up call for the Global South”; file:///C:/Users/ellaf/Dropbox/PC/Downloads/SSRN-id3452323.pdf//EF)

What role for the United Nations? In his address to the General Assembly in September 2018, UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned that ‘multilateralism is under fire precisely when we need it most’. But among the many pressing problems that call for a multilateral approach to be properly addressed, he highlighted two ‘epochal challenges’ in particular: climate change, which is of course of great concern but not covered in this article, and risks associated with advances in technology. Indeed, ‘rapidly developing fields such as artificial intelligence, blockchain and biotechnology have the potential to turbocharge progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals’, Guterres said. On the other hand, new technologies also present serious perils along the way, from mass economic unemployment to cybercrime and malicious use of digital tools.35 Guterres cautioned against the weaponization of AI and the possibility of a dangerous arms race in this domain, including the development of lethal autonomous weapons systems, going so far as to contend that ‘the prospect of machines with the discretion and power to take human life is morally repugnant’. Less oversight over these weapons could severely compromise efforts to contain threats, prevent escalation, and ensure compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law. He urged Member States ‘to use the United Nations as a platform to draw global attention to these crucial matters and to nurture a digital future that is safe and beneficial for all’. To lead by example and engage the UN Secretariat in this enterprise, the SecretaryGeneral launched his own Strategy on New Technologies, with the objective of defining how the UN system will support the use of these technologies to accelerate the achievement of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and to facilitate their alignment with the values enshrined in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the norms and standards of international law. Among the pledges and commitments to pursue this strategy were deepening the UN’s internal capacities and exposure to emerging technologies; increasing understanding, advocacy, and dialogue; supporting dialogue on normative and cooperation frameworks; and enhancing UN system support to government capacity development. 37 In the same vein, the High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation was established by the Secretary-General in 2017 to promote dialogue and look into proposals to build trust and cooperation between countries and other stakeholders, the private sector, research centers, civil society, and academia. In its report, released in June 2019, the Panel envisaged several potential roles for the UN to add value in the digital transformation: as a convener; providing a space for debating values and norms; generating standard setting; holding multi-stakeholder or bilateral initiatives on specific issues; developing the capacity of Member States; ranking, mapping, and measuring cybersecurity; and making available arbitration and dispute-resolution mechanisms. The report put forward various recommendations, such as adopting by 2020 a ‘Global Commitment for Digital Cooperation’ to consolidate in a single political document shared values, principles, understandings, and objectives regarding the governance of cyberspace. Also, it did not shy away from making principled statements of ethical significance, the stipulation that ‘life and death decisions should not be delegated to machines’ being a case in point.38 Most of the UN initiatives on new technologies are focused upon the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, such as the annual ECOSOC’s Science, Technology, and Innovation Forum, which had its fourth edition in May 2019. On the AI front, the flagship UN platform for global dialogue with the wider public is the AI for Good Global Summit, hosted every year in Geneva by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) in partnership with other UN agencies, the XPrize Foundation (organization offering incentivize prize competitions) and the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM).39 This interdisciplinary event brings together speakers from governments, industry, academia, media, and the research community to discuss how AI can be utilized to achieve inter alia results in ending poverty, alleviating hunger, promoting health, and identifying development solutions. The UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) established in 2017 a Center for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics in The Hague, with the aim of disseminating information, undertaking training activities, and promoting public awareness. The Center has notably been active in cybercrime, law enforcement, criminal justice, counter-terrorism, and malicious use of AI.40 Also important is UNESCO’s humanistic approach on ethics, policy, and capacity building in response to new emerging challenges related to AI technologies, including philosophical reflections on what it means to be human in the face of disruptive technologies from the ethical perspective. 41 The New York-based Centre for Policy Research of the United Nations University (UNU) has been conducting foresight analyses, developing collaborative research projects with external partners, and convening policy seminars and events. In 2018, the Centre launched an on-line platform on AI and Global Governance to foster cross-disciplinary insights and ‘inform existing debates from the lens of multilateralism’, as a tool for Member States, multilateral agencies, funds, programs, and other stakeholders.42 The UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) has a research project on the weaponization of increasingly autonomous technologies since 2013, anchored in the idea that mitigating or reducing potential harms caused by AI will be crucial to harness ‘AI for Good’. 43 More broadly, UNIDIR’s objectives in studying the relationship between AI and international security aim at further clarifying functional concerns in the development and future deployment of autonomous weapons systems, including the risk of accidents; manipulation and other vulnerabilities in weaponization; changes in the nature of conflict and their impact upon strategic stability; commercial development of AI-related technologies and its links with the defense industry; access to sensitive technologies and their use to conduct asymmetric warfare; and the structural effects of the AI revolution on geopolitics and power dynamics in the international system.44 In turn, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), both in New York and in Geneva, has been working to implement the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament (Securing Our Common Future), which includes the consideration of possible challenges posed by new weapon technologies. One of the action points of the Agenda seeks to support efforts by Member States ‘to elaborate new measures, including through political or legally binding arrangements, to ensure that humans remain at all times in control over the use of force’.45 Other initiatives include the UN Innovation Network, connecting a collaborative community of innovators within the UN System, as well as a myriad of projects developed by UN agencies to apply AI tools in their daily practice in the field Despite the relative lack of clarity on the way forward, the future role of the UN will be inextricably linked to the global governance of AI. Research and policy proposals on this topic are beginning to shed light upon the likelihood of international cooperation on transformative AI-related issues, incentives needed for the parties to reach meaningful agreements, proper conditions for compliance, and costs of defection or unilateral, non-cooperative measures. 46 Proposals range from informal mechanisms in narrowly-focused domains to much more ambitious, institutionalized forums, such as the establishment of an international regulatory agency, to be named, for example, the ‘International Artificial Intelligence Organization’ (IAIO), aimed at setting standards and benchmarks across numerous areas to be regulated. However, even the proponents of such broad-spectrum organization concede that reaching a workable international consensus on this idea seems rather a remote possibility in the short term. 47 Another proposition to consider is creating a new body modeled on the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to provide policymakers with technical, neutral assessments, subject to review by states, underlining the opportunities, implications, and potential risks of AI, always through evidence-based research by the tech and scientific communities.48 A case can be made for an ‘Intergovernmental Panel on Artificial Intelligence’ (IPAI), as Miailhe did, to gather a large interdisciplinary group of experts with a mandate to collect, organize, and analyze credible and up-to-date information on AI challenges. 49 As technologies become more and more sophisticated and indecipherable to the layman, sound technical advice will be in high demand if intergovernmental negotiations are to be launched to tackle these thorny issues, separating myth, hype, and misinformation from what is in tune with the body of evidence and human knowledge available so far. Politicians obviously have no need to know technicalities about reinforcement learning, multilayer perceptrons, convolutional neural networks, or Boltzmann machines. But as AI puzzles and their impact upon society become increasingly relevant in the real world, AI researchers cannot deny that suitable communication with the political leadership will be of paramount importance to guide decisionmaking in the right direction. One key challenge is to keep the major players engaged, so that AI governance can be instrumental in providing stability to safeguard the system in everyone’s interest. Even though some proposals may require more time for maturation, others could be implemented in a more straightforward manner, without the need for a fully-fledged, previous commitment from governments on the parameters and preconditions deemed appropriate for establishing new criteria at the international level. Advisory and non-binding settings involving states, the private sector, and civil society could be a first step if focused upon information gathering, independent analyses, and recommendations geared at prevention rather than regulation per se. Traditional, institutionally-based intergovernmental diplomacy seems too slow if compared with the staggering pace of technological innovation. Informal, ad-hoc, plurilateral initiatives spurred by some like-minded countries (‘coalitions of the willing’) may at times promote added value in governance, but they usually lack universal appeal and raise suspicious of their agendas in the eyes of states left outside these groups. A better solution to escape shortterm paralysis [immobilization] is for the UN, with the authority and legitimacy conferred to it by Member States, to take the lead and offer a collective space, open to all, strictly voluntary, to encourage cooperation and work on prevention, capacity-building, and normative recommendations. A good example along these lines would be the creation of a ‘Global Foresight Observatory’ on the convergence of AI with other emerging technologies, under the auspices of the UN, as envisaged in the report of UNU’s Centre for Policy Research, i.e. a multi-stakeholder, inclusive platform to foster cooperation in technological and political preparedness for responsive innovation.50 This sort of initiative fits well with what the UN can do even in hardknock situations. Trying to be too ambitious from the very beginning may backlash and lead nowhere. It is essential not to allow resistance from becoming lethargic and continue exploring alternatives to take concrete steps in AI governance in a robust and comprehensive manner.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Solvency › 1NC—PLAN FAILS

Military adoption of AI fails- insert warrants

Horowitz and Scharre, 2021 - Senior Fellows at the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Michael and Paul, Jan 12, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” EZG]

A challenge for military adoption of AI is that two key risks associated with new technology adoption are in tension. First, militaries could fail to adopt—or adopt quickly enough or employ in the right manner—a new technology that yields significant battlefield advantage. As a recent example, despite the overall growth in the military uninhabited, or unmanned, aircraft market, the adoption of uninhabited vehicles has, at times, been a source of contention within the U.S. defense establishment, principally based on debates over the merits of this new technology relative to existing alternatives.17 Alternatively, militaries could adopt an immature technology too quickly, betting heavily and incorrectly on new and untested propositions about how a technology may change warfare. Given the natural incentive militaries have in ensuring their capabilities work on the battlefield, it may be reasonable to assume that militaries would manage these risks reasonably well, although not without some mishaps. But when balancing the risk of accidents versus falling behind adversaries in technological innovation, militaries arguably place safety as a secondary consideration.18 Militaries may be relatively accepting of the risk of accidents in the pursuit of technological advantage, since accidents are a routine element of military operations, even in training.19 Nevertheless, there are strong bureaucratic interests in ultimately ensuring that fielded capabilities are robust and secure, and existing institutional processes may be able to manage AI safety and security risks with some adaptation. For militaries, balancing between the risks of going too slow versus going too fast with AI adoption is complicated by the fact that AI, and deep learning in particular, is a relatively immature technology with significant vulnerabilities and reliability concerns.20 These concerns are heightened in situations where there may not be ample data on which to train machine learning systems. Machine learning systems generally rely on very large data sets, which may not exist in some military settings, particularly when it comes to early warning of rare events (such as a nuclear attack) or tracking adversary behavior in a multidimensional battlefield. When trained with inadequate data sets or employed outside the narrow context of their design, AI systems are often unreliable and brittle. AI systems can often seem deceptively capable, performing well (sometimes better than humans) in some laboratory settings, then failing dramatically under changing environmental conditions in the real world. Self-driving cars, for example, may be safer than human drivers in some settings, then inexplicably turn deadly in situations where a human operator would not have trouble. Additionally, deep learning methods may, at present, be insufficiently reliable for safety-critical applications even when operating within the bounds of their design specifications.21 For example, concerns about limits to the reliability of algorithms across demographic groups have hindered the deployment of facial recognition technology in the United States, particularly in high-consequence applications such as law enforcement. Militaries, too, should be concerned about technical limitations and vulnerabilities in their AI systems. Militaries want technologies that work, especially on the battlefield. Accordingly, the AI strategy of the Department of Defense (DoD) calls for AI systems that are “resilient, robust, reliable, and secure.”22 This is undoubtedly the correct approach but a challenge, at least in the near term, given the reliability issues facing many uses of algorithms today and the highly dynamic conditions of battlefield use. An additional challenge stems from security dilemma dynamics. Competitive pressures could lead nations to shortcut test and evaluation (T&E) in a desire to field new AI capabilities ahead of adversaries. Similar competitive pressures to beat others to market appear to have played an exacerbating role in accident risk relating to AI systems in self-driving cars and commercial airplane autopilots.23 Militaries evaluating an AI system of uncertain reliability could, not unjustifiably, feel pressure to hasten deployment if they believe others are taking similar measures. Historically, these pressures are highest immediately before and during wars, where the risk/reward equation surrounding new technologies can shift due to the very real lives on the line. For example, competitive pressures may have spurred the faster introduction of poison gas in World War I.24 Similarly, in World War II, Germany diverted funds from proven technologies into jet engines, ballistic missiles, and helicopters, even though none of the technologies proved mature until after the war.25 This dynamic risk might spark a self-fulfilling prophecy in which countries accelerate deployment of insufficiently tested AI systems out of the fear that others will deploy first.26 The net effect is not an arms race but a “race to the bottom” on safety, leading to the deployment of unsafe AI systems and heightening the risk of accidents and instability.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Solvency › 2NC—NO SOLVENCY

Cyber deterrence fails

Whyte 20 Christopher Whyte, 11/25/2020, assistant professor of homeland security and emergency preparedness in the L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs at Virginia Commonwealth University;  Strategic Studies Quarterly, "Poison, Persistence, and Cascade Effect," https://www.jstor.org/stable/26956151 //EZJ

In terms of the strategic logic of engagement in the domain, the PE strategy largely emerges from the work of Richard Harknett and Michael Fischerkeller during their time as scholars attached to Cyber Command. The authors argue that the unique character of cyberspace means that traditional deterrent approaches are doomed to failure.36 Given that deterrence involves strong demonstrations of defense or meaningful statements of punishment, they contend, prospects for developing a sustainable deterrent posture online are limited (or so the architects of the new approach hold).37 It is extremely difficult to demonstrate defensive capabilities at the scale demanded by a national cyber deterrent strategy, and punishment rarely works in the way it is intended. Communicating specific meaning in retaliation is difficult, particularly where the diversity of activities that constitute cyber conflict is immensely high. Moreover, response options are often not ready to execute in the time frame required by policy makers that seek to deter. And conceptual agreement on the significance or role of certain elements of the domain is not easy to come by, with poor understanding of what might be meant—if anything—by sovereignty online being a hallmark of the digital world.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Solvency › 1NC—CANT SOLVE CHINESE AI

CCP State Control guarantees that Chinese AI continues to be unregulated

Zeng ’20 (Jinghan, professor of China and International Studies at Lancaster University, “Artificial intelligence and China’s authoritarian governance”, Published October 13th, 2020, https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/96/6/1441/5922010?login=true, Accessed 7/9/2022)

The rise of artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to transform our governments and societies. An AI revolution may make future governments more digital, efficient and economic than ever before. Yet despite all the benefits that AI offers when applied in governance, western democratic societies have considerable concerns regarding civil rights. The authoritarian regime in China, on the other hand, has chosen to fully embrace the age of AI. Nowadays, AI has become a buzzword not only in the capital market but also in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). To develop AI is now considered China's national strategy, with a clear goal of making the country a leading AI power.1 China's open ambition in this field has alarmed many of its competitors, especially in the United States and Europe, where many view it as an open challenge to American AI supremacy.2 In the context of global power transition, the so-called ‘AI race’ between China and the United States has opened up a new front in their already intense geopolitical competition. The US–China AI race is not only a technological competition but also an ideological one. China's bold practices of applying AI technologies in state governance have further contested the superiority of western liberal democracy.3 This article examines the Chinese governance approach towards AI. It shows that China's bold use of AI practices in governance represents an attempt not only to build a more efficient and capable government to deliver better public services, but also to strengthen state control to ensure the continuation of the authoritarian order. The article argues that the application of AI in China's governance should be understood in the wider context of the CCP's broad and incoherent strategy of adaptation to governance by digital means. The CCP's successful employment of digital technologies to strengthen its governance is made possible by China's unique socio-political environment. China's huge internet market has provided, in effect, unlimited data with which to train and advance AI programs. As the world shifts from ‘the age of expertise to the age of data’,4 data are a strategic resource that lays the foundation for digital technologies such as AI. As Kaifu Lee, one of the most prominent figures in the Chinese internet sector, points out, data—rather than computing power and AI talents—constitute the most important factor to ensure successful AI algorithms, as ‘once computing power and engineering talent reach a certain threshold, the quantity of data becomes decisive in determining the overall power and accuracy of an algorithm’.5 In 2019, China had over 854 million internet users—and, with this representing only 61.2 per cent of its 1.3 billion population, long-term growth potential;6 by comparison, the United States had only 312 million users with less than 10 per cent offline population in which to expand.7 In this respect, as the ‘Saudi Arabia of data’, China has considerable comparative advantage in developing its AI industry.8 Moreover, weak civil awareness within Chinese society, combined with the CCP's strong state power, including a well-resourced domestic security sector, has put the regime in a favourable position not only to exploit its data advantage but also to enhance state control via digital means. For example, China is now leading AI technology in areas such as facial recognition that Europe and the United States have put on hold—or even banned—owing to privacy concerns. In contrast to western democratic societies, for China the key barrier to AI advancement lies in technological rather than legal constraints. More importantly, AI is not just another powerful tech tool to boost China's digital surveillance; AI's automation of decision-making capability without human intervention is unleashing the potential of China's sophisticated digital surveillance network in ways that this article will explore. In this respect, the Chinese approach towards digital technology has to date been successful in furthering state power and capacity.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Solvency › 2NC—SQUO SOLVES AI

Squo solves: EU already has GDPR that enforces AI clarity.

Thelisson et al. 17 - (Eva, Co-founder and CEO of the AI Transparency Institute with a PhD in Law at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland on the General Data Protection Regulation. ANd invited expert at the EU Commission, at the Swiss Government and at international conferences; Kirtan Padh, current PhD Candidate at Helmholtz AI and former graduate from EPFL with a specialization in data analytics and research; Elisa Celis, Assistant Professor of Statistics & Data Science at Yale University)

Despite the incredible boon that computational techniques have been to society, certain red flags have recently appeared which demonstrate that algorithms, in particular AI/ML techniques that rely on data, can be biased. A growing number of global leaders and experts including Bill Gates, Elon Musk, Georges Church and Stephen Hawking have publicly voiced their concern regarding the speed and pervasiveness of the developments of AI/ML. In the US, President Obama’s administration produced a report which states that “big data technologies can cause societal harms beyond damages to privacy” [Executive office of the President et al., 2014]. In particular, it expressed concerns about the possibility that decisions informed by big data could have discriminatory effects, even in the absence of discriminatory intent. The 2017 edition of the World Economics Forum Global Risks Report, which surveyed 745 leaders in business, government, academia and members of the Institute of Risk Management, listed AI as “the emerging technology with the greatest potential for negative consequences over the coming decade”. Many negative instances have now been demonstrated [O’Neil, 2016; Kirkpatrick, 2016; Barocas and Selbst, 2015]. For instance, Google’s online advertising system displayed ads for high-income jobs to men much more often than it did to women [Datta et al., 2015], and ads for arrest records were significantly more likely to show up on searches for distinctively black names or a historically black fraternity [Sweeney, 2013]. Recent events have shown that such algorithmic bias is affecting society in a multitude of ways, e.g., exacerbating systemic bias in the racial composition of the American prison population [Angwin et al., 2016], inadvertently promoting extremist ideology [Costello et al., 2016] and affecting the results of elections [Baer, 2016; Bakshy et al., 2015]. Despite these serious concerns, algorithms, at a fundamental level, pervade everything we do. Simply eliminating them is not an option. Hence it is essential to design algorithmic tools and regulatory mechanisms to empower society at large to mitigate any resulting discrimination, inequality and bias. For AI/ML to remain beneficial, we must build trust in the systems that are transforming our social, political and business environments and are making decisions on our behalf. We consider at the technical aspect of how bias and discrimination can creep into decisions made by AI, often despite the best intentions of the developers of the algorithm, and how can we prevent such negative outcomes. We then outline the necessary regulatory mechanisms and techniques that must be developed in order to prevent such biases in the future.

2 Algorithmic Bias

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Solvency › 2NC—SQUO SOLVES AI

EU regulations means our allies don’t need US assistance

Kop ’21 (Mauritz, Stanford Law School TTLF Fellow at Stanford University and is Managing Partner at AIRecht, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, “EU Artificial Intelligence Act: The European Approach to AI, Accessed 7/9/2022, )

On 21 April 2021, the European Commission presented the Artificial Intelligence Act. As a Fellow at Stanford University’s Transatlantic Technology Law Forum and a Member of the European AI Alliance, I made independent strategic recommendations to the European Commission. President Ursula von der Leyen's team adopted some of the suggestions that I offered them, or has itself arrived to the same conclusions. That is encouraging. This contribution will list the main points of this novel regulatory framework for AI. 1 Mauritz Kop is Stanford Law School TTLF Fellow at Stanford University and is Managing Partner at AIRecht, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 2 Core horizontal rules for AI The EU AI Act sets out horizontal rules for the development, commodification and use of AI-driven products, services and systems within the territory of the EU. The draft regulation provides core artificial intelligence rules that apply to all industries. The EU AI Act introduces a sophisticated ‘product safety framework’ constructed around a set of 4 risk categories. It imposes requirements for market entrance and certification of High-Risk AI Systems through a mandatory CE-marking procedure. To ensure equitable outcomes, this pre-market conformity regime also applies to machine learning training, testing and validation datasets. The Act seeks to codify the high standards of the EU trustworthy AI paradigm, which requires AI to be legally, ethically and technically robust, while respecting democratic values, human rights and the rule of law. Objectives of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act The proposed regulatory framework on Artificial Intelligence has the following objectives: 1. ensure that AI systems placed on the Union market and used are safe and respect existing law on fundamental rights and Union values; 2. ensure legal certainty to facilitate investment and innovation in AI; 3. enhance governance and effective enforcement of existing law on fundamental rights and safety requirements applicable to AI systems; 4. facilitate the development of a single market for lawful, safe and trustworthy AI applications and prevent market fragmentation. Subject Matter of the EU AI Act The scope of the AI Act is largely determined by the subject matter to which the rules apply. In that regard, Article 1 states that: Article 1 Subject matter This Regulation lays down: (a) harmonised rules for the placing on the market, the putting into service and the use of artificial intelligence systems (‘AI systems’) in the Union; (a) prohibitions of certain artificial intelligence practices; (b) specific requirements for high-risk AI systems and obligations for operators of such systems; (c) harmonised transparency rules for AI systems intended to interact with natural persons, emotion recognition systems and biometric categorisation systems, and AI systems used to generate or manipulate image, audio or video content; (d) rules on market monitoring and surveillance.