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2022 CNDI Affirmative
NEG › Russia General – NEG › 1NC --- Russia = Defensive

Russia is not being aggressive towards NATO

Fernandes and Finney 16 (Benjamin J Fernandes and Nathan K Finney, Benjamin J Fernandes is a George Mason University PhD student, Council on Foreign Relations Term Member, and U.S. Army officer. His studies focus on security assistance, governance, principal-agent theory, and grand strategy. Nathan K Finney is an officer in the U.S. Army and a PhD candidate in history at the University of Kansas. He is also the founder of the online journal , founder and at the , ‘The Myth of Russian Aggression and NATO Expansion’, Strategy Bridge,  , https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2016/12/16/the-myth-of-russian-aggression-and-nato-expansion)

With the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, many foreign policy experts such as , , , and others warned against expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to former Soviet-aligned countries, arguing expansion would the Russians to take steps inimical to America’s interests. The events of the post-Cold War era simply do not support this assertion. Rather, the historical evidence suggests Russian leaders act aggressively when the cost-benefit-risk of aggression weighs heavily in Russia’s favor—a threshold past NATO expansions have never crossed.

In the intervening 20 years, Russia has protested NATO expansion but never acted aggressively in response to expansion. Russia did respond militarily to events that threatened their interests, such as the revolution in Ukraine and improving Ukraine-European Union economic ties. In those cases, the benefits of military action dwarfed the costs from the perspective of Russian leaders. Recent Russian actions indicate U.S. and NATO will likely continue clashing with Russia, regardless of changes to U.S. administrations, due to the dramatically different values and assumptions held by Russian and NATO leaders. NATO’s defense reductions combined with perceptions the West has few have helped foster an environment where Russia likely believes the costs of aggression are low. To counter this perception, the United States and NATO should continue and expand policies, like the , likely to increase the risks and costs associated with aggression from a Russian perspective.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Russia General – AFF › 2AC --- Russia = Offensive

Russia is an offensive realist that acts irrationally through force

Dayspring 15 [Chief Warrant Officer 4 Stephen Dayspring is a Special Forces Warrant Officer with 17 years of operational experience in 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne). He is currently completing a Master of Science in Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, “TOWARD A THEORY OF HYBRID WARFARE: THE RUSSIAN CONDUCT OF WAR DURING PEACE”, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2015, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=790442] SL

There are two traditions regarding the relationship between conflict and politics: realism and liberalism. “For the realist, the central problem of international politics is war and the use of force, and the central actors are states.”52 The realist is pragmatic in that he expects that others will try to take what he is unable to defend so he must demonstrate strength to ensure his sovereignty. By maximizing one’s own power, one minimizes the ability of other states to threaten one’s security.53 At a certain point however, the realist becomes strong enough that he begins considering what he might be able to take from a weaker neighbor. The “offensive realist” does not even think there is a choice; the only way he can better his odds of survival is to have more relative power than his potential enemies, a gulf he can widen by physically reducing his adversary’s strength.54 Realists see the contemporary international system as anarchic—there is no central or governing power- so the only things that enforce order are the individual states’ ability and willingness to fight to maintain the status quo. Neo-liberalism envisions “a global society that functions alongside the states and sets part of the context for the states.”56 Liberalism promotes the view not just of international governing bodies and legal restraint, but also that interdependent trade, monetary systems, and cross border communication have evolved into a transnational society where conflict is less likely. This is the essence of globalization, and is the preferred view of the world generally held in the West. Realists counter that there will always be a potential for a future state of war and one had better be ready to protect against it. Offensive realism is not a popular concept in the liberal-minded West because it tends to be at odds with our traditionally optimistic values.57 It is the difference in world view of relation power that explains why a country like Russia would suddenly seize Crimea, or why China would rapidly expand into its neighbors’ territorial waters. If a state views the world through the realist lens, specifically from the position of offensive realism, that state’s actions often appear irrational to liberal outsiders as those actions undermine the best interests of the international community. They appear much more pragmatic when they are seen to increase the relative power, and therefore the chances of survival, of the aggressor state. While this realist perspective might be depressing, “it behooves us to see the world as it is, not as we would like it to be.”

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Impact Extensions › 2AC --- Impact Extension --- Econ

US Economic Collapse has severe effects – utilities, unemployment, GDP

Amadeo 22 [Kimberley Amadeo, an expert on U.S. and world economies and investing, with over 20 years of experience in economic analysis and business strategy. She is the President of the economic website World Money Watch. As a writer for The Balance, Kimberly provides insight on the state of the present-day economy, as well as past events that have had a lasting impact, March 4, 2022, “US Economic Collapse: What Would Happen?”, the balance, https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-economy-collapse-what-will-happen-how-to-prepare-3305690]-Hayer

If the U.S. economy were to collapse, you would likely lose access to credit. Banks would close. Demand would outstrip supply of food, gas, and other necessities. If the collapse affected local governments and utilities, then water and electricity might no longer be available. A U.S. economic collapse would create global panic. Demand for the dollar and U.S. Treasurys would plummet. Interest rates would skyrocket. Investors would rush to other currencies, such as the yuan, euro, or even gold. It would create not just inflation, but hyperinflation, as the dollar would lose value to other currencies. If you want to understand what life would look like during an economic collapse, think back to the Great Depression. The stock market crashed on Black Thursday.3 By the following Tuesday, it was down 25%. Many investors lost their life savings that weekend. By 1932, one out of four Americans was unemployed.4 Wages for those who still had jobs fell precipitously—manufacturing wages dropped 32% from 1929 to 1932.5 U.S. gross domestic product was cut nearly in half. Thousands of farmers and other unemployed workers moved to California and elsewhere in search of work. Two-and-a-half million people left the Midwestern Dust Bowl states.6 The Dow Jones Industrial Average didn't rebound to its pre-Crash level until 1954.7

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Impact Extensions › 2AC --- AT: No Russia War --- Conflict Prone

Russia is likely to be in conflict - oil

Weeks and Colgan 2-27-22 [Jessica L.P. Weeks and Jeff D. Colgan, Jessica L.P. Weeks is professor of political science and H. Douglas Weaver chair in diplomacy and international relations at the University of Wisconsin at Madison and Jeff D. Colgan is the Richard Holbrooke associate professor of political science at Brown University, February 27, 2022, “There’s a reason Putin can be so aggressive: Oil”, The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/27/theres-reason-putin-can-be-so-aggressive-oil/]-Hayer

Russia’s oil wealth intensifies the problem of personalist rule and aggressive foreign policy. One of us coined the term “petro-aggression,” indicating the link between oil and war. It turns out that major oil-exporting countries like Russia, known as petrostates, are about 50 percent more conflict prone than non-petrostates, on average, and oil has played a role in 25 to 50 percent of recent wars. Other petrostates with aggressive pasts include Iraq, Libya and Iran. Not every petrostate is conflict-prone, of course. Much depends on the leader’s preferences. When a leader is not interested in revising the status quo, there is nothing about oil that inherently leads to conflict. In the hands of an aggressive or revisionist leader like Putin, however, oil can further reduce domestic political constraints. Oil money allows an autocrat to buy off domestic opposition, build a military machine and create a war chest to ward off sanctions. In that sense, Putin is following in the footsteps of other petrostate dictators like Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi. Oil and energy also helped set the 2014 political context for Putin’s invasion of Crimea.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Impact Extensions › 2AC --- Impact Extension --- Cohesion

NATO cohesion is beneficial

Bazin and Kunertova 18 [Aaron Bazin and Dominika Kunertova, Lt. Col. Aaron Bazin, PsyD, is a transitioning U.S. Army officer, Functional Area 59 (strategist). He holds a doctorate in psychology, specializing in mediation and conflict resolution. He has over twenty years of experience including service with NATO and the U.S. Army Central Command, and operation deployments to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan. He previously published “Winning Trust under Fire” in the January-February 2015 issue of Military Review, Dominika Kunertova is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Université de Montréal, Quebec, Canada. She holds a BA in political science from Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovakia, and an MA in international relations from Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic. Her research focuses on transatlantic security and defense cooperation, and she has published in the Journal of Transatlantic Studies and European Security, February 2018, “An Alliance Divided?”, Military Review, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/An-Alliance-Divided-Five-Factors-That-Could-Fracture-NATO/]-Hayer

The next key term, alliance cohesion, reflects the degree to which the members are able to agree on goals, strategies, and tactics, and coordinate activity for attaining those goals.7 In addition to this behavioral component, cohesion represents the particular quality that makes its members operate as a whole during times of crisis. Literature from the psychology field defines cohesion as “bonds, either social or task based, that contribute to the synergistic functioning as a whole.”8 Other accounts claim “alliance cohesion is based upon the distance between individual member interests and the collective alliance interest.”9 In defining this term, it is key to note that cohesion is a very fluid idea, contextually based and highly subjective. Therefore, this research proceeded under the assumption that cohesion is largely qualitative in nature. Some assert that the best moment to understand cohesion is in time of crisis, such as when the Alliance faces a significant conflict. In case of wartime alliances, cohesion refers to the states’ ability to coordinate military strategy, agree on war aims, and avoid making a separate peace, together with “the degree of convergence among member states’ commitments to the alliance.”10 This is important, since conventional wisdom asserts the source of cohesion is usually the element (be it political, economic, military, or nonmaterial) that is targeted by adversary activities and likely results in the defeat of the attacked party. It then follows that by adhering to these definitions, one could consider Alliance cohesion to be at the level of a center of gravity, since it “exerts a certain centripetal force that tends to hold an entire … structure together.”

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Impact Extensions › 2AC --- Impact Extension --- Cohesion

NATO cohesion allows for stability and advancement

Burns and Lute 19 [Ambassador Nicholas Burns is the Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations at the Harvard Kennedy School. Ambassador Douglas Lute is the former United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s standing political body. “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 10-19-18, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nato-seventy-alliance-crisis] SL

NATO maintains a partnership with forty-one countries outside the Alliance from Mauritania in West Africa to Japan.16 Many states have been invaluable members of coalitions in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans and in the fight against the Islamic State. Most important, NATO should strengthen its partnership with the European Union. Partnerships with the Gulf Coordination Council, the African Union and the Arab League could promote stability along NATO’s periphery. NATO faces yet another critical challenge in adapting quickly to a rapidly changing, global, military technology landscape. Its often-byzantine defense planning processes date to the Cold War, long before the extraordinary, current advances in military arms powered by artificial intelligence, cyber, robotics, quantum computing and biotechnology—perhaps the most decisive change in military technology since the start of the nuclear age. NATO allies, led by the United States, must now commit a far greater share of their military budgets to acquiring these new military technologies, lest China and Russia gain a decisive advantage in the decade ahead.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Impact Extensions › 2AC --- Impact Extension --- Populism

European populism will increase nuclear risk.

Gevarter ’18 [David, an intern for European studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Could European Populism Go Nuclear on NATO?”, The Council for Foreign Affairs, 19 July 2018, ] -ALP

As part of NATO’s shared nuclear deterrent, the United States currently deploys the B61 gravity bomb in five NATO countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. While nuclear weapons are not popular among the European public, technocrats in European governments have recognized that the NATO nuclear deterrent is an unpleasant but strategic imperative. However, the rise of populist and nationalist movements across Europe could damage this consensus and threaten the integrity of NATO’s nuclear mission. The Trump administration believes that the United States must deploy more tactical (non-strategic) weapons in Europe through NATO to signal to Russia that any use of tactical weapons would be met by an equivalent response. The 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review claims that Russia is more likely to use tactical nuclear weapons in a first strike to gain advantage because it believes the United States would not escalate with a strategic nuclear strike. As such, the Trump administration has placed great importance on expanding the United States’ arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons—such as the B61—as a way of countering the perceived Russian advantage in this field. Yet, this strategy could encounter serious obstacles as populist governments gain a foothold on the continent, exacerbated by growing anti-American sentiment. As the wave of populist governments gains popularity in Europe, instead of upholding long-standing NATO commitments, these governments might cave to the will of the masses. They could order the withdrawal of NATO—namely, U.S.—nuclear weapons from their territory, disregarding strategic necessity. The surge of populism in Germany, the backbone of the European project, can do the most damage to the shared nuclear deterrent. The current German government has thus far maintained the nuclear status quo despite opposition, but Angela Merkel’s hold on power is not what it used to be. Recent figures show that 71 percent of Germans favor banning nuclear weapons, and a change in Germany’s executive government could put NATO interests at risk. In the 2017 federal election, Merkel’s political alliance lost a significant percentage of its seats in the Bundestag, most notably to the populist, right-wing party Alternative for Deutschland (AfD). In its platform, AfD explicitly calls for the withdrawal of all NATO troops and nuclear weapons from German territory. With the near collapse of the current German government over immigration, the possibility of a rise to power by AfD or a party with similar views is no longer far-fetched. Like in Germany, the specter of populism has become very real in Italy, with the anti-establishment coalition formed by the League and 5-Star parties taking power. This could spell trouble for the NATO shared deterrent, given the broad unpopularity of nuclear weapons in the country. According to a 2007 survey, 70 percent of Italian respondents indicated that the use of NATO nuclear weapons would never be justified, even in the context of war. Over half of respondents indicated that they believed NATO nuclear-sharing agreements violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and that Italy should not be party to such agreements. Maintaining and expanding the U.S. nuclear arsenal in Italy will require significant cooperation from the Italian government, but Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte's government has shown little intention to acquiesce to President Trump's demands for NATO, such as increasing defense spending. It appears that the new, pro-Russia government in Italy is willing to do whatever it takes to appeal to public opinion, irrespective of the ramifications. Russia has always wanted the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe and such a move could be part of an Italian strategy of warming relations with the Kremlin. The 2016 attempted military coup showed that Turkey is the most unstable NATO country, where the future of nuclear sharing is, at best, unsure. Since the attempted coup, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s populist government has further undermined Turkey’s relationship with the United States, NATO, and other Western countries as the country secures diplomatic and military rapprochement with Moscow. Erdogan has leveraged populist rhetoric to consolidate power, galvanizing support for his agenda and eroding checks and balances on his rule. Erdogan himself is no fan of nuclear weapons, and it is easy to imagine a scenario in which, as part of a pivot toward Moscow, Erdogan orders NATO nuclear weapons out of Turkey. Even if that is not the case, many experts argue that the United States should withdraw its nuclear weapons from Turkey, given the deteriorating political climate in the country. This, given the country’s proximity to Russia and other areas of interest in the Middle East, could jeopardize NATO’s ability to hold enemy targets at risk with its nuclear arsenal. The uncertainty throughout NATO countries prompts questions regarding the future of the shared nuclear deterrent. If U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are withdrawn from Turkey or elsewhere in Europe, where else could they go? Some have suggested Poland, given the country’s desire for an increased NATO presence, but this unprecedented expansion of the nuclear deterrent to Eastern Europe could—and likely would—spark a dramatic showdown with Russia, turning the Polish border with Kaliningrad into a hot zone. The worsening wave of populism in Europe could give impetus to European popular opposition to nuclear weapons, forcing their withdrawal from the continent. If the Pentagon truly wants to adhere to its designs to expand its arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe as part of the NATO shared nuclear deterrent, it needs to start coming up with contingency plans. At the very least, President Trump should stop antagonizing NATO allies and try to preserve what little good will remains toward the U.S. agenda.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Impact Extensions › 2AC --- Impact Extension --- Populism

Populism accelerates climate change

Leigh 21 [Andrew Leigh, Member of Australian Parliament, November 5, 2021, “How Populism Imperils the Planet”, THE MIT PRESS READER, ttps://thereader.mitpress.mit.edu/how-populism-imperils-the-planet/]-Hayer

Yet focusing on catastrophic risk — in climate change and other areas — is hampered by the growth of populist politics. Not every populist is a climate denier, but virtually all climate deniers are populists. One analysis of the 21 largest right-wing populist parties in Europe found that one-third were outright climate deniers, while many others were hostile to climate action. Right-wing populists make up 15 percent of the European Parliament, but their votes account for around half of all those voting against climate and energy resolutions. A recent study in the United Kingdom identified voters who held populist beliefs about politics. These populist voters were significantly less likely to agree that global warming is caused by human action and less likely to support measures to protect the environment. Populism is on the rise. From 1990 to 2018, the number of countries with populist leaders increased from four to 20. The best known was President Donald Trump, who once claimed that climate change is a “hoax,” and asserted that “global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive.” In the current Congress, 52 percent of House Republicans and 60 percent of Senate Republicans are climate deniers. In Brazil, President Jair Bolsonaro has loosened controls over land clearing in the Amazon. This has led farmers to accelerate deforestation by logging and burning. In mid-2019, satellite analysis of major fires in the Amazon showed that an area the size of Yellowstone National Park had been burned. At this pace, this additional deforestation could push the Amazon rainforest toward a tipping point.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Impact Extensions › 2AC --- Impact Extension --- Populism

Populists use nuclear weapons irresponsibly

Meier and Vieluf 21 [Oliver Meier is a senior Researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy. Prior to this, he was Deputy Head in the International Security Division of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Maren Vieluf is a researcher at Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy. December 16, 2021, "Upsetting the nuclear order: how the rise of nationalist populism increases nuclear dangers", The Nonproliferation Review, https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1864932] SL

Nationalist populists, by contrast, often speak loosely about nuclear weapons, which complicates a “reading” of their statements.52 This concerns both style and substance, which coincide with their personalistic style of leadership53 and their desire to flout the rules of what they deride as “political correctness.”54 Donald Trump has again led the way—for example, through his excessive tweeting on nuclear-weapon issues.55 Other nationalist populists have also deviated from previous rhetorical styles by bragging about their nuclear weapons. In April 2019, shortly after an escalation of the Pulwama crisis between India and Pakistan had been averted, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi suggested that his country was ready to use nuclear weapons against Pakistan: “Every other day they used to say ‘we have nuclear button, we have nuclear button’. What do we have then? Have we kept it for Diwali?”56 President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s October 2019 statement that it is unacceptable for Turkey not to have nuclear weapons because “[t]here is no developed nation in the world that doesn’t have them”57 is another typically populist statement, conflating strong views with half-truths or lies. Such loose talk may have several purposes. By emphasizing nuclear weapons, nationalist populists can set themselves apart from the established elite discourse. Donald Trump boasted of having gained knowledge of nuclear weapons not through a formal education but through his uncle, a professor of engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.58 Thus, the US president believed that he did not need to rely on the expertise and experience of the nuclear elite. This ignorance of nuclear lessons by virtue of not “being socialized to the dangers of nuclear weapons”59 derived from the past is a trademark of nationalist populists, but is also part and parcel of a general loss of expertise in executives and parliaments in nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-allied countries.60 Nationalist populists also like to make strong statements on nuclear issues because they may believe that this impresses their main target audience—that is, their domestic power base. Thus, Putin has several times used his regular direct encounters with the Russian public to highlight the importance of nuclear weapons for Moscow’s standing in the world. In March 2018, Putin, in his speech to the Federal Assembly of Parliamentarians, policy makers, religious leaders, public figures, and members of the media, boasted about Russia’s nuclear capabilities and in true populist fashion even invited “[t]hose interested in military equipment … to suggest a name for this new weaponry, this cutting-edge” nuclear-weapon system.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Impact Extensions › 2AC --- Impact Extension --- Democratic Backsliding

Democratic Sliding means authoritarianism

Hudson 21 [Alexander Hudson, a Democracy Assessment Specialist in the Democracy Assessment Unit of International IDEA’s Global Programmes in Stockholm. As part of the team that produces the Global State of Democracy Indices and Global State of Democracy Report, Hudson contributes to our data collection, analysis and visualization work, December 16, 2022, “Democratic backsliding, Different causes, divergent trajectories”, INTERNATIONAL IDEA, https://www.idea.int/blog/democratic-backsliding-different-causes-divergent-trajectories]-Hayer

By democratic backsliding, political analysts generally mean that a democracy is slipping backwards in terms of its democratic performance, and that there are signs of rising authoritarianism. One succinct definition holds that democratic backsliding involves “state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that sustain an existing democracy.” Democratic backsliding differs from more generalized democratic erosion in terms of both intent and focus. International IDEA’s research in this area has highlighted the linkage between democratic backsliding and actions that specifically damage both horizontal constraints (via attacks on the legislature and the courts) and accountability to the voting public (via interference with media integrity and civil liberties). In most cases of democratic backsliding, the ability to hold free and fair elections is not immediately impacted – though this may come later. Applying the implications of this research in a diagnostic way, International IDEA tracks the average value of its indicators for Checks on Government and Civil Liberties for every country, and where we see a decline compared to five years ago that is greater than the threshold we’ve defined, we classify that country as backsliding. That also means that each country is compared to itself, not to some abstract and universal standard.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Impact Extensions › 2AC --- Impact Extension --- Democratic Backsliding

Democratic backsliding undermines law

Wolkenstein 20[Fabio Wolkenstein is an Assistant Professor of "Transformations of Democracy" at the University of Vienna. I work on democratic theory, political parties, representation, ideologies, and the political theory of the EU. Previously I was Associate Professor of politics at Aarhus University and affiliated researcher in political theory, “Transnational Complicity in Democratic Backsliding”, Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric, 12-2-20, https://www.theglobaljusticenetwork.org/index.php/gjn/article/view/206] SL

This leads to another question that must be clarified before moving on: why is democratic backsliding a form of wrongdoing? I have so far just postulated that democratic backsliding is a ‘wrong,’ and relied on readers’ intuitive agreement with this conjecture. But why exactly is it a wrong? The most straightforward answer, I suggest, is that Hungary and Poland violate their duty to obey EU law when they undermine democracy and the rule of law. That duty arises because both states have democratically ratified the EU treaties, thereby having accepted the treaties as (1) a framework for dealing with a specified range of issues and a source of normative demands on national institutional configurations.8 Of course, this is not the only answer that could be given to this question. It is probably possible to mount a more general case against democratic backsliding that shows that governments who undermine democracy and the rule of law engage in wrongdoing irrespective of which treaties they may have signed. This could be achieved by invoking a moral requirement that states ought to secure citizens’ public and private autonomy through well-functioning democratic and legal institutions.9 But though I am sympathetic to this line of reasoning, I simply lack the space to develop such an argument here. The more ‘legalistic’ (and possibly less controversial) argument from treaty-based obligations suffices for our purposes.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Impact Extensions › 2AC --- Impact --- CW = NW

Cyberwar escalates to Nuclear War

Gady 15 [Franz-Stefan Gady, Franz-Stefan Gady is a Research Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) focused on future conflict and the future of war, May 4, 2015, “Could Cyber Attacks Lead to Nuclear War?”, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/could-cyber-attacks-lead-to-nuclear-war/]-Hayer

“One-half of their [U.S. and Russian] strategic arsenals are continuously maintained on high alert. Hundreds of missiles carrying nearly 1,800 warheads are ready to fly at a moment’s notice,” a policy report compiled by a study group chaired by the retired U.S. general summarized. “At the brink of conflict, nuclear command and warning networks around the world may be besieged by electronic intruders whose onslaught degrades the coherence and rationality of nuclear decision-making,” the report further points out. Get briefed on the story of the week, and developing stories to watch across the Asia-Pacific. The War Games-like scenario could unfold in one of the following three ways: First, sophisticated attackers from cyberspace could spoof U.S. or Russian early warning networks into reporting that nuclear missiles have been launched, which would demand immediate retaliatory strikes according to both nations’ nuclear warfare doctrines. Second, online hackers could manipulate communication systems into issuing unauthorized launch orders to missile crews. Third and last, attackers could directly hack into missile command and control systems launching the weapon or dismantling it on site ( a highly unlikely scenario).

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Impact Extensions › 2AC --- Impact UQ --- Biden Escalates

A major cyber attack would destabilize the country – makes nuclear response more likely

Sagan and Weiner, 21 (Scott D. Sagan and Allen S. Weiner, Scott D. Sagan is the Caroline S.G. Monroe professor of political science and senior fellow at the Center for International Security and the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University. Before joining the Stanford faculty, he served as special assistant to the Director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Allen S. Weiner is senior lecturer in law and director of the program in international and comparative law at Stanford Law School. Before joining the Stanford faculty, he served as a career attorney in the U.S. State Department. ‘The U.S. says it can answer cyberattacks with nuclear weapons. That’s lunacy.’, New York Times, July 9, 2021 at 3:46 p.m. EDT, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/07/09/cyberattack-ransomware-nuclear-war/)

Over the July 4 weekend, the Russian-based cybercriminal organization REvil for hacking into as many as 1,500 companies in what has been called the largest ransomware attack to date. In May, another cybercriminal group, DarkSide, also apparently located mainly in Russia, most of the operations of Colonial Pipeline, which supplies nearly half the diesel, gasoline and other fuels used on the East Coast — setting off a round of panic buying that ended only when the company handed over a ransom. These incidents were bad enough. But imagine a much worse cyberattack, one that not only disabled pipelines but turned off the power at hundreds of U.S. hospitals, wreaked havoc on air-traffic-control systems and shut down the electrical grid in major cities in the dead of winter. The grisly cost might be counted not just in lost dollars but in the deaths of many thousands of people. Under current U.S. nuclear doctrine, developed during the Trump administration, the president would be given the military option to launch nuclear weapons at Russia, China or North Korea if that country was determined to be behind such an attack. That’s because , the Trump administration expanded the role of nuclear weapons by declaring for the first time that the United States would consider nuclear retaliation in the case of “significant non-nuclear strategic attacks,” including “attacks on the U.S., allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure.” The same principle could also be used to justify a nuclear response to a devastating biological weapons strike.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Impact Extensions › 2AC --- Impact UQ --- Biden Escalates

Biden would escalate a cyber conflict with Russia now.

Meyer 22 (Josh Meyer, Josh Meyer is a veteran correspondent focusing on domestic, national and global security issues, including terrorism, extremism, cybersecurity and transnational criminal organizations, ‘Biden says 'we are prepared to respond' if Russia launches cyberattack against US’ USA Today, 8:02 PM Feb. 18, 2022, )

President Joe Biden warned Thursday that if Russia launches cyberattacks on American companies and critical infrastructure as part of its hybrid war campaign against Ukraine, “we are prepared to respond.” Biden didn’t elaborate on what the U.S. response might be in his televised address in response to Russia’s stunning invasion of its western neighbor. But U.S. cybersecurity experts say such a response could include a range of options ranging from bolstering America’s cybersecurity safety net to launching top-secret offensive cyberweapons against Russian targets including its own critical infrastructure. Some of those responses are already underway. On Thursday, administration officials stepped up their campaign to implement a “shields up” effort to protect – such as pipelines, banks, commercial aviation and hospitals – from potential Russian cyberattacks linked to its invasion of Ukraine, top U.S. security officials say.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Internal Link Extensions › 2AC --- Nuclear Stability

Russian Hacks Threatens Nuclear Stability

Schneider 22 [Jacquelyn Schneider is a Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. “The Biggest Cyber Risk in Ukraine?” Foreign Affairs, March 7, 2022. ] - NAAh

Just as many military experts predicted that a Russian invasion of Ukraine would be quick and decisive, so many cyber-experts expected that Moscow would fortify its conventional onslaught with a devastating cyberattack. Ukrainian forces would be blinded, critical infrastructure broken, and Russian disinformation rampant. But just as the military experts have been surprised by Russia’s stalled invasion, so have the cyber-experts by the lack of major digital attacks. In the first few days of conflict, cyber-operations seem to be more fizzle than bang. Some Russian cyber-activity has been discovered, but it seems to have done little to invigorate the Russian military campaign or hinder the Ukrainian response. In the run-up to the invasion, Russia launched wiper malware attacks, which deleted data from computers at Ukrainian government agencies. Russia also appears to have conducted some distributed denial-of-service attacks, which bombarded websites with so much information they became paralyzed, and a series of cybernetwork exploitation attempts on Ukrainian government and military systems. But Ukrainian air defense and aircraft didn’t appear to be affected by cyber-disruptions, and there are no reports of critical infrastructure damage from cyberattacks. Even the Internet seems to be up and running in Ukraine. Why the apparent restraint? It is almost impossible to know exactly why (or if) the Russians have indeed held back. Perhaps cyber-operations have been attempted and failed; perhaps Russian President Vladimir Putin has held his cyber-capabilities in reserve, saving them for later. Or maybe cyber-operations have taken place, but their effect—which is often virtual and not clearly attributed—will take longer to materialize. What is known is that the conflict is far from over, and the next question becomes whether cyber-operations could play a larger role as the war turns more violent. It is likely that the next stage of conflict will more than ever be defined by planes, tanks, artillery, and soldiers. It seems unlikely, given the amount of indiscriminate damage currently being inflicted by Russia, that cyber-operations will escalate the violence of the campaign within Ukraine. That said, could cyber-operations lead to horizontal escalation, drawing NATO into the fight, for example? Or, given that the United States and Russia are the world’s largest nuclear powers, could cyber-operations escalate to the worst possible outcome—nuclear war? Recent wargaming research suggests that cyber-exploits into nuclear command and control may be enticing for states looking to neutralize a nuclear escalation threat in the midst of a conventional war, and that actors may underestimate the danger of these exploits and vulnerabilities to nuclear stability.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Internal Link Extensions › 2AC --- Grids Vulnerability

The US’ pipelines and electric grids are vulnerable to cyberattacks.

Plumer 21 [Brad, a reporter covering climate change, energy policy and other environmental issues for The New York Times. Previously, he was a senior editor at Vox.com and a reporter at the Washington Post. “Pipeline Hack Points to Growing Cybersecurity Risk for Energy System”, 08 June 2021, The New York Times, ] -ALP

Despite years of warnings, America’s vast network of pipelines, electric grids and power plants remains acutely vulnerable to cyberattacks with the potential to disrupt energy supplies for millions of people. Dealing with those risks, analysts said, will pose a major challenge for the Biden administration as it seeks hundreds of billions of dollars to modernize the nation’s energy infrastructure and transition to cleaner sources of energy to address climate change. Regulators are increasingly poised to step in. On Monday, Richard Glick, the chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, said it was time to establish mandatory cybersecurity standards for the nation’s nearly 3 million miles of oil and gas pipelines, similar to those currently found in the electricity sector. “Simply encouraging pipelines to voluntarily adopt best practices is an inadequate response to the ever-increasing number and sophistication of malevolent cyber actors,” Mr. Glick said in a statement. The risks to the nation’s energy systems are widespread and varied. Many oil and gas pipelines, for instance, rely on decades-old control systems that are not well defended against more sophisticated cyberattacks and can’t be easily updated. And it’s not just pipelines. As electric grid operators harness a growing array of digital technologies to help manage the flow of power and cut planet-warming emissions — such as smart thermostats, or far-flung yet interconnected networks of solar arrays — hackers may find new entry points to exploit. The shutdown on Friday of the Colonial Pipeline, which stretches 5,500 miles from Texas to New Jersey and transports 45 percent of the East Coast’s fuel supplies, illustrates how devastating such attacks can be. On Saturday, Colonial acknowledged that its corporate computer systems had been hit by a ransomware attack, in which criminal groups hold data hostage until the victim pays a ransom. The company said that it had shut down the pipeline as a precaution, apparently for fear that the hackers might have obtained information that would enable them to attack parts of the pipeline itself. Colonial said on Wednesday that it had started to resume pipeline operations, though it would take several days to restore full service. But throughout the Southeast, panicked Americans were racing to stock up on gasoline, causing thousands of gas stations to run out of fuel. While Colonial has yet to explain exactly what triggered the pipeline shutdown, experts said there were plenty of vulnerabilities lurking throughout America’s energy infrastructure. Last year, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency reported a ransomware attack on a natural gas compression facility that caused a shutdown of the facility for two days. In 2018, several natural gas pipeline operators reported that a system that processes customer transactions had been attacked, leading to service disruptions. But bigger risks lurk: In 2016, hackers knocked out large sections of the power grid in Ukraine, which was thought to be the first intentional blackout triggered by a cyberattack. At the time, the Obama administration warned that America’s electric utilities were not immune to similar attacks. In the past, energy companies typically kept the operational systems that run pipelines or power plants disconnected, or “air gapped,” from the broader internet, which meant that hackers could not easily gain access to the most critical infrastructure. But increasingly that’s no longer the case, as companies install more sophisticated monitoring and diagnostics software that help them operate these systems more efficiently. That potentially creates new cybersecurity risks. “Now these systems are all interconnected in ways that the companies themselves don’t always fully understand,” said Marty Edwards, vice president of operational technology for Tenable, a cybersecurity firm. “That provides an opportunity for attacks in one area to propagate elsewhere.” Many industrial control systems were installed decades ago and run on outdated software, which means that even finding programmers to upgrade the systems can be a challenge. And the operators of vital energy infrastructure — such as pipelines, refineries or power plants — are often reluctant to shut down the flow of fuel or power for extended periods of time to install frequent security patches. Making things harder still, analysts said, many companies do not always have a good sense of exactly when and where it’s worthwhile to spend money on costly new cybersecurity defenses, in part because of a lack of readily available data on which types of risks they are most likely to face. “Companies don’t always release a lot of information publicly” about the threats they’re seeing, said Padraic O’Reilly, a co-founder of CyberSaint Security, who works with pipelines and critical infrastructure on cybersecurity. “That can make it hard as an industry to know where to invest.” Analysts said that the nation’s electric utilities and grid operators were typically further ahead in preparing for cyberattacks than the oil and gas industry, in part because federal regulators have long required cybersecurity standards for the backbone of the nation’s power grid. Still, vulnerabilities remain. “Part of it is the sheer complexity of the grid,” said Reid Sawyer, managing director of the United States cyberconsulting practice at Marsh, an insurance firm. Not all levels of the grid face mandatory standards, for instance, and there are more than 3,000 utilities in the country with varying cybersecurity practices.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Internal Link Extensions › 2AC --- Financial Collapse Internal Link

Cyber-attacks will cause the next financial crisis

Mee and Schuermann 18 [Paul Mee and Til Schuermann,a partner at consulting firm Oliver Wyman and leads its cyber risk practice, a partner in Oliver Wyman’s financial services practice and was a senior vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York during the financial crisis, September 14, 2018, “How a Cyber Attack could Cause the Next Financial Crisis”, Harvard Business Review, https://hbr.org/2018/09/how-a-cyber-attack-could-cause-the-next-financial-crisis]-Hayer

But the next crisis might not come from a financial shock at all. The more likely culprit: a cyber attack that causes disruptions to financial services capabilities, especially payments systems, around the world. Criminals have always sought ways to infiltrate financial technology systems. Now, the financial system faces the added risk of becoming collateral damage in a wider attack on critical national infrastructure. Such an attack could shake confidence in the global financial services system, causing banks, businesses and consumers to be stymied, confused or panicked, which in turn could have a major negative impact on economic activity. Cybercrime alone costs nations more than $1 trillion globally, far more than the record $300 billion of damage due to natural disasters in 2017, according to a recent analysis our firm performed. We ranked cyber attacks as the biggest threat facing the business world today — ahead of terrorism, asset bubbles, and other risks. An attack on a computer processing or communications network could cause $50 billion to $120 billion of economic damage, a loss ranking somewhere between those of Hurricanes Sandy and Katrina, according to recent estimates. Yet a much broader and more debilitating attack isn’t farfetched. Just last month, the Federal Bureau of Investigation issued a warning to banks about a pending large scale attack known as an ATM “cash-out” strike, in which waves of synchronized fraudulent withdrawals drain bank accounts. In July, meanwhile, it was revealed that hackers working for Russia had easily penetrated the control rooms of US electric utilities and could have caused blackouts. How might a financial crisis triggered by a cyber attack unfold? A likely scenario would be an attack by a rogue nation or terrorist group on financial institutions or major infrastructure. Inside North Korea, for example, the Lazarus Group, also known as Hidden Cobra, routinely looks for ways to compromise banks and exploit crypto currencies. An attack on a bank, investment fund, custodian firm, ATM network, the interbank messaging network known as SWIFT, or the Federal Reserve itself would represent a direct hit on the financial services system. Another possibility would be if a so-called hacktivist or “script kiddy” amateur were to use malicious programs to launch a cyber attack without due consideration of the consequences. Such an attack could have a chain reaction, causing damage way beyond the original intent, because rules, battle norms, and principles that are conventional wisdom in most warfare situations but don’t exist in a meaningful way in the digital arena. For example, in 2016 a script kiddie sparked a broad denial-of-service attack impacting Twitter, Spotify, and other well-known internet services as amateurs joined in for mischief purposes. Whether a major cyber attack is deliberate or somewhat accidental, the damage could be substantial. Most of the ATM networks across North America could freeze. Credit card and other payment systems could fail across entire nations, as happened to the VISA network in the UK in June. Online banking could become inaccessible: no cash, no payments, no reliable information about bank accounts. Banks could lose the ability to transact with one another during a critical period of uncertainty. There could be widespread panic, albeit temporary. Such an outcome might not cause the sort of long-simmering financial crisis that sparked the Great Recession, because money would likely be restored to banks and payments providers once systems were back online. At the same time, it isn’t clear how a central bank, the traditional financial crisis firefighter, could respond to this type of crisis on short notice. After the problem is fixed and the crisis halted, a daunting task of recovery would loom. It would be even more difficult if data were corrupted, manipulated or rendered inaccessible.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Uniqueness Extensions › 2AC --- UQ --- Russia Undermines NATO

Russian cyberattacks target current NATO rifts

Shea 17 [Jamie Shea is NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges. He has been working with NATO since 1980. Positions included Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of the Secretary General, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for External Relations, Public Diplomacy Division, Director of Information and Press, Spokesman of NATO and Deputy Director of Information and Press, Deputy Head and Senior Planning Officer in the Policy Planning and Multilateral Affairs Section of the Political Directorate as well as Assistant to the Secretary General of NATO for Special Projects. “How is NATO Meeting the Challenge of Cyberspace”, Prism National Defense University, 12-21-17, https://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/1401835/how-is-nato-meeting-the-challenge-of-cyberspace/] SL

Yet it is not the much discussed theme of the economic damage inflicted by cyber crime in the past year that has dominated the debate. It is more the use of cyber as an instrument of state policy, political influence, and manipulation. From being a useful tool of espionage and intellectual property theft, cyber intrusions have evolved into a potent instrument of hybrid warfare and outright political vandalism. Ukraine, for example, has been the victim of an unprecedented and systematic campaign of cyber bullying. It has acknowledged up to 2,000 orchestrated cyberattacks since Russia occupied Crimea in March 2014. It has suffered disruption to its election voting system, train and airline on-line booking, ports, electricity grid, and most recently, the massive elimination of tax and financial accounting data through the NotPetya malware. Initially disguised as a ransomware attack similar to the previous WannaCry, a hack that affected more than 200,000 computer networks in 150 countries, it soon became clear that the data encrypted was being destroyed, and that the motive of the attack was not financial gain but rather economic and structural sabotage. Although companies in other countries were also affected by NotPetya, 80 percent of the impact was in Ukraine.1 Intelligence analysts now agree that NotPetya was a state-driven effort. All of these orchestrated cyber campaigns suggest that Ukraine is being used as a laboratory or proving ground to test a range of cyber weapons and assess their impact, with widespread collateral damage elsewhere accepted as a consequence of doing business; or even as a way to cover tracks.2 Given the difficulty of technical attribution and the inability of governments to deter or retaliate against cyberattacks in a manner that demands the attacker’s attention but avoids unwanted escalation, NATO has had to take a hard look at its preparedness, not only to fend off cyberattacks but also to preserve its political and military freedom of navigation in the cyber domain. The revelation in a recent Washington Post article of how the Obama Administration rejected nearly all proposed responses to Russian incursions into the communications of the Democratic National Committee because they were deemed to be ineffective, escalatory, or would compromise long-term U.S. intelligence gathering and prematurely expose U.S. offensive cyber capabilities, caught NATO’s attention.3 There is growing awareness that Russian operational activity built around groups such as APT28 is aimed at inflicting damage to the reputation and cohesiveness of organizations such as NATO.4 Consequently, reducing the strategic cyber threat to the functionality of governments and societies and making cyberspace more stable and transparent has become as important to international peace and order as nuclear arms control or the conventional balance of power.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Uniqueness Extensions › 2AC --- UQ --- Ambiguity

Ambiguity of cyber operations will lead to escalation

Lonergan and Milo 22 [Erica D. Lonergan is an Assistant Professor in the Army Cyber Institute at West Point and a Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Previously, she served as a Senior Director on the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission. Keren Yarhi-Milo is a political scientist specializing in the study of interstate communication, crisis bargaining, reputation and credibility, and the psychology of leaders and decision makers. “CYBER SIGNALING AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UKRAINE CRISIS”, War on the Rocks, 4-21-22, https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/cyber-signaling-and-nuclear-deterrence-implications-for-the-ukraine-crisis/] SL

Policymakers and academics are attuned to the cyber risks to nuclear command and control. The practitioner community has largely focused on U.S. vulnerabilities and how to mitigate them. Scholars, in turn, worry about how cyber operations could have unintended escalatory consequences. But less attention has been paid to another likely scenario: the use of cyber operations for signaling purposes (operations with visible effects that aim to convey a message to another state) in a nuclear context. The ambiguity of cyber operations can sometimes be useful for signaling — but the same ambiguity can be dangerous during a nuclear crisis. The problem is that civilian leaders in particular, distinct from the military, are inclined to see cyber attacks as effective signaling tools. Cyber operations could have nuclear implications, especially because modern nuclear command and control systems, like those in Russia and the United States, are becoming increasingly dependent on digital infrastructure. Nuclear command, control, and communications systems, which include early warning, information collection, and communications capabilities, alert decision-makers to impending nuclear strikes and also enable leaders to control decisions about nuclear use (or non-use). But their digital dependencies are creating opportunities for exploitation using cyber means. In a 2020 report, the Nuclear Threat Initiative found that “almost 9 out of 10 planned nuclear modernization programs involve at least some new digital components or upgrades.” Vulnerabilities inherent in the digital infrastructure that undergird modern nuclear systems provide opportunities for actors to engage in cyber espionage — gaining access to a network or system to steal information — or even conduct cyber attacks. Hypothetically, a cyber power like Russia could conduct a cyber attack against a U.S. early warning satellite to degrade its functionality. This has become an urgent concern for practitioners. U.S. Strategic Command, for instance, is currently working to “operationally harden NC3 systems against cyber threats.” Congress has also gotten involved, requiring the Defense Department to evaluate the cybersecurity of major weapon systems. And the Government Accountability Office has published multiple reports decrying the state of cybersecurity and scope of vulnerabilities of weapon systems, including elements of the nuclear triad.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Uniqueness Extensions › 2AC --- UQ --- Hacks

Risk of cyber-attacks high

Nichols 22 (Shaun Nichols, with 15 years of experience as a reporter, Shaun Nichols has been covering the enterprise technology market since the days when the iPod had a hard drive and phones had actual buttons. He has written for international publications including VNUnet, V3, The Register and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, covering everything from embedded controllers to supercomputers, ‘US warns of 'increased' threats from Russian hacking groups’, TechTarget, April 20, 2022, )

U.S. government agencies are warning the public of an expected increase in cyber-attacks from hackers affiliated with the Russian government. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency joined with the National Security Agency and Department of Justice in detailing the threats posed by Russian hacking groups -- both state-sponsored groups and also private cybercrime gangs that support Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The advisory warned that organizations within Ukraine as well as outside the region, including the U.S., could see "increased malicious cyber activity." "This activity may occur as a response to the unprecedented economic costs imposed on Russia as well as materiel support provided by the United States and U.S. allies and partners," the advisory said. Also signing the joint advisory were the four other members of the Five Eyes intelligence network: the U.K., New Zealand, Australia and Canada. Most notably, the advisory for the first time addressed the issue of private cybercriminal hacking groups either working directly with the Kremlin or acting on its behalf in vigilante-style hacking campaigns, as Russia continues to work on disrupting communications in Ukraine. "Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, some cybercrime groups have independently publicly pledged support for the Russian government or the Russian people and/or threatened to conduct cyber operations to retaliate against perceived attacks against Russia or materiel support for Ukraine," the advisory read. "These Russian-aligned cybercrime groups likely pose a threat to critical infrastructure organizations."