Search the archive.

Since deterrence can become part of the actors’ identity, it is also involved in the actors’ will to achieve ontological security, securing the actors’ identity and routines. As McSweeney explains, ontological security is “the acquisition of confidence in the routines of daily life—the essential predictability of interaction through which we feel confident in knowing what is going on and that we have the practical skill to go on in this context.” These routines become part of the social structure that enables and constrains the actors’ possibilities (McSweeney, 1999: 50-1, 154-5; Wendt, 1999: 131, 229-30). Thus, through the emergence of the deterrence norm and the construction of deterrence identities, the actors create an intersubjective context and intersubjective understandings that in turn affect their interests and routines. In this context, deterrence strategy and deterrence practices are better understood by the actors, and therefore the continuous avoidance of violence is more easily achieved. Furthermore, within such a context of deterrence relations, rationality is (re)defined, clarifying the appropriate practices for a rational actor, and this, in turn, reproduces this context and the actors’ identities. Therefore, the internalization of deterrence ideas helps to explain how actors may create more cooperative practices and break away from the spiral of hostility that is forced and maintained by the identities that are attached to the security dilemma, and which lead to mutual perception of the other as an aggressive enemy. As Wendt for example suggests, in situations where states are restrained from using violence—such as MAD (mutual assured destruction)—states not only avoid violence, but “ironically, may be willing to trust each other enough to take on collective identity”. In such cases if actors believe that others have no desire to engulf them, then it will be easier to trust them and to identify with their own needs (Wendt, 1999: 358-9). In this respect, the norm of deterrence, the trust that is being built between the opponents, and the (mutual) constitution of their role identities may all lead to the creation of long term influences that preserve the practices of deterrence as well as the avoidance of violence. Since a basic level of trust is needed to attain ontological security,21 the existence of it may further strengthen the practices of deterrence and the actors’ identities of deterrer and deterred actors. In this respect, I argue that for the reasons mentioned earlier, the practices of deterrence should be understood as providing both physical and ontological security, thus refuting that there is necessarily tension between them. Exactly for this reason I argue that Rasmussen’s (2002: 331-2) assertion—according to which MAD was about enhancing ontological over physical security—is only partly correct. Certainly, MAD should be understood as providing ontological security; but it also allowed for physical security, since, compared to previous strategies and doctrines, it was all about decreasing the physical threat of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the ability to increase one dimension of security helped to enhance the other, since it strengthened the actors’ identities and created more stable expectations of avoiding violence.

Crucially, if we could know for certain what states will do on the basis of either the structure of the system or some predetermined motives of the subjects within the system, the uncertainty of international life would disappear and the ‘politics’ of international politics would lose its meaning.14 Rather than trying to rectify the lack of certainty by creating a stronger sense of certainty, it is therefore imperative to affirm the uncertainties created by the system. It is important, moreover, to oppose the distinction between ethical desirability and political possibility, since the reproduction of this distinction blocks from view the conditions of international life that make ethical thinking and action possible in the first place. Positivist social science and liberal interpretations of Kant are thus, very crudely put, the main obstacles to grasping the ethics of international life. In resisting both moves, neorealism does not seek to close down the violent opening of ethics inherent in the structure of anarchy, for example, by formulating metaphysical ideals informing states how they should act or how they ought to become friends rather than enemies. There can be no absolute friendship between states, and no state can ever offer absolute hospitality to another state. At the heart of every inter-state relation, there is mistrust, uncertainty and incalculability. To positively affirm the latter is not to say that uncertainty or incalculability is good per se. Rather, it implies that they are seen as basic and irrefutable conditions of international life, which, consequently, are not even desirable to overcome. Hence, it also implies that as long as there is international life, there must be ‘the ominous shadow of the future [that] continues to cast its pall over interacting states’ (Waltz, 2000: 39). Crucially, Waltz’s reference to this shadow should not be read as an expression of determinism. It expresses rather an affirmation of uncertainty: the ‘uncertainty of each about the other’s future intentions and actions’ (Waltz, 1979: 105). In order to give friendship in international politics a chance, so to speak, the possibility that a friend suddenly becomes an enemy must never be eliminated. Attempts to create absolute trust in inter-state relations are therefore not only impossible to achieve in the practical sense, but essentially undesirable.15 Along similar lines, Derrida explains how friendship is possible only if one remains open to the deception of the other, since it is precisely the unconditional openness to whatever may happen in the encounter between self and other that makes it possible to develop any sort of friendship in the first place (Derrida, 2005: 219). Even if we were to accept Alexander Wendt’s (1999) distinction between different ‘cultures of anarchy’, some of which are more ‘friendly’ than others, it is not self-evident that a culture in which friendship is prioritized over enmity is actually a better one. This is because in order to exclude the possibility that a friend may suddenly become an enemy, one must first eliminate the time of international life that makes the self–other encounter possible in the first place. For the same reason, the key message of democratic peace theory — that all states should become democracies in order to minimize or eliminate the possibility of wars — is not only practically impossible, but also ethically undesirable. It is impossible to verify because there is no democracy that is immune to corruptibility (Waltz, 2000: 10), but, in addition to that, it can be seen as undesirable since the notion that all states must conform to the same universal ideal cancels out their freedom to act, to take moral responsibility and so on. The undesirability of a system that eradicates violence, borders and discrimination is further underlined by Waltz (1979: 111–114) in his discussion of the ‘virtues of anarchy’. Therein, he attacks the idea of transforming the international system into a world government. Not only would such a transformation ‘be an invitation to prepare for world civil war’ (Waltz, 1979: 112), but it would take away the constitutive violence at the heart of inter-state relations in the structure of anarchy. The constant possibility of war in the international system means that states will always be wary of provoking others in the search for security. As he puts it: The constant possibility that force will be used limits manipulations, moderates demands, and serves as an incentive for the settlement of disputes. One who knows that pressing too hard may lead to war has strong reason to consider whether possible gains are worth the risks entailed.… The possibility that conflicts among nations may lead to long and costly wars has … sobering effects. (Waltz, 1979: 113–114) In this way, the conditions of peace in the international system can be said to rest on the constant possibility of war. In making this point, Waltz argues against moral universalism. Hence, unwittingly or otherwise, he also opens up space for ethical negotiation by recognizing the finitude of the political subject, who is free to interact with others only on the condition that self and other do not have to conform to the ‘same’ universal ideal. The subject is thus able to take moral responsibility and ponder on how to make ethical decisions, which, without difference and alterity, would turn into a strictly formal procedure based on the ‘mechanical application of rules’ (Zehfuss, 2009: 146). Responsibility and ethical decisions are, thus, made possible precisely by the impossibility of predetermining what is the ‘right’ decision in any given context. As Derrida argues, irrespective of how thorough the decision-making procedure is, and regardless of how much knowledge is acquired before taking a decision: the instant of the decision, if there is to be a decision, must be heterogeneous to this accumulation of knowledge. Otherwise, there is no responsibility. In this sense only must the person taking the decision not know everything. Even if one knows everything, the decision, if there is one, must advance toward a future that is not known, that cannot be anticipated. (Derrida, 2002b: 231) The impossibility of anchoring the decision in rational calculation is, in this sense, what creates the chance for any decisions to be taken at all. The instant of the decision belongs, then, not to a fully present moment in which the subject calculates the future consequences of the decision, but to a future that is incalculable (see Derrida, 2002a). It is precisely this incalculability, and the uncertainty of the future, that Waltz’s conception of anarchy positively affirms. Rather than making the instant of the decision obsolete by transforming the decision into a mere application of rules, anarchy makes the ethical decision ‘possible’. Even if Waltz repeatedly claims that the desire to survive is a purely pragmatic assumption made strictly for the purpose of constructing an explanatory theory, it is not neutral or innocent. First and foremost, Waltzian neorealism expresses an ethics due to the way it affirms states’ desire to survive by stipulating the necessary conditions of their survival. More precisely, it affirms the uncertainty of international life by refusing to reduce the play of relations between states to a calculable formula or a regulative ideal, and that rather embraces chance and contingency as central features of the anarchic system — features that make states simultaneously free and insecure.16 In this light, the primary significance of Waltz’s theory is not as an explanatory theory, but as a theory that affirms the time of international life, defined by the uncertainty of the future and the logic of the erasable mortal trace.17 It is this notion of the future that makes it possible for states, as finite political subjects, not only to survive, but also to try to take moral responsibility and make ethical decisions. Why universal ethical ideals are both impossible and undesirable What are the implications of my reading of Waltzian neorealism as an ethics? First of all, it contributes to a new understanding of the difficulties inherent in any attempt to theorize what it might mean to replace the structure of anarchy with an international or world political order that is supposedly ‘more’ ethical. If ethics is inextricably interlinked with the structural conditions of survival, then any attempt to challenge neorealism from an ‘ethical’ perspective must do so by replacing one structure of survival with another, and there can be no guarantees that the new structure will be less violent. While this does not in any way prevent such attempts from being made, it does highlight the risky nature of trying to resolve problems of war and violence in international politics on ethical terms. For example, the idea of creating a new form of political community that transcends the exclusionary borders of states may seem naturally desirable (e.g. Linklater, 1982). Yet, regardless of how sophisticated theories become in terms of articulating the content and meaning of such a community, there can be no guarantees that attempts to actualize it will not result in even more violence. There are no guarantees, as John Mearsheimer (1994: 44) puts it, that ‘a fascist discourse far more violent than realism will not emerge as the new hegemonic discourse’. Moreover, it is important to point out that the value of a neorealist ethics is not that it provides a ‘coherent ethical theory’. One interesting attempt to create such a theory is found in Frost’s (2009) Global Ethics: Anarchy, Freedom and International Relations. For Frost, the point of developing a coherent ethical theory is to demonstrate how international relations can be grasped primarily in ethical terms, rather than as a struggle for power and survival. His assumption is that ‘to engage in international relations at all … is to make ethical claims for oneself and to recognize the ethical standing of others’ (Frost, 2009: 19). Frost links his theory partly to the diverse practices that shape international interactions, and partly to an ‘ethical background theory which justifies the whole set of rules which constitute the practice’ (Frost, 2009: 27). While the background theory is based on an English School-inspired notion of the anarchic system/society of states, the practices added to it have the potential to shape international relations in a direction that is ethically desirable. Arguing for and against the ethical standing of our interlocutors, ‘we construct and reconstruct the social practices within which international relations are conducted’ (Frost, 2009: 94). The main goal of these practices, according to Frost, should be nothing less than resolving the tensions within the current international system between citizen rights and global human rights (Frost, 2009: ch. 3). In contrast to cosmopolitan theories, however, he argues that this goal is attainable within the anarchic structure of the system, through the ethical adjustment of that system (Frost, 2009: 113). This adjustment involves renegotiating the relationship between citizen rights and human rights through practice. Frost (2009: 173) writes: ‘Participants in global civil society and the society of states need to take their own values seriously and need to attempt to make them real for everybody everywhere’. According to Frost, the segregating borders of states are thus meant to persist, while the violent forms of exclusion that these borders enable are to gradually fall away through the aspiration of a common goal that embraces everybody everywhere. From the perspective of my reading of a neorealist ethics, however, the notion of a common universal goal underpinning Frost’s ethical theory is not only impossible, but also undesirable. This is not because the ideal itself is ‘bad’. Rather, it is because it is precisely the absence of a common goal beyond segregating borders that makes ethical negotiation possible in the first place. As soon as such an ideal has been formulated, and the guidelines for how to attain it have been articulated, the incalculable future in which the encounter between self and other is allowed to play out is cancelled out. As previously noted, while this encounter might result in more or less violence, it is the uncertainty of the future that makes the encounter possible in the first place. Frost’s attempt to formulate a universal ethical ideal that embraces everyone everywhere while, at the same time, retaining the segregating borders of the international system is thus problematic. The primary reason for this, then, is that in articulating a universal ethical ideal, his theory works to undermine the conditions of international life. In brief, what Frost fails to recognize is that what makes international ethics possible is also what makes impossible the aspiration of a universal ethical ideal that is applicable to everybody everywhere — like that of a perfect alignment of citizen rights and human rights. Rather than seeking to resolve these tensions, the tensions should be kept alive. Only in this way can we, moreover, maintain a distinctly international ethics without reverting to a ‘global ethics’. For the latter to make any sense, it has to be based on ideals that transcend the borders of states, whether those ideals are linked to a specific goal or just to a general attitude of openness to political negotiation and contestation (Hutchings, 2010: 215). Irrespective of what precisely they are supposed to entail, the ideals associated with a global ethics become problematic as soon as the attempt is made to transform difference and the plurality of wills into one and the same will. It is problematic for the same reason that philosophical attempts to create a new metaphysics that is supposed to resolve the violence of metaphysics. Such attempts can only have as their aim the ultimate destruction of the very possibility of philosophical thought and writing, which, per definition, are metaphysical and therefore violent (see Derrida, 1978).

Recognition that confrontation with Russia cannot be avoided because it is already happening, and acceptance that resolving this conflict will be a long, costly and potentially painful process, will underpin and augment the effect of any deterrent measures put in place. Understanding and accepting this basic clash of interests and world views inevitably means that alongside the concurrent challenge from China, the West must continue to invest heavily and for the long term in deterring Russia from aggressive and hostile actions. This deterrence must include willingness to impose costs and consequences on Russia in response to military adventurism, cyber and information assaults, or any of the other ways in which Russia endangers the integrity of Western states or the lives and livelihoods of their citizens. The process will inevitably be costly and damaging for both sides – but it has to be remembered that a failure to deter Moscow invites consequences that are far more costly and far more damaging.

It is axiomatic, and has been demonstrated repeatedly over history, that Russia respects strength and despises compromise and accommodation. This strength must necessarily include military power, present and ready for use, to provide a visible counter to Russia’s own new capabilities. Some European nations continue to act on the belief that maintaining strong standing armies and investing in hardware and manpower is an outmoded metric of national security. But Russia’s traditional and persistent respect for brute military force as the key determinant of national status and the right to assert national interests means that Western states must respond in kind, because the maintenance of at least comparable conventional military capability is essential to ensuring that Russia does not perceive opportunities to further its interests – or to remove notional threats to itself – by military means.

There is just one problem with the assumption that Putin never backs down. It’s incorrect—part of the myth-making that the Russian president has successfully constructed around himself and has been all-too-easily swallowed by many Western politicians. Contrary to the commonly held belief, when faced with strength and resolve, Putin often backs down instead of responding with more escalatory steps.

One stark example of this came in November 2015 when Turkey shot down a Russian Su-24 fighter jet near the Turkey-Syria border. At the time, there were widespread fears that this could escalate into a direct conflict between Russia and a NATO member. Instead, Putin’s response was mild. Moscow imposed insignificant trade sanctions on Turkish imports and suspended Russian package tours to Turkey. And even those small measures were lifted several months later after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan sent an apology to the Kremlin. Several recent clashes between Russia and Turkey also took place in Libya, where Erdogan and Putin backed opposing sides in a protracted civil war. For example, Turkish forces attacked the strategic military base of al-Watiya in 2020, where mercenaries of the Russian Wagner Group were based, forcing them to flee and leave their equipment and weapons behind. One Russian mercenary was allegedly captured. Losing al-Watiya was a key step in the Libyan National Army (LNA)/Wagner retreat. It meant that taking Tripoli by force was no longer feasible, at least as long as the Turks were present. As result of that defeat, the Wagner Group retreated to the positions it held before the Tripoli campaign. The LNA has not made another attempt to advance on Tripoli since.

In his Feb. 15 Just Security article “Ukraine: Unleashing the Rhetorical Dogs of War,” Barry Posen argued that NATO and Ukraine should have cut a deal with Russia because the Ukrainian military would surely be defeated by Russia without direct U.S./Western military participation and U.S. offers of equipment were only encouraging a potential Ukrainian insurgency against Russian occupation that would be as bloody as it would be futile. The prescription depends entirely on Posen’s assumption that to satisfy Russia, all Ukraine would have had to do would be “to swallow the bitter pill of accepting armed neutrality between NATO and Russia, rather than NATO membership.”

It was only after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 that NATO broke off cooperation with Russia. Until then, Ukrainians themselves were largely against NATO membership. To frame NATO as a security threat to Russia caters to Kremlin propaganda.

On Monday 21 Feb, on the eighth anniversary of the victory of the Euromaidan, Russian president Vladimir Putin effectively declared war on Ukraine. To justify this recklessness, he gave an hour-long pseudo-historical rant that portrayed Ukraine as an artificial state that owes its existence to Russia. He also accused the Ukrainian government of carrying out a genocide on Russian-speaking population, producing nuclear weapons and sponsoring extremist activity in Crimea.

Has Putin’s approach evolved this since then, or has it basically stayed the same, while the West, Germany, in particular, continued to underestimate him?

I think his approach has stayed fairly the same. He does what he says. If he threatens something, he delivers on it. Putin’s use of coercion and compulsion always follows the same pattern. He makes a threat and basically the incentives are one and the same. So, the stick is the threat, and the carrot is the removal of the threat: if you do not do something, I am going to take military action. If you do it, I will not. Or in the case of Georgia: If you do not pursue NATO membership, I will not attack you. If you do, I will attack you.

That Russians ultimately rejected that course has been unfortunate but not entirely surprising. Nor was Russia’s behavior primarily a response to actions by the West, such as the enlargement of NATO. Long-standing Russian ambitions and insecurities, together with a tradition of autocrats benefiting from popular fears of foreign threats, have made it difficult for Russia to steer out of old ruts.

For the better part of three centuries, the Russian empire had included everything from the territories of the Baltics to the Black Sea, as well as parts of Poland. For decades the Soviet Union was regarded by the world as a superpower, the equal of the United States, the co-manager of a “bipolar world.” The Cold War may have been a low point for the living standards and individual freedoms of many Russians, but it was a high point in Russia’s long history as a great power and empire, equaling the triumph of 1814 when Russian forces drove across Europe and occupied Paris. During the Cold War, pride in this superpower role even offered some compensation for the privations and abuses Russians suffered at home. If Russians had changed their historical trajectory after the end of the Cold War, if like Germany and Japan they had chosen economic over geopolitical competition, focused on improving their standard of living and integrating themselves fully into the liberal world economy, they might have lived better lives but at the price of Russia’s historical greatness on the world stage.

(Robert, “Arctic politics in the emerging multipolar system: challenges and consequences,” The Polar Journal, 2.1)

It is no overstatement to say that the end of the Cold War was one of the most important events in recent world history. Scholars from many areas of study have used the fall of the Soviet Union as a starting point to explain shifts in security, globalization, humanitarianism and institutional integration, all of which played important roles in world affairs in the immediate post-Cold War era. Since 1991, explanatory models for international and global politics have broadened their scope to include variables such as individual preferences, capitalist oppression, ideational construction, environmentalism, gender and sexual politics, and discursive power to levels previously unforeseen throughout the Cold War years. As such, we now see the world as a far more complex and nefarious arena in which power and dominance are exercised each day. At the systemic level, the fall of the Soviet Union equated to nothing short of a monumental shift in the way states would make foreign and defence strategy. For 50 years, the bipolar system was dominated by two superpowers constantly competing and building arms in an effort to balance one another. The end of the Cold War signalled a major shift in systemic arrangement, as the system went from being bipolar to the world entering what was often referred to as the “unipolar moment.”1 The era of unipolarity and American hegemony in the international system has been marked by stability in an interstate sense, and the realignment of various spheres of influence in the wake of the Soviet Union’s demise. Far from being just a theoretical notion, the unipolar moment has also provided states with an environment in which to pursue their national self-interest where the likelihood of conflict is decreased and great power security competition has been minimized.2 As such, new areas of foreign affairs and defence strategy have become far more important than they could have been throughout the bipolar con- strained Cold War years. One of the most notable examples in this regard has been the increased desire for territorial protection and extension in the Arctic region. In an era of state preoccupation with humanitarianism, terrorism and economic reces- sion, it is being suggested by some observers that the Arctic has become the primary stage through which states, both great and minor in power, can pursue their self-interest in a way that combines soft power cooperation through bodies of gov- ernance with hard power and military build-up. As things presently stand, there are a variety of nations and institutions all seek- ing to claim governing authority over different parts of the circumpolar region. Nations making claims to parts of the Arctic Ocean or other northern waters include Canada, Russia, the United States, Norway, Iceland and Denmark/Greenland. On the institutional side, Arctic governance has been debated and defined by bodies such as the United Nations, the European Union, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Arctic Council.3 To date, no clear resolution to competing claims is in sight, and in some cases the situation is on the verge of becoming far more competitive as nations such as Russia have resorted to asserting possible military solutions to contested Arctic issues to bolster their declarations. It is important to note the increased levels of interest over Arctic relations between states, but, on this point, little attention has been given to the influence of the international system over this situation. If the unipolar moment has been defined as an era of relative stability and diplomatic coexistence, and tensions in the Arctic are already on the rise, what is to happen when the multipolar system finally emerges in the near future? Since 2005, the status of the United States as systemic hegemon has been in decline due to economic, military and political strains placed on American power capabilities throughout the Bush era and beyond. This decrease in relative power preponderance has been even further exacerbated by the economic recession starting in 2008 and the nation’s inability to stabilize its markets. As such, the predictions of those like Christopher Layne and John Mearsheimer are on the verge of coming to fruition, in that the unipolar moment is about to end.4 New great powers are ris- ing, the United States is no longer able to prevent these nations from balancing their power, and the once obvious prevalence of American power is far murkier than it was a decade ago. As the multipolar era becomes increasingly likely, one must ponder the effects this shift might have on state foreign and defence strategy- making, especially towards the Arctic region. To date, though its relative power position has declined significantly in recent years, the United States remains the hegemon of the international system, but it is contended here that such status is soon to evaporate. In this context, this article argues that the emergence of a multipolar systemic arrangement is very likely to increase security competition in the system as a whole, and the Arctic will be at the epicentre of such conflict. To lend support to this hypothesis, an examination of the impending shift from unipolarity to multipolarity will be made, as will an account of current security dynamics in the circumpolar region. The article concludes with a stark warning that without some kind of real action towards settling competing Arctic claims, it will be left to states to secure their own territorial assertions through hard power and forceful means. The system is unipolar ... for now In order to evaluate the polarity of the international system in a given historical period, one must identify the hierarchy of power in terms of the number of super or great powers dominating international outcomes. Counting great or super powers can be somewhat difficult in contemporary international relations, as scholars have begun to expand the notions of power and capabilities, but the clearest guideline for being able to identify great powers is through determining capabilities. The rea- son it is essential to understand the great powers in international relations is that they, above all other states, institutions, non-state actors and ideational forces, are responsible for the daily conduct of behaviour in the international system, and they have been historically accountable for substantial alterations to power distribution since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. Measuring capabilities allows observers to explain which states are most likely to affect the behaviour of other states, to use force or violence; also, the number of great powers in a given era determines how stable or unstable the international system will be. Identifying great powers is literally done by evaluating each state’s capabilities in essential areas of political life that can maximize security or extend one’s power. When discussing the distribution of power across states, there is a clear hierarchy of capabilities among states that leads observers to classify these utility maximizing, rational actors as super, great, major, middle or minor powers in the international system. In terms of actual measurement, Kenneth Waltz argues: “Their rank depends on how they score on all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.”5 Once these various factors are taken into account, one can clearly determine the given polarity of the system at a given moment in history. Why is polarity important? According to structural realist theory, the number of great powers in the system determines how conflictual, violent or stable interna- tional politics will be. While the overall structure of the system remains anarchic, meaning a clear absence of a governing authority above states that can control their actions, there can be consequential variations within the anarchic structure that can impact how states will evaluate their foreign and defence policy strategies and affect their overall behaviour. Waltz claims that “ ‘consequential’ variations in number are changes of number that lead to different expectations about the effect of structure on units.”6 There are three types of structure within the system that have been determined throughout the history of the modern state system – unipolarity, bipolar- ity and multipolarity. The consequential variations described by Waltz take place when great powers either rise or fall, and induce shifts from one type of polarity to another. The rise and fall of great powers is perhaps the most important explanatory aspect of international politics because it is these states that “inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each other.”7 Though the primary motivation for all states is secu- rity maximization, great powers become the most important actors because while they are capable of defending themselves, they also have the ability to extend their sphere of influence in offensive posturing. It is in this context that the polarity of the system becomes even more vital, in that the more great powers there are, the greater likelihood of violence and conflict there is. In each systemic arrangement, the abilities of great powers to pursue their ultimate goal, which is hegemony, dic- tates whether foreign and defence policy strategies will be overtly defensive or potentially offensive. All states are like-units, in that they all strive for survival by making rational calculations about how to best pursue their interests in an anarchic system. Of course, strategies of states will differ greatly based on the distribution of power, meaning that great powers are able to pursue their goals more freely than minor powers because they can operate without allies or institutions in achieving their goals. Lesser powers, however, typically try to increase their power position in world affairs through various alliance blocs and institutional binding. In doing so, it is hoped that middle and minor powers are able to guarantee their survival by align- ing themselves with powers larger than themselves. Given the arrangement of the system, the number of alliances or blocs of power will differ, which also contributes to just how stable or violent the system will be. Conflict, or the possibility of it, is a constant problem in international relations due to the anarchic structure of the international system. Anarchy, by its definition, denotes a lack of overarching authority and thus states, especially the most powerful states, are able to behave as they would like, without any external body capable of controlling their actions. Robert Art and Robert Jervis aptly define anarchy by argu- ing: “States can make commitments and treaties, but no sovereign power ensures compliance and punished deviation. This – the absence of a supreme power – is what is meant by the anarchic environment of international politics.”8 In anarchy, just as in the state of nature or war prior to the establishment of civilized human society, there is no harmony and actors are left to their own inclinations to pursue their self-interest. The key elements of anarchy that precipitate conflict are the con- stant distrust of others’ motives, the assumption that other actors may not be as rational as oneself, and, as Waltz notes, “a state will use force to attain its goals if, after assessing the prospects for success, it values those goals more than it values the pleasures of peace.”9 The constant tensions between states, and the ability of great powers to more freely pursue their national interests, contributes to a system where security and survival are at a premium, and the polarity of the system matters to all states. By definition, bipolar systems are the most stable. According to Mearsheimer, this assumption is made based on three criteria: First, the number of conflict dyads is fewer, leaving fewer possibilities for war. Sec- ond, deterrence is easier, because imbalances of power are fewer and more easily averted. Third, the prospects for deterrence are greater because miscalculations of rela- tive power and opponents’ resolve are fewer and less likely.10 By contrast, multipolar systems have a far greater probability of conflict, tension and distrust among states. War is far more likely in multipolar systems because major power dyads are more numerous, each posing the potential for conflict. Conflict could also erupt across dyads involving major and minor powers. Dyads between minor powers could also lead to war [...]. Wars in a multipolar world involving just minor powers or only one major power are not likely to be as devastating as a conflict between two major powers. However, local wars tend to widen and escalate. Hence there is always a chance that a small war will trigger a general conflict.11 While bipolarity is considered to be the most stable arrangement, and multipolarity the least stable, there is also the rare time when the system is unipolar in character. Put simply, unipolarity occurs when there is such a preponderance of power by one state that others are incapable of balancing against it. According to William Wohl- forth, unipolarity is also a stable and peaceful arrangement: unipolarity favors the absence of war among the great powers and comparatively low levels of competition for prestige or security for two reasons: the leading state’s power advantage removes the problem of hegemonic rivalry from world politics, and it reduces the salience and stakes of balance-of-power politics among the major states.12 The status of the hegemonic power in a unipolar system allows for the expansion of its normative agenda, but also allows it to pacify international affairs because it lacks both a hegemonic rival and the effects of balance of power politics.13 As such, unipolar systems can be stable, depending on whom the hegemon is and what its vision for dominance might be. Since the end of World War II, only two types of polarity have been seen. Between 1945 and 1991, the system was bipolar, in that there were only two super- powers dominating the affairs of international politics. This bipolar arrangement was surprisingly stable and though smaller proxy wars erupted throughout the years of the Cold War, the relations between the two dominant powers, namely the United States and the Soviet Union, never came to a head. There are various explanations for why this was the case, but John Mearsheimer provides perhaps the most concise and accurate explanations as he contends that the absence of war in Europe and beyond throughout the Cold War can be attributed to three specific factors: the bipolar distribution of military power on the [European] Continent; the rough mili- tary equality between the two states comprising the two poles in Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union; and the fact that each superpower was armed with a large nuclear arsenal.14 At the conclusion of the Cold War, there was a clear and major shift in the distribution of power in the system, which translated into the unipolar moment. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States retained its superpower status and held a preponderance of power in virtually all areas of capabilities measurement. Christopher Layne contends that American hegemony is contingent upon two factors: First, the United States enjoys a commanding preeminence in both military and eco- nomic power. Second, since the Soviet Union’s disappearance, no other great power has emerged to challenge US preponderance. In this sense, US hegemony is the result of objective material conditions.15 Throughout the Clinton and early years of the Bush administrations, the role of the United States as systemic hegemon was virtually unquestioned, and it seemed as if American hegemony could last for a very long time. It was not until the latter years of the Bush administration that the waning of American hegemony began to become apparent. One of the key reasons the system remains unipolar is that there has yet to be a state that can balance against US power in either the hard or soft power senses. That said, the main reason for the decline in American hegemony has been a costly set of irrational and ill-advised foreign policy decisions, combined with years of economic overvaluation that eroded the hegemonic position of the world’s lone superpower.16 Both the intervention into Iraq, starting in 2003, and the fallout of the 2008 recession have served to substantially weaken the United States in both the hard and soft power contexts, and thus it is clear that a multipolar system is on the horizon. As Layne notes, “although a new geopolitical balance has yet to emerge, there is considerable evidence that other states have been engaging in bal- ancing against the United States – including hard balancing.”17 The emerging great powers, especially China and Russia, will have a profound impact on the conduct of international relations in the years to come. Perhaps the most important area of security competition that has gone under- scrutinized from a systemic standpoint is the increased level of interest in the Arctic. Currently, the competing claims for the circumpolar region are mostly peaceful and focusing on diplomatic and legal battles, but recent trends suggest that non-violent strategy may not continue. As the era of American hegemony comes to an end, and a multipolar system begins to emerge, the impact on the Arctic region is likely to be profound due to the militaristic nature of state security strategies, unpredictability and a potential retreat from cooperation normally seen in multipolar structures. The Arctic in the unipolar moment One of the cornerstones of America’s unipolar moment has been the remarkable decline in interstate conflict. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the interna- tional system has not been on the verge of any major war, nor have great powers aggressively pursued policies that would balance against American power in a way that would be taken seriously. According to many scholarly studies, the world since the end of the Cold War has become far more secure in the interstate sense, and security and defence policies of states are now preoccupied more with human- centric and intrastate variables than anything else. Though it is difficult to deny that the world has become more stable at the systemic level, the role of hard power and military capabilities did not disappear with the Soviet Union; instead, the use of militarism to achieve national goals in the unipolar moment greatly decreased as a direct result of the values and grand strategy of the United States. The impact of a unipolar systemic arrangement on state behaviour is best explained by the hegemonic stability theory.18 According to this theory, a unipolar structure is able to pacify the relations of states because there is recognition of the hegemon’s ability to control or intervene in conflicts that may threaten its power, or the order of the system. Wohlforth summarizes the basic precept of hegemonic stability theory by contending: The theory stipulates that especially powerful states (“hegemons”) foster international orders that are stable until differential growth in power produces a dissatisfied state with the capability to challenge the dominant state for leadership. The clearer and larger the concentration of power in the leading state, the more peaceful the international order associated with it will be [...] If the system is unipolar, the great power hierar- chy should be much more stable than any hierarchy lodged within a system of more than one pole. Because unipolarity is based on a historically unprecedented concentra- tion of power in the United States, a potentially important source of great power con- flict – hegemonic rivalry – will be missing.19 It is essential to note two things about the status of the United States as systemic hegemon throughout the immediate post-Cold War era – first, that its preponderance of power in every area of capability measurement created a stable and less tense system in which states were able to interact; and second, that the United States’ time as hegemon has fostered the growth of multilateral institutions and agreements rather than a bullying type of unipolarity.20 From a systemic standpoint, it would seem that there is little reason to be concerned about military aggression, arms racing and distrustful competition in the modern system, but one vital concern to note is that much of the unipolar and hegeomic stability literature completely ignores the role of the Arctic in state security calculations. Throughout an era of institutional binding, regional integra- tion, humanitarianism and soft power growth, the competition for the Arctic was following much of the same pattern, with states preferring to make their claims in institutional or legal settings. Yet, as the unipolar moment has started to decline, and multipolarity is on the horizon, the competition in the circumpolar region has taken on a very different tone. Competing claims over Arctic territories, such as the Northwest Passage, Beaufort Sea and other maritime boundaries, and the use of the region as a space for military exercises are by no means new and they have not come to the forefront of the strategic security agendas of states since the post-9/11 era. Rather, throughout the Cold War, the Arctic was a realm of constant supervision, not because either superpower wanted to develop the region, but more because of the mutual fear each side had of offensive attacks being launched over the pole. Even throughout the unipolar moment, the Arctic has been a space for sovereignty competition, but the nature of the competition had been mostly legal, institutional or soft power focused.21 Worth noting as well is the very complex nature of reasons for state interests in the Arctic. Mark Nuttall effectively summarizes the complexities of the high north as he claims: In the post-Cold War world [the Arctic] is seen as a natural scientific laboratory, under- stood as a homeland for indigenous peoples, a place of sovereignty conflicts, an emerg- ing hydrocarbon province with which the world is coming to think of as one of the last major frontiers for oil and gas, and a region of dramatic environmental change.22 Though the intricacies of Arctic competition are intriguing to note, it is how states are strategically asserting their claims that is of particular importance. The start of America’s hegemonic decline has allowed states to revisit their approaches to the Arctic as nations jockey for position by balancing or rivalling American preferences. As a result, the nature of Arctic competition has incorporated both soft power and hard power elements. Further, the nature of militarism and hard power tension has increased due to the recent spending and strategic shifts by many Arctic states in recent years, including Canada, Norway, Sweden and Russia.23 The reasons for America’s decline are relatively unsurprising – military overextension in Afghanistan and Iraq; the lack of international support for American foreign policy objectives throughout the Bush era; the 2008 economic recession; and the utter dis- trust by most states, including close American allies, of the United States’ political objectives.24 The system remains unipolar, of course, but as stated above, the pre- ponderance of power capabilities has substantially diminished, opening the door for others to balance and rival American power in the coming years. Coincidentally, it has also been the revelations of science in recent years that have also promoted a faster pace for those states making Arctic claims. The role of climate change and its impact over the Arctic has allowed for states to more freely move into the region and pursue strategies previously unavailable.25 According to Lotta Numminen, climate change has recently affected states’ perceptions of the possible economic opportunities in the Arctic in four ways: first, that the subsurface of the Arctic Ocean floor is assumed to contain substantial oil and gas reserves, to which there will be increased access; second, that melting waters will provide new waters for international fisheries; third, the increase in research strategies; and fourth, is the greater access to sea passages.26 One of the main reasons states see the Arctic region as such a lucrative area is the potential for increasing their respec- tive economic and natural resource capabilities. Previously, the northern ice caps prevented states from entering most of the Arctic Ocean and surrounding areas, but as these environmental situations change, states have readily identified the high north as a priority in both their security and economic strategies. Among the main reasons the Arctic has not been more readily seen as a poten- tial area for security competition and conflict is the interpretation that the United States has little or no interest in the circumpolar region at all. According to Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, American hegemony throughout the post-Cold War era was seen as passive, stable and enduring because of the lack of counterpower being demonstrated in the system: Bounded by oceans to the east and west and weak, friendly powers to the north and south, the United States is both less vulnerable than previous aspiring hegemons and also less threatening to others. The main potential challengers to its unipolarity, mean- while – China, Russia, Japan, and Germany – are in the opposite position. They can- not augment their military capabilities so as to balance the United States without simultaneously becoming an immediate threat to their neighbors. Politics, even interna- tional politics, is local. Although American power attracts a lot of attention globally, states are usually more concerned with their own neighborhoods than with the global equilibrium. Were any of the potential challengers to make a serious run at the United States, regional balancing efforts would almost certainly help contain them, as would the massive latent power capabilities of the United States, which could be mobilized as necessary to head off an emerging threat.27 Almost completely omitted from such interpretations, however, are America’s north- ern borders over Alaska and into the Arctic. Latitudinal thinking would seem to indicate that Brooks and Wohlforth are correct in terms of America’s interests in many areas of the globe, but this ignores what has been happening at the top of the world in the high north. It is not as if the United States has been ignorant of its own decline in power, especially regarding the Arctic. In 2009, the United States issued National Security Presidential Directive 66 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25 that deal exclusively with American Arctic policy. According to these directives, the altera- tions to national policies of other states regarding the Arctic compelled the United States to clearly outline the security and development strategies they would use to protect its Arctic interests. Among the first, and most clear, elements of the direc- tives is the clear intention of the United States to defend their national security interests. According to Article III, subsection B 1 of the directives: The United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests. These interests include suchmatters as missile defense and early warning; deployment ofsea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight.28 The contemporary changes to the international system as the era of American hegemony has begun to wane, the effects of climate change and greater access, and the increasingly militaristic strategies of most every Arctic state have led to a situa- tion where tensions are at an all time high, and that legal or institutional processes are unlikely to resolve anything amicably. As the system continues its transition away from unipolarity, observers are left to ponder what might come next after an era of relative interstate stability. Multipolarity and the circumpolar In their 2002 article on the nature of United States primacy and the enduring aspects of American hegemony, Brooks and Wohlforth argue that the United States would have to act as a benevolent hegemon in order to prevent counterbalancing and to be able to build effective regimes worldwide. They argue: Magnanimity and restraint in the face of temptation are tenets of successful statecraft that have proved their worth from classical Greece onward. Standing taller than lead- ing states of the past, the United States has unprecedented freedom to do as it pleases. It can play the game for itself alone or for the system as a whole; it can focus on small returns today or larger ones tomorrow. If the administration truly wants to be loved as well as feared, the policy answers are not hard to find.29 The problem with such analyses of American hegemony is that the Bush administration chose to ignore utterly such warnings and, rather than acting mag- nanimously, post-9/11 American foreign policy did precisely what it should not have. Pre-emption, coercion and irrational interventions, combined with a major economic recession, all serve to explain why American hegemony began to decline by 2005 in terms of both actual power levels and perceptions of legitimate hege- monic status.30 The clearest sign that American exceptionalism has been decreasing is the aggressive and regional balancing dynamics taking place between states in the Arctic region. Security strategy in the circumpolar region has altered dramatically since 2005, with more states showing interest, hard power spending increasing, and legal pro- cesses being coupled by at times overtly offensive strategy.31 Russia, Canada and a number of European states, especially Norway and Sweden, exemplify this line of argument about how sovereignty claims have become focused on traditional inter- state arms racing and militarism while soft power components, like governance structures and legal processes, continually evolve.32 As mentioned previously, even the United States has woken up to see that, as their hegemony declines, other states have begun to balance against them in the Arctic, thus provoking the 2009 Presi- dential Directives. Even so, Arctic interested nations have not yielded to American claims, nor has there been any evidence of America’s closest allies backing down in the face of its Arctic assertions, most clearly evidenced by Canada’s continued claims over the Northwest Passage.33 In the international relations canon, most observers point to either India or China as emerging great powers that are the most likely to counterbalance Ameri- can power. The 2004 American National Intelligence Council report highlights this theory by stating: The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players – similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century – will transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two centuries. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century, the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India came into their own.34 Both China and India have recently expressed their interest in Arctic affairs, but no power is as close to rivalling or challenging American power in hard power terms than Russia. This is especially true in the Arctic, as Russia’s Arctic policies have made its intentions towards asserting its control over territory it deems to be sovereign very clear. The role of the Arctic in Russian foreign policy cannot be understated. According to Russia’s 2008 Arctic policy document, the region is seen as the epicentre of Russia’s military and socio-economic development. The top two priorities for Russian Arctic interests are defined as follows: (a) In the sphere of socio-economic development – the expansion of the resource base of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation, in order to substantially satisfy Russia’s needs in hydrocarbon resources, hydro-biological resources, and other types of strate- gic raw materials; (b) In the sphere of military security, defense, and safekeeping of the state borders of the Russian Federation located in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation – the upkeep of a favorable operational regime in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federa- tion, including the maintenance of the required combat potential of military groupings under the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and agencies in this region [...]35 In order to achieve these goals, the Russians have created a unique military brigade to be permanently posted in the Arctic, have placed a Russian Federation flag on the Arctic Ocean seabed, have conducted various missile tests, have sailed their nuclear submarines through contested waters and have openly challenged the abilities of other states to enforce their own claims. In response to Russian offensive posturing and the inability of the United States to dissuade security competition in the area, middle and minor powers have begun to use hard power as a means of trying to enforce their sovereignty. Perhaps the best example here is Canada, whose military capabilities are extremely weak, but strong rhetoric and a drastically increased level of high-north military spending since 2006 seems to indicate that the Canadian government cannot rely on its American alliances to protect its interests, and that posturing by states like Russia or even Denmark clearly threaten Canada’s national interests. As Norway, Sweden and Denmark have begun to put an emphasis on hard power capabilities to extend or defend northern claims, Canada has done the same. Worth noting as well in the Canadian context is that, while great powers like Russia and the United States can easily defeat any middle or minor power, Canada’s capabilities are being either rivalled or surpassed by European states like Norway.36 Canada’s realization of the evolving security and environmental climate in the Arctic has compelled changes to its domestic and foreign security policies, each seeking to assert Canadian sovereignty over areas of the Arctic, especially the Northwest Passage. One of the main components of now Prime Minister Harper’s 2005–06 campaign was to bolster Arctic security resources, as many Canadians have identified the region as an essential part of Canada’s national security and identity.37 Rob Huebert argues: The Harper government has increasingly recognized the significance of maintaining a strong presence in the Arctic and has vigorously begun to improve Canada’s northern abilities [...] The Harper government has also made a series of promises to consider- ably expand Canada’s northern capability [...] If these promises are implemented, Canada will have significantly improved its ability to control activity in its Arctic.38 In virtually any other area of the world, Canadian national security cannot be divorced from the United States, which is a partial explanation for why Canada has traditionally been considered a middle power since the end of World War II.39 Yet, since the start of American decline, the Canadian government has recognized that its fate in the Arctic will be its own, and not intrinsically tied to the protection of the United States, as the Americans have their own interests in the region and have shown a complete disregard for Canadian claims over the Northwest Passage and the Beaufort Sea. As the world moves towards multipolarity, it has become increasingly obvious that the Arctic region represents an area of increased security competition and a potentially conflictual region in the future. Multipolar systems are the most unsta- ble, and history has shown these to produce military conflict due to the natural effects brought by a larger number of self-interested powers vying for power and security. Further, as new great powers begin to emerge, American strategic consid- erations will be spread so thin that they will be unable to prevent against their even- tual loss of hegemony. The largest mistake being made at this time by international security scholars and policymakers is their normal obsession with China, India and latitudinal thinking. The next area of major war is not likely to be the Middle East, the Indian Ocean or the South China Sea, due to traditional security balancing, deterrence and economic interests in each of these areas. Multipolarity naturally brings the possibility of war. Mearsheimer contends that war is far more likely in multipolar systems for three reasons: First, there are more opportunities for war, because there are more potential conflict dyads in a multipolar system. Second, imbalances of power are more commonplace in a multipolar world, and thus great powers are more likely to have the capability to win a war, making deterrence more difficult and war more likely. Third, the potential for miscalculation is greater in multipolarity: states might think they have the capabil- ity to coerce or conquer another state when, in fact, they do not.40 Presently, there is little reason to believe that tension and strategic posturing will lead to the outbreak of war in the near future. That said, as America’s influence continues to wane, other states have shown their desire to take full advantage of the United States’ inability to control northern affairs. If the United States does lose its hegemony, which many commentators believe is inevitable, there will be at least four dyads in security calculations, with Russia, China and India entering the fray, and two of those states have Arctic borders and a historical legacy of conflict. Power imbalance in the Arctic is already apparent, with only Russia and the United States as great powers, while the other Arctic states are middle or minor powers with no hope of preventing a great power from doing as it pleases. Lastly, miscalculation is evident in the present context, as Sweden and Norway are both arming for possible Russian aggression, though Russia has shown little or no overtly aggressive tendencies towards Nordic nations. Unipolarity was not going to last forever, but as it fades the probability of northern conflict is ever increasing. The shift to hard power strategies, the effects of cli- mate change, and the decline of the United States all speak to the fact that multipolarity can increase levels of tension and mistrust, thus altering the currently stable nature of Arctic affairs. Efforts at Arctic governance through institutional binding or legal claims, as seen in the Arctic Council and UNCLOS, are able at present to mitigate the ongoing and ever increasing security competition in the high north, but as the system changes from unipolarity to multipolarity, constraining state behaviour becomes increasingly difficult. As such, observers must be mindful of the systemic variables at play when explaining and forecasting Arctic politics, as changes to the structure are very likely to translate into changes to state security strategies

More worrying for him is the discontent of the Russian economic elite, who will lose a lot of money to his adventurism, and that presents a real risk of fragmentation in a regime that until now maintained subtle balances. With “his” war, Putin is making enemies from within, including very powerful oligarchs who will pay the price of his dreams of grandeur. Adding to this are the nuclear threats that he may be willing to carry out, but most of his entourage, who are supposedly more reasonable, probably would not.

The logical conclusion of all this is that the resentment and hostility and fear that Putin generates within the Russian elite constitutes a real risk for his maintenance in power in the coming weeks, months, and years. The probability of a palace coup or an oligarchic revolt is substantial. There may come a point where it appears to the population and the economic, military, and security elite, including within the Kremlin, that the only way to save Russia is to get rid of Putin. This war is his greatest error of judgement and could be his undoing. That is why I wrote that it will be “the beginning of the end” — his end.

Now with the Ukrainians' weekend victory in Lyman, a Donetsk region city and strategic rail hub southeast of Kharkiv, that criticism is bursting into wider public view, hitting the front pages of some of Russia's biggest newspapers.

That's a serious problem for Russia's military brass -- and potentially for the Kremlin.

(Jeffery, 6-17-12, Mater’s Thesis, “Coercion: A Credible and Capable United States Military Instrument of Power Key to Future US Foreign Policy Success,” http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a562347.pdf)

To accomplish foreign policy goals without resorting to war, the United States ¶ (US) will need to employ coercion to shape the environment to favor US interests. ¶ Successfully coercing nations to comply with US demands will require developing a clear ¶ strategy, with realistic and consistent goals, along with credible means to issue threats of ¶ escalating force that are capable of imposing the stated objectives. A credible and ¶ capable military instrument of power is a key to successful coercion. ¶ Coercion attempts to manipulate an adversary’s behavior to comply with demands ¶ levied by the coercer. The coercer uses the elements of national power to deter or, if ¶ necessary compel acceptance. Compellence is obtained by increasing the perceived or ¶ real cost of behavior to exceed the benefits gained by the adversary. Therefore, the ¶ coercer must develop a strategy that makes the adversary perceive the cost will be too ¶ high, as the adversary’s perception is essential to alter unwanted behavior. ¶ To increase the perception of cost, threats must be credible and capable in order to ¶ achieve escalation dominance over the adversary. Credibility is achieved by keeping all ¶ options available publicly, not unnecessarily limiting options or levels and types of force ¶ employed. Though force limits will likely be applied, keeping these limits secret from ¶ the adversary are important to winning the perception battle. Capability is achieved by ¶ making forces appear flexible to accomplish required missions. Eliminating undue public ¶ restrictions will make it more difficult for the adversary to counter the coercive force. ¶ However, threats should not be issued or implied unless the coercer has the will to ¶ employ the threat. ¶ 80 ¶ Political leaders will have greater success in remaining credible when they agree ¶ on when and how to employ US forces before making interventions in foreign affairs. ¶ The case studies show that actions or statements that reduce the appearance of ¶ commitment also reduce the credibility of US demands. Once credibility is undermined, ¶ the adversary will believe the US forces employed also lack the capability required to ¶ impose the unwanted demand. This lack of credibility and capability encourages the ¶ adversary to counter the coercion or simply wait until the coercer tires of the struggle.

(Michael A. Newton, “Inadvertent Implications of the War Powers Resolution,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 45, No. 1)

The corollary to this modern reality, and the second of three inadvertent implications of the Resolution, is that our enemies now focus on American political will as the Achilles heel of our vast capabilities. Prior to the War Powers Resolution, President Eisenhower understood that it was necessary to "seek the cooperation of the Congress. Only with that can we give the reassurance needed to deter aggression." 62 President Clinton understood the importance of clear communication with the Congress and the American people in order to sustain the political legitimacy that is a vital element of modern military operations. Justifying his bombing of targets in Sudan, he argued that the "risks from inaction, to America and the world, would be far greater than action, for that would embolden our enemies, leaving their ability and their willingness to strike us intact."13 In his letter to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," the president reported that the strikes "were a necessary and proportionate response to the imminent threat of further terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities" and "were intended to prevent and deter additional attacks by a clearly identified terrorist threat."6 ' The following day, in a radio address to the nation, the president explained his decision to take military action, stating, "Our goals were to disrupt bin Laden's terrorist network and destroy elements of its infrastructure in Afghanistan and Sudan. And our goal was to destroy, in Sudan, the factory with which bin Laden's network gas."*6 Citing "compelling evidence that the bin Laden network was poised to strike at us again" and was seeking to acquire chemical weapons, the president declared that we simply could not ignore the threat posed, and hence ordered the strikes. 66 Similarly, President Clinton understood that intervention in Bosnia could not be successful absent some national consensus, which had been slow to form during the long Bosnian civil war.6 1¶ Secretary of State George Schultz provided perhaps the most poignant and pointed example of this truism in his testimony to Congress regarding the deployment of US Marines into Lebanon to separate the warring factions in 1982. On September 21, 1983, he testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and provided a chilling premonition of the bombing that would come only one month later and kill 241 Americans, which was the bloodiest day in the Marine Corps since the battle of Iwo Jima.6" Seeking to bolster legislative support and to better explain the strategic objectives, he explained that:¶ It is not the mission of our marines or of the [Multinational Force in Lebanon] as a whole to maintain the military balance in Lebanon by themselves. Nevertheless, their presence remains one crucial pillar of the structure of stability behind the legitimate Government of Lebanon, and an important weight in the scales.¶ To remove the marines would put both the Government and what we are trying to achieve in jeopardy. This is why our domestic controversy over the war powers has been so disturbing. Uncertainty about the American commitment can only weaken our effectiveness. Doubts about our staying power can only cause political aggressors to discount our presence or to intensify their attacks in hopes of hastening our departure.

(Robert, “The Return of the Problem-Solvers,” http://www.e-ir.info/2014/03/19/the-return-of-the-problem-solvers/)

A caveat here is that I began as a historian and turned into a political scientist, though I have indicted my field in the past for its ignorance of history, especially in theory-building. I have also had the benefit of working in academia, policy, and now in the think-tank world, so I have insights into all three. Schindler is correct to point out that academics typically make lousy policy-makers, especially in modern IR. IR has become a field more focused on sociology and philosophy than one interested in real world events and policy. This has been evident in the current crisis in Ukraine when everything the Putin regime has been doing has challenged the predominant assumptions in IR as it currently exists. Imagine the shock of IR scholars when Putin failed to recognize that we live in a “post-sovereign” world where “states don’t invade other states anymore” and “complex interdependence” deters states from that outdated Cold War thinking because of liberal economic links. Oops.∂ Where I would disagree with Schindler is that I would say not all IR experts, political scientists or historians are meant to be, or want to be, policy-makers. I have not met many postmodern IR scholars itching to write a policy brief on military procurement – for which I am thankful because it would likely be 200 pages of Derridian discourse analysis.∂ Schindler does have a point in noting those currently making US foreign policy are totally lost. However, I do not believe they “know nothing” – in fact, I think the senior officials in the Obama Administration know a lot. The problem is that what they know is premised on flawed assumptions about the way the world actually works, making them ill-equipped to deal with difficult foreign and defence policy issues.∂ Appointing a group of utopians who call for humanitarian intervention (or worse yet, R2P) at every turn, who believe democracy can be imposed and grown, who believe war is somehow obsolete, and whose assumptions are premised on cooperation, cosmopolitanism and solidarism is highly problematic. It was equally as problematic during the Bush Administration when foreign policy was being driven by neoconservative beliefs in pre-emptive strikes and American divine superiority. In essence, no foreign policy establishment is ever going to function well, especially in times of crisis, if it is stacked with like-minded political cronies. The most effective groups are those that are comprised of individuals with varying areas of expertise or ideological preference. A good leader wants to hear from realists and liberals, political scientists and historians, etc and make decisions that encompass the best knowledge possible.∂ When it comes to educating the next generation of policy-makers, there is a problem facing the academy and the crises in Ukraine and Syria demonstrate that. The assumptions that now dominate IR emerged in the unipolar era without seeing major war and the ugly side of great power politics but as the system begins to shift and international politics continue to evolve, those pesky realists need to be dusted off and brought back into the conversation, even if they are not leading the discussions.∂ I do not believe that every academic needs to do policy-oriented work and that there is a place for what Robert Cox would call “critical theories”. At the same time, I think recent events demonstrate the pressing need for traditional, problem-solving understandings and the less the academy produces experts in those approaches, the more the Putin’s of the world will continue to make the US (and other western states) look as inept as they currently do.

Yes, there is something we can do. Something that, even if small, is meaningful. The propaganda war has always been crucial to Vladimir Putin. He uses floods of disinformation to confuse and misdirect people overseas and bolster support at home. The Kremlin knows that every action requires an apparatus of justification. Russia cannot continue its costly war without the consent of its troops and many other citizens.

Putin’s troll factories are notorious for turning out misleading claims, but their power is limited by their lack of credibility. What serves him well, as a study by Cardiff University’s crime and security research institute suggests, are “organic comments”: statements by real people, repeating and amplifying his propaganda. These are liked or upvoted by his bots then reproduced in Russian media to create the impression that he has widespread overseas support.

The noosphere concept carries a set of standards for strategy. This is clearest if strategy is understood not only as an art of relating ends, ways, and means, but also as an art of positioning for spatial, temporal, and actional advantages. Then, valuing the noosphere strategically means thinking and acting in global/planetary ways (spatially), while minding long-range future end-stakes (temporally), and creating new means or forms of agency to shape problems and opportunities at all scales (actionally).

Indeed, the noosphere concept, like the biosphere concept, has long implied an end to Westphalian realpolitik-type thinking that nation-states are the most important actors and that material factors matter most. Now, in the information age, other actors and factors increasingly matter more. Reflecting this, proponents of the noosphere helped inspire the establishment of “noospheric institutions” such as the United Nations and UNESCO, as well as Green Cross International, and a range of activist civil-society NGOs (Samson & Pitt, p. 184-185). The time may come, as we propose in Section VI, when aspects and/or parts of the noosphere are defined as belonging to the “global commons” (and vice-versa).

Applied postmodernism as it is practiced by Russia has two features. The first is an attempt to promote a sense of epistemic insecurity amongst targeted populations by undermining existing bonds of trust between them and the sources of information on which they rely (Giles 2016: p. 37). The second is the promotion of ‘alternative’ or ‘antihegemonic’ perspectives or narratives, especially those in line with Russia’s foreign policy objectives (ibid.). Earlier I drew attention to a parallel that exists between Russia’s calls for multipolarity and the politics of identity. It will be useful to return to this example for the parallels that Russia’s IW strategy – aimed at bringing about multipolarity – has with an important aspect of postmodern theory, namely poststructuralism, and its relationship to identity politics.

Poststructuralism is a theory about language that stands in a subtle but important relationship to the politics of identity. It makes two central claims. The first is that words and phrases get their meanings not by referring to anything in the world, but by occupying a place within a network of relationships internal to a language. As an example, the term ‘funny’ gets its meaning by being the opposite of ‘unfunny’ and by standing in more complex relationships with ‘sarcastic’ and other related terms. Its second claim is that the place a term occupies in this network is fluid not fixed and that meaning is therefore also fluid. On such an account it is impossible simply to ‘report the facts’ of a given situation, because it is beyond the scope of language to refer to anything outside of itself. ‘Facts’ are therefore always constructed.

The promotion of scepticism in this way is absolutely central not just to understanding RT but to understanding Russia’s IW programme in general. This can be seen in the campaign to influence the 2016 presidential election in the United States, which made use of a wide variety of IW tools, including not just traditional media but also social media and cyber weapons, and which had the same effect. Here too, excessive focus on any apparent tactical aims can easily obscure the true strategic importance of such attacks. As Nocetti writes, ‘Russian maneuvers aimed less at influencing the outcome of the election than at the perceptions (soznanie) Americans have about the reliability of their rulers and institutions… Moscow’s larger goal is to strengthen the doubt in public opinion toward Western policies and values: liberal democracy, multiculturalism, and interventionism under the guise of “responsibility to protect”’ (Nocetti 2018: p. 193). If those in the United States who imagined a decisive role for Russian interference in the victory of Donald Trump were wrong to draw on such an exaggerated picture Russian of capabilities, they were also mistaken in their assessment of the fundamental aims of that interference. That doubt in the legitimacy of the current president, the American media system, and so on, has been generated on such a large scale — that was the aim of Russian efforts. In this they were remarkably successful. The victory of a candidate much more favorable to their interests was, as it were, the cherry on top — if a rather large one.

To reiterate, the promotion of epistemic insecurity among the populations of Russia’s enemies constitutes the first part of the applied postmodernism tactic. This function benefits the Putin regime in at least two ways, one tactical and one strategic. In the short term, the spread of confusion allows the regime to diminish or counter negative coverage of its actions. In the long term, however, it works to undermine the perceived objectivity of Western positions and values, turning them into just one among a number of self-interested positions in a swarm of competing narratives. This serves to undermine the perceived legitimacy of Western criticisms of Russia, neutralising what it fears most, the spread of Western values and practices and a colour style revolution at home.

What would a full-fledged noosphere encompass? What ideas, values, and norms — what principles, practices, and rules — should it embody? We presume these would include much that America stands for: openness, freedom, democracy, the rule of law, humane behavior, respect for human rights, a preference for peaceful conflict resolution, etc. — all that the noosphere’s original proponents said should and would be embedded. In addition, a fullfledged noosphere would require an interactive organizational and technological foundation to uphold its ideational essences.

However, the world is not yet in the age of the noosphere, but rather in an era of transition that is far from smooth or peaceful. When we first started writing about the noosphere and noopolitik, we figured we were witnessing halting steps forward. Yet it’s the steps backwards that are most evident today, especially in the behavior of some of the world’s most powerful states, as discussed above.

Russia’s cruel war of aggression upon Ukraine must finally awaken the West from its post-Cold War slumber. This is merciless Putin’s war, waged against an innocent sovereign nation, but there will always be aggressors, and it is up to democracies to stop them before they are so emboldened and powerful that they threaten freedom itself. As U.K. Foreign Secretary Liz Truss put it in a recent speech, “For years now, Russia’s been building its capabilities, violating its commitments, and probing our weaknesses. … The free world must draw a line under a decade of drift.” While it is refreshing to hear a Western leader call out the West’s inertia, the sad reality is that the Russian threat is greater than Truss implies, and our “drift” in response to it should have ended long ago. So should our complacency toward the global march of authoritarianism spearheaded by the growing axis of Russia, China, and Iran.

The Russian threat grew while democracies weighed and meted out minimalist costs. Penalties for Russian wars in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria; paramilitary and disinformation campaigns in Europe, the Americas, and the Middle East; cyber operations to divide and destabilize the United States; assassinations, poisonings, imprisonment, and torture of those who dare to speak out; and violation of peace treaties, arms agreements, and international norms have been halting and incremental. Russia exacerbates and foments ethnic strife, corruption, and even antisemitism insofar as these variables help Russia increase its own power at the expense of the West. It uses menacing military exercises and energy blackmail for intimidation and control. Russia’s multipronged Europe strategy creates fear and dependency, and exploits chaos and division, in order to reap geopolitical rewards.