2022
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Counterplan
MSDI Unilateral CP + Aff Answers › 2NC › 2NC---NATO Fails in AI
Jill Aitoro, 18, (Jill Aitoro, 2-17-2018, Defense News, AI warfare is coming, and some global leaders say NATO isn’t ready, https://www.defensenews.com/smr/munich-security-forum/2018/02/16/ai-warfare-is-coming-and-some-global-leaders-say-nato-isnt-ready/, 6-24-2022) SCade
The future of warfare will involve artificial intelligence systems acting as lethal weapons, and much like cyber a decade ago, NATO allies are ill-equipped to manage the potential threat, said current and former European leaders speaking at the Munich Security Conference. Kersti Kaljulaid, president of Estonia, estimated a 50 percent chance that by the middle of this century we will have an AI system capable of launching a lethal attack. And yet, just as the world was not prepared for a cyberattack when Russia first launched a cyberattack against Estonia in 2007 — bombarding websites of Estonian parliament, banks, ministries, and news outlets — there is no strategy or international law to deter such tactics of warfare. First, “we need to understand the risks — what we’re afraid of,” said Kaljulaid,, pointing to three: someone using AI disruptively; intelligence going widespread; and AI depleting energy. “Right now we know we want to give systems some right of auto decision-making when it has the necessarily information to react,” Kaljulaid said. But once that is accomplished, “then we have the responsibility” to establish standards — the ability to apply reporting requirements to AI system, or to even shutdown systems if they are deemed threatening. The kind of standards gradually being put in place for cybersecurity “need to apply to the AI world, exactly the same way,” she said. For such standards to potentially be established for AI, there must be acceptable models of use in combat, and in conjunction with that, when there is evidence that AI is deployed outside those established boundaries, there must be a right to intervene. And much like nuclear non-proliferation efforts, “if we say that we will have the right to intervene, we have to have the right to international inspection,” Kaljulaid said. Among the standards advocated by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former NATO secretary general, is that AI always involve human beings. There are three options, he said during the panel: humans can be in charge, always “in the loop;” humans can be “on the loop” through a supervisory role, able to intervene; or humans can be “out of the loop” – telling the system to attack, and then leaving the rest to the machine. “I’m in favor of trying to introduce legally binding [standards] that will prevent production and use of these kinds of autonomous lethal weapons,” Rasmussen said, strongly advocating for a human role. But such standards don’t come fast. It took until 2017 for NATO to declare that a cyberattack would spur an Article 5 response – that being, collective defense among allies — after a massive computer hack paralyzed portions of government and businesses in Ukraine before spreading around the globe. In the meantime, much like cybersecurity, AI presents an opportunity for Russia as well as China to use “grey zones,” said Rasmussen – not initiating open military conflict, but provoking allies enough to disrupt.
2022
SDI
Counterplan
MSDI Unilateral CP + Aff Answers › 2NC › 2NC---US Leadership Key
David H. Freedman, 21, (David H. Freedman, 9-15-2021, Newsweek, The U.S, is the only nation with ethical standard for AI weapons. Should we be afraid?, https://www.newsweek.com/2021/09/24/us-only-nation-ethical-standards-ai-weapons-should-we-afraid-1628986.html, 6-26-2022) SCade
Even if military AI systems work exactly as intended, is it ethical to give machines the authority to destroy and kill? Work, the former defense deputy secretary, insists the U.S. military is strictly committed to keeping a human decision-maker in the "kill chain" so that no weapon will pick a target and fire on its own without an OK. But other nations may not be as careful, he says. "As far as we know, the U.S. military is the only one that has established ethical principles for AI." Twenty-two nations have asked the United Nations to ban automated weapons capable of operating outside human oversight, but so far no agreements have been signed. Human Rights Watch and other advocacy groups have called for similar bans to no avail. If Russia, China and others give AI weapons the authority to choose targets, the U.S. may face a choice: go along or operate at a military disadvantage. That sets up a race-to-the-bottom in which the least ethical or most careless adversary—one that is most aggressive about fielding AI-enabled weaponry, regardless of reliability and safeguards—forces others to follow suit. Nuclear weapons could be placed under the control of flawed AI systems that watch for signs that someone else's AI nukes are about to launch. AI is "increasing the risk of inadvertent or accidental escalation caused by misperception or miscalculation," says James Johnson, a foreign-policy researcher at Ireland's Dublin City University and author of Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare. (Manchester University Press, September 2021).
2022
SDI
Counterplan
MSDI Unilateral CP + Aff Answers › 1NC › VS Cyber
Joseph Marks, 21, (Joseph Marks, Anchor of The Cybersecurity 202 newsletter, 6-28-2021, Washington Post, Analysis, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/06/28/cybersecurity-202-united-states-is-still-number-one-cyber-capabilities/, 6-24-2022) SCade
The United States remains by far the world’s most cyber-capable nation with no major competitors for the title. That’s the conclusion from a mammoth 182-page report released today by British think tank the International Institute for Strategic Studies that reviews the cyber capabilities of 15 of the world’s biggest players in hacking and digital defense. The report assesses both government and private-sector capabilities. The report relegates the most troublesome U.S. adversaries, Russia and China, to a second tier of cyber powers. That group also contains the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Israel and France. However, China’s rapid digital development and its growing slate of technology firms make it “the only state currently on a trajectory to join the U.S. in the first tier of cyber powers,” the authors warn. The report marks a major endorsement for U.S. cyber capabilities, which have been called into question by a string of major cyberattacks by Kremlin-linked hackers and Russia-based cybercriminals. It also comes as U.S. officials are struggling to temper the global growth of Chinese tech firms, which they fear could give Beijing a critical edge in cyber competition. “China has made significant progress in bolstering its capabilities since 2014, but nowhere near enough to close the gap with the U.S.,” said IISS Senior Fellow for Cyber, Space and Future Conflict Greg Austin. “The main reason is the relative standing of the two nations’ digital economies, where the U.S. remains far advanced despite China’s digital progress.” Yet all of the U.S. advantages in cyberspace haven’t kept it safe. American companies and government agencies are being pummeled by less capable nations — including not just Russia and China but also Iran and North Korea. And U.S. government hackers are less likely to punch back because they’re trying to follow rules of good behavior in cyberspace that their adversaries ignore, according to the report. “The ways in which the U.S. wields its cyber power appear politically and legally constrained when compared with its main cyber adversaries,” the report notes. It adds that “factors have combined to give the adversaries of the U.S. an edge in the use of unsophisticated cyber techniques that are aimed at subversion but pitched below the legal threshold for an act of aggression that might justify an armed response.” In other words, U.S. officials can't legally justify responding to most adversary hacks by counterpunching with traditional arms or cyberattacks. But more measured responses, such as economic sanctions and indicting hackers, have done little to deter adversaries. IISS places Iran and North Korea in a third tier of cyber capability along with India, Japan, Indonesia and Malaysia.
2022
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Counterplan
MSDI Unilateral CP + Aff Answers › 1NC › VS AI
Ulrike Esther Franke, 2021 (Ulrike Esther Franke, 2021, European Council on Foreign Relations, ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep29123, 6-24-2022) SCade
Obstacles to cooperation Both sides of the Atlantic are already motivated to cooperate with each other on AI. But, despite these shared interests, transatlantic cooperation on AI may not be straightforward. Four trends, in particular, could pose problems: transatlantic estrangement; European digital autonomy efforts; differing views on China; and, potentially, Brexit. Transatlantic estrangement The transatlantic alliance has had a bad four years. The Trump administration’s criticism of the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, the president’s threats to leave NATO, and his active criticism of the EU all made Europeans wonder whether they had lost their most important partner. Moreover, in light of the conflict over 5G, in the minds of many Europeans, technology in particular has become an area that creates conflict in the transatlantic relationship rather than fostering cooperation. Although transatlantic relations are likely to improve under Biden, substantial damage has been done, and it will take some time to mend these ties. But, even if relations improve, it is becoming increasingly obvious that US has a diminishing interest in Europe as a geopolitically important part of the world. This trend was already visible under Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama. It is, therefore, unsurprising that, on technology cooperation, both sides emphasise the importance of working with other actors as well as each other. The US National Security Commission on AI, for example, recommends that the US Departments of State and Defense “should negotiate formal AI cooperation agreements with Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam”. Its March 2020 report emphasises on several occasions the importance of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. Meanwhile, Europeans are pursuing the idea of an alliance for multilateralism. And, on technology and AI more specifically, they have also begun to reach out to other democratic allies. European digital autonomy The most important aspect of transatlantic estrangement, however, is not the loss of trust between the US and Europe – which they will eventually reverse. Rather, during the four years of the Trump administration, and partly in response to isolationist tendencies in the US, Europeans have become much more comfortable talking about European strategic autonomy or sovereignty. Without encouraging the narrative that these efforts are directed against the US, or were primarily an answer to Trump, Europeans aim to empower Europe as an actor in its own right. In the technological realm, this led to the idea of European digital sovereignty, the aim of which is to build up European technological capabilities. Although European digital sovereignty is not specifically targeted at the US, it has led, among other things, to efforts such as the possible regulation of American technology companies and concerns over American firms acquiring European start-ups. European campaigners and some policymakers believe US tech giants such as Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon are forces to protect against. European thinking on technology partly developed in opposition to the US and US companies. Thus, European efforts to build up digital sovereignty may impede transatlantic cooperation. The EU’s effort to strengthen ethical AI, and to make ‘trustworthy AI’ a unique selling point for Europe, might also end up creating problems for transatlantic cooperation. Many EU policymakers believe that the EU’s insistence on ethical AI will eventually become a location advantage for Europe (much like data privacy): as more people become concerned about unethical AI and data security, they will prefer to use or buy AI ‘made in Europe’ rather than elsewhere. In this respect, two European aims are at odds with each other: on the one hand, Europeans want to ensure that AI is developed and used in an ethical way. Partnering with a powerful player such as the US on this matter should be an obvious way to help them achieve this goal. However, if the EU considers ethical AI not just a goal for humanity but a development that may also create commercial advantages for Europe, then transatlantic cooperation on this issue is counterproductive, as it would undermine Europe’s uniqueness. Finally, many Europeans have expressed scepticism about the extent to which Europe and the US are indeed aligned on ethical AI principles. For example, the Danish national AI strategy argues for a common ethical and human-centred basis for AI. It describes ethical AI as a particularly European approach: “Europe and Denmark should not copy the US or China. Both countries are investing heavily in artificial intelligence, but with little regard for responsibility, ethical principles and privacy.” Many Europeans feel that the US “has no idea how to regulate” cyberspace and continues to show little enthusiasm for doing so. The EU, however, likes to think of itself as a trailblazer when it comes to digital rights, such as the 2014 “right to be forgotten” or the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation. Differing views on China As noted, only a few European states look at AI through a geopolitical lens, and EU efforts on this matter focus primarily on strengthening the EU as a global player. This means that the American interest in using transatlantic cooperation as a means to curb Chinese power is likely to have only limited traction in Europe. And US companies, rather than Chinese ones, currently remain the primary ‘other’ for Europe to measure itself against. European regulation efforts still concentrate on US companies rather than Chinese firms. In light of recent changes in language on China in both NATO and the EU, which describe the country as a “strategic competitor” and “systemic rival”, European and American views of China may converge eventually. But, at the moment, Europeans do not feel the same urgency as the US when it comes to pushing back against China. Unfortunately for those in the US who favour greater transatlantic cooperation, the European nation that most often thinks in geopolitical terms, France, is among those most sceptical of the US.
2022
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Answers to: › A2 Regulation CP
Roberto Andorno 2022 Human Dignity, Life Sciences Technologies and the Renewed Imperative to Preserve Human Freedom https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Roberto-Andorno/publication/360729946_Human_Dignity_Life_Sciences_Technologies_and_the_Renewed_Imperative_to_Preserve_Human_Freedom/links/628cecf0d4e5243d9b9624f7/Human-Dignity-Life-Sciences-Technologies-and-the-Renewed-Imperative-to-Preserve-Human-Freedom.pdf
In his book The Future of Human Nature, Jürgen Habermas makes the case that the use of germline genetic engineering would give us an exorbitant power over our descendants and lead to a dramatic loss of liberty for future generations. In his view, preventing the manipulation of the genome of our descendants “is crucial for our capacity to see ourselves as the authors of our own life history, and to recognize us as autonomous persons.” 47 He claims that the principle of equality between generations crucially depends on the condition that each individual’s features are more to the result of chance than choice, of contingency rather than human design. Certainly, it can be argued, as is often done, that the germline alterations will only aim at preventing the transmission of genetically related diseases. The problem is that, even if this were the initial focus, the risk is too high that we will then gradually start to make genetic changes for the non-therapeutic design of children.48 Even the best-intentioned efforts to restrict the use of the technique to specified conditions would be unlikely to hold, for a number of reasons that cannot be discussed here.49 Besides that, it is well-known that the boundaries between “therapy” and “enhancement” are extremely difficult to define in real practice. Moreover, the expression “therapeutic purpose” is itself somehow misleading in this context. Germline gene editing does not aim to treat, cure, or prevent diseases in any existing patient. Instead, it aims to modify the genes of future children and generations through the intentional creation of embryos with altered genomes. Strictly speaking, the procedure is not a medical intervention but a way to satisfy parental desires for genetically related children or for children with specific genetic traits.50 In other words, we are not dealing with a therapeutic procedure but with a wish-fulfilling technology, which is something very different from an ethical and legal point of view. It must be noted that germline engineering is radically different from other technologies in the sense that it does not aim to change the tools that we use but the users themselves (that is, ourselves, or rather, our descendants), and in an irreversible manner. Some reports from scientific academies have argued that the procedure could become acceptable once the risks of side effects on the children can be reduced to a minimum.51 However, besides the fact that the concerns raised by the technique exceed by far the question of the purely medical side effects, can a risk that may unpredictably affect future people –either physically or psychologically – ever be regarded as “minimal”? Is the classic risk–benefit analysis really applicable to this radically new scenario? These questions are difficult to answer. What is clear is that humankind has rarely been confronted with such challenging issues concerning our self-understanding as free, non-engineered human beings, and the long-term effects of our technological choices.
Regulations cannot resolve the ethical issues – no responsible path forward unless a ban.
2022
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Answers to: › A2 Germline Leadership Turn
Ikenberry 18 – G. John, professor of Politics and International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. “Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive”, Carnegie Ethics and International Affairs, pg. 25-26, , 03-xx-2018
What Rising States Want The liberal international order was built by the Western liberal democracies, but its basic features do not exclusively advance the interests of these countries. In fact, as China and other non-Western developing states rise, they have already demonstrated a growing interest in the perpetuation of some sort of open and multilateral global system. These countries may not want Western dominance of global institutions, but they want the West’s rules and organizational principles.
These rising states certainly want an open world economy. They want access to other countries for trade, investment, and technology. It is their outward-oriented development strategies that have propelled them forward. The ascent of these countries began in the late 1980s with broad-gauged reform efforts. Countries why the liberal world order will survive such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey broke with their closed, authoritarian pasts and moved toward more reform-oriented and accountable governments. Together with China, these countries opened up to the world economy. As Ted Piccone argues, they all “entered the global marketplace through an increasing reliance on international trade, migration, remittances, energy, and foreign investment flows.” This liberalization and economic openness has come along with a mix of nationalist and populist appeals, and ideological critiques of Western neoliberalism. More generally, however, these rising states see their prospects for growth and advancement to be tied to engagement with and integration into a reformed and open world economy.
2022
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Answers to: › A2 Germline Leadership Turn
Ikenberry 18 – G. John, professor of Politics and International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. “Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive”, Carnegie Ethics and International Affairs, pg. 24-25, , 03-xx-2018
Four characteristics reinforce and draw states into the order. First, it has integrative tendencies. Over the last century states with diverse characteristics have found pathways into its “ecosystem” of rules and institutions. Germany and Japan found roles and positions of authority in the post-war order; and after the cold war many more states—in Eastern Europe, Asia, and elsewhere—have joined its economic and security partnerships. It is the multilateral logic of the order that makes it relatively easy for states to join and rise up within the order. Second, the liberal order offers opportunities for leadership and shared authority. One state does not “rule” the system. The system is built around institutions, and this provides opportunities for shifting and expanding coalitions of states to share leadership. Formal institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, are led by boards of directors and weighted voting. Informal groups, such as the G-7 and G-20, are built on principles of collective governance. Third, the actual economic gains from participation within the liberal order are widely shared. In colonial and informal imperial systems, the gains from trade and investment are disproportionately enjoyed by the lead state. In the existing order, the “profits of modernity” are distributed across the system. Indeed, China’s great economic ascent was only possible because the liberal international order rewarded its pursuit of openness and trade-oriented growth. For the same reason, states in all regions of the world have made systematic efforts to integrate into the system. Finally, the liberal international order accommodates a diversity of models and strategies of growth and development. In recent decades the Anglo-American model of neoliberalism has been particularly salient. But the post-war system also provides space for other capitalist models, such as those associated with European social democracy and East Asian developmental statism. The global capitalist system might generate some pressures for convergence, but it also provides space for the coexistence of alternative models and ideologies.
These aspects of the liberal international order create incentives and opportunities for states to integrate into its core economic and political realms. The order allows states to share in its economic spoils. Its pluralistic character creates possibilities for states to “work the system”—to join in, negotiate, and maneuver in ways that advance their interests. This, in turn, creates an order with expanding constituencies that have a stake in its continuation. Compared to imperial and colonial orders of the past, the existing order is easy to join and hard to overturn.
2022
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Answers to: › A2 Germline Leadership Turn
Simona R. Soare Biden’s Security Policy: Democratic Security or Democratic Exceptionalism? Volume 56, 2021 · Number 1 · pp. 14–20 https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2021/number/1/article/biden-s-security-policy-democratic-security-or-democratic-exceptionalism.html
The first pillar is to regain trust and reaffirm the unbreakable security and defence ties within NATO. The reason behind this is strategic - the Biden administration correctly regards the North Atlantic alliance as a key tool in confronting and containing aggressive Russian behaviour and Chinese influence. The Alliance is already undergoing a detailed self-reflection process, i.e. NATO 2030, after which Secretary General Stoltenberg will propose that allies develop a new NATO Strategic Concept in early 2021. This represents an opportunity for the US to exercise more prominent NATO leadership right from the start of the new administration. The upcoming 2021 NATO Summit will open diplomatic doors to allow for symbolic gestures of reaffirmation of the American commitment to European security. It will equally be a useful framework for substantive discussions about the future direction of the Alliance on emerging technologies, climate change, China, critical infrastructure protection as well as how to deal with difficult allies that transgress on democratic principles. In this context, the Biden administration could drive a new stage of NATO adaptation beginning in 2021: 'œAs president, I will do more than just restore our historic partnerships; I will lead the effort to reimagine them for the world we face today' (Biden, 2020a).
2022
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Answers to: › A2 Germline Leadership Turn
Henrik Larsen Sunday, May 22, 2022, 10:01 AM NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-must-get-resilience-right-withstand-russia-and-china
NATO is at arguably the most important juncture in its post-Cold War history. NATO must adapt not only its military preparedness but also its approach to the nonmilitary—and specifically illiberal—challenges that Russia and China pose to its resilience and cohesion. To advance their geopolitical interests, Russia and China exploited the openness of society in NATO allies and the divisions between them over the past decade. NATO must always be wary of external challenges that could undermine its unity. This was true during the Cold War in the face of an ideological rival seeking to undermine confidence in Western democratic governments, and it remains true in the face of Russia and China today. Conversely, NATO needs to navigate its adaptation to its illiberal challenge while avoiding functional over-extension. The alliance is at , whereby it extends its own activities unnecessarily into civilian areas of security in which it lacks necessary expertise and legacy. Strong voices in the for NATO to specify resilience as a core task in the forthcoming Strategic Concept, in principle elevating it to a task of equal importance to collective defense. An commissioned by Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to inspire the Strategic Concept recommends that NATO reinvent itself as a “liberal bulwark” against Russia and China and extend the alliance’s responsibilities into the realm of democratic resilience.
2022
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Answers to: › A2 Disease Turn
Gregory E. Kaebnick is a research scholar at The Hastings Center and the editor of theHastings Center Report. A Moratorium on Gene Editing? March 27 2015 https://www.thehastingscenter.org/a-moratorium-on-gene-editing/
The second problem – identifying the correct genetic changes – is the real issue, though, and CRISPR/Cas9 doesn’t even address this problem. In fact, no gene editing tool can solve the second problem, any more than a word processing tool can by itself solve the problem of how to write the next great American novel. To identify the “correct” genetic changes, we need to understand what the targeted gene does, but also how it interacts with other genes, and also how the genome interacts with environments. We’re not there. As David Baltimore, a Nobel laureate and a member of one of the groups calling for a moratorium, told the Times,“I personally think we are just not smart enough — and won’t be for a very long time — to feel comfortable about the consequences.” This is the second and bigger reason that the moratorium is a good idea.
2022
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Answers to: › A2 Disease Turn
on April 15, 2019 Environmental Thinker Bill McKibben Sounds Warning on Technology https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/environmental-thinker-bill-mckibben-sounds-warning-on-technology/
I truthfully don't think that human genetic engineering offers us much in the way of benefit. If people are worried about genetic disease, we can already deal with that through preimplantation genetic diagnosis, which is used in fertility clinics around the world. It lets you make sure your child doesn't have a genetic disease, but it doesn't let you improve your child. So I don't think the benefits [of human germline genetic engineering] are very high, and the potential cost—in terms of meaning—is enormous.
The “medical necessity” argument is a farce – the cases are vanishingly rare
2022
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Answers to: › A2 Disease Turn
Hurlbut, J.B. (2020).the author of Experiments in Democracy: Human Embryo Research and the Politics of Bioethics (Columbia University Press, 2017) and co-editor of Perfecting Human Futures: Transhuman Visions and Technological Imaginations, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2016), as well as numerous articles and book chapters. He holds an A.B. from Stanford University and a Ph.D. in the History of Science from Harvard University. He was a postdoctoral fellow in the program on Science, Technology and Society at the Harvard Kennedy School. Imperatives of Governance: Human Genome Editing and the Problem of Progress. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 63(1), 177-194. . /nfs
The project of “consciously perfecting” human life begins with the misguided but well-meaning step of seeking to repair human beings that have been marked as lessor, inferior, or defective. For He’s would-be parents, the defect lay not in their future children’s DNA, but in a society that sorts, classifies, and seek to correct—or discard—those who do not measure up. No society is free of such defects. Yet acquiescing to them—editing children to compensate for the deficiencies of the societies into which they will be born—will amount to nothing less than affirming those deficiencies. Developing and deploying HGGE in the name of some unjustifiable notion of “medical necessity” amounts to setting this technology free to be used for genetic fixes for social problems—“cur[ing] prejudice”—of whatever sort the market will sustain. And the market that He imagined is vast. Liberating the technology in this way would deny the vast majority of the human community the freedom to ask whether we want it at all. If there is even a small possibility that developing heritable human genome editing could contribute to such a future (and as the He case makes clear, that possibility is far from remote), humanity has a duty to carefully contend with the question of how to guide and govern this technology. This entails asking not only what should be done, but how we should understand what is at stake: what questions need to be asked but are going unasked, how the terms of debate are being set, by whom, and with what consequences for which cultural, J. Benjamin Hurlbut 192 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine moral, and spiritual vocabularies can contribute to steering the ship. And yet the imperatives of governance that have guided debate thus far have taken us far off course. Unless we correct, the ways of thinking and speaking that this essay has examined will continue to drive the direction of technology—encouraging and justifying irresponsible science, sidelining serious ethical reflection, constraining democratic governance, and inhibiting deliberation that draws upon the wealth of tradition, experience and moral imagination. As we navigate into the uncharted waters of our technological future, we would do well to recall, with restraint and humility, that we are an imperfect species. The aspiration to heal the infirmities of our mortal lives, no matter how virtuous, is endlessly vulnerable to that all-too-human impulse to redeem ourselves though mastery of nature and self. It is but a short step from the desire to repair what is imperfect to the impulse to perfect. And one need not look long to see that the will to perfectibility is also a will to power— to render fragile and vulnerable human life an object of manipulation and control. Beneath a hunger for prestige and a belief in the virtue and righteousness of his project, He Jiankui was also driven by the thrill of it: the reckless speed, the heroic transgression, the wielding of an unprecedented and seemingly righteous power over the fragility of human life. So too were his aiders and abettors, members of a guild that wields ever-increasing powers over life. They encouraged He not in the name of healing the sick, but in the name of an imagined right—and righteousness—of radical scientific freedom to ordain the lives we shall have and the purposes for which we shall live. J. Robert Oppenheimer described this ethos more than half a century ago: “When you see something that is technically sweet, you go ahead and do it, and you argue about what to do about it only after you have had your technical success” (US Atomic Energy Commission 1954). The sweet successes of the nuclear age threatened to extinguish civilization itself. Biology’s emerging powers over the stuff of life, though far more subtle, are no less threatening to human integrity. It is at our peril that we the people cede the authority to guide and govern our common future to those who would mistake the sweetness of their own success for progress
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Answers to: › A2 Business confidence / Innovation
Lander, et.al. 2019 Eric S. Lander , Françoise Baylis , Feng Zhang , Emmanuelle Charpentier , Paul Berg , Catherine Bourgain , Bärbel Friedrich , J. Keith Joung , Jinsong Li , David Liu , Luigi Naldini , Jing-Bao Nie , Renzong Qiu , Bettina Schoene-Seifert , Feng Shao , Sharon Terry , Wensheng Wei & Ernst-Ludwig Winnacker 13 March 2019 Adopt a moratorium on heritable genome editing https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-00726-5
To be clear, our proposed moratorium does not apply to germline editing for research uses, provided that these studies do not involve the transfer of an embryo to a person’s uterus. It also does not apply to genome editing in human somatic (non-reproductive) cells to treat diseases, for which patients can provide informed consent and the DNA modifications are not heritable.
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Answers to: › A2 Business confidence / Innovation
Gregory E. Kaebnick is a research scholar at The Hastings Center and the editor of theHastings Center Report. A Moratorium on Gene Editing? March 27 2015 https://www.thehastingscenter.org/a-moratorium-on-gene-editing/
CRISPR/Cas9 can be turned to many other uses than editing the human germline, however. One of the most extraordinary is the possibility of using it in “gene drives” that could be make genetic modifications to sexually reproducing populations of microorganisms, animals, or plants. Sexually reproducing organisms have two sets of gene—one from each parent. A gene drive is a set of genes that, if it is inserted into one set, will get itself copied to the appropriate location on the other set, replacing any competing genes and also ensuring that all of the organism’s offspring receive the drive. Within those offspring, the drive will again replace any competing genes, ensuring that all of the next generation receives the gene. If a species reproduces rapidly, it might be possible to quickly alter the whole species. Mosquitoes could be altered so that they can no longer transmit malaria or dengue, for example.
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Answers to: › A2 Politics
Tanya Lewis Dec 16, 2015, 1:45 PM Congress just put a massive roadblock in the way of genetically editing human embryos https://www.businessinsider.com/congress-bans-funding-for-embryo-gene-editing-2015-12
Congressional Republicans proposed a spending deal late Tuesday night to fund the government through 2016, and it places new restrictions on the use of federal funding for gene editing, Politico reported. The House and Senate are expected to pass the legislation soon. Obama will have to sign the bill or face the prospect of a government shut down. The $1.1 trillion Omnibus Spending Bill contains a provision that outlaws the use of federal money for research that involves genetically modifying human embryos, a topic of intense debate. The technology in question, known as CRISPR/Cas9, allows scientists to precisely and easily tweak the genomes of any organism. It has already been used by Chinese scientists to modify human embryos, though not ones that were capable of surviving until birth. Specifically, the bill specifies that none of the funding be used for clinical research "in which a human embryo is intentionally created or modified to include a heritable genetic modification."
2022
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Answers to: › A2 Politics
BY REP. BILL FOSTER, PH.D. (D-ILL.) - 07/09/15 8:00 AM ET Last scientist in Congress warns on human genetic engineering https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/247221-last-scientist-in-congress-warns-on-human-genetic-engineering/
It is rare that prominent members of the scientific community come together to warn our leaders of technological breakthroughs that our legal system and society are not prepared for. As the last Ph.D. scientist remaining in Congress, I feel a responsibility to transmit those concerns to my colleagues and to the public. The breakthrough in question relates to human genetic engineering. This has long been a theoretical possibility assumed to be decades away from practicality. In the last several years this has changed significantly, due to recent breakthroughs that allow inexpensive and precise editing of chromosomal DNA. The technological potential has been amplified by the widespread adoption of in vitro fertilization, the rapid decline in the cost of genome sequencing, increasing use of Big Data to understand the relationship between genetic variations and behavior, as well as the rapid spread of these technologies throughout the world. It’s time for leaders in government to take notice. The ability to modify DNA has been around for decades, but until recently it was expensive, time consuming, and required a very high level of technical skill. That has changed significantly in the last few years with the development of new gene editing tools such as CRISPR/Cas9, introduced by Dr. Jennifer Doudna and others. These tools have been rapidly adopted by researchers around the world. These tools are revolutionary because they enable any researcher with basic capabilities in molecular biology to edit genomes. Therein lies the promise and the danger. Anyone with $300 and Internet access can now buy their own CRISPR kit to begin primitive genome editing of plants and animals. It works like an old-fashioned film reel, where a director can cut apart a film, take frames out, and fill them in with something new. Already, this tool is in daily use in laboratories around the world, editing DNA to produce genetically customized versions of organisms from cell cultures to insects, plants, mice, and monkeys. There is the possibility of great benefit from these new technologies. Animal models with specific genetic variations are being created to greatly accelerate research to determine the links between genetics and disease. In agriculture, it has the potential to vastly accelerate our ability to develop more productive crops, better biofuels, and favorable animal characteristics like high growth rates and stronger immune systems to reduce the need for antibiotics. However, environmental risks are also amplified. Yet what really makes this tool revolutionary is what it could mean for humans. Many of the potential applications of this technology are likely to be non-controversial: for example, replacing the bone marrow of someone suffering from a sickle-cell disease with a modified version of their own marrow, but with the genetic defect removed. Genetic modifications of this kind will only carry risks to a single person and not affect future generations. However, if genetic modifications are made to “germline” cells – sperm, eggs, and embryos – these modifications will also be carried forward to future generations. This will fundamentally change the course of human evolution, and is something that ethicists have been concerned about for decades. Although none of these tools have yet demonstrated the reliability necessary for safe clinical modification of the human germline, the rate of technological progress is such that it is prudent to begin thinking through the implications. Many in the scientific community believe there are critical ethical, legal, and safety questions that must be answered before this research advances. Earlier this year, many of the most respected scientists in the field published a letter calling for a moratorium on human germline modification for clinical applications, warning that “there is an urgent need for open discussion of the merits and risks of human genome modification.”
2022
SDI
Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Answers to: › A2 Politics
Britta C van Beers Author Notes Rewriting the human genome, rewriting human rights law? Human rights, human dignity, and human germline modification in the CRISPR era Published: 09 June 2020 Journal of Law and the Biosciences, Volume 7, Issue 1, January-June 2020, lsaa006, https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsaa006
Also in the USA, the most prolific country with regard to basic genome editing research, several legal limits to HGGE are in place. These limits are part of what has been called ‘a complex regulatory and statutory web concerned with human embryo research in general and human germline modification in particular.’ Although HGGE is not formally prohibited, currently several mechanisms, taken together, practically impede the clinical introduction of this technology. First, the National Institutes of Health, which is responsible for research funding in the USA, has stated that it ‘will not fund any use of gene-editing technologies in human embryos’. Second, the US Food and Drug Administration, which has the authority to regulate products and drugs involving gene editing, including human gene editing, has so far stood in the way of using HGGE for reproductive purposes and is also not likely to change its policy in the near future. Since December 2015, US Congress has regularly added an amendment to the FDA’s funding bill, a so-called ‘bill rider’, making it impossible for the FDA to consider any application which involves ‘research in which a human embryo is intentionally created or modified to include a heritable genetic modification’. Without the FDA’s approval, implantation of a genetically modified human embryo is illegal in the USA. However, genetically modifying human embryos for research purposes are permitted, even though such experiments remain ineligible for public funding.
2022
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Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Answers to: › A2 Politics
Walter G. Johnson and Diana M. Bowman April 22, 2022 It’s time for Congress to stop blocking mitochondrial replacement therapy https://www.statnews.com/2022/04/22/congress-allow-mitochondrial-replacement-more-forward/
Lawmakers have done this by including a rider in laws that fund the FDA each year. These say that the FDA cannot use any of its funding to review an application to start clinical trials on “a drug or biological product … in research in which a human embryo is intentionally created or modified to include a heritable genetic modification.” The rider was in 2015, but there was no public discussion at the time about the effects the rider would have on mitochondrial replacement. While the rider was likely originally intended to block gene editing of the nuclear DNA with tools like CRISPR, the the ban to apply to mitochondrial replacement as well, even though no nuclear DNA is edited.
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Inherency
Melanie Hess -2020 A Call for an International Governance Framework for Human Germline Gene Editing 95 Notre Dame Law Review 1369 https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4899&context=ndlr
The United States does not have an explicit legal prohibition on human germline editing.78 This is relatively unusual in the international community, where there are official prohibitions on human germline editing in many countries, including ones that allow human embryonic stem cell research.79 That said, germline editing does not exactly have a clear path forward in the current U.S. regulatory and political climate. Current genome-editing protocols and clinical trials in the United States do not have their own regulatory framework and have instead been “absorbed into the preexisting U.S. regulatory framework for gene therapy, whose overview is largely derived from gene transfer studies”80—despite the fact that germline editing, while involving similar technologies and techniques, has vastly different consequences and implications
2022
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Solvency › NATO says yes
Morial Shah (2019) "Genetic Warfare: Super Humans And The Law," North Carolina Central University Science & Intellectual Property Law Review: Vol. 12 : Iss. 1 , Article 2. Available at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/siplr/vol12/iss1/2
The Oviedo Convention of the EU has a more definitive answer for our purposes.106 Through Article 13, it specifies that an intervention “seeking to modify the human genome may only be undertaken for preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and only if its aim is not to introduce any modification in the genome of any descendants.”107 Accordingly, it makes clear that EU member states may not lawfully engage in human enhancement. Nonetheless, since the distinction between therapy and enhancement is open to debate, EU states may enhance their citizens under the guise of therapy. For instance, soldiers or athletes may receive treatment to make them run faster or carry oxygen to better treat “fatigue” or “exhaustion.”