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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Solvency › NATO says yes
Carole Hognestad ##-##-#### [Norwegian to English Translator; Honrs at University of Dundee/Open University; Diploma in Computing Distinction at Næringsakademiet, Skien, Norway; Diploma in Personnel and Recruitment PracticeDistinction College of Further Education, Oxford], “The Oviedo Convention,” https://www.forskningsetikk.no/en/resources/the-research-ethics-library/legal-statutes-and-guidelines/oviedo-convention/ Cut By: m.jam
The Oviedo Convention (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine) was formulated in 1997 by the Council of Europe. The Convention is the first convention in international law that has a particular focus on protecting the rights of individuals in connection with biomedical treatment and research. The Convention aims to ensure that scientific and medical advances are not at the expense of human rights.
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Solvency › NATO says yes
Mena Report 04-12-2022 [Web Publication on Nexis Uni; Provided by Syndigate Media Inc; business news source established in 2001 and run by Al Bawaba], “Croatia : NATO highlights Croatias contribution to security through civil science and technology,” Cut By: m.jam
An Information Day took place in Zagreb on Friday (8 April 2022), marking the important achievements accomplished by Croatia in the framework of the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme. Scientists, experts, and government representatives met to take stock of the results of civil scientific cooperation attained amongst Croatia, NATO Allies, and partner countries. They also shared views on the prospects for potential new activities in security-related science and technological innovation, in line with Croatias research priorities. Over 60 participants attended the event, which was jointly organized by the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme, the Croatian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, the Permanent Delegation of Croatia to NATO, and the University of Zagreb. It was also streamed online to link up several other universities in the country, including in Dubrovnik, Osijek and Split. At the official opening, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, David van Weel, stated: The Science for Peace and Security Programme is a central component of NATOs science and technology ecosystem, and it has been for over 60 years. During this time, it has helped to demonstrate NATOs commitment to scientific and technological advancement. Representing the host country, State Secretary Frano Matui highlighted Croatia's participation in 78 SPS projects in collaboration with Allies and partners from around the globe. He also stressed the importance of this Information Day to strengthen and expand future cooperation. At the margins of the event, Croatian research teams displayed various prototypes developed with support from the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme, demonstrating their ability to address a wide range of contemporary security challenges and offer solutions with tangible deliverables. These include initiatives such as the development and deployment of the Next-generation Incident Command System (NICS), a web-based command and control software that facilitates collaboration among first responders during natural and man-made disasters. Experts from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, and North Macedonia, as well as the United States, worked together to implement and test this platform across the region, putting it to use in a variety of crisis scenarios. Research and development activities supported by the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme have helped to identify innovative solutions to other security challenges of particular relevance, such as the detection of landmines and explosive hazards, as well as technological solutions to enhance security at border crossing points, airports and seaports. Moreover, events such as the yearly Zagreb Security Forum have fostered the exchange of lessons learned and expertise on hybrid challenges and resilience amongst a network of experts and officials in eastern and south eastern Europe. Through interactions with their peers from other NATO Allies and partner countries, Croatian scientists and experts have taken part in many activities within the framework of NATOs Science for Peace and Security Programme, on such security-related topics as counter-Terrorism, cyber defence, defence against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents, environmental security, advanced technology, mine and unexploded ordnance clearance and detection, and hybrid challenges. With the recent launch of a new call for applications, NATOs Science for Peace and Security Programme has opened the opportunity for scientists in Croatia, as well as other NATO and partner countries to develop proposals for innovative security-related scientific activities. More information about the call can be found on the SPS website.
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Solvency › NATO says yes
Paul Belkin Analyst in European Affairs NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress Updated June 3, 2021
Throughout the course of the Trump Administration, Secretary General Stoltenberg stressed that disagreement among allies is not a new phenomenon and underscored that “Europe and North American are doing more together in NATO today than we have for decades.” 31 More recently, however, Stoltenberg has acknowledged that differences between Europe and the United States have raised “serious questions about the strength of our alliance on both sides of the Atlantic” and has pointed to the coming years as a “historic opportunity to build a stronger alliance. To regain trust, and reinforce our unity. Europe and North America working together in NATO, in strategic solidarity.” 32 When allied leaders met in London in 2019, they agreed to initiate a “forward-looking reflection process … to further strengthen NATO’s political dimension including consultation.” 33 Secretary General Stoltenberg has since launched the NATO 2030 Initiative to develop proposals to make sure “NATO remains strong militarily, becomes even stronger politically and takes a more global approach.” 34 Stoltenberg plans to present his proposals to allied heads of state and government at the June 2021 NATO summit. He says his recommendations will focus on the following three areas: Reinforcing unity by increasing common funding for deterrence and the defense of NATO territory, agreeing to political consultations on all issues affecting member states’ security, and updating NATO’s Strategic Concept—last updated in 2010—to “chart a common course going forward;” Broadening NATO’s approach to security beyond the military sphere to include societal resilience, increasing collective investments to maintain NATO’s technological edge and interoperability, and addressing the security impact of climate change; and Defending the rules-based international order, and countering China’s and Russia’s challenges to this order, by strengthening NATO’s commitment to democratic values and enhancing its relationships with like-minded partners across the globe.35
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Solvency › NATO says yes
Melanie Hess -2020 A Call for an International Governance Framework for Human Germline Gene Editing 95 Notre Dame Law Review 1369 https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4899&context=ndlr
The failure of this self-regulation is perhaps a consequence of the fact that there is not currently a stronger international regulatory framework or set of principles guiding this subject. There is scant consensus on how to regulate and what to allow, and this is largely because despite the potential benefits of germline editing, the field is rife with controversy surrounding the “safety concerns, unprecedented informed consent, challenges to human dignity, and the potential for permanent negative impact on future generations, including its abuse for eugenics or enhancement (the parental pursuit of specific traits for non-medical reasons).”11 There is, however, a general consensus that no clinical applications should proceed until there is “broad societal consensus” involving the opinions of all social groups, perhaps on a global scale.12
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Solvency › NATO says yes
Dr Ulf Ehlert Why our values should drive our technology choices 16 December 2021 https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/12/16/why-our-values-should-drive-our-technology-choices/index.html
Within this broadly applicable framing, NATO’s role is specific. As the international organisation committed to defence and security in the North Atlantic area, it convenes considerable political, military, economic, and technological power. Building in particular on its political and intellectual capital, the Alliance can credibly spearhead norm setting for technology applications in defence to comply with Western values.
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Solvency › Not safe
Scott J. Schweikart, Global Regulation of Germline Genome Editing: Ethical Considerations and Application of International Human Rights Law, 43 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 279 (2021). Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol43/iss3/6
Additionally, there is a significant level of uncertainty about the safety and potential consequences of germline genome editing. For instance, it is uncertain “whether current knowledge of human genes, genomes, and genetic variation and the interactions between genes and the environment is sufficient to enable heritable genome editing to be performed safely.”28
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Solvency › Not safe
Ormond, et.al. 2017 Kelly E.Ormond, Douglas P.Mortlock Derek T.Scholes, YvonneBombard, Lawrence C.Brody, W. AndrewFaucett, Nanibaa’ A.Garrison,LauraHercher RosarioIsas, Anna Middleton, KiranMusunuru,DanielShriner,AliceVirani1, Caroline E.Young Human Germline Genome Editing AJHG , 3 August 2017, Pages 167-176 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0002929717302471
Regardless of whether it entails somatic or germline genome editing, its efficacy and safety must be established before any consideration is given to a genome-editing method as a potential therapeutic approach. CRISPR/Cas9 is indeed highly efficient in many cell types, but it is seldom 100% effective at introducing alterations at a target site, although double-digit percentages are routine. More concerning is that the desired “editing” event usually competes with the generation of unwanted mutations at the target site. Thus, genome-editing applications usually generate a mixture of genetically heterogeneous cells.
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Solvency › Not safe
Lander, et.al. 2019 Eric S. Lander , Françoise Baylis , Feng Zhang , Emmanuelle Charpentier , Paul Berg , Catherine Bourgain , Bärbel Friedrich , J. Keith Joung , Jinsong Li , David Liu , Luigi Naldini , Jing-Bao Nie , Renzong Qiu , Bettina Schoene-Seifert , Feng Shao , Sharon Terry , Wensheng Wei & Ernst-Ludwig Winnacker 13 March 2019 Adopt a moratorium on heritable genome editing https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-00726-5
For germline editing to even be considered for a clinical application, its safety and efficacy must be sufficient — taking into account the unmet medical need, the risks and potential benefits and the existence of alternative approaches. Although techniques have improved in the past several years, germline editing is not yet safe or effective enough to justify any use in the clinic. As was evident at the second summit, there is wide agreement in the scientific community that, for clinical germline editing, the risk of failing to make the desired change or of introducing unintended mutations (off-target effects) is still unacceptably high. Considerable research is being directed at this issue.
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Solvency › Not safe
Gregory E. Kaebnick is a research scholar at The Hastings Center and the editor of theHastings Center Report. A Moratorium on Gene Editing? March 27 2015 https://www.thehastingscenter.org/a-moratorium-on-gene-editing/
The second problem – identifying the correct genetic changes – is the real issue, though, and CRISPR/Cas9 doesn’t even address this problem. In fact, no gene editing tool can solve the second problem, any more than a word processing tool can by itself solve the problem of how to write the next great American novel. To identify the “correct” genetic changes, we need to understand what the targeted gene does, but also how it interacts with other genes, and also how the genome interacts with environments. We’re not there. As David Baltimore, a Nobel laureate and a member of one of the groups calling for a moratorium, told the Times,“I personally think we are just not smart enough — and won’t be for a very long time — to feel comfortable about the consequences.” This is the second and bigger reason that the moratorium is a good idea.
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Solvency › Alternatives solve
Mills, P.F.R. (2020). Quals: Peter Mills is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Hawaii at Hilo. He holds his degrees from the University of California, Berkeley (Ph.D.), Washington State University, and the University of Vermont, and his fields of specialization are Oceania and New World Archaeology, complex societies, archaeometry, the archaeology of colonialism, indigenous archaeology, ethnohistory, exchange, and lithic technology. He is active with the , the , and the North Hawaiʻi Education and Research Center’s . Genome Editing and Human Reproduction: The Therapeutic Fallacy and the "Most Unusual Case". Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 63(1), 126-140. . /nfs
Part of the objection to GEHR is that for all the possible outcomes that GEHR may be expected to deliver, there are existing reproductive technologies for securing these outcomes. If this is the case, and these established procedures do not entail the same risks or uncertainties that GEHR does, then introducing GEHR could not be a proportionate means to achieve the desired outcome. What is this outcome? In most discussions of GEHR, this outcome is usually assumed to be the birth of a child with at least two preferred characteristics. The first is implicitly (although often only implicitly) the presence of a direct genetic link to both the prospective parents, which is achieved through the combining of their individual genomes, as happens in unassisted sexual reproduction. The second characteristic is the presence (or absence) of at least one other genetically conditioned feature that the combination of those genomes makes it unlikely (or likely) that any resulting child will inherit. Such a characteristic might be the absence of a serious disease that has been diagnosed in the prospective parents, like cystic fibrosis. Disease traits of this kind are usually assumed to be good candidates for the second characteristic. In such cases, however, GEHR is unlikely to be the only intervention available. There are reproductive technologies that involve the donation of sperm or eggs from third-party donors, thereby simply circumventing the genetic endowment from one parent. Since, however, these children would lack the first preferred characteristic (genetic relatedness), other approaches are also widely available in many (though not all) parts of the world. They involve genetic testing to select embryos for transfer (preimplantation genetic testing, or PGT) or to select pregnancies to carry to term (prenatal testing and termination of pregnancy, PNT/ToP).
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Solvency › Alternatives solve
on April 15, 2019 Environmental Thinker Bill McKibben Sounds Warning on Technology https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/environmental-thinker-bill-mckibben-sounds-warning-on-technology/
I truthfully don't think that human genetic engineering offers us much in the way of benefit. If people are worried about genetic disease, we can already deal with that through preimplantation genetic diagnosis, which is used in fertility clinics around the world. It lets you make sure your child doesn't have a genetic disease, but it doesn't let you improve your child. So I don't think the benefits [of human germline genetic engineering] are very high, and the potential cost—in terms of meaning—is enormous.
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Solvency › Bans work
L. Sophie Gullino January 2022 Human genome editing: unlimited potential or ethical concern?https://oxsci.org/human-genome-editing-unlimited-potential-or-ethical-concern/
As human gene editing has global public health implications, international cooperation is also essential to provide oversight. This can involve international agreements, institutions and bodies that can be developed following international discussion of the different views on gene editing. Notably, not all countries have committed the necessary resources to ensure appropriate and effective regulations of this technology. This introduces the risk of so-called “ethics dumping” which refers to scientists from strictly regulated countries purposefully choosing to conduct research in countries that lack the relevant domestic policy or oversight. This issue should clearly be addressed and international agencies are aiming to assist countries to create a regulatory framework which prevent the unethical use of this technology.
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Solvency › Bans work
Terry Kaan, Vicki Xafis, Owen Schaefer Et al. 11-17-2021 [Kaan is affiliated with The University of Hong Kong, China; Xafis is affiliated with the National University of Singapore and a Journal of Medical Ethics resercher; Schaefer is an Assistant Professor of the Centre for Biomedical Ethics, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine], “Germline genome editing: Moratorium, hard law, or an informed adaptive consensus,” Cut By: m.jam
To begin with, there should be a fixed period during which no clinical uses of germline editing whatsoever are allowed. As well as allowing for discussions about the technical, scientific, medical, societal, ethical and moral issues that must be considered before germline editing is permitted, this period would provide time to establish an international framework. Thereafter, nations may choose to follow separate paths. About 30 nations currently have legislation that directly or indirectly bars all clinical uses of germline editing, and they might choose to continue the moratorium indefinitely or implement a permanent ban. However, any nation could also choose to allow specific applications of germline editing, provided that it first: gives public notice of its intention to consider the application and engages for a defined period in international consultation about the wisdom of doing so; determines through transparent evaluation that the application is justified; and ascertains that there is broad societal consensus in the nation about the appropriateness of the application. Nations might well choose different paths, but they would agree to proceed openly and with due respect to the opinions of humankind on an issue that will ultimately affect the entire species. To be clear, our proposed moratorium does not apply to germline editing for research uses, provided that these studies do not involve the transfer of an embryo to a person’s uterus. It also does not apply to genome editing in human somatic (non-reproductive) cells to treat diseases, for which patients can provide informed consent and the DNA modifications are not heritable. The 18 signatories of this call include scientists and ethicists who are citizens of 7 countries. Many of us have been involved in the gene-editing field by developing and applying the technology, organizing and speaking at international summits, serving on national advisory committees and studying the ethical issues raised.
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Solvency › Bans work
ALICE PARK MARCH 13, 2019 2:22 PM EDT Experts Are Calling for a Ban on Gene Editing of Human Embryos. Here's Why They're Worried https://time.com/5550654/crispr-gene-editing-human-embryos-ban/
The ban applies only to a select set of studies that involve genetic changes to germline cells: studies that involve altering the genes in eggs, sperm or embryos that would then be transferred for pregnancy. The vast majority of genetic experts believe it’s too early for any technique, including CRISPR, to be used in this way, because the safety of the technology hasn’t been established yet. Although CRISPR, for example, gives scientists the most precise molecular scissors possible to snip human DNA exactly where disease-causing genes or mutations might reside — or to even replace portions of the genome with healthy DNA — studies in animals and cells in a lab dish show that sometimes the scissors splice where they aren’t supposed to. It’s also not clear what effect manipulating the human genome by removing or replacing fragments of DNA might have on people’s health — now, or for future generations. The moratorium calls for researchers and nations to suspend studies on human gene editing of eggs, sperm and embryos for about five years, and during that time, for countries agreeing to the ban to encourage societal discussion about how its citizens would like to see such work proceed. If a nation decided it was ready to begin conducting such studies again, it would share its plans with the international community, preferably two years ahead of time, so additional discussions could ensure that safety and ethical issues had been addressed. The moratorium does not apply to research on so-called somatic cells, or any other cell except the egg and sperm that are involved in reproduction. Somatic cells, such as blood and skin, are not passed on to the next generation, so any genetic changes made to a person’s own genome in these cells are not inherited. Promising studies involving gene editing to treat sickle cell, for example, won’t be affected by the ban. “Those clinical trials should not in any way be impeded by this,” says Collins. “The only focus on the moratorium is on embryos and germline manipulation with the intent to implant that embryo in the mother’s womb. It’s a very narrow prohibition. All the rest of the applications of gene editing should not only go forward, but should go forward vigorously and with great energy.”
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Solvency › Bans work
Hurlbut, J.B. (2020).Quals: He is the author of Experiments in Democracy: Human Embryo Research and the Politics of Bioethics (Columbia University Press, 2017) and co-editor of Perfecting Human Futures: Transhuman Visions and Technological Imaginations, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2016), as well as numerous articles and book chapters. He holds an A.B. from Stanford University and a Ph.D. in the History of Science from Harvard University. He was a postdoctoral fellow in the program on Science, Technology and Society at the Harvard Kennedy School. Imperatives of Governance: Human Genome Editing and the Problem of Progress. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 63(1), 177-194. . /nfs
This narrative should now be familiar: a new technology raises “complex ethical and governance issues” yet also “outpaces” responses to them. The “scientific and medical communities” who drive forward development of the technology claim the authority and responsibility to respond, even as actions undertaken and encouraged by members of those communities “outpace” their own efforts to address those issues. Science first, ethics second. As we have seen, this story is a self-fulfilling prophesy. It is the story He told himself—and was told by others—to justify his experiment. Yet He’s experiment, driven by others’ predictions of inevitability, was then itself taken as proof that HGGE is inevitable. This is manufactured inevitability, and it is used to assert an imperative of governance: science races ahead irrespective of whether societal consensus is or is not achieved. Therefore governance must cease the futile effort to sail against the winds of scientific and technological change, shift course and catch up by “thoughtfully crafting regulations of the technology without stifling it” (Doudna 2019). The inevitable must be embraced because it is unavoidable. But it is unavoidable because it is embraced. In this vision of governance, catching up means ceasing to ask whether science has given us a technological future we wish to welcome or shun. It means acquiescing to what is (putatively) inevitable and then mitigating its negative effects as best we can. Governance—steering the ship—becomes on this view an ethically attenuated effort to regain a modicum of control: reclaiming the helm from a mutinous rogue who threatens the future of science, but nevertheless following the course he charted—in effect, doing responsibly what He did irresponsibly. “[The He] case highlights the urgent need to accelerate efforts to reach international agreement upon more specific criteria and standards that have to be met before human germline editing would be deemed permissible” (Dzau, McNutt and Bai 2018).
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Solvency › Bans work
Hurlbut, J.B. (2020).the author of Experiments in Democracy: Human Embryo Research and the Politics of Bioethics (Columbia University Press, 2017) and co-editor of Perfecting Human Futures: Transhuman Visions and Technological Imaginations, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2016), as well as numerous articles and book chapters. He holds an A.B. from Stanford University and a Ph.D. in the History of Science from Harvard University. He was a postdoctoral fellow in the program on Science, Technology and Society at the Harvard Kennedy School. Imperatives of Governance: Human Genome Editing and the Problem of Progress. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 63(1), 177-194. . /nfs
Why should this be? In what other domain of social life do we treat the violation of a prohibition as justification for abandoning that prohibition? We do not accept thievery and murder simply because there are always thieves and murderers in any society. Why should we respond to what David Baltimore in his rebuke to He at the Second International Summit described as “a failure of self-regulation by the scientific community” by doubling down on self-regulation by the scientific community (Statement of David Baltimore 2018)? Surely the judgment of an individual scientist, an advisory committee or even a whole professional community should not be privileged over a societal commitment to democratic governance simply because scientists feel constrained in their freedom to do what they want. Certainly it is challenging to achieve a democratic and cosmopolitan bioethics sufficient to govern a technology that “touches on the whole of humanity” (Hurlbut et al. 2018; Feinstein et al. 2019). Surely this means that we must redouble our efforts, not abandon them. Far from casting aside the aspiration to “broad societal consensus,” we should see with clear eyes what happens when scientists (and, thus, science) are left to decide for themselves the future of humanity. He’s hubristic project was an act of appropriation and has rightly been condemned as such. But so too is the move to substitute “broad scientific consensus on the responsible pursuit of human genome editing research and clinical applications” for “broad societal consensus” about our common future (Dzau, McNutt, and Bai 2018; Organizing Committee for the International Summit on Human Gene Editing 2015, emphasis added). One of the most startling features of the He debacle is the sense of urgency to race ahead that it has engendered in the upper echelons of international science. It is one thing for a young, ambitious and reckless scientist operating at “Shenzhen speed” to put the pedal to the floor (Kirksey 2020). When the leaders of international science declare an “urgent need to accelerate efforts,” hitting the gas in hot pursuit of runaway science that they themselves have branded as “rogue,” they are recklessly committing to a race of their own making (Dzau, McNutt and Bai 2018). Why not call a halt instead? In fact, some have done just that, calling for an explicit, international moratorium on creating genome-edited babies for a defined period of time (Lander et al 2019). It is extraordinary—and revealing—that this apparently unobjectionable proposal has itself become a focus of controversy. Opponents have argued that a de facto moratorium is already in place, but object to making it explicit by using the term itself (Begley 2019). The objection comes down to a preference for self-imposed scientific limitation, so that the scientists who impose limits at one moment are free to lift them in the next. David Baltimore has argued: The important point is to be flexible going forward. That’s what’s wrong with a moratorium. It’s that the idea gets fixed in people’s minds that we’re making firm statements about what we don’t want to do and for how long we don’t want to do it. With a science that’s moving forward as rapidly as this science is, you want to be able to adapt to new discoveries, new opportunities and new understandings. To make rules is probably not a good idea. (Saey 2019) Yet setting a rule that clearly prohibited HGGE—and threatening excommunication from international science for violating it—is precisely what would have restrained He and his boosters. Given this, why not make firm statements about “what we don’t want to do”? Yet, setting rules for what should or should not be done is not the remit of science alone. The question of whether to proceed, particularly on a matter that touches upon such fundamental dimensions of human life, belongs to all of us. There has not yet been a serious effort to invite inclusive public deliberation, to say nothing of anything resembling consensus. Why, therefore, should the default be to let research go forward? The reason is that what is at stake for the opponents of the moratorium proposal is not merely governance of genome editing, but scientific freedom as such—the sovereign authority of science to self-regulate and self-govern. As Baltimore explains: restricting gene editing “could hold back the science” (Saey 2019). In other words, science should race ahead, and ethics should lag behind—after all, “there’s nothing like actually moving ahead [with research] to teach us what the actual pitfalls are” (Saey 2019). But surely He Jiankui has already made it abundantly clear that the pitfall of blindly and recklessly moving ahead is that one moves ahead blindly and recklessly.
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 3 - Bioterrorism › 2AC---No Countermeasures
Antonio Regalado, 19, (Antonio Regalado, 5-2-2019, MIT Technology Review, The search for the kryptonite that can stop CRISPR, https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/05/02/65813/the-search-for-the-kryptonite-that-can-stop-crispr/, 6-28-2022) SCade
In September 2016, Jennifer Doudna called a new colleague named Kyle Watters to her office. By then, the University of California, Berkeley, biochemist was famous as the coinventor of CRISPR. The invention of the fast and versatile tool to edit genes had vaulted her to global notoriety and to considerable wealth. She was the founder of several startup companies and had collected millions in science-prize money. Ominously, though, as Doudna has recounted, she was haunted by a dream in which Adolf Hitler appeared, holding a pen and paper, requesting a copy of the CRISPR recipe. What horrible purpose could Hitler have? Doudna, in her retellings of her dream, didn’t say. Now Doudna’s question was, would Watters like to work on a way to stop it? Stop CRISPR. CRISPR is found inside bacteria. It’s a billion-year-old defense against marauding viruses that spots their DNA and uses a scissors-like protein to chop it up. Doudna played a key role in transforming the find into a revolutionary gene-editing tool that’s been taken up worldwide, propelling a wave of new research and potential cures. But if scientists learn to deliver gene editors inside people’s bodies, what’s to stop a madman, terrorist, or state from employing CRISPR to cause harm? People imagine personalized attacks that would strike only at certain ethnic groups or super soldiers edited to feel no pain. Doudna was well familiar with the dilemma. In her book A Crack in Creation, she wrote that she feared gene editing could come to the world’s attention, as atomic power did, in a mushroom cloud. “Could I and other concerned scientists save CRISPR from itself … before a cataclysm occurred?” Now she would have a chance. Earlier in 2016, the US intelligence agencies had designated gene editing as a potential weapon of mass destruction. That September, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) had jumped in, putting out a call for new ways to control or reverse the effects of gene-editing technology. The program, called Safe Genes, would end up with a budget of more than $65 million, making it one of the largest sources of cash for CRISPR research, aside from biotech startups developing new genetic treatments. One problem, as DARPA saw it, was the lack of any easy-to-use countermeasure, undo button, or antidote for CRISPR. And the more powerful gene editing becomes, the more we might need one—in case of a lab accident, or worse. As UC Berkeley put it in a 2017 press release after Doudna, with Watters’s help, claimed part of the big DARPA contract, the university intended to build tools to counter bioterrorism threats including “weapons employing CRISPR itself.” CRISPR weapons? We’ll leave it to your imagination exactly what one could look like. What is safe to say, though, is that DARPA has asked Doudna and others to start looking into prophylactic treatments or even pills you could take to stop gene editing, just the way you can swallow antibiotics if you’ve gotten an anthrax letter in the mail. Scientists under Doudna’s project say they are set to begin initial tests on mice to see if the rodents can be made immune to CRISPR editors. “Can we shut off CRISPR?” asks Joseph S. Schoeniger, who leads one arm of the defense effort at Sandia National Laboratories, in Livermore, California. “That is what we are looking at. The basic concept is that this technology is coming along, [so] wouldn’t it be nice to have an ‘off’ switch.”
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**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 3 - Bioterrorism › 2AC---Germline undetected
CROSS 18. (Ryan Cross covers the science and business of the biotech industry and drug discovery for the Boston Globe. He was previously a biotech reporter for Chemical & Engineering News where led coverage of COVID-19 vaccines. He has also written for MIT Technology Review and Science magazine. “Synthetic Biology Poses New Biosecurity Risks: Report from National Academies Categorizes a Dozen Scenarios from Highest to Lowest Concern.” C&EN Global Enterprise, vol. 96, no. 26, June 2018, p. 16. EBSCOhost, . Last Accessed: June 29, 2022, shARK).
The report, released last week by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, & Medicine, identifies a dozen ways that synthetic biology could be used to create biological weapons to harm humans. “Synthetic biology has the potential to enable new types of weapons,” says Michael J. Imperiale, a microbiologist at the University of Michigan Medical School and chair of the committee that authored the report. The committee identified three concerns of highest priority, including recreating pathogenic viruses such as Ebola, SARS, or smallpox. The second is engineering bacteria to make them more dangerous, which could be easily accomplished by inserting genes to confer antibiotic resistance. “Capabilities to do either of those have been around for a long time. They are only becoming more readily available,” Imperiale says. The third major concern is engineering microbes to produce and release toxic biochemicals. “The effects could resemble a chemical weapon or food poisoning,” says Patrick Boyle, head of design at Ginkgo Bioworks and an author of the new report. That scenario is particularly worrisome because it is unclear how long it would take scientists to detect that a maliciously engineered microbe was at play rather than a natural pathogen. “The report was extremely well done and delivered something that has potential to be useful for policy-makers,” because it prioritized potential threats, says Margaret E. Kosal, a chemist by training and currently a professor of international affairs at Georgia Institute of Technology, who reviewed a draft of the report. “If everything is a problem, then nothing gets addressed,” she says. The report highlights one recently published scientific study outlining how to construct a horsepox virus, a relative of smallpox thought to be extinct in nature. Many biodefense experts, including Gregory Koblentz of George Mason University, have warned that synthetic biology tools could enable recreation of smallpox. “Safeguards against the misuse of those tools are weak and fragmented,” he says. Currently, some synthetic biology companies choose to run their own safeguards. Twist Bioscience uses computer programs to scan its DNA orders, and James Diggans, director of bioinformatics and biosecurity, says the company would have easily detected the horsepox DNA due to its similarity to smallpox. “That would have triggered internal review,” Diggans says. That virus is “not something we would be comfortable manufacturing,” he adds. Diggans, who also reviewed a draft of the report, applauds the “balanced treatment of the incredibly positive impact of synthetic biology and its risks.” However, he thinks that synthetic biology doesn’t actually make building biological weapons easier. Kosal concurs. “Making ineffective biological weapons is easy,” she says. “Making effective biological weapons is not easy.” —RYAN CROSS
2022
SDI
Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 3 - Bioterrorism › 2AC---CRISPR BioTerror
Gronlund 18. (Kristen Gronlund, Kirsten Gronlund is a writer and researcher with an interest in policy issues. She majored in English at Cornell University and double minored in neurobiology and philosophy. “Genome Editing and the Future of Biowarfare: A Conversation with Dr. Piers Millett.” The Future of Life Institute, October 12, 2018. . Last Accessed: June 29, 2022, shARK).
Developments such as CRISPR present new possibilities for biowarfare, but biological weapons caused concern long before the advent of gene editing. The first recorded use of biological pathogens in warfare dates back to 600 BC, when Solon, an Athenian statesman, poisoned enemy water supplies during the siege of Krissa. Many centuries later, during the 1346 AD siege of Caffa, the Mongol army catapulted plague-infested corpses into the city, which is thought to have contributed to the 14th century Black Death pandemic that wiped out up to two thirds of Europe’s population. Though biological weapons were internationally banned by the 1925 Geneva Convention, state biowarfare programs continued and in many cases expanded during World War II and the Cold War. In 1972, as evidence of these violations mounted, 103 nations signed a treaty known as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The treaty bans the creation of biological arsenals and outlaws offensive biological research, though defensive research is permissible. Each year, signatories are required to submit certain information about their biological research programs to the United Nations, and violations reported to the UN Security Council may result in an inspection. But inspections can be vetoed by the permanent members of the Security Council, and there are no firm guidelines for enforcement. On top of this, the line that separates permissible defensive biological research from its offensive counterpart is murky and remains a subject of controversy. And though the actual numbers remain unknown, pathologist Dr. Riedel asserts that “the number of state-sponsored programs has increased significantly during the last 30 years.”
2022
SDI
Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 3 - Bioterrorism › 2AC---Break Out Programs
Gronlund 18. (Kristen Gronlund, Kirsten Gronlund is a writer and researcher with an interest in policy issues. She majored in English at Cornell University and double minored in neurobiology and philosophy. “Genome Editing and the Future of Biowarfare: A Conversation with Dr. Piers Millett.” The Future of Life Institute, October 12, 2018. . Last Accessed: June 29, 2022, shARK).
Large-scale bioweapons programs, such as those run by states, pose a double threat: there is always the possibility of accidental release alongside the potential for malicious use. Millett believes that these threats are roughly equal, a conclusion backed by a thousand page report from Gryphon Scientific, a US defense contractor. Historically, both accidental release and malicious use of biological agents have caused damage. In 1979, there was the accidental release of aerosolized anthrax from the Sverdlovsk bioweapons production facility in the Soviet Union – a clogged air filter in the facility had been removed, but had not been replaced. Ninety-four people were affected by the incident and at least 64 died, along with a number of livestock. The Soviet secret police attempted a cover-up and it was not until years later that the administration admitted the cause of the outbreak. More recently, Millett says, a US biodefense facility “failed to kill the anthrax that it sent out for various lab trials, and ended up sending out really nasty anthrax around the world.” Though no one was infected, a 2015 government investigation revealed that “over the course of the last decade, 86 facilities in the United States and seven other countries have received low concentrations of live spore samples… thought to be completely inactivated.” These incidents pale, however, in comparison with Japan’s intentional use of biological weapons during the 1930s and 40s. There is “a published history that suggests up to 30,000 people were killed in China by the Japanese biological weapons program during the lead up to World War II. And if that data is accurate, that is orders of magnitude bigger than anything else,” Millett says. Given the near-impossibility of controlling the spread of disease, a deliberate attack may have accidental effects far beyond what was intended. The Japanese, for example, may have meant to target only a few Chinese villages, only to unwittingly trigger an epidemic. There are reports, in fact, that thousands of Japan’s own soldiers became infected during a biological attack in 1941.Despite the 1972 ban on biological weapons programs, Millett believes that many countries still have the capacity to produce biological weapons. As an example, he explains that the Soviets developed “a set of research and development tools that would answer the key questions and give you all the key capabilities to make biological weapons.” The BWC only bans offensive research, and “underneath the umbrella of a defensive program,” Millett says, “you can do a whole load of research and development to figure out what you would want to weaponize if you were going to make a weapon.” Then, all a country needs to start producing those weapons is “the capacity to scale up production very, very quickly.” The Soviets, for example, built “a set of state-based commercial infrastructure to make things like vaccines.” On a day-to-day basis, they were making things the Soviet Union needed. “But they could be very radically rebooted and repurposed into production facilities for their biological weapons program,” Millett explains. This is known as a “breakout program.”Says Millett, “I believe there are many, many countries that are well within the scope of a breakout program … so it’s not that they necessarily at this second have a fully prepared and worked-out biological weapons program that they can unleash on the world tomorrow, but they might well have all of the building blocks they need to do that in place, and a plan for how to turn their existing infrastructure towards a weapons program if they ever needed to. These components would be permissible under current international law.”