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2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Advantage 3 – Bioterrorism › 2NC---No BioWeapons

No engineered bioweapons – can’t reliably engineer pathogen characteristics – tradeoffs mean the more virulent a pathogen, the less effective it is

Lentzos et al. 14 – Flippa, a Senior Lecturer in Science & International Security at the Department of War Studies and Co-Director of the Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS) at King’s College London. Catherine Jefferson, researcher in the Department of Social Science, Health, and Medicine at King’s College London. Claire Morris, a senior research fellow in the Department of Social Science, Health, and Medicine at King’s College London. “The myths (and realities) of synthetic bioweapons”, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, , 09-18-2014

Even experts have a hard time enhancing disease pathogens. Some observers have also expressed concerns that synthetic biology could be used to enhance the virulence or increase the transmissibility of known pathogens, creating novel threat agents.

Mousepox and bird flu (H5N1) experiments are frequently cited to demonstrate how dangerous new pathogens could be designed. But assessments of this threat tend to overlook a salient fact: In both these experiments, the researchers did not actually design the pathogens. With respect to H5N1, researchers had indeed been trying to design an air-transmissible virus variant for some time, without success. The ferret experiment was set up as an alternative approach, to see whether natural mutations could generate an air-transmissible variant. The researchers had no influence on the specific mutations induced. In the mousepox experiment, researchers inserted the gene for interleukin-4 into the mousepox virus to induce infertility in mice and serve as an infectious contraceptive for pest control. The result—that the altered virus was lethal to mice—was unanticipated by the researchers. In other words, it was not planned.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Advantage 3 – Bioterrorism › 2NC---No BioWeapons

No bio or chemical weapon threat

Revill 17 – Dr. James, Research Fellow with the Harvard Sussex Program at SPRU. “Past as Prologue? The Risk of Adoption of Chemical and Biological Weapons by Non-State Actors in the EU”, Cambridge, pg. 626-642, , 09-29-2017

The second factor is “the perceived complexity of the innovation in terms of adoption and use”.40 This is important in the innovation literature, as Rogers remarked, “[t]he complexity of an innovation, as perceived by members of a social system, is negatively related to its rate of adoption”.41 Several scholars of terrorist innovation have also highlighted the issue of complexity;42 or, as Cragin et al have stated, “[h]ow simple or complex a technology appears affects perceptions of how risky it will be to adopt.”43

In most cases terrorist groups appear to have largely opted for the simplest pathway towards the achievement of their goals and the weapons used tend to be vernacular, functional devices drawing on local and readily-available materials, rather than sophisticated, “baroque” technologies. This is certainly the case with IEDs, the history of which is characterised largely by incremental innovations – although nevertheless frequently effective ones – with many means of delivery recycled from the past.44 Complexity can therefore be seen as important in the adoption of technology by terrorists generally, but is perhaps particularly acute in the case of CBW technology.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Advantage 3 – Bioterrorism › 1NC---No BioWeapons

No synthetic pathogens

Wimmer 18 – Eckard, Professor at Stony Brook University. “Synthetic Biology, Dual Use Research, and Possibilities for Control”, Defence against Bioterrorism, pg. 7-11, , 03-23-2018

Listed below are some constraints that show how in the US the development of dangerous infectious agents, referred to as “select agents”, is controlled – perhaps misuse even prevented – through technical and administrative hurdles:

I. Re-creating an already existing dangerous virus for malicious intent is a complex scientific endeavor. (i) It requires considerable scientific knowledge and experience and, more importantly, considerable financial support. That support usually comes from government and private agencies (NIH, NAF, etc.), organizations that carefully screen at multiple levels all applications for funding of ALL biological research. (ii) It requires an environment suitable for experimenting with dangerous infectious agents (containment facilities). Any work in containment facilities is also carefully regulated.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Advantage 3 – Bioterrorism › 1NC---Anti-CRISPR tech

Anti-CRISPR tech safeguards against any potential bioterror threat and famines

Antonio Regalado, 19, (Antonio Regalado, 5-2-2019, MIT Technology Review, The search for the kryptonite that can stop CRISPR, https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/05/02/65813/the-search-for-the-kryptonite-that-can-stop-crispr/, 6-28-2022) SCade

Another application being studied is whether anti-CRISPR could create a safeguard against “gene drives.” The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation is backing the development of a CRISPR tool that will spread though wild mosquitoes, causing their populations to crash, with the idea of preventing malaria. Others want to develop such gene drives in mice, so they can eradicate the rodents from islands without using poison. But what if these experiments go haywire and lead to an extinction? Researchers think they can create organisms with anti-CRISPR programmed into their genomes so they’re immune. In an initial proof of principle, scientists in Kansas last year engineered yeast cells with anti-CRISPR to resist a gene drive. “If some North Korean lab comes at you with a gene drive to wipe out an economically important crop, you could have a transgenic crop that [is resistant]. That is the drawing board scenario,” says Erik Sontheimer of the University of Massachusetts Medical School.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Advantage 3 – Bioterrorism › 1NC---Anti-CRISPR tech

Anti-CRISPR technology is becoming more prevalent now

Antonio Regalado, 19, (Antonio Regalado, 5-2-2019, MIT Technology Review, The search for the kryptonite that can stop CRISPR, https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/05/02/65813/the-search-for-the-kryptonite-that-can-stop-crispr/, 6-28-2022) SCade

Anti-CRISPR By the time Doudna drafted her proposal to DARPA, other scientists already had one big clue for how to stop CRISPR. In the ancient struggle between bacteria and the viruses called phage that infect them, phage had developed their own antidotes to CRISPR. In fact, their genomes, it’s been found, harbor the ability to produce what is essentially CRISPR kryptonite—small proteins exquisitely tuned by evolution to disable the gene-editing tool. Scientists call these molecules “anti-CRISPRs.” The first anti-CRISPRs were discovered in 2013 by a student at the University of Toronto named Joseph Bondy-Denomy. “It was serendipity. We stumbled onto the fact that some phages seemed to be resistant to CRISPR. When we put the phage into a cell, the bacteria couldn’t protect itself,” says Bondy-Denomy, now a professor at the University of California, San Francisco. He quickly zeroed in on one of the virus’s 50 or so genes as the reason. “We thought, wow, maybe this is turning off CRISPR.” The number of labs studying such defenses is smaller than the number working with CRISPR. But anti-CRISPR is becoming a booming field in its own right. More than 40 anti-CRISPR proteins have already been found, many by Doudna’s lab. Other teams are having early success locating conventional chemicals that can inhibit CRISPR as well. Today, Amit Choudhary of Harvard Medical School, in Boston, also with funding from DARPA, reported he had found two drugs that prevent gene-editing when mixed with human cells. “The hallmark of any powerful technology is control,” says Choudhary. “It’s that simple.” Researchers like Bondy-Denomy believe anti-CRISPRs could have a role in improving future gene-editing treatments, by giving researchers more precise control. For instance, a team in Germany recently showed if they combined CRISPR and anti-CRISPR, they could create an editor that will change DNA only in liver cells, not neurons or muscle. Another application being studied is whether anti-CRISPR could create a safeguard against “gene drives.” The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation is backing the development of a CRISPR tool that will spread though wild mosquitoes, causing their populations to crash, with the idea of preventing malaria. Others want to develop such gene drives in mice, so they can eradicate the rodents from islands without using poison. But what if these experiments go haywire and lead to an extinction? Researchers think they can create organisms with anti-CRISPR programmed into their genomes so they’re immune. In an initial proof of principle, scientists in Kansas last year engineered yeast cells with anti-CRISPR to resist a gene drive. “If some North Korean lab comes at you with a gene drive to wipe out an economically important crop, you could have a transgenic crop that [is resistant]. That is the drawing board scenario,” says Erik Sontheimer of the University of Massachusetts Medical School.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Advantage 3 – Bioterrorism › 1NC---No CRISPR Bioterror

Risk of bioterror from CRISPR is crying wolf – its too complex and no empirics

Kathleen M. Vogel And Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, 18, (Kathleen M. Vogel And Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, 10-23-2018, Cambridge Core, Anticipating emerging biotechnology threats, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-the-life-sciences/article/anticipating-emerging-biotechnology-threats/CCBB40DBD2BCE6CECDE9F2ACB71588CE, 6-27-2022) SCade

These developments prompted policymakers and security analysts to begin pondering the security implications of CRISPR and evaluate its potential use for bioweapons developments. CRISPR scientists have themselves advanced several scenarios for bioterrorism, including the use of gene drives to create more lethal or infectious pathogens. Some scientists have argued that the expertise required to develop gene drives can be acquired relatively easily and that an amateur scientist could set up a lab in his garage and develop a gene drive undetected. Additional questions that have been raised include the following: Could CRISPR be used to introduce antibiotic resistance into a bioweapons agent? Will CRISPR allow the development of chimeric bioweapons — weapons that cause the symptoms of one disease but ravage the body with a different, undetected disease? Echoing these concerns, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper included gene editing in his 2016 worldwide threat assessment report to Congress. Clapper warned, “Given the broad distribution, low cost, and accelerated pace of development of this dual-use technology, its deliberate or unintentional misuse might lead to far-reaching economic and national security implications.” In the fall of 2016, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology called for a new biodefense strategy that would address emerging biotechnology threats like CRISPR that open up new possibilities for misuse. 22 At the international level, United Nations entities are also struggling with how to regulate and anticipate nefarious international developments in gene-editing technologies. 23 To date, however, most policy and public discussions about CRISPR have focused on the technology — how it will drive new kinds of security threats — as if it existed in a vacuum. This kind of technological determinism — the belief that technology is the primary driver of history and contemporary life — has underpinned many popular narratives regarding American technological innovation since the Industrial Revolution. This way of understanding technology, however, oversimplifies what it takes, and how long it takes, to develop, use, and diffuse technology for beneficial or nefarious applications. Technology never develops and diffuses in isolation — it is always shaped by a variety of social forces — and understanding the complex interconnecting set of push-pull factors on technology is important to getting threat assessments right. Since the 1980s, there have a variety of actors “crying wolf” 4 engineering techniques for harm. Yet we have little empirical data over the past 30 years that show a specific state or terrorist group using any of these new biotechnological innovations to create biological weapons. And, even those who are known to have dabbled in applying genetic engineering to produce bioweapons (e.g., the Soviet Union) encountered a series of technological, social, political, organizational, and economic hurdles that prevented the development of viable weapons. Thus, existing data suggest a very mixed picture on the ability of individuals, groups, or countries to use new biotechnologies for harm. What the existing data do make clear, however, is that it is not just access to, or emergence of, science and technology that leads to a threat but how a variety of social, economic, organizational, and political factors shape the development and use of science and technology. This latter point is left out of existing dystopian bio-imaginaries, but it is critical to assess the threat posed by CRISPR or any emerging biotechnology.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Advantage 2 – Economic inequality › Warming defense

Climate change is inevitable – even ending emissions won’t solve

Zing Tsjeng, 19, 2-27-2019, executive editor and the author of the Forgotten Women book series, "The Climate Change Paper So Depressing It's Sending People to Therapy", [https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/vbwpdb/the-climate-change-paper-so-depressing-its-sending-people-to-therapy], AVD

"Deep Adaptation" is quite unlike any other academic paper. There's the language ("we are about to play Russian Roulette with the entire human race with already two bullets loaded"). There's the flashes of dark humor ("I was only partly joking earlier when I questioned why I was even writing this paper"). But most of all, there's the stark conclusions that it draws about the future. Chiefly, that it's too late to stop climate change from devastating our world—and that "climate-induced societal collapse is now inevitable in the near term." How near? About a decade. Professor Jem Bendell, a sustainability academic at the University of Cumbria, wrote the paper after taking a sabbatical at the end of 2017 to review and understand the latest climate science "properly—not sitting on the fence anymore," as he puts it on the phone to me. What he found terrified him. "The evidence before us suggests that we are set for disruptive and uncontrollable levels of climate change, bringing starvation, destruction, migration, disease, and war," he writes in the paper. "Our norms of behavior—that we call our 'civilization'—may also degrade." "It is time," he adds, "we consider the implications of it being too late to avert a global environmental catastrophe in the lifetimes of people alive today." Even a schmuck like me is familiar with some of the evidence Bendell sets out to prove his point. You only needed to step outside during the record-breaking heatwave last year to acknowledge that 17 of the 18 hottest years on the planet have occurred since 2000. Scientists already believe we are soon on course for an ice-free Arctic, which will only accelerate global warming. Back in 2017, even Fox News reported scientists' warnings that the Earth's sixth mass extinction was underway. Erik Buitenhuis, a senior researcher at the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, tells me that Bendell's conclusions may sound extreme, but he agrees with the report's overall assessment. "I think societal collapse is indeed inevitable," he says, though adds that "the process is likely to take decades to centuries." The important thing, Buitenhuis says, is to realize that the negative effects of climate change have already been with us for some time: "Further gradual deterioration looks much more likely to me than a disaster within the next ten years that will be big enough that, after that, everybody will agree the status quo is doomed." "Jem's paper is in the main well-researched and supported by relatively mainstream climate science," says Professor Rupert Read, chair of the Green House think-tank and a philosophy academic at the University of East Anglia. "That's why I'm with him on the fundamentals. And more and more people are." Read's key disagreement with Bendell is his belief that we still have time to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, saying, "I think it's hubris to think that we know the future." But that doesn't mean Bendell's premise is wrong: "The way I see it, deep adaptation is insurance against the possibility—or rather, the probability—of some kind of collapse," says Read. "'Deep Adaptation' is saying, 'What do we need to do if collapse is something we need to realistically plan for?'" When I speak to Bendell, he tells me he thinks of "Deep Adaptation" as more of an ethical and philosophical framework, rather than a prophecy about the future of the planet. "The longer we refuse to talk about climate change as already here and screwing with our way of life—because we don't want to think like that because it's too frightening or will somehow demotivate people—the less time we have to reduce harm," he says with deliberation. What does he mean by harm? "Starvation is the first one," he answers, pointing to lowering harvests of grain in Europe in 2018 due to drought that saw the EU reap 6 million tons less wheat. "In the scientific community at the moment, the appropriate thing is to say that 2018 was an anomaly. However, if you look at what's been happening over the last few years, it isn't an anomaly. There's a possibility that 2018 is the new best case scenario." That means, in Bendell's view, that governments need to start planning emergency responses to climate change, including growing and stockpiling food. He minces his words even less in his paper: "When I say starvation, destruction, migration, disease, and war, I mean in your own life. With the power down, soon you won't have water coming out of your tap. You will depend on your neighbors for food and some warmth. You will become malnourished. You won't know whether to stay or go. You will fear being violently killed before starving to death." Should people start building bunkers and buying bulletproof vests? "There's no way of getting through this unless we try together," he says. "We need to help people stay fed and watered where they live already to reduce disruption and reduce civil unrest as much as we can." Of the Silicon Valley financiers prepping for the apocalypse in New Zealand, he says: "Once money doesn't matter anymore and the armed guards are trying to feed their starving children, what do you think they'll do? The billionaires doing that are just deluded." Bendell wasn't always this gloomy about the state of the world. He once worked for WWF, one of the biggest environmental charities in the world, and in 2012 founded the Institute for Leadership and Sustainability (IFLAS) at the University of Cumbria. The World Economic Forum named him a Young Global Leader for his work. So how did he end up writing a paper that determined that civilization—and environmental sustainability as we currently understand it—is doomed? "Since the age of 15, I've been an environmentalist," he tells me. "I've given my life professionally and personally. I'm a workaholic, and it was all about sustainability." Once he sat down with the data, however, he realized that his field was quickly becoming irrelevant in the face of oncoming climate catastrophe. "It would mean not getting super excited about the expansion of your recycling program in a major multinational," he says. "It's a completely different paradigm of what we should be looking at." What he didn’t expect was for the paper to take off online. "It was aimed at those people in my professional community and why we're in denial," he says. "When I put it out there, I didn’t expect 15-year-olds in schools in Indonesia to be reading it with their teachers." He says that "Deep Adaptation" has been downloaded over 110,000 times since it was released by IFLAS as an occasional paper. "Someone in the alternative economics and bitcoin crowd told me, 'Oh, everyone's talking about deep adaptation in London at all the dinner parties,'" he laughs. Researchers from the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), an established progressive think-tank, consulted Bendell's paper in the process of writing its new report, "This is a crisis: Facing up to the age of environmental breakdown." Laurie Laybourn-Langton, its lead author, told me via email: "I appreciated the frankness of the report in facing up to issues that so many in research and policy communities seem unwilling to. We don't subscribe to the view that social collapse is inevitable, however." He explains: "This is partly because it's so hard to predict the outcomes of the complex and uncertain process of environmental shocks interacting with social and economic systems. We simply don't know. That said, they shouldn’t be disregarded as a potential outcome, and so we are calling for greater levels of preparedness to these shocks." Not everyone was so taken with the paper. Bendell submitted it to a well-respected academic journal for publication, with little success. Sustainability Accounting, Management and Policy Journal (SAMPJ) told me that the paper was in need of "major revisions" before it would be ready for publication. Bendell ended up publishing it through IFLAS and his blog. "The academic process is such that I took that as an effective rejection," he explains, saying that the reviewers wanted him to fundamentally alter his conclusions. "I couldn't completely rewrite the paper to say that I don't think collapse is inevitable. It was asking for a different paper." Emerald, the scholarly publisher that owns SAMPJ, says it takes issue with how Bendell frames its reception of its paper on his blog: "the study on collapse they thought you should not read—yet." A spokesperson told me: "The decision was arrived at based on the merit of the submitted article and the double blind peer review process integral to academia and the advancement of knowledge. SAMPJ, and [editor Carol Adams] are proud members of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) and adhere to the highest ethical standards in publishing. We see no evidence that the decision of Major Revision was politically motivated. "Emerald requested the author correct their blog post to reflect the facts. This request was unfortunately ignored. The post continues to imply the paper was rejected because it was deemed too controversial. The paper was not rejected, and was given a Major Revision due to the rigorous standards of the scholarly output of the journal." Bendell says he did reply to Emerald's request to amend his blog post—but only if they would consider telling him the decisions of those who reviewed his paper. (Under the double blind peer review, reviewers' decisions are anonymous.) "That title can be read in a number of ways," he says. "It is a paper that the reviewers didn't want you to read. They didn't want it published." Climate gloom and doom is nothing new—doomsday preppers have been stockpiling their freeze-dried food rations for decades now. But Bendell's paper appears to have hit a unique nerve, especially given that the average scientific paper is estimated to be read by only three or so people. Rupert Read tells me that he was sent it simultaneously by three other academics when it was published. But it hasn’t trended on Twitter. It hasn't been pushed by a celebrity. It was briefly mentioned in a Bloomberg Businessweek article, but that's it. "Deep Adaptation" is that unique social phenomenon: an academic paper that has gone viral through word of mouth. Nathan Savelli, a 31-year-old high school life coach from Hamilton, Canada, was recommended the paper by a local environmental activist. Reading it sent him spiraling into depression. "I guess in some ways it felt like I was diagnosed with a terminal illness," he tells me. "If I'm being honest, it was a mix of heartbreaking sadness and extreme anger." Savelli felt so low that he sought help from a climate grief support group organized by 350.org, the global grassroots climate movement. "I had attended counseling in the past for other issues, but never a group session, and thought it might be something helpful for me," he tells me. Did it help? "I'm not sure I'd say it alleviated my grief, but it was definitely comforting to be around people who understood what I was feeling." And therein lies the problem with "Deep Adaptation:" if you accept that the paper is entirely correct in its prediction of collapse, how do you move on with your life? How do you even get out of bed in the morning? "I'm aware of what difficult emotions it triggers," Bendell acknowledges. "I do believe that if you’ve come across this [paper], then absolutely some grief and despair is very natural. Why isn't that OK? We all die in the end. Life is about impermanence." On his blog, he lists several sources for psychological support, including several groups on Facebook and LinkedIn that discuss collapse and offer help to those struggling to come to terms with the conclusions of his paper. But, Bendell adds, reading the paper has been "transformative" for some. "People find a new boldness about living life on their own terms—actually connecting to their heart's desire. How do they wish to live, and why don't they live that way now rather than postponing it?" In one case, it even helped prompt one high-ranking academic to quit her job and the city. In December of 2017, Dr. Alison Green left her post as the pro vice-chancellor of Arden University. She had read the IPCC report warning that the world is nowhere near averting global temperature increases, as well as the 1,656-page National Climate Assessment on how climate change is now dramatically affecting our lives—and then she read Bendell's paper.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Advantage 2 – Economic inequality › Warming defense

Extinction from warming requires 12 degrees, far greater than their internal link, and intervening actors will solve before then

Sebastian Farquhar 17 leads the Global Priorities Project (GPP) at the Centre for Effective Altruism, et al., 2017, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf

The most likely levels of global warming are very unlikely to cause human extinction.15 The existential risks of climate change instead stem from tail risk climate change – the low probability of extreme levels of warming – and interaction with other sources of risk. It is impossible to say with confidence at what point global warming would become severe enough to pose an existential threat. Research has suggested that warming of 11-12°C would render most of the planet uninhabitable,16 and would completely devastate agriculture.17 This would pose an extreme threat to human civilisation as we know it.18 Warming of around 7°C or more could potentially produce conflict and instability on such a scale that the indirect effects could be an existential risk, although it is extremely uncertain how likely such scenarios are.19 Moreover, the timescales over which such changes might happen could mean that humanity is able to adapt enough to avoid extinction in even very extreme scenarios. The probability of these levels of warming depends on eventual greenhouse gas concentrations. According to some experts, unless strong action is taken soon by major emitters, it is likely that we will pursue a medium-high emissions pathway.20 If we do, the chance of extreme warming is highly uncertain but appears non-negligible. Current concentrations of greenhouse gases are higher than they have been for hundreds of thousands of years,21 which means that there are significant unknown unknowns about how the climate system will respond. Particularly concerning is the risk of positive feedback loops, such as the release of vast amounts of methane from melting of the arctic permafrost, which would cause rapid and disastrous warming.22 The economists Gernot Wagner and Martin Weitzman have used IPCC figures (which do not include modelling of feedback loops such as those from melting permafrost) to estimate that if we continue to pursue a medium-high emissions pathway, the probability of eventual warming of 6°C is around 10%,23 and of 10°C is around 3%.24 These estimates are of course highly uncertain. It is likely that the world will take action against climate change once it begins to impose large costs on human society, long before there is warming of 10°C. Unfortunately, there is significant inertia in the climate system: there is a 25 to 50 year lag between CO2 emissions and eventual warming,25 and it is expected that 40% of the peak concentration of CO2 will remain in the atmosphere 1,000 years after the peak is reached.26 Consequently, it is impossible to reduce temperatures quickly by reducing CO2 emissions. If the world does start to face costly warming, the international community will therefore face strong incentives to find other ways to reduce global temperatures.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Advantage 2 – Economic inequality

The best empirical evidence disproves the inequality-crisis-cooperation link

Bordo 12 – Michael D, Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for Monetary and Financial History at Rutgers University, PhD from the University of Chicago, and Christopher M. Meissner, professor of economics at UC Davis, PhD in Economics from UC Berkeley. “Does Inequality Lead to a Financial Crisis?”, National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper No. 17896, , 03-xx-2012

The recent financial crisis in the U.S. has been attributed to a rise in inequality by several authors. In his 2010 book, Fault Lines, Raghuram Rajan argued that rising inequality in the past three decades led to political pressure for redistribution that eventually came in the form of subsidized housing finance. Political pressure was exerted so that low income households who otherwise would not have qualified received improved access to mortgage finance. The resulting lending boom created a massive run-up in housing prices which reversed in 2007 and led to the banking crisis of 2008. Along these lines, Kumhof and Rancière (2011) study the links between inequality, credit and crises complementing the Rajan hypothesis with a DSGE model. In this model, rising inequality and stagnant incomes in the lower deciles lead workers to borrow to maintain their consumption growth. As these households become increasingly indebted, they continue to borrow more to maintain their consumption. This increases leverage, and eventually a shock to the economy leads to a financial crisis. They posit that their story holds both for the 1920s stock market boom in the US and the run up to the 2008 crisis. The focus on income inequality by Kumhof and Rancière and Rajan is a novel approach to understanding macroeconomic outcomes prior to the recent financial crisis, and to the Great Depression. The theme deserves further empirical scrutiny from other time periods and countries. There is reason to wonder about the generality of this new view since income inequality rarely plays a significant role in the large literature on financial instability and credit booms. Mendoza and Terrones (2008) study the experience of a large number of advanced and emerging economies since the 1960s finding that current account deficits, strong economic growth and fixed exchange rates accompanied credit booms. Borio and White (2003) have also elaborated a view of pro-cyclical financial systems. Periods of expected low and stable inflation, strong economic growth and liberalized finance can give rise to complacency amongst borrowers, lenders and regulators. Endogenous market forces that might normally “rein in” these imbalances seem to be absent. Massive buildups in credit lead to financial instability in this case. Income inequality plays no active role in generating the boom-bust outcome in these contributions. In this paper, we present new empirical evidence on whether rising inequality has any explanatory power in accounting for credit booms and financial crises. Rather than limiting the focus to inequality as the Rajan/Kumhof/Rancière (RKR) frameworks do, we control for more traditional determinants of the credit cycle. Different from these authors, we also bring evidence from a much larger sample than the two unique periods in US economic history that are the focus of RKR. Our sample is a panel of 14 mainly advanced countries from 1920 to 2008 covering a wide variety of boom-bust episodes and financial crises. We find very little evidence linking credit booms and financial crises to rising inequality. Instead, the two key determinants of credit booms are the upswing of the business cycle or economic expansion and low interest rates. This is very much consistent with a broader literature on credit cycles. While inequality often ticks upwards in the expansionary phase of the business cycle, this factor does not appear to be a significant determinant of credit growth once we condition on other macroeconomic aggregates. Neither is income concentration a good predictor of the financial crises that often follow above average growth in credit. The anecdotal evidence from several historical credit booms finds little support for the inequality/crisis hypothesis.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Advantage 2 – Economic inequality

No risk from economic inequality – effects are exaggerated and its declining.

Phil Gramm and John Early March 23 2021 Wall Street Journal, “Incredible Shrinking Income Inequality,”

Twice over the past 50 years, the Census Bureau has significantly changed how it collects and records income statistics. In 1993 and 2013 the Census Bureau changed its methods in an effort to collect better information from high-income households. These changes created two major discontinuities and distorted the time-series so that the change in measured income inequality in those years was as much as 15 times the average annual change found for the entire 50-year period. At the time, the Census Bureau explained in detail what it had done. It also explained the limitations the changes imposed on the use of its income-inequality measure to look at changes over extended periods. In subsequent use of the data by the Census Bureau and others, however, those warnings have been neglected. The simple solution would have been to isolate the distortions caused solely by the changes in data-collection techniques and adjusted the previous years’ measures to reflect the effect of the changes. We made these adjustments and they are shown in the nearby figure. The blue line is the actual reported Census Bureau measurement of income inequality. The yellow line eliminates the effects of the 1993 and 2013 discontinuities caused solely by changes in measurement technique. The black line shows income inequality when the value of all transfer payments received is counted as income, income is reduced by taxes paid, and the two technical corrections are made. Lo and behold—income inequality is lower than it was 50 years ago. The raging debate over income inequality in America calls to mind the old Will Rogers adage: “It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It is what you do know that ain’t so.” We are debating the alleged injustice of a supposedly growing social problem when—for all the reasons outlined above—that problem isn’t growing, it’s shrinking. Those who want to transform the greatest economic system in the history of the world ought to get their facts straight first.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Advantage 2 – Economic inequality

Inequality doesn’t cause gridlock and stagnation.

Nolan 19 – Brian, Professor of Social Policy and Director, Equity Employment and Growth Research Programme, University of Oxford. “Why We Can’t Just Blame Rising Inequality For The Growth Of Populism Around The World”, The Conservation, https://theconversation.com/why-we-cant-just-blame-rising-inequality-for-the-growth-of-populism-around-the-world-120951, 08-13-2019

The idea is now commonplace that income inequality is inexorably on the rise. The US experience in particular has become central to a new grand narrative prominent in public debate and taken to apply across rich countries: globalisation and technological change have polarised society into a small elite with highly paid, secure jobs on one side, and on the other side are growing numbers of people, including an increasingly “squeezed” middle class, in insecure, poorly-paid work.

This growing inequality is held responsible for a wide range of social and political ills. Not least the erosion of solidarity, social trust and faith in democratic institutions. And, politically, it caused the election of Donald Trump, the UK’s Brexit vote, and the broad rise of populism seen as threatening democracy.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Advantage 2 – Economic inequality

Germline editing is ethically justifiable – can solve economic equality concerns with enhanced access.

DANIEL J. MALKIN attorney practicing in intellectual property law. 2021 GERMLINE EDITING USING CRISPR: WHY A MORATORIUM IS NOT THE SOLUTION, 55 Fam. L.Q. 69

Using CRISPR to repair germline mutations that cause serious congenital single-gene diseases is ethically justifiable. Such a use poses even fewer ethical barriers than does IVF generally, which is minimally regulated. Therefore, the COA erred in forbidding the FDA to even consider clinical germline editing applications.

For certain applications, modifying severe single-gene diseases in the germline using CRISPR would satisfy the FDA's benefit-risk analysis. For example, where both parents will pass on the Huntington's disease mutation to their children, CRISPR may be the only potential treatment to eliminate the mutation. Evidence also shows that public opinion strongly supports such use for CRISPR to address serious medical conditions or diseases. While equal access to the therapy poses an ethical concern, the answer is to enhance access, rather than to reject treatments that could eliminate serious physical or mental impairments that would substantially limit a child's major life activities. Finally, fears of a new eugenics movement should be allayed if the FDA authorizes germline editing licenses only for therapies targeting severe single-gene diseases.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Advantage 1 - Ethics › A2 Ableism

No solvency - disrupting the inequitable social constructions of people with disabilities is insufficient and leaves the disabled people excluded

Dewsbury et al 4 Guy, Lancaster Univ, Karen Clarke, Lancaster Univ, Dave Randalll, Manchester Metropolitan Univ, Mark Rouncefield Lancaster, Ian Sommerville, Lancaster, The anti-social model of disability, Disability & Society, 19.2 March

We do not share all these concerns as they apply to the social model of disability, for we are not menaced by constructionism, nor do we wish to promote one variety of truth claim over another. We are concerned specifically with how this helps. The constructionist focus, we feel, has altered our perspective on expertise such that where we had previously unquestioningly accepted the professional expertise of medical practitioners, we now equally unquestioningly accept the expertise of the sociologist who wishes to undermine it. The social constructionist, that is, provides professional explanation by revealing the hidden nature of the social world in and through a number of typical steps. These include: 1. Showing that definitions of a given concept are shifting, especially historically. Many social constructionist studies draw attention to the ways in which explanations that were accepted as matters of fact were embedded in the ideologies or discourses of the time and can now be clearly seen as absurd or wrong. 2. Deriving from this that ‘things could be otherwise’ insofar as new and ‘constructionist’ models can be used contrastively with models that have preceded them, including models that still have a currency. 3. Arguing that in some way this challenges the ‘social reality’ of the concept in question. 4. Suggesting that this challenge to the social reality of any given social fact has important political consequences and that the social constructionist is pivotal in the realization of these consequences. We think there may be problems here, mainly with steps 3 and 4. As Hacking (1999) has convincingly shown the validity and importance of challenges to social reality depend very much on what kind of challenge they are. Equally, we will suggest that the apparent political importance of the constructionist position is largely rhetorical. This is not to understate its importance, for rhetoric is a powerful force, but it does not assist us with our ‘what to do next’ problem. In explicating the various ways in which disability is a social construct the Social Model highlights the social features of what, on first consideration, might appear as a purely physical problem. As Humphrey argues: ‘… the social model harbours a number of virtues in redefining disability in terms of a disabling environment, repositioning disabled people as citizens with rights, and reconfiguring the responsibilities for creating, sustaining and overcoming disablism’ (Humphrey, 2000, p. 63). Again, there are self-evident, political, advantages in adopting this position. As Hacking suggests, ‘it can still be liberating suddenly to realize that something is constructed and is not part of the nature of things, of people, or human society’ (Hacking, 1999, p. 35). However, the metaphor has grown tired, if not tiresome, and in the matter of what we call ‘practical politics’, that is the quite ordinary business of making-do, managing, coping (and obviously everyone ‘makes do’, not just disabled people) that might inform the design-related questions we want to ask, it is for the most part empty. In order to pursue this theme, we need to examine the sense in which the ‘social model’ can be seen as ‘radical’, for as with so many similar avowals there is less to this than meets the eye. Despite the supposedly ‘radical’ nature and claims of the social model of disability it clearly engages in the ordinary business of sociology and, as Button (1991) suggests, any radical claims are readily absorbed into everyday sociological debate. That is, radical political commitments are not radical sociologies—they are, from within a sociological perspective, unremarkable. Radical causes are the very stuff of conventional sociology, conducted along conventional lines. Even, for example, the argument that some current sociological approaches propagate a ‘disablist’ view of society that legitimates the treatment of disabled people, whilst simultaneously obscuring their real position within society is but a pale imitation of earlier, similar, Feminist and Marxist arguments. The application of the idea may be new but the idea itself, and the argument presented, is not.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Advantage 1 - Ethics › A2 Ableism

No solvency - exposing disability oppression does not lead to change in perception or attitude

Donoghue 2003 (Christopher, Fordham University, Challenging the authority of the medical definition of disability: an analysis of the resistance to the social constructionist paradigm, Disability & Society 18.2)

In an effort to debunk the entrenched authority of the medical model, a social constructionist paradigm has been adopted by many disability theorists and activists. They have suggested that society normally creates a negative social identity for people with disabilities (Gergen, 1985; Fine & Asch, 1988; Scotch, 1988; Brzuzy, 1997). Through the construction of this identity, which is typically characterised by deviant or abnormal behaviour, the non-disabled majority is granted a legitimate means to exclude and isolate people with disabilities. As removed members of society, their contributions are often discredited and their successes are treated as aberrations. Likewise, the expectations of people with disabilities are chronically low, and there is an ever-present suggestion that their lives are not necessarily worth living. This identity has been argued to derive from the medical model, which defines a disability as a deficiency that restricts one’s ability to perform normal life activities. By adopting the social constructionist viewpoint, theorists and activists have contended that society has created disability by choosing not to remove structural constraints that would enable more people to participate and gain access to social resources. The social constructionist approach was an effective ideological rejoinder to the established medical model. Yet the question of how to convince the non-disabled majority that society has disabled certain individuals has not been adequately resolved. The activists attempted to adopt the social constructionist theory as a basis for a minority group model of disability. They would use this model to support a plea for action to people with disabilities as a mechanism to overcome the oppression being inflicted upon them by the non-disabled majority. While it is clear that such a transformation of the definition of disability among academics and disability activists has clearly taken hold, the disability movement appears to have achieved only limited success in changing the views of the non-disabled majority. By accepting the reward of civil rights protection without insisting that the medical model be publicly dismantled, the hopes of the disability activists to change the views of the broader public may have been sacrificed. The willingness to make this concession may have stemmed from the belief among social constructionist theorists that society will change its perception of disability if it is merely demonstrated that the prior notion has been made unjustly. From a structural point of view, it would seem to take much more to convince a dominant group in society that it needs to redistribute power and access to its treasured resources. The more desirable arrangement to the non-disabled majority is one that maintains the superiority of people with ‘normal’ abilities. As a result, the disabled are typically described as dysfunctional and are often perceived to be incapable of understanding the world in the same way that ‘normal’ people do. Although social constructionists argue that such judgements regarding how people should be able to think or act are subjective notions that stem from dominant social ideologies, they may be said to underestimate the extent to which those ideologies are created and legitimated by the non-disabled majority because they best serve their interests.

The affirmative essentializes the experiences of the disabled and the non-disabled and their perspectives on germline gene editing

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Advantage 1 - Ethics › A2 Ableism

Germline editing itself is not bad---taking social models of disabilities into account solves the harms many fear

Solveig Magnus Reindal, 4-1-2000, Reindal works at Oslo University in Norway, "Disability, gene therapy and eugenics", Journal of Medical Ethics, https://jme.bmj.com/content/26/2/89, 6-29-2022, //ms

Introduction In the article, “Is gene therapy a form of eugenics?” Harris discusses disability and the production of “fine” children and how this should be achieved. He also criticises people who argue that a predisposition to being impaired will be used as a basis for discrimination against disabled people. Harris builds his critique on what he calls “The moral continuum” and his understanding of disability. He argues that “there is in short no moral difference between attempts to cure dysfunction and attempts to enhance function where the enhancement protects life or health”. He does not distinguish between gene therapy on the germ line and gene therapy on the somatic line. In his view there is in theory no moral difference between the two practices. Harris does not agree with disabled people who argue that gene therapy is a form of eugenics and that discrimination against them as a group is tantamount to devaluing them as persons. He argues that to decide not to keep a “disabled neonate” alive no more constitutes an attack on the disabled than does curing disability, and that to prefer to remove disability where we can is not to prefer non-disabled individuals as persons. The wrongs that practising eugenics may involve are, according to Harris: the assumption that those who are genetically weak should be discouraged from reproducing or are less morally important than other persons, and that compulsory measures to prevent them reproducing might be defensible. But this is not what Harris advocates: “It is not that the genetically weak should be discouraged from reproducing but that everyone should be discouraged from reproducing children who will be significantly harmed by their genetic constitution. Indeed, gene therapy offers the prospect of enabling the genetically weak to produce and give birth to the genetically strong . . . . It might thus, as we have just noted, enable individuals with genetic defects to be sure of having healthy rather than harmed children and thus liberate them from the terrible dilemma of whether or not to risk having children with genetic defects”. Consequently, Harris argues that there is nothing morally wrong per se in practising eugenics, but that there is a wrong practice. The wrong practice occurs in the moment when a majority, a collective, argues that it is defensible to discourage and/or prevent a minority which is “genetically weak” from reproducing. Thus, morally right eugenics does not deny the “genetically weak” reproduction; it only prohibits or prevents the “genetically weak” from giving birth naturally. Furthermore, according to Harris, it is morally wrong to produce children “who will be significantly harmed by their genetic constitution”. In Harris's view eugenics is not wrong and it is a matter of indifference whether we call it eugenics or not: “call it what you will, eugenics or not, we ought to be in favour of it”. In the following I will examine how Harris understands the moral continuum and disability. The moral continuum In arguing for the moral continuum Harris uses a hypothetical example of a woman who has five eggs fertilised in vitro, and who wishes to use some of these embryos to become pregnant. Normal practice at an IVF clinic would be to insert two embryos or at most three. Harris asks us to consider the following: “If preimplantation screening had revealed two of the embryos to possess disabilities of one sort of another, would it be right to implant the two embryos with disability rather than the others? Would it be right to choose the implantation embryos randomly? Could it be defensible for a doctor to override the wishes of the mother and implant the disabled embryos rather than the healthy ones - would we applaud her for so doing? The answer that I expect to all these rhetorical questions will be obvious. It depends however on accepting that disability is somehow disabling and therefore undesirable”. Whether this is a moral continuum depends, according to Harris, on accepting that disability is somehow disabling and therefore undesirable. Harris asks us whether it could be defensible for a doctor to override the wishes of the mother and implant the disabled embryos rather than the healthy ones? However, it is not obvious that the mother's wish in all circumstances is what Harris presumes. There could be situations where the mother wished to implant the impaired embryos, or there could be a situation where all the embryos showed signs, at preimplantation screening, of some impairment and the mother still wanted to implant them. Thus, we need to distinguish, on the one hand, whether a mother's or couple's decision is morally justified and, on the other hand, whether the doctor is justified in overriding it. Let us consider the following hypothetical examples. Achondroplasia Example A: A couple, both of whom have the diagnosis achondroplasia, consider having children. As their house and all other facilities, their car and summer cabin, are adjusted to their situation they will have to do major alterations in order to bring up a child of “normal” height. They have only managed to pay some of the costs of these adjustments and cannot see how they can afford to make new alterations in a couple of years. In these circumstances they decide to go to an IVF clinic and ask for a preimplantation screening for achondroplasia. The result of the screening is that three of the five embryos have the gene for achondroplasia. The couple decide they would like to implant the achondroplasia embryos. Is it defensible for a doctor to override the wishes of the couple and implant the embryos without achondroplasia rather than those with achondroplasia? Example B: A couple with congenital deafness consider having children. For both of them sign language is their first language, because their parents were also deaf. As both speak and lip read the hearing language very poorly they will not be able to communicate with their child through speech. Facilities in the house are adjusted to their situation and most of their friends use sign language. Considering these circumstances they opt for the IVF method of becoming pregnant and as the preimplantation screening shows two embryos of five with the gene for congenital deafness they choose to implant these. Again, is it defensible for a doctor to override the wishes of the couple and implant the three embryos without the gene for congenital deafness? Underlying presupposition Example C: A couple come for a second attempt at in vitro fertilisation. They decide that this will be their final attempt. Last time the woman had a miscarriage. This time a preimplantation screening shows that all the embryos have some sign of impairment. However, the couple want to try to implant the embryos despite supposed impairments and the risk of a miscarriage. Is it defensible for a doctor to override the wishes of the couple and not implant any of the embryos because of presumed impairments? If Harris considers the offspring of the couples with the diagnoses of achondroplasia and congenital deafness to be examples of “children who will be significantly harmed by their genetic constitution”, I suppose he would answer that it is morally wrong to implant the embryos with the impairments under these circumstances and that the parents' decision is not morally justifiable. The right thing to do for the doctor in examples A and B would thus be to override the wishes of the two couples, if he or she were convinced that it was morally wrong to produce “children who will be significantly harmed by their genetic constitution”. In Harris's terminology the doctor would not be involved in a wrong eugenic practice because he or she is enabling the genetically weak to reproduce and give birth to the genetically strong. However, what about example C, is this couple's wish morally justifiable? I suppose their wish is not justifiable according to Harris if “disability” is undesirable under all circumstances. Again, we might presume that the doctor overrides the couple's wish with reference to the embryos assumed impairments. The underlying presupposition for the doctor's decision might have been that even though it is better to produce “unhealthy” children than to produce no children at all this is provided that the “unhealthiness” does not make their lives not worth living. Let us suppose that the doctor views the embryos' “unhealthiness” to be of such a kind that their lives would not be worth living. After the births couples A and B realise that the doctor has overridden their wishes and decide to sue the doctor on the grounds that she or he has acted negligently in respect of their wishes. The couple in example C sue the doctor for negligent action and a loss of a potential child. The other two couples charge full economic compensation for the changes that have to be made in order to raise the children, and try to sue the doctor by bringing “wrongful life” cases. However, according to Heyd wrongful life cases are at most, victimless crimes: “And in that respect, even if we cannot, for logical reasons, grant legal standing to the child in its claim for compensation, should not the negligent doctor be held responsible for the wrong and be liable to (criminal) punishment? Putting aside the parents' claim, a wrong was done in the world even if no individual can be identified as its victim”. The problem with these “wrongful life” cases in comparison to other “wrongful life” cases, for instance where “wrongful life” is claimed because of being born with achondroplasia, deafness etc, is that one cannot claim that a wrong was done in the world without acknowledging thereby that “disability” is undesirable under any circumstances. This will also be the case with the couple in example C, where the doctor's overriding decision might have prevented a child being born with, for example, achondroplasia, deafness etc. If the judges follow Harris's view that “disability” is, under any circumstances, undesirable, the couples will not be given any compensation or approval. However, if the judges hold that respect for parental autonomy should be given more weight than preventing the birth of an impaired child, the doctor could be charged for having violated parental autonomy. Examples A, B and C raise the question of parental autonomy where impairments are stated. The practice of genetic engineering (or treatment) challenges parental autonomy on several levels: first, there is the possibility of resisting genetic engineering, suggested because of supposed “genetic disorders”; second, there is the possibility of agreeing to enhance “genetic disorders” through gene therapy, and third there is the possibility of demanding genetic engineering according to aesthetic standards, intellectual abilities and so forth (“utopian eugenics”). All these examples of how parental autonomy may be exercised raise the issue of normality. While resisting genetic engineering (or treatment) suggests a widening of diversities, the exercise of parental autonomy in relation to genetic engineering of “genetic disorders”and “utopian eugenics” increases tendencies to adopt narrow notions of normality and can provide opportunities to stigmatise and exclude people. This is what disabled people fear will be the result of genetic technology. In Harris's thinking there is a presupposition that “disability” is undesirable under any circumstances, otherwise there would be no motive to try to cure or obviate “disability” in health care more generally. The crucial question to be asked then is what is “disability”? What is disability? Harris argues that we know pretty clearly what we mean by disability. According to him, a disability is a physical or mental condition we have a strong preference not to be in ourselves. What is more important, he argues that it is a condition,which is in some sense a “harmed condition”. According to Harris, a disability or incapacity is disabling in some sense, and it is a harm to those who suffer it. The “harmed condition” can be a result of someone knowingly disabling another individual or leaving the individual disabled when the disability could be removed. An example of knowingly disabling an individual is provided, according to Harris, by the case of a pregnant woman who knows that something will have a bad effect on her fetus, knows she could remove the bad effect by a simple dietary adjustment, and who fails to make that adjustment. Harris further defines disability as a disabling condition relative to active and passive intervention, that is, he defines disability as a function of people's choices caused by an action or refraining from an action. It is a condition within the individual caused by earlier choices made by parents or professionals before, during or after pregnancy. Harris argues that his definition avoids certain obvious pitfalls: “First it does not define disability in terms of any conception of normalcy. Secondly it does not depend on post hoc ratification by the subject of the condition - it is not a prediction about how the subject of the condition will feel”. The second element is especially important for Harris as his definition can thus be used for the potentially self-conscious: gametes, embryos, fetuses and neonates and for people who are temporarily unconscious; it is a definition which does not wait upon subsequent ratification by the person concerned. However, one pitfall Harris does not avoid is to regard disability as an individual problem, a condition within the subject. This understanding of disability is, within contemporary disability studies, familiar as the medical model, where disability is seen as a product of biological determinism or personal tragedy. This individual, or medical, model sees disablement as a medical problem, which affects only a small proportion of the population. Recent studies in Britain, however, conclude that four out of every ten adult women and men have a longstanding illness or disability. Other studies show that internationally there are around 50 million disabled people in Europe and approximately 500 million worldwide. Disability is far from merely being a medical problem that can be “cured”, on the contrary it is mainly a cultural and sociopolitical problem. The medical notion of disability, seeing disability as a cause of a limitation within the individual, cannot account for the fact that not all people with losses, diseases, illnesses etc experience disablement. If it were that impairment, some functional difficulties of any kind, were tantamount to identifying someone as a disabled person then the medical notion of disability would have to be utterly comprehensive, exhaustive, in order to account for an understanding of what disability is. Research studies A comparison of three research studies carried out in Norway showed that the number of disabled people decreased when a commonsense definition of disability was used as a starting point. When the definition of disability was based on self-report and common sense, the estimate of disabled people was 15 per cent. However, when criteria-based definitions were the starting point, 35 and 40-50 per cent of the population were categorised as disabled. These people were considered disabled because of certain impairments. If the medical notion of disability is correct, stating disability as a condition within the subject, which is disabling in some sense, then having impairments and the experience of disablement, should coalesce. In Harris's definition of disability “how the subject of the condition will feel” is left out. Harris leaves it out because decisions about whether individuals will come into existence have to be taken before we can know how they will feel and therefore we have to decide on some “objective” basis. However, as shown above the issue of identity is a challenge to definitions that adhere to a purely medical perspective of disability. Although Harris regards the cause of disability as relative to active or passive intervention, his understanding of disability comprises a causal link between having a certain condition in the individual and being disabled. Hence, anatomy is seen as destiny. As already mentioned, disability studies show that there is a distinction between having an impairment and being disabled. Because of this distinction, researchers have argued for a division between a certain condition in the individual and disablement. To deny that there is a necessary causal link between a certain condition in the individual and disablement does not imply that researchers defending a social model deny that there are such things as impairments. On the contrary, impairment simply means that aspects of a person's body do not function or they function with difficulty. What they insist on is that whether an impairment results in disablement is conditional on other things than merely the impairment itself. They acknowledge the fact that individuals might regard their impairment as positive, neutral or negative, and that this might differ according to time and place. Hence, they favour a social model of disability where the basis of disability is located in social conditions. Advocates for the social model maintain that disability is a sociopolitical construction, a product of organisation and culture rather than a personal limitation due to a person's impairment, where agency and structure are intricately knit together. Such a view implies that social barriers, norms and values, rather than impairments, should be analysed in determining quality of life. Debates in genethics on quality of life often rest on an individual model of disability, hence low quality of life is attributed to an impairment of some kind and associated with “personal tragedy”. However, it is not unusual for disabled people to report that their lives have changed for the better following disablement. Of course the social models do not deny that impairments can affect quality of life but they deny a priori assumptions, on which, for example, the practice of fetal screening for abortion and infanticide for babies with significant impairments, rests. ‘Curing disability’ and discrimination The main discrimination that results from the creation and construction of disability is that various institutions refuse to give up individual models of disability. The very idea of “curing” disability is the core element in the discrimination of disabled people because the “curing ideal” resides in conformity and normalcy. The presupposition of the “curing” ideal makes the removal of disadvantage contingent upon the removal or “overcoming” of impairment: in other words, full participation in society is found through cure or fortitude. To challenge the unacceptable features of the medical model does not imply that disabled people do not need, or see, at specific points in their lives, the necessity of medical support. However, what is being challenged are the social conditions and relations in which such encounters take place, the enveloping of disabled people's identity in medical terms. It is important that their voices are heard and that they have much more effective participation in decisions which affect them. A consequence of the medical model, in that it deals only with impairment, is that resources are directed into impairment-related research and intervention, whereas scant resources are channelled into social change for the inclusion of people with impairments. Cornes found that in relation to impairment new technology is widespread, well established and well funded compared with technology that could lessen disabling barriers. Another example is research within gene therapy that strives to “cure disability”, while ignoring the social and cultural factors that make not walking, hearing, seeing etc into a problem. There is little public questioning of the distribution of the funds between these two approaches. The main reason this has not been an issue for discussion is the persistence of an individual model of disability in the culture and the social structures. Advocates for the “curing” ideal will argue that we cannot assume that society is obliged to undertake changing the world for disabled people so as to render them not disabled in all cases, rather than eliminating the impairment, especially where doing that is cheaper. Such a view rests on the assumption that impairments are primarily a result of genetic predisposition and biological determinism. Thus, impairments can be avoided and eliminated through abortion, sterilisation, and infanticide or cured through somatic and germ line therapy. This view underestimates the prevalence of disablement, which is increasing, especially in wealthier, developed societies due to a combination of an aging population and medical interventions which prolong life. Research in Britain showed that four per cent of those aged 16-64 suffered from some impairment compared to 28% of the population over the age of 65. The insistence on individual models of disability within social structures means seeing the “impairment” exclusively as the problem and will render the aging population ever more disabled as the principle behind service provision will continue to neglect disabling barriers. Approaches of the individual model to the study of aging have been criticised for failing to take account of external and structural factors, which influence people's experience of aging. Another aspect such a view disregards is the creating of impairments through physical abuse, industrial accidents, unsafe environments, environmental pollution, stress and exhaustion, war and violence. To continue to persist with individual models of disability, equating the problem of disability to impairments and individual conditions, is itself a discrimination against disabled people. Historically, the right to define has been an instrument of power in relation to minority groups and in the oppression of, and discrimination against, people. Conceivably, it is not a coincidence that the majority of non-disabled people use an individual model of disability, whereas disabled researchers use a social model of disability. Non-disabled people's insistence on the right to define who is disabled or what disability is, would in itself constitute discrimination against disabled people if the understanding that disabled people themselves have of disability is ignored in, for instance, academic discussions. Let us now return to Harris's position. If it is correct that Harris's definition of disability stems from an individual view of disability, then his argument for claiming that gene therapy is not a form of eugenics and discrimination against the disabled as a group, would also rest on this presupposition. If discussions on gene therapy use individual models of disability, dominated by biological understandings as a point of departure, disabled people will experience these discussions as eugenics in disguise and hence as discrimination against them. This is because biological determinist understandings were the underlying presupposition in the eugenic policies that, for example, were at the root of sterilisation laws introduced in several countries in the 1930s. Accordingly, in order to have a sincere ethical debate on gene therapy comprehension demands not just biology and rational reasoning but the methodologies of the social sciences as well. Hence, the perspectives and empirical evidence gained from disability studies should eventually be considered and not ignored in philosophical research into bioethics. Conclusion Individual models of disability and especially the “medical model” are inadequate as models for explaining the phenomenon of disability. They adhere to a causal understanding of the interplay between impairment and disablement. As long as ethical thinking within gene therapy adheres to a “medical model” of disability, individual differences as impairments will be regarded as essential attributes which are given moral status. The medical model of disability leads to value judgments by the unimpaired in so far as they view an impairment as meaning that a person has such poor quality of life that that life is judged, by the unimpaired, to be not worth living. These erroneous judgments will only be avoided if social models of disability are taken into account and the views of individuals with those impairments are sought and heard.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Advantage 1 - Ethics › Yes War

Nuclear war leads to extinction and even if it doesn’t our impact still outweighs

Starr 15 (Steven - the director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program, “Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction,” Federation of American Scientists, https://fas.org/pir-pubs/nuclear-war-nuclear-winter-and-human-extinction/)

While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. That is, a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs. Following the detonation (in conflict) of US and/or Russian launch-ready strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke (up to 180 million tons, according to peer-reviewed studies), which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere. [For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see Atmospheric effects & societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts.] The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke, producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more. The longevity of the smoke layer would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere. Once in the stratosphere, the smoke (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) would rapidly engulf the Earth and form a dense stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere. Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia. [For an explanation of nuclear winter, see Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences.] Nuclear winter would cause average global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of the last Ice Age. Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a decade or longer. Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years? The results of such a scenario are obvious. Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to death. Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed, resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. We don’t need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet. Would the few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Advantage 1 - Ethics › Yes War

Deterrence doesn’t explain peace – nuclear powers are still engaged in war, non-nuclear powers attacking stronger states

Mack 11 {Andrew, Director of the Human Security Report Project, member of the School for International Studies (Simon Fraser University), Former Director of the Strategic Planning Office in the Executive Office of UN Secretary-General, Previously a professor and researcher at Harvard, the London School of Economics, UC Berkeley, and Fudan University, "A More Secure World?” CATO Unbound, 2/7, http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/07/andrew-mack/more-secure-world}

A Nuclear Peace? For “realist” scholars, the absence of war between the major powers during the Cold War years is best explained by the existence of a stable balance of power between East and West—in particular by the deterrence created by the mutual possession of nuclear arsenals with “second strike” capacities. Kenneth Waltz, the leading proponent of the pacifying impact of nuclear weapons, has argued that, “Peace has become the privilege of states having nuclear weapons, while wars are fought by those who lack them.”[3] But while nuclear arsenals undoubtedly induced a measure of caution in the behaviour of the superpowers and their allies towards each other, Waltz’ assertion is wrong for two reasons. First, nuclear weapons states are not embroiled in fewer wars. Quite the contrary. Each of the four countries that have fought most international wars since the end of World War II—France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia (USSR)—is a nuclear weapons state. Second, since the end of World War II, non-nuclear states have repeatedly attacked nuclear weapons states. U.S. nuclear weapons did not deter China from attacking U.S. forces in the Korean War, nor North Vietnam from attacking South Vietnam and U.S. forces in the 1960s. Israeli nuclear weapons did not dissuade Egypt from attacking Israel in 1973. British nuclear weapons did not deter Argentina from invading the Falkland Islands in 1982, and the Soviet nuclear arsenal did not deter the mujahedeen from waging war against the Soviet army in Afghanistan in the 1980s—nor did they prevent a Soviet defeat.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Advantage 1 - Ethics › Yes War

2000 years of empirical evidence go our way

Francis S. Sempa, 2010, an attorney earned degrees from the University of Scranton and the Dickinson School of Law, written extensively on national security questions, publishing articles in Strategic Review, The National Interest, National Review, and Presidential Studies Quarterly, adjunct professor of political science at the University of Scranton and at Wilkes University, JFQ, “Book Review: Dangerous Times? The International Politics of Great Power Peace,”

Forget Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Machiavelli. Put aside Mackinder, Mahan, and Spykman. Close the military academies and war colleges. Shut our overseas bases. Bring our troops home. Make dramatic cuts in the defense budget. The end of major war, and perhaps the end of war itself, is near, according to Tulane assistant professor Christopher Fettweis in his recent book, Dangerous Times? The International Politics of Great Power Peace. Fettweis is not the first intellectual, nor will he be the last, to proclaim the onset of perpetual peace. He is squarely in the tradition of Immanuel Kant, Herbert Spencer, and Norman Angell, to name just three. Indeed, in the book's introduction, Fettweis attempts to rehabilitate Angell's reputation for prophecy, which suffered a devastating blow when the Great War falsified his claim in The Great Illusion that economic interdependence had rendered great power war obsolete. Angell, Fettweis writes, was the first "prominent constructivist thinker of the twentieth century," and was not wrong—just ahead of his time (p. 5). Fettweis bases his theory or vision of the obsolescence of major war on the supposed linear progress of human nature, a major tenet of 20th-century liberalism that is rooted in the rationalist theories of the Enlightenment. "History," according to Fettweis, "seems to be unfolding as a line extending into the future—a halting, incomplete, inconsistent line perhaps, one with frequent temporary reversals, but a line nonetheless." The world is growing "more liberal and more reliant upon reason, logic, and science" (p. 217). We have heard this all before. Human nature can be perfected. Statesmen and leaders will be guided by reason and science. Such thinking influenced the visionaries of the French Revolution and produced 25 years of war among the great powers of Europe. Similar ideas influenced President Woodrow Wilson and his intellectual supporters who endeavored at Versailles to transform the horrors of World War I into a peace that would make that conflict "the war to end all wars." What followed were disarmament conferences, an international agreement to outlaw war, the rise of expansionist powers, appeasement by the democracies, and the most destructive war in human history. Ideas, which Fettweis claims will bring about the proliferation of peace, transformed Russia, Germany, and Japan into expansionist, totalitarian powers. Those same ideas led to the Gulag, the Holocaust, and the Rape of Nanking. So much for human progress. Fettweis knows all of this, but claims that since the end of the Cold War, the leaders and peoples of the major powers, except the United States, have accepted the idea that major war is unthinkable. His proof is that there has been no major war among the great powers for 20 years—a historical period that coincides with the American "unipolar" moment. This is very thin empirical evidence upon which to base a predictive theory of international relations. Fettweis criticizes the realist and neorealist schools of thought, claiming that their adherents focus too narrowly on the past behavior of states in the international system. In his view, realists place too great an emphasis on power. Ideas and norms instead of power, he claims, provide structure to the international system. Classical geopolitical theorists such as Halford Mackinder, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Nicholas Spykman, and Colin Gray are dismissed by Fettweis in less than two pages, despite the fact that their analyses of great power politics and conflict have long been considered sound and frequently prescient. Realists and classical geopoliticians have more than 2,000 years of empirical evidence to support their theories of how states and empires behave and how the international system works. Ideas are important, but power is the governing force in international politics, and geography is the most permanent factor in the analysis of power. Fettweis makes much of the fact that the countries of Western and Central Europe, which waged war against each other repeatedly for nearly 400 years, are at peace, and claims that there is little likelihood that they will ever again wage war against each other. Even if the latter assertion turns out to be true, that does not mean that the end of major war is in sight. Throughout history, some peoples and empires that previously waged war for one reason or another became pacific without producing worldwide perpetual peace: the Mongols, Saracens, Ottomans, Dutch, Venetians, and the Spanish Empire come immediately to mind. A Europe at peace does not translate to an Asia, Africa, and Middle East at peace. In a world in which major wars are obsolete, Fettweis believes the United States needs to adjust its grand strategy from vigorous internationalism to strategic restraint. His specific recommendations include the removal of all U.S. military forces from Europe; an end to our bilateral security guarantees to Japan and South Korea; an end to our alliance with Israel; an indifference to the balance of power on the Eurasian landmass; a law enforcement approach to terrorism; a drastic cut in military spending; a much smaller Navy; and the abolition of regional combatant commands.What Fettweis is proposing is effectively an end to what Walter Russell Mead calls "the maritime world order" that was established by Great Britain and maintained first by the British Empire and then by the United States. It is a world order that has defeated repeated challenges by potential hegemonic powers and resulted in an unprecedented spread of prosperity and freedom. But all of that, we are assured, is in the past. China poses no threat. The United States can safely withdraw from Eurasia. The power vacuum will remain unfilled. Fettweis needs a dose of humility. Sir Halford Mackinder, the greatest of all geopoliticians, was referring to visionaries and liberal idealists like Fettweis when he cautioned, "He would be a sanguine man . . . who would trust the future peace of the world to a change in the mentality of any nation." Most profoundly, General Douglas MacArthur, who knew a little bit more about war and international conflict than Fettweis, reminded the cadets at West Point in 1962 that "only the dead have seen the end of war."

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Advantage 1 - Ethics › A2 Precautionary principle

Precaution on genome editing bad – targeted gene modifications likely safe

Chan, S. (2020). Quals: Sarah Chan is a Chancellor’s Fellow at the Usher Institute for Population Health Sciences and Informatics, University of Edinburgh. She was educated at the University of Melbourne, Australia, where she completed degrees in biological science and in law, and spent a number of years as a researcher in a molecular biology laboratory before moving to work in the area of science policy and stem cell ethics. In 2005 Sarah took up a Research Fellowship in Bioethics and Law at the Centre for Social Ethics and Policy, University of Manchester, where she also completed a MA in Health Care Ethics and Law and a PhD in Bioethics. From 2009 to 2015 she was Deputy Director of the Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation, University of Manchester. Her research interests and publications cover areas including the ethics of gene therapy and genetic information, enhancement, research ethics, stem cells, animal ethics, transhumanism, and the ethics of science and innovation.Playing it Safe? Precaution, Risk, and Responsibility in Human Genome Editing. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 63(1), 111-125. . /nfs

This analogy, they argue, relies on misconceived interpretations of evolutionary theory: we should resist the presumption that intentional genetic modification is likely to be more dangerous than “unintentional genetic modification”—that is, the process of mutation, inheritance, and selection that occurs whether we like it or not. It may be that random genetic changes are more likely to be deleterious than beneficial, but this is not necessarily true of targeted modifications designed with some understanding of their likely effects. Moreover, judgments about risk are not absolute but comparative: whether a likely consequence is better than or worse than the alternative. Precaution as a presumption against action assumes that the consequences of doing are probably going to be worse than not-doing. In the case of genome editing for serious disease, it is far from evident that this is so

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Advantage 1 - Ethics › A2 Precautionary principle

Precautionary principle increases risks: diverts attention from more serious threats and ignores risk of inaction

Elizabeth Whelan 5/23/2000 (“Can Too Much Safety Be Hazardous?”)

There are, however, at least two reasons why the precautionary principle itself, when applied in its extreme, is a hazard, both to our health and our high standard of living. First, if we act on all the remote possibilities in identifying causes of human disease, we will have less time, less money and fewer general resources left to deal with the real public health problems which confront us. This does not mean that before we take prudent action to protect public health we have to dot every scientific “i” and cross every environmental “t”. It does mean that we should not let the distraction of purely hypothetical threats cause us to lose sight of the known or highly probable ones. Second, the precautionary principle assumes that no detriment to health or the environment will result from the proposed new banning or chemical regulation. For example, what are the known health risks from the current regulated use of chlorine? None. How great are the benefits? Enormous. What new health risks wold we encounter if we were to ban chlorinated compounds because they “might” be harmful? Plenty. Chlorine, for example, is the essential cornerstone of modern industrial chemistry. We need chlorine to disinfect our nation’s water supply, make the agricultural pesticides that enable us to have a food supply rich in cancer-fighting fruits and vegetables, and to produce lifesaving pharmaceuticals. When we apply the precautionary principle and focus on hypothetical risks and ponder what actions we might take “just in case”, we leave the world of science and enter the realm of ideology. We allow ourselves to come under the spell of those who are motivated , for whatever reason, by a desire to return to what they perceive as a pre-industrial Garden of Eden. These “what if” ideologues need to be reminded that wealth and industrial progress are associated with better, not worse health. Blanket applications of the precautionary principle ultimately would mean rejecting the modern technologies that have given us our enviable state of good health and longevity, and the freedom to enjoy it. So what is to be done with those instances in which the risks are hypothetical and the costs of eliminating the technology substantial in terms of costs and lost human benefits? What should we do when confronted with the radical version of the precautionary principle? Go back to what Mom said: “When in doubt, throw it out”.