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The fearsome destructive power of nuclear weapons provokes understandable dread, but in crafting public policy we must move beyond this initial reaction to soberly assess the risks and consider appropriate actions. Out of awe over and anxiety about nuclear weapons, the world's superpowers accumulated enormous arsenals of them for nearly 50 years. But then, in the wake of the Cold War, fears that the bombs would be used vanished almost entirely. At the same time, concerns that terrorists and rogue nations could acquire nuclear weapons have sparked a new surge of fear and speculation. In the past, excessive fear about nuclear weapons led to many policies that turned out to be wasteful and unnecessary. We should take the time to assess these new risks to avoid an overreaction that will take resources and attention away from other problems. Indeed, a more thoughtful analysis will reveal that the new perceived danger is far less likely than it might at first appear. Albert Einstein memorably proclaimed that nuclear weapons "have changed everything except our way of thinking." But the weapons actually seem to have changed little except our way of thinking, as well as our ways of declaiming, gesticulating, deploying military forces, and spending lots of money. To begin with, the bomb's impact on substantive historical developments has turned out to be minimal. Nuclear weapons are, of course, routinely given credit for preventing or deterring a major war during the Cold War era. However, it is increasingly clear that the Soviet Union never had the slightest interest in engaging in any kind of conflict that would remotely resemble World War II, whether nuclear or not. Its agenda emphasized revolution, class rebellion, and civil war, conflict areas in which nuclear weapons are irrelevant. Thus, there was no threat of direct military aggression to deter. Moreover, the possessors of nuclear weapons have never been able to find much military reason to use them, even in principle, in actual armed conflicts. Although they may have failed to alter substantive history, nuclear weapons have inspired legions of strategists to spend whole careers agonizing over what one analyst has called "nuclear metaphysics," arguing, for example, over how many MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) could dance on the head of an ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile). The result was a colossal expenditure of funds. Most important for current policy is the fact that contrary to decades of hand-wringing about the inherent appeal of nuclear weapons, most countries have actually found them to be a substantial and even ridiculous misdirection of funds, effort, and scientific talent. This is a major if much-underappreciated reason why nuclear proliferation has been so much slower than predicted over the decades. In addition, the proliferation that has taken place has been substantially inconsequential. When the quintessential rogue state, Communist China, obtained nuclear weapons in 1964, Central Intelligence Agency Director John McCone sternly proclaimed that nuclear war was "almost inevitable." But far from engaging in the nuclear blackmail expected at the time by almost everyone, China built its weapons quietly and has never made a real nuclear threat. Despite this experience, proliferation anxiety continues to flourish. For more than a decade, U.S. policymakers obsessed about the possibility that Saddam Hussein's pathetic and technologically dysfunctional regime in Iraq could in time obtain nuclear weapons, even though it took the far more advanced Pakistan 28 years. To prevent this imagined and highly unlikely calamity, damaging and destructive economic sanctions were imposed and then a war was waged, and each venture has probably resulted in more deaths than were suffered at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined. (At Hiroshima and Nagasaki, about 67,000 people died immediately and 36,000 more died over the next four months. Most estimates of the Iraq war have put total deaths there at about the Hiroshima-Nagasaki levels, or higher.) Today, alarm is focused on the even more pathetic regime in North Korea, which has now tested a couple of atomic devices that seem to have been fizzles. There is even more hysteria about Iran, which has repeatedly insisted it has no intention of developing weapons. If that regime changes its mind or is lying, experience suggests it is likely to find that, except for stoking the national ego for a while, the bombs are substantially valueless and a very considerable waste of money and effort.

Regardless, I was more drawn to a comment that James Cartwright, Obama and (presumably) David Sanger’s favorite general, makes in the article. As summarized by Kenner, Cartwright believes “Obama has also come to grips with the fact that the proliferation of knowledge about nuclear technology has permanently altered America’s options in combatting the spread of these weapons. Since you can’t bomb knowledge, he says, military force can only delay, not stop, proliferation risks.” Or, in Cartwright’s own words: “[If] a country wants these weapons, they can get them … So you have to start to think of alternatives to the threats of: ‘I’m going to attack you.’” Cartwright is hardly alone in holding these views. Indeed, the general consensus when it comes to nuclear weapons has long been “when there’s a will there’s a way.” And yet, the spread of nuclear weapons has always been surprisingly slow. Moreover, despite the diffusion of nuclear technology, nuclear weapons have actually been spreading much more slowly than they did during the first few decades of the nuclear era. Consider that, in the three decades following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, no less than seven countries developed at least a nascent nuclear weapon capability. In the nearly four decades since, only three countries — Pakistan, South Africa, and North Korea — have developed a nuclear weapons capability, and one of these states — South Africa — voluntarily dismantled its arsenal. So what explains this great nuclear slowdown? Two converging trends seem to be at work. First, there has been an undeniable decline in the number of states interested in acquiring nuclear weapons. Harald Muller and Andreas Schmidt have documented this well. In their comprehensive study of states with nuclear weapons activities between 1945 and 2005, they find that “states with nuclear weapons activities were always a minority, and today they are the smallest minority since 1945.” Specifically, in 2005 they identified 10 states as having nuclear weapons activities (including those with nuclear weapons), which constituted less than six percent of UN members. Today the only non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) that might be interested in an atomic weapon is Iran. The fact that states have by and large been uninterested in nuclear weapons is somewhat perplexing from a historic perspective. After all, what other revolutionary military technology hasn’t elicited strong interest from most states competing in the international system? At the same time, when one examines the properties of nuclear weapons more closely, the lack of interest is easier to understand. Nuclear weapons have basically served one purpose for states possessing them; namely, they have deterred others from challenging that state’s survival and other fundamental interests. But the nuclear era has also been characterized by a sharp decline in warfare and today fewer states face fundamental external threats to their existence. Given the high costs of building and maintaining a nuclear arsenal, it makes little sense to acquire nuclear weapons without such an existential threat. While lack of interest explains why some states have renounced nuclear weapons despite possessing the capability to build them, the difficulty in building them has prevented others states that seek nuclear weapons from acquiring them. Despite the view that “where there is a will there’s a way,” and a strong sense that globalization has exacerbated this, the historical record tells a very different story. As Jacques Hymans has pointed out, before 1970 seven countries launched dedicated nuclear weapon programs and all seven succeeded in an average of seven years. Since 1970, ten states have launched dedicated nuclear weapons programs and only three have succeeded (the jury’s still out on Iran). These three have taken an average of 17 years to succeed and Iran under the Islamic Republic has been working towards a nuclear weapon capability for some three decades. Just as pundits have routinely underestimated the difficulty of building nuclear weapons, so too do they grossly overstate the number of states who are technically capable of building them. Both journalists and scholars regularly cite 40 as the number of non-nuclear weapon states who are technically capable of building them. This figure is often attributed to the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, who said in 2004: “Some estimates indicate that 40 countries or more now have the know-how to produce nuclear weapons, which means if they have the required fissile material — high enriched uranium or plutonium — we are relying primarily on the continued good intentions of these countries.” As Scott Sagan has pointed out, most of those citing ElBaradei omit the latter part of his statement about having the required fissile material. But this statement is crucial as only a handful of NNWS are capable of producing or otherwise procuring fissile material, which is necessary for a nuclear bomb. Moreover, thanks in no small part to President Obama’s focus on nuclear security, the global availability of fissile material has been declining as the U.S. and its allies help remove fissile material from some states while downsizing the stockpiles in many others. Furthermore, compared with the Cold War era and even the 1990s, nuclear weapon holding and nuclear capable states are much less willing to sell NNWS crucial dual use technology that can be used to indigenously produce fissile material. Thus, contrary to common perception, there is no impeding nuclear domino about to fall.

The debate on Iran and its nuclear program does little credit to the U.S. foreign policy community, because much of it rests on dubious assumptions that do not stand up to even casual scrutiny. Lots of ink, pixels, and air-time has been devoted to discussing whether Iran truly wants a bomb, how close it might be to getting one, how well sanctions are working, whether the mullahs in charge are "rational," and whether a new diplomatic initiative is advisable. Similarly, journalists, politicians and policy wonks spend endless hours asking if and when Israel might attack and whether the United States should help. But we hardly ever ask ourselves if this issue is being blown wildly out of proportion. At bottom, the whole debate on Iran rests on the assumption that Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon would be an event of shattering geopolitical significance: On a par with Hitler's rise to power in Germany in 1933, the fall of France in 1940, the Sino-Soviet split, or the breakup of the former Soviet Union. In this spirit, Henry Kissinger recently argued that a latent Iranian capability (that is, the capacity to obtain a bomb fairly quickly) would have fearsome consequences all by itself. Even if Iran stopped short of some red line, Kissinger claims this would: 1) cause "uncontrollable military nuclear proliferation throughout [the] region," 2) "lead many of Iran's neighbors to reorient their political alignment toward Tehran" 3) "submerge the reformist tendencies in the Arab Spring," and 4) deliver a "potentially fatal blow" to hopes for reducing global nuclear arsenals. Wow. And that's just if Iran has nuclear potential and not even an actual weapon! It follows that the United States must either persuade them to give up most of their enrichment capacity or go to war to destroy it. Yet this "mother of all assumptions" is simply asserted and rarely examined. The obvious question to ask is this: did prior acts of nuclear proliferation have the same fearsome consequences that Iran hawks now forecast? The answer is no. In fact, the spread of nuclear weapons has had remarkably little impact on the basic nature of world politics and the ranking of major powers. The main effect of the nuclear revolution has been to induce greater caution in the behavior of both those who possessed the bomb and anyone who had to deal with a nuclear-armed adversary. Proliferation has not transformed weak states into influential global actors, has not given nuclear-armed states the ability to blackmail their neighbors or force them to kowtow, and it has not triggered far-reaching regional arms races. In short, fears that an Iranian bomb would transform regional or global politics have been greatly exaggerated; one might even say that they are just a lot of hooey. Consider the historical record. Did the world turn on its axis when the mighty Soviet Union tested its first bomb in 1949? Although alarmist documents like NSC-68 warned of a vast increase in Soviet influence and aggressiveness, Soviet nuclear development simply reinforced the caution that both superpowers were already displaying towards each other. The United States already saw the USSR as an enemy, and the basic principles of containment were already in place. NATO was being formed before the Soviet test and Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe was already a fait accompli. Having sole possession of the bomb hadn't enabled Truman to simply dictate to Stalin, and getting the bomb didn't enable Stalin or his successors to blackmail any of their neighbors or key U.S. allies. It certainly didn't lead any countries to "reorient their political alignment toward Moscow." Nikita Khrushchev's subsequent missile rattling merely strengthened the cohesion of NATO and other U.S.-led alliances, and we now know that much of his bluster was intended to conceal Soviet strategic inferiority. Having a large nuclear arsenal didn't stop the anti-commnist uprisings in East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Poland, and didn't allow the Soviet Union to win in Afghanistan. Nor did it prevent the USSR from eventually collapsing entirely. Did British and French acquisition of nuclear weapons slow their decline as great powers? Not in the slightest. Having the force de frappe may have made De Gaulle feel better about French prestige and having their own deterrent made both states less dependent on America's security umbrella, but it didn't give either state a louder voice in world affairs or win them new influence anywhere. And you might recall that Britain couldn't get Argentina to give back the Falklands by issuing nuclear threats -- even though Argentina had no bomb of its own and no nuclear guarantee -- they had to go retake the islands with conventional forces. Did China's detonation of a bomb in 1964 suddenly make them a superpower? Hardly. China remained a minor actor on the world stage until it adopted market principles, and its rising global influence is due to three decades of economic growth, not a pile of nukes. And by the way, did getting a bomb enable Mao Zedong--a cruel megalomaniac who launched the disastrous Great Leap Forward in 1957 and the destructive Cultural Revolution in the 1960s -- to start threatening and blackmailing his neighbors? Nope. In fact, China's foreign policy behavior after 1964 was generally quite restrained. What about Israel? Does Israel's nuclear arsenal allow it to coerce its neighbors or impose its will on Hezbollah or the Palestinians? No. Israel uses its conventional military superiority to try to do these things, not its nuclear arsenal. Indeed, Israel's bomb didn't even prevent Egypt and Syria from attacking it in October 1973, although it did help convince them to limit their aims to regaining the territory they had lost in 1967. It is also worth noting that Israel's nuclear program did not trigger a rapid arms race either. Although states like Iraq and Libya did establish their own WMD programs after Israel got the bomb, none of their nuclear efforts moved very rapidly or made it across the finish line. But wait, there's more. The white government in South Africa eventually produced a handful of bombs, but nobody noticed and apartheid ended anyway. Then the new government gave up its nuclear arsenal to much acclaim. If anything, South Africa was more secure without an arsenal than it was before. What about India and Pakistan? India's "peaceful nuclear explosion" in 1974 didn't turn it into a global superpower, and its only real effect was to spur Pakistan -- which was already an avowed rival -- to get one too. And it's worth noting that there hasn't been a large-scale war between the two countries since, despite considerable grievances on both sides and occasional skirmishes and other provocations. Finally, North Korea is as annoying and weird as it has always been, but getting nuclear weapons didn't transform it from an economic basket case into a mighty regional power and didn't make it more inclined to misbehave. In fact, what is most remarkable about North Korea's nuclear program is how little impact it has had on its neighbors. States like Japan and South Korea could go nuclear very quickly if they wanted to, but neither has done so in the six years since North Korea's first nuclear test. In short, both theory and history teach us that getting a nuclear weapon has less impact on a country's power and influence than many believe, and the slow spread of nuclear weapons has only modest effects on global and regional politics. Nuclear weapons are good for deterring direct attacks on one's homeland, and they induce greater caution in the minds of national leaders of all kinds. What they don't do is turn weak states into great powers, they are useless as tools of blackmail, and they cost a lot of money. They also lead other states to worry more about one's intentions and to band together for self-protection. For these reasons, most potential nuclear states have concluded that getting the bomb isn't worth it. But a few states-and usually those who are worried about being attacked-decide to go ahead. The good news is that when they do, it has remarkably little impact on world affairs. For some strange reason, however, the U.S. national security community seems to think that both logic and all this prior history does not apply to Iran. They forget that similarly dire warnings were uttered before many of these others states got the bomb, yet none of these fearsome forecasts took place. Ironically, by repeatedly offering doom-and-gloom scenarios about the vast geopolitical consequences of an Iranian bomb, they may be strengthening the hands of Iranian hardliners who might be interested in actually obtaining a working weapon. After all, if getting a bomb would give Iran all the influence that Kissinger and others fear, why wouldn't Tehran want one? In fact, the smart way to discourage Iran from going nuclear is both to take the threat of force off the table (thereby reducing Iran's perceived need for a deterrent) and to make it clear that getting a bomb won't bring Iran big strategic benefits and won't affect global or regional politics very much if at all. And in this case, the smart strategy has the additional merit of being true.

Disincentives. Saudi Arabia is expected to continually weigh these incentives to acquire advanced nuclear capabilities (which possibly include the ability to weaponize fissile material and deliver a nuclear weapon) against a considerable list of disincentives. For starters, Saudi Arabia would jeopardize its good standing in the international community, which it has established through signing several treaties and joining nonproliferation regimes. These include the NPT, IAEA, Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), and 2005 amendment of the CPPNM. Following the discovery of a covert program, Saudi Arabia would risk severe United Nations and other countries’ sanctions. While economic in nature, the sanctions take on a security dimension because Saudi Arabia’s economy is predominantly reliant on its oil exports. They accounted for nearly 50 percent of gross domestic product and about 85 percent of export earnings in 2015.39 Its imported reactors would also likely remain dependent on the supply of low enriched uranium fuel. Therefore, a targeted sanctions regime focused on Saudi oil exports and imported nuclear fuel could cripple [devastate] its economy and hurt its security. On the other hand, the countries and organizations applying sanctions would have to weigh their own significant energy and security demands against concerns that Saudi Arabia could get advanced nuclear capabilities. Saudi Arabia’s contribution to the global oil market (which is roughly three times greater than that of Iran) grants it substantial leverage in determining global oil prices.40 As such, establishing a credible sanctions regime targeting Saudi oil would pose a difficult choice for the oil-dependent West. This will be particularly true if some in the international community become sympathetic to a Saudi desire to obtain a nuclear deterrent to balance Iran. The threat of potential sanctions would also carry great weight in Saudi Arabia’s nuclear weapons calculus as the government is facing its largest budget deficit in history. It is currently seeking to diversify its energy usage in order to sell more oil abroad rather than use it domestically at an expensive loss.41 If there is a decrease in revenue, the Saudis would be unable to spend as much money balancing Iranian influence in neighboring

Still, numerous Iranian politicians, including the country’s current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, have engaged in Holocaust denial. And Ahmadinejad, as you note in the book, once claimed he would “use a nuclear weapon to wipe Israel off the face of the Earth.” Are these threats to be taken seriously?

Iranian leaders have been guilty of Holocaust denialism and used inflammatory rhetoric towards Israel. But are the leaders of the Islamic Republic genocidal, and by extension, suicidal? I’m not sure they are. If Iran was to use a nuclear bomb against Israel it would be unleashing nuclear war not only in the Middle East, but globally too, and that would mean the end of the Islamic Republic. This apocalyptic scenario doesn’t fit with their behavior [thus far] as a government and as a state.

Ross, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute and on the faculty of the University of Pittsburgh, and Alex Vatanka, the director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute. “The Middle East Might Be Moving Toward Stability” June 26, 2023 dmr

China’s new diplomatic role in the Middle East is another factor that could help sustain trends of de-escalation. Beijing eschews the U.S. approach of offshore balancing against Iran via Saudi Arabia and Israel; it sees such an approach as escalatory. Rather, China is taking a more neutral approach to regional conflicts, on the premise it will calm rather than stoke tensions. Several Iranian sources have highlighted China’s emerging critical role as a regional stabilizer. Iranian state-run media reported that after Iran attacked Saudi petroleum assets in 2019, China warned Tehran that such acts undermine its interests, given Beijing’s energy security policy is based on unhindered import of Saudi and Gulf oil. Beijing is the largest trade partner for both Iran and Saudi Arabia, although Chinese-Saudi trade is about six times larger than Chinese-Iranian trade. Given that China receives half its oil from the Persian Gulf, its energy security necessitates it push for policies that reduce the likelihood of a conflict between the Iranians in Tehran and the Saudis in Riyadh. It remains to be seen whether China has the heft and political will to help Iran and Saudi Arabia pursue economic integration, the sort that the European continent saw at the end of the Second World War. This will be a big test for China. Perhaps counterintuitively, China’s diplomatic forays in the Middle East could push Washington toward diplomacy too. China’s moves might have served as the impetus for recent talk of an informal deal between Iran and the United States on the nuclear issue. Reputationally, the White House now must fight the narrative of China as a peacemaker and the United States as a warmonger that only wants to sell weapons to the Middle East. On balance and in the short term, Riyadh stands to gain the most from China’s involvement. Riyadh wins if China can press Tehran to force the Houthis in Yemen to reach a political agreement with Saudi Arabia and stop threatening to target Saudi infrastructure, trade, and economic plans. The Saudis also win if the Iranians fail to do so, as Riyadh can then showcase to Beijing that it is the Iranians who are not serious about de-escalation. The diplomatic resumption also has another benefit for Riyadh: In the event of a military conflict between Iran and the United States or Iran and Israel, the Saudis have now made it far less likely that Saudi Arabia will become a target of Iranian retaliation. The short-term win for Tehran is that this agreement with Riyadh might push Saudi Arabia away from Israel, at least for now. More importantly, at a minimum, the deal can signal a new era of “cold peace” between Tehran and Riyadh, during which both sides cease to interfere in each other’s internal affairs. Both sides consider this promise of non-interference as pivotal, a message that was repeated during the June 17 visit of Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud to Tehran.

Analysts, however, say that the Middle East is unlikely to become an arena for US-Chinese rivalry, given Beijing’s economy-oriented focus and its aversion to playing regional politics. The Saudi-China relationship is therefore unlikely to become a full-blown alliance.

Saudi Arabia is China’s biggest supplier of crude, and China is the biggest destination of Saudi oil exports. The kingdom’s economy is nonetheless tied to the US as its currency is pegged to the dollar and the sale of its oil is conducted in that currency. Saudi Arabia’s defense infrastructure is also heavily reliant on American equipment.

An executive agreement along the lines of the proposals below need not be a treaty. Such provisions need not require Senate advice and consent or any other congressional action. Further-reaching commitments by the United States (presumably in exchange for further-reaching commitments by Saudi Arabia) could be included in a subsequent U.S.-Saudi treaty or other agreement requiring congressional action. The key areas explored are: security assurances and cooperation; preventing a nuclear-armed Iran; arms sales; oil, gas, and petrochemicals; nuclear energy; terrorism; and human rights.

SECURITY ASSURANCES AND COOPERATION

This led to the visits to Riyadh this month of Mr. Blinken and Mr. McGurk.

For Saudi Arabia, normalization with Israel is less about Israel and more about what it can get out of the United States, its historical security guarantor. Given how unpopular Israel remains among Saudi citizens, normalizing relations with the country would cost Prince Mohammed political capital with his own people, Saudi officials say. To justify that, they say, he would need to secure significant concessions from the United States, with an eye toward deterring Iran.

Israelis across the political spectrum prefer the status quo to the two-state solution, and Palestinians are only willing to accept a two-state solution that Israelis will be unable to accept, according to a new RAND Corporation report that assesses whether there are any alternative solutions to the conflict that average Israelis and Palestinians would support.

Jerusalem (CNN) — A shocking 48 hours of violence – bloody even by the standards of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – followed immediately by a fortunately timed flying visit from US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, focused the eyes of the world on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu this week.

He looked back without blinking.

Title: Saudi FM rules out normalization with Israel without a two-state solution

RIYADH, Saudi Arabia — Saudi Arabia will not normalize ties with Israel in the absence of a two-state solution with the Palestinians, the kingdom’s top diplomat has said, according to a tweet by the foreign ministry on Friday.

Title: Saudi-Israeli Relations No Longer Depend on Washington

There has been a growing consensus within the American foreign policy community that the route toward establishing diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel runs through Washington. This consensus has come about in part due to leaks of discussions that U.S. diplomats and think tank leaders have held with both Saudi and Israeli officials. As it is usually framed, the argument is that if the Biden administration agrees to certain Saudi demands, then Saudi Arabia will agree to join the Abraham Accords and establish diplomatic relations with Israel. However, such thinking ignores the Saudi government’s strategic independence, its position as a leader of the Arab and Islamic worlds, and its reluctance to go against the wishes of its own people, most of whom still have strong sympathy for the plight of the Palestinians.

Mitchell Plitnick is the president of ReThinking Foreign Policy. He is the co-author, with Marc Lamont Hill, of Except for Palestine: The Limits of Progressive Politics. Mitchell's previous positions include vice president at the Foundation for Middle East Peace, Director of the US Office of B'Tselem, and Co-Director of Jewish Voice for Peace. “Biden push for Saudi-Israeli normalization reflects misreading of domestic and international politics,” May 28, 2023 dmr

Saudi Arabia in no hurry

The Biden administration will likely be unable to agree to Riyadh’s requests without congressional acquiescence, which seems unlikely owing to anti-Saudi sentiment among some members of Congress. Riyadh is therefore increasingly sidling up to Beijing.2 It is not clear whether Riyadh realizes that this strategy risks sending already-strained U.S.-Saudi relations into a freefall. Americans of both parties increasingly believe that countries that “side” with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are not America’s friends (or partners).

To address this growing sense of insecurity, Riyadh appears to be seeking three things. The first is “firm guarantees that the U.S. will come to the kingdom’s defense when needed,” according to a March 9, 2023, Wall Street Journal report.30 The second is more reliable and expeditious access to American weapons.31 Third, Riyadh wants U.S. support for a civilian nuclear program, which would include Saudi enrichment of uranium.32

The problem for the Saudis is that in order for the administration to accommodate these three objectives, Congress must acquiesce. That is virtually impossible right now, given current sentiment on Capitol Hill stemming from grievous Saudi actions on the battlefield in Yemen as well as the murder of Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey in 2018.

The report was not surprising – Netanyahu visited Saudi Arabia at the end of 2020 and met with MBS in the presence of then-secretary of state Mike Pompeo – and while the two leaders were said to have focused on an Israeli request to allow Israeli-Arabs to fly directly from Israel to Saudi Arabia for the Haj, there is hope for much more. The sense in Jerusalem right now is that there is a window of about a year to finalize a normalization deal with Saudi Arabia. The reason is not because of something in Riyadh or Jerusalem but rather due to the upcoming presidential election in the United States, and because it is there, in Washington DC, where the real decision has to be made about such a deal. As seen by the phone calls, there is communication between Saudi and Israeli leaders. There are economic ties, security ties and even diplomatic coordination that goes on behind the scenes. Can those ties be deepened? Of course, but for now, the question is more about the big step that needs to be taken toward full-blown normalization. The key to that is in Washington. Saudi Arabia has felt the cold shoulder from the US ever since Joe Biden was elected president. It was this distancing that enabled China to insert itself into the region and broker the rapprochement between Saudi and Iran, something that in the past would not have happened. The message was heard in Washington and has been followed up by action. There is a new ambassador in Riyadh who happened to have served in Jerusalem just a few years ago, and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan recently visited there as well and spoke publicly about the administration’s desire to see Israeli-Saudi normalization happen. To move forward with Israel, Saudi Arabia wants to receive a few benefits from the US: arm sales, security guarantees and even a civilian nuclear program with the ability to mine uranium and enrich it domestically. US diplomats do not hide the fact that the decision on this will need to be made by Biden and that it will depend on more than just US ties with MBS. A normalization deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia would be a huge win for Netanyahu. Does Biden want to give him that right now? Biden has not held back on his discontent with Netanyahu and his democratically-elected government. He has yet to invite the Israeli premier to the White House and – as long as it is not clear that the coalition’s judicial reform is completely dead and buried – he might not want to. On the other hand, Biden does need a foreign policy feather in his cap. Until now, the president’s track record in the Middle East does not look great. There was the hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan that enabled the Taliban to quickly take over, and China’s growing role in the region. Brokering a deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia would give the president a big win that could help on the campaign trail. The situation is dynamic, and Netanyahu is doing all he can to move this forward. For him too, a deal with Saudi Arabia would be a huge win and a much-needed distraction from the chaos – caused by the judicial reform, the public protests and the budget talks – that has enveloped his government since it took office at the end of December. Such a deal has the potential to alter the balance of power in the Middle East. With Israel’s top military officers warning of the possibility of war, a normalization deal would be a better alternative.

Quoting Rob Sobhani, Adjunct professor at Georgetown University specializing in US policy in the Middle East Washington Times op-ed, “US needs partners to face challenges, it has no better friend than MBS: Washington Times columnist,” Arab Times, June 11, 2023 dmr

RIYADH: A leading American academic, specializing in US policy in the Middle East, has urged President Joe Biden’s administration to extend a “respectful” and “genuine hand of cooperation” to Saudi Arabia’s forward-thinking Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. “(America) can have no better friend than Mohammed bin Salman,” wrote S. Rob Sobhani in an op-ed in The Washington Times. “More than ever, the US needs partners as it navigates challenges, from Russia, China and Iran and as it responds intelligently and constructively to cross-border pandemics, global supply chain constraints, and the recent rise of artificial intelligence as the fourth industrial revolution.” Sobhani, an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, said the Saudi crown prince “is leading an unprecedented and groundbreaking set of reforms that are transforming the country that is most consequential for global energy security.” With the crown prince motivated to create a “New Saudi Renaissance,” the US can find no better partner in addressing global challenges. Sobhani urged US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy to invite the crown prince to address a joint session of Congress and give “the visionary leader of one of the most important countries in the world the opportunity to share his vision with the American government and its people.” The academic said it was important for Americans to understand that the crown prince is driven by his love for, and pride in, Saudi Arabia and its people. “This explains why he is determined to catapult his country into a trillion-dollar economic powerhouse so that the prosperity of its citizens can be guaranteed,” he wrote. As the leader of a country in which 60 percent of the population is under 30 years of age, the crown prince is on a mission to lay a foundation for the next generation of Saudis and transform the nation into a force for positive change on the global stage. This quest to tackle global challenges provides Washington with a unique opportunity to address conflicts in such theaters as Ukraine and Sudan. “Indeed, the energetic leader of Saudi Arabia can become a true partner of the US in the resolution of global conflict,” Sobhani wrote. He also highlighted the crown prince’s unwavering commitment to empowering the talented women of Saudi Arabia. “It is truly incredible to meet so many Saudi women in the workforce, all of whom are playing a significant role in helping Saudi Arabia become a $1 trillion economy,” he said. As a supporter of innovation, the crown prince also aims to leverage technology for the common good, Sobhani wrote: “He loves creativity, and this enthusiasm comes across when one speaks with Saudi scientists and sees their desire to use AI for better global health outcomes. Now is the time to embrace this impulse for innovation because a partnership between Saudi Arabia and America in delivering responsible and ethical AI for the benefit of humanity represents a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.”

Alex, The Hill, “US plays nice despite Saudis flexing oil power,” June 12, 2023 dmr

The Biden administration is touting improved relations with Saudi Arabia since tensions spiked ahead of last year’s election, but there’s no sign of U.S. progress in convincing Riyadh to lower global gas prices. Following a surprise meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman this week, Secretary of State Antony Blinken reported warming relations since October, when Biden ultimately held back on a promise to impose “consequences” on Saudi Arabia after the Kingdom cut oil production. “We had a difference in views in October over the OPEC+ decision, but I think what we’re seeing is an increasing convergence in our partnership to advance in issues of mutual interest to Saudi Arabia, to the United States, and, for that matter, to countries in the region and beyond,” Blinken said in a Thursday interview with Arabic media in Riyadh. Oil revenues remain the bulk of Riyadh’s wealth as the 37-year-old crown prince, the de-facto ruler and heir apparent to the kingdom, seeks to remake Saudi Arabia as a center of business, culture and leisure in the Middle East. Riyadh’s refusal to find common ground with America’s energy interests — despite a high-profile visit by President Biden last year and billions in weapons sales — has compounded unease over the kingdom’s chilling human rights record. But even some of Biden’s allies in Congress are giving up on the potential for consequences. “I’m kind of giving up that we’re going to be able to dramatically change our assistance to Saudi Arabia and Egypt in a way that telegraphs to the world, and to the region, that we care in the way that we spend money on human rights,” Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), said in frustration during a budget hearing in late May. The Biden administration appears to have come to the strategic decision to compartmentalize areas where the U.S. and Saudis have shared interests. That includes making progress on ending Yemen’s devastating, eight-year civil war; supporting the kingdom’s communication with Iran to calm tensions in the region; setting up a breakthrough in ties with Israel; and using Riyadh’s help and influence to roll back an outbreak of war in Sudan. The U.S. is also intent on keeping Saudi Arabia and Crown Prince Mohammed in its sphere of influence even as the kingdom balances its ties with Russia and China. Tellingly, the administration has treaded carefully around Saudi Arabia’s recent announcement that it intends to make deep cuts to its oil output for July. While gas prices peaked in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, those prices have gone down, giving the administration some domestic breathing room — for now. Gas prices are down from a year ago, at nearly $3.60, but have incrementally increased from last month, according to AAA. “You’ve heard us say this before: We believe that supply should meet demand. And we’ll continue to work with all producers and consumers to ensure that energy markets support economic growth and lower prices for American families,” State Department deputy spokesperson Vedant Patel said Monday. The Saudis argue that decisions made in the OPEC+ group of top oil-producing nations are based strictly on economic factors and the global market. But in private, the crown prince reportedly threatened to blow up the relationship with the U.S. and attack the American economy in retaliation for Biden’s comments that there would be consequences for cutting oil production, the Washington Post reported on Friday, citing an intelligence analysis revealed in a wide-ranging leak of classified documents. High oil prices and increased oil production have contributed to a boom for the Saudi economy, the International Monetary Fund wrote in a recent summary of the country’s economic status. That has bankrolled increased investments in so-called “giga projects” — large-scale business ventures targeting entertainment, culture and technology the kingdom is pursuing to diversify its economy away from oil. This includes a surprise deal to merge the PGA Golf tour with the Saudi-funded LIV Golf tour and the crown prince’s determination to realize a $500 billion futuristic city in the desert. “It seems to me the Saudis have a genuine challenge figuring out how to manage the oil market,” said Jon Alterman, the director of the CSIS Middle East Program. “They want to get a sweet spot between revenues that help finance their investments internally — their economic transition, essentially — and not have prices so high that it makes alternative energy much more economical.” The Biden administration appears to be swallowing the Saudi’s reasoning on its oil decisions to avoid blowing up the relationship entirely, in particular as they see Riyadh make genuine progress in pushing forward a resolution in Yemen and after the Kingdom was indispensable in helping people flee Sudan when civil war broke out in the country’s capital in late April. Barbara Leaf, assistant secretary of State for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, told a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee that Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of their “socio-economic modernization project” is a primary driver of their push for easing tensions in the region, particularly with Iran and in efforts to pursue peace in Yemen. “The Saudis were really determined — since last fall — to use a bilateral channel that they had opened up to drive to an end to their engagement in the Yemen conflict, and indeed to drive to an end of the conflict itself. They did not want the Iranians to scupper that.” The Biden administration has taken pains to appeal to the Saudis and the crown prince to move beyond Biden calling out the Saudi royal as a pariah for his role in the 2018 killing of Jamal Khashoggi, the former palace insider turned critic and columnist for the Washington Post. The White House notably this week didn’t comment on the PGA Tour and LIV golf merger while 9/11 victims’ families and some Democrats on Capitol Hill quickly bashed the U.S. golf league for caving to the Saudis. “I don’t think making the Saudis cry uncle is especially interesting. I think trying to figure out how to engage with important partners who are looking to do something different and think the world is moving in a different direction, that’s interesting,” Alterman of CSIS said.

Surprisingly, they wouldn’t. The results of nuking any place at all in the Middle East would likely be broad Muslim outrage and horror that would make ISIS the most popular Muslim organization in the world. Every U.S. embassy in the Middle East would likely be destroyed and all our diplomats killed. American citizens would be murdered in the streets and all across Europe you’d have formerly peaceful Muslims becoming radicalized. But what about our allies? Oh, we wouldn’t have any allies anymore. It’s a funny thing, murdering millions of people because you’re impatient with the degradation of a terrorist organization isn’t generally viewed as a valid reason to deploy nuclear weapons on civilians. You can pretty much bet the farm that every nation in the world would deploy sanctions agains the U.S. and we would be 100% diplomatically and economically isolated by the end of the week. We’d be booted from the U.N., from NATO, and we’d have every other nation’s nukes suddenly pointing us right in the face ready to kill us. The stock market would crash and by crash I mean fall through the ground into the center of the Earth. Inflation would skyrocket and your money would soon have almost no value at all. What’s more, you’d have fighting in the streets as outraged U.S. citizens (including this writer) declared war against their own insane and genocidal government. 7. The Lesson Only the supremely ignorant talk about using nuclear weapons against small groups of terrorists or non-aggressive nations who haven’t started a war for well over 100 years (Iran). This isn’t serious talk but it is dangerous talk. Nuke talk makes angry people feel powerful and it gets people pumped up about just how awesome they think they are but an actual nuclear engagement like this would completely destroy the country in every way and would risk setting off an exchange with the U.S. as a target.